(PDF Version)

              THE ART OF DECEPTION
                Controlling the Human Element of Security
                       KEVIN D. MITNICK
                           & William L. Simon
                        Foreword by Steve Wozniak



  For Reba Vartanian, Shelly Jaffe, Chickie Leventhal, and Mitchell
 Mitnick, and for the late Alan Mitnick, Adam Mitnick, and Jack Biello

     For Arynne, Victoria, and David, Sheldon,Vincent, and Elena.

                            Social Engineering
    Social Engineering uses influence and persuasion to deceive people
     by convincing them that the social engineer is someone he is not,
     or by manipulation. As a result, the social engineer is able to take
    advantage of people to obtain information with or without the use of
                                technology.
Contents

Foreword

Preface

Introduction

Part 1 Behind the Scenes
Chapter 1 Security's Weakest Link

Part 2 The Art of the Attacker
Chapter 2 When Innocuous Information Isn't
Chapter 3 The Direct Attack: Just Asking for it
Chapter 4 Building Trust
Chapter 5 "Let Me Help You"
Chapter 6 "Can You Help Me?"
Chapter 7 Phony Sites and Dangerous Attachments
Chapter 8 Using Sympathy, Guilt and Intimidation
Chapter 9 The Reverse Sting

Part 3 Intruder Alert
Chapter 10 Entering the Premises
Chapter 11 Combining Technology and Social Engineering
Chapter 12 Attacks on the Entry-Level Employee
Chapter 13 Clever Cons
Chapter 14 Industrial Espionage

Part 4 Raising the Bar
Chapter 15 Information Security Awareness and Training
Chapter 16 Recommended Corporate Information Security Policies

Security at a Glance

Sources

Acknowledgments
Foreword
We humans are born with an inner drive to explore the nature of our
surroundings. As young men, both Kevin Mitnick and I were intensely curious
about the world and eager to prove ourselves. We were rewarded often in our
attempts to learn new things, solve puzzles, and win at games. But at the same
time, the world around us taught us rules of behavior that constrained our inner
urge toward free exploration. For our boldest scientists and technological
entrepreneurs, as well as for people like Kevin Mitnick, following this inner urge
offers the greatest thrills, letting us accomplish things that others believe cannot
be done.

Kevin Mitnick is one of the finest people I know. Ask him, and he will say
forthrightly that what he used to do - social engineering – involes conning people.
But Kevin is no longer a social engineer. And even when he was, his motive
never was to enrich himself or damage others. That's not to say that there aren't
dangerous and destructive criminals out there who use social engineering to
cause real harm. In fact, that's exactly why Kevin wrote this book - to warn you
about them.

The Art of Deception shows how vulnerable we all are - government, business,
and each of us personally - to the intrusions of the social engineer. In this
security-conscious era, we spend huge sums on technology to protect our
computer networks and data. This book points out how easy it is to trick insiders
and circumvent all this technological protection.
Whether you work in business or government, this book provides a powerful road
map to help you understand how social engineers work and what you can do to
foil them. Using fictionalized stories that are both entertaining and eye-opening,
Kevin and co-author Bill Simon bring to life the techniques of the social
engineering underworld. After each story, they offer practical guidelines to help
you guard against the breaches and threats they're described.

Technological security leaves major gaps that people like Kevin can help us
close. Read this book and you may finally realize that we all need to turn to the
Mitnick's among us for guidance.

Steve Wozniak
Preface
Some hackers destroy people's files or entire hard drives; they're called crackers
or vandals. Some novice hackers don't bother learning the technology, but simply
download hacker tools to break into computer systems; they're called script
kiddies. More experienced hackers with programming skills develop hacker
programs and post them to the Web and to bulletin board systems. And then there
are individuals who have no interest in the technology, but use the computer
merely as a tool to aid them in stealing money, goods, or services.

Despite the media-created myth of Kevin Mitnick, I am not a malicious hacker.

But I'm getting ahead of myself.


STARTING OUT
My path was probably set early in life. I was a happy-go-lucky kid, but bored.
After my father split when I was three, my mother worked as a waitress to
support us. To see me then - an only child being raised by a mother who put in
long, harried days on a sometimes-erratic schedule - would have been to see a
youngster on his own almost all his waking hours. I was my own babysitter.

Growing up in a San Fernando Valley community gave me the whole of Los
Angeles to explore, and by the age of twelve I had discovered a way to travel free
throughout the whole greater L.A. area. I realized one day while riding the bus
that the security of the bus transfer I had purchased relied on the unusual pattern
of the paper-punch, that the drivers used to mark day; time, and route on the
transfer slips. A friendly driver, answering my carefully planted question, told me
where to buy that special type of punch.

The transfers are meant to let you change buses and continue a journey to your
destination, but I worked out how to use them to travel anywhere I wanted to go
for free. Obtaining blank transfers was a walk in the park.

The trash bins at the bus terminals were always filled with only-partly used books
of transfers that the drivers tossed away at the end of the shifts. With a pad of
blanks and the punch, I could mark my own transfers and travel anywhere that
L.A. buses went. Before long, I had all but memorized the bus schedules of the
entire system. (This was an early example of my surprising memory for certain
types of information; I can still, today, remember phone numbers, passwords, and
other seemingly trivial details as far back as my childhood.)

Another personal interest that surfaced at an early age was my fascination with
performing magic. Once I learned how a new trick worked, would practice,
practice, and practice some more until I mastered it. To an extent, it was through
magic that I discovered the enjoyment in gaining secret knowledge.

From Phone Phreak to Hacker
My first encounter with what I would eventually learn to call social engineering
came about during my high school years when I met another student who was
caught up in a hobby called phone phreakin. Phone phreaking is a type of hacking
that allows you to explore the telephone network by exploiting the phone systems
and phone company employees. He showed me neat tricks he could do with a
telephone, like obtaining any information the phone company had on any
customer, and using a secret test number to make long-distance calls for free.
(Actually it was free only to us. I found out much later that it wasn't a secret test
number at all. The calls were, in fact, being billed to some poor company's MCI
account.)

That was my introduction to social engineering-my kindergarten, so to speak. My
friend and another phone phreaker I met shortly thereafter let me listen in as they
each made pretext calls to the phone company. I heard the things they said that
made them sound believable; I learned about different phone company offices,
lingo, and procedures. But that "training" didn't last long; it didn't have to. Soon I
was doing it all on my own, learning as I went, doing it even better than my first
teachers.
The course my life would follow for the next fifteen years had been set. In high
school, one of my all-time favorite pranks was gaining unauthorized access to the
telephone switch and changing the class of service of a fellow phone phreak.
When he'd attempt to make a call from home, he'd get a message telling him to
deposit a dime because the telephone company switch had received input that
indicated he was calling from a pay phone.

I became absorbed in everything about telephones, not only the electronics,
switches, and computers, but also the corporate organization, the procedures, and
the terminology. After a while, I probably knew more about the phone system
than any single employee. And I had developed my social engineering skills to
the point that, at seventeen years old, I was able to talk most telco employees into
almost anything, whether I was speaking with them in person or by telephone.

My much-publicized hacking career actually started when I was in high school.
While I cannot describe the detail here, suffice it to say that one of the driving
forces in my early hacks was to be accepted by the guys in the hacker group.

Back then we used the term hacker to mean a person who spent a great deal of
time tinkering with hardware and software, either to develop more efficient
programs or to bypass unnecessary steps and get the job done more quickly. The
term has now become a pejorative, carrying the meaning of "malicious criminal."
In these pages I use the term the way I have always used it - in its earlier, more
benign sense.

After high school I studied computers at the Computer Learning Center in Los
Angeles. Within a few months, the school's computer manager realized I had
found vulnerability in the operating system and gained full administrative
privileges on their IBM minicomputer. The best computer experts on their
teaching staff couldn't figure out how I had done this. In what may have been one
of the earliest examples of "hire the hacker," I was given an offer I couldn't
refuse: Do an honors project to enhance the school's computer security, or face
suspension for hacking the system. Of course, I chose to do the honors project,
and ended up graduating cum laude with honors.

Becoming a Social Engineer
Some people get out of bed each morning dreading their daily work routine at
the proverbial salt mines. I've been lucky enough to enjoy my work. n particular,
you can't imagine the challenge, reward, and pleasure I had the time I spent as a
private investigator. I was honing my talents in the performance art called social
engineering (getting people to do things they wouldn't ordinarily do for a
stranger) and being paid for it.

For me it wasn't difficult becoming proficient in social engineering. My father's
side of the family had been in the sales field for generations, so the art of
influence and persuasion might have been an inherited trait. When you combine
that trait with an inclination for deceiving people, you have the profile of a
typical social engineer.


You might say there are two specialties within the job classification of con artist.
Somebody who swindles and cheats people out of their money belongs to one
sub-specialty, the grifter. Somebody who uses deception, influence, and
persuasion against businesses, usually targeting their information, belongs to the
other sub-specialty, the social engineer. From the time of my bus-transfer trick,
when I was too young to know there was anything wrong with what I was doing,
I had begun to recognize a talent for finding out the secrets I wasn't supposed to
have. I built on that talent by using deception, knowing the lingo, and developing
a well-honed skill of manipulation.

One way I worked on developing the skills of my craft, if I may call it a craft,
was to pick out some piece of information I didn't really care about and see if I
could talk somebody on the other end of the phone into providing it, just to
improve my skills. In the same way I used to practice my magic tricks, I practiced
pretexting. Through these rehearsals, I soon found that I could acquire virtually
any information I targeted.

As I described in Congressional testimony before Senators Lieberman and
Thompson years later:

I have gained unauthorized access to computer systems at some of the largest
corporations on the planet, and have successfully penetrated some of the most
resilient computer systems ever developed. I have used both technical and non-
technical means to obtain the source code to various operating systems and
telecommunications devices to study their vulnerabilities and their inner
workings.

All of this activity was really to satisfy my own curiosity; to see what I could do;
and find out secret information about operating systems, cell phones, and
anything else that stirred my curiosity.

FINAL THOUGHTS
I've acknowledged since my arrest that the actions I took were illegal, and that I
committed invasions of privacy.

My misdeeds were motivated by curiosity. I wanted to know as much as I could
about how phone networks worked and the ins-and-outs of computer security. I
went from being a kid who loved to perform magic tricks to becoming the world's
most notorious hacker, feared by corporations and the government. As I reflect
back on my life for the last 30 years, I admit I made some extremely poor
decisions, driven by my curiosity, the desire to learn about technology, and the
need for a good intellectual challenge.

I'm a changed person now. I'm turning my talents and the extensive knowledge
I've gathered about information security and social engineering tactics to helping
government, businesses, and individuals prevent, detect, and respond to
information-security threats.

This book is one more way that I can use my experience to help others avoid the
efforts of the malicious information thieves of the world. I think you will find the
stories enjoyable, eye-opening, and educational.
Introduction
This book contains a wealth of information about information security and social
engineering. To help you find your way, here's a quick look at how this book is
organized:

In Part 1 I'll reveal security's weakest link and show you why you and your
company are at risk from social engineering attacks.

In Part 2 you'll see how social engineers toy with your trust, your desire to be
helpful, your sympathy, and your human gullibility to get what they want.
Fictional stories of typical attacks will demonstrate that social engineers can wear
many hats and many faces. If you think you've never encountered one, you're
probably wrong. Will you recognize a scenario you've experienced in these
stories and wonder if you had a brush with social engineering? You very well
might. But once you've read Chapters 2 through 9, you'll know how to get the
upper hand when the next social engineer comes calling.

Part 3 is the part of the book where you see how the social engineer ups the ante,
in made-up stories that show how he can step onto your corporate premises, steal
the kind of secret that can make or break your company, and thwart your hi-tech
security measures. The scenarios in this section will make you aware of threats
that range from simple employee revenge to cyber terrorism. If you value the
information that keeps your business running and the privacy of your data, you'll
want to read Chapters 10 through 14 from beginning to end.

It's important to note that unless otherwise stated, the anecdotes in this book are
purely fictional.

In Part 4 I talk the corporate talk about how to prevent successful social
engineering attacks on your organization. Chapter 15 provides a blueprint for a
successful security-training program. And Chapter 16 might just save your neck -
it's a complete security policy you can customize for your organization and
implement right away to keep your company and information safe.

Finally, I've provided a Security at a Glance section, which includes checklists,
tables, and charts that summarize key information you can use to help your
employees foil a social engineering attack on the job. These tools also provide
valuable information you can use in devising your own security-training program.

Throughout the book you'll also find several useful elements: Lingo boxes
provide definitions of social engineering and computer hacker terminology;
Mitnick Messages offer brief words of wisdom to help strengthen your security
strategy; and notes and sidebars give interesting background or additional
information.
Part 1
Behind The Scenes
Chapter 1
Security’s Weakest Link

A company may have purchased the best security technologies that money can
buy, trained their people so well that they lock up all their secrets before going
home at night, and hired building guards from the best security firm in the
business.

That company is still totally Vulnerable.

Individuals may follow every best-security practice recommended by the experts,
slavishly install every recommended security product, and be thoroughly vigilant
about proper system configuration and applying security patches.

Those individuals are still completely vulnerable.

THE HUMAN FACTOR
Testifying before Congress not long ago, I explained that I could often get
passwords and other pieces of sensitive information from companies by
pretending to be someone else and just asking for it.

It's natural to yearn for a feeling of absolute safety, leading many people to settle
for a false sense of security. Consider the responsible and loving homeowner who
has a Medico, a tumbler lock known as being pickproof, installed in his front
door to protect his wife, his children, and his home. He's now comfortable that he
has made his family much safer against intruders. But what about the intruder-
who breaks a window, or cracks the code to the garage door opener? How about
installing a robust security system? Better, but still no guarantee. Expensive locks
or no, the homeowner remains vulnerable.

Why? Because the human factor is truly security's weakest link.

Security is too often merely an illusion, an illusion sometimes made even worse
when gullibility, naivete, or ignorance come into play. The world's most
respected scientist of the twentieth century, Albert Einstein, is quoted as saying,
"Only two things are infinite, the universe and human stupidity, and I'm not sure
about the former." In the end, social engineering attacks can succeed when people
are stupid or, more commonly, simply ignorant about good security practices.
With the same attitude as our security-conscious homeowner, many information
technology (IT) professionals hold to the misconception that they've made their
companies largely immune to attack because they've deployed standard security
products - firewalls, intrusion detection systems, or stronger authentication
devices such as time-based tokens or biometric smart cards. Anyone who thinks
that security products alone offer true security is settling for. the illusion of
security. It's a case of living in a world of fantasy: They will inevitably, later if
not sooner, suffer a security incident.

As noted security consultant Bruce Schneier puts it, "Security is not a product, it's
a process." Moreover, security is not a technology problem - it's a people and
management problem.

As developers invent continually better security technologies, making it
increasingly difficult to exploit technical vulnerabilities, attackers will turn more
and more to exploiting the human element. Cracking the human firewall is often
easy, requires no investment beyond the cost of a phone call, and involves
minimal risk.

A CLASSIC CASE OF DECEPTION
What's the greatest threat to the security of your business assets? That's easy: the
social engineer--an unscrupulous magician who has you watching his left hand
while with his right he steals your secrets. This character is often so friendly, glib,
and obliging that you're grateful for having encountered him.

Take a look at an example of social engineering. Not many people today still
remember the young man named Stanley Mark Rifkin and his little adventure
with the now defunct Security Pacific National Bank in Los Angeles. Accounts of
his escapade vary, and Rifkin (like me) has never told his own story, so the
following is based on published reports.

Code Breaking
One day in 1978, Rifkin moseyed over to Security Pacific's authorized-personnel-
only wire-transfer room, where the staff sent and received transfers totaling
several billion dollars every day.


He was working for a company under contract to develop a backup system for the
wire room's data in case their main computer ever went down. That role gave him
access to the transfer procedures, including how bank officials arranged for a
transfer to be sent. He had learned that bank officers who were authorized to
order wire transfers would be given a closely guarded daily code each morning to
use when calling the wire room.

In the wire room the clerks saved themselves the trouble of trying to memorize
each day's code: They wrote down the code on a slip of paper and posted it where
they could see it easily. This particular November day Rifkin had a specific
reason for his visit. He wanted to get a glance at that paper.

Arriving in the wire room, he took some notes on operating procedures,
supposedly to make sure the backup system would mesh properly with the
regular systems. Meanwhile, he surreptitiously read the security code from the
posted slip of paper, and memorized it. A few minutes later he walked out. As he
said afterward, he felt as if he had just won the lottery.

There's This Swiss Bank Account...
Leaving the room at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, he headed straight for the
pay phone in the building's marble lobby, where he deposited a coin and dialed
into the wire-transfer room. He then changed hats, transforming himself from
Stanley Rifkin, bank consultant, into Mike Hansen, a member of the bank's
International Department.

According to one source, the conversation went something like this:

"Hi, this is Mike Hansen in International," he said to the young woman who
answered the phone.
She asked for the office number. That was standard procedure, and he was
prepared: “286” he said.
The girl then asked, "Okay, what's the code?"

Rifkin has said that his adrenaline-powered heartbeat "picked up its pace" at this
point. He responded smoothly, "4789." Then he went on to give instructions for
wiring "Ten million, two-hundred thousand dollars exactly" to the Irving Trust
Company in New York, for credit of the Wozchod Handels Bank of Zurich,
Switzerland, where he had already established an account.

The girl then said, "Okay, I got that. And now I need the interoffice settlement
number."

Rifkin broke out in a sweat; this was a question he hadn't anticipated, something
that had slipped through the cracks in his research. But he managed to stay in
character, acted as if everything was fine, and on the spot answered without
missing a beat, "Let me check; I'll call you right back." He changed hats once
again to call another department at the bank, this time claiming to be an employee
in the wire-transfer room. He obtained the settlement number and called the girl
back.

She took the number and said, "Thanks." (Under the circumstances, her thanking
him has to be considered highly ironic.)
Achieving Closure
A few days later Rifkin flew to Switzerland, picked up his cash, and handed over
$8 million to a Russian agency for a pile of diamonds. He flew back, passing
through U.S. Customs with the stones hidden in a money belt. He had pulled off
the biggest bank heist in history--and done it without using a gun, even without a
computer. Oddly, his caper eventually made it into the pages of the Guinness
Book of World Records in the category of "biggest computer fraud."

Stanley Rifkin had used the art of deception--the skills and techniques that are
today called social engineering. Thorough planning and a good gift of gab is all it
really took.

And that's what this book is about--the techniques of social engineering (at which
yours truly is proficient) and how to defend against their being used at your
company.

THE NATURE OF THE THREAT
The Rifkin story makes perfectly clear how misleading our sense of security can
be. Incidents like this - okay, maybe not $10 million heists, but harmful incidents
nonetheless - are happening every day. You may be losing money right now, or
somebody may be stealing new product plans, and you don't even know it. If it
hasn't already happened to your company, it's not a question of if it will happen,
but when.

A Growing Concern
The Computer Security Institute, in its 2001 survey of computer crime, reported
that 85 percent of responding organizations had detected computer security
breaches in the preceding twelve months. That's an astounding number: Only
fifteen out of every hundred organizations responding were able to say that they
had not had a security breach during the year. Equally astounding was the
number of organizations that reported that they had experienced financial losses
due to computer breaches: 64 percent. Well over half the organizations had
suffered financially. In a single year.
My own experiences lead me to believe that the numbers in reports like this are
somewhat inflated. I'm suspicious of the agenda of the people conducting the
survey. But that's not to say that the damage isn't extensive; it is. Those who fail
to plan for a security incident are planning for failure.

Commercial security products deployed in most companies are mainly aimed at
providing protection against the amateur computer intruder, like the youngsters
known as script kiddies. In fact, these wannabe hackers with downloaded
software are mostly just a nuisance. The greater losses, the real threats, come
from sophisticated attackers with well-defined targets who are motivated by
financial gain. These people focus on one target at a time rather than, like the
amateurs, trying to infiltrate as many systems as possible. While amateur
computer intruders simply go for quantity, the professionals target information of
quality and value.

Technologies like authentication devices (for proving identity), access control
(for managing access to files and system resources), and intrusion detection
systems (the electronic equivalent of burglar alarms) are necessary to a corporate
security program. Yet it's typical today for a company to spend more money on
coffee than on deploying countermeasures to protect the organization against
security attacks.

Just as the criminal mind cannot resist temptation, the hacker mind is driven to
find ways around powerful security technology safeguards. And in many cases,
they do that by targeting the people who use the technology.

Deceptive Practices
There's a popular saying that a secure computer is one that's turned off. Clever,
but false: The pretexter simply talks someone into going into the office and
turning that computer on. An adversary who wants your information can obtain
it, usually in any one of several different ways. It's just a matter of time, patience,
personality, and persistence. That's where the art of deception comes in.

To defeat security measures, an attacker, intruder, or social engineer must find a
way to deceive a trusted user into revealing information, or trick an unsuspecting
mark into providing him with access. When trusted employees are deceived,
influenced, or manipulated into revealing sensitive information, or performing
actions that create a security hole for the attacker to slip through, no technology
in the world can protect a business. Just as cryptanalysts are sometimes able to
reveal the plain text of a coded message by finding a weakness that lets them
bypass the encryption technology, social engineers use deception practiced on
your employees to bypass security technology.


ABUSE OF TRUST
In most cases, successful social engineers have strong people skills. They're
charming, polite, and easy to like--social traits needed for establishing rapid
rapport and trust. An experienced social engineer is able to gain access to
virtually any targeted information by using the strategies and tactics of his craft.

Savvy technologists have painstakingly developed information-security solutions
to minimize the risks connected with the use of computers, yet left unaddressed
the most significant vulnerability, the human factor. Despite our intellect, we
humans - you, me, and everyone else - remain the most severe threat to each
other's security.


Our National Character
We're not mindful of the threat, especially in the Western world. In the United
States most of all, we're not trained to be suspicious of each other. We are taught
to "love thy neighbor" and have trust and faith in each other. Consider how
difficult it is for neighborhood watch organizations to get people to lock their
homes and cars. This sort of vulnerability is obvious, and yet it seems to be
ignored by many who prefer to live in a dream world - until they get burned.

We know that all people are not kind and honest, but too often we live as if they
were. This lovely innocence has been the fabric of the lives of Americans and it's
painful to give it up. As a nation we have built into our concept of freedom that
the best places to live are those where locks and keys are the least necessary.

Most people go on the assumption that they will not be deceived by others, based
upon a belief that the probability of being deceived is very low; the attacker,
understanding this common belief, makes his request sound so reasonable that it
raises no suspicion, all the while exploiting the victim's trust.

Organizational Innocence
That innocence that is part of our national character was evident back when
computers were first being connected remotely. Recall that the ARPANet (the
Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency Network), the
predecessor of the Internet, was designed as a way of sharing research
information between government, research, and educational institutions. The goal
was information freedom, as well as technological advancement. Many
educational institutions therefore set up early computer systems with little or no
security. One noted software libertarian, Richard Stallman, even refused to
protect his account with a password.

But with the Internet being used for electronic commerce, the dangers of weak
security in our wired world have changed dramatically. Deploying more
technology is not going to solve the human security problem.

Just look at our airports today. Security has become paramount, yet we're alarmed
by media reports of travelers who have been able to circumvent security and
carry potential weapons past checkpoints. How is this possible during a time
when our airports are on such a state of alert? Are the metal detectors failing? No.
The problem isn't the machines. The problem is the human factor: The people
manning the machines. Airport officials can marshal the National Guard and
install metal detectors and facial recognition systems, but educating the frontline
security staff on how to properly screen passengers is much more likely to help.

The same problem exists within government, business, and educational
institutions throughout the world. Despite the efforts of security professionals,
information everywhere remains vulnerable and will continue to be seen as a ripe
target by attackers with social engineering skills, until the weakest link in the
security chain, the human link, has been strengthened.

Now more than ever we must learn to stop wishful thinking and become more
aware of the techniques that are being used by those who attempt to attack the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of our computer systems and networks.
We've come to accept the need for defensive driving; it's time to accept and learn
the practice of defensive computing.

The threat of a break-in that violates your privacy, your mind, or your company's
information systems may not seem real until it happens. To avoid such a costly
dose of reality, we all need to become aware, educated, vigilant, and aggressively
protective of our information assets, our own personal information, and our
nation's critical infrastructures. And we must implement those precautions today.

TERRORISTS AND DECEPTION
Of course, deception isn't an exclusive tool of the social engineer. Physical
terrorism makes the biggest news, and we have come to realize as never before
that the world is a dangerous place. Civilization is, after all, just a thin veneer.

The attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., in September 2001 infused
sadness and fear into the hearts of every one of us - not just Americans, but well-
meaning people of all nations. We're now alerted to the fact that there are
obsessive terrorists located around the globe, well - trained and waiting to launch
further attacks against us.

The recently intensified effort by our government has increased the levels of our
security consciousness. We need to stay alert, on guard against all forms of
terrorism. We need to understand how terrorists treacherously create false
identities, assume roles as students and neighbors, and melt into the crowd.
They mask their true beliefs while they plot against us - practicing tricks of
deception similar to those you will read about in these pages.

And while, to the best of my knowledge, terrorists have not yet used social
engineering ruses to infiltrate corporations, water-treatment plants, electrical
generation facilities, or other vital components of our national infrastructure, the
potential is there. It's just too easy. The security awareness and security policies
that I hope will be put into place and enforced by corporate senior management
because of this book will come none too soon.

ABOUT THIS BOOK
Corporate security is a question of balance. Too little security leaves your
company vulnerable, but an overemphasis on security gets in the way of
attending to business, inhibiting the company's growth and prosperity. The
challenge is to achieve a balance between security and productivity.

Other books on corporate security focus on hardware and software technology,
and do not adequately cover the most serious threat of all: human deception. The
purpose of this book, in contrast, is to help you understand how you, your co-
workers, and others in your company are being manipulated, and the barriers you
can erect to stop being victims. The book focuses mainly on the non-technical
methods that hostile intruders use to steal information, compromise the integrity
of information that is believed to be safe but isn't., or destroy company work
product.

My task is made more difficult by a simple truth: Every reader will have been
manipulated by the grand experts of all time in social engineering - their parents.
They found ways to get you - "for your own good" - to do
what they thought best. Parents become great storytellers in the same way that
social engineers skillfully develop very plausible stories, reasons, and
justifications for achieving their goals. Yes, we were all molded by our parents:
benevolent (and sometimes not so benevolent) social engineers.

Conditioned by that training, we have become vulnerable to manipulation. We
would live a difficult life if we had to be always on our guard, mistrustful of
others, concerned that we might become the dupe of someone trying to take
advantage of us. In a perfect world we would implicitly trust others, confident
that the people we encounter are going to be honest and trustworthy. But we do
not live in a perfect world, and so we have to exercise a standard of vigilance to
repel the deceptive efforts of our adversaries.

The main portions of this book, Parts 2 and 3, are made up of stories that show
you social engineers in action. In these sections you'll read about:

• What phone phreaks discovered years ago: A slick method for getting an
  unlisted phone number from the telephone company.
• Several different methods used by attackers to convince even alert, suspicious
  employees to reveal their computer usernames and passwords.
• How an Operations Center manager cooperated in allowing an attacker to
  steal his company's most secret product information.
• The methods of an attacker who deceived a lady into downloading software
  that spies on every keystroke she makes and emails the details to him.
• How private investigators get information about your company, and about you
  personally, that I can practically guarantee will send a chill up your spine.

You might think as you read some of the stories in Parts 2 and 3 that they're not
possible, that no one could really succeed in getting away with the lies, dirty
tricks, and schemes de, scribed in these pages. The reality is that in every case,
these stories depict events that can and do happen; many of them are happening
every day somewhere on the planet, maybe even to your business as you read this
book.


The material in this book will be a real eye-opener when it comes to protecting
your business, but also personally deflecting the advances of a social engineer to
protect the integrity of information in your private life.

In Part 4 of this book I switch gears. My goal here is to help you create the
necessary business policies and awareness training to minimize the chances of
your employees ever being duped by a social engineer. Understanding the
strategies, methods, and tactics of the social engineer will help prepare you to
deploy reasonable controls to safeguard your IT assets, without undermining your
company's productivity.

In short, I've written this book to raise your awareness about the serious threat
posed by social engineering, and to help you make sure that your company and its
employees are less likely to be exploited in this way.

Or perhaps I should say, far less likely to be exploited ever again.
Part 2
The Art Of The Attacker
Chapter 2
When Innocuous Information Isn’t

What do most people think is the real threat from social engineers? What should
you do to be on your guard?

If the goal is to capture some highly valuable prize--say, a vital component of the
company's intellectual capital - then perhaps what's needed is, figuratively, just a
stronger vault and more heavily armed guards. Right?

But in reality penetrating a company's security often starts with the bad guy
obtaining some piece of information or some document that seems so innocent,
so everyday and unimportant, that most people in the organization wouldn't see
any reason why the item should be protected and restricted

HIDDEN VALUE OF INFORMATION
Much of the seemingly innocuous information in a company's possession is
prized
by a social engineering attacker because it can play a vital role in his effort to
dress himself in a cloak of believability.

Throughout these pages, I'm going to show you how social engineers do what
they do by letting you "witness" the attacks for yourself--sometimes presenting
the action from the viewpoint of the people being victimized, allowing you to put
yourself in their shoes and gauge how you yourself (or maybe one of your
employees or co-workers) might have responded. In many cases you'll also
experience the same events from the perspective of the social engineer.

The first story looks at a vulnerability in the financial industry.


CREDITCHEX
For a long time, the British put up with a very stuffy banking system. As an
ordinary, upstanding citizen, you couldn't walk in off the street and open a bank
account. No, the bank wouldn't consider accepting you as a customer unless some
person already well established as a customer provided you with a letter of
recommendation.
    Quite a difference, of course, in the seemingly egalitarian banking world of
today. And our modern ease of doing business is nowhere more in evidence than
in friendly, democratic America, where almost anyone can walk into a bank and
easily open a checking account, right? Well, not exactly. The truth is that banks
understandably have a natural reluctance to open. an account for somebody who
just might have a history of writing bad checks--that would be about as welcome
as a rap sheet of bank robbery or embezzlement charges. So it's standard practice
at many banks to get a quick thumbs-up or thumbs-down on a prospective new
customer.

One of the major companies that banks contract with for this information is an
outfit we'll call CreditChex. They provide a valuable service to their clients, but
like many companies, can also unknowingly provide a handy service to knowing
social engineers.


The First Call: Kim Andrews
"National Bank, this is Kim. Did you want to open an account today?"
"Hi, Kim. I have a question for you. Do you guys use CreditChex?"
"Yes."
"When you phone in to CreditChex, what do you call the number you give them--
is it a 'Merchant ID'?"

A pause; she was weighing the question, wondering what this was about and
whether she should answer.

The caller quickly continued without missing a beat:

"Because, Kim, I'm working on a book. It deals with private investigations."
"Yes," she said, answering the question with new confidence, pleased to be
   helping a writer.
"So it's called a Merchant ID, right?"
"Uh huh."
 "Okay, great. Because I wanted to male sure I had the lingo right. For the book.
   Thanks for your help. Good-bye, Kim."

The Second Call: Chris Talbert
"National Bank, New Accounts, this is Chris."
"Hi, Chris. This is Alex," the caller said. "I'm a customer service rep with
CreditChex. We're doing a survey to improve our services. Can you spare me a
couple of minutes?"

She was glad to, and the caller went on:

"Okay - what are the hours your branch is open for business?" She answered, and
continued answering his string of questions.
"How many employees at your branch use our service?"
"How often do you call us with an inquiry?"
"Which of our 800-numbers have we assigned you for calling us?"
"Have our representatives always been courteous?"
"How's our response time?"
"How long have you been with the bank?"
"What Merchant ID are you currently using?"
"Have you ever found any inaccuracies with the information we've provided
    you?"
"If you had any suggestions for improving our service, what would they be?"

And:

"Would you be willing to fill out periodic questionnaires if we send them to your
  branch?"

She agreed, they chatted a bit, the caller rang off, and Chris went back to work.


The Third Call: Henry McKinsey
"CreditChex, this is Henry McKinsey, how can I help you?"

The caller said he was from National Bank. He gave the proper Merchant ID and
then gave the name and social security number of the person he was looking for
information on. Henry asked for the birth date, and the caller gave that, too.

After a few moments, Henry read the listing from his computer screen.

"Wells Fargo reported NSF in 1998, one time, amount of $2,066." NSF – non
sufficient funds - is the familiar banking lingo for checks that have been written
when there isn't enough money in the account to cover them.
"Any activities since then?"
"No activities."
"Have there been any other inquiries?"
"Let's see. Okay, two of them, both last month. Third United Credit Union of
Chicago." He stumbled over the next name, Schenectady Mutual Investments,
and had to spell it. "That's in New York State," he added.

Private Investigator at Work
All three of those calls were made by the same person: a private investigator we'll
call Oscar Grace. Grace had a new client, one of his first. A cop until a few
months before, he found that some of this new work came naturally, but some
offered a challenge to his resources and inventiveness. This one came down
firmly in the challenge category.
The hardboiled private eyes of fiction - the Sam Spades and the Philip Marlowes
- spend long night time hours sitting in cars waiting to catch a cheating spouse.
Real-life PIs do the same. They also do a less written about, but no less important
kind of snooping for warring spouses, a method that leans more heavily on social
engineering skills than on fighting off the boredom of night time vigils.

Grace's new client was a lady who looked as if she had a pretty comfortable
budget for clothes and jewelry. She walked into his office one day and took a seat
in the leather chair, the only one that didn't have papers piled on it. She settled
her large Gucci handbag on his desk with the logo turned to face him and
announced she was planning to tell her husband that she wanted a divorce, but
admitted to "just a very little problem."

It seemed her hubby was one step ahead. He had already pulled the cash out of
their savings account and an even larger sum from their brokerage account. She
wanted to know where their assets had been squirreled away, and her divorce
lawyer wasn't any help at all. Grace surmised the lawyer was one of those
uptown, high-rise counselors who wouldn't get his hands dirty on something
messy like where did the money go.

Could Grace help?

He assured her it would be a breeze, quoted a fee, expenses billed at cost, and
collected a check for the first payment.

Then he faced his problem. What do you do if you've never handled a piece of
work like this before and don't quite know how to go about tracking down a
money trail? You move forward by baby steps. Here, accord- mg to our source, is
Grace's story.

I knew about CreditChex and how banks used the outfit - my ex-wife used to
work at a bank. But I didn't know the lingo and procedures, and trying to ask my
ex- would be a waste of time.

Step one: Get the terminology straight and figure out how to make the request so
it sounds like I know what I'm talking about. At the bank I called, the first young
lady, Kim, was suspicious when I asked about how they identify themselves
when they phone CreditChex. She hesitated; she didn't know whether to tell me.
Was I put off by that? Not a bit. In fact, the hesitation gave me an important clue,
a sign that I had to supply a reason she'd find believable. When I worked the con
on her about doing research for a book, it relieved her suspicions. You say you're
an author or a movie writer, and everybody opens up.
She had other knowledge that would have helped - things like what reformation
CreditChex requires to identify the person you're calling about, what information
you can ask for, and the big one, what was Kim's bank Merchant ID number. I
was ready to ask those questions, but her hesitation sent up the red flag. She
bought the book research story, but she already had a few niggling suspicions. If
she'd been more willing right way, I would have asked her to reveal more details
about their procedures.

LINGO
MARK: The victim of a con.
BURN THE SOURCE: An attacker is said to have burned the source when he
allows a victim to recognize that an attack has taken place. Once the victim
becomes aware and notifies other employees or management of the attempt, it
becomes extremely difficult to exploit the same source in future attacks.

You have to go on gut instinct, listen closely to what the mark is saying and how
she's saying it. This lady sounded smart enough for alarm bells to start going off
if I asked too many unusual questions. And even though she didn't know who I
was or what number I was calling from, still in this
business you never want anybody putting out the word to be on the look out for
someone calling to get information about the business. That’s because you don't
want to burn the source - you may want to call same office back another time.

I'm always on the watch for little signs that give me a read on how cooperative a
person is, on a scale that runs from "You sound like a nice person and I believe
everything you're saying" to "Call the cops, alert the National Guard, this guy's
up to no good."

I read Kim as a little bit on edge, so I just called somebody at a different branch.
On my second call with Chris, the survey trick played like a charm. The tactic
here is to slip the important questions in among inconsequential ones that are
used to create a sense of believability. Before I dropped the question about the
Merchant ID number with CreditChex, I ran a little last-minute test by asking her
a personal question about how long she'd been with the bank.

A personal question is like a land mine - some people step right over it and never
notice; for other people, it blows up and sends them scurrying for safety. So if I
ask a personal question and she answers the question and the tone of her voice
doesn't change, that means she probably isn't skeptical about the nature of the
request. I can safely ask the sought after question without arousing her
suspicions, and she'll probably give me the answer I'm looking for.
One more thing a good PI knows: Never end the conversation after getting the
key information. Another two or three questions, a little chat, and then it's okay to
say good-bye. Later, if the victim remembers anything about what you asked, it
will probably be the last couple of questions. The rest will usually be forgotten.

So Chris gave me their Merchant ID number, and the phone number they call to
make requests. I would have been happier if I had gotten to ask some questions
about how much information you can get from CreditChex. But it was better not
to push my luck.

It was like having a blank check on CreditChex. I could now call and get
information whenever I wanted. I didn't even have to pay for the service. As it
turned out, the CreditChex rep was happy to share exactly the information I
wanted: two places my client's husband had recently applied to open an account.
So where were the assets his soon-to-be ex-wife was looking for? Where else but
at the banking institutions the guy at CreditChex listed?

Analyzing the Con
This entire ruse was based on one of the fundamental tactics of social
engineering: gaining access to information that a company employee treats as
innocuous, when it isn't.

The first bank clerk confirmed the terminology to describe the identifying
number used when calling CreditChex: the Merchant ID. The second provided
the phone number for calling CreditChex, and the most vital piece of information,
the bank's Merchant ID number. All this information appeared to the clerk to be
innocuous. After all, the bank clerk thought she was talking to someone from
CreditChex -so what could be the harm in disclosing the number?

All of this laid the groundwork for the third call. Grace had everything he needed
to phone CreditChex, pass himself off as a rep from one of their customer banks,
National, and simply ask for the information he was after.

With as much skill at stealing information as a good swindler has at stealing your
money, Grace had well-honed talents for reading people. He knew the common
tactic of burying the key questions among innocent ones. He knew a personal
question would test the second clerk's willingness to cooperate, before innocently
asking for the Merchant ID number.

The first clerk's error in confirming the terminology for the CreditChex ID
number would be almost impossible to protect against. The information is so
widely known within the banking industry that it appears to be unimportant - the
very model of the innocuous. But the second clerk, Chris, should not have been
so willing to answer questions without positively verifying that the caller was
really who he claimed to be. She should, at the very least, have taken his name
and number and called back; that way, if any questions arose later, she may have
kept a record of what phone number the person had used. In this case, making a
call like that would have made it much more difficult for the attacker to
masquerade as a representative from CreditChex.

MITNICK MESSAGE
A Merchant ID in this situation is analogous to a password. If bank personnel
treated it like an ATM PIN, they might appreciate the sensitive nature of the
information. Is there an internal code or number in your organization that people
aren't treating with enough care?

Better still would have been a call to CreditChex using a nun bank already had on
record - not a number provided by the caller – to verify that the person really
worked there, and that the company was really doing a customer survey. Given
the practicalities of the real world and the time pressures that most people work
under today, though, this kind of verification phone call is a lot to expect, except
when an employee is suspicious that some kind of attack is being made.



THE ENGINEER TRAP
It is widely known that head-hunter firms use social engineering to recruit
corporate talent. Here's an example of how it can happen.

In the late 1990s, a not very ethical employment agency signed a new client, a
company looking for electrical engineers with experience in the telephone
industry. The honcho on the project was a lady endowed with a throaty voice and
sexy manner that she had learned to use to develop initial trust and rapport over
the phone.

The lady decided to stage a raid on a cellular phone service provider to see if she
could locate some engineers who might be tempted to walk across the street to a
competitor. She couldn't exactly call the switch board and say, "Let me talk to
anybody with five years of engineering experience." Instead, for reasons that will
become clear in a moment, she began the talent assault by seeking a piece of
information that appeared to have no sensitivity at all, information that company
people give out to almost anybody who asks.

The First Call: The receptionist
The attacker, using the name Didi Sands, placed a call to the corporate offices of
the cellular phone service. In part, the conversation went like this:
Receptionist: Good afternoon. This is Marie, how may I help you?
Didi: Can you connect me to the Transportation Department?

R:   I'm not sure if we have one, I'll look in my directory. Who's calling?
D:   It's Didi.
R:   Are you in the building, or... ?
D:   No, I'm outside the building.
R:    Didi who?
D:   Didi Sands. I had the extension for Transportation, but I forgot what it was.
R:    One moment.

To allay suspicions, at this point Didi asked a casual, just making conversation
question designed to establish that she was on the "inside," familiar with
company locations.

D: What building are you in - Lakeview or Main Place?
R: Main Place. (pause) It's 805 555 6469.

To provide herself with a backup in case the call to Transportation didn't provide
what she was looking for, Didi said she also wanted to talk to Real Estate. The
receptionist gave her that number, as well. When Didi asked to be connected to
the Transportation number, the receptionist tried, but the line was busy.

At that point Didi asked for a third phone number, for Accounts Receivable,
located at a corporate facility in Austin, Texas. The receptionist asked her to wait
a moment, and went off the line. Reporting to Security that she had a suspicious
phone call and thought there was something fishy going on? Not at all, and Didi
didn't have the least bit of concern. She was being a bit of a nuisance, but to the
receptionist it was all part of a typical workday. After about a minute, the
receptionist came back on the line, looked up the Accounts Receivable number,
tried it, and put Didi through.


The Second Call: Peggy
The next conversation went like this:

Peggy: Accounts Receivable, Peggy.
Didi: Hi, Peggy. This is Didi, in Thousand Oaks.
P: Hi, Didi.
D: How ya doing?
P: Fine.
Didi then used a familiar term in the corporate world that describes the charge
code for assigning expenses against the budget of a specific organization or
workgroup:

D: Excellent. I have a question for you. How do I find out the cost center for a
   particular department?
P: You'd have to get a hold of the budget analyst for the department.

D:      Do you know who'd be the budget analyst for
Thousand Oaks - headquarters? I'm trying to fill out a
form and I don't know the proper cost center.
P:      I just know when y'all need a cost center number, you call your budget
analyst.
D: Do you have a cost center for your department there in Texas?
P: We have our own cost center but they don't give us a complete list of them.
D: How many digits is the cost center? FOr example, what's your cost center?
P: Well, like, are you with 9WC or with SAT?

Didi had no idea what departments or groups these referred to, but it didn't
matter. She answered:

D:   9WC.
P:   Then it's usually four digits. Who did you say you were with?
D:   Headquarters--Thousand Oaks.
P:   Well, here's one for Thousand Oaks. It's 1A5N, that's N like in Nancy.

By just hanging out long enough with somebody willing to be helpful, Didi had
the cost center number she needed - one of those pieces of information that no
one thinks to protect because it seems like something that couldn't be of any
value to an outsider.

The Third Call: A Helpful Wrong Number
Didi's next step would be to parlay the cost center number into something of real
value by using it as a poker chip.

She began by calling the Real Estate department, pretending she had reached a
wrong number. Starting with a "Sorry to bother you, but .... " she claimed she was
an employee who had lost her company directory, and asked who you were
supposed to call to get a new copy. The man said the print copy was out of date
because it was available on the company intranet site.

Didi said she preferred using a hard copy, and the man told her to call
Publications, and then, without being asked - maybe just to keep the sexy-
sounding lady on the phone a little longer - helpfully looked up the number and
gave it to her.


The Fourth Call: Bart in Publications

In Publications, she spoke with a man named Bart. Didi said she was from
Thousand Oaks, and they had a new consultant who needed a copy of the
company directory. She told him a print copy would work better for the
consultant, even if it was somewhat out of date. Bart told her she'd have to fill out
a requisition form and send the form over to him.

Didi said she was out of forms and it was a rush, and could Bart be a sweetheart
and fill out the form for her? He agreed with a little too much enthusiasm, and
Didi gave him the details. For the address of the fictional contractor, she drawled
the number of what social engineers call a mail drop, in this case a Mail Boxes
Etc.-type of commercial business where her company rented boxes for situations
just like this.

The earlier spadework now came in handy: There would be a charge for the cost
and shipping of the directory. Fine - Didi gave the cost center for Thousand Oaks:

"IA5N, that's N like in Nancy."

A few days later, when the corporate directory arrived, Didi found it was an even
bigger payoff than she had expected: It not only listed the names and phone
numbers, but also showed who worked for whom - the corporate structure of the
whole organization.

The lady of the husky voice was ready to start making her head-hunter, people-
raiding phone calls. She had conned the information she needed to launch her
raid using the gift of gab honed to a high polish by every skilled social engineer.
Now she was ready for the payoff.

LINGO
MAIL DROP: The social engineer’s term for a rental mailbox, typically rented
under an assumed name, which is used to deliver documents or packages the
victim has been duped into sending

MITNICK MESSAGE
Just like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, each piece of information may be irrelevant by
itself. However, when the pieces are put together, a clear picture emerges. In this
I case, the picture the social engineer saw was the entire internal structure of the
company .

Analyzing the Con
In this social engineering attack, Didi started by getting phone numbers for three
departments in the target company. This was easy, because the numbers she was
asking for were no secret, especially to employees. A social engineer learns to
sound like an insider, and Didi was skilled at this
game. One of the phone numbers led her to a cost center number, which she then
used to obtain a copy of the firm's employee directory.
The main tools she needed: sounding friendly, using some corporate lingo, and,
with the last victim, throwing in a little verbal eyelash-batting.
And one more tool, an essential element not easily acquired - the manipulative
skills of the social engineer, refined through extensive practice and the unwritten
lessons of bygone generations of confidence men.

MORE "WORTHLESS" INFO
Besides a cost center number and internal phone extensions, what other
seemingly useless information can be extremely valuable to your enemy?.

Peter Abel’s Phone Call
"Hi," the voice at the other end of the line says. "This is Tom at Parkhurst Travel.
Your tickets to San Francisco are ready. Do you want us to deliver them, or do
you want to pick them up?"
"San Francisco?" Peter says. "I'm not going to San Francisco." "Is this Peter
Abels?"
"Yes, but I don't have any trips coming up."
"Well," the caller says with a friendly laugh, "you sure you don't want to go to
    San Francisco?"
"If you think you can talk my boss into it..." Peter says, playing along with the
    friendly conversation.
"Sounds like a mix-up," the caller says. "On our system, we book travel
arrangements under the employee number. Maybe somebody used the wrong
number. What's your employee number?"

Peter obligingly recites his number. And why not? It goes on just about every
personnel form he fills out, lots of people in the company have access to it -
human resources, payroll, and, obviously, the outside travel agency. No one treats
an employee number like some sort of secret. What difference could it make?

The answer isn't hard to figure out. Two or three pieces of information might be
all it takes to mount an effective impersonation - the social engineer cloaking
himself in someone else's identity. Get hold of an employee's name, his phone
number, his employee number--and maybe, for good measure, his manager's
name and phone number--and a halfway- competent social engineer is equipped
with most of what he's likely to need to sound authentic to the next target he
calls.

If someone who said he was from another department in your company had
called yesterday, given a plausible reason, and asked for your employee number,
would you have had any reluctance in giving it to him?

And by the way, what is your social security number?

MITNICK MESSAGE
The moral of the story is, don't give out any personal or internal company
information or identifiers to anyone, unless his or her voice is recognizable and
the requestor has a need to know.

PREVENTING THE CON
Your company has a responsibility to make employees aware of how a serious
mistake can occur from mishandling non public information. A well thought-out
information security policy, combined with proper education and training, will
dramatically increase employee awareness about the proper handling of corporate
business information. A data classification policy will help you to implement
proper controls with respect to disclosing information. Without a data
classification policy, all internal information must be considered confidential,
unless otherwise specified.

Take these steps to protect your company from the release of seemingly
innocuous information:

The Information Security Department needs to conduct awareness training
detailing the methods used by social engineers. One method, as described above,
is to obtain seemingly non sensitive information and use it as a poker chip to gain
short-term trust. Each and every employee needs to be aware that when a caller
has knowledge about company procedures, lingo, and internal identifiers it does
not in any way, shape, or form authenticate the requestor or authorize him or her
as having a need to know. A caller could be a former employee or contractor with
the requisite insider information. Accordingly, each corporation has a
responsibility to determine the appropriate authentication method to be used
when employees interact with people they don't recognize in person or over the
telephone.

The person or persons with the role and responsibility of drafting a data
classification policy should examine the types of details that may be used to gain
access for legitimate employees that seem innocuous, but could lead to
information that is, sensitive. Though you'd never give out the access codes for
your ATM card, would you tell somebody what server you use to develop
company software products? Could that information be used by a person
pretending to be somebody who has legitimate access to the corporate network?

Sometimes just knowing inside terminology can make the social engineer appear
authoritative and knowledgeable. The attacker often relies on this common
misconception to dupe his or her victims into compliance. For example, a
Merchant ID is an identifier that people in the New Accounts department of a
bank casually use every day. But such an identifier exactly the same as a
password. If each and every employee understands the nature of this identifier -
that it is used to positively authenticate a requestor--they might treat it with more
respect.

MITNICK MESSAGE
As the old adage goes - even real paranoids probably have enemies. We must
assume that every business has its enemies, too - attackers that target the network
infrastructure to compromise business secrets. Don't end up being a statistic on
computer crime - it's high time to shore up the necessary defenses by
implementing proper controls through well-thought-out security policies and
procedures.

No companies - well, very few, at least - give out the direct dial phone numbers
of their CEO or board chairman. Most companies, though, have no concern about
giving out phone numbers to most departments and workgroups in the,
organization - especially to someone who is, or appears to be, an employee. A
possible countermeasure: Implement a policy that prohibits giving internal phone
numbers of employees, contractors, consultants, and temps to outsiders. More
importantly, develop a step-by-step procedure to positively identify whether a
caller asking for phone numbers is really an employee.

Accounting codes for workgroups and departments, as well as copies of the
corporate directory (whether hard copy, data file, or electronic phone book on the
intranet) are frequent targets of social engineers. Every company needs a written,
well-publicized policy on disclosure of this type of information. The safeguards
should include maintaining an audit log that records instances when sensitive
information is disclosed to people outside of the company.

Information such as an employee number, by itself, should not be used as any
sort of authentication. Every employee must be trained to verify not just the
identity of a requestor, but also the requestor's need to know.
In your security training, consider teaching employees this approach: Whenever
asked a question or asked for a favor by a stranger, learn first to politely decline
until the request can be verified. Then - before giving in to the natural desire to be
Mr. or Ms. Helpful - follow company policies and procedures with respect to
verification and disclosure of non public information. This style may go against
our natural tendency to help others, but a little healthy paranoia may be necessary
to avoid being the social engineer's next dupe.

As the stories in this chapter have shown, seemingly innocuous information can
be the key to your company's most prized secrets.
Chapter 3
The Direct Attack: Just Asking for It

Many social engineering attacks are intricate, involving a number of steps and
elaborate planning, combining a mix of manipulation and technological know-
how.

But I always find it striking that a skillful social engineer can often achieve his
goal with a simple, straightforward, direct attack. Just asking outright for the
information may be all that's needed - as you'll see.

AN MLAC QUICKIE
Want to know someone's unlisted phone number? A social engineer can tell you
half a dozen ways (and you'll find some of them described in other stories in
these pages), but probably the simplest scenario is one that uses a single phone
call, like this one.

Number, Please
The attacker dialed the private phone company number for the MLAC, the
Mechanized Line Assignment Center. To the woman who answered, he said:

"Hey, this is Paul Anthony. I'm a cable splicer. Listen, a terminal box out here got
fried in a fire. Cops think some creep tried to burn his own house down for the
insurance. They got me out here alone trying to rewire this entire two hundred-
pair terminal. I could really use some help right now. What facilities should be
working at 6723 South Main?"


In other parts of the phone company, the person called would know that reverse
lookup information on non pub (non published) numbers is supposed to be given
out only to authorized phone company MLAC is supposed to be known only to
company employees. And while they'd never give out information to the public,
who would want to refuse a little help to a company man coping with that heavy-
duty assignment?. She feels sorry for him, she's had bad days on the job herself,
and she’ll
bend the rules a little to help out a fellow employee with a problem. She gives
him the cable and pairs and each working number assigned to the address.


MITNICK MESSAGE
It's human nature to trust our fellow man, especially when the request meets the
test of being reasonable. Social engineers use this knowledge to exploit their
victims and to achieve their goals.
Analyzing the Con
As you'll notice repeatedly in these stories, knowledge of a company’s lingo, and
of its corporate structure - its various offices and departments what each does and
what information each has - is part of the essential bag of tricks of the successful
social engineer.


YOUNG MAN ON THE RUN
A man we'll call Frank Parsons had been on the run for years, still wanted by the
federal government for being part of an underground antiwar group in the 1960s.
In restaurants he sat facing the door and he had a way of glancing over his
shoulder every once in a while that other people found disconcerting. He moved
every few years.

At one point Frank landed in a city he didn't know, and set about job hunting. For
someone like Frank, with his well-developed computer skills (and social
engineering skills as well, even ,though he never listed those on a job
application), finding a good job usually wasn't a problem. Except in times when
the economy is very tight, people with good technical computer knowledge
usually find their talents in high demand and they have little problem landing on
their feet. Frank quickly located a well – paying job opportunity at a large,
upscale, long-term care facility near where he was living.

Just the ticket, he thought. But when he started plodding his way through the
application forms, he came upon an uh-oh: The employer required the applicant
to provide a copy of his state criminal history record, which he had to obtain
himself from the state police. The stack of employment papers included a form to
request this document, and the form had a little box for providing a fingerprint.
Even though they were asking for a print of just the right index finger, if they
matched his print with one in the FBI's database, he'd probably soon be working
in food service at a federally funded resort.

On the other hand, it occurred to Frank that maybe, just maybe, he might still be
able to get away with this. Perhaps the state didn't send those fingerprint samples
to the FBI at all. How could he find out?

How? He was a social engineer--how do you think he found out? He placed a
phone call to the state patrol: "Hi. We're doing a study for the State Department
of Justice. We're researching the requirements to implement a new fingerprint
identification system. Can I talk to somebody there that's really familiar with
what you're doing who could maybe help us out?"
And when the local expert came on the phone, Frank asked a series of questions
about what systems they were using, and the capabilities to search and store
fingerprint data. Had they had any equipment problems? Were they tied into the
National Crime Information Center's (NCIC) Fingerprint Search or just within the
state? Was the equipment pretty easy for everybody to learn to use?

Slyly, he sneaked the key question in among the rest.

The answer was music to his ears: No they weren't tied into the NCIC, they only
checked against the state's Criminal Information Index (CII).

MITNICK MESSGAE
Savvy information swindlers have no qualms about ringing up federal, state, or
local government officials to learn about the procedures of law enforcement.
With such information in hand, the social engineer may be able to circumvent
your company's standard security checks.

That was all Frank needed to know. He didn't have any record in that state, so he
submitted his application, was hired for the job, and nobody ever showed up at
his desk one day with the greeting, "These gentlemen, are from the FBI and
they'd like to have a little talk with you."

And, according to him, he proved to be a model employee.

ON THE DOORSTEP
In spite of the myth of the paperless office, companies continue to print out reams
of paper every day. Information in print at your company may be vulnerable,
even if you use security precautions and stamp it confidential.

Here's one story that shows you how social engineers might obtain your most
secret documents.



Loop-Around Deception
Every year the phone company publishes a volume called the Test Number
Directory (or at least they used to, and because I am still on supervised release,
I'm not going to ask if they still do). This document was highly prized by phone
phreaks because it was packed with a list of all the closely guarded phone
numbers used by company craftsmen, technicians, a others for things like trunk
testing or checking numbers that always ring busy.
One of these test numbers, known in the lingo as a loop-around, was particularly
useful. Phone phreaks used it as a way to find other phone phreaks to chat with,
at no cost to them. Phone phreaks also used it a way to create a call back number
to give to, say, a bank. A social engineer would tell somebody at the bank the
phone number to call to reach at his office. When the bank called back to the test
number (loop-around) the phone phreak would be able to receive the call, yet he
had the protection of having used a phone number that could not be traced back
to him.

A Test Number Directory provided a lot of neat information that could be used
by any information-hungry, testosteroned, phone phreak. So when the new
directories were published each year, they were coveted by a lot of youngsters
whose hobby was exploring the telephone network.


MITNICK MESSAGE
Security training with respect to company policy designed to protect information
assets needs to be for everyone in the company, not just any employee who has
electronic or physical access to the company's IT assets.

Stevie’s Scam
Naturally phone companies don't make these books easy to get hold of, so phone
phreaks have to be creative to get one. How can they do this? An eager youngster
with a mind bent on acquiring the directory might enact a scenario like this.

Late one day, a mild evening in the southern California autumn, a guy I'll call
him Stevie phones a small telephone company central office, which is the
building from which phone lines run to all the homes and businesses in the
established service area.

When the switchman on duty answers the call, Stevie announces that he's from
the division of the phone company that publishes and distributes printed
materials. "We have your new Test Number Directory," he says. "But for security
reasons, we cant deliver your copy until we pick up the old one. And the delivery
guy is running late. If you wanna leave your copy just outside your door, he can
swing by, pick up yours, drop the new one and be on his way."

The unsuspecting switchman seems to think that sounds reasonable. He does
exactly as asked, putting out on the doorstep of the building his copy of the
directory, its cover clearly marked in big red letters with the "COMPANY
CONFIDENTIAL - WHEN NO LONGER NEEDED THIS DOCUMENT
MUST BE SHREDDED."
Stevie drives by and looks around carefully to spot any cops or phone company
security people who might be lurking behind trees or watching for him from
parked cars. Nobody in sight. He casually picks up the coveted directory and
drives away.

Here's just one more example of how easy it can be for a social engineer to get
what he wants by following the simple principle of "just ask for it."


GAS ATTACK
Not only company assets are at risk in a social engineering scenario. Sometimes
it's a company's customers who are the victims.

Working as a customer-service clerk brings its share of frustrations, its share of
laughs, and its share of innocent mistakes - some of which can have unhappy
consequences for a company's customers.

Janie Acton's Story
Janie Acton had been manning a cubicle as a customer service rep f Hometown
Electric Power, in Washington, D.C., for just over three years. She was
considered to be one of the better clerks, smart and conscientious

It was Thanksgiving week when this one particular call came in. The caller, said,
"This is Eduardo in the Billing Department. I've got a lady on hold, she's a
secretary in the executive offices that works for one of the vice presidents, and
she's asking for some information and I can't use my computer I got an email
from this girl in Human Resources that said 'ILOVEYOU.’ and when I opened
the attachment, I couldn't use my machine any more. A virus. I got caught by a
stupid virus. Anyways, could you look up some customer information for me?"
"Sure," Janie answered. "It crashed your computer? That's terrible."
"Yeah."
"How can I help?" Janie asked.

Here the attacker called on information from his advance research to make
himself sound authentic. He had learned that the information he, wanted was
stored in something called the Customer Billing Information System, and he had
found out how employees referred to the system. He asked, "Can you bring up an
account on CBIS?"

"Yes, what's the account number.? "
"I don't have the number; I need you to bring it up by name."
"Okay, what's the name?"
"It's Heather Marning." He spelled the name, and Janie typed it in.
"Okay, I have it up."
"Great. Is the account current?"
"Uh huh, it's current."
"What's the account number?" he asked.
"Do you have a pencil?"
 "Ready to write."
 "Account number BAZ6573NR27Q."
 He read the number back and then said, "And what's the service address?"
 She gave him the address.
 "And what's the phone?"
 Janie obligingly read off that information, too.

The caller thanked her, said good-bye, and hung up. Janie went on to the next
call, never thinking further about it.

Art Sealy's Research Project
Art Sealy had given up working as a freelance editor for small publishing houses
when he found he could make more money doing research for writers and
businesses. He soon figured out that the fee he could charge went up in
proportion to how close the assignment took him to the sometimes hazy line
between the legal and the illegal. Without ever realizing it, certainly without ever
giving it a name, Art became a social engineer, using techniques familiar to every
information broker. He turned out to have a native talent for the business,
figuring out for himself techniques that most social engineers had to learn from
others. After a while, he crossed the line without the least twinge of guilt.

A man contacted me who was writing a book about the Cabinet in the Nixon
years, and was looking for a researcher who could get the inside scoop on
William E. Simon, who had been Nixon's Treasury secretary. Mr. Simon had
died, but the author had the name of a woman who had been on his staff. He was
pretty sure she still lived in D.C., but hadn't been able to get an address. She
didn't have a telephone in her name, or at least none that was listed. So that's
when he called me. I told him, sure, no problem.

This is the kind of job you can usually bring off in a phone call or two, if you
know what you're doing. Every local utility company can generally be counted on
to give the information away. Of course, you have to BS a little. But what's a
little white lie now and then - right?

I like to use a different approach each time, just to keep things interesting. "This
is so-and-so in the executive offices" has always worked well for me. So has "I've
got somebody on the line from Vice President Somebody's office," which worked
this time, too.
MITNICK MESSAGE
Never think all social engineering attacks need to be elaborate ruses so complex
that they're likely to be recognized before they can be completed. Some are in-
and-out, strike-and-disappear, very simple attacks that are no more than.., well,
just asking for it.

You have to sort of develop the social engineer's instinct, get a sense of how
cooperative the person on the other end is going to be with you. This time I
lucked out with a friendly, helpful lady. In a single phone call, I had the address
and phone number. Mission accomplished.

Analyzing the Con
Certainly Janie knew that customer information is sensitive. She would
never discuss one customer's account with another customer, or give out
private information to the public.

But naturally, for a caller from within the company, different rules apply. For a
fellow employee it's all about being a team player and helping each other get the
job done. The man from Billing could have looked up the details himself if his
computer hadn't been down with a virus, and she was glad to be able to help a co-
worker.

Art built up gradually to the key information he was really after, asking
questions along the way about things he didn't really need, such as the
account number. Yet at the same time, the account number information
provided a fallback: If the clerk had become suspicious, he'd call a second time
and stand a better chance of success, because knowing the account       number
would make him sound all the more authentic to the next clerk he reached.

It never occurred to Janie that somebody might actually lie about some
thing like this, that the caller might not really be from the billing department at
all. Of course, the blame doesn't lie at Janie's feet. She wasn't well versed in the
rule about making sure you know who you're talking to before discussing
information in a customer's file. Nobody had ever told her about the danger of a
phone call like the one from Art. It wasn't in the company policy, it wasn't part
of her training, and her supervisor had never mentioned it.

PREVENTING THE CON
A point to include in your security training: Just because a caller or visitor knows
the names of some people in the company, or knows some of the corporate lingo
or procedures, doesn't mean he is who he claims to be. And it definitely doesn't
establish him as anybody authorized to be given internal information, or access to
your computer system or network.

Security training needs to emphasize: When in doubt, verify, verify, verify.

In earlier times, access to information within a company was a mark of rank and
privilege. Workers stoked the furnaces, ran the machines, typed the letters, and
filed the reports. The foreman or boss told them what to do, when, and how. It
was the foreman or boss who knew how many widgets each worker should be
producing on a shift, how many and in what colors and sizes the factory needed
to turn out this week, next week, and by the end of the month.

Workers handled machines and tools and materials, and bosses handled
information. Workers needed only the information specific to their specific jobs.

The picture is a little different today, isn't it? Many factory workers use some
form of computer or computer-driven machine. For a large part of the workforce,
critical information is pushed down to the users' desktops so that they can fulfill
their responsibility to get their work done. In today's environment, almost
everything employees do involves the handling of information.
That's why a company's security policy needs to be distributed enterprise-wide,
regardless of position. Everybody must understand that it's not just the bosses and
executives who have the information that an attacker might be after. Today,
workers at every level, even those who don't use a computer, are liable to be
targeted. The newly hired rep in the customer service group may be just the weak
link that a social engineer breaks to achieve his objective.
Security training and corporate security policies need to strengthen that
link.
Chapter 4
Building Trust

Some of these stories might lead you to think that I believe everyone in business
is a complete idiot, ready, even eager, to give away every secret in his or her
possession. The social engineer knows isn't true. Why are social engineering
attacks so successful? It isn't because people are stupid or lack common sense.
But we, as human beings are all vulnerable to being deceived because people can
misplace their trust if manipulated in certain ways.

The social engineer anticipates suspicion and resistance, and he's always prepared
to turn distrust into trust. A good social engineer plans his attack like a chess
game, anticipating the questions his target might ask so he can be ready with the
proper answers.

One of his common techniques involves building a sense of trust on the part of
his victims. How does a con man make you trust him? Trust me, he can.

TRUST: THE KEY TO DECEPTION
The more a social engineer can make his contact seem like business as usual, the
more he allays suspicion. When people don't have a reason to be suspicious, it's
easy for a social engineer to gain their trust.

Once he's got your trust, the drawbridge is lowered and the castle door thrown
open so he can enter and take whatever information he wants.

NOTE
You may notice I refer to social engineers, phone phreaks, and con-game
operators as 'he" through most of these stories. This is not chauvinism; it simply
reflects the truth that most practitioners in these fields are male. But though there
aren’t many women social engineers, the number is growing. There are enough
female social engineers out there that you shouldn’t let your guard down just
because you hear a women’s voice. In fact, female social engineers have a
distinct advantage because they can use their sexuality to obtain cooperation.
You’ll find a small number of the so-called gentler sex represented in these pages

The First Call: Andrea Lopez
Andrea Lopez answered the phone at the video rental store where she worked,
and in a moment was smiling: It's always a pleasure when a customer takes the
trouble to say he's happy about the service. This caller said he had had a very
good experience dealing with the store, and he wanted to send the manager a
letter about it.
He asked for the manager's name and the mailing address, and she told him it was
Tommy Allison, and gave him the address. As he was about to hang up, he had
another idea and said, "I might want to write to your company headquarters, too.
What's your store number?" She gave him that information, as well. He said
thanks, added something pleasant about how helpful she had been, and said
goodbye.

"A call like that," she thought, "always seems to make the shift go by faster. How
nice it would be if people did that more often."

The Second Call: Ginny
"Thanks for calling Studio Video. This is Ginny, how can I help you?"
"Hi, Ginny," the caller said enthusiastically, sounding as if he talked to Ginny
every week or so. "It's Tommy Allison, manager at Forest Park, Store 863. We
have a customer in here who wants to rent Rocky 5 and we're all out of copies.
Can you check on what you've got?"
She came back on the line after a few moments and said, "Yeah, we've got
three copies."
"Okay, I'll see if he wants to drive over there. Listen, thanks. If you ever need any
help from our store, just call and ask for Tommy. I'll be glad to do whatever I can
for you."

Three or four times over the next couple of weeks, Ginny got calls from Tommy
for help with one thing or another. They were seemingly legitimate requests, and
he was always very friendly without sounding like he was trying to come on to
her. He was a little chatty along the way, as well - "Did you hear about the big
fire in Oak Park? Bunch of streets closed over there," and the like. The calls were
a little break from the routine of the day, and Ginny was always glad to hear from
him.

One day Tommy called sounding stressed. He asked, "Have you guys been
having trouble with your computers?"

"No," Ginny answered. "Why?"
"Some guy crashed his car into a telephone pole, and the phone company
repairman says a whole part of the city will lose their phones and Internet
connection till they get this fixed."
"Oh, no. Was the man hurt?"
"They took him away in an ambulance. Anyway, I could use a little help. I've got
a customer of yours here who wants to rent Godfather II and doesn't have his
card with him. Could you verify his information for me?"
"Yeah, sure."
Tommy gave the customer's name and address, and Ginny found him in the
computer. She gave Tommy the account number.
"Any late returns or balance owed?" Tommy asked.
"Nothing showing."
"Okay, great. I'll sign him up by hand for an account here and put it in our
database later on when the computers come back up again. And he wants to put
this charge on the Visa card he uses at your store, and he doesn't have it with him.
What's the card number and expiration date?"

She gave it to him, along with the expiration date. Tommy said, "Hey, thanks for
the help. Talk to you soon," and hung up.

Doyle Lonnegan's Story
Lonnegan is not a young man you would want to find waiting when you open
your front door. A one-time collection man for bad gambling debts, he still does
an occasional favor, if it doesn't put him out very much. In this case, he was
offered a sizable bundle of cash for little more than making some phone calls to
a video store. Sounds easy enough. It's just that none of his "customers" knew
how to run this con; they needed somebody with Lonnegan's talent and know-
how.

People don't write checks to cover their bets when they're unlucky or stupid at the
poker table. Everybody knows that. Why did these friends of mine keep on
playing with a cheat that didn't have green out on the table? Don't ask. Maybe
they're a little light in the IQ department. But they're friends of mine--what can
you do?
This guy didn't have the money, so they took a check. I ask you! Should of drove
him to an ATM machine, is what they should of done. But no, a check. For
$3,230.
Naturally, it bounced. What would you expect? So then they call me; can I help?
I don't close doors on people's knuckles any more. Besides, there are better ways
nowadays. I told them, 30 percent commission, I'd see what I could do. So they
give me his name and address, and I go up on the computer to see what's the
closest video store to him. I wasn't in a big hurry. Four phone calls to cozy up to
the store manager, and then, bingo, I've got the cheat's Visa card number.
Another friend of mine owns a topless bar. For fifty bucks, he put the guy's poker
money through as a Visa charge from the bar. Let the cheat explain that to his
wife. You think he might try to tell Visa it's not his charge? Think again. He
knows we know who he is. And if we could get his Visa number, he'll figure we
could get a lot more besides. No worries on that score.
Analyzing the Con
Tommy's initial calls to Ginny were simply to build up trust. When time came for
the actual attack, she let her guard down and accepted Tommy for who he
claimed to be, the manager at another store in the chain.
    And why wouldn't she accept him--she already knew him. She'd only met him
over the telephone, of course, but they had established a business friendship that
is the basis for trust. Once she had accepted him as an authority figure, a manager
in the same company, the trust had been established and the rest was a walk in the
park.

MITNICK MESSAGE
The sting technique of building trust is one of the most effective social
engineering tactics. You have to think whether you really know the person you're
talking to. In some rare instances, the person might not be who he claims to be.
Accordingly, we all have to learn to observe, think, and question authority.

VARIATION ON A THEME: CARD CAPTURE
Building a sense of trust doesn't necessarily demand a series of phone calls with
the victim, as suggested by the previous story. I recall one incident I witnessed
where five minutes was all it took.

Surprise, Dad
I once sat at a table in a restaurant with Henry and his father. In the course of
conversation, Henry scolded his father for giving out his credit card number as if
it were his phone number. "Sure, you have to give your card number when you
buy something," he said. "But giving it to a store that files your number in their
records - that's real dumb."

The only place I do that is at Studio Video," Mr. Conklin said, naming the same
chain of video stores. "But I go over my Visa bill every month. If they started
running up charges, I'd know it.
Sure," said Henry, "but once they have your number, it's so easy for somebody to
steal it "

You mean a crooked employee."
No, anybody - not just an employee."
You're talking through your hat," Mr. Conklin said.
I can call up right now and get them to tell me your Visa number," Henry shot
back.
No, you can't, "his father said.
"I can do it in five minutes, right here in front of you without ever leaving
 the table."
Mr. Conklin looked tight around the eyes, the look of somebody feeling sure of
himself, but not wanting to show it. "I say you don't know that you're talking
about," he barked, taking out his wallet and slapping fifty dollar bill down on the
table. "If you can do what you say, that's
yours.
"I don't want your money, Dad," Henry said.
He pulled out his cell phone, asked his father which branch he used, and called
Directory Assistance for the phone number, as well as the number of the store in
nearby Sherman Oaks.

He then called the Sherman Oaks store. Using pretty much the same approach
described in the previous story, he quickly got the manager's name and the store
number.

Then he called the store where his father had an account. He pulled the old
impersonate-the-manager trick, using the manager's name as his own and giving
the store number he had just obtained. Then he used the same ruse: "Are your
computers working okay? Ours have been up and down." He listened to her reply
and then said, "Well, look, I've got one of your customers here who wants to rent
a video, but our computers are down right now. I need you to look up the
customer account and make sure he's a customer at your branch."
Henry gave him his father's name. Then, using only a slight variation in
technique, he made the request to read off the account information: address,
phone number, and date the account was opened. And then he said, "Hey, listen,
I'm holding up a long line of customers here. What's the credit card number and
expiration date?"
Henry held the cell phone to his ear with one hand while he wrote on a
paper napkin with the other. As he finished the call, he slid the napkin in
front of his father, who stared at it with his mouth hanging open. The to poor guy
looked totally shocked, as if his whole system of trust had just gone down the
drain.

Analyzing the Con
Think of your own attitude when somebody you don't know asks you for
something. If a shabby stranger comes to your door, you're not likely to let him
in; if a stranger comes to your door nicely dressed, shoes shined, hair perfect,
with polite manner and a smile, you're likely to be much less suspicious. Maybe
he's really Jason from the Friday the 13th movies, but you're willing to start out
trusting that person as long as he looks normal and doesn't have a carving knife in
his hand.
What's less obvious is that we judge people on the telephone the same way. Does
this person sound like he's trying to sell me something? Is he friendly and
outgoing or do I sense some kind of hostility or pressure? Does he or she have the
speech of an educated person? We judge these things and perhaps a dozen others
unconsciously, in a flash, often in the first few moments of the conversation.


MITNICK MESSAGE
It's human nature to think that it's unlikely you're being deceived in any particular
transaction, at least until you have some reason to believe otherwise. We weigh
the risks and then, most of the time, give people the benefit of the doubt. That's
the natural behavior of civilized people.., at least civilized people who have never
been conned or manipulated or cheated out of a large amount of money.
As children our parents taught us not to trust strangers. Maybe we should all heed
this age-old principle in today's workplace.

At work, people make requests of us all the time. Do you have an email address
for this guy? Where's the latest version of the customer list? Who's the
subcontractor on this part of the project? Please send me the latest project update.
I need the new version of the source code.

And guess what: Sometimes people who make those requests are people your
don't personally know, folks who work for some other part of the company, or
claim they do. But if the information they give checks out, and they appear to be
in the know ("Marianne said . . ."; "It's on the K-16 server..."; "... revision 26 of
the new product plans"), we extend our circle of trust to include them, and
blithely give them what they're asking for.

Sure, we may stumble a little, asking ourselves "Why does somebody in the
Dallas plant need to see the new product plans?" or "Could it hurt anything to
give out the name of the server it's on?" So we ask another question or two. If the
answers appear reasonable and the person's manner is reassuring, we let down
our guard, return to our natural inclination to trust our fellow man or woman, and
do (within reason) whatever it is we're being asked to do.

And don't think for a moment that the attacker will only target people 'ho use
company computer systems. What about the guy in the mail room? "Will you do
me a quick favor? Drop this into the intra company mail pouch?" Does the mail
room clerk know it contains a floppy disk with a special little program for the
CEO's secretary? Now that attacker gets his own personal copy of the CEO's
email. Wow! Could that really happen at your company? The answer is,
absolutely.

THE ONE-CENT CELL PHONE
Many people look around until the); find a better deal; social engineers don't look
for a better deal, they find a way to make a deal better. For example, sometimes a
company launches a marketing campaign that's so you can hardly bear to pass it
up, while the social engineer looks at the offer and wonders how he can sweeten
the deal.

Not long ago, a nationwide wireless company had a major promotion underway
offering a brand-new phone for one cent when you signed up for one of their
calling plans.

As lots of people have discovered too late, there are a good many questions a
prudent shopper should ask before signing up for a cell phone calling plan
whether the service is analog, digital, or a combination; the number of anytime
minutes you can use in a month; whether roaming charges are included.., and on,
and on. Especially important to understand up front is the contract term of
commitment--how many months or years will you have to commit to?

Picture a social engineer in Philadelphia who is attracted by a cheap phone model
offered by a cellular phone company on sign-up, but he hates the calling plan that
goes with it. Not a problem. Here's one way he might handle the situation.

The First Call: Ted
First, the social engineer dials an electronics chain store on West Girard.

"Electron City. This is Ted."
"Hi, Ted. This is Adam. Listen, I was in a few nights ago talking to a sales guy
about a cell phone. I said I'd call him back when I decided on the plan I wanted,
and I forgot his name. Who's the guy who works in that department on the night
shift?
"There's more than one. Was it William?"
"I'm not sure. Maybe it was William. What's he look like?" "Tall guy. Kind of
skinny."
"I think that's him. What's his last name, again?
"Hadley. H--A--D--L--E-- Y."
"Yeah, that sounds right. When's he going to be on?"
"Don't know his schedule this week, but the evening people come in about five."
"Good. I'll try him this evening, then. Thanks, Ted."

The Second Call: Katie
The next call is to a store of the same chain on North Broad Street.

"Hi, Electron City. Katie speaking, how can I help you?"

"Katie, hi. This is William Hadley, over at the West Girard store. How're you
today?"
"Little slow, what's up?"
"I've got a customer who came in for that one-cent cell phone program. You
    know the one I mean?"
"Right. I sold a couple of those last week."
"You still have some of the phones that go with that plan?"
"Got a stack of them."
"Great. 'Cause I just sold one to a customer. The guy passed credit; we signed
him up on the contract. I checked the damned inventory and we don't have any
phones left. I'm so embarrassed. Can you do me a favor? I'll send him over to
your store to pick up a phone. Can you sell him the phone for one cent and write
him up a receipt? And he's supposed to call me back once he's got the phone so I
can talk him through how to program it."
"Yeah, sure. Send him over."
"Okay. His name is Ted. Ted Yancy."

When the guy who calls himself Ted Yancy shows up at the
North Broad St. store, Katie writes up an invoice and sells him
the cell phone for one cent, just as she had been asked to do
by her "co worker." She fell for the con hook, line, and sinker.

When it's time to pay, the customer doesn't have any pennies in his pocket, so he
reaches into the little dish of pennies at the cashier's counter, takes one out, and
gives it to the girl at the register. He gets the phone without paying even the one
cent for it.

He's then free to go to another wireless company that uses the same model of
phone, and choose any service plan he likes. Preferably one on a month-to-month
basis, with no commitment required.

Analyzing the Con
Its natural for people to have a higher degree of acceptance for anyone who
claims to be a fellow employee, and who knows company procedures ,d lingo.
The social engineer in this story took advantage of that by finding out the details
of a promotion, identifying himself as a company
employee, and asking for a favor from another branch. This happens
between branches of retail stores and between departments in a company, people
are physically separated and deal with fellow employees they have never actually
met day in and day out.


HACKING INTO THE FEDS
People often don't stop to think about what materials their organization is making
available on the Web. For my weekly show on KFI Talk Radio in Los Angeles,
the producer did a search on line and found a copy of an instruction manual for
accessing-the database of the National Crime Information Center. Later he found
the actual NCIC manual itself on line, a sensitive document that gives all the
instructions for retrieving information from the FBI's national crime database.

The manual is a handbook for law enforcement agencies that gives the formatting
and codes for retrieving information on criminals and crimes from the national
database. Agencies all over the country can search the same database for
information to help solve crimes in their own jurisdiction. The manual contains
the codes used in the database for designating everything from different kinds of
tattoos, to different boat hulls, to denominations of stolen money and bonds.

Anybody with access to the manual can look up the syntax and the commands to
extract information from the national database. Then, following instructions from
the procedures guide, with a little nerve, anyone can extract information from the
database. The manual also gives phone numbers to call for support in using the
system. You may have similar manuals in your company offering product codes
or codes for retrieving sensitive information.

The FBI almost certainly has never discovered that their sensitive manual and
procedural instructions are available to anyone on line, and I don't think they'd be
very happy about it if they knew. One copy was posted by a government
department in Oregon, the other by a law enforcement agency in Texas. Why? In
each case, somebody probably thought the information was of no value and
posting it couldn't do any harm. Maybe somebody posted it on their intranet just
as a convenience to their own employees, never realizing that it made the
information available to everyone on the Internet who has access to a good search
engine such as Google - including the just-plain-curious, the wannabe cop, the
hacker, and the organized crime boss.

Tapping into the System
The principle of using such information to dupe someone in the government or a
business setting is the same: Because a social engineer knows how to access
specific databases or applications, or knows the names of a company's computer
servers, or the like, he gains credibility. Credibility leads to trust. Once a social
engineer has such codes, getting the information he needs
is an easy process. In this example, he might begin by calling a clerk in a local
state police Teletype office, and asking a question about one of the codes in the
manual - for example, the offense code. He might say something like, "When I do
an OFF inquiry in the NCIC, I'm getting a "System is down' error. Are you
getting the same thing when you do an OFF? Would you try it for me?" Or
maybe he'd say he was trying to look up a wpf - police talk for a wanted person's
file.
The Teletype clerk on the other end of the phone would pick up the cue
that the caller was familiar with the operating procedures and the commands to
query the NCIC database. Who else other than someone trained in using NCIC
would know these procedures?

After the clerk has confirmed that her system is working okay, the conversation
    might go something like this:
"I could use a little help." "What're you looking for?"
"I need you to do an OFF command on Reardon, Martin. DOB 10118/66."
"What's the sosh?" (Law enforcement people sometimes refer to the
social security number as the sosh.)
"700-14-7435."
After looking for the listing, she might come back with something like,
"He's got a 2602."
The attacker would only have to look at the NCIC on line to find the meaning of
the number: The man has a case of swindling on his record.

Analyzing the Con
An accomplished social engineer wouldn't stop for a minute to ponder ways of
breaking into the NCIC database. Why should he, when a simple call to his local
police department, and some smooth talking so he sounds convincingly like an
insider, is all it takes to get the information he wants? And the next time, he just
calls a different police agency and uses the same pretext.

LINGO
SOSH: Law enforcement slang for a social security number

You might wonder, isn't it risky to call a police department, a sheriff's station, or
a highway patrol office? Doesn't the attacker run a huge risk?

The answer is no . . . and for a specific reason. People in law enforce-ment, like
people in the military, have ingrained in them from the first day in the academy a
respect for rank. As long as the social engineer is posing as a sergeant or
lieutenant--a higher rank than the person he's talking to - the victim will be
governed by that well-learned lesson that says you don't question people who are
in a position of authority over you. Rank, in other words, has its privileges, in
particular the privilege of not being challenged by people of lower rank.

But don't think law enforcement and the military are the only places where this
respect for rank can be exploited by the social engineer. Social engineers often
use authority or rank in the corporate hierarchy as a weapon in their attacks on
businesses - as a number of the stories in these pages demonstrate.
PREVENTING THE CON
What are some steps your organization can take to reduce the likelihood that
social engineers will take advantage of your employees' natural instinct to trust
people? Here are some suggestions.

Protect Your Customers
In this electronic age many companies that sell to the consumer keep credit cards
on file. There are reasons for this: It saves the customer the nuisance of having to
provide the credit card information each time he visits the store or the Web site to
make a purchase. However, the practice should be discouraged.

If you must keep credit card numbers on file, that process needs to be
accompanied by security provisions that go beyond encryption or using access
control. Employees need to be trained to recognize social engineering scams like
the ones in this chapter. That fellow employee you've never met in person but
who has become a telephone friend may not be who he or she claims to be. He
may not have the "need to know" to access sensitive customer information,
because he may not actually work for the company at all.

MITNICK MESSAGE
Everyone should be aware of the social engineer's modus operandi: Gather as
much information about the target as possible, and use that information to gain
trust as an insider. Then go for the jugular!

 Trust Wisely
It's not just the people who have access to clearly sensitive information - the
software engineers, the folks in R&D, and so on - who need to be on the
defensive against intrusions. Almost everyone in your organization needs training
to protect the enterprise from industrial spies and information thieves.

Laying the groundwork for this should begin with a survey of enterprise- wide
information assets, looking separately at each sensitive, critical, or valuable asset,
and asking what methods an attacker might use to compromise those assets
through the use of social engineering tactics. Appropriate training for people who
have trusted access to such information should be designed around the answers to
these questions.

When anyone you don't know personally requests some information or material,
or asks you to perform any task on your computer, have your employees ask
themselves some. questions. If I gave this information to my worst enemy, could
it be used to injure me or my company? Do I completely understand the potential
effect of the commands I am being asked to enter into my computer?
We don't want to go through life being suspicious of every new person we
encounter. Yet the more trusting we are, the more likely that the next social
engineer to arrive in town will be able to deceive us into giving up our company's
proprietary information.

What Belongs on Your Intranet?
Parts of your intranet may be open to the outside world, other parts restricted to
employees. How careful is your company in making sure sensitive information
isn't posted where it's accessible to audiences you meant to protect it from? When
is the last time anyone in your organization checked to see if any sensitive
information on your company's intranet had inadvertently been made available
through the public-access areas of your Web site?

If your company has implemented proxy servers as intermediaries to protect the
enterprise from electronic security threats, have those servers been checked
recently to be sure they're configured properly?

In fact, has anyone ever checked the security of your intranet?
Chapter 5
"Let Me Help You"

We're all grateful when we're plagued by a problem and somebody with the
knowledge, skill, and willingness comes along offering to lend us a hand. The
social engineer understands that, and knows how to take advantage of it.

He also knows how to cause a problem for you.., then make you grateful when he
resolves the problem.., and finally play on your gratitude to extract some
information or a small favor from you that will leave your company (or maybe
you, individually) very much worse off for the encounter. And you may never
even know you've lost something of value. Here are some typical ways that social
engineers step forward to "help."

THE NETWORK OUTAGE
Day/Time: Monday, February 12, 3:25 p.m.
Place: Offices of Starboard Shipbuilding

The First Call: Tom Delay
"Tom DeLay, Bookkeeping."
"Hey, Tom, this is Eddie Martin from the Help Desk. We're trying to
troubleshoot a computer networking problem. Do you know if anyone in your
group has been having trouble staying on line?"
"Uh, not that I know of."
"And you're not having any problems yourself."
"No, seems fine."
"Okay, that's good. Listen, we're calling people who might be affected 'cause itLs
important you let us know right away if you lose your network connection."
"That doesn't sound good. You think it might happen?"
"We hope not, but you'll call if it does, right?"
"You better believe it."
"Listen, sounds like having your network connection go down would be a
problem for you..."
"You bet it would."
"... so while we're working on this, let me give you my cell phone number. Then
you can reach me directly if you need to."
"That'd be great. Go ahead."
"It's 555 867 5309."
"555 867 5309. Got it. Hey, thanks. What was your name again?"
"It's Eddie. Listen, one other thing--I need to check which port your computer is
connected to. Take a look on your computer and see if there's a sticker
somewhere that says something like 'Port Number'."
"Hang on No, don't see anything like that."
"Okay, then in the back of the computer, can you recognize the network cable."
"Yeah."
"Trace it back to where it's plugged in. See if there's a label on the jack it's
plugged into."
"Hold on a second. Yeah, wait a minute - I have to squat down here so I can get
close enough to read it. Okay - it says Port 6 dash 47."
"Good - that's what we had you down as, just making sure."

The Second Call: The IT Guy
Two days later, a call came through to the same company's Network Operations
Center.

"Hi, this is Bob; I'm in Tom DeLay's office in Bookkeeping. We're trying to
troubleshoot a cabling problem. I need you to disable Port 6-47."

The IT guy said it would be done in just a few minutes, and to let them know
when he was ready to have it enabled.

The Third Call: Getting Help from the Enemy
 About an hour later, the guy who called himself Eddie Martin was shopping at
Circuit City when his cell phone rang. He checked the caller ID, saw the call was
from the shipbuilding company, and hurried to a quiet spot before answering.

"Help Desk, Eddie."
"Oh, hey, Eddie. You've got an echo, where are you?"
"I'm, uh, in a cabling closet. Who's this?
"It's Tom DeLay. Boy, am I glad I got ahold of you. Maybe you remember you
called me the other day? My network connection just went down like you said it
might, and I'm a little panicky here."
"Yeah, we've got a bunch of people down right now. We should have it taken
care of by the end of the day. That okay?"
"NO! Damn, I'll get way behind if I'm down that long. What's the best you can do
for me?"
"How pressed are you?"
"I could do some other things for right now. Any chance you could take care of it
in half an hour?"
"HALF AN HOUR! You don't want much. Well, look, I'll drop what I'm doing
and see if I can tackle it for you."
"Hey, I really appreciate that, Eddie."

The Fourth Call: Gotcha!
Forty-five minutes later...
"Tom? It's Eddie. Go ahead and try your network connection."

After a couple of moments:

"Oh, good, it's working. That's just great."
"Good, glad I could take care of it for you."
"Yeah, thanks a lot."
"Listen, if you want to make sure your connection doesn't go down again, there's
some software you oughta be running. Just take a couple of minutes."
"Now's not the best time."
"I understand... It could save us both big headaches the next time this network
   problem happens."
"Well . . . if it's only a few minutes."
"Here's what you do..."

Eddie then took Tom through the steps of downloading a small application from a
Web site. After the program had downloaded, Eddie told Tom to double-click on
it. He tried, but reported:

"It's not working. It's not doing anything."
"Oh, what a pain. Something must be wrong with the program. Let's just get rid
of it, we can try again another time." And he talked Tom through the steps of
deleting the program so it couldn't be recovered.

Total elapsed time, twelve minutes.

The Attacker's Story
Bobby Wallace always thought it was laughable when he picked up a good
assignment like this one and his client pussyfooted around the unasked but
obvious question of why they wanted the information. In this case he could only
think of two reasons. Maybe they represented some outfit that was interested in
buying the target company, Starboard Shipbuilding, and wanted to know what
kind of financial shape they were really in - especially all the stuff the target
might want to keep hidden from a potential buyer. Or maybe they represented
investors who thought there was something fishy about the way the money was
being handled and wanted to find out whether some of the executives had a case
of hands-in-the cookie-jar.

And maybe his client also didn't want to tell him the real reason because, if
Bobby knew how valuable the information was, he'd probably want more money
for doing the job.
There are a lot of ways to crack into a company's most secret files. Bobby spent a
few days mulling over the choices and doing a little checking around before he
decided on a plan. He settled on one that called for an approach he especially
liked, where the target is set up so that he asks the attacker for help.

For starters, Bobby picked up a $39.95 cell phone at a convenience store. He
placed a call to the man he had chosen as his target, passed himself off as being
from the company help desk, and set things up so the man would call Bobby's
cell phone any time he found a problem with his network connection.

He left a pause of two days so as not to be too obvious, and then made a call to
the network operations center (NOC) at the company. He claimed he was trouble-
shooting a problem for Tom, the target, and asked to have Tom's network
connection disabled. Bobby knew this was the trickiest part of the whole
escapade - in many companies, the help desk people work closely with the NOC;
in fact, he knew the help desk is often part of the IT organization. But the
indifferent NOC guy he spoke with treated the call as routine, didn't ask for the
name of the help desk person who was supposedly working on the networking
problem, and agreed to disable the target's network port. When done, Tom would
be totally isolated from the company's intranet, unable to retrieve files from the
server, exchange files with his co-workers, download his email, or even send a
page of data to the printer. In today's world, that's like living in a cave.

As Bobby expected, it wasn't long before his cell phone rang. Of course he made
himself sound eager to help this poor "fellow employee" in distress. Then he
called the NOC and had the man's network connection turned back on. Finally,
he called the man and manipulated him once again, this time making him feel
guilty for saying no after Bobby had done him a favor. Tom agreed to the request
that he download a piece of software to his computer.

Of course, what he agreed to wasn't exactly what it seemed. The software that
Tom was told would keep his network connection from going down, was really a
Trojan Horse, a software application that did for Tom's computer what the
original deception did for the Trojans: It brought the enemy inside the camp. Tom
reported that nothing happened when he double-clicked on the software icon; the
fact was that, by design, he couldn't see anything happening, even though the
small application was installing a secret program that would allow the infiltrator
covert access to Tom's computer.

With the software running, Bobby was provided with complete control over
Tom's computer, an arrangement known as a remote command shell. When
Bobby accessed Tom's computer, he could look for the accounting files that
might be of interest and copy them. Then, at his leisure, he'd examine them for
the information that would give his clients what they were looking for.

LINGO
TROJAN HORSE: A program containing malicious or harmful code, designed to
damage the victim's computer or files, or obtain information from the victim's
computer or network. Some Trojans are designed to hide within the computer's
operating system and spy on every keystroke or action, or accept instruction over
a network connection to perform some function, all without the victim being
aware of its presence.

And that wasn't all. He could go back at any time to search through the email
messages and private memos of the company's executives, running a text search
for words that might reveal any interesting tidbits of information.

Late on the night that he conned his target into installing the Trojan Horse
software, Bobby threw the cell phone into a Dumpster. Of course he was careful
to clear the memory first and pull the battery out before he tossed it - the last
thing he wanted was for somebody to call the cell phone's number by mistake and
have the phone start ringing!

Analyzing the Con
The attacker spins a web to convince the target he has a problem that, in fact,
doesn't really exist - or, as in this case, a problem that hasn't happened yet, but
that the attacker knows will happen because he's going to cause it. He then
presents himself as the person who can provide the solution.

The setup in this kind of attack is particularly juicy for the attacker:
Because of the seed planted in advance, when the target discovers he has
a problem, he himself makes the phone call to plead for help. The attacker
just sits and waits for the phone to ring, a tactic fondly known in the trade
as reverse social engineering. An attacker who can make the target call him
gains instant credibility: If I place a call to someone I think is on the help desk,
I'm not going to start asking him to prove his identity. That's when the attacker
has it made.


LINGO
REMOTE COMMAND SHELL: A non graphical interface that accepts text
based commands to perform certain functions or run programs. An attacker who
exploits technical vulnerabilities or is able to install a Trojan Horse program on
the victims computer may be able to obtain remote access to a command shell
REVERSE SOCIAL ENGINEERING: A social engineering attack in which the
attacker sets up a situation where the victim encounters a problem and contacts
the attacker for help. Another form of reverse social engineering turns the tables
on the attacker. The target recognizes the attack, and uses psychological
principles of influence to draw out as much information as possible from the
attacker so that the business can safeguard targeted assets.

MITNICK MESSAGE
If a stranger does you a favor, then asks you for a favor, don't reciprocate without
thinking carefully about what he's asking for.

In a con like this one, the social engineer tries to pick a target who is likely to
have limited knowledge of computers. The more he knows, the more likely that
he'll get suspicious, or just plain figure out that he's being manipulated. What I
sometimes call the computer-challenged worker, who is less knowledgeable
about technology and procedures, is more likely to comply. He's all the more
likely to fall for a ruse like "Just download this little program," because he has no
idea of the potential damage a software program can inflict. What's more, there's
a much smaller chance he'll understand the value of the information on the
computer network that he's placing at risk.


A LITTLE HELP FOR THE NEW GAL
New employees are a ripe target for attackers. They don't know many people yet,
they don't know the procedures or the dos and don'ts of the company. And, in the
name of making a good first impression, they're eager show how cooperative and
quick to respond they can be.

Helpful Andrea
"Human Resources, Andrea Calhoun."
"Andrea, hi, this is Alex, with Corporate Security."
"Yes?"
"How're you doing today?"
"Okay. What can I help you with?"
"Listen, we're developing a security seminar for new employees and we need to
round up some people to try it out on. I want to get the name and phone number
of all the new hires in the past month. Can you help me with that?"
"I won't be able to get to it 'til this afternoon. Is that okay?
"What's your extension?"
"Sure, okay, it's 52 . . . oh, uh, but I'll be in meetings most of today. I'll call you
when I'm back in my office, probably after four."
When Alex called about 4:30, Andrea had the list ready, and read him the names
and extensions.

A Message for Rosemary
Rosemary Morgan was delighted with her new job. She had never worked for a
magazine before and was finding the people much friendlier than she expected, a
surprise because of the never-ending pressure most of the staff was always under
to get yet another issue finished by the monthly deadline. The call she received
one Thursday morning reconfirmed that impression of friendliness.
"Is that Rosemary Morgan?"
"Yes."
"Hi, Rosemary. This is Bill Jorday, with the Information Security group."
"Yes?"
"Has anyone from our department discussed best security practices with you?"
"I don't think so."
"Well, let's see. For starters, we don't allow anybody to install software brought
in from outside the company. That's because we don't want any liability for
unlicensed use of software. And to avoid any problems with software that might
have a worm or a virus."
"Okay."
"Are you aware of our email policies?"
"No."
"What's your current email address?" "Rosemary@ttrzine.net."
"Do you sign in under the username Rosemary?"
"No, it's R underscore Morgan."
"Right. We like to make all our new employees aware that it can be dangerous to
open any email attachment you aren't expecting. Lots of viruses and worms get
sent around and they come in emails that seem to be from people you know. So if
you get an email with an attachment you weren't expecting you should always
check to be sure the person listed as sender really did send you the message. You
understand?"
"Yes, I've heard about that."
"Good. And our policy is that you change your password every ninety days.
When did you last change your password?"
"I've only been here three weeks; I'm still using the one I first set."
"Okay, that's fine. You can wait the rest of the ninety days. But we need to be
sure people are using passwords that aren't too easy to guess. Are you using a
password that consists of both letters and numbers?"
"No."
We need to fix that. What password are you using now?"
"It's my daughter's name - Annette."
"That's really not a secure password. You should never choose a password that's
based on family information. Well, let's see.., you could do the same thing I do.
It's okay to use what you're using now as the first part of the password, but then
each time you change it, add a number for the current month."
"So if I did that now, for March, would I use three, or oh-three."
"That's up to you. Which would you be more comfortable with?"
"I guess Annette-three."
"Fine. Do you want me to walk you through how to make the change?"
"No, I know how."
"Good. And one more thing we need to talk about. You have anti-virus software
on your computer and it's important to keep it up to date. You should never
disable the automatic update even if your computer slows down every once in a
while. Okay?"
"Sure."
"Very good. And do you have our phone number over here,
so you can call us if you have any computer problems?"
She didn't. He gave her the number, she wrote it down carefully, and went back
to work, once again, pleased at how well taken care of she felt.


Analyzing the Con
This story reinforces an underlying theme you'll find throughout this book: The
most common information that a social engineer wants from an employee,
regardless of his ultimate goal, is the target's authentication credentials. With an
account name and password in hand from a single employee in the right area of
the company, the attacker has what he needs to get inside and locate whatever
information he's after. Having this information is like finding the keys to the
kingdom; with them in hand, he can move freely around the corporate landscape
and find the treasure he seeks.


MITNICK MESSAGE
Before new employees are allowed access to any company computer systems,
they must be trained to follow good security practices, especially policies about
never disclosing their passwords.

NOT AS SAFE AS YOU THINK
"The company that doesn't make an effort to protect its sensitive information is
just plain negligent." A lot of people would agree with that statement. And the
world would be a better place if life were so obvious and so simple. The truth is
that even those companies that do make an effort to protect confidential
information may be at serious risk.
Here's a story that illustrates once again how companies fool themselves every
day into thinking their security practices, designed by experienced, competent,
professionals, cannot be circumvented.

Steve Cramer's Story
It wasn't a big lawn, not one of those expensively seeded spreads. It garnered no
envy. And it certainly wasn't big enough to give him an excuse for buying a sit-
down mower, which was fine because he wouldn't have used one anyway. Steve
enjoyed cutting the grass with a hand-mower because it took longer, and the
chore provided a convenient excuse to focus on his own thoughts instead of
listening to Anna telling him stories about the people at the bank where she
worked or explaining errands for him to do. He hated those honey-do lists that
had become an integral part of his weekends. It flashed though his mind that 12-
year-old Pete was damn smart to join the swimming team. Now he'd have to be at
practice or a meet every Saturday so he wouldn't get stuck with Saturday chores.

Some people might think Steve's job designing new devices for GeminiMed
Medical Products was boring; Steve knew he was saving lives. Steve thought of
himself as being in a creative line of work. Artist, music composer, engineer - in
Steve's view they all faced the same kind of challenge he did: They created
something that no one had ever done before. And his latest, an intriguingly clever
new type of heart stent, would be his proudest achievement yet.

It was almost 11:30 on this particular Saturday, and Steve was annoyed because
he had almost finished cutting the grass and hadn't made any real progress in
figuring out how to reduce the power requirement on the heart stent, the last
remaining hurdle. A perfect problem to mull over while mowing, but no solution
had come.

Anna appeared at the door, her hair covered in the red paisley cowboy scarf she
always wore when dusting. "Phone call," she shouted to him. "Somebody from
work."
"Who?" Steve shouted back.
"Ralph something. I think."
Ralph? Steve couldn't remember anybody at GeminiMed named Ralph who
might be calling on a weekend. But Anna probably had the name wrong.

"Steve, this is Ramon Perez in Tech Support." Ramon - how in the world did
Anna get from a Hispanic name to Ralph, Steve wondered.
"This is just a courtesy call,, Ramon was saying. "Three of the servers are down,
we think maybe a worm, and we have to wipe the drives and restore from backup.
We should be able to have your files up and running by Wednesday or
Thursday. If we're lucky."
"Absolutely unacceptable," Steve said firmly, trying not to let his frustration take
over. How could these people be so stupid? Did they really think he could
manage without access to his files all weekend and most of next week? "No way.
I'm going to sit down at my home terminal in just about two hours and I will need
access to my files. Am I making this clear?"

"Yeah, well, everybody I've called so far wants to be at the top of the list.
I gave up my weekend to come in and work on this and it's no fun having
everybody I talk to get pissed at me."
"I'm on a tight deadline, the company is counting on this; I've got to get work
done this afternoon. What part of this do you not understand?"
"I've still got a lot of people to call before I can even get started," Ramon laid.
"How about we say you'll have your files by Tuesday?"
"Not Tuesday, not Monday, today. NOW!" Steve said, wondering who he
was going to call if he couldn't get his point through this guy's thick skull.
"Okay, okay," Ramon said, and Steve could hear him breathe a sigh of
annoyance. "Let me see what I can do to get you going. You use the RM22
server, right?"
"RM22 and the GM16. Both."
"Right. Okay, I can cut some corners, save some time--I'll need your username
and password."
Uh oh, Steve thought. What's going on here? Why would he need my password?
Why would IT, of all people, ask for it?
"What did you say your last name was? And who's your supervisor?" "Ramon
Perez. Look, I tell you what, when you were hired, there was a form you had to
fill out to get your user account, and you had to put down a password. I could
look that up and show you we've got it on file here. Okay?"
Steve mulled that over for a few moments, then agreed. He hung on with growing
impatience while Ramon went to retrieve documents from a file cabinet. Finally
back on the phone, Steve could hear him shuffling through a stack of papers.
"Ah, here it is," Ramon said at last. "You put down the password 'Janice.'" Janice,
Steve thought. It was his mother's name, and he had indeed sometimes used it as
a password. He might very well have put that down for his password when filling
out his new-hire papers.
"Yes, that's right," he acknowledged.
"Okay, we're wasting time here. You know I'm for real, you want me to           use
the shortcut and get your files back in a hurry, you re gonna have to help        me
out                                                                            here."
"My ID is s, d, underscore, cramer--c-r-a-m-e-r. The password is 'pelican 1 .'"
"I'll get right on it," Ramon said, sounding helpful at last. "Give me a couple of
hours."
Steve finished the lawn, had lunch, and by the time he got to his computer found
that his files had indeed been restored. He was pleased with himself for handling
that uncooperative IT guy so forcefully, and hoped Anna had heard how assertive
he was. Would be good to give the guy or his boss an attaboy, but he knew it
was one of those things he'd never get around to doing.




Craig Cogburne's Story
Craig Cogburne had been a salesman for a high-tech company, and done well at
it. After a time he began to realize he had a skill for reading a customer,
understanding where the person was resistant and recognizing
some weakness or vulnerability that made it easy to close the sale. He began to
think about other ways to use this talent, and the path eventually led him into a
far more lucrative field: corporate espionage.

This one was a hot assignment. Didn't look to take me very long and worth
enough to pay for a trip to Hawaii. Or maybe Tahiti.

The guy that hired me, he didn't tell me the client, of course, but it figured to be
some company that wanted to catch up with the competition in one quick, big,
easy leap. All I'd have to do is get the designs and product specs for a new
gadget called a heart stent, whatever that was. The company was called
GeminiMed. Never heard of it, but it was a Fortune 500 outfit with offices in half
a dozen locations - which makes the job easier than a smaller company where
there's a fair chance the guy you're talking to knows the guy you're claiming to be
and knows you're not him. This, like pilots say about a midair collision, can ruin
your whole day.

My client sent me a fax, a bit from some doctor's magazine that said GeminiMed
was working on a stent with a radical new design and it would be called the STH-
IO0. For crying out loud, some reporter has already done a big piece of the
legwork for me. I had one thing I needed even before I got started, the new
product name.

First problem: Get names of people in the company who worked on the STH-100
or might need to see the designs. So I called the switchboard operator and said, "I
promised one of the people in your engineering group I'd get in touch with him
and I don't remember his last name, but his first name started with an S." And she
said, "We have a Scott Archer and a Sam Davidson." I took a long shot. "Which
one works in the STH100 group?" She didn't know, so I just picked Scott Archer
at random, and she rang his phone.
When he answered, I said, "Hey, this is Mike, in the mail room. We've got a
FedEx here that's for the Heart Stent STH-100 project team. Any idea who that
should go to?" He gave me the name of the project leader, Jerry Mendel. I even
got him to look up the phone number for me.

I called. Mendel wasn't there but his voice mail message said he'd be on vacation
till the thirteenth, which meant he had another week left for skiing or whatever,
and anybody who needed something in the meantime should call Michelle on
9137. Very helpful, these people. Very helpful.

I hung up and called Michelle, got her on the phone and said, "This is Bill
Thomas. Jerry told me I should call you when I had the spec ready that he
wanted the guys on his team to review. You're working on the heart stent, right?"
She said they were.

Now we were getting to the sweaty part of the scam. If she started sounding
suspicious, I was ready to play the card about how I was just trying to
do a favor Jerry had asked me for. I said, "Which system are you on?"
"System?"
"Which computer servers does your group use?"
"Oh," she said, "RM22. And some of the group also use GM16." Good. I needed
that, and it was a piece of information I could get from her without making her
suspicious. Which softened her up for the next bit, done as casually as I could
manage. "Jerry said you could give me a list of email addresses for people on the
development team," I said, and held my breath.
"Sure. The distribution list is too long to read off, can I email it to you?"

Oops. Any email address that didn't end in GeminiMed.com would be
a huge red flag. "How about you fax it to me?" I said.
She had no problem with doing that.

"Our fax machine is on the blink. I'll have to get the number of another one. Call
you back in a bit," I said, and hung up.

Now, you might think I was saddled with a sticky problem here, but it's just
another routine trick of the trade. I waited a while so my voice wouldn't sound
familiar to the receptionist, then called her and said, "Hi, it's Bill Thomas, our fax
machine isn't working up here, can I have a fax sent to your machine?" She said
sure, and gave me the number.

Then I just walk in and pick up the fax, right? Of course not. First rule: Never
visit the premises unless you absolutely have to. They have a hard time
identifying you if you're just a voice on the telephone. And if they can't identify
you, they can't arrest you. It's hard to put handcuffs around a voice. So I called
the receptionist back after a little while and asked her, did my fax come? "Yes,"
she said.

"Look," I told her, "I've got to get that to a consultant we're using. Could you
send it out for me?" She agreed. And why not--how could any receptionist be
expected to recognize sensitive data? While she sent the fax out to the
"consultant," I had my exercise for the day walking over to a stationery store near
me, the one with the sign out front "Faxes Sent/Rcvd." My fax was supposed to
arrive before I did, and as expected, it was there waiting for me when I walked in.
Six pages at $1.75. For a $10 bill and change, I had the group's entire list of
names and email addresses.

Getting Inside
Okay, so I had by now talked to three or four different people in only a few hours
and was already one giant step closer to getting inside the company's computers.
But I'd need a couple more pieces before I was home.

Number one was the phone number for dialing into the Engineering server from
outside. I called GeminiMed again and asked the switchboard operator for the IT
Department, and asked the guy who answered for somebody who could give me
some computer help. He transferred me, and I put on an act of being confused
and kind of stupid about anything technical. "I'm at home, just bought a new
laptop, and I need to set it up o I can dial in from outside."

The procedure was obvious but I patiently let him talk me through it until he got
to the dial-in phone number. He gave me the number like it was just another
routine piece of information. Then I made him wait while I tried it. Perfect.

So now I had passed the hurdle of connecting to the network. I dialed in and
found they were set up with a terminal server that would let a caller connect to
any computer on their internal network. After a bunch of tries I stumbled across
somebody's computer that had a guest account with no password required. Some
operating systems, when first installed, direct the user to set up an ID and
password, but also provide a guest account. The user is supposed to set his or her
own password for the guest account or disable it, but most people don't know
about this, or just don't bother. This system was probably just set up and the
owner hadn't bothered to disable the guest account.

LINGO
PASSWOPRD HASH: A string of gibberish that results from processing a
password through a one way encryption process. The process is supposedly
irreversible; that is, its believed that it is not possible to reconstruct the password
from the hash

Thanks to the guest account, I now had access to one computer, which turned out
to be running an older version of the UNIX operating system. Under UNIX, the
operating system maintains a password file which con- rains the encrypted
passwords of everybody authorized to access that computer. The password file
contains the one-way hash (that is, a form of encryption that is irreversible) of
every user's password. With a one-way hash an actual password such as, say,
"justdoit" would be represented by a hash in encrypted form; in this case the hash
would be converted by UNIX to thirteen alphanumeric characters.

When Billy Bob down the hall wants to transfer some files to a computer, he's
required to identify himself by providing a username and password. The system
program that" checks his authorization encrypts the password he enters, and then
compares the result to the encrypted password (the hash) contained in the
password file; if the two match, he's given access.

Because the passwords in the file were encrypted, the file itself was made
available to any user on the theory that there's no known way to decrypt the
passwords. That's a laugh - I downloaded the file, ran a dictionary attack on it
(see Chapter 12 for more about this method) and found that one of the engineers
on the development team, a guy named Steven Cramer, currently had an account
on the computer with the password "Janice." Just on the chance, I tried entering
his account with that password on one of the development servers; if it had
worked, it would have saved me some time and a little risk. It didn't.

That meant I'd have to trick the guy into telling me his username and password.
For that, I'd wait until the weekend. 70 You already know the rest. On Saturday I
called Cramer and walked him through a ruse about a worm and the servers
having to be restored from backup to overcome his suspicions.

What about the story I told him, the one about listing a password when he filled
out his employee papers? I was counting on him not remembering that had never
happened. A new employee fills out so many forms that, years later, who would
remember? And anyway, if I had struck out with him, I still had that long list of
other names.

With his username and password, I got into the server, fished around for a little
while, and then located the design files for the STH-100. I wasn't exactly sure
which ones were key, so I just transferred all the files to a dead drop, a free FTP
site in China, where they could be stored without anybody getting suspicious. Let
the client sort through the junk and find what he wants.
LINGO
DEAD DROP A place for leaving information where it is unlikely to be found by
others. In the world of traditional spies, this might be behind a loose stone in a
wall; in the world of the computer hacker, it's commonly an Internet site in a
remote country.

Analyzing the Con
For the man we're calling Craig Cogburne, or anyone like him equally skilled in
the larcenous-but-not-always-illegal arts of social engineering, the challenge
presented here was almost routine. His goal was to locate and download files
stored on a secure corporate computer, protected by a firewall and all the usual
security technologies.

Most of his work was as easy as catching rainwater in a barrel. He began
by posing as somebody from the mail room and furnished an added sense of
urgency by claiming there was a FedEx package waiting to be delivered. This
deception produced the name of the team leader for the heart-stent engineering
group, who was on vacation, but - convenient for any social engineer trying to
steal information - he had helpfully left the name and phone number of his
assistant. Calling her, Craig defused any suspicions by claiming that he was
responding to a request from the team leader. With the team leader out of town,
Michelle had no way to verify his claim. She accepted it as the truth and had no
problem providing a list of people in the group - for Craig, a necessary and highly
prized set of information.

She didn't even get suspicious when Craig wanted the list sent by fax instead of
by email, ordinarily more convenient on both ends. Why was she so gullible?
Like many employees, she didn't want her boss to return to town and find she had
stonewalled a caller who was just trying to do something the boss had asked him
for. Besides, the caller said that the boss had not just authorized the request, but
asked for his assistance. Once again, here's an example of someone displaying the
strong desire to be a team player, which makes most people susceptible to
deception.

Craig avoided the risk of physically entering the building simply by having the
fax sent to the receptionist, knowing she was likely to be helpful. Receptionists
are, after all, usually chosen for their charming personalities and their ability to
make a good impression. Doing small favors like receiving a fax and sending it
on comes with the receptionist's territory, a fact that Craig was able to take
advantage of. What she was ending out happened to be information that might
have raised alarm bells with anyone knowing the value of the information - but
how could receptionist be expected to know which information is benign and
which sensitive?
Using a different style of manipulation, Craig acted confused and naïve to
convince the guy in computer operations to provide him with the dial up access
number to the company's terminal server, the hardware used as a connection
point to other computer systems within the internal network.


MITNICK MESSAGE
Everybody's first priority at work is to get the job done. Under that pressure,
security practices often take second place and are overlooked or ignored. Social
engineers rely on this when practicing their craft.

Craig was able to connect easily by trying a default password that had never been
changed, one of the glaring, wide-open gaps that exist throughout many internal
networks that rely on firewall security. In fact, the default passwords for many
operating systems, routers, and other types of products, including PBXs, are
made available on line. Any social engineer, hacker, or industrial spy, as well as
the just plain curious, can find the list at http://www.phenoelit.de/dpl/dpl.html.
(It's absolutely incredible how easy the Internet makes life for those who know
where to look. And now you know, too.)

Cogburne then actually managed to convince a cautious, suspicious man
("What did you say your last name was? Who's your supervisor?") to divulge his
username and password so that he could access servers used by the     heart-stent
development team. This was like leaving Craig with an open door to browse the
company's most closely guarded secrets and download the plans for the new
product.
What if Steve Cramer had continued to be suspicious about Craig's call? It was
unlikely he would do anything about reporting his suspicions until he showed up
at work on Monday morning, which would have been too late to prevent the
attack.

One key to the last part of the ruse: Craig at first made himself sound
lackadaisical and uninterested in Steve's concerns, then changed his tune and
sounded as if he was trying to help so Steve could get his work done. Most of the
time, if the victim believes you're trying to help him or do him some kind of
favor, he will part with confidential information that he would have otherwise
protected carefully.

PREVENTING THE CON
One of the most powerful tricks of the social engineer involves turning the tables.
That's what you've seen in this chapter. The social engineer creates the problem,
and then magically solves the problem, deceiving the victim into providing
access to the company's most guarded secrets. Would your employees fall for this
type of ruse? Have you bothered to draft and distribute specific security rules that
could help to prevent it?

Educate, Educate, and Educate...
There's an old story about a visitor to New York who stops a man on the street
and asks, "How do I get to Carnegie Hall?" The man answers, "Practice, practice,
practice." Everyone is so vulnerable to social engineering attacks that a
company's only effective defense is to educate and train your people, giving them
the practice they need to spot a social engineer. And then keep reminding people
on a consistent basis of what they learned in the training, but are all too apt to
forget.

Everyone in the organization must be trained to exercise an appropriate degree of
suspicion and caution when contacted by someone he or she doesn't personally
know, especially when that someone is asking for any sort of access to a
computer or network. It's human nature to want to trust others, but as the
Japanese say, business is war. Your business cannot afford to let down its guard.
Corporate security policy must clearly define appropriate and inappropriate
behavior.

Security is not one-size-fits-all. Business personnel usually have disparate roles
and responsibilities and each position has associated vulnerabilities. There
should be a base level of training that everyone in the company is required to
complete, and then people must also be trained according to their job profile to
adhere to certain procedures that will reduce the chance that they will become
part of the problem. People who work with sensitive information or are placed in
positions of trust should be given additional specialized training.

Keeping Sensitive Information Safe
When people are approached by a stranger offering to help, as seen in the stories
in this chapter, they have to fall back on corporate security policy that is tailored
as appropriate to the business needs, size, and culture of your company.
NOTE
Personally, I don’t believe any business should allow any exchange of passwords.
Its much easier to establish a hard rule that forbids personnel from ever sharing or
exchanging confidential passwords. Its safer, too. But each business has to assess
its own culture and security concerns in making this choice

Never cooperate with a stranger who asks you to look up information, enter
unfamiliar commands into a computer, make changes to software settings or - the
most potentially disastrous of all - open an email attachment or download
unchecked software. Any software program - even one that appears to do nothing
at all - may not be as innocent as it appears to be.
There are certain procedures that, no matter how good our training, we tend to
grow careless about over time. Then we forget about that training at crunch time,
just when we need it. You would think that not giving out your account name and
password is something that just about everybody knows (or should know) and
hardly needs to be told: it's simple common sense. But in fact, every employee
needs to be reminded frequently that giving out the account name and password
to their office computer, their home computer, or even the postage machine in the
mail room is equivalent to giving out the PIN number for their ATM card.

There is occasionally - very occasionally - a quite valid circumstance when it's
necessary, perhaps even important, to give someone else confidential
information. For that reason, it's not appropriate to make an absolute rule about
"never." Still, your security policies and procedures do need to be very specific
about circumstances under which an employee may give out his or her password
and - most importantly--who is authorized to ask for the information.

Consider the Source
In most organizations, the rule should be that any information that can possibly
cause harm to the company or to a. fellow employee may be given only to
someone who is known on a face-to-face basis, or whose voice is so familiar that
you recognize it without question.
In high-security situations, the only requests that should be granted are ones
delivered in person or with a strong form of authentication--for example, two
separate items such as a shared secret and a time-based token.

Data classification procedures must designate that no information be provided
from a part of the organization involved with sensitive work to anyone not
personally known or vouched for in some manner.

NOTE
Incredibly, even looking up the name and phone number of the caller in the
company's employee database and calling him back is not an absolute guarantee
social engineers know ways of planting names in a corporate database or
redirecting telephone calls.

So how do you handle a legitimate-sounding request for information from
another company employee, such as the list of names and email addresses of
people in your group? In fact, how do you raise awareness so that an item like
this, which is clearly less valuable than, say, a spec sheet for a product under
development, is recognized as something for internal use only? One major part of
the solution: Designate employees in each department who will handle all
requests for information to be sent outside the group. An advanced security-
training program must then be provided to make these designated employees
aware of the special verification procedures they should follow.

Forget Nobody
Anyone can quickly rattle off the identity of organizations within her company
that need a high degree of protection against malicious attacks. But we often
overlook other places that are less obvious, yet highly vulnerable. In one of these
stories, the request for a fax to be sent to a phone number within the company
seemed innocent and secure enough, yet the attacker took advantage of this
security loophole. The lesson here: Everybody from secretaries and
administrative assistants to company executives and high-level managers needs to
have special security training so that they can be alert to these types of tricks.
And don't forget to guard the front door: Receptionists, too, are often prime
targets for social engineers and must also be made aware of the deceptive
techniques used by some visitors and callers.

Corporate security should establish a single point of contact as a kind of central
clearinghouse for employees who think they may have been the target of a social
engineering ruse. Having a single place to report security incidents will provide
an effective early-warning system that will make it dear when a coordinated
attack is under way, so that any damage can be controlled immediately.
Chapter 6
"Can You Help Me?"

You’ve seen how social engineers trick people by offering to help.Another
favorite approach turns the tables: The social engineer manipulates by pretending
he needs the other person to help him. We can all sympathize with people in a
tight spot, and the approach proves effective over and over again in allowing a
social engineer to reach his goal.

THE OUT-OF TOWNER
A story in Chapter 3 showed how an attacker can talk a victim into revealing his
employee number. This one uses a different approach for achieving the same
result, and then shows how the attacker can make use of that

Keeping Up with the Joneses
In Silicon Valley there is a certain global company that shall be nameless. The
scattered sales offices and other field installations around the worldare all
connected to that company's headquarters over a WAN, a wide area network. The
intruder, a smart, feisty guy named Brian Atterby, knew it was almost always
easier to break into a network at one of the remote sites where security is
practically guaranteed to be more lax than at headquarters.

The intruder phoned the Chicago office and asked to speak with Mr Jones.
The receptionist asked if he knew Mr. Jones's first name; he answered,
"I had it here, I'm looking for it. How many Joneses do you have?" She said,
"Three. Which department would he be in?"
He said, "If you read me the names, maybe I'll recognize it." So she did:
"Barry, Joseph, and Gordon."
"Joe. I'm pretty sure that was it," he said. "And he was in .. which
department?"
"Business Development."
"Fine. Can you connect me, please?"
She put the call through. When Jones answered, the attacker said, "Mr.
Jones? Hi, this is Tony in Payroll. We just put through your request to have your
paycheck deposited directly to your credit union account."
"WHAT???!!! You've got to be kidding. I didn't make any request like that. I
don't even have an account at a credit union."
"Oh, damn, I already put it through."
Jones was more than a little upset at the idea that his paycheck might be
going to someone else's account, and he was beginning to think the guy on the
other end of the phone must be a little slow. Before he could even reply, the
attacker said, "I better see what happened. Payroll changes are entered by
employee number. What's your employee number?"
Jones gave the number. The caller said, "No, you're right, the request wasn't from
you, then." They get more stupid every year, Jones thought.
"Look, I'll see it's taken care of. I'll put in a correction right now. So don't worry -
you'll get your next paycheck okay," the guy said reassuringly.

A Business Trip
Not long after, the system administrator in the company's Austin, Texas, sales
office received a phone call. "This is Joseph Jones," the caller announced. "I'm in
Business Development at corporate. I'll be in to, for the week, at the Driskill
Hotel. I'd like to have you set me up with a temporary account so I can access my
email without making a long distance call."

"Let me get that name again, and give me your employee number," the sys admin
said. The false Jones gave the number and went on, "Do you have any high speed
dial-up numbers.

"Hold on, buddy. I gotta verify you in the database." After a bit, he said, "Okay,
Joe. Tell me, what's your building number?" The attacker had done his
homework and had the answer ready


MITNICK MESSAGE
Don't rely on network safeguards and firewalls to protect your information. Look
to your most vulnerable spot. You'll usually find that vulnerability lies in your
people.

"Okay," the sys admin told him, "you convinced me."

It was as simple as that. The sys admin had verified the name Joseph Jones, the
department, and the employee number, and "Joe" had given the right answer to
the test question. "Your username's going to be the same as your corporate one,
jbjones," the sys admin said, "and I'm giving you an initial password of
'changeme.'"


Analyzing the Con
With a couple of phone calls and fifteen minutes of time, the attacker had gained
access to the company's wide area network. This was a company that, like many,
had what I refer to as candy security, after a description first used by two Bell
Labs researchers, Steve Bellovin and Steven Cheswick. They described such
security as "a hard crunchy shell with a oft chewy center" - like an M&M candy.
The outer shell, the firewall, Bellovin and Cheswick argued, is not sufficient
protection, because once an intruder is able to circumvent it, the internal
computer systems have soft, chewy security. Most of the time, they are
inadequately protected.

This story fits the definition. With a dial-up number and an account, the attacker
didn't even have to bother trying to defeat an Internet firewall, and, once inside,
he was easily able to compromise most of the systems on the internal network.

Through my sources, I understand this exact ruse was worked on one of the
largest computer software manufacturers in the world. You would think the
systems administrators in such a company would be trained to detect this type of
ruse. But in my experience, nobody is completely safe if a social engineer is
clever and persuasive enough.

LINGO
CANDY SECURITY A term coined by Bellovin and Cheswick of Bell Labs to
describe a security scenario where the outer perimeter, such as firewall, is strong,
but the infrastructure behind it is weak. The term refers to M&M candy, which
has a hard outer shell and soft center.


LINGO
SPEAKEASY SECURITY Security that relies on knowing where desired
information is, and using a word or name to gain access to that information or
computer system.

SPEAKEASY SECURITY
In the old days of speakeasies - those Prohibition-era nightclubs where so-called
bathtub gin flowed--a would-be customer gained admission by showing up at the
door and knocking. After a few moments, a small flap in the door would swing
open and a tough, intimidating face would peer out. If the visitor was in the
know, he would speak the name of some frequent patron of the place ("Joe sent
me" was often enough), whereupon the bouncer inside would unlatch the door
and let him in.

The real trick lay in knowing the location of the speakeasy because the door was
unmarked, and the owners didn't exactly hang out neon signs to mark their
presence. For the most part, just showing up at the right place was about all it
took to get in. The same degree of safekeeping is, unhappily, practiced widely in
the corporate world, providing a level of non protection that I call speakeasy
security.
I Saw It at the Movies
Here's an illustration from a favorite movie that many people will remember. In
Three Days of the Condor the central character, Turner (played by Robert
Redford), works for a small research firm contracted by the CIA. One day he
comes back from a lunch run to find that all his co workers have been gunned
down. He's left to figure out who has done this and why, all the while knowing
that the bad guys, whoever they are, are looking for him.

Late in the story, Turner manages to get the phone number of one the bad guys.
But who is this person, and how can Turner pin down his location? He's in luck:
The screenwriter, David Rayfiel, has happily given Turner a background that
includes training as a telephone lineman with the Army Signal Corps, making
him knowledgeable about techniques and practices of the phone company. With
the bad guy's phone number in hand, Turner knows exactly what to do. In the
screenplay, the scene reads like this:

TURNER RECONNECTS and TAPS OUT ANOTHER NUMBER.

RING! RING! Then:

WOMAN'S VOICE (FILTER) CNA, Mrs. Coleman speaking.
TURNER (into test set)

This is Harold Thomas, Mrs. Coleman. Customer Service.

CNA on 202-555-7389, please.

WOMAN'S VOICE (FILTER) One moment, please. (almost at once)

Leonard Atwood, 765 MacKensie Lane, Chevy Chase, Maryland.

Ignoring the fact that the screenwriter mistakenly uses a Washington, D.C., area
code for a Maryland address, can you spot what just happened here?

Turner, because of his training as a telephone lineman, knew what number to dial
in order to reach a phone company office called CNA, the Customer Name and
Address bureau. CNA is set up for the convenience of installers and other
authorized phone company personnel. An installer could call CNA, and give
them a phone number. The CNA clerk wouldrespond by providing the name of
the person the phone belongs to andhis address.

Fooling the Phone Company
In the real world, the phone number for CNA is a closely guarded secret.
Although the phone companies finally caught on and these days are less
generous about handing out information so readily, at the time they operated
on a variation of speakeasy security that security professionals call security
through obscurity. They presumed that anybody who called CNA and knew the
proper lingo ("Customer service. CNA on 555-1234, please for example) was a
person authorized to have the information.

LINGO
SECURITY THROUGH OBSCURITY An ineffective method of computer
security that relies on keeping secret the details of how the system works
(protocols, algorithms, and internal systems). Security through obscurity relies on
the false assumption that no one outside a trusted group of people will be able to
circumvent the system.

MITNICK MESSGAE
Security through obscurity does not have any effect in blocking social
engineering attacks. Every computer system in the world has at least one human
that use it. So, if the attacker is able to manipulate people who use the systems,
the obscurity of the system is irrelevant.

There was no need to verify or identify oneself, no need to give an employee
number, no need for a password that was changed daily. If you knew the number
to call and you sounded authentic, then you must be entitled to the information.

That was not a very solid assumption on the part of the telephone company. Their
only effort at security was to change the phone number on l periodic basis, at
least once a year. Even so, the current number at any particular moment was very
widely known among phone phreaks, who delighted in taking advantage of this
convenient source of information and in sharing the how-to-do-it with their
fellow phreaks. The CN,' Bureau trick was one of the first things I learned when I
was in to the hobby of phone phreaking as a teenager.

Throughout the world of business and government, speakeasy security. is still
prevalent. It's likely that about your company's departments, people, and lingo.
Sometimes les to than that: Sometimes an internal phone number is all it takes.

THE CARELESS COMPUTER MANAGER
Though many employees in organizations are negligent, unconcerned, or unaware
of security dangers, you'd expect someone with the title manager in the computer
center of a Fortune 500 corporation to be thoroughly knowledgeable about best
security practices, right?
You would not expect a computer center manager - someone who is part of his
company's Information Technology department - to fall victim to a simplistic and
obvious social engineering con game. Especially not the social engineer is hardly
more than a kid, barely out of his teens. But sometimes your expectations can be
wrong.

Tuning In
Years ago it was an amusing pastime for many people to keep a radio tuned to the
local police or fire department frequencies, listening in on the occasional highly
charged conversations about a bank robbery in progress, an office building on
fire, or a high-speed chase as the event unfolded. The radio frequencies used by
law enforcement agencies and fire departments used to be available in books at
the corner bookstore; today they're provided in listings on the Web, and from a
book you can buy at Radio Shack frequencies for local, county, state, and, in
some cases, even federal agencies.

Of course, it wasn't just the curious who were listening in. Crooks robbing a store
in the middle of the night could tune in to hear if a police car was being
dispatched to the location. Drug dealers could keep a check on activities of the
local Drug Enforcement Agency agents. An arsonist could enhance his sick
pleasure by lighting a blaze and then listening to all the radio traffic while
firemen struggled to put it out.

Over recent years developments in computer technology have made it possible to
encrypt voice messages. As engineers found ways to cram more and more
computing power onto a single microchip, they began to build small, encrypted
radios for law enforcement that kept the bad guys and the curious from listening
in.



Danny the Eavesdropper
A scanner enthusiast and skilled hacker we'll call Danny decided to see if he
couldn't find a way to get his hands on the super-secret encryption software - the
source code - from one of the top manufacturers of secure radio systems. He was
hoping a study of the code would enable him to learn how to eavesdrop on law
enforcement, and possibly also use the technology so that even the most powerful
government agencies would find it difficult to monitor his conversations with his
friends.

The Dannys of the shadowy world of hackers belong to a special category
that falls somewhere in between the merely-curious but-entirely- benign and the
dangerous. Dannys have the knowledge of the expert, combined with the
mischievous hacker's desire to break into systems and networks for the
intellectual challenge and for the pleasure of gaining insight into how technology
works. But their electronic breaking-and- entering stunts are just that--stunts.
These folks, these benign hackers, illegally enter sites for the sheer fun and
exhilaration of proving they can do it. They don't steal anything, they don't make
any money from their exploits; they don't destroy any files, disrupt any network
connections, or crash any computer system. The mere fact of their being there,
snaring copies of files and searching emails for passwords behind the backs of
curity and network administrators, tweaks the noses of the people responsible for
keeping out intruders like them. The one-upmanship is a big part of the
satisfaction.

In keeping with this profile, our Danny wanted to examine the details of his target
company's most closely guarded product just to satisfy his own burning curiosity
and to admire whatever clever innovations the manufacturer might have come up
with.

The product designs were, needless to say, carefully guarded trade secrets, as
precious and protected as just about anything in the company's possession. Danny
knew that. And he didn’t care a bit. After all, it was just some big, nameless
company.

But how to get the software source code? As it turned out, grabbing the crown
jewels of the company's Secure Communications Group proved to be all too easy,
even though the company was one of those that used two- factor authentication,
an arrangement under which people are required to use not one but two separate
identifiers to prove their identity.

Here's an example you're probably already familiar with. When your renewal
credit card arrives, you're asked to phone the issuing company to let them know
that the card is in possession of the intended customer, and not somebody who
stole the envelope from the mail. The instructions with the card these days
generally tell you to call from home. When you call, software at the credit card
company analyzes the ANI, the automatic number identification, which is
provided by the telephone switch on toll- free calls that the credit card company
is paying for.

A computer at the credit card company uses the calling party's number provided
by the ANI, and matches that number against the company's database of
cardholders. By the time the clerk comes on the line, her or his display shows
information from the database giving details about the customer. So the clerk
already knows the call is coming from the home of a customer; that's one form of
authentication.
LINGO
TWO-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION The use of two different types of
authentication to verify identity. For example, a person might have to identify
himself by calling from a certain identifiable location and knowing a password.

The clerk then picks an item from the information displayed about you - most
often social security number, date of birth, or mother's maiden name - and asks
you for this piece of information. If you give the right answer, that's a second
form of authentication - based on information you should know.

At the company manufacturing the secure radio systems in our story, every
employee with computer access had their usual account name and password, but
in addition was provided with a small electronic device called Secure ID. This is
what's called a time-based token. These devices come in two types: One is about
half the size of a credit card but a little thicker; another is small enough that
people simply attach it to their key chains.

Derived from the world of cryptography, this particular gadget has a small
window that displays a series of six digits. Every sixty seconds, the display
changes to show a different six-digit number. When an authorized person needs
to access the network from offsite, she must first identify herself as an authorized
user by typing in her secret PIN and the digits displayed on her token device.
Once verified by the internal system, she then authenticates with her account
name and password.

For the young hacker Danny to get at the source code he so coveted, he would
have to not only compromise some employee's account name and password (not
much of a challenge for the experienced social engineer) but also get around the
time-based token.

Defeating the two-factor authentication of a time-based token combined with a
user's secret PIN code sounds like a challenge right out of Mission Impossible.
But for social engineers, the challenge is similar to that aced by a poker player
who has more than the usual skill at reading his opponents. With a little luck,
when he sits down at a table he knows he's likely to walk away with a large pile
of other people's money.

Storming the Fortress
Danny began by doing his homework. Before long he had managed to put
together enough pieces to masquerade as a real employee. He had an employee's
name, department, phone number, and employee number, as well as the
manager's name and phone number.
Now was the calm before the storm. Literally. Going by the plan he had worked
out, Danny needed one more thing before he could take the next step, and it was
something he had no control over: He needed a snow-storm. Danny needed a
little help from Mother Nature in the form of weather so bad that it would keep
workers from getting into the office. In the winter in South Dakota, where the
manufacturing plant in question was located, anyone hoping for bad weather did
not have very long to wait. On Friday night, a storm arrived. What had begun as
snow quickly turned to freezing rain so that, by morning, the roads were coated
with a slick, dangerous sheet of ice. For Danny, this was a perfect opportunity.

He telephoned the plant, asked for-the computer room and reached one of the
worker bees of IT, a computer operator who announced himself as Roger
Kowalski.

Giving the name of the real employee he had obtained, Danny said, "This is Bob
Billings. I work in the Secure Communications Group. I'm at home right now and
I can't drive in because of the storm. And the problem is that I need to access my
workstation and the server from home, and I left my Secure ID in my desk. Can
you go fetch it for me? Or can somebody? And then read off my code when I
need to get in? Because my team has a critical deadline and there's no way I can
get my work done. And there's no way I can get to the office--the roads are much
too dangerous up my way.

The computer operator said, "I can't leave the Computer Center." Danny jumped
right in: "Do you have a Secure ID yourself?."

"There's one here in the Computer Center," he said. "We keep one for the
operators in case of an emergency."

"Listen," Danny said. "Can you do me a big favor? When I need to dial
into the network, can you let me borrow your Secure ID? Just until it's safe to
drive in."
"Who are you again?" Kowalski asked.
"Who do you work for.
"For Ed Trenton."
"Oh, yeah, I know him."

When he's liable to be faced with tough sledding, a good social engineer does
more than the usual amount of research. "I'm on the second floor," Danny went
on. "Next to Roy Tucker."

He knew that name, as well. Danny went back to work on him. "It'd be much
easier just to go to my desk and fetch my Secure ID for me."
Danny was pretty certain the guy would not buy into this. First of all, he would
not want to leave in the middle of his shift to go traipsing down corridors and up
staircases to some distant part of the building. He would also not want to have to
paw through someone else's desk, violating somebody's personal space. No, it
was a safe bet he wouldn't want to do that.

Kowalski didn't want to say no to a guy who needed some help, but he didn't
want to say yes and get in trouble, either. So he sidestepped the decision: I'll have
to ask my boss. Hang on." He put the phone down, and Danny could hear him
pick up another phone, put in the call, and explain the request. Kowalski then did
something unexplainable: He actually vouched for the man using the name Bob
Billings. "I know him," he told his manager. "He works for Ed Trenton. Can we
let him use the Secure ID in the Computer Center' Danny, holding on to the
phone, was amazed to overhear this extraordinary and unexpected support for his
cause. He couldn't believe his ears or his luck.
After another couple of moments, Kowalski came back on the line and said, "My
manager wants to talk to you himself," and gave him the man's name and cell
phone number.

Danny called the manager and went through the whole story one more time,
adding details about the project he was working or and why his product team
needed to meet a critical deadline. "It'd be easier if someone just goes and
fetches my card," he said. "I don't think the desk is locked, it should be there in
my upper left drawer."

"Well," said the manager, "just for the weekend, I think we can let you use the
one in the Computer Center. I'll tell the guys on duty that when you call, they
should read off the random-access code for you," and he gave him the PIN
number to use with it.

For the whole weekend, every time Danny wanted to get into the corporate
computer system, he only had to call the Computer Center and ask them to read
off the six digits displayed on the Secure ID token.

An Inside Job
Once he was inside the company's computer system, then what? How would
Danny find his way to the server with the software he wanted? He had already
prepared for this.

Many computer users are familiar with newsgroups, that extensive set of
electronic bulletin boards where people can post questions that other people
answer, or find virtual companions who share an interest in music, computers, or
any of hundreds of other topics.
What few people realize when they post any message on a newsgroup site is that
their message remains on line and available for years. Google, for example, now
maintains an archive of seven hundred million messages, some dating back
twenty years! Danny started by going to the Web address
http://groups.google.com.

As search terms, Danny entered "encryption radio communications" and the
name of the company, and found a years-old message on the subject from an
employee. It was a posting that had been made back when the company was first
developing the product, probably long before police departments and federal
agencies had considered scrambling radio signals.
The message contained the sender's signature, giving not just the man's name,
Scott Press, but his phone number and even the name of his workgroup, the
Secure Communications Group.

Danny picked up the phone and dialed the number. It seemed like a long shot--
would he still be working in the same organization years later? Would he be at
work on such a stormy weekend? The phone rang once, twice, three times, and
then a voice came on the line. "This is Scott," he said.

Claiming to be from the company's IT Department, Danny manipulated Press (in
one of the ways now familiar to you from earlier chapters) into revealing the
names of the servers he used for development work. These were the servers that
could be expected to hold the source code containing the proprietary encryption
algorithm and firmware used in the company's secure radio products.

Danny was moving closer and closer, and his excitement was building. He was
anticipating the rush, the great high he always felt when he succeeded at
something he knew only a very limited number of people could accomplish.

Still, he wasn't home free yet. For the rest of the weekend he'd be able to get into
the company's network whenever he wanted to, thanks to that cooperative
computer center manager. And he knew which servers he wanted to access. But
when he dialed in, the terminal server he logged on to would not permit him to
connect to the Secure Communications Group development systems. There must
have been an internal firewall or router protecting the computer systems of that
group. He'd have to find some other way in.

The next step took nerve: Danny called back to Kowalski in Computer
Operations and complained "My server won't let me connect," and told the IT
guy, "I need you to set me up with an account on one of the computers in your
department so I can use Telnet to connect to my system."
The manager had already approved disclosing the access code displayed on the
time-based token, so this new request didn't seem unreasonable. Kowalski set up
a temporary account and password on one of the Operation Center's computers,
and told Danny to "call me back when you don't need it any more and I'll remove
it."

Once logged into the temporary account, Danny was able to connect over the
network to the Secure Communications Group's computer systems. After an hour
of on-line searching for a technical vulnerability that would give him access to a
main development server, he hit the jackpot. Apparently the system or network
administrator wasn't vigilant in keeping up with the latest news on security bugs
in the operating system that allowed remote access. But Danny was.

Within a short time he had located the source code files that he was after and was
transferring them remotely to an e-commerce site that offered free storage space.
On this site, even if the files were ever discovered, they would never be traced
back to him.

He had one final step before signing off: the methodical process of erasing his
tracks. He finished before the Jay Leno show had gone off the air for the night.
Danny figured this had been one very good weekend's work. And he had never
had to put himself personally at risk. It was an intoxicating thrill, even better than
snowboarding or skydiving.

Danny got drunk that night, not on scotch, gin, beer, or sake, but on his sense of
power and accomplishment as he poured through the files he had stolen, closing
in on the elusive, extremely secret radio software.

Analyzing the Con
As in the previous story, this ruse only worked because one company employee
was all too willing to accept at face value that a caller was really the employee he
claimed to be. That eagerness to help out a co worker with a problem is, on the
one hand, part of what greases the wheels of industry, and part of what makes the
employees of some companies more pleasant to work with than employees of
others. But on the other hand, this helpfulness can be a major vulnerability that a
social engineer will attempt to exploit.

One bit of manipulation Danny used was delicious: When he made the request
that someone get his Secure ID from his desk, he kept saying he wanted
somebody to "fetch" it for him. Fetch is a command you give your dog. Nobody
wants to be told to fetch something. With that one word, Danny made it all the
more certain the request would be refused and some other solution accepted
instead, which was exactly what he wanted.
The Computer Center operator, "Kowalski, was taken in by Danny dropping the
names of people Kowalski happened to know. But why would Kowalski's
manager - an IT manager, no less - allow some stranger access to the company's
internal network? Simply because the call for help can be a powerful, persuasive
tool in the social engineer's arsenal.

MITNICK MESSAGE
This story goes to show that time-based tokens and similar forms of
authentication are not a defense against the wily social engineer. The only
defense is a conscientious employee who follows security policies and
understands how others can maliciously influence his behavior.

Could something like that ever happen in your company? Has it already?

PREVENTING THE CON
It seems to be an often-repeated element in these stories that an attacker arranges
to dial in to a computer network from outside the company, without the person
who helps him taking sufficient measures to verify that the caller is really an
employee and entitled to the access. Why do I return to this theme so often?
Because it truly is a factor in so many social engineering attacks. For the social
engineer, it's the easiest way to reach his goal. Why should an attacker spend
hours trying to break in, when he can do it instead with a simple phone call?

One of the most powerful methods for the social engineer to carry out this kind
of attack is the simple ploy of pretending to need help - an approach frequently
used by attackers. You don't want to stop your employees from being helpful to
co workers or customers, so you need to arm them with specific verification
procedures to use with anybody making a request for computer access or
confidential information. That way they can be helpful to those who deserve to be
helped, but at the same time protect the organization's information assets and
computer systems.

Company security procedures need to spell out in detail what kind of verification
mechanisms should be used in various circumstances. Chapter 17 provides a
detailed list of procedures, but here are some guidelines to consider:

One good way to verify the identity of a person making a request is to call the
phone number listed in the company directory for that person. If the person
making the request is actually an attacker, the verification call will either let you
speak to the real person on the phone while the imposter is on hold, or you will
reach the employee's voice mail so that you can listen to the sound of his voice,
and compare it to thespeech of the attacker.
If employee numbers are used in your company for verifying identity, then those
numbers have to be treated as sensitive information, carefully guarded and not
given out to strangers. The same goes for all other kinds of internal identifiers,
such as internal telephone numbers, departmental billing identifiers, and even
email addresses.

Corporate training should call everyone's attention to the common practice of
accepting unknown people as legitimate employees on the grounds that they
sound authoritative or knowledgeable. Just because somebody knows a company
practice or uses internal terminology is no reason to assume that his identity
doesn't need to be verified in other ways.

Security officers and system administrators must not narrow their focus so that
they are only alert to how security-conscious everyone else is being. They also
need to make sure they themselves are following the same rules, procedures, and
practices.

Passwords and the like must, of course, never be shared, but the restriction
against sharing is even more important with time-based tokens and other secure
forms of authentication. It should be a matter of common sense that sharing any
of these items violates the whole point of the company's having installed the
systems. Sharing means there can be no accountability. If a security incident
takes place or something goes wrong, you won't be able to determine who the
responsible party is.

As I reiterate throughout this book, employees need to be familiar with social
engineering strategies and methods to thoughtfully analyze requests they receive.
Consider using role-playing as a standard part of security training, so that
employees can come to a better understanding of how the social engineer works.
Chapter 7
Phony Sites and Dangerous Attachments

There’s an old saying that you never get something for nothing,
Still, the ploy of offering something for free continues to be a big draw for both
legitimate ("But wait--there's more! Call right now and we'll throw in a set of
knives and a popcorn popper!") and not-so- legitimate ("Buy one acre of
swampland in Florida and get a second acre free!") businesses.

And most of us are so eager to get something free that we may be distracted from
thinking clearly about the offer or the promise being made.

We know the familiar warning, "buyer beware," but it's time to heed another
warning: Beware of come-on email attachments and free software. The savvy
attacker will use nearly any means to break into the corporate network, including
appealing to our natural desire to get a free gift. Here are a few examples.

WOULDN'T YOU LIKE A FREE (BLANK)?"
Just as viruses have been a curse to mankind and medical practitioners since the
beginning of time, so the aptly named computer virus represents a similar curse
to users of technology. The computer viruses that get most of the attention and
end up in the spotlight, not coincidentally, do the most damage. These are the
product of computer vandals.

Computer nerds turned malicious, computer vandals strive to show off how
clever they are. Sometimes their acts are like a rite of initiation, meant to
impress older and more experienced hackers. These people are motivated to
create a worm or virus intended to inflict damage. If their work destroys files,
trashes entire hard drives, and emails itself to thousands of unsuspecting people,
vandals puff with pride at their accomplishment. If the virus causes enough chaos
that newspapers write about it and the network news broadcasts warn against it,
so much the better.

Much has been written about vandals and their viruses; books, software
programs, and entire companies have been created to offer protection, and we
won't deal here with the defenses against their technical attacks. Our interest at
the moment is less in the destructive acts of the vandal than in the more targeted
efforts of his distant cousin, the social engineer.

It Came in the Email
You probably receive unsolicited emails every day that carry advertising
messages or offer a free something-or-other that you neither need nor want. You
know the kind. They promise investment advice, discounts on computers,
televisions, cameras, vitamins, or travel, offers for credit cards you don't need, a
device that will let you receive pay television channels free, ways to improve
your health or your sex life, and on and on.

But every once in a while an offer pops up in your electronic mailbox for
something that catches your eye. Maybe it's a free game, an offer of photos of
your favorite star, a free calendar program, or inexpensive share" ware that will
protect your computer against viruses. Whatever the offer, the email directs you
to download the file with the goodies that the message has convinced you to try.

Or maybe you receive a message with a subject line that reads Don, I miss you,"
or "Anna, why haven't you written me," or "Hi, Tim, here's the sexy photo I
promised you." This couldn't be junk advertising mail, you think, because it has
your own name on it and sounds so personal. So you open the attachment to see
the photo or read the message.

All of these actions--downloading software you learned about from an
advertising email, clicking on a link that takes you to a site you haven't heard of
before, opening an attachment from someone you don't really know--are
invitations to trouble. Sure, most of the time what you get is exactly what you
expected, or at worst something disappointing or offensive, but harmless. But
sometimes what you get is the handiwork of a vandal.

Sending malicious code to your computer is only a small part of the attack. The
attacker needs to persuade you to download the attachment for the attack to
succeed.

NOTE
One type of program know in the computer underground as a RAT, or Remote
Access Trojan, gives the attacker full access to your computer, just as if he were
sitting at your keyboard.

The most damaging forms of malicious code - worms with names like Love
Letter, SirCam, and Anna Kournikiva, to name a few - have all relied on social
engineering techniques of deception and taking advantage of our desire to get
something for nothing in order to be spread. The worm arrives as an attachment
to an email that offers something tempting, such as confidential information, free
pornography, or - a very clever ruse - a message saying that the attachment is the
receipt for some expensive item you supposedly ordered. This last ploy leads you
to open the attachment for fear your credit card has been charged for an item you
didn't order.
It's astounding how many people fall for these tricks; even after being told and
told again about the dangers of opening email attachments, awareness of the
danger fades over time, leaving each of us vulnerable.

Spotting Malicious Software
Another kind of malware - short for malicious software - puts a program onto
your computer that operates without your knowledge or consent, or performs a
task without your awareness. Malware may look innocent enough, may even be a
Word document or PowerPoint presentation, or any program that has macro
functionality, but it will secretly install an unauthorized program. For example,
malware may be a version of the Trojan Horse talked about in Chapter 6. Once
this software is installed on your machine, it can feed every keystroke you type
back to the attacker, including all your passwords and credit card numbers.

There are two other types of malicious software you may find shocking.
One can feed the attacker every word you speak within range of your computer
microphone, even when you think the microphone is turned off. Worse, if you
have a Web cam attached to your computer, an attacker using a variation of this
technique may be able to capture everything that takes place in front of your
terminal, even when you think the camera is off, day or night.

LINGO
MALWARE Slang for malicious software, a computer program, such as a virus,
worm, or Trojan Horse, that performs damaging tasks.


MITNICK MESSAGE
Beware of geeks bearing gifts, otherwise your company might endure the same
fate as the city of Troy. When in doubt, to avoid an infection, use protection.

A hacker with a malicious sense of humor might try to plant a little program
designed to be wickedly annoying on your computer. For example, it might make
your CD drive tray keep popping open, or the file you're working on keep
minimizing. Or it might cause an audio file to play a scream at full volume in the
middle of the night. None of these is much fun when you're trying to get sleep or
get work done.., but at least they don't do any lasting damage.

MESSAGE FROM A FRIEND
The scenarios can get even worse, despite your precautions. Imagine: You've
decided not to take any chances. You will no longer download any files except
from secure sites that you know and trust, such as SecurityFocus.com or
Amazon.com. You no longer click on links in email
from unknown sources. You no longer open attachments in any email that you
were not expecting. And you check your browser page to make sure there is a
secure site symbol on every site you visit for e-commerce transactions or to
exchange confidential information.

And then one day you get an email from a friend or business associate that carries
an attachment. Couldn't be anything malicious if it comes from someone you
know well, right? Especially since you would know who to blame if your
computer data were damaged.

You open the attachment, and... BOOM! You just got hit with a worm or Trojan
Horse. Why would someone you know do this to you? Because some things are
not as they appear. You've read about this: the worm that gets onto someone's
computer, and then emails itself to everyone in that person's address book. Each
of those people gets an email from someone he knows and trusts, and each of
those trusted emails contains the worm, which propagates itself like the ripples
from a stone thrown into a still pond.

The reason this technique is so effective is that it follows the theory of killing two
birds with one stone: The ability to propagate to other unsuspecting victims, and
the appearance that it originated from a trusted person.


MITNICK MESSAGE
Man has invented many wonderful things that have changed the world and our
way of life. But for every good use of technology, whether a computer,
telephone, or the Internet, someone will always find a way to abuse it for his or
her own purposes.

It's a sad fact of life in the current state of technology that you may get an email
from someone close to you and still have to wonder if it's safe to open.

VARIATIONS ON A THEME
In this era of the Internet, there is a kind of fraud that involves misdirecting you
to a Web site that is not what you expected. This happens regularly, and it takes a
variety of forms. This example, which is based on an actual scam perpetrated on
the Internet, is representative.

Merry Christmas. . .
A retired insurance salesman named Edgar received an email one day from
PayPal, a company that offers a fast and convenient way of making online
payments. This kind of service is especially handy when a person in one part of
the country (or the world, for that matter) is buying an item from an individual he
doesn't know. PayPal charges the purchaser's credit card and transfers the money
directly to the seller's account. As a collector of antique glass jars Edgar did a lot
of business through the on-line auction company eBay. He used PayPal often,
sometimes several times a week. So Edgar was interested when he received an
email in the holiday season of 2001 that seemed to be from PayPal, offering him
a reward for updating his PayPal account. The message read:

Season's Greetings Valued PayPal Customer;
As the New Year approaches and as we all get ready to move a year ahead,
PayPal would like to give you a $5 credit to your account!
All you have to do to claim your $5 gift from us is update your information on
our secure Pay Pal site by January 1st, 2002. A year brings a lot of changes, by
updating your information with us you will allow for us to continue providing
you and our valued customer service with excellent service and in the meantime,
keep our records straight!

To update your information now and to receive $5 in your PayPal account
instantly, click this link:

http://www, paypal -secure. com/cgi bin

Thank you for using PayPal.com and helping us grow to be the largest of our
kind! Sincerely wishing you a very "Merry Christmas and Happy New Year,"
PayPal Team


A Note about E.commerce Web Sites

You probably know people who are reluctant to buy goods on line, even from
brand-name companies such as Amazon and eBay, or the Web sites of Old Navy,
Target, or Nike. In a way, they're right to be suspicious. If your browser uses
today's standard of 128-bit encryption, the information you send to any secure
site goes out from your computer encrypted. This data could be unencrypted with
a lot of effort, but probably is not breakable in a reasonable amount of time,
except perhaps by the National Security Agency (and the NSA, so far 98 as we
know, has not shown any interest in stealing credit card numbers of American
citizens or trying to find out who is ordering sexy videotapes or kinky
underwear).

These encrypted files could actually be broken by anyone with the time and
resources. But really, what fool would go to all that effort to steal one credit card
number when many e-commerce companies make the mistake of storing all their
customer financial information unencrypted in their databases? Worse, a number
of e-commerce companies that use a particular SQL database software badly
compound the problem: They have never changed the default system
administrator password for the program. When they took the software out of the
box, the password was "null," and it's still "null" today. So the contents of the
database are available to anyone on the Internet who decides to try to connect to
the database server. These sites are under attack all the time and information does
get stolen, without anyone being the wiser,

On the other hand, the same people who won't buy on the Internet because they're
afraid of having their credit card information stolen have no problem buying
with that same credit card in a brick-and- mortar store, or paying for lunch,
dinner, or drinks with the card
even in a back-street bar or restaurant they wouldn't take their mother to. Credit
card receipts get stolen from these places all the time, or fished out of trash bins
in the back alley. And any unscrupulous clerk or waiter can jot down your name
and card info, or use a gadget readily available on the Internet, a card-swiping
device that stores data from any credit card passed through it, for later retrieval.

There are some hazards to shopping on line, but it's probably as safe as shopping
in a bricks-and-mortar store. And the credit card companies offer you the same
protection when using your card on line--if any fraudulent charges get made to
the account, you're only responsible for the first $50.
So in my opinion, fear of shopping online is just another misplaced
worry.

Edgar didn't notice any of the several tell-tale signs that something was wrong
with this email (for example, the semicolon after the greeting line, and the
garbled text about "our valued customer service with excellent service"). He
clicked on the link, entered the information requested - name, address, phone
number, and credit card information - and sat. back to wait for the five-dollar
credit to show up on his next credit-card bill. What showed up instead was a list
of charges for items he never purchased.

Analyzing the Con
Edgar had been taken in by a commonplace Internet scam. It's a scam that comes
in a variety of forms. One of them (detailed in Chapter 9) involves a decoy login
screen created by the attacker that looks identical to the real thing. The difference
is that the phony screen doesn't give access to the computer system that the user
is trying to reach, but instead feeds his username and password to the hacker.

Edgar had been taken in by a scam in which the crooks had registered a Web site
with the name "paypal-secure.com"- which sounds as if it should have been a
secure page on the legitimate PayPal site, but it isn't. When he entered
information on that site, the attackers got just what they wanted.


MITNICK MESSAGE
While not foolproof (no security is), whenever visiting a site that requests
information you consider private, always ensure that the connection is
authenticated and encrypted. And even more important, do not automatically
click Yes in any dialog box that may indicate a security issue, such as an invalid,
expired, or revoked digital certificate.


VARIATIONS ON THE VARIATION
How many other ways are there to deceive computer users into going to a bogus
Web site where they provide confidential information? I don't suppose anyone
has a valid, accurate answer, but "lots and lots" will serve the purpose.

The Missing Link
One trick pops up regularly: Sending out an email that offers a tempting reason to
visit a site, and provides a link for going directly to it. Except that the link doesn't
take you to the site you think you're going to, because the link actually only
resembles a link for that site. Here's another exam- pie that has actually been used
on the Internet, again involving misuse of the name PayPal:

www. PayPai. com

At a quick glance, this looks as if it says PayPal. Even if the victim notices, he
may think it's just a slight defect in the text that makes the "I" of Pal look like an
"i." And who would notice at a glance that:

www. PayPal. com

uses the number 1 instead of a lowercase letter L? There are enough people who
accept misspellings and other misdirection to make this gambit continually
popular with credit card bandits. When people go to the phony site, it looks like
the site they expected to go to, and they blithely enter their credit card
information. To set up one of these scares, an attacker only needs to register the
phony domain name, send out his emails, and wait for suckers to show up, ready
to be cheated.

In mid-2002, I received an email, apparently part of a mass mailing that was
marked as being from "Ebay@ebay.com." The message is shown in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1. The link in this or any other email should be used with caution.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------
msg: Dear eBay User,

It has become very noticeable that another party has been corrupting your eBay
account and has violated our User Agreement policy listed:

4. Bidding and Buying

You are obligated to complete the transaction with the seller if you purchase an
item through one of our fixed price formats or are the highest bidder as described
below. If you are the highest bidder at the end of an auction (meeting the
applicable minimum bid or reserve requirements) and your bid is accepted by the
seller, you are obligated to complete the transaction with the seller, or the
transaction is prohibited by law or by this Agreement.

You received this notice from eBay because it has come to our attention that your
current account has caused interruptions with other eBay members and eBay
requires immediate verification for your account. Please verify your account or
the account may become disabled. Click Here To Verify Your Account -
http://error ebay.tripod.com

Designated trademarks and brands are the property of their respective owners,
eBay and the eBay logo are trademarks of eBay Inc.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------

Victims who clicked on the link went to a Web page that looked very much like
an eBay page. In fact, the page was well designed, with an authentic eBay logo,
and "Browse," "Sell" and other navigation links that, if clicked, took the visitor to
the actual eBay site. There was also a security logo in the bottom right corner. To
deter the savvy victim, the designer had even used HTML encryption to mask
where the user-provided information was being sent.

It was an excellent example of a malicious computer-based social engineering
attack. Still, it was not without several flaws.

The email message was not well written; in particular, the paragraph beginning
"You received this notice" is clumsy and inept (the people responsible for these
hoaxes never hire a professional to edit their copy, and it always shows). Also,
anybody who was paying close attention would have become suspicious about
eBay asking for the visitor's PayPal information; there is no reason eBay would
ask a customer for this private information involving a different company.

And anyone knowledgeable about the Internet would probably recognize that the
hyperlink connects not to the eBay domain but to tripod.com, which is a free
Web hosting service. This was a dead giveaway that the email was not legitimate.
Still, I bet a lot of people entered their information, including a credit card
number, onto this page.

NOTE
Why are people allowed to register deceptive or inapproprate domain names?.
Because under current law and on-line policy, anyone can register any site names
that’ not already in use.
Companies try to fight this use of copycat addresses, but consider what they’re up
against. General Motors filed suit against a company that registered
f**kgeneralmotors.com (but without the asterisks) and pointed the URL to
General Motor's Web site. GM lost.


Be Alert
As individual users of the Internet, we all need to be alert, making a conscious
decision about when it's okay to enter personal information, passwords, account
numbers, PINs, and the like.

How many people do you know who could tell you whether a particular Internet
page they're looking at meets the requirements of a secure page? How many
employees in your company know what to look for?

Everyone who uses the Internet should know about the little symbol that often
appears somewhere on a Web page and looks like a drawing of a padlock. They
should know that when the hasp is closed, the site has been certified as being
secure. When the hasp is open or the lock icon is missing, the Web site is not
authenticated as genuine, and any information transmitted is in the clear--that is,
unencrypted.

However, an attacker who manages to compromise administrative privileges on a
company computer may be able to modify or patch the operating system code to
change the user's perception of what is really happening. For example, the
programming instructions in the browser software that indicate a Web site's
digital certificate is invalid can be modified to bypass the check. Or the system
could be modified with something called a root kit, installing one or more back
doors at the operating system level, which are harder to detect.
A secure connection authenticates the site as genuine, and encrypts the
information being communicated, so an attacker cannot make use of any data that
is intercepted. Can you trust any Web site, even one that uses a secure
connection? No, because the site owner may not be vigilant about applying all the
necessary security patches, or forcing users or administrators to respect good
password practices. So you can't assume that any supposedly secure site is
invulnerable to attack.

LINGO
BACK DOOR A covert entry point that provides a secret way into a user’s
computer that is unkown to the user. Also used by programmers while developing
a software program so that they can go into the program to fix problems

Secure HTTP (hypertext transfer protocol) or SSL (secure sockets layer) provides
an automatic mechanism that uses digital certificates not only to encrypt
information being sent to the distant site, but also to provide authentication (an
assurance that you are communicating with the genuine Web site). However, this
protection mechanism does not work for users who fail to pay attention to
whether the site name displayed in the address bar is in fact the correct address of
the site they're trying to access.

Another security issue, mostly ignored, appears as a warning message that says
something like "This site is not secure or the security certificate has expired. Do
you want to go to the site anyway?" Many Internet users don't understand the
message, and when it appears, they simply click Okay or Yes and go on with
their work, unaware that they may be on quicksand. Be warned: On a Web site
that does not use a secure protocol, you should never enter any confidential
information such as your address or phone number, credit card or bank account
numbers, or anything else you want to keep private.

Thomas Jefferson said maintaining our freedom required "eternal vigilance."
Maintaining privacy and security in a society that uses information as currency
requires no less.

Becoming Virus Savvy
A special note about virus software: It is essential for the corporate intranet, but
also essential for every employee who uses a computer. Beyond just having anti
virus software installed on their machines, users obviously need to have the
software turned on (which many people don't like because it inevitably slows
down some computer functions).

With anti virus software there's another important procedure to keep in
mind, as well: Keeping the virus definitions up to date. Unless your company is
set up to distribute software or updates over the network to every user, each
individual user must carry the responsibility of downloading the latest set of virus
definitions on his own. My personal recommendation is to have everyone set the
virus software preferences so that new virus definitions are automatically updated
every day.


LINGO
SECURE SOCKETS LAYER A protocol developed by Netscape that provides
authentication of both client and server in a secure communication on the
internet.

Simply put, you're vulnerable unless the virus definitions are updated regularly.
And even so, you're still not completely safe from viruses or worms that the anti
virus software companies don't yet know about or haven't yet published a
detection pattern file for.

All employees with remote access privileges from their laptops or home
computers need to have updated virus software and a personal firewall on those
machines at a minimum. A sophisticated attacker will look at the big picture to
seek out the weakest link, and that's where he'll attack. Reminding people with
remote computers regularly about the need for personal firewalls and updated,
active virus software is a corporate responsibility, because you can't expect that
individual workers, managers, sales people, and others remote from an IT
department will remember the dangers of leaving their computers unprotected.

Beyond these steps, I strongly recommend use of the less common, but no less
important, software packages that guard against Trojan Horse attacks, so-called
anti-Trojan software. At the time of this writing, two of the better-known
programs are The Cleaner (www.moosoft.com), and Trojan Defense Sweep
(www.diamondcs.com.au).

Finally, what is probably the most important security message of all for
companies that do not scan for dangerous emails at the corporate gateway: Since
we all tend to be forgetful or negligent about things that seem peripheral to
getting our jobs done, employees need to be reminded over and over again, in
different ways, about not opening email attachments unless they are certain that
the source is a person or organization they can trust. And management also needs
to remind employees that they must use active virus software and anti-Trojan
software that provides invaluable protection against the seemingly trustworthy
email that may contain a destructive payload.
Chapter 8
Using Sympathy, Guilt, and Intimidation

As discussed in Chapter 15, a social engineer uses the psychology of influence to
lead his target to comply with his request. Skilled social engineers are very adept
at developing a ruse that stimulates emotions, such as fear, excitement, or guilt.
They do this by using psychological triggers--automatic mechanisms that lead
people to respond to requests without in-depth analysis of all the available
information.

We all want to avoid difficult situations for ourselves and others. Based on this
positive impulse, the attacker can play on a person's sympathy, make his victim
feel guilty, or use intimidation as a weapon.

Here are some graduate-school lessons in popular tactics that play on the
emotions.

A VISIT TO THE STUDIO
Have you ever noticed how some people can walk up to the guard at the door of,
say, a hotel ballroom where some meeting, private party, or book-launching
function is under way, and just walk past that person without being asked for his
ticket or pass?

In much the same way, a social engineer can talk his way into places that you
would not have thought possible - as the following story about the movie industry
makes clear.


The Phone Call
"Ron Hillyard's office, this is Dorothy."
"Dorothy, hi. My name is Kyle Bellamy. I've just come on board to work in
Animation Development on Brian Glassman's staff. You folks sure do things
different over here."
"I guess. I never worked on any other movie lot so I don't really know. What can
    I do for you?"
"To tell you the truth, I'm feeling sort of stupid. I've got a writer coming over this
afternoon for a pitch session and I don't know who I'm supposed to talk to about
getting him onto the lot. The people over here in Brian's office are really nice but
I hate to keep bothering them, how do I do this, how do I do that. It's like I just
started junior high and can't find my way to the bathroom. You know what I
mean?"
Dorothy laughed.
"You want to talk to Security. Dial 7, and then 6138. If you
get Lauren, tell her Dorothy said she should take good
care of you."
"Thanks, Dorothy. And if I can't find the men's room, I may call you back!"

They chuckled together over the idea, and hung up.

David Harold's Story
I love the movies and when I moved to Los Angeles, I thought I'd get to
meet all kinds of people in the movie business and they'd take me along           to
parties and have me over to lunch at the studios. Well, I was there for a year, I
was turning twenty-six years old, and the closest I got was going        on         the
Universal Studios tour with all the nice people from Phoenix and         Cleveland.
So finally it got to the point where I figured, if they won't invite me in, I'll invite
myself. Which is what I did.

I bought a copy of the Los Angeles Times and read the entertainment column
for a couple of days, and wrote down the names of some producers at different
studios. I decided I'd try hitting on one of the big studios first. So I called the
switchboard and asked for the office of this producer I had read about in the
paper. The secretary that answered sounded like the motherly type, so I figured I
had gotten lucky; if it was some young girl who was just there hoping she'd be
discovered, she probably wouldn't have given me the time of day.

But this Dorothy, she sounded like somebody that would take in a stray kitten,
somebody who'd feel sorry for the new kid that was feeling a little overwhelmed
on the new job. And I sure got just the right touch with her. It's not every day you
try to trick somebody and they give you even more than you asked for. Out of
pity, she not only gave me the name of one of the people in Security, but said I
should tell the lady that Dorothy wanted her to help me.

Of course I had planned to use Dorothy's name anyway. This made it even better.
Lauren opened right up and never even bothered to look up the name I gave to
see if it was really in the employee database.

When I drove up to the gate that afternoon, they not only had my name on the
visitor's list, they even had a parking space for me. I had a late lunch at the
commissary, and wandered the lot until the end of the day. I even sneaked into a
couple of sound stages and watched them shooting movies. Didn't leave till 7
o'clock. It was one of my most exciting days ever.
Analyzing the Con
Everybody was a new employee once. We all have memories of what that first
day was like, especially when we were young and inexperienced. So when a new
employee asks for help, he can expect that many people-- especially entry-level
people--will remember their own new-kid on-the- block feelings and go out of
their way to lend a hand. The social engineer knows this, and he understands that
he can use it to play on the sympathies of his victims.

We make it too easy for outsiders to con their way into our company
plants and offices. Even with guards at entrances and sign-in procedures for
anyone who isn't an employee, any one of several variations on the ruse used in
this story will allow an intruder to obtain a visitor's badge and walk right in. And
if your company requires that visitors be escorted? That's a good rule, but it's
only effective if your employees are truly conscientious about stopping anyone
with or without a visitor's badge who is on his own, and questioning him. And
then, if the answers aren't satisfactory, your employees have to be willing to
contact security.

Making it too easy for outsiders to talk their way into your facilities endangers
your company's sensitive information. In today's climate, with the threat of
terrorist attacks hanging over our society, it's more than just information that
could be at risk.

"DO IT NOW"
Not everyone who uses social engineering tactics is a polished social engineer.
Anybody with an insider's knowledge of a particular company can turn
dangerous. The risk is even greater for any company that holds in its files and
databases any personal information about its employees, which, of course, most
companies do.

When workers are not educated or trained to recognize social engineering attacks,
determined people like the jilted lady in the following story can do things that
most honest people would think impossible.

Doug's Story
Things hadn't been going all that well with Linda anyway, and I knew as soon as
I met Erin that she was the one for me. Linda is, like, a little bit... well, sort of not
exactly unstable but she can sort of go off the deep end when she gets upset.
I told her as gentle as I could that she had to move out, and I helped her pack and
even let her take a couple of the Queensryche CDs that were really mine. As soon
as she was gone I went to the hardware store for a new Medico lock to put on the
front door and put it on that same night. The next morning I called the phone
company and had them change my phone number, and made it unpublished.
That left me free to pursue Erin.

Linda's Story
I was ready to leave, anyway, I just hadn't decided when. But nobody likes to feel
rejected. So it was just a question of, what could I do to let him know what a jerk
he was?

It didn't take long to figure out. There had to be another girl, otherwise he
wouldn't of sent me packing in such a hurry. So I'd just wait a bit and then start
calling him late in the evening. You know, around the time they would least want
to be called.

I waited till the next weekend and called around 11 o'clock on Saturday night.
Only he had changed his phone number. And the new number was unlisted. That
just shows what kind of SOB the guy was.

It wasn't that big of a setback. I started rummaging through the papers I had
managed to take home just before I left my job at the phone company. And there
it was--I had saved a repair ticket from once when there was a problem with the
telephone line at Doug's, and the printout listed
the cable and pair for his phone. See, you can change your phone number all
you want, but you still have the same pair of copper wires running from your
house to the telephone company switching office, called the Central
Office, or CO. The set of copper wires from every house and apartment        is
identified by these numbers, called the cable and pair. And if you know      how
the phone company does things, which I do, knowing the target's cable and pair is
all you need to find out the phone number.
I had a list giving all the COs in the city, with their addresses and phone
numbers. I looked up the number for the CO in the neighborhood where         I
used to live with Doug the jerk, and called, but naturally nobody was there.
Where's the switchman when you really need him? Took me all of about twenty
seconds to come up with a plan. I started calling around to the other COs and
finally located a guy. But he was miles away and he was probably sitting there
with his feet up. I knew he wouldn't want to do what I needed. I was ready with
my plan.
"This is Linda, Repair Center," I said. "We have an emergency. Service       for a
paramedic unit has gone down. We have a field tech trying to restore
service but he can't find the problem. We need you to drive over to the
Webster CO immediately and see if we have dial tone leaving the central office."

And then I told him, 'I'll call you when you get there," because of course        I
couldn't have him calling the Repair Center and asking for me.
I knew he wouldn't want to leave the comfort of the central office to bundle up
and go scrape ice off his windshield and drive through the slush late at night. But
it was an emergency, so he couldn't exactly say he was too busy.
When I reached him forty-five minutes later at the Webster CO, I told him        to
check cable 29 pair 2481, and he walked over to the flame and checked and said,
Yes, there was dial tone. Which of course I already knew.

So then I said, "Okay, I need you to do an LV," which means line verification,
which is asking him to identify the phone number. He does this by dialing a
special number that reads back the number he called from. He doesn't know
anything about if it's an unlisted number or that it's justbeen changed, so he did
what I asked and I heard the number being announced over his lineman's test set.
Beautiful. The whole thing had worked like a charm.

I told him, "Well, the problem must be out in the field," like I knew the ,,umber
all along. I thanked him and told him we'd keep working on it, and said good
night.



MITNICK MESSAGE
Once a social engineer knows how things work inside the targeted company, it
becomes easy to use that knowledge to develop rapport with legitimate
employees. Companies need to prepare for social engineering attacks from
current or former employees who may have an axe to grind. Background checks
may be helpful to weed out prospects who may have a propensity toward this
type of behavior. But in most cases, these people will be extremely difficult to
detect. The only reasonable safeguard in these cases is to enforce and audit
procedures for verifying identity, including the person's employment status, prior
to disclosing any information to anyone not personally known to still be with the
company.

So much for that Doug and trying to hide from me behind an unlisted number.
The fun was about to begin.

Analyzing the Con
The young lady in this story was able to get the information she wanted to carry
out her revenge because she had inside knowledge: the phone numbers,
procedures, and lingo of the telephone company. With it she was not only able to
find out a new, unlisted phone number, but was able to do it in the middle of a
wintry night, sending a telephone switchman chasing across town for her.
"MR. BIGG WANTS THIS"
A popular and highly effective form of intimidation--popular in large measure
because it's so simple--relies on influencing human behavior by using authority.

Just the name of the assistant in the CEO's office can be valuable. Private
investigators and even head-hunters do this all the time. They'll call the
switchboard operator and say they want to be connected to the CEO's office.
When the secretary or executive assistant answers, they'll say they have a
document or package for the CEO, or if they send an email attachment, would
she print it out? Or else they'll ask, what's the fax number? And by the way,
what's your name?

Then they call the next person, and say, "Jeannie in Mr. Bigg's office told me to
call you so you can help me with something."

The technique is called name-dropping, and it's usually used as a method to
quickly establish rapport by influencing the target to believe that the attacker is
connected with somebody in authority. A target is more likely to do a favor for
someone who knows somebody he knows.

If the attacker has his eyes set on highly sensitive information, he may use this
kind of approach to stir up useful emotions in the victim, such as fear of getting
into trouble with his superiors. Here's an example.


Scott's Story
"Scott Abrams."

"Scott, this is Christopher Dalbridge. I just got off the phone with Mr. Biggley,
and he's more than a little unhappy. He says he sent a note ten days ago that you
people were to get copies of all your market penetration research over to us for
analysis. We never got a thing."

"Market penetration research? Nobody said anything to me about it.
What department are you in?"
"We're a consulting firm he hired, and we're already behind schedule." "Listen,
I'm just on my way to a meeting. Let me get your phone number
 and . . ."

The attacker now sounded just short of truly frustrated: "Is that what
you want me to tell Mr. Biggley?! Listen, he expects our analysis by tomorrow
morning and we have to work on it tonight. Now, do you want me to tell him we
couldn't do it 'cause we couldn't get the report from you, or do you want to tell
him that yourself?."

An angry CEO can ruin your week. The target is likely to decide that maybe this
is something he better take care of before he goes into that meeting. Once again,
the social engineer has pressed the right button to get the response he wanted.

Analyzing the Con
The ruse of intimidation by referencing authority works especially well if the
other person is at a fairly low level in the company. The use of an important
person's name not only overcomes normal reluctance or suspicion, but often
makes the person eager to please; the natural instinct of wanting to be helpful is
multiplied when you think that the person you're helping is important or
influential.

The social engineer knows, though, that it's best when running this particular
deceit to use the name of someone at a higher level than the person's own boss.
And this gambit is tricky to use within a small organization: The attacker doesn't
want his victim making a chance comment to the VP of marketing. "I sent out the
product marketing plan you had that guy call me about," can too easily produce a
response of "What marketing plan? What guy?" And that could lead to the
discovery that the company has been victimized.


MITNICKS MESSAGE
Intimidation can create a fear of punishment, influencing people to cooperate.
Intimidation can also raise the fear of embarrassment or of being disqualified
from that new promotion.
People must be trained that it's not only acceptable but expected to challenge
authority when security is at stake. Information security training should include
teaching people how to challenge authority in customer-friendly ways, without
damaging relationships. Moreover, this expectation must be supported from the
top down. If an employee is not going to be backed up for challenging people
regardless of their status, the normal reaction is to stop challenging--just the
opposite of what you want.


WHAT THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION KNOWS ABOUT
YOU
We like to think that government agencies with les on us keep the information
safely locked away from people without an authentic need to know. The reality is
that even the federal government isn't as immune to penetration as we would like
to imagine.
May Linn’s Phone Call
Place: A regional office of the Social Security Administration
Time: 1 0:1 8 A.M., Thursday morning

"Mod Three. This is May Linn Wang."

The voice on the other end of the phone sounded apologetic, almost timid.

"Ms. Wang, this is Arthur Arondale, in the Office of the Inspector General. Can I
call you 'May'?
"It's 'May Linn'," she said.
 "Well, it's like this, May Linn. We've got a new guy in here who there's no
computer for yet, and right now he's got a priority project and he's using mine.
We're the government of the United States, for cryin' out loud, and they say they
don't have enough money in the budget to buy a computer for this guy to use.
And now my boss thinks I'm falling behind and doesn't want to hear any excuses,
you know?"

"I know what you mean, all right."
"Can you help me with a quick inquiry on MCS?" he asked, using the name of
the computer system for looking up taxpayer information.
"Sure, what'cha need?"
"The first thing I need you to do is an alphadent on Joseph Johnson, DOB
7/4/69." (Alphadent means to have the computer search for an account
alphabetically by taxpayer name, further identified by date of birth.)

After a brief pause, she asked:

"What do you need to know?"
"What's his account number?" he said, using the insider's
    shorthand for the social security number. She read it off.
"Okay, I need you to do a numident on that account number,"
 the caller said.

That was a request for her to read off the basic taxpayer data, and May Linn
responded by giving the taxpayer's place of birth, mother's maiden name, and
father's name. The caller listened patiently while she also gave him the month and
year the card was issued, and the district office it was issued by.

He next asked for a DEQY. (Pronounced "DECK-wee,"                      it's short
for "detailed earnings query.")
The DEQY request brought the response, "For what year?"
The caller replied, "Year 2001 ."
May Linn said, "The amount was $190,286, the payer was Johnson MicroTech."
"Any other wages?"
"No."
"Thanks," he said. "You've been very kind."
Then he tried to arrange to call her whenever he needed information and couldn't
get to his computer, again using the favorite trick of social engineers of always
trying to establish a connection so that he can keep going back to the same
person, avoiding the nuisance of having to find a new mark each time.

"Not next week," she told him, because she was going to Kentucky for her sister's
  wedding.' Any other time, she'd do whatever she could.

When she put the phone down, May Linn felt good that she had been able to offer
a little help to a fellow unappreciated public servant.



Keith Carter's Story
To judge from the movies and from best-selling crime novels, a private
investigator is short on ethics and long on knowledge of how to get the juicy facts
on people. They do this by using thoroughly illegal methods, while just barely
managing to avoid getting arrested. The truth, of course, is that most PIs run
entirely legitimate businesses. Since many of them started their working lives as
sworn law enforcement officers, they know perfectly well what's legal and what
isn't, and most are not tempted to cross the line.

There are, however, exceptions. Some Pis - more than a few - do indeed fit the
mold of the guys in the crime stories. These guys are known in the trade as
information brokers, a polite term for people who are willing to break the rules.
They know they can get any assignment done a good deal faster and a good deal
easier if they take some shortcuts. That these shortcuts happen to be potential
felonies that might land them behind bars for a few years doesn't seem to deter
the more unscrupulous ones.

Meanwhile the upscale PIs--the ones who work out of a fancy office suite in a
high-rent part of town--don't do this kind of work themselves. They simply hire
some information broker to do it for them.

The guy we'll call Keith Carter was the kind of private eye unencumbered by
ethics.
It was a typical case of "Where's he hiding the money?" Or sometimes it's
"Where's she hiding the money?" Sometimes it was a rich lady who wanted to
know where her husband had hidden her money (though why a woman with
money ever marries a guy without was a riddle Keith Carter wondered about now
and then but had never found a good answer for).

In this case the husband, whose name was Joe Johnson, was the one keeping the
money on ice. He "was a very smart guy who had started a high-tech company
with ten thousand dollars he borrowed from his wife's family and built into a
hundred-million dollar firm. According to her divorce lawyer, he had done an
impressive job of hiding his assets, and the lawyer wanted a complete rundown.

Keith figured his starting point would be the Social Security Administration,
targeting their files on Johnson, which would be packed with highly useful
information for a situation like this. Armed with their info, Keith could pretend to
be the target and get the banks, brokerage firms, and offshore institutions to tell
him everything.
His first phone call was to a local district office, using the same 800 number that
any member of the public uses, the number listed in the local phone book. When
a clerk came on the line, Keith asked to be connected to someone in Claims.
Another wait, and then a voice. Now Keith shifted gears; "Hi," he began. "This is
Gregory Adams, District Office 329. Listen, I'm trying to reach a claims adjuster
that handles an account number that ends in 6363, and the number I have goes to
a fax machine."

"That's Mod 2," the man said. He looked up the number and gave it to Keith.

Next he called Mod 2. When May Linn answered, he switched hats and went
through the routine about being from the Office of the Inspector General, and the
problem about somebody else having to use his computer. She gave him the
information he was looking for, and agreed to do whatever she could when he
needed help in the future.

Analyzing the Con
What made this approach effective was the play on the employee's sympathy with
the story about someone else using his computer and "my boss is not happy with
me." People don't show their emotions at work very often; when they do, it can
roll right over someone else's ordinary defenses against social engineering
attacks. The emotional ploy of "I'm in trouble, won't you help me?" was all it
took to win the day.
Social Insecurity
Incredibly, the Social Security Administration has posted a copy of their entire
Program Operations Manual on the Web, crammed with information that's useful
for their people, but also incredibly valuable to social engineers. It contains
abbreviations, lingo, and instructions for how to request what you want, as
described in this story.

Want to learn more inside information about the Social Security Administration?
Just search on Google or enter the following address into your browser:
http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/. Unless the agency has already read this story and
removed the manual by the time you read this, you'll find on-line instructions that
even give detailed information on what data an SSA clerk is allowed to give to
the law enforcement community. In practical terms, that community includes any
social engineer who can convince an SSA clerk that he is from a law enforcement
organization. The attacker could not have been successful in obtaining this
information from one of the clerks who handles phone calls from the general
public. The kind of attack Keith used only works when the person on the
receiving end of the call is someone whose phone number is unavailable to the
public, and who therefore has the expectation that anyone calling must be
somebody on the inside--another example of speakeasy security'. The elements
that helped this attack to work included:

Knowing the phone number to the Mod.

Knowing the terminology they used--numident, alphadent, and DEQY.

Pretending to be from the Office of the Inspector General, which every federal
government employee knows as a government-wide investigative agency with
broad powers. This gives the attacker an aura of authority.

One interesting sidelight: Social engineers seem to know how to make requests
so that hardly anyone ever thinks, "Why are you calling me.'- even when,
logically; it would have made more sense if the call had gone to some other
person in some completely different department. Perhaps it simply offers such a
break in the monotony of the daily grind to help the caller that the victim
discounts how unusual the call seems.
Finally, the attacker in this incident, not satisfied with getting the information just
for the case at hand, wanted to establish a contact he could call on regularly. He
might otherwise have been able to use a common ploy for the sympathy attack--
"I spilled coffee on my keyboard." That was no good here, though, because a
keyboard can be replaced in a day.
Hence he used the story about somebody else using his computer, which he could
reasonably string out for weeks: "Yep, I thought he'd have his own computer
yesterday, but one came in and another guy pulled some kind of deal and got it
instead. So this joker is still showing up in my cubicle." And so on.

Poor me, I need help. Works like a charm.

ONE SIMPLE CALL
One of an attacker's main hurdles is to make his request sound reasonable
something typical of requests that come up in the victim's workday, something
that doesn't put the victim out too much. As with a lot of other things in life,
making a request sound logical may be a challenge one day, but the next, it may
be a piece of cake.


Mary H's Phone Call
Date/Time: Monday, November 23, 7:49 A.M.
Place: Mauersby & Storch Accounting, New York

To most people, accounting work is number crunching and bean counting,
generally viewed as being about as enjoyable as having a root canal. Fortunately,
not everyone sees the work that way. Mary Harris, for example, found her work
as a senior accountant absorbing, part of the reason she was one of the most
dedicated accounting employees at her
firm.

On this particular Monday, Mary arrived early to get a head start on what she
expected to be a long day, and was surprised to find her phone ringing. She
picked it up and gave her name.

"Hi, this is Peter Sheppard. I'm with Arbuclde Support, the company that does
tech support for your firm. We logged a couple of complaints over the weekend
from people having problems with the computers there. I thought I could
troubleshoot before everybody comes into work this morning. Are you having
any problems with your computer or connecting to the network?"

She told him she didn't know yet. She turned her computer on and while it was
booting, he explained what he wanted to do.

"I'd like to run a couple of tests with you, he said. "I'm able to see on my screen
the keystrokes you type, and I want to make sure they're going across the network
correctly. So every time you type a stroke, I want you to tell me what it is, and I'll
see if the same letter or number is appearing here. Okay?"
With nightmare visions of her computer not working and a frustrating day of not
being able to get any work done, she was more than happy to have this man help
her. After a few moments, she told him, "I have the login screen, and I'm going to
type in my ID. I'm typing it now--M...A...R...Y...D."

"Great so far," he said. "I'm seeing that here. Now, go ahead and type your
password but don't tell me what it is. You should never tell anybody your
password, not even tech support. I'll just see asterisks here--your password is
protected so I can't see it.': None of this was true, but it made sense to Mary. And
then he said, "Let me know once your computer has started up."
When she said it was running, he had her open two of her applications, and she
reported that they launched "just fine."

Mary was relieved to see that everything seemed to be working normally. Peter
said, "I'm glad I could make sure you'll be able to use your computer okay. And
listen," he went on, "we just installed an update that allow people to change their
passwords. Would you be willing to take a couple of minutes with me so I can
see if we got it working right?

She was grateful for the help he had given her and readily agreed. Peter talked
her through the steps of launching the application that allows a user to change
passwords, a standard element of the Windows 2000 operating system. "Go
ahead and enter your password," he told her. "But remember not to say it out
loud."

When she had done that, Peter said, "Just for this quick test, when it asks for your
new password, enter 'test123.' Then type it again in the Verification box, and
click Enter."

He walked her through the process of disconnecting from the server. He had her
wait a couple of minutes, then connect again, this time trying to log on with her
new password. It worked like a charm, Peter seemed very pleased, and talked her
through changing back to her original password or choosing a new one--once
more cautioning her about not saying the password out loud.

"Well, Mary," Peter told her. "We didn't find any trouble, and that's great. Listen,
if any problems do come up, just call us over here at Arbuckle. I'm usually on
special projects but anybody here who answers can help you." She thanked him
and they said goodbye.

Peter's Story
The word had gotten around about Peter--a number of the people in his
community who had gone to school with him had heard he turned into some kind
of a computer whiz who could often find out useful information that other people
couldn't get. When Alice Conrad came to him to ask a favor, he said no at first.
Why should he help? When he ran into her once and tried to ask for a date, she
had turned him down cold.

But his refusal to help didn't seem to surprise her. She said she didn't think it was
something he could do anyway. That was like a challenge, because of course he
was sure he could. And that was how he came to
agree.
Alice had been offered a contract for some consulting work for a marketing
company, but the contract terms didn't seem very good. Before she went back to
ask for a better deal, she wanted to know what terms other consultants had on
their contracts.

This is how Peter tells the story.

I wouldn't tell Alice but I got off on people wanting me to do something they
didn't think I could, when I knew it would be easy. Well, not easy, exactly, not
this time. It would take a bit of doing. But that was okay.

I could show her what smart was really all about.

A little after 7:30 Monday morning, I called the marketing company's offices and
got the receptionist, said that I was with the company that handled their pension
plans and I need to talk to somebody in Accounting. Had she noticed if any of the
Accounting people had come in yet? She said, "I think I saw Mary come in a few
minutes ago, I'll try her for you."

When Mary picked up the phone, I told her my little story about computer
problems, which was designed to give her the jitters so she'd be glad to cooperate.
As soon as I had talked her through changing her password, I then quickly logged
onto the system with the same temporary password I had asked her to use,
test123.

Here's where the mastery comes in--I installed a small program that
allowed me to access the company's computer system whenever I wanted, using a
secret password of my own. After I hung up with Mary, my first step was to erase
the audit trail so no one would even know I had been on his or her system. It was
easy. After elevating my system privileges, I was able to download a free
program called clearlogs that I found on a security- related Web site at
www.ntsecurity.nu.
Time for the real job. I ran a search for any documents with the word contract" in
the filename, and downloaded the files. Then I searched some more and came on
the mother lode--the directory containing all the consultant payment reports. So I
put together all the contract files and a list of payments.

Alice could pore through the contracts and see how much they were paying other
consultants. Let her do the donkeywork of poring through all those files. I had
done what she asked me to.
From the disks I put the data onto, I printed out some of the files so I
could show her the evidence. I made her meet me and buy dinner. You should
have seen her face when she thumbed through the stack of papers. "No way," she
said. "No way."

I didn't bring the disks with me. They were the bait. I said she'd have to come
over to get them, hoping maybe she'd want to show her gratitude for the favor I
just did her.


MITNICK MESSAGE
It's amazing how easy it is for a social engineer to get people to do things based
on how he structures the request. The premise is to trigger an automatic response
based on psychological principles, and rely on the mental shortcuts people take
when they perceive the caller as an ally.

Analyzing the Con
Peter's phone call to the marketing company represented the most basic form of
social engineering--a simple attempt that needed little preparation, worked on the
first attempt, and took only a few minutes to bring off.

Even better, Mary, the victim, had no reason to think that any sort of trick or ruse
had been played on her, no reason to file a report or raise a ruckus.

The scheme worked through Peter's use of three social engineering tactics. First
he got Mary's initial cooperation by generating fear--making her think that her
computer might not be usable. Then he took the time to have her open two of her
applications so she could be sure they were working okay, strengthening the
rapport between the two of them, a sense of being allies. Finally, he got her
further cooperation for the essential part of his task by playing on her gratitude
for the help he had provided in making sure her computer was okay.

By telling her she shouldn't ever reveal her password, should not reveal it even to
him, Peter did a thorough but subtle job of convincing her that he was concerned
about the security of her company's files. This boosted her confidence that he
must be legitimate because he was protecting her and the company.

THE POLICE RAID
Picture this scene: The government has been trying to lay a trap for a man named
Arturo Sanchez, who has been distributing movies free over the Internet. The
Hollywood studios say he's violating their copyrights, he says he's just trying to
nudge them to recognize an inevitable market so they'll start doing something
about making new movies available for download. He points out (correctly) that
this could be a huge source of revenue for the studios that they seem to be
completely ignoring.

Search Warrant, Please
Coming home late one night, he checks the windows of his apartment from
across the street and notices the lights are off, even though he always leaves one
on when he goes out.

He pounds and bangs on a neighbor's door until he wakes the man up, and learns
that there was indeed a police raid in the building. But they made the neighbors
stay downstairs, and he still isn't sure what apartment they went into. He only
knows they left carrying some heavy things, only they were wrapped up and he
couldn't tell what they were. And they didn't take anybody away in handcuffs.

Arturo checks his apartment. The bad news is that there's a paper from the police
requiring that he call immediately and set up an appointment for an interview
within three days. The worse news is that his computers are missing.

Arturo vanishes into the night, going to stay with a friend. But the uncertainty
gnaws at him. How much do the police know? Have they caught up with him at
last, but left him a chance to flee? Or is this about something else entirely,
something he can clear up without having to leave town?

Before you read on, stop and think for a moment: Can you imagine any way you
could find out what the police know about you? Assuming you don't have any
political contacts or friends in the police department or the prosecutor s office, do
you imagine there's any way that you, as an ordinary citizen, could get this
information? Or that even someone with social engineering skills could?

Scamming the Police
Arturo satisfied his need to know like this: To start with, he got the phone
number for a nearby copy store, called them, and asked for their fax number.
Then he called the district attorney's office, and asked for Records. When he was
connected with the records office, he introduced himself as an investigator with
Lake County, and said he needed to speak with the clerk who files the active
search warrants.

"I do," the lady said. "Oh, great," he answered. "Because we raided a
suspect last night and I'm trying to locate the affidavit."

"We file them by address," she told him.

He gave his address, and she sounded almost excited. "Oh, yeah," she bubbled, "I
know about that one. 'The Copyright Caper.'"

"That's the one," he said. "I'm looking for the affidavit and copy of the warrant.

"Oh, I have it right here."

"Great," he said. "Listen, I'm out in the field and I have a meeting with the Secret
Service on this case if I fifteen minutes. I've been so absentminded lately, I left
the file at home, and I'll never make it there and back in time. Could I get copies
from you?"

"Sure, no problem. I'll make copies; you can come right over and pick them up."

"Great," he said. "That's great. But listen, I'm on the other side of town. Is it
possible you could fax them to me?"

That created a small problem, but not insurmountable. "We don't have a fax up
here in Records," she said. "But they have one downstairs in the Clerk's office
they might let me use."

He said, "Let me call the Clerk's office and set it up."

The lady in the Clerk's office said she'd be glad to take care of it but wanted to
know "Who's going to pay for it?" She needed an accounting code.

"I'll get the code and call you back," he told her.
He then called the DA's office, again identified himself as a police officer and
simply asked the receptionist, "What's the accounting code for the DA's office?"
Without hesitation, she told him.
Calling back to the Clerk's office to provide the accounting number gave him the
excuse for manipulating the lady a little further: He talked her into walking
upstairs to get the copies of the papers to be faxed.
NOTE
How does a social engineer know the details of so many operation – police
departments, prosecutors offices, phone company practices, the organization of
specific companies that are in fields useful in his attacks, such as
telecommunications and computers ? Because it’s his business to find out. This
knowledge is a social engineers stock in the trade because information can aid
him in his efforts to deceive.


Covering His Tracks
Arturo still had another couple of steps to take. There was always a possibility
that someone would smell something fishy, and he might arrive at the copy store
to find a couple of detectives, casually dressed and trying to look busy until
somebody showed up asking for that particular fax. He waited a while, and then
called the Clerk's office back to verify that the lady had sent the fax. Fine so far.

He called another copy store in the same chain across town and used the ruse
about how he was "pleased with your handling of a job and want to write the
manager a letter of congratulations, what's her name?" With that essential piece
of information, he called the first copy store again and said he wanted to talk to
the manager. When the man picked up the phone, Arturo said, "Hi, this is Edward
at store 628 in Hartfield. My manager, Anna, told me to call you. We've got a
customer who's all upset--somebody gave him the fax number of the wrong store.
He's here waiting for an important fax, only the number he was given is for your
store." The manager promised to have one of his people locate the fax and send it
on to the Hartfield store immediately.

Arturo was already waiting at the second store when the fax arrived there. Once
he had it in hand, he called back to the Clerk's office to tell the lady thanks, and
'It's not necessary to bring those copies back upstairs, you can just throw them
away now." Then he called the manager at the first store and told him, too, to
throw away their copy of the fax. This way there wouldn't be any record of what
had taken place, just in case somebody later came around asking questions.
Social engineers know you can never be too careful.

Arranged this way, Arturo didn't even have to pay charges at the first copy store
for receiving the fax and for sending it out again to the second store. And if it
turned out that the police did show up at the first store, Arturo would already
have his fax and be long gone by the time they could arrange to get people to the
second location.

The end of the story: The affidavit and warrant showed that the police had well-
documented evidence of Arturo's movie-copying activities. That was what he
needed to know. By midnight, he had crossed the state line. Arturo was on the
way to a new life, somewhere else with a new identity, ready to get started again
on his campaign.

Analyzing the Con
The people who work in any district attorney's office, anywhere, are in constant
contact with law enforcement officers--answering questions, making
arrangements, taking messages. Anybody gutsy enough to call and claim to be a
police officer, sheriff's deputy, or whatever will likely be taken at his word.
Unless it's obvious that he doesn't know the terminology, or if he's nervous and
stumbles over his words, or in some other way doesn't sound authentic, he may
not even be asked a single question to verify his claim. That's exactly what
happened here, with two different
workers.

MITNICK MESSAGE
The truth of the matter is that no one is immune to being duped by a good social
engineer. Because of the pace of normal life, we don't always take the time for
thoughtful decisions, even on matters that are important to us. Complicated
situations, lack of time, emotional state, or mental fatigue can easily distract us.
So we take a mental shortcut, making our decisions without analyzing the
information carefully and completely, a mental process known as automatic
responding. This is even true for federal, state, and local law enforcement
officials. We're all human.

Obtaining a needed charge code was handled with a single phone call. Then
Arturo played the sympathy card with the story about "a meeting with the Secret
Service in fifteen minutes, I've been absent-minded and left the file at home." She
naturally felt sorry for him, and went out of her way to help.

Then by using not one but two copy stores, Arturo made himself extra safe when
he went to pick up the fax. A variation on this that makes the fax even more
difficult to trace: Instead of having the document sent to another copy store, the
attacker can give what appears to be a fax number, but is really an address at a
free Internet service that will receive a fax for you and automatically forward it to
your email address. That way it can be downloaded directly to the attacker's
computer, and he never has to show his face anyplace where someone might later
be able to identify him. And the email address and electronic fax number can be
abandoned as soon as the mission has been accomplished.

TURNING THE TABLES
A young man I'll call Michael Parker was one of those people who figured out a
bit late that the better-paying jobs mostly go to people with college degrees. He
had a chance to attend a local college on a partial scholarship plus education
loans, but it meant working nights and weekends to pay his rent, food, gas, and
car insurance. Michael, who always liked to find shortcuts, thought maybe there
was another way, one that paid off faster and with less effort. Because he had
been learning about computers from the time he got to play with one at age ten
and became fascinated with finding out how they worked, he decided to see if he
could "create" his own accelerated bachelor's degree in computer science.

Graduating--Without Honors
He could have broken into the computer systems of the state university, found the
record of someone who had graduated with a nice B+ or A-average, copied the
record, put his own name on it, and added it to the records of that year's
graduating class. Thinking this through, feeling somehow uneasy about the idea,
he realized there must be other records of a student having been on campus--
tuition payment records, the housing office, and who knows what else. Creating
just the record of courses and grades would leave too many loopholes.

Plotting further, feeling his way, it came to him that he could reach his
goal by seeing if the school had a graduate with the same name as his, who had
earned a computer science degree any time during an appropriate span of years. If
so, he could just put down the other Michael Parker's social security number on
employment application forms; any company that checked the name and social
security number with the university would be told that, yes, he did have the
claimed degree. (It wouldn't be obvious to most people but was obvious to him
that he could put one social security number on the job application and then, if
hired, put his own real number on the new-employee forms. Most companies
would never think to check whether a new hire had used a different number
earlier in the hiring process.)
Logging In to Trouble
How to find a Michael Parker in the university's records? He went about it like
this:

Going to the main library on the university campus, he sat down at a computer
terminal, got up on the Internet, and accessed the university's Web site. He then
called the Registrar's office. With the person who answered, he went through one
of the by-now-familiar social engineering routines: "I'm calling from the
Computer Center, we're making some changes to the network configuration and
we want to make sure we don't
disrupt your access. Which server do you connect to?"

"What do you mean, server, he was asked.
"What computer do you connect to when you need to look up student academic
information.

The answer, admin.rnu.edu, gave him the name of the computer where student
records were stored. This was the first piece of the puzzle: He now knew his
target machine.


LINGO
DUMB TERMINAL A terminal that doesn’t contain its own microprocessor.
Dumb terminals can only accept simple commands and display text characters
and numbers.

He typed that URL into the computer and got no response--as expected, there was
a firewall blocking access. So he ran a program to see if he could connect to any
of the services running on that computer, and found an open port with a Telnet
service running, which allows one computer to connect remotely to another
computer and access it as if directly connected using a dumb terminal. All he
would need to gain access would be the standard user ID and password.

He made another call to the registrar's office, this time listening carefully to make
sure he was talking to a different person. He got a lady, and again he claimed to
be from the university's Computer Center. They were installing a new production
system for administrative records, he told her. As a favor, he'd like her to connect
to the new system, still in test mode, to see if she could access student academic
records okay. He gave her the IP address to connect to, and talked her through the
process.

In fact, the IP address took her to the computer Michael was sitting at in the
campus library. Using the same process described in Chapter 8, he had created a
login simulator--a decoy sign-in screen--looking just like the one she was
accustomed to seeing when going onto the system for student records. "It's not
working," she told him. "It keeps saying 'Login incorrect.

By now the login simulator had fed the keystrokes of her account name and
password to Michael's terminal; mission accomplished. He told her, "Oh, some of
the accounts haven't been brought over yet to this machine. Let me set up your
account, and I'll call you back." Careful about tying up loose ends, as any
proficient social engineer needs to be, he would make a point of phoning later to
say that the test system wasn't working right yet, and if it was okay with her,
they'd call back to her or one of the other folks there when they had figured out
what was causing the problem.
The Helpful Registrar
Now Michael knew what computer system he needed to access, and he had a
user's ID and password. But what commands would he need in order to search the
files for information on a computer science graduate with the right name and
graduation date? The student database would be a proprietary one, created on
campus to meet the specific requirements of the university and the Registrar's
office, and would have a unique way of accessing information in the database.

First step in clearing this last hurdle: Find out who could guide him through the
mysteries of searching the student database. He called the Registrar's office
again, this time reaching a different person. He was from the office of the Dean
of Engineering, he told the lady, and he asked, "Who are we supposed to call for
help when we're having problems accessing the student academic rues.

Minutes later he was on the phone with the college's database administrator,
pulling the sympathy act: "I'm Mark Sellers, in the registrar's office. You feel like
taking pity on a new guy? Sorry to be calling you but they're all in a meeting this
afternoon and there's no one around to help me. I need to retrieve a list of all
graduates with a computer science degree, between 1990 and 2000. They need it
by the end of the day and if I don't have it, I may not have this job for long. You
willing to help out a guy in trouble?" Helping people out was part of what this
database administrator did, so he was extra patient as he talked Michael step by
step through the process.

By the time they hung up, Michael had downloaded the entire list of computer
science graduates for those years. Within a few minutes he had run a search,
located two Michael Parkers, chosen one of them, and obtained the guy's social
security number as well as other pertinent information stored in the database.

He had just become "Michael Parker, B.S. in Computer Science, graduated with
honors, 1998." In this case, the "B.S." was uniquely appropriate.

Analyzing the Con
This attack used one ruse I haven't talked about before: The attacker asking the
organization's database administrator to walk him through the steps of carrying
out a computer process he didn't know how to do. A powerful and effective
turning of the tables, this is the equivalent of asking the owner of a store to help
you carry a box containing items you've just stolen from his shelves out to your
car.
MITNICK MESSAGE
Computer users are sometimes clueless about the threats and vulnerabilities
associated with social engineering that exist in our world of technology. They
have access to information, yet lack the detailed knowledge of what might prove
to be a security threat. A social engineer will target an employee who has little
understanding of how valuable the information being sought is, so the target is
more likely to grant the stranger's request.

PREVENTING THE CON
Sympathy, guilt, and intimidation are three very popular psychological triggers
used by the social engineer, and these stories have demonstrated the tactics in
action. But what can you and your company do to avoid these types of attacks?

Protecting Data
Some stories in this chapter emphasize the danger of sending a file to someone
you don't know, even when that person is (or appears to be) an employee, and the
file is being sent internally, to an email address or tax machine within the
company.

Company security policy needs to be very specific about the safeguards for
surrendering valued data to anyone not personally known to the sender. Exacting
procedures need to be established for transferring files with sensitive information.
When the request is from someone not personally known, there must be clear
steps to take for verification, with different levels of authentication depending on
the sensitivity of the information.

Here are some techniques to consider:

Establish the need to know (which may require obtaining authorization from the
designated information owner).

Keep a personal or departmental log of these transactions.

Maintain a list of people who have been specially trained in the procedures and
who are trusted to authorize sending out sensitive information. Require that only
these people be allowed to send information to anyone outside the workgroup.

If a request for the data is made in writing (email, fax, or mail) take additional
security steps to verify that the request actually came from the person it appears
to have come from.
About Passwords
All employees who are able to access any sensitive information--and today that
means virtually every worker who uses a computer--need to understand that
simple acts like changing your password, even for a few moments, can lead to a
major security breach.

Security training needs to cover the topic of passwords, and that has to focus in
part on when and how to change your password, what constitutes an acceptable
password, and the hazards of letting anyone else become involved in the process.
The training especially needs to convey to all employees that they should be
suspicious of any request that involves their passwords.

On the surface this appears to be a simple message to get across to employees. It's
not, because to appreciate this idea requires that employees grasp how a simple
act like changing a password can lead to a security compromise. You can tell a
child "Look both ways before crossing the street," but until the child understands
why that's important, you're relying on blind obedience. And rules requiring blind
obedience are typically ignored or forgotten.

NOTE
Passwords are such a central focus of social engineering attacks that we devote a
separate section to the topic in Chapter 16, where you will find specific
recommended policies on managing passwords.

A Central Reporting Point
Your security policy should provide a person or group designated as a central
point for reporting suspicious activities that appear to be attempts to infiltrate
your organization. All employees need to know who to call any time they suspect
an attempt at electronic or physical intrusion. The phone number of the place to
make these reports should always be close at hand so employees don't have to dig
for it if they become suspicious that an attack is taking place.

Protect Your Network
Employees need to understand that the name of a computer server or network is
not trivial information, but rather it can give an attacker essential knowledge that
helps him gain trust or find the location of the information he desires.

In particular, people such as database administrators who work with software
belong to that category of those with technology expertise, and they need to
operate under special and very restrictive rules about verifying the identity of
people who call them for information or advice.
People who regularly provide any. kind of computer help need to be well trained
in what kinds of requests should be red flags, suggesting that the caller may be
attempting a social engineering attack.

It's worth noting, though, that from the perspective of the database administrator
in the last story in this chapter, the caller met the criteria for being legitimate: He
was calling from on campus, and he was obviously on a site that required an
account name and password. This just makes clear once again the importance of
having standardized procedures for verifying the identity of anybody requesting
information, especially in a case like this where the caller was asking for help in
obtaining access to confidential records.

All of this advice goes double for colleges and universities. It's not news that
computer hacking is a favorite pastime for many college students, and it should
also be no surprise that student records--and sometimes faculty records, as well--
are a tempting target. This abuse is so rampant that some corporations actually
consider campuses a hostile environment, and create firewall rules that block
access from educational institutions with addresses that end in .edu.

The long and short of it is that all student and personnel records of any kind
should be seen as prime targets of attack, and should be well protected as
sensitive information.

Training Tips
Most social engineering attacks are ridiculously easy to defend against... for
anyone who knows what to be on the lookout for.

From the corporate perspective, there is a fundamental need for good training.
But there is also a need for something else: a variety of ways to remind people of
what they've learned.

Use splash screens that appear when the user's computer is turned on, with a
different security message each day. The message should be designed so that it
does not disappear automatically, but requires the user to click on some kind of
acknowledgement that he/she has read it.

Another approach I recommend is to start a series of security reminders. Frequent
reminder messages are important; an awareness program needs to be ongoing and
never-ending. In delivering content, the reminders should not be worded the same
in every instance. Studies have shown that these messages are more effectively
received when they vary in wording or when used in different examples.
One excellent approach is to use short blurbs in the company newsletter. This
should not be a full column on the subject, although a security column would
certainly be valuable. Instead, design a two- or three-column-wide insert,
something like a small display ad in your local newspaper. In each issue of the
newsletter, present a new security reminder in this short, attention-catching way.
Chapter 9
The Reverse Sting

The sting, mentioned elsewhere in this book (and in my opinion probably the best
movie that s ever been made about a con operation), lays out its tricky plot in
fascinating detail. The sting operation in the movie is an exact depiction of how
top grifters run "the wire," one of the three types of major swindles referred to as
"big cons." If you want to know how a team of professionals pulls off a scam
raking in a great deal of money in a single evening, there's no better textbook.

But traditional cons, whatever their particular gimmick, run according to a
pattern. Sometimes a ruse is worked in the opposite direction, which is called a
reverse sting. This is an intriguing twist in which the attacker sets up the situation
so that the victim calls on the attacker for help, or a co worker has made a
request, which the attacker is responding to.
How does this work? You're about to find out.

LINGO
REVERSE STING A con in which the person being attacked asks the attacker
for help

THE ART OF FRIENDLY PERSUASION
When the average person conjures up the picture of a computer hacker, what
usually comes to mind is the uncomplimentary image of a lonely, introverted
nerd whose best friend is his computer and who has difficulty carrying on a
conversation, except by instant messaging. The social engineer, who often has
hacker skills, also has people skills at the opposite end of the spectrum--well-
developed abilities to use and manipulate people that allow him to talk his way
into getting information in ways you would never have believed possible.

Angela's Caller
Place: Valley branch, Industrial Federal Bank.
Time: 11:27 A.M.

Angela Wisnowski answered a phone call from a man who said he was just about
to receive a sizeable inheritance and he wanted information on the different types
of savings accounts, certificates of deposit, and whatever other investments she
might be able to suggest that would be safe, but earn decent interest. She
explained there were quite a number of choices and asked if he'd like to come in
and sit down with her to discuss them. He was leaving on a trip as soon as the
money arrived, he said, and had a lot of arrangements to make. So she began
suggesting some of the possibilities and giving him details of the interest rates,
what happens if you sell a CD early, and so on, while trying to pin down his
investment goals.

She seemed to be making progress when he said, "Oh, sorry, I've got to take this
other call. What time can I finish this conversation with you so I can make some
decisions? When do you leave for lunch?" She told him 12:30 and he said he'd try
to call back before then or the following day.

Louis’s Caller
Major banks use internal security codes that change every day. When somebody
from one branch needs information from another branch, he proves he's entitled
to the information by demonstrating he knows the day's code. For an added
degree of security and flexibility, some major banks issue multiple codes each
day. At a West Coast outfit I'll call Industrial Federal Bank, each employee finds
a list of five codes for the day, identified as A through E, on his or her computer
each morning.

Place: Same.
Time: 12:48 '.M., same day.

Louis Halpburn didn't think anything of it when a call came in that afternoon, a
call like others he handled regularly several times a week.

'Hello," the caller said. "This is Neil Webster. I'm calling from branch 3182 in
Boston. Angela Wisnowski, please."
"She's at lunch. Can I help?"
"Well, she left a message asking us to fax some information on one of our
   customers."

The caller sounded like he had been having a bad day.

"The person who normally handles those requests is out sick," he said. "I've got a
stack of these to do, it's almost 4 o'clock here and I'm supposed to be out of this
place to go to a doctor's appointment in half an hour."

The manipulation--giving all the reasons why the other person should feel sorry
for him--was part of softening up the mark. He went on, "Whoever took her
phone message, the fax number is unreadable. It's 213-something. What's the
rest?"

Louis gave the fax number, and the caller said, "Okay, thanks.
Before I can fax this, I need to ask you for Code B."
"But you called me," he said with just enough chill so the man from Boston
  would get the message.

This is good, the caller thought. It's so cool when people don't fall over at the first
gentle shove. If the, don't resist a little, the job is too easy and I could start getting
lazy.

To Louis, he said, "I've got a branch manager that's just turned paranoid about
getting verification before we send anything out, is all. But listen, if you don't
need us to fax the information, it's okay. No need to verify."
"Look," Louis said, "Angela will be back in half an hour or so. I can have her call
    you back."
"I'll just tell her I couldn't send the information today because you wouldn't
    identify this as a legitimate request by giving me the code. If I'm not out sick
    tomorrow, I'll call her back then."

"The message says 'Urgent.' Never mind, without verification my hands are tied.
   You'll tell her I tried to send it but you wouldn't give the code, okay?"

Louis gave up under the pressure. An audible sigh of annoyance came winging
its way down the phone line.

"Well," he said, "wait a minute; I have to go to my computer. Which code did
   you want?"
"B," the caller said.
He put the call on hold and then in a bit picked up the line again. "It's 3184."

"That's not the right code."
"Yes it is--B is 3184."
"I didn't say B, I said E."
"Oh, damn. Wait a minute."
Another pause while he again looked up the codes.
"E is 9697."
"9697--right. I'll have the fax on the way. Okay?"
"Sure. Thanks."

Walter’s Call
"Industrial Federal Bank, this is Walter."
"Hey, Walter, it's Bob Grabowski in Studio City, branch 38," the caller said. "I
need you to pull a sig card on a customer account and fax it to me." The sig card,
or signature card, has more than just the customer's signature on it; it also has
identifying information, familiar items such as the social security number, date of
birth, mother's maiden name, and sometimes even a driver's license number. Very
handy to a social engineer.

"Sure thing. What's Code C?"

"Another teller is using my computer right now," the caller said. "But I just used
B and E, and I remember those. Ask me one of those."

"Okay, what's E?"

"E is 9697."

A few minutes later, Walter faxed the sig card as requested.

Donna Plaice’s Call
"Hi, this is Mr. Anselmo."
"How can I help you today?"
"What's that 800 number I'm supposed to call when I want to see if a deposit has
   been credited yet?"
"You're a customer of the bank?"
"Yes, and I haven't used the number in a while and now I don't know where I
   wrote it down."
"The number is 800-555-8600."

"Okay, thanks."

Vince Capelli's Tale
The son of a Spokane street cop, Vince knew from an early age that he wasn't
going to spend his life slaving long hours and risking his neck for minimum
wage. His two main goals in life became getting out of Spokane, and going into
business for himself. The laughter of his homies all through high school only
fired him up all the more--they thought it was hilarious that he was so busted on
starting his own business but had no idea what business it might be.

Secretly Vince knew they were right. The only thing he was good at was playing
catcher on the high school baseball team. But not good enough to capture a
college scholarship, no way good enough for professional baseball. So what
business was he going to be able to start?

One thing the guys in Vince's group never quite figured out: Anything
one of them had---a new switchblade knife, a nifty pair of warm gloves, a sexy
new girlfriend if Vince admired it, before long the item was his. He didn't steal it,
or sneak behind anybody's back; he didn't have to. The guy who had it would
give it up willingly, and then wonder afterward how it had happened. Even
asking Vince wouldn't have gotten you anywhere: He didn't know himself.
People just seemed to let him have whatever he wanted.

Vince Capelli was a social engineer from an early age, even though he had never
heard the term.

His friends stopped laughing once they all had high school diplomas in hand.
While the others slogged around town looking for jobs where you didn't have to
say "Do you want fries with that?" Vince's dad sent him off to talk to an old cop
pal who had left the force to start his own private investigation business in San
Francisco. He quickly spotted Vince's talent for the work, and took him on.

That was six years ago. He hated the part about getting the goods on unfaithful
spouses, which involved achingly dull hours of sitting and watching, but felt
continually challenged by assignments to dig up asset information for attorneys
trying to figure out if some miserable stiff was rich enough to be worth suing.
These assignments gave him plenty of chances to use his wits.

Like the time he had to look into the bank accounts of a guy named Joe
Markowitz. Joe had maybe worked a shady deal on a one-time friend of his,
which friend now wanted to know, if he sued, was Markowitz flush enough that
the friend might get some of his money back?

Vince's first step would be to find out at least one, but preferably two, of the
bank's security codes for the day. That sounds like a nearly impossible challenge:
What on earth would induce a bank employee to knock a chink in his own
security system? Ask yourself--if you wanted to do this, would you have any idea
of how to go about it?
For people like Vince, it's too easy.

People trust you if you know the inside lingo of their job and their company. It's
like showing you belong to their inner circle. It's like a secret handshake.

I didn't need much of that for a job like this. Definitely not brain surgery. All's I
needed to get started was a branch number. When I dialed the Beacon Street
office in Buffalo, the guy that answered sounded like a teller.

"This is Tim Ackerman," I said. Any name would do, he wasn't going to write it
down. "What's the branch number there?"

"The phone number or the branch number, he wanted to know, which was pretty
stupid because I had just dialed the phone number, hadn't I? "Branch number."
"3182," he said. Just like that. No, "Whad'ya wanna know for?" or anything.
'Cause it's not sensitive information, it's written on just about every piece of paper
they use.

Step Two, call the branch where my target did his banking, get the name of one
of their people, and find out when the person would be out for lunch. Angela.
Leaves at 12:30. So far, so good.

Step Three, call back to the same branch during Angela's lunch break, say I'm
calling from branch number such-and-such in Boston, Angela needs this
information faxed, gimme a code for the day. This is the tricky part; it's where the
rubber meets the road. If I was making up a test to be a social engineer, I'd put
something like this on it, where your victim gets suspicious--for good reason--
and you still stick in there until you break him down and get the information you
need. You can't do that by reciting lines from a script or learning a routine, you
got to be able to read your victim, catch his mood, play him like landing a fish
where you let out a little line and reel in, let out and reel in. Until you get him in
the net and flop him into the boat, splat!

So I landed him and had one of the codes for the day. A big step. With most
banks, one is all they use, so I would've been home flee. Industrial Federal Bank
uses five, so having just one out of five is long odds. With two out of five, I'd
have a much better chance of getting through the next act of this little drama. I
love that part about "I didn't say B, I said E." When it works, it's beautiful. And it
works most of the time.

Getting a third one would have been even better. I've actually managed to get
three on a single call--"B," "D," and "E" sound so much alike that you can claim
they misunderstood you again. But you have to be talking to somebody who's a
real pushover. This man wasn't. I'd go with two.

The day codes would be my trump to get the signature card. I call, and the guy
asks for a code. C he wants, and I've only got B and E. But it's not the end of the
world. You gotta stay cool at a moment like this, sound confident, keep right on
going, Real smooth, I played him with the one about, "Somebody's using my
computer, ask me one of these others."

We're all employees of the same company, we're all in this together, make it easy
on the guy--that's what you're hoping the victim is thinking at a moment like this.
And he played it right by the script. He took one of the choices I offered, I gave
him the right answer, he sent the fax of the sig card.
Almost home. One more call gave me the 800 number that customers use for the
automated service where an electronic voice reads you off the information you
ask for. From the sig card, I had all of my target's account numbers and his PIN
number, because that bank used the first five or last four digits of the social
security number. Pen in hand, I called the 800 number and after a few minutes of
pushing buttons, I had the latest balance in all four of the guy's accounts, and just
for good measure, his most recent deposits and withdrawals in each.

Everything my client had asked for and more. I always like to give a little extra
for good measure. Keep the clients happy. After all, repeat business is what keeps
an operation going, right?

Analyzing the Con
The key to this entire episode was obtaining the all-important day codes, and to
do that the attacker, Vince, used several different techniques.

He began with a little verbal arm-twisting when Louis proved reluctant to give
him a code. Louis was right to be suspicious--the codes are designed to be used in
the opposite direction. He knew that in the usual flow of things, the unknown
caller would be giving him a security code. This was the critical moment for
Vince, he hinge on which the entire success of his effort depended.

In the face of Louis's suspicion, Vince simply laid it on with manipulation, using
an appeal to sympathy ("going to the doctor"), and pressure ("I've got a stack to
do, it's almost 4 o'clock"), and manipulation ("Tell her you wouldn't give me the
code"). Cleverly, Vince didn't actually make a threat, he just implied one: If you
don't give me the security code, I won't send the customer information that your
co worker needs, and I'll tell her I would have sent it but you wouldn't cooperate.

Still, let's not be too hasty in blaming Louis. After all, the person on the phone
knew (or at least appeared to know) that co worker Angela had requested a fax.
The caller knew about the security codes, and knew they were identified by letter
designation. The caller said his branch manager was requiring it for greater
security. There didn't really seem any reason not to give him the verification he
was asking for.

Louis isn't alone. Bank employees give up security codes to social engineers
every day. Incredible but true.

There's a line in the sand where a private investigator's techniques stop being
legal and start being illegal. Vince stayed legal when he obtained the branch
number. He even stayed legal when he conned Louis into giving him two of the
day's security codes. He crossed the line when he had confidential information on
a bank customer faxed to him.

But for Vince and his employer, it's a low-risk crime. When you steal money or
goods, somebody will notice it's gone. When you steal information, most of the
time no one will notice because the information is still in their possession.

MITNICK MESSAGE
Verbal security codes are equivalent to passwords in providing a convenient and
reliable means of protecting data. But employees need to be knowledgeable about
the tricks that social engineers use, and trained not to give up the keys to the
kingdom.

COPS AS DUPES
For a shady private investigator or social engineer, there are frequent occasions
when it would be handy to know someone's driver's license number--for example,
if you want to assume another person's identity in order to obtain information
about her bank balances.

Short of lifting the person's wallet or peering over her shoulder at an opportune
moment, finding out the driver's license number ought to be next to impossible.
But for anyone with even modest social engineering skills, it's hardly a challenge.
One particular social engineer--Eric Mantini, I'll call him, needed to get driver's
license and vehicle registration numbers on a regular basis. Eric figured it was
unnecessarily increasing his risk to call the Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV) and go through the same ruse time after time whenever he needed that
information. He wondered whether there wasn't some way to simplify the
process.

Probably no one had ever thought of it before, but he figured out a way
to get the information in a blink, whenever he wanted it. He did it by taking
advantage of a service provided by his state's Department of Motor Vehicles.
Many state DMVs (or whatever the department may be called in your state) make
otherwise-privileged information about citizens available to insurance firms,
private investigators, and certain other groups that the state legislature has
deemed entitled to share it for the good of commerce and the society at large.

The DMV, of course, has appropriate limitations on which types of data will be
given out. The insurance industry can get certain types of information from the
files, but not others. A different set of limitations applies to PIs, and so on.

For law enforcement officers, a different rule generally applies: The DMV will
supply any information in the records to any sworn peace officer who properly
identifies himself. In the state Eric then lived in, the required identification was a
Requestor Code issued by the DMV, along with the officer's driver's license
number. The DMV employee would always verify by matching the officer's
name against his driver's license number and one other piece of information--
usually date of birth-- before giving out any information.

What social engineer Eric wanted to do was nothing less than cloak himself in the
identity of a law enforcement officer. How did he manage that? By running a
reverse sting on the cops!

Eric’s Sting
First he called telephone information and asked for the phone number of DMV
headquarters in the state capitol. He was given the number 503555-5000; that, of
course, is the number for calls from the general public. He then called a nearby
sheriff's station and asked for Teletype--the office where communications are
sent to and received from other law enforcement agencies, the national crime
database, local warrants, and so forth. When he reached Teletype, he said he was
looking for the phone number for law enforcement to use when calling the DMV
state headquarters.

"Who are you?" the police officer in Teletype asked.

"This is Al. I was calling 503-555-5753," he said. This was partly an assumption,
and partly a number he pulled out of thin air; certainly the special DMV office set
up to take law enforcement calls would be in the same area code as the number
gtyen out for the public to call, and it was almost as certain that the next three
digits, the prefix, would be the same. as well. All he really needed to find out was
the last four.

A sheriff's Teletype room doesn't get calls from the public. And the caller already
had most of the number. Obviously he was legitimate.

"It's 503-555-6127," the officer said.

So Eric now had the special phone number for law enforcement officers to call
the DMV. But just the one number wasn't enough to satisfy him; the office would
have a good many more than the single phone line, and Eric needed to know how
many lines there were, and the phone number of each.

The Switch
To carry out his plan, he needed to gain access to the telephone switch that
handled the law enforcement phone lines into DMV. He called the state
Telecommunications Department and claimed he was from Nortel, the
manufacturer of the DMS-100, one of the most widely used commercial
telephone switches. He said, "Can you please transfer me to one of the switch
technicians that works on the DMS-100?"

When he reached the technician, he claimed to be with the Nortel Technical
Assistance Support Center in Texas, and explained that they were creating a
master database to update all switches with the latest software upgrades. It would
all be done remotely--no need for any switch technician to participate. But they
needed the dial-in number to the switch so that they could perform the updates
directly from the Support Center.

It sounded completely plausible, and the technician gave Eric the phone number.
He could now dial directly into one of the state's telephone switches.

To defend against outside intruders, commercial switches of this type are
password-protected, just like every corporate computer network. Any good social
engineer with a phone-phreaking background knows that Nortel switches provide
a default account name for software updates: NTAS (the abbreviation for Nortel
Technical Assistance Support; not very subtle). But what about a password? Eric
dialed in several times, each time trying one of the obvious and commonly used
choices. Entering the same as the account name, NTAS, didn't work. Neither did
"helper." Nor did "patch."

Then he tried "update" . . . and he was in. Typical. Using an obvious, easily
guessed password is only very slightly better than having no password at all.

It helps to be up to speed in your field; Eric probably knew as much about that
switch and how to program and troubleshoot it as the technician. Once he was
able to access the switch as an authorized user, he would gain full control over
the telephone lines that were his target. From his computer, he queried the switch
for the phone number he had been given for law enforcement calls to the DMV,
555-6127. He found there were nineteen other phone lines into the same
department. Obviously they handled a high volume of calls.

For each incoming call, the switch was programmed to "hunt" through the twenty
lines until it found one that wasn't busy.

He picked line number eighteen in the sequence, and entered the code that added
call forwarding to that line. For the call-forwarding number, he entered the phone
number of his new, cheap, prepaid cell phone, the kind that drug dealers are so
fond of because they're inexpensive enough to throw away after the job is over.
With call forwarding now activated on the eighteenth line, as soon as the office
got busy enough to have seventeen calls in progress, the next call to come in
would not ring in the DMV office but would instead be forwarded to Eric's cell
phone. He sat back and waited.

A Call to DMV
Shortly before 8 o'clock that morning, the cell phone rang. This part was the best,
the most delicious. Here was Eric, the social engineer, talking to a cop, someone
with the authority to come and arrest him, or get a search warrant and conduct a
raid to collect evidence against him.

And not just one cop would call, but a string of them, one after another. On one
occasion, Eric was sitting in a restaurant having lunch with friends, fielding a call
every five minutes or so, writing the information on a paper napkin using a
borrowed pen. HE still finds this hilarious.

But talking to police officers doesn't faze a good social engineer in the least. In
fact, the thrill of deceiving these law enforcement agencies probably added to
Eric s enjoyment of the act.
According to Eric, the calls went something like this:
"DMV, may I help you?"
"This is Detective Andrew Cole."
"Hi, detective. What can I do for you today?"

"I need a Soundex on driver's license 005602789," he might say, using the term
familiar in law enforcement to ask for a photo--useful, for example, when officers
are going out to arrest a suspect and want to know what he looks like.
"Sure, let me bring up the record," Eric would say. "And, Detective Cole, what's
your agency?"
"Jefferson County." And then Eric would ask the hot questions:
"Detective, what's your requestor code?
What's your driver's license number. "What's your date of birth"
The caller would give his personal identifying information. Eric would go
through some pretense of verifying the information, and then tell the caller that
the identifying information had been confirmed, and ask for the details of what
the caller wanted to find out from the DMV. He'd pretend to start looking up the
name, with the caller able to hear the clicking of the keys, and then say something
like, "Oh, damn, my computer just went down again. Sorry, detective, my
computer has been on the blink, all week. Would you mind calling back and
getting another clerk to help you?"

This way he'd end the call tying up the loose ends without arousing any suspicion
about why he wasn't able to assist the officer with his request. Meanwhile Eric
had a stolen identity--details he could use to obtain confidential            DMV
information whenever he needed to.

After taking calls for a few hours and obtaining dozens of requestor codes, Eric
dialed into the switch and deactivated the call forwarding.

For months after that, he'd carry on the assignments jobbed out to him by
legitimate PI firms that didn't want to know how he was getting his information.
Whenever he needed to, he'd dial back into the switch, turn on call forwarding,
and gather another stack of police officer credentials.

Analyzing the Con
Let's run a playback on the ruses Eric pulled on a series of people to make this
deceit work. In the first successful step, he got a sheriff's deputy in a Teletype
room to give out a confidential DMV phone number to a complete stranger,
accepting the man as a deputy without requesting any verification.

Then someone at the state Telecom Department did the same thing, accepting
Eric's claim that he was with an equipment manufacturer, and providing the
stranger with a phone number for dialing into the telephone switch serving the
DMV.

Eric was able to get into the switch in large measure because of weak security
practices on the part of the switch manufacturer in using the same account name
on all their switches. That carelessness made it a walk in the park for the social
engineer to guess the password, knowing once again that switch technicians, just
like almost everybody else, choose passwords that will be a cinch for them to
remember.

With access to the switch, he set up call forwarding from one of the DMV phone
lines for law enforcement to his own cell phone.

And then, the capper and most blatant part, he conned one law enforcement
officer after another into revealing not only their requestor codes but their own
personal identifying information, giving Eric the ability to impersonate them.

While there was certainly technical knowledge required to pull off this stunt, it
could not have worked without the help of a series of people who had no clue that
they were talking to an imposter.

This story was another illustration of the phenomenon of why people don't ask
"Why me?" Why would the Teletype officer give this information to some
sheriff's deputy he didn't know--or, in this case, a stranger passing himself off as
a sheriff's deputy--instead of suggesting he get the information from a fellow
deputy or his own sergeant? Again, the only answer I can offer is that people
rarely ask this question. It doesn't occur to them to ask? They don't want to sound
challenging and unhelpful? Maybe. Any further explanation would just be
guesswork. But social engineers don't care why; they only care that this little fact
makes it easy to get information that otherwise might be a challenge to obtain.


MITNICK MESSAGE
If you have a telephone switch at your company facilities, what would the person
in charge do if he received a call from the vendor, asking for the dial-in number?
And by the way, has that person ever changed the default password for the
switch? Is that password an easy-to-guess word found in any dictionary?


PREVENTING THE CON
A security code, properly used, adds a valuable layer of protection. A security
code improperly used can be worse than none at all because it gives the illusion
of security where it doesn't really exist. What good are codes if your employees
don't keep them. secret?

Any company with a need for verbal security codes needs to spell out clearly for
its employees when and how the codes are used. Properly trained, the character in
the first story in this chapter would not have had to rely on his instincts, easily
overcome, when asked to give a security code to a stranger. He sensed that he
should not be asked for this information under the circumstances, but lacking a
clear security policy--and good common sense--he readily gave in.

Security procedures should also set up steps to follow when an employee fields
an inappropriate request for a security code. All employees should be trained to
immediately report any request for authentication credentials, such as a daily
code or password, made under suspicious circumstances. They should also report
when an attempt to verify the identity of a requestor doesn't check out.

At the very least, the employee should record the caller's name, phone number,
and office or department, and then hang up. Before calling back he should verify
that the organization really does have an employee of that name, and that the call
back phone number matches the phone number in the on-line or hard-copy
company directory. Most of the time, this simple tactic will be all that's needed to
verify that the caller is who he says he is.

Verifying becomes a bit trickier when the company has a published phone
directory instead of an on-line version. People get hired; people leave; people
change departments, job positions, and phone. The hard-copy directory is already
out of date the day after it's published, even before being distributed. Even on-
line directories can't always be relied on, because social engineers know how to
modify them. If an employee can't verify the phone number from an independent
source, she should be instructed to verify by some other means, such as
contacting the employee's manager.
Part 3
Intruder Alert
Chapter 10
Entering the Premises

Why is it so easy for an outsider to assume the identity of a company employee
and carry off an impersonation so convincingly that even people who are highly
security conscious are taken in? Why is it so easy to dupe individuals who may
be fully aware of security procedures, suspicious of people they don't personally
know, and protective of their company's interests?

Ponder these questions as you read the stories in this chapter.

THE EMBARRASSED SECURITY GUARD
Date/Time: Tuesday, October 17, 2:16 A.M.
Place: Skywatcher Aviation, Inc. manufacturing plant on the outskirts of Tucson,
Arizona.

The Security Guard's Story
Hearing his leather heels click against the floor in the halls of the nearly deserted
plant made Leroy Greene feel much better than spending the night hours of his
watch in front of the video monitors in the security office. There he wasn't
allowed to do anything but stare at the screens, not even read a magazine or his
leather-bound Bible. You just had to sit there looking at the displays of still
images where nothing ever moved.

But walking the halls, he was at least stretching his legs, and when he
remembered to throw his arms and shoulders into the walk, it got him a little
exercise, too. Although it didn't really count very much as exercise for a man who
had played right tackle on the All-City champion high school football team. Still,
he thought, a job is a job.

He turned the southwest corner and started along the gallery overlooking the half-
mile-long production floor. He glanced down and saw two people walking past
the line of partly built copters. The pair stopped and seemed to be pointing things
out to each other. A strange sight at this time of night. 'Better check, "he thought.

Leroy headed for a staircase that would bring him onto the production-line floor
behind the pair, and they didn't sense his approach until he stepped alongside.
"Morning. Can I see your security badges, please," he said. Leroy always tried to
keep his voice soft at moments like this; he knew that the sheer size of him could
seem threatening.
"Hi, Leroy," one of them said, reading the name off his badge. "I'm Tom Stilton,
from the Marketing office at corporate in Phoenix. I'm in town for meetings and
wanted to show my friend here how the world's greatest helicopters get built."

"Yes, sir. Your badge, please," Leroy said. He couldn't help noticing how young
they seemed. The Marketing guy looked barely out of high school, the other one
had hair down to his shoulders and looked about fifteen.

The one with the haircut reached into his pocket for his badge, then started
patting all his pockets. Leroy was suddenly beginning to have a bad feeling about
this. "Damn," the guy said. "Must've left it in the car. I can get it--just take me ten
minutes to go out to the parking lot and back."

Leroy had his pad out by this time. "What'd you say your name was, sr. he asked,
and carefully wrote down the response. Then he asked them to go with him to the
Security Office. On the elevator to the third floor, Tom chatted about having been
with the company for only six months and hoped he wasn't going to get in any
trouble for this.

In the Security monitoring room, the two others on the night shift with Leroy
joined him in questioning the pair. Stilton gave his telephone number, and said
his boss was Judy Underwood and gave her telephone number, and the
information all checked out on the computer. Leroy took the other two security
people aside and they talked about what to do. Nobody wanted to get this wrong;
all three agreed they better call the guy's boss even though it would mean waking
her in the middle of the night.

Leroy called Mrs. Underwood himself, explained who he was and did she have a
Mr. Tom Stilton working for her? She sounded like she was still half-asleep.
"Yes," she said.

"Well, we found him down on the production line at 2:30 in the morning with no
ID badge."
Mrs. Underwood said, "Let me talk to him."

Stilton got on the phone and said, "Judy, I'm really sorry about these guys waking
you up in the middle of the night. I hope you're not going to
hold this against me."

He listened and then said, "It was just that I had to be here in the morning
anyway, for that meeting on the new press release. Anyway, did you get the email
about the Thompson deal? We need to meet with Jim on Monday morning so we
don't lose this. And I'm still having lunch with you on Tuesday, right?"
He listened a bit more and said good-bye and hung up.

That caught Leroy by surprise; he had thought he'd get the phone back so the lady
could tell him everything was okay. He wondered if maybe he should call her
again and ask, but thought better of it. He had already bothered her once in the
middle of the night; if he called a second time, maybe she might get annoyed and
complain to his boss. "Why make waves?" he thought.

Okay if I show my friend the rest of the production line? Stilton asked Leroy
You want to come along, keep an eye on us ?

"Go on, Leroy said. "Look around. Just don't forget your badge next time. And let
Security know if you need to be on the plant floor after hours--it's the rule."
I'll remember that, Leroy," Stilton said. And they left.

Hardly ten minutes had gone by before the phone rang in the Security Office.
Mrs. Underwood was on the line. "Who was that guy?!" she wanted to know. She
said she kept trying to ask questions but he just kept on talking about having
lunch with her and she doesn't know who the hell he is.

The security guys called the lobby and the guard at the gate to the parking lot.
Both reported the two young men had left some minutes before.

Telling the story later, Leroy always finished by saying, "Lordy, did boss chew
me up one side and down the other. I'm lucky I still have a job."

Joe Harper's Story
Just to see what he could get away with, seventeen-year-old Joe Harper had been
sneaking into buildings for more than a year, sometimes in the daytime,
sometimes at night. The son of a musician and a cocktail waitress, both working
the night shift, Joe had too much time by himself. His story of that same incident
sheds instructive light on how it all happened.

I have this friend Kenny who thinks he wants to be a helicopter pilot. He asked
me, could I get him into the Skywatcher factory to see the production line where
they make the choppers. He knows I've got into other places before. It's an
adrenaline rush to see if you can slip into places you're not supposed to be.

But you don't just walk into a factory or office building. Got to think it through,
do a lot of planning, and do a full reconnaissance on the target. Check the
company's Web page for names and titles, reporting structure, and telephone
numbers. Read press clippings and magazine articles. Meticulous research is my
own brand of caution, so I could talk to anybody that challenged me, with as
much knowledge as any employee.

So where to start? First I looked up on the Internet to see where the company had
offices, and saw the corporate headquarters was in Phoenix. Perfect. I called and
asked for Marketing; every company has a marketing department. A lady
answered, and I said I was with Blue Pencil Graphics and we wanted to see if we
could interest them in using our services and who would I talk to. She said that
would be Tom Stilton. I asked for his phone number and she said they didn't give
out that information but she could put me through. The call rang into voice mail,
and his message said, "This is Tom Stilton in Graphics, extension 3147, please
leave a message." Sure--they don't give out extensions, but this guy leaves his
right on his voice mail. So that was cool. Now I had a name and extension.

Another call, back to the same office. "Hi, I was looking for Tom Stilton. He's
not in. I'd like to ask his boss a quick question." The boss was out, too, but by the
time I was finished, I knew the boss's name. And she had nicely left her extension
number on her voice mail, too.

I could probably get us past the lobby guard with no sweat, but I've driven by that
plant and I thought I remembered a fence around the parking lot. A fence means a
guard who checks you when you try to drive in. And at night, they might be
writing down license numbers, too, so I'd have to buy an old license plate at a flea
market.

But first I'd have to get the phone number in the guard shack. I waited a little so if
I got the same operator when I dialed back in, she wouldn't recognize my voice.
After a bit I called and said, "We've got a complaint that the phone at the Ridge
Road guard shack has reported intermittent problems--are they still having
trouble?" She said she didn't know but would connect me.
The guy answered, "Ridge Road gate, this is Ryan." I said, "Hi, Ryan, this is Ben.
Were you having problems with your phones there?" He's just a low-paid security
guard but I guess he had some training because he right away said, "Ben who--
what's your last name?" I just kept right on as if I hadn't even heard him.
"Somebody reported a problem earlier."

I could hear him holding the phone away and calling out, "Hey, Bruce, Roger,
was there a problem with this phone. He came back on and said, "No, no
problems we know about."

"How many phone lines do you have there?"
He had forgotten about my name. "Two," he said. "Which one are you on now?"
"3140."
Gotcha! "And they're both working okay?"
"Seems like."
Okay, I said. Listen, Tom, if you have any phone problems, just call us in
Telecom any time. We're here to help."

My buddy and I decided to visit the plant the very next night. Late that afternoon
I called the guard booth, using the name of the Marketing guy. I said, "Hi, this is
Tom Stilton in Graphics. We're on a crash deadline and I have a couple of guys
driving into town to help out. Probably won't be here till one or two in the
morning. Will you still be on then?"
He was happy to say that, no, he got off at midnight.
I said, "Well, just leave a note for the next guy, okay? When two guys show up
and say they've come to see Tom Stilton, just wave 'em on in--okay?"

Yes, he said, that was fine. He took down my name, department, and extension
number and said he'd take care of it.

We drove up to the gate a little after two, I gave Tom Stilton's name, and a sleepy
guard just pointed to the door we should go in and where I should park.

When we walked into the building, there was another guard station in the lobby,
with the usual book for after-hours sign-ins. I told the guard I had a report that
needed to be ready in the morning, and this friend of mine wanted to see the
plant. "He's crazy about helicopters," I said "Thinks he wants to learn to pilot
one." He asked me for my badge. I reached into a pocket, then patted around and
said I must have left it in car; I’ll go get it. I said, "It'll take about ten minutes."
He said, Never mind, it's okay, just sign in."
Walking down that production line--what a gas. Until that tree-trunk of a Leroy
stopped us.

In the security office, I figured somebody who didn't really belong would look
nervous and frightened. When things get tight, I just start sounding like I'm really
steamed. Like I'm really who I claimed to be and it's annoying they don't believe
me.

When they started talking about maybe they should call the lady I said was my
boss and went to get her home phone number from the computer, I stood there
thinking, "Good time to just make a break for it." But there was that parking-lot
gate--even if we got out of the building, they'd close the gate and we'd never
make it out.
When Leroy called the lady who was Stilton's boss and then gave me the phone,
the lady started shouting at me "Who is this, who are you!" and I just kept on
talking like we were having a nice conversation, and then hung up.

How long does it take to find somebody who can give you a company phone
number in the middle of the night? I figured we had less than fifteen minutes to
get out of there before that lady was ringing the security office and putting a bug
in their ears.

We got out of there as fast as we could without looking like we were in a hurry.
Sure was glad when the guy at the gate just waved us through.

Analyzing the Con
It's worth noting that in the real incident this story is based on, the intruders
actually were teenagers. The intrusion was a lark, just to see if they could get
away with it. But if it was so easy for a pair of teenagers, it would have been even
easier for adult thieves, industrial spies, or terrorists.

How did three experienced security officers allow a pair of intruders to just walk
away? And not just any intruders, but a pair so young that any reasonable person
should have been very suspicious?

Leroy was appropriately suspicious, at first. He was correct in taking them to the
Security Office, and in questioning the guy who called himself Tom Stilton and
checking the names and phone numbers he gave. He was certainly correct in
making the phone call to the supervisor.

But in the end he was taken in by the young man's air of confidence and
indignation. It wasn't the behavior he would expect from a thief or intruder--only
a real employee would have acted that way.., or so he assumed. Leroy should
have been trained to count on solid identification, not perceptions.

Why wasn't he more suspicious when the young man hung up the phone without
handing it back so Leroy could hear the confirmation directly from Judy
Underwood and receive her assurance that the kid had a reason for being in the
plant so late at night?

Leroy was taken in by a ruse so bold that it should have been obvious. But
consider the moment from his perspective: a high-school graduate, concerned for
his job, uncertain whether he might get in trouble for bothering a company
manager for the second time in the middle of the night. If you had been in his
shoes, would you have made the follow-up call?
But of course, a second phone call wasn't the only possible action. What else
could the security guard have done?

Even before placing the phone call, he could have asked both of the pair to show
some kind of picture identification; they drove to the plant, so at least one of
them should have a driver's license. The fact that they had originally given phony
names would have been immediately obvious (a professional would have come
equipped with fake ID, but these teenagers had not taken that precaution). In any
case, Leroy should have examined their identification credentials and written
down the information. If they both insisted they had no identification, he should
then have walked them o the car to retrieve the company ID badge that "Tom
Stilton" claimed he had left there.

MITNICK MESSAGE
Manipulative people usually have very attractive personalities. They are typically
fast on their feet and quite articulate. Social engineers are also skilled at
distracting people's thought processes so that they cooperate. To think that any
one particular person is not vulnerable to this manipulation is to underestimate
the skill and the killer instinct of the social engineer.
A good social engineer, on the other hand, never underestimates his adversary.

Following the phone call, one of the security people should have stayed with the
pair until they left the building. And then walked them to their car and written
down the license-plate number. If he had been observant enough, he would have
noted that the plate (the one that the attacker had purchased at a flea market) did
not have a valid registration sticker - and that should have been reason enough to
detain the pair for further investigation.

DUMPSTER DIVING
Dumpster diving is a term that describes pawing through a target's garbage in
search of valuable information. The amount of information you can learn about a
target is astounding.

Most people don't give much thought to what they're discarding at home: phone
bills, credit card statements, medical prescription bottles, bank statements, work-
related materials, and so much more.

At work, employees must be made aware that people do look through trash to
obtain information that may benefit them.

During my high school years, I used to go digging through the trash behind the
local phone company buildings--often alone but occasionally with friends who
shared an interest in learning more about the telephone company. Once you
became a seasoned Dumpster diver, you learn a few tricks, such as how to make
special efforts to avoid the bags from the restrooms, and the necessity of wearing
gloves.

Dumpster diving isn't enjoyable, but the payoff was extraordinary-- internal
company telephone directories, computer manuals, employee lists, discarded
printouts showing how to program switching equipment, and more--all there for
the taking.

I'd schedule visits for nights when new manuals were being issued, because the
trash containers would have plenty of old ones, thoughtlessly thrown away. And
I'd go at other odd times as well, looking for any memos, letters, reports, and so
forth, that might offer some interesting gems of information.

On arriving I'd find some cardboard boxes, pull them out and set them aside. If
anyone challenged me, which happened now and then, I'd say that a friend was
moving and I was just looking for boxes to help him pack. The guard never
noticed all the documents I had put in the boxes to take home. In some cases, he'd
tell me to get lost, so I'd just move to another phone company central office.

LINGO
DUMPSTER DRIVING Going through a company’s garbage (often in an
outside and vulnerable Dumpster) to find discarded information that either itself
has value, or provides a tool to use in a social engineering attack, such as internal
phone numbers or titles

I don't know what it's like today, but back then it was easy to tell which bags
might contain something of interest. The floor sweepings and cafeteria garbage
were loose in the large bags, while the office wastebaskets were all lined with
white disposable trash bags, which the cleaning crew would lift out one by one
and wrap a tie around.

One time, while searching with some friends, we came up with some sheets of
paper torn up by hand. And not just torn up: someone had gone to the trouble of
ripping the sheets into tiny pieces, all conveniently thrown out in a single five-
gallon trash bag. We took the bag to a local donut shop, dumped the pieces out on
a table, and started assembling them one by one.

We were all puzzle-doers, so this offered the stimulating challenge of a giant
jigsaw puzzle . . . but turned out to have more than a childish reward. When done,
we had pieced together the entire account name and password list for one of the
company's critical computer systems.
Were our Dumpster-diving exploits worth the risk and the effort? You bet they
were. Even more than you would think, because the risk is zero. It was true then
and still true today: As long as you're not trespassing, poring through someone
else's trash is 100 percent legal.

Of course, phone phreaks and hackers aren't the only ones with their heads in
trash cans. Police departments around the country paw through trash regularly,
and a parade of people from Mafia dons to petty embezzlers have been convicted
based in part on evidence gathered from their rubbish. Intelligence agencies,
including our own, have resorted to this method for years.

It may be a tactic too low down for James Bond--movie-goers would much rather
watch him outfoxing the villain and bedding a beauty than standing up to his
knees in garbage. Real-life spies are less squeamish when something of value
may be bagged among the banana peels and coffee grounds, the newspapers and
grocery lists. Especially if gathering the information doesn't put them in harm's
way.

Cash for Trash
Corporations play the Dumpster-diving game, too. Newspapers had a field day in
June 2000, reporting that Oracle Corporation (whose CEO, Larry Ellison, is
probably the nation's most outspoken foe of Microsoft) had hired an investigative
firm that had been caught with their hands in the cookie jar. It seems the
investigators wanted trash from a Microsoft-supported lobbying outfit, ACT, but
they didn't want to risk getting caught. According to press reports, the
investigative firm sent in a woman who offered the janitors $60 to let her have
the ACT trash. They turned her down. She was back the next night, upping the
offer to $500 for the cleaners and $200 for the supervisor.

The janitors turned her down and then turned her in.

Leading on-line journalist Declan McCullah, taking a leaf from literature, titled
his Wired News story on the episode, "'Twas Oracle That Spied on MS." Time
magazine, nailing Oracle's Ellison, titled their article simply "Peeping Larry."

Analyzing the Con
Based on my own experience and the experience of Oracle, you might wonder
why anybody would bother taking the risk of stealing someone's trash.

The answer, I think, is that the risk is nil and the benefits can be substantial.
Okay, maybe trying to bribe the janitors increases the chance of consequences,
but for anyone who's willing to get a little dirty, bribes aren't necessary.
For a social engineer, Dumpster diving has its benefits. He can get enough
information to guide his assault against the target company, including memos,
meeting agendas, letters and the like that reveal names, departments, titles, phone
numbers, and project assignments. Trash can yield company organizational
charts, information about corporate structure, travel schedules, and so on. All
those details might seem trivial to insiders, yet they may be highly valuable
information to an attacker.

Mark Joseph Edwards, in his book Internet Security with Windows NT, talks
about "entire reports discarded because of typos, passwords written on scraps of
paper, 'While you were out' messages with phone numbers, whole file folders
with documents still in them, diskettes and tapes that weren't erased or destroyed-
-all of which could help a would-be intruder."

The writer goes on to ask, "And who are those people on your cleaning crew?
You've decided that the cleaning crew won't [be permitted to] enter the computer
room but don't forget the other trash cans. If federal agencies deem it necessary to
do background checks on people who have access to their wastebaskets and
shredders, you probably should as well."


MITNICK MESSAGE
Your trash may be your enemy's treasure. We don't give much consideration to
the materials we discard in our personal lives, so why should we believe people
have a different attitude in the workplace? It all comes down to educating the
workforce about the danger (unscrupulous people digging for valuable
information) and the vulnerability (sensitive information not being shredded or
properly erased).

THE HUMILIATED BOSS
Nobody thought anything about it when Harlan Fortis came to work on Monday
morning as usual at the County Highway Department, and said he'd left home in
a hurry and forgotten his badge. The security guard had seen Harlan coming in
and going out every weekday for the two years she had been working there. She
had him sign for a temporary employee's badge, gave it to him, and he went on
his way.

It wasn't until two days later that all hell started breaking loose. The
story spread through the entire department like wildfire. Half the people who
heard it said it couldn't be true. Of the rest, nobody seemed to know whether to
laugh out loud or to feel sorry for the poor soul.
After all, George Adamson was a kind and compassionate person, the best head
of department they'd ever had. He didn't deserve to have this happen to him.
Assuming that the story was true, of course.

The trouble had begun when George called Harlan into his office late one Friday
and told him, as gently as he could, that come Monday Harlan would be reporting
to a new job. With the Sanitation Department. To Harlan, this wasn't like being
fired. It was worse; it was humiliating. He wasn't going to take it lying down.

That same evening he seated himself on his porch to watch the homeward- bound
traffic. At last he spotted the neighborhood boy named David who everyone
called "The War Games Kid" going by on his moped on the way home from high
school. He stopped David, gave him a Code Red Mountain Dew he had bought
especially for the purpose, and offered him a deal: the latest video game player
and six games in exchange for some computer help and a promise of keeping his
mouth shut.

After Harlan explained the project - without giving any of the compromising
specifics--David agreed. He described what he wanted Harlan to do. He was to
buy a modem, go into the office, find somebody's computer where there was a
spare phone jack nearby, and plug in the modem. Leave the modem under the
desk where nobody would be likely to see it. Then came the risky part. Harlan
had to sit down at the computer, install a remote-access software package, and get
it running. Any moment the man who worked in the office might show up, or
someone might walk by and see him in another person's office. He was so uptight
that he could hardly read the instructions that the kid had written down for him.
But he got it done, and slipped out of the building without being noticed.

Planting the Bomb
David stopped over after dinner that night. The two sat down at Harlan's
computer and within in a few minutes the boy had dialed into the        modem,
gained access, and reached George Adamson's machine. Not very difficult, since
George never had time for precautionary things like changing
passwords, and was forever asking this person or that to download or email a file
for him. In time, everyone in the office knew his password.      A bit of hunting
turned up the file called BudgetSlides2002.ppt, which     the boy downloaded
onto Harlan's computer. Harlan then told the kid to       go on home, and come
back             in            a            couple            of             hours.
When David returned, Harlan asked him to reconnect to the Highway
Department computer system and put the same file back where they had
found it, overwriting the earlier version. Harlan showed David the video
game player, and promised that if things went well, he'd have it the next day.
Surprising George
You wouldn't think that something sounding as dull as budget hearings
would be of much interest to anyone, but the meeting chamber of the County
Council was packed, filled with reporters, representatives of special interest
groups, members of the public, and even two television news crews.

George always felt much was at stake for him in these sessions. The County
Council held the purse strings, and unless George could put on a       convincing
presentation, the Highways budget would be slashed. Then         everyone would
start complaining about potholes and stuck traffic lights and           dangerous
intersections, and blaming him, and life would be miser able      for the whole
coming year. But when he was introduced that evening, he stood up feeling
confident. He had worked six weeks on this presentation and the PowerPoint
visuals, which he had tried out on his wife, his top staff people, and some
respected friends. Everyone agreed it was his best presentation ever.

The first three PowerPoint images played well. For a change, every Council
member was paying attention. He was making his points effectively.

And then all at once everything started going wrong. The fourth image was
supposed to be a beautiful photo at sunset of the new highway extension opened
last year. Instead it was something else, something very embarrassing. A
photograph out of a magazine like Penthouse or Hustler. He could hear the
audience gasp as he hurriedly hit the button on his laptop to move to the next
image.

This one was worse. Not a thing was left to the imagination.

He was still trying to click to another image when someone in the audience
pulled out the power plug to the projector while the chairman banged loudly with
his gavel and shouted above the din that the meeting was adjourned.

Analyzing the Con
Using a teenage hacker's expertise, a disgruntled employee managed to access the
computer of the head of his department, download an important PowerPoint
presentation, and replace some of the slides with images certain to cause grave
embarrassment. Then he put the presentation back on the man's computer.

With the modem plugged into a jack and connected to one of the office
computers, the young hacker was able to dial in from the outside. The kid had set
up the remote access software in advance so that, once connected to the
computer, he would have full access to every file stored on the entire system.
Since the computer was connected to the organization's network and he already
knew the boss's username and password, he could easily gain access to the boss's
files.
Including the time to scan in the magazine images, the entire effort had taken
only a few hours. The resulting damage to a good man's reputation was beyond
imagining.

MITNICK MESSAGE
The vast majority of employees who are transferred, fired, or let go in a
downsizing are never a problem. Yet it only takes one to make a company
realize too late what steps they could have taken to prevent disaster.
Experience and statistics have clearly shown that the greatest threat to the
enterprise is from insiders. It's the insiders who have intimate knowledge of
where the valuable information resides, and where to hit the company to cause
the most harm.

THE PROMOTION SEEKER
Late in the morning of a pleasant autumn day, Peter Milton walked into the lobby
of the Denver regional offices of Honorable Auto Parts, a national parts
wholesaler for the automobile aftermarket. He waited at the reception desk while
the young lady signed in a visitor, gave driving directions to a caller, and dealt
with the UPS man, all more or less at the same time.

"So how did you learn to do so many things at once?" Pete said when she had
time to help him. She smiled, obviously pleased he had noticed. He was from
Marketing in the Dallas office, he told her, and said that Mike Talbott from
Atlanta field sales was going to be meeting him. "We have a client to visit
together this afternoon," he explained. I'll just wait here in the lobby."

"Marketing." She said the word almost wistfully, and Pete smiled at her, waiting
to hear what was coming. "If I could go to college, that's what I'd take," she said.
"I'd love to work in Marketing."

He smiled again. "Kaila," he said, reading her name off the sign on the counter,
"We have a lady in the Dallas office who was a secretary. She got herself moved
over to Marketing. That was three years ago, and now she's an assistant
marketing manager, making twice what she was."
Kaila looked starry-eyed. He went on, "Can you use a computer?" "Sure," she
said.

"How would you like me to put your name in for a secretary's job in Marketing.
She beamed. "For that I'd even move to Dallas."
"You're going to love Dallas," he said. "I can't promise an opening right away,
but I'll see what I can do."
She thought that this nice man in the suit and tie and with the neatly trimmed,
well-combed hair might make a big difference in her working life.

Pete sat down across the lobby, opened his laptop, and started getting some work
done. After ten or fifteen minutes, he stepped back up to the counter. "Listen," he
said, "it looks like Mike must've been held up. Is there a conference room where I
could sit and check my emails while I'm waiting?"

Kaila called the man who coordinated the conference room scheduling and
arranged for Pete to use one that wasn't booked. Following a pattern picked up
from Silicon Valley companies (Apple was probably the first to do this) some of
the conference rooms were named after cartoon characters, others after restaurant
chains or movie stars or comic book heroes. He was told to look for the Minnie
Mouse room. She had him sign in, and gave him directions to find Minnie
Mouse.

He located the room, settled in, and connected his laptop to the Ethernet port.

Do you get the picture yet?

Right--the intruder had connected to the network behind the corporate firewall.

Anthony's Story
I guess you could call Anthony Lake a lazy businessman. Or maybe "bent" comes
closer.
Instead of working for other people, he had decided he wanted to go to work for
himself; he wanted to open a store, where he could be at one place all day and not
have to run all over the countryside. Only he wanted to have a business that he
could be as sure as possible he could make money at.

What kind of store? That didn't take long to figure out. He knew about repairing
cars, so an auto parts store.

And how do you build in a guarantee of success? The answer came to him in a
flash: convince auto parts wholesaler Honorable Auto Parts to sell him all the
merchandise he needed at their cost.

Naturally they wouldn't do this willingly. But Anthony knew how to con people,
his friend Mickey knew about breaking into other people's computers, and
together they worked out a clever plan.

That autumn day he convincingly passed himself off as an employee named Peter
Milton, and he had conned his way inside the Honorable Auto Parts offices and
had already plugged his laptop into their network. So far, so good, but that was
only the first step. What he still had to do wouldn't be easy, especially since
Anthony had set himself a fifteen-minute time limit--any longer and he figured
that the risk of discovery would be too high.


MITNICK MESSAGE
Train your people not to judge a book solely by its cover--just because someone
is well-dressed and well-groomed he shouldn't be any more believable.

In an earlier phone call pretexting as a support person from their computer
supplier, he had put on a song-and-dance act. "Your company has purchased a
two-year support plan and we're putting you in the database so we can know
when a software program you're using has come out with a patch or a new
updated version. So I need to have you tell me what applications you're using."
The response gave him a list of programs, and an accountant friend identified the
one called MAS 90 as the target--the program that would hold their list of
vendors and the discount and payment terms for each.

With that key knowledge, he next used a software program to identifiy," all the
working hosts on the network, and it didn't take him long to locate the correct
server used by the Accounting department. From the arsenal of hacker tools on
his laptop, he launched one program and used it to identify all of the authorized
users on the target server. With another, he then ran a list of commonly used
passwords, such as "blank," and "password" itself. "Password" worked. No
surprise there. People just lose all creativity when it comes to choosing
passwords.

Only six minutes gone, and the game was half over. He was in.

Another three minutes to very carefully add his new company, address, phone
number, and contact name to the list of customers. And then for the crucial entry,
the one that would make all the difference, the entry that said all items were to be
sold to him at 1 percent over Honorable Auto Parts' cost.

In slightly under ten minutes, he was done. He stopped long enough to tell Kaila
thanks, he was through checking his emails. And he had reached Mike Talbot,
change of plans, he was on the way to a meeting at a client's office. And he
wouldn't forget about recommending her for that job in Marketing, either.

Analyzing the Con
The intruder who called himself Peter Milton used two psychological subversion
techniques--one planned, the other improvised on the spur of the moment.
He dressed like a management worker earning good money. Suit and tie, hair
carefully styled--these seem like small details, but they make an impression. I
discovered this myself, inadvertently. In a short time as a programmer at GTE
California--a major telephone company no longer in existence--I discovered that
if I came in one day without a badge, neatly dressed but casual--say, sports shirt,
chinos, and Dockers--I'd be stopped and questioned. Where's your badge, who are
you, where do you work? Another day I'd arrive, still without a badge but in a
suit and tie, looking very corporate. I'd use a variation of the age-old
piggybacking technique, blending in with a crowd of people as they walk into a
building or a secure entrance. I would latch onto some people as they approached
the main entrance, and walk in chatting with the crowd as if I was one of them. I
walked past, and even if the guards noticed I was badge-less, they wouldn't
bother me because I looked like management and I was with people who were
wearing badges.

From this experience, I recognized how predictable the behavior of security
guards is. Like the rest of us, they were making judgments based on appearances-
-a serious vulnerability that social engineers learn to take advantage of.

The attacker's second psychological weapon came into play when he noticed the
unusual effort that the receptionist was making. Handling several things at once,
she didn't get testy but managed to make everyone feel they had her full attention.
He took this as the mark of someone interested in getting ahead, in proving
herself. And then when he claimed to work in the Marketing department, he
watched to see her reaction, looking for clues to indicate if he was establishing a
rapport with her. He was. To the attacker, this added up to someone he could
manipulate through a promise of trying to help her move into a better job. (Of
course, if she had said she wanted to go into the Accounting department, he
would have claimed he had contacts for getting her a job there, instead.)

Intruders are also fond of another psychological weapon used in this story:
building trust with a two-stage attack. He first used that chatty conversation about
the job in Marketing, and he also used "name- dropping"--giving the name of
another employee--a real person, incidentally, just as the name he himself used
was the name of a real employee.

He could have followed up the opening conversation right away with a request to
get into a conference room. But instead he sat down for a while and pretended to
work, supposedly waiting for his associate, another way of allaying any possible
suspicions because an intruder wouldn't hang around. He didn't hang around for
very long, though; social engineers know better than to stay at the scene of the
crime any longer than necessary.
MITNICK MESSAGE
Allowing a stranger into an area where he can plug a laptop into the corporate
network increases the risk of a security incident. It's perfectly reasonable for an
employee, especially one from offsite, to want to check his or her email from a
conference room, but unless the visitor is established as a trusted employee or the
network is segmented to prevent unauthorized connections, this may be the weak
link that allows company files to be compromised.

Just for the record: By the laws on the books at the time of this writing, Anthony
had not committed a crime when he entered the lobby. He had not committed a
crime when he used the name of a real employee. He had not committed a crime
when he talked his way into the conference room. He had not committed a crime
when he plugged into the company's network and searched for the target
computer.

Not until he actually broke in to the computer system did he break the law.

SNOOPING ON KEVIN
Many years ago when I was working in a small business, I began to notice that
each time I walked into the office that I shared with the three other computer
people who made up the IT department, this one particular guy (Joe, I'll call him
here) would quickly toggle the display on his computer to a different window. I
immediately recognized this as suspicious. When it happened two more times the
same day, I was sure something was going on that I should know about. What
was this guy up to that he didn't want me to see?

Joe's computer acted as a terminal to access the company's minicomputers, so I
installed a monitoring program on the VAX minicomputer hat allowed me to spy
on what he was doing. The program acted as if a TV camera was looking over his
shoulder, showing me exactly what he was seeing on his computer.

My desk was next to Joe's; I turned my monitor as best I could to partly
mask his view, but he could have looked over at any moment and realized I
was spying on him. Not a problem; he was too enthralled in what he was
doing to notice.

What I saw made my jaw drop. I watched, fascinated, as the bastard called up
my payroll data. He was looking up my salary!    I had only been there a few
months at the time and I guessed Joe couldn't    stand the idea that I might
have been making more than he was.

A few minutes later I saw that he was downloading hacker tools used by less
experienced hackers who don't know enough about programming to devise the
tools for themselves. So Joe was clueless, and had no idea that one of American's
most experienced hackers was sitting right next to him. I thought it was hilarious.

He already had the information about my pay; so it was too late to stop him.
Besides, any employee with computer access at the IRS or the Social Security
Administration can look your salary up. I sure didn't want to tip my hand by
letting him know I'd found out what he was up to. My main goal at the time was
maintaining a low profile, and a good social engineer doesn't advertise his
abilities and knowledge. You always want people to underestimate you, not see
you as a threat.

So I let it go, and laughed to myself that Joe thought he knew some secret about
me, when it was the other way around: I had the upper hand by knowing what he
had been up to.

In time I discovered that all three of my co-workers in the IT group amused
themselves by looking up the take-home pay of this or that cute secretary or (for
the one girl in the group) neat-looking guy they had spotted. And they were all
finding out the salary and bonuses of anybody at the company they were curious
about, including senior management.

Analyzing the Con
This story illustrates an interesting problem. The payroll files were accessible to
the people who had the responsibility of maintaining the company's computer
systems. So it all comes down to a personnel issue: deciding who can be trusted.
In some cases, IT staff might find it irresistible to snoop around. And they have
the ability to do so because they have privileges allowing them to bypass access
controls on those files.

One safeguard would be to audit any access to particularly sensitive files,
such as payroll. Of course, anyone with the requisite privileges could disable
auditing or possibly remove any entries that would point back to them, but each
additional step takes more effort to hide on the part of an unscrupulous employee.

PREVENTING THE CON
From pawing through your trash to duping a security guard or receptionist, social
engineers can physically invade your corporate space. But you'll be glad to hear
that there are preventive measures you can take.

Protection After Hours
All employees who arrive for work without their badges should be required to
stop at the lobby desk or security office to obtain a temporary badge for the day.
The incident in the first story of this chapter could have come to a much different
conclusion if the company security guards had had a specific set of steps to
follow when encountering anyone without the required employee badge.

For companies or areas within a company where security is not a high-level
concern, it may not be important to insist that every person have a badge visible
at all times. But in companies with sensitive areas, this should be a standard
requirement, rigidly enforced. Employees must be trained and motivated to
challenge people who do not display a badge, and higher-level employees must
be taught to accept such challenges without causing embarrassment to the person
who stops them.

Company policy should advise employees of the penalties for those who
consistently fail to wear their badges; penalties might include sending the
employee home for the day without pay, or a notation in his personnel file. Some
companies institute a series of progressively more stringent penalties that may
include reporting the problem to the person's manager, then issuing a formal
warning.

In addition, where there is sensitive information to protect, the company should
establish procedures for authorizing people who need to visit during non-business
hours. One solution: require that arrangements be made through corporate
security or some other designated group. This group would routinely verify the
identity of any employee calling to arrange an off-hours visit by a call back to the
person's supervisor or some other reasonably secure method.

Treating Trash with Respect
The Dumpster-diving story dug into the potential misuses of your corporate trash.
The eight keys to wisdom regarding trash:

Classify all sensitive information based on the degree of sensitivity.

Establish company-wide procedures for discarding sensitive information.

Insist that all sensitive information to be discarded first be shredded, and provide
for a safe way for getting rid of important information on scraps of paper too
small for shredding. Shredders must not be the low-end budget type, which turn
out strips of paper that a determined attacker, given enough patience, can
reassemble. Instead, they need to be the kind called cross-shredders, or those that
render the output into useless pulp.

Provide a way for rendering unusable or completely erasing computer media--
floppy disks, Zip disks, CDs and DVDs used for storing files, removable tapes,
old hard drives, and other computer media--before they are discarded. Remember
that deleting files does not actually remove them; they can still be recovered--as
Enron executives and many others have learned to their dismay. Merely dropping
computer media in the trash is an invitation to your local friendly Dumpster
diver. (See Chapter 16 for specific guidelines on disposal of media and devices.)

Maintain an appropriate level of control over the selection of people on your
cleaning crews, using background checks if appropriate.

Remind employees periodically to think about the nature of the materials they are
tossing into the trash.

Lock trash Dumpsters.

Use separate disposal containers for sensitive materials, and contract to have the
materials disposed of by a bonded company that specializes in this work.

Saying Good-Bye to Employees
The point has been made earlier in these pages about the need for ironclad
procedures when a departing employee has had access to sensitive information,
passwords, dial-in numbers, and the like. Your security procedures need to
provide a way to keep track of who has authorization to various systems. It may
be tough to keep a determined social engineer from slipping past your security
barriers, but don't make it easy for an ex-employee.

Another step easily overlooked: When an employee who was authorized to
retrieve backup tapes from storage leaves, a written policy must call for the
storage company to be immediately notified to remove her name from its
authorization list.

Chapter 16 of this book provides .detailed information on this vital subject, but it
will be helpful to list here some of the key security provisions that should be in
place, as highlighted by this story:

A complete and thorough checklist of steps to be taken upon the departure of an
employee, with special provisions for workers who had access to sensitive data.

A policy of terminating the employee's computer access immediately--preferably
before the person has even left the building.

A procedure to recover the person's ID badge, as well as any keys or electronic
access devices.
Provisions that require security guards to see photo ID before admitting any
employee who does not have his or her security pass, and for checking the name
against a list to verify that the person is still employed by the organization.

Some further steps will seem excessive or too expensive for some companies, but
they are appropriate to others. Among these more stringent security measures are:

Electronic ID badges combined with scanners at entrances; each employee
swipes his badge through the scanner for an instantaneous electronic
determination that the person is still a current employee and entitled to enter the
building. (Note, however, that security guards must still be trained to be on the
alert for piggybacking--an unauthorized person slipping by in the wake of a
legitimate employee.)

A requirement that all employees in the same workgroup as the person leaving
(especially if the person is being fired) change their passwords. (Does this seem
extreme? Many years after my short time working at General Telephone, I
learned that the Pacific Bell security people, when they heard General Telephone
had hired me, "rolled on the ground with laughter." But to General Telephone's
credit when they realized they had a reputed hacker working for them after they
laid me off, they then required that passwords be changed for everyone in the
company!)

You don't want your facilities to feel like jails, but at the same time you need to
defend against the guy who was fired yesterday but is back today intent on doing
damage.

Don't Forget Anybody
Security policies tend to overlook the entry-level worker, people like
receptionists who don't handle sensitive corporate information. We've seen
elsewhere that receptionists are a handy target for attackers, and the story of the
break-in at the auto parts company provides another example: A friendly person,
dressed like a professional, who claims to be a company employee from another
facility may not be what he appears. Receptionists need to be well-trained about
politely asking for company ID when appropriate, and the training needs to be
not just for the main receptionist but also for everyone who sits in as relief at the
reception desk during lunchtime or coffee breaks.

For visitors from outside the company, the policy should require that a photo ID
be shown and the information recorded. It isn't hard to get fake ID, but at least
demanding ID makes pre-texting one degree harder for the would-be attacker.
In some companies, it makes sense to follow a policy requiring that visitors be
escorted from the lobby and from meeting to meeting. Procedures should require
that the escort make clear when delivering the visitor to his first appointment that
this person has entered the building as an employee , or non-employee. Why is
this important? Because, as we've seen in earlier
stories, an attacker will often pass himself off in one guise to the first person
encountered, and as someone else to the next. It's too easy for an attacker to show
up in the lobby, convince the receptionist that he has an appointment with, say, an
engineer.., then be escorted to the engineer's office where he claims to be a rep
from a company that wants to sell some product to the company.., and then, after
the meeting with the engineer, he has free access to roam the building.

Before admitting an off-site employee to the premises, suitable procedures must
be followed to verify that the person is truly an employee; receptionists and
guards must be aware of methods used by attackers to pretext the identity of an
employee in order to gain access to company buildings.

How about protecting against the attacker who cons his way inside the building
and manages to plug his laptop into a network port behind the corporate firewall?
Given today's technology, this is a challenge: conference rooms, training rooms,
and similar areas should not leave network ports unsecured but should protect
them with firewalls or routers. But better protection would come from the use of
a secure method to authenticate any users who connect to the network.

Secure IT!
A word to the wise: In your own company, every worker in IT probably knows or
can find out in moments how much you are earning, how much the CEO takes
home, and who's using the corporate jet to go on skiing vacations.

It's even possible in some companies for IT people or accounting people to
increase their own salaries, make payments to a phony vendor, remove negative
ratings from HR records, and so on. Sometimes it's only the fear of getting caught
that keeps them honest.., and then one day along comes somebody whose greed
or native dishonesty makes him (or her) ignore the risk and take whatever he
thinks he can get away with.

There are solutions, of course. Sensitive files can be protected by installing
proper access controls so that only authorized people can open them. Some
operating systems have audit controls that can be configured to maintain a log of
certain events, such as each person who attempts to access a protected file,
regardless of whether or not the attempt succeeds.
If your company has understood this issue and has implemented proper access
controls and auditing that protects sensitive files--you're taking powerful steps in
the right direction.
Chapter 11
Combining Technology and Social Engineering

A social engineer lives by his ability to manipulate people into doing things that
help him achieve his goal, but success often also requires a large measure of
knowledge and skill with computer systems and telephone systems.

Here's a sampling of typical social engineering scams where technology played
an important role.

HACKING BEHIND BARS
What are some of the most secure installations you can think of, protected against
break-in, whether physical, telecommunications, or electronic in nature? Fort
Knox? Sure. The White House? Absolutely. NORAD, the North American Air
Defense installation buried deep under a mountain? Most definitely.

How about federal prisons and detention centers? They must be about as secure
as any place in the country, right? People rarely escape, and when they do, they
are normally caught in short order. You would think that a federal facility would
be invulnerable to social engineering attacks. But you would be wrong--there is
no such thing as foolproof security, anywhere.

A few years ago, a pair of grifters (professional swindlers) ran into a problem. It
turned out they had lifted a large bundle of cash from a local judge. The pair had
been in trouble with the law on and off through the years, but this time the federal
authorities took an interest. They nabbed one of the grifters, Charles Gondorff,
and tossed him into a correctional center near San Diego. The federal magistrate
ordered him detained as flight risk and a danger to the community.

His pal Johnny Hooker knew that Charlie was going to need a defense attorney.
But where was the money going to come from? most grifters, their money had
always gone for good clothes, fancy cam and the ladies as fast as it came in.
Johnny larely had enough to live on.

The money for a good lawyer would have to come from running another scam.
Johnny wasn't up to doing this on this own. Charlie Gondorff had always been
the brains behind their cons. But Johnny didn't dare visit the detention center to
ask Charlie what to do, not when the Feds knew there had been two men involved
in the scam and were so eager to lay their hands on the other one. Especially
since only family can visit. which meant he'd have to show fake identification
and claim to be a family member. Trying to use fake ID in a federal prison didn't
sound like a smart idea.
No, he'd have to get in touch with Gondorff some other way.
It wouldn't be easy. No inmate in any federal, state, or local facility is allowed to
receive phone calls. A sign posted by every inmate telephone in a federal
detention center says something like, "This notice is to advise the user that all
conversations from this telephone are subject to monitoring. and the use of the
telephone constitutes consent to the monitoring. Having government officials
listen in on your phone calls while committing
a crime has a way of extending your federally funded vacation plans.
Johnny knew, though, that certain phone calls were not monitored: calls
between a prisoner and his attorney, protected by the Constitution as client-
attorney communications, for example. In fact, the facility where          Gondorff
was being held had telephones connected directly to the federal Public
Defender's Office. Pick up one of those phones, and a direct connection
is made to the corresponding telephone in the PDO. The phone company calls
this service Direct Connect. The unsuspecting authorities assume the service is
secure and invulnerable to tampering because outgoing
calls can only go to the PDO, and incoming calls are blocked. Even if someone
were somehow able to find out the phone number, the phones are programmed
in the telephone company switch as deny terminate,          which is a clumsy
phone company term for service where incoming calls are             not     permitted.

Since any halfway decent grifter is well versed in the art of deception, Johnny
figured there had to be a way around this problem. From the    inside, Gondorff
had already tried picking up one of the PDO phones and saying, "This is Tom, at
the phone company repair center.


LINGO
DIRECT CONNECT Phone company term for a phone line that goes directly to
a specific number when picked up

DENY TERMINATE A phone company service option where switching
equipment is set that incoming calls cannot be received at a phone number

We're running a test on this line and I need you to try dialing nine, and then zero-
zero." The nine would have accessed an outside line, the zero-zero would then
have reached a long-distance operator. It didn't work the person answering the
phone at the PDO was already hip to that trick.

Johnny was having better success. He readily found out that there were ten
housing units in the detention center, each with a direct connect telephone line to
the Public Defender's Office. Johnny encountered some obstacles, but like a
social engineer, he was able to think his way around these annoying stumbling
blocks. Which unit was Gondorff in? What was the telephone number to the
direct connect services in that housing unit? And how would he initially get a
message to Gondorff without it being intercepted by prison officials?

What may appear to be the impossible to average folks, like obtaining the secret
telephone numbers located in federal institutions, is very often no more than a
few phone calls away for a con artist. After a couple of tossing-and-turning nights
brainstorming a plan, Johnny woke up one mormng with the whole thing laid out
in his mind, in five steps.

First, he'd find out the phone numbers for those ten direct-connect telephones to
the PDO.

He'd have all ten changed so that the phones would allow incoming calls.

He'd find out which housing unit Gondorff was on.

Then he'd find out which phone number went to that unit.

Finally, he'd arrange with Gondorff when to expect his call, without the
government suspecting a thing.

Piece a' cake, he thought.

Calling Ma Bell...
Johnny began by calling the phone company business office under the pretext of
being from the General Services Administration, the agenc responsible for
purchasing goods and services for the federal government.
He said he was working on an acquisition order for additional services and
needed to know the billing information for any direct connect services currently
in use, including the working telephone numbers and monthly cost at the San
Diego     detention    center.     The     lady    was    happy      to    help.

Just to make sure, he tried dialing into one of those lines and was answered by the
typical audichron recording, "This line has been disconnected or is no longer in
service"—which he knew meant nothing of kind but instead meant that the line
was programmed to block incoming calls, just as he expected.

He knew from his extensive knowledge of phone company operations and
procedures that he'd need to reach a department called the Recent Change
Memory Authorization Center or RCMAC (I will always wonder        who
makes up these names!). He began by calling the phone company     Business
Office, said he was in Repair and needed to know the number for the RCMAC
that handled the service area for the area code and prefix he gave, which was
served out of the same central office for all the to telephone lines in the detention
center. It was a routine request, the kind provided for technicians out in the field
in need of some assistance, and the clerk had no hesitation in giving him the
number.

He called RCMAC, gave a phony name and again said he was in Repair
He had the lady who answered access one of the telephone numbers he had
conned out of the business office a few calls earlier; when she had it up, Johnny
asked,     "Is      the      number        set       to     deny      termination?

"Yes," she said.

"Well, that explains why the customer isn't able to receive calls!" Johnny said.
"Listen, can you do me a favor. I need you to change the line class   code    or
remove the deny terminate feature, okay?" There was a pause as she checked
another computer system to verify that a service order had been placed to
authorize the change. She said, "That number is supposed to be restricted    for
outgoing calls only. There's no service order for a change."

"Right, it's a mistake. We were supposed to process the order yesterday but the
regular account rep that handles this customer went home sick and forgot to have
someone else take care of the order for her. So now of course the customer is up
in arms about it."

After a momentary pause while the lady pondered this request, which would be
out of the ordinary and against standard operating procedures, she said, "Okay."
He could hear her typing, entering the change. And a few seconds later, it was
done.
The ice had been broken, a kind of collusion established between them. Reading
the woman's attitude and willingness to help, Johnny didn't hesitate to go for it
all. He said, "Do you have a few minutes more to help me?"

"Yeah," she answered. "What do you need?"

"I've got a several other lines that belong to the same customer, and all have the
same problem. I'll read off the numbers, so you can make sure that they're not set
for deny terminate--okay?" She said that was fine.

A few minutes later, all ten phone lines had been "fixed" to accept incoming
calls.
Finding Gondorff
Next, find out what housing unit Gondorff was on. This is information that the
people who run detention centers and prisons definitely don't want outsiders to
know. Once again Johnny had to rely on his social engineering skills.

He placed a call to a federal prison in another city--he called Miami,
but any one would have worked--and claimed he was calling from the detention
center in New York. He asked to talk to somebody who worked with the Bureau's
Sentry computer, the computer system that contains information on every
prisoner being held in a Bureau of Prisons facility anywhere in the country.

When that person came on the phone, Johnny put on his Brooklyn accent. "Hi,"
he said. "This is Thomas at the FDC New York. Our connection to Sentry keeps
going down, can you find the location of a prisoner for me, I think this prisoner
may be at your institution," and gave Gondorff's name and his registration
number.

"No, he's not here," the guy said after a couple of moments. "He's at the
correctional center in San Diego."

Johnny pretended to be surprised. "San Diego! He was supposed to be transferred
to Miami on the Marshal's airlift last week! Are we talking about the same guy--
what's the guy's DOB?"

12/3/60," the man read from his screen.

"Yeah, that's the same guy. What housing unit is he on?"

"He's on Ten North," the man said--blithely answering the question
even though there isn't any conceivable reason why a prison employee in
New York would need to know this.

Johnny now had the phones turned on for incoming calls, and knew which
housing unit Gondorff was on. Next, find out which phone number connected to
unit Ten North.

This one was a bit difficult. Johnny called one of the numbers. He knew the
ringer of the phone would be turned off; no one would know it was ringing. So he
sat there reading Fodor's Europe} Great Cities travel guide. while listening to the
constant ringing on speakerphone until finally somebody picked up. The inmate
on the other end would, of course, be trying to reach his court-appointed lawyer.
Johnny was prepared with the expected response. "Public Defender's Office," he
announced.
When the man asked for his attorney, Johnny said, "I'll see if he's available, what
housing unit are you calling from?" He jotted down the man's answer, clicked
onto hold, came back after half a minute and said, "He's in court, you'll have to
call back later," and hung up.

He had spent the better part of a morning, but it could have been worse; his fourth
attempt turned out to be from Ten North. So Johnny now knew the phone number
to the PDO phone on Gondorff's housing unit.

Synchronize Your Watches
Now to get a message through to Gondorff on when to pick up the telephone line
that connects inmates directly to the Public Defender's Office. ]'his was easier
than it might sound.

Johnny called the detention center using his official-sounding voice, identified
himself as an employee, and asked to be transferred to Ten North. The call was
put right through. When the correctional officer there picked up, Johnny conned
him by using the insider's abbreviation for Receiving and Discharge, the unit that
processes new inmates in, and departing ones out: "This is Tyson in R&D," he
said. "I need to speak to inmate Gondorff. We have some property of his we have
to ship and we need an address where he wants it sent. Could you call him to the
phone for me?"

Johnny could hear the guard shouting across the day room. After an impatient
several minutes, a familiar voice came on the line.
Johnny told him, "Don't say anything until I explain what this is." He explained
the pretext so Johnny could sound like he was discussing where his property
should be shipped. Johnny then said, "If you can get to the Public Defender
phone at one this afternoon, don't respond. If you can't, then say a time that you
can be there." Gondorff didn't reply. Johnny went on, "Good. Be there at one
o'clock. I'll call you then. Pick up the phone.

If it starts to ring to the Public Defenders Office, flash the switch hook every
twenty seconds. Keep trying till you hear me on the other end."

At one o'clock, Gondorff picked up the phone, and Johnny was there waiting for
him. They had a chatty, enjoyable, unhurried conversation, leading to a series of
similar calls to plan the scam that would raise the money to pay Gondorff's legal
fees--all free from government surveillance.

Analyzing the Con
This episode offers a prime example of how a social engineer can make the
seemingly impossible happen by conning several people, each one doing
something that, by itself, seems inconsequential. In reality, each action provides
one small piece of the puzzle until the con is complete.

The first phone company employee thought she was giving information to
someone from the federal government's General Accounting Office.

The next phone company employee knew she wasn't supposed to change the class
of telephone service without a service order, but helped out the friendly man
anyway. This made it possible to place calls through to all ten of the public
defender phone lines in the detention center.

For the man at the detention center in Miami, the request to help someone at
another federal facility with a computer problem seemed perfectly reasonable.
And even though there didn't seem any reason he would want to know the
housing unit, why not answer the question?

And the guard on Ten North who believed that the caller was really from within
the same facility, calling on official business? It was a perfectly reasonable
request, so he called the inmate Gondorff to the telephone. No big deal.

A series of well-planned stories that added up to completing the sting.


THE SPEEDY DOWNLOAD
Ten years after they had finished law school, Ned Racine saw his classmates
living in nice homes with front lawns, belonging to country clubs, playing golf
once or twice a week, while he was still handling penny-ante cases for the kind of
people who never had enough money to pay his bill. Jealousy can be a nasty
companion. Finally one day, Ned had had enough.

The one good client he ever had was a small but very successful accounting firm
that specialized in mergers and acquisitions. They hadn't used Ned for long, just
long enough for him to realize they were involved in deals that, once they hit the
newspapers, would affect the stock price of one or two publicly traded
companies. Penny-ante, bulletin-board stocks, but in some ways that was even
better--a small jump in price could represent a big percentage gain on an
investment. If he could only tap into their files and find out what they were
working on...

He knew a man who knew a man who was wise about things not exactly in the
mainstream. The man listened to the plan, got fired up and agreed to help. For a
smaller fee than he usually charged, against a percentage of Ned's stock market
killing, the man gave Ned instructions on what to do. He also gave him a handy
little device to use, something brand-new on the market.

For a few days in a row Ned kept watch on the parking lot of the small business
park where the accounting company had its unpretentious, storefront-like offices.
Most people left between 5:30 and 6. By 7, the lot was empty. The cleaning crew
showed up around 7:30. Perfect.

The next night at a few minutes before 8 o'clock, Ned parked across the street
from the parking lot. As he expected, the lot was empty except for the truck from
the janitorial services company. Ned put his ear to the door and heard the vacuum
cleaner running. He knocked at the door very loudly, and stood there waiting in
his suit and tie, holding his well-worn briefcase. No answer, but he was patient.
He knocked again. A man from the cleaning crew finally appeared. "Hi," Ned
shouted through the glass door, showing the business card of one of the partners
that he had picked up some time earlier. "I locked my keys in my car and I need
to get to my desk."

The man unlocked the door, locked it again behind Ned, and then went down the
corridor turning on lights so Ned could see where he was going. And why not--he
was being kind to one of the people who helped put food on his table. Or so he
had every reason to think.


MITNICK MESSAGE
Industrial spies and computer intruders will sometimes make a physical entry into
the targeted business. Rather than using a crowbar to break in, the social engineer
uses the art of deception to influence the person on the other side of the door to
open up for him.

Ned sat down at the computer of one of the partners, and turned it on. While it
was starting up, he installed the small device he had been given into the USB port
of the computer, a gadget small enough to carry on a key ring, yet able to hold
more than 120 megabytes of data. He logged into the network with the username
and password of the partner's secretary, which were conveniently written down
on a Post-it note stuck to the display. In less than five minutes, Ned had
downloaded every spreadsheet and document file stored on the workstation and
from the partner's network directory and was on his way home.


EASY MONEY
When I was first introduced to computers in high school, we had to connect over
a modem to one central DEC PDP 11 minicomputer in downtown Los Angeles
that all the high schools in L.A. shared. The operating system on that computer
was called RSTS/E, and it was the operating system I first learned to work with.

At that time, in 1981, DEC sponsored an annual conference for its product users,
and one year I read that the conference was going to be held in L.A. A popular
magazine for users of this operating system carried an announcement about a new
security product, LOCK-11. The product was being promoted with a clever ad
campaign that said something like, "It's 3:30 ,.M. and Johnny down the street
found your dial-in number, 555-0336, on his 336th try. He's in and you're out.
Get LOCK-11." The product, the ad suggested, was hacker-proof. And it was
going to be on display at the conference.

I was eager to see the product for myself. A high school buddy and friend, Vinny,
my hacking partner for several years who later became a federal informant
against me, shared my interest in the new DEC product, and encouraged me to go
to the conference with him.

Cash on the Line
We arrived to find a big buzz already going around the crowd at the trade show
about LOCK-11. It seemed that the developers were staking cash on the line in a
bet that no one could break into their product. Sounded like a challenge I could
not resist.

We headed straight for the LOCK-11 booth and found it manned by three guys
who were the developers of the product; I recognized them and they recognized
me--even as a teen, I already had a reputation as a phreaker and hacker because
of a big story the LA Times had run about my first juvenile brush with the
authorities. The article reported that I had talked my way into a Pacific Telephone
building in the middle of the night and walked out with computer manuals, right
under the nose of their security guard. (It appears the Times wanted to run a
sensationalist story and it served their purposes to publish my name; because I
was still a juvenile, the article violated the custom if not the law of withholding
the names of minors accused of wrongdoing.)

When Vinny and I walked up, ir created some interest on both sides. There was
an interest on their side because they recognized me as the hacker they had read
about and they were a bit shocked to see me. It created an interest on our side
because each of the three developers was standing there with a $100 bill sticking
out of his tradeshow badge. The prize money for anybody who could defeat their
system would be the whole $300--which sounded like a lot of money to a pair of
teenagers. We could hardly wait to get started.
LOCK-11 was designed on an established principle that relied on two levels of
security. A user had to have a valid ID and password, as usual, but in addition
that ID and password would only work when entered from authorized terminals,
an approach called terminal-based security. To defeat the system, a hacker would
need not only to have knowledge of an account ID and password, but would also
have to enter that information from the correct terminal. The method was well
established, and the inventors of LOCK-11 were convinced it would keep the bad
guys out. We decided we were going to teach them a lesson, and earn three
hundred bucks to boot.

A guy I knew who was considered an RSTS/E guru had already beaten us to the
booth. Years before he had been one of the guys who had challenged me to break
into the DEC internal development computer, after which his associates had
turned me in. Since those days he had become a respected programmer. We
found out that he had tried to defeat the LOCK-11 security program not long
before we arrived, but had been unable to. The incident had given the developers
greater confidence that their product really was secure.

LINGO
TERMINAL-BASED SECURITY Security based in part on the identification
of the particular computer terminal being used; this method of security was
especially popular with IBM mainframe computers.

The contest was a straightforward challenge: You break in, you win the bucks. A
good publicity stunt.., unless somebody was able to embarrass them and take the
money. They were so sure of their product that they were even audacious enough
to have a printout posted at the booth giving the account numbers and
corresponding passwords to some accounts on the system. And not just regular
user accounts, but all the privileged accounts.

That was actually less daring than it sounds: In this type of set-up, I knew, each
terminal is plugged into a port on the computer itself. It wasn't rocket science to
figure out they had set up the five terminals in the conference hall so a visitor
could log in only as a non-privileged user--that is, logins were possible only to
accounts without system administrator privileges. It looked as if there were only
two routes: either bypass the security software altogether--exactly what the
LOCK-11 was designed to prevent; or somehow get around the software in a way
that the developers hadn't imagined.

Taking Up the Challenge
Vinny and I walked away and talked about the challenge, and I came up with a
plan. We wandered around innocently, keeping an eye on the booth from a
distance. At lunchtime, when the crowd thinned out, the three developers took
advantage of the break and took off together to get something to eat, leaving
behind a woman who might have been the wife or girlfriend of one of them. We
sauntered back over and I distracted the woman, chatting her up about this and
that, "How long have you been with the company? "What other products does
your company have on the market?" and so on.

Meanwhile Vinny, out of her sight line, had gone to work, making use of a skill
he and I had both developed. Besides the fascination of breaking into computers,
and my own interest in magic, we had both been intrigued by learning how to
open locks. As a young kid, I had scoured the shelves of an underground
bookstore in the San Fernando Valley that had volumes on picking locks, getting
out of handcuffs, creating fake identities--all kinds of things a kid was not
supposed to know about.

Vinny, like me, had practiced lock-picking until we were pretty good with any
run-of-the-mill hardware-store lock. There had been a time when I got a kick out
of pranks involving locks, like spotting somebody who was using two locks for
extra protection, picking the locks, and put-ring them back in the opposite places,
which would baffle and frustrate the owner when he tried to open each with the
wrong key.

In the exhibit hall, I continued to keep the young woman distracted while Vinny,
squatting down at the back of the booth so he couldn't beseen, picked the lock on
the cabinet that housed their PDP-11 minicomputer and the cable terminations.
To call the cabinet locked was almost a joke. It was secured with what locksmiths
refer to as a wafer lock, notoriously easy to pick, even for fairly clumsy, amateur
lock-pickers like us.

It took Vinny all of about a minute to open the lock. Inside the cabinet he found
just what we had anticipated: the strip of ports for plugging in user terminals, and
one port for what's called the console terminal. This was the terminal used by the
computer operator or system administrator to control all the computers. Vinny
plugged the cable leading from the console port into one of the terminals on the
show floor.

That meant this one terminal was now recognized as a console terminal. I sat
down at the recabled machine and logged in using a password the developers had
so audaciously provided. Because the LOCK-11 software now identified that I
was logging in from an authorized terminal, it granted me access, and I was
connected with system administrator privileges. I patched the operating system
by changing it so that from any of the terminals on the floor, I would be able to
log in as a privileged user.
Once my secret patch was installed, Vinny went back to work disconnecting the
terminal cable plugging it back in where it had been originally. Then he picked
the lock once again, this time to fasten the cabinet door closed.

I did a directory listing to find out what files were on the computer, looking for
the LocK-11 program and associated files and stumbled on something I found
shocking: a directory that should not have been on this machine. The developers
had been so overconfident, so certain their software was invincible, that they
hadn't bothered to remove the source code of their new product. Moving to the
adjacent hard-copy terminal, I started printing out portions of the source code
onto the continuous sheets of the green-striped computer paper used in those
days.

Vinny had only just barely finished picking the lock closed and rejoined me when
the guys returned from lunch. They found me sitting at the computer pounding
the keys while the printer continued to churn away. "What'cha doing, Kevin?"
one of them asked.

"Oh, just printing out your source code," I said. They assumed I was joking, of
course. Until they looked at the printer and saw that it really u, as the jealously
guarded source code for their product.

They didn't believe it was possible that I was logged in as a privileged user.
"Type a Control-T," one of the developers commanded. I did. The display that
appeared on the screen confirmed my claim. The guy smacked his forehead, as
Vinny said, "Three hundred dollars, please."

MITNICK MESSAGE
Here's another example of smart people underestimating the enemy. How about
you--are you so certain about your company's security safeguards that you would
bet $300 against an attacker breaking in? Sometimes the way around a
technological security device is not the one you expect.

They paid up. Vinny and I walked around the tradeshow floor for the rest of the
day with the hundred-dollar bills stuck into our conference badges. Everyone
who saw the bills knew what they represented.

Of course, Vinny and I hadn't defeated their software, and if the developer team
had thought to set better rules for the contest, or had used a really secure lock, or
had watched their equipment more carefully, they wouldn't have suffered the
humiliation of that day--humiliation at the hands of a pair of teenagers.
I found out later that the developer team had to stop by a bank to get some cash:
those hundred-dollar bills represented all the spending money they had brought
with them.


THE DICTIONARY AS AN ATTACK TOOL
When someone obtains your password, he's able to invade your system. In most
circumstances, you never even know that anything bad has happened.
A young attacker I'll call Ivan Peters had a target of retrieving the source code for
a new electronic game. He had no trouble getting into the company's wide area
network, because a hacker buddy of his had already compromised one of the
company's Web servers. After finding an un-patched vulnerability in the Web
server software, his buddy had just about fallen out of his chair when he realized
the system had been set up as a dual-homed host, which meant he had an entry
point into the internal network.                               .

But once Ivan was connected, he then faced a challenge that was like being inside
the Louvre and hoping to find the Mona Lisa. Without a floor plan, you could
wander for weeks. The company was global, with hundreds of offices and
thousands of computer servers, and they didn't exactly provide an index of
development systems or the services of a tour guide to steer him to the right one.

Instead of using a technical approach to finding out what server he needed to
target, Ivan used a social engineering approach. He placed phone calls based on
methods similar to those described elsewhere in this book. First, calling IT
technical support, he claimed to be a company employee having an interface
issue on a product his group was designing. and asked for the phone number of
the project leader for the gaming development team.

Then he called the name he'd been given, posing as a guy from IT. "Later
tonight," he said, "we're swapping out a router and need to make sure the people
on your team don't lose connectivity to your server. So we need to know which
servers your team uses." The network was being upgraded all the time. And
giving the name of the server wouldn't hurt anything anyway, now would it?
Since it was password-protected, just having the name couldn't help anybody
break in. So the guy gave the attacker the server name. Didn't even bother to call
the man back to verify his story, or write down his name and phone number. He
just gave the name of the servers, ATM5 and ATM6.

The Password Attack
At this point, Ivan switched to a technical approach to get the authentication
information. The first step with most technical attacks on systems that provide
remote access capability is to identify an account with a weak password, which
provides an initial entry point into the system.

When an attacker attempts to use hacking tools for remotely identifying
passwords, the effort may require him to stay connected to the company's
network for hours at a time. Clearly he does this at his peril: The longer he stays
connected, the greater the risk of detection and getting caught.

As a preliminary step, Ivan would do an enumeration, which reveals details about
a target system. Once again the Internet conveniently provides software for the
purpose (at http://ntsleuth.0catch.com; the character before "catch" is a zero).
Ivan found several publicly available hacking tools on the Web that automated
the enumeration process, avoiding the need to do it by hand, which would take
longer and thus run a higher risk. Knowing that the organization mostly deployed
Windows-based servers, he downloaded a copy of NBTEnum, a NetBIOS (basic
input/output system) enumeration utility. He entered the IP (Internet protocol)
address of the ATM5 server, and started running the program. The enumeration
tool was able to identify several accounts that existed on the server.


LINGO
ENUMERATION A process that reveals the service enabled on the target
system, the operating system platform, and a list of accounts names of the users
who have access to the system.

Once the existing accounts had been identified, the same enumeration tool had
the ability to launch a dictionary attack against the computer system. A dictionary
attack is something that many computer security folks and intruders are
intimately familiar with, but that most other people will probably be shocked to
learn is possible. Such an attack is aimed at uncovering the password of each user
on the system by using commonly used words.
We're all lazy about some things, but it never ceases to amaze me that when
people choose their passwords, their creativity and imagination seem to
disappear. Most of us want a password that gives us protection but that is at the
same time easy to remember, which usually means something closely connected
to us. Our initials, middle name, nickname, spouse's name, favorite song, movie,
or brew, for example. The name of the street we live on or the town we live in,
the kind of car we drive, the beachfront village we like to stay at in Hawaii, or
that favorite stream with the best trout fishing around. Recognize the pattern
here? These are mostly personal names, place names, or dictionary words. A
dictionary attack runs through common words at a very rapid pace, trying each as
a password on one or more user accounts.
Ivan ran the dictionary attack in three phases. For the first, he used a simple list
of some 800 of the most common passwords; the list includes secret, work, and
password. Also the program permutated the dictionary words to try each word
with an appended digit, or appending the number of the current month. The
program tried each attempt against all of the user accounts that had been
identified. No luck.

For the next attempt, Ivan went to Google's search engine and typed, "wordlists
dictionaries," and found thousands of sites with extensive wordlists and
dictionaries for English and several foreign languages. He downloaded an entire
electronic English dictionary. He then enhanced this by downloading a number of
word lists that he found with Google. Ivan chose the site at
www.outpost9.com/files/WordLists.html.

This site allowed him to download (all of this for free) a selection of files
including family names, given namek, congressional names and words, actor's
names, and words and names from the Bible.

Another of the many sites offering word lists is actually provided through Oxford
University, at ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/wordlists.

Other sites offer lists with the names of cartoon characters, words used in
Shakespeare, in the Odyssey, Tolkien, and the Star Trek series, as well as in
science and religion, and on and on. (One on-line company sells a list containing
4.4 million words and names for only $20.) The attack program can be set to test
the anagrams of the dictionary words, as well-- another favorite method that
many computer users think increases their safety.

Faster Than You Think
Once Ivan had decided which wordlist to use, and started the attack, the software
ran on autopilot. He was able to turn his attention to other things. And here's the
incredible part: You would think such an attack would allow the hacker to take a
Rip van Winkle snooze and the software would still have made little progress
when he awoke. In fact, depending on the platform being attacked, the security
configuration of the system, and network connectivity, every word in an English
dictionary can, incredibly, be attempted in less than thirty minutes!

While this attack was running, Ivan started another computer running a similar
attack on the other server used by the development group, ATM6. Twenty
minutes later, the attack software had done what most unsuspecting users like to
think is impossible: It had broken a password, revealing that one of the users had
chosen the password "Frodo," one of the Hobbits in the book The Lord of the
Rings.
With this password in hand, Ivan was able to connect to the ATM6 server using
the user's account.

There was good news and bad news for our attacker. The good news was that the
account he cracked had administrator privileges, which would be essential for the
next step. The bad news was that the source code for the game was not anywhere
to be found. It must be, after all, on the other machine, the ATM5, which he
already knew was resistant to a dictionary attack. But Ivan wasn't giving up just
yet; he still had a few more tricks to try.

On some Windows and UNIX operating systems, password hashes (encrypted
passwords) are openly available to anyone who has access to the computer they're
stored on. The reasoning is that the encrypted passwords cannot be broken and
therefore do not need to be protected. The theory is wrong. Using another tool
called pwdump3, also available on the Internet, he was able to extract the
password hashes from the ATM6 machine and download them.


A typical file of password hashes looks like this:

   Administrator:
   500:95E4321A38AD8D6AB75EOC8D76954A50:2E48927AO
   BO4F3BFB341E26F6D6E9A97 : : :

   akasper                                                                      :
   1110:5A8D7E9E3C3954F642C5C736306CBFEF:393CE7F90A8357
   F157873D72D0490821: : :

   digger:     1111:5D15COD58DD216C525AD3B83FA6627C7                            :
   17AD564144308B4 2B8403DOIAE256558: : :

   ellgan                                                                       :
   1112:2017D4A5D8D1383EFF17365FAFIFFE89:O7AEC950C22CBB9
   C2C734EB89320DB13: : :

   tabeck:             1115:9F5890B3FECCAB7EAAD3B435B51404EE:
   1FO115A72844721 2FCO5EID2D820B35B: : :

   vkantar                                                                      :
   1116:81A6A5DO35596E7DAAD3B435B51404EE:B933D36DD12258
   946FCC7BD153F1CD6E : : :
   vwallwick: 1119 : 25904EC665BA30F4449AF42E1054F192:15B2B7953FB6
   32907455D2706A432469 : : :

   mmcdonald:         1121:A4AEDO98D29A3217AAD3B435B51404EE:
   E40670F936B7 9C2ED522F5ECA9398A27 : : :

   kworkman      :     1141:C5C598AF45768635AAD3B435B51404EE:
   DEC8E827A1212 73EFO84CDBF5FD1925C : : :

With the hashes now downloaded to his computer, Ivan used another tool that
performed a different flavor of password attack known as brute force. This kind
of attack tries every combination of alphanumeric characters and most special
symbols.

Ivan used a software utility called L0phtcrack3 (pronounced loft-crack; available
at www.atstake.com; another source for some excellent password recovery tools
is www.elcomsoft.com). System administrators use L0pht-crack3 to audit weak
passwords; attackers use it to crack passwords. The brute force feature in LC3
tries passwords with combinations of letters, numerals, and most symbols
including !@#$%^&. It systematically tries every possible combination of most
characters. (Note, however, that if nonprintable characters are used, LC3 will be
unable to discover the password )

The program has a nearly unbelievable speed, which can reach to as high as 2.8
million attempts a second on a machine with a 1 GHz processor. Even with this
speed, and if the system administrator has configured the Windows operating
system properly (disabling the use of LANMAN hashes), breaking a password
can still take an excessive amount of time.

LINGO
BRUTE FORCE ATTACK A password detection stategy that tries every
possible combination of alphanumeric characters and special symbols.

For that reason the attacker often downloads the hashes and runs the attack on his
or another machine, rather than staying on line on the target company's network
and risking detection.
For Ivan, the wait was not that long. Several hours later the program presented
him with passwords for every one of the development team members. But these
were the passwords for users on the ATM6 machine, and he already knew the
game source code he was after was not on this server.

What now? He still had not been able to get a password for an account on the
ATM5 machine. Using his hacker mindset, understanding the poor security habits
of typical users, he figured one of the team members might have chosen the same
password for both machines.

In fact, that's exactly what he found. One of the team members was using the
password "garners" on both ATM5 and ATM6.

The door had swung wide open for Ivan to hunt around until he found the
programs he was after. Once he located the source-code tree and gleefully
downloaded it, he took one further step typical of system crackers: He changed
the password of a dormant account that had administrator rights, just in case he
wanted to get an updated version of the software at some time in the future.

Analyzing the Con
In this attack that called on both technical and people-based vulnerabilities, the
attacker began with a pretext telephone call to obtain the location and host names
of the development servers that held the proprietary information.

He then used a software utility to identify valid account-user names for everyone
who had an account on the development server. Next he ran two successive
password attacks, including a dictionary attack, which searches for commonly
used passwords by trying all of the words in an English dictionary, sometimes
augmented by several word lists containing names, places, and items of special
interest.

Because both commercial and public-domain hacking tools can be obtained by
anyone for whatever purpose they have in mind, it's all the more important that
you be vigilant in protecting enterprise computer systems and your network
infrastructure.

The magnitude of this threat cannot be overestimated. According to Computer
World magazine, an analysis at New York-based Oppenheimer Funds led to a
startling discovery. The firm's Vice President of Network Security and Disaster
Recovery ran a password attack against the employees of his firm using one of
the standard software packages. The magazine reported that within three minutes
he managed to crack the passwords of 800 employees.


MITNICK MESSAGE
In the terminology of the game Monopoly, if you use a dictionary word for your
password--Go directly to Jail. Do not pass Go, do not collect $200. You have to
teach your employees how to choose passwords that truly protect your assets.
PREVENTING THE CON
Social engineering attacks may become even more destructive when the attacker
adds a technology element. Preventing this kind of attack typically involves
taking steps on both human and technical levels.

Just Say No
In the first story of the chapter, the telephone company RCMAC clerk should not
have removed the deny terminate status from the ten phone lines when no service
order existed authorizing the change. It's not enough for employees to know the
security policies and procedures; employees must understand how important
these policies are to the company in preventing damage.

Security policies should discourage deviation from procedure through a system of
rewards and consequences. Naturally, the policies must be realistic, not calling on
employees to carry out steps so burdensome that they are likely to be ignored.
Also, a security awareness program needs to convince employees that, while it's
important to complete job assignments in a timely manner, taking a shortcut that
circumvents proper security procedures can be detrimental to the company and co
workers.

The same caution should be present when providing information to a stranger on
the telephone. No matter how persuasively the person presents himself,
regardless of the person's status or seniority in the company, absolutely no
information should be provided that is not designated as publicly available until
the caller's identity has been positively verified. If this policy had been strictly
observed, the social engineering scheme in this story would have failed and
federal detainee Gondorff would never have been able to plan a new scare with
his pal Johnny.

This one point is so important that I reiterate it throughout this book: Verify,
verify, verify. Any request not made in person should never be accepted without
verifying the requestor's identity--period.

Cleaning Up
For any company that does not have security guards around the clock, the scheme
wherein an attacker gains access to an office after hours presents a challenge.
Cleaning people will ordinarily treat with respect anyone who appears to be with
the company and appears legitimate. After all, this is someone who could get
them in trouble or fired. For that reason, cleaning crews, whether internal or
contracted from an outside agency, must be trained on physical security matters.

Janitorial work doesn't exactly require a college education, or even the ability to
speak English, and the usual training, if any, involves non-security related issues
such as which kind of cleaning product to use for different tasks. Generally these
people don't get an instruction like, "If someone asks you to let them in after
hours, you need to see their company ID card, and then call the cleaning
company office, explain the situation, and wait for authorization."

An organization needs to plan for a situation like the one in this chapter before it
happens and train people accordingly. In my personal experience, I have found
that most, if not all, private sector businesses are very lax in this area of physical
security. You might try to approach the problem from the other end, putting the
burden on your company's own employees. A company without 24-hour guard
service should tell its employees that to get in after hours, they are to bring their
own keys or electronic access cards, and must never put the cleaning people in
the position of deciding who it is okay to admit. Then tell the janitorial company
that their people must always be trained that no one is to be admitted to your
premises by them at any time. This is a simple rule: Do not open the door for
anyone. If appropriate, this could be put into writing as a condition of the contract
with the cleaning company.

Also, cleaning crews should be trained about piggybacking techniques
(unauthorized persons following an authorized person into a secure entrance).
They should also be trained not to allow another person to follow them into the
building just because the person looks like they might be an employee.

Follow up every now and then--say, three or four times a year--by staging a
penetration test or vulnerability assessment. Have someone show up at the door
when the cleaning crew is at work and try to talk her way into the building.
Rather than using your own employees, you can hire a firm that specializes in this
kind of penetration testing.

Pass It On: Protect Your Passwords
More and more, organizations are becoming increasingly vigilant about enforcing
security policies through technical means--for example, configuring the operating
system to enforce password policies and limit the number of invalid login
attempts that can be made before locking out the account. In fact, Microsoft
Windows business platforms generally have this feature built in. Still,
recognizing how easily annoyed customers are by features that require extra
effort, the products are usually delivered with security features turned off. It's
really about time that software manufacturers stop delivering products with
security features disabled by default when it should be the other way around. (I
suspect they'll figure this out soon enough.)

Of course, corporate security policy should mandate system administrators to
enforce security policy through technical means whenever possible, with the goal
of not relying on fallible humans any more than necessary. It's a no-brainer that
when you limit the number of successive invalid login attempts to a particular
account, for example, you make an attacker's life significantly more difficult.

Every organization faces that uneasy balance between strong security and
employee productivity, which leads some employees to ignore security policies,
not accepting how essential these safeguards are for protecting the integrity of
sensitive corporate information.

If a company's policies leave some issues un-addressed, employees may use the
path of least resistance and do whatever action is most convenient and makes
their job easier. Some employees may resist change and openly disregard good
security habits. You may have encountered such an employee, who follows
enforced rules about password length and complexity but then writes the
password on a Post-it note and defiantly sticks it to his monitor.

A vital part of protecting your organization is the use of hard-to-discover
passwords, combined with strong security settings in your technology.

For a detailed discussion of recommended password policies, see Chapter 16.
Chapter 12
Attacks on the Entry-Level Employee

As many of the stories here demonstrate, the skilled social engineer often targets
lower-level personnel in the organizational hierarchy. It can be easy to
manipulate these people into revealing seemingly innocuous information that the
attacker uses to advance one step closer to obtaining more sensitive company
information.

An attacker targets entry-level employees because they are typically unaware of
the value of specific company information or of the possible results of certain
actions. Also, they tend to be easily influenced by some of the more common
social engineering approaches--a caller who invokes authority; a person who
seems friendly and likeable; a person who appears to know people in the
company who are known to the victim; a request that the attacker claims is
urgent; or the inference that the victim will gain some kind of favor or
recognition.

Here are some illustrations of the attack on the lower-level employee in action.

THE HELPFUL SECURITY GUARD
Swindlers hope to find a person who's greedy because they are the ones most
likely to fall for a con game. Social engineers, when targeting someone such as a
member of a sanitation crew or a security guard, hope to find someone who is
good-natured, friendly, and trusting of others. They are the ones most likely to be
willing to help. That's just what the attacker had in mind in the following story.

Elliot's View
Date/time: 3:26 a.m. on a Tuesday morning in February 1998.
Location: Marchand Microsystems facility, Nashua, New Hampshire

Elliot Staley knew he wasn't supposed to leave his station when he wasn't on his
scheduled rounds. But it was the middle of the night, for crying out loud, and he
hadn't seen a single person since he had come on duty. And it was nearly time to
make his rounds anyway. The poor guy on the telephone sounded like he really
needed help. And it makes a person feel fine when they can do a little good for
somebody.

Bill's Story
Bill Goodrock had a simple goal, one he had held on to, unaltered, since age
twelve: to retire by age twenty-four, not ever touching a penny of his trust fund.
To show his father, the almighty and unforgiving banker, that he could be a
success on his own.

Only two years left and it's by now perfectly clear he won't make his fortune in
the next twenty-four months by being a brilliant businessman and he won't do it
by being a sharp investor. He once wondered about robbing banks with a gun but
that's just the stuff of fiction--the risk-benefit
 trade-off is so lousy. Instead he daydreams about doing a Rifkin--robbing a bank
electronically. The last time Bill was in Europe with the family, he opened a bank
account in Monaco with 100 Francs. It still has only 100 francs in it, but he has a
plan that could help it reach seven digits in a hurry. Maybe even eight if he's
lucky.

Bill's girlfriend Anne-marie worked in M&A for a large Boston bank. One day
while waiting at her offices until she got out of a late meeting, he gave in to
curiosity and plugged his laptop into an Ethernet port in the conference room he
was using. Yes!--he was on their internal network, connected inside the bank's
network.., behind the corporate firewall. That gave him an idea.

He pooled his talent with a classmate who knew a young woman named Julia, a
brilliant computer science Ph.D. candidate doing an internship at Marchand
Microsystems. Julia looked like a great source for essential insider information.
They told her they were writing a script for a movie and she actually believed
them. She thought it was fun making up a story with them and giving them all the
details about how you could actually bring off the caper they had described. She
thought the idea was brilliant, actually, and kept badgering them about giving her
a screen credit, too.


They warned her about how often screenplay ideas get stolen and made her swear
she'd never tell anyone.

Suitably coached by Julia, Bill did the risky part himself and never doubted he
could bring it off.

I called in the afternoon and managed to find out that the night supervisor of the
security force was a man named Isaiah Adams. At 9:30 that night I called the
building and talked to the guard on the lobby security desk. My story was all
based on urgency and I made myself sound a little panicky. "I'm having car
trouble and I can't get to the facility," I said. "I have this emergency and I really
need your help. I tried calling the guard supervisor, Isaiah, but he's not at home.
Can you just do me this onetime favor, I'd really appreciate it?"
The rooms in that big facility were each labeled with a mail-stop code so I gave
him the mail-stop of the computer lab and asked him if he knew where that was.
He said yes, and agreed to go there for me. He said it would take him a few
minutes to get to the room, and I said I'd call him in the lab, giving the excuse
that I was using the only phone line available to me and I was using it to dial into
the network to try to fix the problem.

He was already there and waiting by the time I called, and I told him where to
find the console I was interested in, looking for one with a paper banner reading
"elmer"--the host that Julia had said was used to build the release versions of the
operating system that the company marketed. When he said he had found it, I
knew for sure that Julia had been feeding us good information and my heart
skipped a beat. I had him hit the Enter key a couple of times, and he said it
printed a pound sign. Which told me the computer was logged in as root, the
super-user account with all system privileges. He was a hunt-and-peck typist and
got all in a sweat when I tried to talk him through entering my next command,
which was more than a bit tricky:

echo 'fix:x:0:0::/:/bin/sh' >> /etc/passwd

Finally he got it right, and we had now provided an account with a name fix. And
then I had him type

echo 'fix: :10300:0:0' 55 /etc/shadow

This established the encrypted password, which goes between the double colon.
Putting nothing between those two colons meant the account would have a null
password. So just those two commands was all it took to append the account fix
to the password file, with a null password. Best of all, the account would have the
same privileges as a super-user.

The next thing I had him do was to enter a recursive directory command that
printed out a long list of file names. Then I had him feed the paper forward, tear it
off, and take it with him back to his guard desk because "I may need you to read
me something from it later on."

The beauty of this was that he had no idea he had created a new account. And I
had him print out the directory listing of filenames because I needed to make sure
the commands he typed earlier would leave the computer room with him. That
way the system administrator or operator wouldn't spot anything the next
morning that would alert them there had been a security breach.
I was now set up with an account, a password, and full privileges. A little before
midnight I dialed in and followed the instructions Julia had carefully typed up
"for the screenplay." In a blink I had access to one of the development systems
that contained the master copy of the source code for the new version of the
company's operating system software.

I uploaded a patch that Julia had written, which she said modified a routine in one
of the operating system's libraries. That patch would, in effect, create a covert
backdoor that would allow remote access into the system with a secret password.

NOTE
The type of backdoor used here does not change the operating system login
program itself Rather, a specific function contained within the dynamic library
used by the login program is replaced to create the secret entry point. In typical
attacks, computer intruders often replace or patch the login program itself, but
sharp system administrators can detect the change by comparing it to the version
shipped on media such as cd , or by other distribution methods.

I carefully followed the instructions she had written down for me, first installing
the patch, then taking steps that removed the fix account and wiped clean all audit
logs so there would be no trace of my activities, effectively erasing my tracks.

Soon the company would begin shipping the new operating system upgrade to
their customers: Financial institutions all over the world. And every copy they
sent out would include the backdoor I had placed into the master distribution
before it was sent out, allowing me to access any computer system of every bank
and brokerage house that installed the upgrade.


LINGO
PATCH Traditionally a piece of code that , when placed in an executable
program, fixes a problem.

Of course, I wasn't quite home free--there would still be work to do. I'd still have
to gain access to the internal network of each financial institution I wanted to
"visit." Then I'd have to find out which of their computers was used for money
transfers, and install surveillance software to learn the details of their operations
and exactly how to transfer funds.

All of that I could do long distance. From a computer located anywhere. Say,
overlooking a sandy beach. Tahiti, here I come.
I called the guard back, thanked him for his help, and told him he could go ahead
and toss the printout.

Analyzing the Con
The security guard had instructions about his duties, but even thorough, well-
thought-out instructions can't anticipate every possible situation. Nobody had told
him the harm that could be done by typing a few keystrokes on a computer for a
person he thought was a company employee.

With the cooperation of the guard, it was relatively easy to gain access to a
critical system that stored the distribution master, despite the fact that it was
behind the locked door of a secure laboratory. The guard, of course, had keys to
all locked doors.

Even a basically honest employee (or, in this case, the Ph.D. candidate and
company intern, Julia) can sometimes be bribed or deceived into revealing
information of crucial importance to a social engineering attack, such as where
the target computer system is located and--the key to the success of this attack---
when they were going to build the new release of the software for distribution.
That's important, since a change of this kind made too early has a higher chance
of being detected or being nullified if the operating system is rebuilt from a clean
source.

Did you catch the detail of having the guard take the printout back to the lobby
desk and later destroying it? This was an important step. When the computer
operators came to work the next workday, the attacker didn't want them to find
this damning evidence on the hard-copy terminal, or notice it in the trash. Giving
the guard a plausible excuse to take the printout with him avoided that risk.

MITNICK MESSAGE
When the computer intruder cannot gain physical access to a computer system or
network himself, he will try to manipulate another person to do it for him. In
cases where physical access is necessary for the plan, using the victim as a proxy
is even better than doing it himself, because the attacker assumes much less risk
of detection and apprehension.

THE EMERGENCY PATCH
You would think a tech support guy would understand the dangers of giving
access to the computer network to an outsider. But when that outsider is a clever
social engineer masquerading as a helpful software vendor, the results might not
be what you expect.
A Helpful Call
The caller wanted to know Who's in charge of computers there? and the
telephone operator put him through to the tech support guy, Paul Ahearn.

The caller identified himself as "Edward, with SeerWare, your database vendor.
Apparently a bunch of our customers didn't get the email about our emergency
update, so we're calling a few for a quality control check to see whether there was
a problem installing the patch. Have you installed the update yet?"

Paul said he was pretty sure he hadn't seen anything like that.

Edward said, "Well, it could cause intermittent catastrophic loss of data, so we
recommend you get it installed as soon as possible." Yes, that was something he
certainly wanted to do, Paul said. "Okay," the caller responded. "We can send
you a tape or CD with the patch, and I want to tell you, it's really critical--two
companies already lost several days of data. So you really should get this
installed as soon as it arrives, before it happens to your company."

"Can't I download it from your Web site?" Paul wanted to know.

"It should be available soon--the tech team has been putting out all these fires. If
you want, we can have our customer support center install it for you, remotely.
We can either dial up or use Telnet to connect to the system, if you can support
that."

"We don't allow Telnet, especially from the Internet--it's not secure," Paul
answered. "If you can use SSH, that'd be okay," he said, naming a product that
provides secure file transfers.
"Yeah. We have SSH. So what's the IP address?"

Paul gave him the IP address, and when Andrew asked, "and what username and
password can I use," Paul gave him those, as well.
Analyzing the Con
Of course that phone call might really have come from the database
manufacturer. But then the story wouldn't belong in this book.

The social engineer here influenced the victim by creating a sense of fear that
critical data might be lost, and offered an immediate solution that would resolve
the problem.

Also, when a social engineer targets someone who knows the value of the
information, he needs to come up with very convincing and persuasive arguments
for giving remote access. Sometimes he needs to add the element of urgency so
the victim is distracted by the need to rush, and complies before he has had a
chance to give much thought to the request.

THE NEW GIRL
What kind of information in your company's files might an attacker want to gain
access to? Sometimes it can be something you didn't think you needed to protect
at all.

Sarah’s Call
"Human Resources, this is Sarah."

"Hi, Sarah. This is George, in the parking garage. You know the access card
you use to get into the parking garage and elevators? Well, we had a problem and
we need to reprogram the cards for all the new hires from the last fifteen days."

"So you need their names?"

"And their phone numbers."

"I can check our new hire list and call you back. What's your phone number?"

"I'm at 73 . . . Uh, I'm going on .break, how about if I call you back in a half-
hour?"

"Oh. Okay."
When he called back, she said:

"Oh, yes. Well, there's just two. Anna Myrtle, in Finance, she's a secretary. And
that new VP, Mr. Underwood."
"And the phone numbers?"
"Right Okay, Mr. Underwood is 6973. Anna Myrtle is 2127."
"Hey, you've been a big help. "thanks."

Anna’s Call
"Finance, Anna speaking."

"I'm glad I found somebody working late. Listen, this is Ron Vittaro, I'm
publisher of the business division. I don't think we've been introduced. Welcome
to the company."

"Oh, thank you."
"Anna, I'm in Los Angeles and I've got a crisis. I need to take about ten minutes
of your time."

"Of course. What do you need?"

"Go up to my office. Do you know where my office is?

"No."

"Okay, it's the corner office on the fifteenth floor—room 1502. I'll call you there
in a few minutes. When you get to the office, you'll need to press the forward
button on the phone so my call won't go directly to my voice mail."

"Okay, I'm on my way now."

Ten minutes later she was in his office, had cancelled his call forwarding and was
waiting when the phone rang. He told her to sit down at the computer and launch
Internet Explorer. When it was running he told her to type in an address:
www.geocities.com/ron-insen/manuscript.doc.exe.

A dialog box appeared, and he told her to click Open. The computer appeared to
start downloading the manuscript, and then the screen went blank. When she
reported that something seemed to be wrong, he replied, "Oh, no. Not again. I've
been having a problem with downloading from that Web site every so often but I
thought it was fixed. Well, okay, don't worry, I'll get the file another way later."
Then he asked her to restart his computer so he could be sure it would start up
properly after the problem she had just had. He talked her through the steps for
rebooting.

When the computer was running again properly, he thanked her warmly and hung
up, and Anna went back to the Finance department to finish the job she had been
working on.


Kurt Dillon's Story
Millard-Fenton Publishers was enthusiastic about the new author they were just
about to sign up, the retired CEO of a Fortune 500 company who had a
fascinating story to tell. Someone had steered the man to a business manager for
handling his negotiations. The business manager didn't want to admit he knew zip
about publishing contracts, so he hired an old friend to help him figure out what
he needed to know. The old friend, unfortunately, was not a very good choice.
Kurt Dillon used what we might call unusual methods in his research, methods
not entirely ethical.
Kurt signed up for a free site on Geocities, in the name of Ron Vittaro, and
loaded a spy-ware program onto the new site. He changed the name of the
program to manuscript.doc.exe, so the name would appear to be a Word
document and not raise suspicion. In fact, this worked even better than Kurt had
anticipated; because the real Vittaro had never changed a default setting in his
Windows operating system called "Hide file extensions for known file types."
Because of that setting the file was actually displayed with the name
manuscript.doc.

Then he had a lady friend call Vittaro's secretary. Following Dillon's coaching,
she said, "I'm the executive assistant to Paul Spadone, president of Ultimate
Bookstores, in Toronto. Mr. Vittaro met my boss at a book fair a while back, and
asked him to call to discuss a project they might do together. Mr. Spadone is on
the road a lot, so he said I should find out when Mr. Vittaro will be in the office."

By the time the two had finished comparing schedules, the lady friend had
enough information to provide the attacker with a list of dates when Mr. Vittaro
would be in the office. Which meant he also knew when Vittaro would be out of
the office. It hadn't required much extra conversation to find out that Vittaro's
secretary would be taking advantage of his absence to get in a little skiing. For a
short span of time, both would be out of the office. Perfect.

LINGO
SPYWARE Specialized software used to covertly monitor a targets computer
activities. One form used to track the sites visited by internet shoppers so that on-
line advertisements can be tailored to their surfing habits. The other form is
analogous to a wiretap, except that the target device is a computer. The software
captures the activities of the user, including passwords and keystrokes typed,
email, chat conversations, instant messenger, all the web sites visited, and
screenshots of the display screen.


LINGO
SILENT INSTALL A method of installing a software application without the
computer user or operator being aware that such a action is taking place.

The first day they were supposed to be gone he placed a pretext urgent call just to
make sure, and was told by a receptionist that "Mr. Vittaro is not in the office and
neither is his secretary. Neither of them is expected any time today or tomorrow
or the next day."

His very first try at conning a junior employee into taking part in his scheme was
successful, and she didn't seem to blink an eye at being told to help him by
downloading a "manuscript," which was actually a popular, commercially
available spyware program that the attacker had modified for a silent install.
Using this method, the installation would not be detected by any antivirus
software. For some strange reason, antivirus manufacturers do not market
products that will detect commercially available spyware.

Immediately after the young woman had loaded the software onto Vittaro's
computer, Kurt went back up to the Geocities site and replaced the doc.exe file
with a book manuscript he found on the Internet. Just in case anyone stumbled on
the ruse and returned to the site to investigate what had taken place, all they'd
find would be an innocuous, amateurish, un-publishable book manuscript.

Once the program had been installed and the computer rebooted, it was set to
immediately become active. Ron Vittaro would return to town in a    few days,
start to work, and the spyware would begin forwarding all the keystrokes typed
on his computer, including all outgoing emails and screen shots showing what
was displayed on his screen at that moment. It would all be sent at regular
intervals to a free email service provider in the Ukraine.

Within a few days after Vittaro's return, Kurt was plowing through the log files
piling up in his Ukrainian mailbox and before long had located confidential
emails that indicated just how far Millard-Fenton Publishing was willing to go in
making a deal with the author. Armed with that knowledge, it was easy for the
author's agent to negotiate much better terms than originally offered, without ever
running the risk of losing the deal altogether. Which, of course, meant a bigger
commission for the agent.


Analyzing the Con
In this ruse, the attacker made his success more likely by picking a new employee
to act as his proxy, counting on her being more willing to cooperate and be a
team player, and being less likely to have knowledge of the company, its people,
and good security practices which could thwart the attempt.

Because Kurt was pretexting as a vice president in his conversation with Anna, a
clerk in Finance, he knew that it would be very unlikely that she would question
his authority. On the contrary, she might entertain the thought that helping a VP
could gain her favor.

And the process he walked Anna through that had the effect of installing
the spyware appeared innocuous on its face. Anna had no idea that her seemingly
innocent actions had set an attacker up to gain valuable information that could be
used against the interests of the company.
And why did he choose to forward the VP's message to an email account
in the Ukraine? For several reasons a far-off destination makes tracing or taking
action against an attacker much less likely. These types of crimes are generally
considered low priority in countries like this, where the police tend to hold the
view that committing a crime over the Internet isn't a noteworthy offense. For
that reason, using email drops in countries that are unlikely to cooperate with
U.S. law enforcement is an attractive strategy.

PREVENTING THE CON
A social engineer will always prefer to target an employee who is unlikely to
recognize that there is something suspicious about his requests. It makes his job
not only easier, but also less risky--as the stories in this chapter illustrate.

MITNICK MESSAGE
Asking a co-worker or subordinate to do a favor is a common practice. Social
engineers know how to exploit people's natural desire to help and be a team
player. An attacker exploits this positive human trait to deceive unsuspecting
employees into performing actions that advance him toward his goal. It's
important to understand this simple concept so you will be more likely to
recognize when another person is trying to manipulate you.


Deceiving the Unwary
I've emphasized earlier the need to train employees thoroughly enough that they
will never allow themselves to be talked into carrying out the instructions of a
stranger. All employees also need to understand the danger of carrying out a
request to take any action on another person's computer. Company policy should
prohibit this except when specifically approved by a manager. Allowable
situations include:

When the request is made by a person well known to you, with the request made
either face-to-face, or over the telephone when you unmistakably recognize the
voice of the caller.

When you positively verify the identity of the requestor through approved
procedures.

When the action is authorized by a supervisor or other person in authority who is
personally familiar with the requestor.

Employees must be trained not to assist people they do not personally know, even
if the person making the request claims to be an executive. Once security policies
concerning verification have been put in place, management must support
employees in adhering to these policies, even when it means that an employee
challenges a member of the executive staff who is asking the employee to
circumvent a security policy.

Every company also needs to have policies and procedures that guide employees
in responding to requests to take any action with computers or computer-related
equipment. In the story about the publishing company, the social engineer
targeted a new employee who had not been trained on information security
policies and procedures. To prevent this type of attack, every existing and new
employee must be told to follow a simple rule: Do not use any computer system
to perform an action requested by a stranger. Period.

Remember that any employee who has physical or electronic access to a
computer or an item of computer-related equipment is vulnerable to being
manipulated into taking some malicious action on behalf of an attacker.

Employees, and especially IT personnel, need to understand that allowing an
outsider to gain access to their computer networks is like giving your bank
account number to a telemarketer or giving your telephone calling card number to
a stranger in jail. Employees must give thoughtful attention to whether carrying
out a request can lead to disclosure of sensitive information or the compromising
of the corporate computer system.

IT people must also be on their guard against unknown callers posing as vendors.
In general, a company should consider having specific people designated as the
contacts for each technology vendor, with a policy in place that other employees
will not respond to vendor requests for information about or changes to any
telephone or computer equipment. That way, the designated people become
familiar with the vendor personnel who call or visit, and are less likely to be
deceived by an imposter. If a vendor calls even when the company does not have
a support contract, that should also raise suspicions.

Everyone in the organization needs to be made aware of information security
threats and vulnerabilities. Note that security guards and the like need to be given
not just security training, but training in information security, as well. Because
security guards frequently have physical access to the entire facility, they must be
able to recognize the types of social engineering attacks that may be used against
them.

Beware Spyware
Commercial spyware was once used mostly by parents to monitor what their
children were doing on the Internet, and by employers, supposedly to determine
which employees were goofing off by surfing the Internet. A more serious use
was to detect potential theft of information assets or industrial espionage.
Developers market their spyware by offering it as a tool to protect the children,
when in fact their true market is people who want to spy on someone. Nowadays,
the sale of spyware is driven to a great extent by people's desire to know if their
spouse or significant other is cheating on them.

Shortly before I began writing the spyware story in this book, the person who
receives email for me (because I'm not allowed to use the Internet) found a spam
email message advertising a group of spyware products. One of the items offered
was described like this:

FAVORITE! MUST HAVE:

This powerful monitoring and spy program secretly captures all keystrokes and
the time and title of all active windows to a text file, while running hidden in the
background. Logs can be encrypted and automatically sent to a specified email
address, or just recorded on the hard drive. Access to the program is password
protected and it can be hidden from the CTRL+ALT+DEL menu.
Use it to monitor typed URLs, chat sessions, emails and many other things (even
passwords).

Install without detection on ANY PC and email yourself the logs!

Antivirus Gap?
Antivirus software doesn't detect commercial spyware, thereby treating the
software as not malicious even though the intent is to spy on other people. So the
computer equivalent of wiretapping goes unnoticed, creating the risk that each of
us might be under illegal surveillance at any time. Of course, the antivirus
software manufacturers may argue that spyware can be used for legitimate
purposes, and therefore should not be treated as malicious. But the developers of
certain tools once used by the hacking community, which are now being freely
distributed or sold as security-related software, are nonetheless treated as
malicious code. There's a double standard here, and I'm left wondering why.

Another item offered in the same email promised to capture screen shots of the
user's computer, just like having a video camera looking over his shoulder. Some
of these software products do not even require physical access to the victim's
computer. Just install and configure the application remotely, and you have an
instant computer wiretap! The FBI must love technology.

With spyware so readily available, your enterprise needs to establish two levels
of protection. You should install spyware-detection software such as SpyCop
(available from www.spycop.com) on all workstations, and you should require
that employees initiate periodic scans. In addition, you must train employees
against the danger of being deceived into downloading a program, or opening an
email attachment that could install malicious software.

In addition to preventing spyware from being installed while an employee is
away from his desk for a coffee break, lunch, or a meeting, a policy mandating
that all employees lock their computer systems with a screen saver password or
similar method will substantially mitigate the risk of an unauthorized person
being able to access a worker's computer. No one slipping into the person's
cubicle or office will be able to access any of their files, read their email, or
install spyware or other malicious software. The resources necessary to enable
the screensaver password are nil, and the benefit of protecting employee
workstations is substantial. The cost-benefit analysis in this circumstance should
be a no-brainer.
Chapter 13
Clever Cons

By now you've figured out that when a stranger calls with a request for sensitive
information or something that could be of value to an attacker, the person
receiving the call must be trained to get the caller's phone number, and call back
to verify that the person is really who he claims to be--a company employee, or
an employee of a business partner, or a technical support representative from one
of your vendors, for example.

Even when a company has an established procedure that the employees follow
carefully for verifying callers, sophisticated attackers are still able to use a
number of tricks to deceive their victims into believing they are who they claim
to be. Even security conscious employees can be duped by methods such as the
following.

THE MISLEADING CALLER ID
Anyone who has ever received a call on a cell phone has observed the feature
known as caller ID--that familiar display showing the telephone number of the
caller. In a business setting, it offers the advantage of allowing a worker to tell at
a glance whether the call coming in is from a fellow employee or from outside
the company.

Many years ago some ambitious phone phreakers introduced themselves to the
wonders of caller ID before the phone company was even allowed to offer the
service to the public. They had a great time freaking people out by answering the
phone and greeting the caller by name before they said a word.

Just when you thought it was safe, the practice of verifying identity by trusting
what you see--what appears on the caller ID display--is exactly what the attacker
may be counting on.

Linda's Phone Call
Day/Time: Tuesday, July 23, 3:12 P.M.
Place." The offices of the Finance Department, Starbeat Aviation

Linda Hill's phone rang just as she was in the middle of writing a memo to her
boss. She glanced at her caller ID, which showed that the call was from the
corporate office in New York, but from someone named Victor Martin--not a
name she recognized.
She thought of letting the call roll over to voice mail so she wouldn't break the
flow of thought on the memo. But curiosity got the better of her. She picked up
the phone and the caller introduced himself and said he was from PR, and
working on some material for the CEO. "He's on his way to Boston for meetings
with some of our bankers. He needs the top-line financials for the current
quarter," he said. "And one more thing. He also needs the financial projections on
the Apache project," Victor added, using the code name for a product that was to
be one of the company's major releases in the spring.

She asked for his email address, but he said he was having a problem receiving
email that tech support was working on, so could she fax it instead? She said that
would be fine, and he gave her the internal phone extension to his fax machine.

She sent the fax a few minutes later.

But Victor did not work for the PR department. In fact, he didn't even work for
the company.

Jack's Story
Jack Dawkins had started his professional career at an early age as a pickpocket
working games at Yankee Stadium, on crowded subway platforms, and among
the night-time throng of Times Square tourists. He proved so nimble and artful
that he could take a watch off a man's wrist without his knowing. But in his
awkward teenage years he had grown clumsy and been caught. In Juvenile Hall,
Jack learned a new trade with a much lower risk of getting nabbed.

His current assignment called for him to get a company's quarterly profit and loss
statement and cash flow information, before the data was filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and made public. His client was a dentist who
didn't want to explain why he wanted the information. To Jack the man's caution
was laughable. He'd seen it all before--the guy probably had a gambling problem,
or else an expensive girlfriend his wife hadn't found out about yet. Or maybe he
had just been bragging to his wife about how smart he was in the stock market;
now he had lost a bundle and wanted to make a big investment on a sure thing by
knowing which way the company's stock price was going to go when they
announced their quarterly results.

People are surprised to find out how little time it takes a thoughtful social
engineer to figure out a way of handling a situation he's never faced before. By
the time Jack got home from his meeting with the dentist, he had already formed
a plan. His friend Charles Bates worked for a company, Panda Importing, that
had its own telephone switch, or PBX.
In terms familiar to people knowledgeable about phone systems, the PBX was
connected to a digital telephone service known as a T1, configured as Primary
Rate Interface ISDN (integrated services digital network) or PRI ISDN. What this
meant was that every time a call was placed from Panda, setup and other call
processing information went out over a data channel to the phone company's
switch; the information included the calling party number, which (unless
blocked) is delivered to the caller ID device at the receiving end.

Jack's friend knew how to program the switch so the person receiving the     call
would see on his caller ID, not the actual phone number at the Panda office, but
whatever phone number he had programmed into the switch. This trick works
because local phone companies do not bother to validate the calling number
received from the customer against the actual phone numbers the customer is
paying for.

All Jack Dawkins needed was access to any such telephone service. Happily his
friend and sometime partner in crime, Charles Bates, was always glad to lend a
helping hand for a nominal fee. On this occasion, Jack and Charles temporarily
reprogrammed the company's telephone switch so that calls from a particular
telephone line located on the Panda premises would spoof Victor Martin's
internal telephone number, making the call appear to be coming from within
Starbeat Aviation.

The idea that your caller ID can be made to show any number you wish is so little
known that it's seldom questioned. In this case, Linda was happy to fax the
requested information to the guy she thought was from PR.

When Jack hung up, Charles reprogrammed his company's telephone switch,
restoring the telephone number to the original settings.


Analyzing the Con
Some companies don't want customers or vendors to know the telephone
numbers of their employees. For example, Ford may decide that calls from their
Customer Support Center should show the 800-number for the Center and a name
like "Ford Support," instead of the real direct-dial phone number of each support
representative placing a call. Microsoft may want to give their employees the
option of telling people their phone number, instead of having everyone they call
be able to glance at their caller ID and know their extension. In this way the
company is able to maintain the confidentiality of internal numbers.

But this same capability of reprogramming provides a handy tactic for the
prankster, bill collector, telemarketer, and, of course, the social engineer.
VARIATION: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS
CALLING
As co-host of a radio show in Los Angeles called "Darkside of the Internet" on
KFI Talk Radio, I worked under the station's program director. David, one of the
most committed and hardworking people I've ever met, is very difficult to reach
by telephone because he's so busy. He's one of those people who doesn't answer a
call unless he sees from the caller ID that it's someone he needs to talk to.

When I'd phone him, because I have call blocking on my cell phone, he could not
tell who was calling and wouldn't pick up the call. It would roll over to voice
mail, and it became very frustrating for me.

I talked over what to do about this with a long-time friend who is the cofounder
of a real estate firm that provides office space for high-tech companies. Together
we came up with a plan. He had access to his company's Meridian telephone
switch, which gives him the ability to program the calling party number, as
described in the previous story. Whenever I needed to reach the program director
and couldn't get a call through, I would ask my friend to program any number of
my choosing to appear on the caller ID. Sometimes I'd have him make the call
look as if it was coming from David's office assistant, or sometimes from the
holding company that owns the station.

But my favorite was programming the call to appear from David's own home
telephone number, which he always picked up. H1 give the guy credit, though.
He always had a good sense of humor about it when he'd pick up the phone and
discover I had fooled him once again. The best partwas that he'd then stay on the
line long enough to find out what I wanted and resolve whatever the issue was.

When I demonstrated this little trick on the Art Bell Show, I spoofed my caller ID
to display the name and number of the Los Angeles headquarters of the FBI. Art
was quite shocked about the whole affair and admonished me for doing
something illegal. But I pointed out to him that it's perfectly legal, as long as it's
not an attempt to commit fraud. After the program I received several hundred
emails asking me to explain how I had done it. Now you know.

This is the perfect tool to build credibility for the social engineer. If, for example,
during the research stage of the social engineering attack cycle, it was discovered
that the target had caller ID, the attacker could spoof his or her own number as
being from a trusted company or employee. A bill collector can make his or her
calls appear to come from your place of business.

But stop and think about the implications. A computer intruder can call you at
home claiming to be from the IT department at your company. The person on the
line urgently needs your password to restore your files from a server crash. Or the
caller ID displays the name and number of your bank or stock brokerage house,
the pretty sounding girl just needs to verify your account numbers and your
mother's maiden name. For good measure, she also needs to verify your ATM
PIN because of some system problem. A stock market boiler-room operation can
make their calls seem to come from Merrill Lynch or Citibank. Someone out to
steal your identity could call, apparently from Visa, and convince you to tell him
your Visa card number. A guy with a grudge could call and claim to be from the
IRS or the FBI.

If you have access to a telephone system connected to a PRI, plus a bit of
programming knowledge that you can probably acquire from the system vendor's
Web site, you can use this tactic for playing cool tricks on your friends. Know
anybody with overblown political aspirations? You could program the referral
number as 202 456-1414, and his caller ID will display the name "WHITE
HOUSE."

He'll think he's getting a call from the president!

The moral of the story is simple: Caller ID cannot be trusted, except when being
used to identify internal calls. Both at work and at home, everyone needs to
become aware of the caller ID trick and recognize that the name or phone number
shown in a caller ID display cannot ever be trusted for verification of identity.


MITNICK MESSAGE
The next time you receive a call and your caller ID shows it's from your dear old
mom, you never know--it might be from a sweet little old social engineer.
THE INVISIBLE EMPLOYEE
Shirley Cutlass has found a new and exciting way to make fast money. No more
putting in long hours at the salt mine. She has joined the hundreds of other scam
artists involved in the crime of the decade. She is an identity thief.

Today she has set her sights on getting confidential information from the
customer service department of a credit card company. After doing the usual kind
of homework, she calls the target company and tells the switchboard operator
who answers that she'd like to be connected to the Telecom Department.
Reaching Telecom, she asks for the voice mail administrator.

Using information gathered from her research, she explains that her name is
Norma Todd from the Cleveland office. Using a ruse that should by now be
familiar to you, she says she'll be traveling to corporate headquarters for a week,
and she'll need a voice mailbox there so she won't have to make long distance
calls to check her voice mail messages. No need for a physical telephone
connection, she says, just a voice mailbox. He says he'll take care of it, he'll call
her back when it's set up to give her the information she'll need.

In a seductive voice, she says "I'm on my way into a meeting, can I call you back
in an hour.

When she calls back, he says it's all set up, and gives her the information-- her
extension number and temporary password. He asks whether she knows how to
change the voice mail password, and she lets him talk her through the steps,
though she knows them at least as well as he does.

"And by the way," she asks, "from my hotel, what number do I call to check my
messages?" He gives her the number.

Shirley phones in, changes the password, and records her new outgoing greeting.

Shirley Attacks
So far it's all been an easy setup. She's now ready to use the art of deception.

She calls the customer service department of the company. "I'm with Collections,
in the Cleveland office," she says, and then launches into a variation on the by-
now familiar excuse. "My computer is being fixed by technical support and I
need your help looking up this information." And she goes on to provide the
name and date of birth of the person whose identity she is intent on stealing. Then
she lists the information she wants: address, mother's maiden name, card number,
credit limit, available credit, and payment history. "Call me back at this number,"
she says, giving the internal extension number that the voice mail administrator
set up for her. "And if I'm not available, just leave the information on my voice
mail."

She keeps busy with errands for the rest of the morning, and then checks her
voice mail that afternoon. It's all there, everything she asked for. Before hanging
up, Shirley clears the outgoing message; it would be careless to leave a recording
of her voice behind.

And identify theft, the fastest growing crime in America, the "in" crime of the
new century, is about to have another victim. Shirley uses the credit-card and
identity information she just obtained, and begins running up charges on the
victim's card.
Analyzing the Con
In this ruse, the attacker first duped the company’s voice mail administrator into
believing she was an employee, so that he would set up a temporary voice
mailbox. If he bothered to check at all, he would have found that the name and
telephone number she gave matched the listings in the corporate employee
database.

The rest was simply a matter of giving a reasonable excuse about a computer
 problem, asking for the desired information, and requesting that the response be
left on voice mail. And why would any employee be reluctant to share
information with a co-worker? Since the phone number that Shirley provided was
clearly an internal extension, there was no reason for any suspicion.


MITNICK MESSAGE
Try calling your own voice mail once in a while; if you hear an outgoing message
that's not yours, you may have just encountered your first social engineer.

THE HELPFUL SECRETARY
Cracker Robert Jorday had been regularly breaking into the computer net works
of a global company, Rudolfo Shipping, Inc. The company eventually recognized
that someone was hacking into their terminal server, an, that through that server
the user could connect to any computer system at the company. To safeguard the
corporate network, the company decide, to require a dial-up password on every
terminal server.

Robert called the Network Operations Center posing as an attorney with the
Legal Department and said he was having trouble connecting to the network. The
network administrator he reached explained that there had been some recent
security issues, so all dial-up access users would need to obtain the monthly
password from their manager. Robert wondered what method was being used to
communicate each month's password to the managers and how he could obtain it.
The answer, it turned out, was that the password for the upcoming month was
sent in a memo via office, mail to each company manager.

That made things easy. Robert did a little research, called the company just after
the first of the month, and reached the secretary of one manager who gave her
name as Janet. He said, "Janet, hi. This is Randy Goldstein in Research and
Development. I know I probably got the memo with this month's password for
logging into the terminal server from outside the company but I can't find it
anywhere. Did you get your memo for this, month?"

Yes, she said, she did get it.
He asked her if she would fax it to him, and she agreed. He gave her the fax
number of the lobby receptionist in a different building on the company campus,
where he had already made arrangements for faxes to be held for him, and would
then arrange for the password fax to be forwarded. This time, though, Robert
used a different fax-forwarding method. He gave the receptionist a fax number
that went to an on-line fax service. When this service receives a fax, the
automated system sends it to the subscriber's email address.

The new password arrived at the email dead drop that Robert set up on a free
email service in China. He was sure that if the fax was ever traced, the
investigator would be pulling out his hair trying to gain cooperation from Chinese
officials, who, he knew, were more than a little reluctant to be helpful in matters
like this. Best of all, he never had to show up physically at the location of the fax
machine.



MITNICK MESSAGE
The skilled social engineer is very clever at influencing other people to do favors
for him. Receiving a fax and forwarding it to another location appears so
harmless that it's all too easy to persuade a receptionist or someone else to agree
to do it. When somebody asks for a favor involving information, if you don't
know him or can't verify his identity, just say no.

TRAFFIC COURT
Probably everyone who has ever been given a speeding ticket has daydreamed
about some way of beating it. Not by going to traffic school, or simply paying the
fine, or taking a chance on trying to convince the judge about some technicality
like how long it has been since the police-car speedometer or the radar gun was
checked. No, the sweetest scenario would be beating the ticket by outsmarting the
system.

The Con
Although I would not recommend trying this method of beating a traffic ticket (as
the saying goes, don't try this at home) still, this is a good example of how the art
of    deception    can      be      used    to     help     the   social    engineer.

Let's call this traffic violater Paul Durea.

First Steps
"LAPD, Hollenbeck Division."
"Hi, I'd like to talk to the Subpoena Control."
"I'm the subpoena clerk."
"Fine. This is Attorney John Leland, of Meecham, Meecham, and Talbott. I need
to subpoena an officer on a case."
"Okay, which officer?"
"Do you have Officer Kendall in your division?"
"What's his serial number?"
"21349."
"Yes. When do you need him?"
"Some time next month, but I need to subpoena several other witnesses on the
case and then tell the court what days will work for us. Are there any days next
month Officer Kendall won't be available?"

"Let's see... He has vacation days on the 20th through the 23rd, and he has
training days on the 8th and 16th."
"Thanks. That's all I need right now. I'll call you back when the court date is set."

Municipal Court, Clerk’s Counter
Paul: "I'd like to schedule a court date on this traffic ticket."
Clerk: "Okay. I can give you the 26th of next month."
"Well, I'd like to schedule an arraignment."
"You want an arraignment on a traffic ticket?"
"Yes."
"Okay. We can set the arraignment tomorrow in the morning or afternoon. What
   would you like?"
"Afternoon."
"Arraignment is tomorrow at 1:30 P.M. in Courtroom Six." "Thanks. I'll be
there."


Municipal Court, Courtroom Six
Date: Thursday, 1:45 P.M.
Clerk: "Mr. Durea, please approach the bench."

Judge: "Mr. Durea, do you understand the rights that have been explained to you
this afternoon?"

Paul: "Yes, your honor."

Judge: "Do you want to take the opportunity to attend traffic school? Your case
will be dismissed after successful completion of an eight-hour course. I've
checked your record and you are presently eligible."

Paul: "No, your honor. I respectfully request that the case be set for trial. One
more thing, your honor, I'll be travelling out of the country, but I'm available on
the 8th or 9th. Would it be possible to set my case for trial on either of those
days? I'm leaving on a business trip for Europe tomorrow, and I return in four
weeks."

Judge: "Very well. Trial is set for June 8th, 8:30 A.M., Courtroom Four."

Paul: "Thank you, your honor."


Municipal Court, Courtroom Four
Paul arrived at court early on the 8th. When the judge came in, the clerk gave him
a list of the cases for which the officers had not appeared. The judge called the
defendants, including Paul, and told them their cases were dismissed.

Analyzing the Con
When an officer writes a ticket, he signs it with his name and his badge number
(or whatever his personal number is called in his agency). Finding his station is a
piece of cake. A call to directory assistance with the name of the law enforcement
agency shown on the citation (highway patrol, county sheriff, or whatever) is
enough to get a foot in the door. Once the agency is contacted, they can refer the
caller to the correct telephone number for the subpoena clerk serving the
geographical area where the traffic stop was made.

Law enforcement officers are subpoenaed for court appearances with regularity;
it comes with the territory. When a district attorney or a defense lawyer needs an
officer to testify, if he knows how the system works, he first checks to make sure
the officer will be available. That's easy to do; it just takes a call to the subpoena
clerk for that agency.

Usually in those conversations, the attorney asks if the officer in question will be
available on such-and-such a date. For this ruse, Paul needed a bit of tact; he had
to offer a plausible reason why the clerk should tell him what dates the officer
would not be available.

When he first went to the court building, why didn't Paul simply tell the
court clerk what date he wanted? Easy--from what I understand, traffic-court
clerks in most places don't allow members of the public to select court dates. If a
date the clerk suggests doesn't work for the person, she'll offer an alternative or
two, but that's as far as she will bend. On the other hand, anyone who is willing to
take the extra time of showing up for an arraignment is likely to have better luck.

Paul knew he was entitled to ask for an arraignment. And he knew the judges are
often willing to accommodate a request for a specific date. He carefully asked for
dates that coincided with the officer's training days, knowing that in his state,
officer training takes precedence over an appearance in traffic court.


MITNICK MESSAGE
The human mind is a marvelous creation. It's interesting to note how imaginative
people can be at developing deceptive ways to get what they want or to get out of
a sticky situation. You have to use the same creativity and imagination to
safeguard information and computer systems in the public and private sectors. So,
folks, when devising your company's security policies--be creative and think
outside the box.
And in traffic court, when the officer does not show up--case dismissed. No
fines. No traffic school. No points. And, best of all, no record of a traffic offense!

My guess is that some police officials, court officers, district attorneys and the
like will read this story and shake their heads because they know       that  this
ruse does work. But shaking their heads is all they'll do. Nothing will change. I'd
be willing to bet on it. As the character Cosmo says in the 1992 movie Sneakers,
"It's all about the ones and zeros"--meaning that in the end, everything comes
down to information.

As long as law enforcement agencies are willing to give information about an
officer's schedule to virtually anyone who calls, the ability to get out of traffic
tickets will always exist. Do you have similar gaps in your company              or
organization's procedures that a clever social engineer can take advantage of to
get information you'd rather they didn't have?

SAMANTHA'S REVENGE
Samantha Gregson was angry.

She had worked hard for her college degree in business, and stacked up a pile of
student loans to do it. It had always been drummed into her that a college degree
was how you got a career instead of a job, how you earned the big bucks. And
then she graduated and couldn't find a decent job anywhere.

How glad she had been to get the offer from Lambeck Manufacturing. Sure, it
was humiliating to accept a secretarial position, but Mr. Cartright had said how
eager they were to have her, and taking the secretarial job would put her on the
spot when the next non-administrative position opened up.

Two months later she heard that one of Cartright's junior product managers was
leaving. She could hardly sleep that night, imagining herself on the fifth floor, in
an office with a door, attending meetings and making decisions.
The next morning she went first thing to see Mr. Cartright. He said they felt she
needed to learn more about the industry before she was ready for a professional
position. And then they went and hired an amateur from outside the company
who knew less about the industry than she did.

It was about then that it began to dawn on her: The company had plenty of
women, but they were almost all secretaries. They weren't going to give her a
management job. Ever.

Payback
It took her almost a week to figure out how she was going to pay them back.
About a month earlier a guy from an industry trade magazine had tried to hit on
her when he came in for the new product launch. A few weeks later he called her
up at work and said if she would send him some advance information on the
Cobra 273 product, he'd send her flowers, and if it was really hot information that
he used in the magazine, he'd make a special trip in from Chicago just to take her
out to dinner.

She had been in young Mr. Johannson's office one day shortly after that when he
logged onto the corporate network. Without thinking, she had watched his fingers
(shoulder surfing, this is sometimes called). He had entered "marty63" as his
password.

Her plan was beginning to come together. There was a memo she remembered
typing not long after she came to the company. She found a copy in the files and
typed up a new version, using language from the original one. Her version read:

TO: C. Pelton, IT dept.
FROM: L. Cartright, Development
Martin Johansson will be working with a special projects team in my department.

I hereby authorize him to have access to the servers used by the engineering
group. Mr. Johansson's security profile is to be updated to grant him the same
access rights as a product developer.

Louis Cartright


LINGO
SHOULDER SURFING The act of watching a person type at his computer
keyboard to detect and steal his password or other user information.
When most everybody was gone at lunch, she cut Mr. Cartright's signature from
the original memo, pasted it onto her new version, and daubed Wite-Out around
the edges. She made a copy of the result, and then made a copy of the copy. You
could barely see the edges around the signature. She sent the fax from the
machine "near Mr. Cartright's office.

Three days later, she stayed after hours and waited till everyone left. She walked
into Johannson's office, and tried logging onto the network with his username and
the password, marry63. It worked.

In minutes she had located the product specification files for the Cobra 273, and
downloaded them to a Zip disk.

The disk was safely in her purse as she walked in the cool night-time breeze to
the parking lot. It would be on its way to the reporter that night.

Analyzing the Con
A disgruntled employee, a search through the files, a quick cut-paste-and Wite-
Out operation, a little creative copying, and a fax. And, voila!--she has access to
confidential marketing and product specifications.

And a few days later, a trade magazine journalist has a big scoop with the specs
and marketing plans of a hot new product that will be in the hands of magazine
subscribers throughout the industry months in advance of the product's release.
Competitor companies will have several months head start on developing
equivalent products and having their ad campaigns ready to undermine the Cobra
273.

Naturally the magazine will never say where they got the scoop.

PREVENTING THE CON
When asked for any valuable, sensitive, or critical information that could be of
benefit to a competitor or anyone else, employees must be aware that using caller
ID as a means of verifying the identity of an outside caller is not acceptable.
Some other means of verification must be used, such as checking with the
person's supervisor that the request was appropriate and that the user has
authorization to receive the information.

The verification process requires a balancing act that each Company must define
for itself: Security versus productivity. What priority is going to be assigned to
enforcing security measures? Will employees be resistant to following security
procedures, and even circumvent them in order to complete their job
responsibilities? Do employees understand why security is important to the
company and themselves? These questions need to be answered to develop a
security policy based on corporate culture and business needs.
Most people inevitably see anything that interferes with getting their work done
as an annoyance, and may circumvent any security measures that appear to be a
waste of time. Motivating employees to make security part of their everyday
responsibilities through education and awareness is key.

Although caller ID service should never be used as a means of authentication for
voice calls from outside the company, another method called automatic number
identification (ANI) can. This service is provided when a company subscribes to
toll-flee services where the company pays for the incoming calls and is reliable
for identification. Unlike caller ID, the telephone company switch does not use
any information that is sent from a customer when providing the calling number.
The number transmitted by ANI is the billing number assigned to the calling
party.

Note that several modem manufacturers have added a caller ID feature into their
products, protecting the corporate network by allowing remote-access calls only
from a list ofpreauthorized telephone numbers. Caller ID modems are an
acceptable means of authentication in a low-security environment but, as should
be clear by now, spoofing caller ID is a relatively easy technique for computer
intruders, and so should not be relied on for proving the caller's identity or
location in a high-security setting.

To address the case of identity theft, as in the story about deceiving an
administrator to create a voice mailbox on the corporate phone system, make it a
policy that all phone service, all voice mailboxes, and all entries to the corporate
directory, both in print and on line, must be requested in writing, on a form
provided for the purpose. The employee's manager should sign the request, and
the voice mail administrator should verify the signature.

Corporate security policy should require that new computer accounts or increases
in access rights be granted only after positive verification of the person making
the request, such as a callback to the system manager or administrator, or his or
her designee, at the phone number listed in the print or on-line company
directory. If the company uses secure email where employees can digitally sign
messages, this alternative verification method may also be acceptable.

Remember that every employee, regardless of whether he has access to company
computer systems, may be duped by a social engineer. Everyone must be
included in security awareness training. Administrative assistants, receptionists,
telephone operators, and security guards must be made familiar with the types of
social engineering attack most likely to be directed against them so that they will
be better prepared to defend against those attacks.
Chapter 14
Industrial Espionage

The threat of information attacks against government, corporations, and
university systems is well established. Almost every day, the media reports a new
computer virus, denial of service attack, or theft of credit card information from
an e-commerce Web site.

We read about cases of industrial espionage such as Borland accusing Symantec
of stealing trade secrets, Cadence Design Systems filing a suit charging the theft
of source code by a competitor. Many business people read these stories and
think it could never happen at their company.
It's happening every day.

VARIATION ON A SCHEME
The ruse described in the following tale has probably been pulled off many times,
even though it sounds like something taken out of a Hollywood movie like The
Insider, or from the pages of a John Grisham novel.

Class Action
Imagine that a massive class-action lawsuit is raging against a major
pharmaceutical company, Pharmomedic. The suit claims that they knew one of
their very popular drugs had a devastating side effect, but one that would not be
evident until a patient had been on the medication for years. The suit alleges that
they had results from a number of research studies that revealed this danger, but
suppressed the evidence and never turned it over to the FDA as required.

William ("Billy") Chaney, the attorney of record on the masthead of the New
York law firm that filed the class-action suit, has depositions from two
Pharmomedic doctors supporting the claim. But both are retired, neither has any
files or documentation, and neither would make a strong, convincing witness.
Billy knows he's on shaky ground. Unless he can get a copy of one of those
reports, or some internal memo or communication between company executives,
his whole case will fall apart.

So he hires a firm he's used before: Andreeson and Sons, private investigators.
Billy doesn't know how Pete and his people get the stuff they do, and he doesn't
want to know. All he knows is that Pete Andreeson is one good investigator.

To Andreeson, an assignment like this is what he calls a black bag job. The first
rule is that the law firms and companies that hire him never learn how he gets his
information so that they always have complete, plausible deniability. If anybody
is going to have his feet shoved into boiling water, it's going to be Pete, and for
what he collects in fees on the big jobs, he figures it's worth the risk. Besides, he
gets such personal satisfaction from outsmarting smart people.

If the documents that Chaney wants him to find actually existed and haven't been
destroyed, they'll be somewhere in the files of Pharmomedic. But finding them in
the massive files of a large corporation would be a huge task. On the other hand,
suppose they've turned copies over to their law firm, Jenkins and Petry? If the
defense attorneys knew those documents existed and didn't turn them over as part
of the discovery process, then they have violated the legal profession's canon of
ethics, and violated the law, as well. In Pete's book, that makes any attack fair
game.

Pete's Attack
Pete gets a couple of his people started on research and within days he knows
what company Jenkins and Petty uses for storing their offsite backups. And he
knows that the storage company maintains a list of the names of people whom the
law firm has authorized to pick up tapes from storage. He also knows that each of
these people has his or her own password. Pete sends two of his people out on a
black bag job.

The men tackle the lock using a lock pick gun ordered on the Web at
www.southord.com. Within several minutes they slip into the offices of the
storage firm around 3 a.m. one night and boot up a PC. They smile when they see
the Windows 98 logo because it means this will be a piece of cake. Windows 98
does not require any form of authentication. After abit of searching, they locate a
Microsoft Access database with the names of people authorized by each of the
storage company customers to pick up tapes. They add a phony name to the
authorization list for Jenkins and Petry, a name matching one on a phony driver's
license one of the men has already obtained. Could they have broken into the
locked storage area and tried to locate the tapes their client wanted? Sure--but
then all the company's customers, including the law firm, would have certainly
been notified of the breach. And the attackers would have lost an advantage:
Professionals always like to leave an opening for future access, should the need
arise.

Following a standard practice of industrial spies to keep something in the back
pocket for future use, just in case, they also made a copy of the file containing the
authorization list onto a floppy disk. None of them had any idea how it might
ever prove useful, but it's just one of those "We're here, we might just as well"
things that every now and then turns out to be valuable.
The next day, one of the same men called the storage company, used the name
they had added to the authorization list, and gave the corresponding password. He
asked for all the Jenkins and Petry tapes dated within the last month, and said that
a messenger service would come by to pick up the package. By mid-afternoon,
Andreeson had the tapes. His people restored all the data to their own computer
system, ready to search at leisure. Andreeson was very pleased that the law firm,
like most other businesses, didn't bother encrypting their backup data.

The tapes were delivered back to the storage company the next day and no one
was the wiser.


MITNICK MESSAGE
Valuable information must be protected no matter what form it takes or where it
is located. An organization's customer list has the same value whether in
hardcopy form or an electronic file at your office or in a storage box. Social
engineers always prefer the easiest to circumvent, least defended point of attack.
A company's offsite backup storage facility is seen as having less risk of
detection or getting caught. Every organization that stores any valuable, sensitive,
or critical data with third parties should encrypt their data to protect its
confidentiality.

Analyzing the Con
Because of lax physical security, the bad guys were easily able to pick the lock of
the storage company, gain access to the computer, and modify the
database containing the list of people authorized to have access to the storage
unit. Adding a name to the list allowed the imposters to obtain the computer
backup tapes they were after, without having to break into the firm's storage unit.
Because most businesses don't encrypt backup data, the information was theirs
for the taking.

This incident provides one more example of how a vendor company that does not
exercise reasonable security precautions can make it easy for an attacker to
compromise their customer's information assets.

THE NEW BUSINESS PARTNER
Social engineers have a big advantage over con men and grifters, and the
advantage is distance. A grifter can only cheat you by being in your presence,
allowing you to give a good description of him afterward or even call the cops if
you catch on to the ruse early enough.

Social engineers ordinarily avoid that risk like the plague. Sometimes, though,
the risk is necessary, and justified by the potential reward.
Jessica's Story
Jessica Andover was feeling very good about getting a job with a hotshot robotics
company. Sure, it was only a start-up and they couldn't pay very much, but it was
small, the people were friendly, and there was the excitement of knowing her
stock options just might turn out to make her rich. Okay, maybe not a millionaire
like the company founders would be, but rich enough.

Which was how it happened that Rick Daggot got a glowing smile when he
walked into the lobby that Tuesday morning in August. In his expensive- looking
suit (Armani) and his heavy gold wrist-watch (a Rolex President), with his
immaculate haircut, he had that same manly, self-confident air that had driven all
the girls crazy when Jessica was in high school.

"Hi," he said. "I'm Rick Daggot and I'm here for my meeting with Larry."

Jessica's smile faded. "Larry?" she said. "Larry's on vacation all week." "I have
an appointment with him at one o'clock. I just flew in from Louisville to meet
with him," Rick said, as he drew out his Palm, turned it on, and showed her.

She looked at it and gave a small shake of her head. "The 20th," she said. "That's
next week." He took the palmtop back and stared at it. "Oh, no!" he groaned. "I
can't believe what a stupid mistake I made."

"Can I book a return flight for you, at least?" she asked, feeling sorry for
him.

While she made the phone call, Rick confided that he and Larry had arranged to
set up a strategic marketing alliance. Rick's company was producing products for
the manufacturing and assembly line, items that would perfectly complement
their new product, the C2Alpha. Rick's products and the C2Alpha together would
make a strong solution that would open up important industrial markets for both
companies.

When Jessica had finished making his reservation on a late afternoon flight, Rick
said, "Well, at least I could talk to Steve if he's available." But Steve, the
company's VP and cofounder, was also out of the office.

Rick, being very friendly to Jessica and flirting just a little, then suggested that, as
long as he was there and his flight home wasn't till late afternoon, he'd like to
take some of the key people to lunch. And he added, "Including you, of course--is
there somebody who can fill in for you at lunchtime.
Flushed at the idea of being included, Jessica asked, "Who do you want to
come?" He tapped his palmtop again and named a few people--two engineers
from R&D, the new sales and marketing man, and the finance guy assigned to the
project. Rick suggested she tell them about his relationship with the company,
and that he'd like to introduce himself to them. He named the best restaurant in
the area, a place where Jessica had always wanted to go, and said he'd book the
table himself, for 12:30, and would call back later in the morning to make sure
everything was all set.

When they gathered at the restaurant--the four of them plus Jessica their table
wasn't ready yet, so they settled at the bar, and Rick made it clear that drinks and
lunch were on him. Rick was a man with style and class, the kind of person who
makes you feel comfortable from the very first, the same way you feel with
someone you've known for years. He always seemed to know just the right thing
to say, had a lively remark or something funny whenever the conversation
lagged, and made you feel good just being around him.

He shared just enough details about his own company's products that they could
envision the joint marketing solution he seemed so animated about. He named
several Fortune 500 companies that his firm was already selling to, until everyone
at the table began to picture their product becoming a success from the day the
first units rolled out of the factory.

Then Rick walked over to Brian, one of the engineers. While the others chatted
among themselves, Rick shared some ideas privately with Brian, and drew him
out about the unique features of the C2Alpha and what set it apart from anything
the competition had. He found out about a couple of features the company was
downplaying that Brian was proud of and thought really "neat."

Rick worked his way along the line, chatting quietly with each. The marketing
guy was happy for a chance to talk about the roll-out date and marketing plans.
And the bean counter pulled an envelope from his pocket and wrote down details
of the material and manufacturing costs, price point and expected margin, and
what kind of deal he was trying to work out with each of the vendors, which he
listed by name.

By the time their table was ready, Rick had exchanged ideas with everybody and
had won admirers all along the line. By the end of the meal, they each shook
hands with Rick in turn and thanked him. Rick     swapped business cards with
each and mentioned in passing to Brian, the engineer, that he wanted to have a
longer discussion as soon as Larry returned.
The following day Brian picked up his telephone to find that the caller was Rick,
who said he had just finished speaking with Larry. I'll be coming back in on
Monday to work out some of the specifics with him," Rick said, "and he wants
me to be up to speed on your product. He said you should email the latest designs
and specs to him. He'll pick out the parts he wants me to have and forward them
on to me."

The engineer said that would be fine. Good, Rick answered. He went on, "Larry
wanted you to know he's having a problem retrieving his email. Instead of
sending the stuff to his regular account, he arranged with the hotel's business
center to set up a Yahoo mail account for him. He says you should send the files
to larryrobotics@yahoo.com."

The following Monday morning, when Larry walked into the office looking
tanned and relaxed, Jessica was primed and eager to gush over Rick. "What a
great guy. He took a bunch of us to lunch, even me." Larry looked confused.
"Rick? Who the hell is Rick?"

"What're you talking about?--your new business partner." "What!!!???"

"And everybody was so impressed with what good questions he asked." "I don't
know any Rick ..."

"What's the matter with you? Is this a joke, Larry--you're just fooling with me,
right?"

"Get the executive team into the conference room. Like now. No matter what
they're doing. And everybody who was at that lunch. Including you."

They sat around the table in a somber mood, hardly speaking. Larry walked in,
sat down and said, "I do not know anybody named Rick. I do not have a new
business partner I've been keeping secret from all of you. Which I would have
thought was obvious. If there's a practical ,joker in our midst, I want him to speak
up now."

Not a sound. The room seemed to be growing darker moment by moment.

Finally Brian spoke. "Why didn't you say something when I sent you
that email with the product specs and source code?"

"What email! ?"

Brian stiffened. "Oh... shit!"
Cliff, the other engineer, chimed in. "He gave us all business cards. We just need
to call him and see what the bell's going on."

Brian pulled out his palmtop, called up an entry, and scooted the device
across the table to Larry. Still hoping against hope, they all watched as if
entranced while Larry dialed. After a moment, he stabbed the speakerphone
button and everyone heard a busy signal. After trying the number several times
over a period of twenty minutes, a frustrated Larry dialed the operator to ask for
an emergency interruption.

A few moments later, the operator came back on the line. She said in a
challenging tone, "Sir, where did you get this number?" Larry told her it was on
the business card of a man he needed to contact urgently. The operator, said, "I'm
sorry. That's a phone company test number. It always rings busy."

Larry started making a list of what information had been shared with Rick. The
picture was not pretty.

Two police detectives came and took a report. After listening to the story, they
pointed out that no state crime had been committed; there was nothing they could
do. They advised Larry to contact the FBI because they have jurisdiction over
any crimes involving interstate commerce. When Rick Daggot asked the engineer
to forward the test results by misrepresenting himself, he may have committed a
federal crime, but Rick would have to speak with the FBI to find out.

Three months later Larry was in his kitchen reading the morning paper over
breakfast, and almost spilled his coffee. The thing he had been dreading since he
had first heard about Rick had come true, his worst nightmare. There it was in
black and white, on the front page of the business section: A company he'd never
heard of was announcing the release of a new product that sounded exactly like
the C2Alpha his company had been developing for the past two years.

Through deceit, these people had beaten him to market. His dream was destroyed.
The millions of dollars invested in research and development wasted. And he
probably couldn't prove a single thing against them.

Sammy Sanford's Story
Smart enough to be earning a big salary at a legitimate job, but crooked enough
to prefer making a living as a con man, Sammy Sanford had done very well for
himself. In time he came to the attention of a spy who had been forced into early
retirement because of a drinking problem; bitter and revengeful, the man had
found a way of selling the talents that the government had made him an expert in.
Always on the lookout for people he could use, he had spotted Sammy the first
time they met. Sammy had found it easy, and very profitable, to shift his focus
from lifting people's money to lifting company secrets.


Most people wouldn't have the guts to do what I do. Try to cheat people over the
telephone or over the Internet and nobody ever gets to see you. But any good con
man, the old-fashioned, face-to-face kind (and there are plenty of them still
around, more than you would think) can look you in the eye, tell you a whopper,
and get you to believe it. I've known a prosecutor or two who think that's
criminal. I think it's a talent.

But you can't go walking in blind, you have to size things up first. A street con,
you can take a man's temperature with a little friendly conversation and couple of
carefully worded suggestions. Get the right responses and Bingo!--you've bagged
a pigeon.

A company job is more like what we call a big con. You've got setup to do. Find
out what their buttons are, find out what they want. What they need. Plan an
attack. Be patient, do your homework. Figure out the role you're going to play
and learn your lines. And don't walk in the door until you're ready.

I spent better than three weeks getting up to speed for this one. The client gave
me a two-day session in what I should say "my" company did and how to
describe why it was going to be such a good joint marketing alliance.

Then I got lucky. I called the company and said I was from a venture capital firm
and we were interested in setting up a meeting and I was juggling schedules to
find a time when all of our partners would be available sometime in the next
couple of months, and was there any time slot I should avoid, any period when
Larry wasn't going to be in town? And she said, Yes, he hadn't had any time off
in the two years since they started the company but his wife was dragging him
away on a golf vacation the first week in August.

That was only two weeks away. I could wait.

Meanwhile an industry magazine gave me the name of the firm's PR company. I
said I liked the amount of space they were getting for their robotics company
client and I wanted to talk to whoever was handling that account about handling
my company. It turned out to be an energetic young lady who liked the idea she
might be able to bring in a new account. Over a pricey lunch with one more drink
than she really wanted, she did her best to convince me they were oh, so good at
understanding a client's problems and finding the right PR solutions. I played
hard to convince. I needed some details. With a little prodding, by the time the
plates were being cleared she had told me more about the new product and the
company's problems than I could have hoped for.

The thing went like clockwork. The story about being so embarrassed that the
meeting was next week but I might as well meet the team as long as I'm here, the
receptionist swallowed whole. She even felt sorry for me into the bargain. The
lunch set me back all of $150. With tip. And I had what I needed. Phone
numbers, job titles, and one very key guy who believed I was who I said I was.

Brian had me fooled, I admit. He seemed like the kind of guy who'd just email
me anything I asked for. But he sounded like he was holding back a little when I
brought up the subject. It pays to expect the unexpected. That email account in
Larry's name, I had it in my back pocket just in case. The Yahoo security people
are probably still sitting there waiting for somebody to use the account again so
they can trace him. They'll have a long wait. The fat lady has sung. I'm off on
another project.

Analyzing the Con
Anyone who works a face-to-face con has to cloak himself in a look that will
make him acceptable to the mark. He'll put himself together one way to appear at
the race track, another to appear at a local watering hole, still another for an
upscale bar at a fancy hotel.

It's the same way with industrial espionage. An attack may call for a suit and tie
and an expensive briefcase if the spy is posing as an executive of an established
firm, a consultant, or a sales rep. On another job, trying to pass as a software
engineer, a technical person, or someone from the mail room, the clothes, the
uniform--the whole look would be different.

For infiltrating the company, the man who called himself Rick Daggot knew he
had to project an image of confidence and competence, backed by a thorough
knowledge of the company's product and industry.

Not much difficulty laying his hands on the information he needed in advance.
He devised an easy ruse to find out when the CEO would be away. A small
challenge, but still not very tough, was finding out enough details about the
project that he could sound "on the inside" about what they were doing. Often
this information is known to various company suppliers, as well as investors,
venture capitalists they've approached about raising money, their banker, and
their law firm. The attacker has to take care, though: Finding someone who will
part with insider knowledge can be tricky, but trying two or three sources to turn
up someone who can be squeezed for information runs the risk that people will
catch on to the game. That way lies danger. The Rick Daggots of the world need
to pick carefully and tread each information path only once.

The lunch was another sticky proposition. First there was the problem of
arranging things so he'd have a few minutes alone with each person, out of
earshot of the others. He told Jessica 12:30 but booked the table for 1 P.M., at an
upscale, expense-account type of restaurant. He hoped that would mean they'd
have to have drinks at the bar, which is exactly what happened. A perfect
opportunity to move around and chat with each individual.

Still, there were so many ways that a misstep--a wrong answer or a careless
remark could reveal Rick to be an imposter. Only a supremely confident and wily
industrial spy would dare take a chance of exposing himself that way. But years
of working the streets as a confidence man had built Rick's abilities and given
him the confidence that, even if he made a slip, he'd be able to cover it up well
enough to quiet any suspicions. This was the most challenging, most dangerous
time of the entire operation, and the elation he felt at bringing off a sting like this
made him realize why he didn't have to drive fast cars or skydive or cheat on his
wife--he got plenty of excitement just doing his job. How many people, he
wondered, could say as much?


 MITNICK MESSAGE
While most social engineering attacks occur over the telephone or email, don't
assume that a bold attacker will never appear in person at your business. In most
cases, the imposter uses some form of social engineering to gain access to a
building after counterfeiting an employee badge using a commonly available
software program such as Photoshop.
What about the business cards with the phone company test line? The television
show The Rockford Files, which was a series about a private investigator,
illustrated a clever and somewhat humorous technique. Rockford (played by actor
James Garner) had a portable business card printing machine in his car, which he
used to print out a card appropriate to whatever the occasion called for. These
days, a social engineer can get business cards printed in an hour at any copy
store, or print them on a laser printer.

NOTE
John Le Carre, author of The Spy Who Came in from the Cold, A Perfect Spy,
and many other remarkable books, grew up as the son of a polished, engaging
lifelong can man. Le Carre was struck as a youngster to discover that, successful
as his father was in deceiving other, he was also gullible, a victim more than once
to another con man or woman. Which just goes to show that everyone is at risk of
being taken in by a social engineer, even another social engineer.
What leads a group of smart men and women to accept an imposter? We size up a
situation by both instinct and intellect. If the story adds up-- that's the intellect
part--and a con man manages to project a believable image, we're usually willing
to let down our guard. It's the believable image that separates a successful con
man or social engineer from one who quickly lands behind bars.

Ask yourself: How sure am I that I would never fall for a story like Rick's? If
you're sure you wouldn't, ask yourself whether anyone has ever put anything
over on you. If the answer to this second question is yes, it's probably the correct
answer to the first question, as well.

LEAPFROG
A challenge: The following story does not involve industrial espionage. As you
read it, see if you can understand why I decided to put it in this chapter!

Harry Tardy was back living at home, and he was bitter. The Marine Corps had
seemed like a great escape until he washed out of boot camp. Now he had
returned to the hometown he hated, was taking computer courses at the local
community college," and looking for a way to strike out at the world.
Finally he hit upon a plan. Over beers with a guy in one of his classes, he'd been
complaining about their instructor, a sarcastic know-it-all, and together they
cooked up a wicked scheme to burn the guy: They'd grab the source code for a
popular personal digital assistant (PDA) and have it sent to the instructor's
computer, and make sure to leave a trail so the company would think the
instructor was the bad guy.

The new friend, Karl Alexander, said he "knew a few tricks" and would tell
Harry how to bring this off. Arid get away with it.

Doing Their Homework
A little initial research showed Harry that the product had been engineered at the
Development Center located at the PDA manufacturer's headquarters overseas.
But there was also an R&D facility in the United States. That was good, Karl
pointed out, because for the attempt to work there had to be some company
facility in the United States that also needed access to the source code.

At that point Harry was ready to call the overseas Development Center. Here's
where a plea for sympathy came in, the "Oh, dear, I'm in trouble, I need help,
please, please, help me." Naturally the plea was a little more subtle than that. Karl
wrote out a script, but Harry sounded completely phony trying to read it. In the
end, he practiced with Karl so he could say what he needed to in a conversational
tone.
What Harry finally said, with Karl sitting by his side, went something like this:

"I'm calling from R&D Minneapolis. Our server had a worm that infected the
whole department. We had to install the operating system again and then when
we went to restore from backup, none of the backups was any good. Guess who
was supposed to be checking the integrity of the backups? Yours truly. So I'm
getting yelled at by my boss, and management is up in arms that we've lost the
data. Look, I need to have the latest revision of the source-code tree as quick as
you can. I need you to gzip the source code and send it to me."

At this point Karl scribbled him a note, and Harry told the man on the other end
of the phone that he just wanted him to transfer the file internally, to Minneapolis
R&D. This was highly important: When the man on the other end of the phone
was clear that he was just being asked to send the file to another part of the
company, his mind was at ease--what could be wrong with that?

LINGO
GZIP To archive files in a single compressed file using a Linux GNU utility.
He agreed to gzip and send it. Step by step, with Karl at his elbow, Harry talked
the man there through getting started on the procedure for compressing the huge
source code into a single, compact file. He also gave him a file name to use on
the compressed file, "newdata," explaining that this name would avoid any
confusion with their old, corrupted files.

Karl had to explain the next step twice before Harry got it, but it was central to
the little game of leapfrog Karl had dreamed up. Harry was to call R&D
Minneapolis and tell somebody there "I want to send a file to you, and then I
want you to send it somewhere else for me"—of course all dressed up with
reasons that would make it all sound plausible. What confused Harry was this: He
was supposed to say "I’m going to send you a file," when it wasn't going to be
Harry sending the file at all. He had to make the guy he was talking to at the
R&D Center think the file was coming from him, when what the Center was
really going to receive was the file of proprietary source code from Europe. "Why
would I tell him it's coming from me when it's really coming from overseas?"
Harry wanted to know.

"The guy at the R&D Center is the linchpin," Karl explained. "He's got to think
he's just doing a favor for a fellow employee here in the U.S., getting a file from
you and then just forwarding it for you."

Harry finally understood. He called the R&D Center, where he asked the
receptionist to connect him to the Computer Center, where he asked to speak to a
computer operator. A guy came on the line who sounded as young as Harry
himself. Harry greeted him, explained he was calling from the Chicago
fabricating division of the company and that he had this file he'd been trying to
send to one of their partners working on a project with them, but, he said, "We've
got this router problem and can't reach their network. I'd like to transfer the file to
you, and after you receive it, I'll phone you so I can walk you through
transferring it to the partner's computer.

So far, so good. Harry then asked the young man whether his computer center
had an anonymous FTP account, a setup that allows anyone to transfer files in
and out of a directory where no password is required. Yes, an anonymous FTP
was available, and he gave Harry the internal Internet Protocol (IP) address for
reaching it.

LINGO
ANONYMOUS FTP A program that provides access to a remote computer even
though you don’t have an account by using the File Transfer protocol (FTP).
Although anonymous FTP can be accessed without a password, generally user-
access rights to certain folders are restricted.

With that information in hand, Harry called back the Development Center
overseas. By now the compressed file was ready, and Harry gave the instructions
for transferring the file to the anonymous FTP site. In less than five minutes, the
compressed source-code file was sent to the kid at the R&D Center.

Setting Up the Victim
Halfway to the goal. Now Harry and Karl had to wait to make sure the file had
arrived before proceeding. During the wait, they walked across the room to the
instructor's desk and took care of two other necessary steps. They first set up an
anonymous FTP server on his machine, which would serve as a destination for
the file in the last leg of their scheme.

The second step provided a solution for an otherwise tricky problem. Clearly they
couldn't tell their man at the R&D Center to send the file to an address such as,
say, warren@rms.ca.edu. The ".edu" domain would be a dead giveaway, since
any half-awake computer guy would recognize it as the address of a school,
immediately blowing the whole operation. To avoid this, they went into Windows
on the instructor's computer and looked up the machine's IP address, which they
would give as the address for sending the file.

By then it was time to call back the computer operator at the R&D Center. Harry
got him on the phone and said, "I just transferred the file that I talked to you
about. Can you check that you received it "
Yes, it had arrived. Harry then asked him to try forwarding it, and gave him the
IP address. He stayed on the phone while the young man made the connection
and started transmitting the file, and they watched with big grins from across the
room as the light on the hard drive of the instructor's computer blinked and
blinked--busy receiving the download.

Harry exchanged a couple of remarks with the guy about how maybe one day
computers and peripherals would be more reliable, thanked him and said
goodbye.

The two copied the file from the instructor's machine onto a pair of Zip disks, one
for each of them, just so they could look at it later, like stealing a painting from a
museum that you can enjoy yourself but don't dare show to your friends. Except,
in this case, it was more like they had taken a duplicate original of the painting,
and the museum still had their own original.

Karl then talked Harry through the steps of removing the FTP server from the
instructor's machine, and erasing the audit trail so there would be no evidence of
what they had done--only the stolen file, left where it could be located easily.

As a final step, they posted a section of the source code on Usenet directly from
the instructor's computer. Only a section, so they wouldn't do any great damage
to the company, but leaving clear tracks directly back to the instructor. He would
have some difficult explaining to do.

Analyzing the Con
Although it took the combination of a number of elements to make this escapade
work, it could not have succeeded without some skill-ful playacting of an appeal
for sympathy and help: I'm getting yelled at by my boss, and management is up in
arms, and so on. That, combined with a pointed explanation of how the man on
the other end of the phone could help solve the problem, proved to be a
powerfully convincing con. It worked here, and has worked many other times.

The second crucial element: The man who understood the value of the file was
asked to send it to an address within the company.

And the third piece of the puzzle: The computer operator could see that the file
had been transferred to him from within the company. That could only mean--or
so it seemed--that the man who sent it to him could himself have sent it on to the
final destination if only his external network connection had been working. What
could possibly be wrong with helping him out by sending it for him?
But what about having the compressed file assigned a different name? Seemingly
a small item, but an important one. The attacker couldn't afford taking a chance
of the file arriving with a name identifying it as source code, or a name related to
the product. A request to send a file with a name like that outside the company
might have set off alarm bells. Having the file re-labeled with an innocuous name
was crucial. As worked out by the attackers, the second young man had no
qualms about sending the file outside the company; a file with a name like new
data, giving no clue as to the true nature of the information, would hardly make
him suspicious.

MITNICK MESSGAE
The underlying rule that every employee should have firmly planted in his or her
brain: Except with management approval, don't transfer files to people you don't
personally know, even if the destination appears to be within your company's
internal network.


Finally, did you figure out what this story is doing in a chapter on industrial
espionage? If not, here's the answer: What these two students did as a malicious
prank could just as easily have been done by a professional industrial spy,
perhaps in the pay of a competitor, or perhaps in the pay of a foreign government.
Either way, the damage could have been devastating to the company, severely
eroding the sales of their new product once the competitive product reached the
market.

How easily could the same type of attack be carried out against your company?

PREVENTING THE CON
Industrial espionage, which has long been a challenge to businesses, has now
become the bread and butter of traditional spies who have focused their efforts on
obtaining company secrets for a price, now that the Cold War has ended. Foreign
governments and corporations are now using freelance industrial spies to steal
information. Domestic companies also hire information brokers who cross the
line in their efforts to obtain competitive intelligence. In many cases these are
former military spies turned industrial information brokers who have the
prerequisite knowledge and experience to easily exploit organizations, especially
those that have failed to deploy safeguards to protect their information and
educate their people.

Safety Off-Site
What could have helped the company that ran into problems with their off-site
storage facility? The danger here could have been avoided if the company had
been encrypting their data. Yes, encryption requires extra time and expense, but
it's well worth the effort. Encrypted files need to be spot-checked regularly to be
sure that the encryption/decryption is working smoothly.

There's always the danger that the encryption keys will be lost or that the only
person who knows the keys will be hit by a bus. But the nuisance level can be
minimized, and anyone who stores sensitive information off-site with a
commercial firm and does not use encryption is, excuse me for being blunt, an
idiot. It's like walking down the street in a bad neighborhood with twenty-dollar
bills sticking out of your pockets, essentially asking to be robbed.

Leaving backup media where someone could walk off with it is a common flaw
in security. Several years ago, I was employed at a firm that could have made
better efforts to protect client information. The operation's staff left the firm's
backup tapes outside the locked computer room door for a messenger to pick up
each day. Anyone could have walked off with the backup tapes, which contained
all of the firm's word-processed documents in unencrypted text. If backup data is
encrypted, loss of the material is a nuisance; if it's not encrypted--well, you can
envision the impact on your company better than I can.

The need in larger companies for reliable offsite storage is pretty much a given.
But your company's security procedures need to include an investigation of your
storage company to see how conscientious they are about their own security
policies and practices. If they're not as dedicated as your own company, all your
security efforts could be undermined.

Smaller companies have a good alternate choice for backup: Send the new and
changed files each night to one of the companies offering online storage. Again,
it's essential that the data be encrypted. Otherwise, the information is available
not just to a bent employee at the storage company but to every computer intruder
who can breach the on-line storage companys computer systems or network.

And of course, when you set up an encryption system to protect the security of
your backup files, you must also set up a highly secure procedure for storing the
encryption keys or the pass phrases that unlock them. Secret keys used to encrypt
data should be stored in a safe or vault. Standard company practice needs to
provide for the possibility that the employee handling this data could suddenly
leave, die, or take another job. There must always be at least two people who
know the storage place and the encryption/decryption procedures, as well as the
policies for how and when keys are to be changed. The policies must also require
that encryption keys be changed immediately upon the departure of any
employee who had access to them.
Who Is That?
The example in this chapter of a slick con artist who uses charm to get employees
to share information reinforces the importance of verification of identity. The
request to have source code forwarded to an FTP site also points to the
importance of knowing your requester.

In Chapter 16 you will find specific policies for verifying the identity of any
stranger who makes a request for information or a request that some action be
taken. We've talked about the need for verification throughout the book; in
Chapter 16 you'll get specifics of how this should be done.
Part 4
Raising the bar
Chapter 15
Information Security Awareness and Training

A social engineer has been given the assignment of obtaining the plans to your
hot new product due for release in two months.

What's going to stop him?

Your firewall? No.

Strong authentication devices? No. Intrusion detection systems? No. Encryption?
No.

Limited access to phone numbers for dial-up modems? No.

Code names for servers that make it difficult for an outsider to determine which
server might contain the product plans? No.

The truth is that there is no technology in the world that can prevent a social
engineering attack.

SECURITY          THROUGH          TECHNOLOGY,           TRAINING,          AND
PROCEDURES
Companies that conduct security penetration tests report that their attempts to
break into client company computer systems by social engineering methods are
nearly 100 percent successful. Security technologies can make these types of
attacks more difficult by removing people from the decision-making process.
However the only truly effective way to mitigate the threat of social engineering
is through the use of security technologies combined with security policies that
set ground rules for employee behavior, and appropriate education and training
for employees.


There is only one way to keep your product plans safe and that is by having a
trained, aware, and a conscientious workforce. This involves training on the
policies and procedures, but also--and probably even more important--an ongoing
awareness program. Some authorities recommend that 40 percent of a company's
overall security budget be targeted to awareness training.

The first step is to make everyone in the enterprise aware that unscrupulous
people exist who will use deception to psychologically manipulate them.
Employees must be educated about what information needs to be protected, and
how to protect it. Once people have a better understanding of how they can be
manipulated, they are in a far better position to recognize that an attack is
underway.

Security awareness also means educating everyone in the enterprise on the
company's security policies and procedures. As discussed in Chapter 17, policies
are necessary rules to guide employee behavior to protect corporate information
systems and sensitive information.

This chapter and the next one provide a security blueprint that could save you
from costly attacks. If you don't have trained and alert employees following well-
thought-out procedures, it's not a matter of if, but when you will lose valuable
information to a social engineer. Don't wait for an attack to happen to you before
instituting these policies: It could be devastating to your business and to your
employees' welfare.

UNDERSTANDING HOW ATTACKERS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
HUMAN NATURE
To develop a successful training program, you have to understand why people are
vulnerable to attacks in the first place. By identifying these tendencies in your
training--for example, by drawing attention to them in role-playing discussions--
you can help your employees to understand why we can all be manipulated by
social engineers.

Manipulation has been studied by social scientists for at least fifty years. Robert
B. Cialdini, writing in Scientific American (February 2001), summarized this
research, presenting six "basic tendencies of human nature" that are involved in
an attempt to obtain compliance to a request.

These six tendencies are those that social engineers rely on (consciously or, most
often, unconsciously) in their attempts to manipulate.

Authority
People have a tendency to comply when a request is made by a person in
authority. As discussed elsewhere in these pages, a person can be convinced to
comply with a request if he or she believes the requestor is a person in authority
or a person who is authorized to make such a request.

In his book Influence, Dr. Cialdini writes of a study at three Midwestern
hospitals in which twenty-two separate nurses' stations were contacted by a caller
who claimed to be a hospital physician, and given instructions for administering a
prescription drug to a patient on the ward. The nurses who received these
instructions did not know the caller. They did not even know whether he was
really a doctor (he was not). They received the instructions for the prescription by
telephone, which was a violation of hospital policy. The drug they were told to
administer was not authorized for use on the wards, and the dosage they were told
to administer was twice the maximum daily dosage, and thus could have
endangered the life of the patient. Yet in 95 percent of the cases, Cialdini
reported, "the nurse proceeded to obtain the necessary dosage from the ward
medicine cabinet and was on her way to administer it to the patient" before being
intercepted by an observer and told of the experiment.

Examples of attacks: A social engineer attempts to cloak himself in the mantle
of authority by claiming that he is with the IT department, or that he is an
executive or works for an executive in the company.

Liking
People have the tendency to comply when the person making a request has been
able to establish himself as likable, or as having similar interests, beliefs, and
attitudes as the victim.

Examples of attacks: Through conversation, the attacker manages to learn a
hobby or interest of the victim, and claims an interest and enthusiasm for the
same hobby or interest. Or he may claim to be from the same state or school, or
to have similar goals. The social engineer will also attempt to mimic the
behaviors of his target to create the appearance of similarity.

Reciprocation
We may automatically comply with a request when we have been given or
promised something of value. The gift may be a material item, or advice, or help.
When someone has done something for you, you feel an inclination to
reciprocate. This strong tendency to reciprocate exists even in situations where
the person receiving the gift hasn't asked for it. One of the most effective ways to
influence people to do us a "favor" (comply with a request) is by giving some gift
r assistance that forms an underlying obligation.

Members of the Hare Krishna religious cult were very effective at influencing
people to donate to their cause by first giving them a book or flower as a gift. If
the recipient tried to return the gift, the giver would refuse remarking, "It's our
gift to you." This behavioral principle of reciprocation was used by the Krishnas
to substantially increase donations.
Examples of attacks: An employee receives a call from a person who identifies
himself as being from the IT department. The caller explains that some company
computers have been infected with a new virus not recognized by the antivirus
software that can destroy all files on a computer, and offers to talk the person
through some steps to prevent problems. Following this, the caller asks the
person to test a software utility that has just been recently upgraded for allowing
users to change passwords. The employee is reluctant to refuse, because the caller
has just provided help that will supposedly protect the user from a virus. He
reciprocates by complying with the caller's request.

Consistency
People have the tendency to comply after having made a public commitment or
endorsement for a cause. Once we have promised we will do something, we don't
want to appear untrustworthy or undesirable and will tend to follow through in
order to be consistent with our statement or promise.

Example of attack: The attacker contacts a relatively new employee and advises
her of the agreement to abide by certain security policies and procedures as a
condition of being allowed to use company information systems. After discussing
a few security practices, the caller asks the user for her password "to verify
compliance" with policy on choosing a difficult-to-guess password. Once the user
reveals her password, the caller makes a recommendation to construct future
passwords in such a way that the attacker will be able to guess it. The victim
complies because of her prior agreement to abide by company policies and her
assumption that the caller is merely verifying her compliance.

Social Validation
People have the tendency to comply when doing so appears to be in line with
what others are doing. The action of others is accepted as validation that the
behavior in question is the correct and appropriate action.

Examples of attacks: The caller says he is conducting a survey and names other
people in the department who he claims have already cooperated with him. The
victim, believing that cooperation by others validates the authenticity of the
request, agrees to take part. The caller then asks a series of questions, among
which are questions that draw the victim into revealing his computer username
and password.



Scarcity
People have the tendency to comply when it is believed that the object sought is
in short supply and others are competing for it, or that it is available only for a
short period of time.

Example of attack: The attacker sends emails claiming that the first 500 people
to register at the company's new Web site will win free tickets to a hot new
movie. When an unsuspecting employee registers at the site, he is asked to
provide his company email address and to choose a password. Many people,
motivated by convenience, have the propensity to use the same or a similar
password on every computer system they use. Taking advantage of this, the
attacker then attempts to compromise the target's work and home computer
systems with the username and password that have been entered during the Web
site registration process.

CREATING TRAINING AND AWARENESS PROGRAMS
Issuing an information security policy pamphlet or directing employees to an
intranet page that details security policies will not, by itself, mitigate your risk.
Every business must not only define the rules with written policies, but must
make the extra effort to direct everyone who works with corporate information or
computer systems to learn and follow the rules. Furthermore, you must ensure
that everyone understands the reason behind each policy so that people don't
circumvent the rule as a matter of convenience. Otherwise, ignorance will always
be the worker's excuse, and the precise vulnerability that social engineers will
exploit.

The central goal of any security awareness program is to influence people to
change their behavior and attitudes by motivating every employee to want to
chip in and do his part to protect the organization's information assets. A great
motivator in this instance is to explain how their participation will benefit not just
the company, but the individual employees as well. Since the company retains
certain private information about every worker, when employees do their part to
protect information or information systems, they are actually protecting their own
information, too.

A security training program requires substantial support. The training effort needs
to reach every person who has access to sensitive information or corporate
computer systems, must be on-going, and must be continuously revised to update
personnel on new threats and vulnerabilities. Employees must see that senior
management is fully committed to the program. That commitment must be real,
not just a rubber-stamped "We give our blessings" memo. And the program must
be backed up with sufficient resources to develop, communicate, test it, and to
measure success.

Goals
The basic guideline that should be kept in mind during development of an
information security training and awareness program is that the program needs to
focus on creating in all employees an awareness that their company might be
under attack at any time. They must learn that each employee plays a role in
defending against any attempt to gain entry to computer systems or to steal
sensitive data.
Because many aspects of information security involve technology, it's too easy
for employees to think that the problem is being handled by firewalls and other
security technologies. A primary goal of training should be to create awareness in
each employee that they are the front line needed to protect the overall security of
the organization.

Security training must have a significantly greater aim than simply imparting
rules. The training program designer must recognize the strong temptation on the
part of employees, under pressure of getting their jobs done, to overlook or ignore
their security responsibilities. Knowledge about the tactics of social engineering
and how to defend against the attacks is important, but it will only be of value if
the training is designed to focus heavily on motivating employees to use the
knowledge.

The company can count the program as meeting its bottom-line goal if everyone
completing the training is thoroughly convinced and motivated by one basic
notion: that information security is part of his or her job.

Employees must come to appreciate and accept that the threat of social
engineering attacks is real, and that a serious loss of sensitive corporate
information could endanger the company as well as their own personal
information and jobs. In a sense, being careless about information security at
work is equivalent to being careless with one's ATM PIN or credit card number.
This can be a compelling analogy for building enthusiasm for security practices.

Establishing the Training and Awareness Program
The person responsible for designing the information security program needs to
recognize that this is not a one-size-fits-all project. Rather, the training needs to
be developed to suit the specific requirements of several different groups within
the enterprise. While many of the security policies outlined in Chapter 16 apply
to all employees across the board, many others are unique. At a minimum, most
companies will need training programs tailored to these distinct groups:
managers; IT personnel; computer users; non-technical personnel; administrative
assistants; receptionists; and security guards. (See the breakdown of policies by
job assignment in Chapter 16.)

Since the personnel of a company's industrial security force are not ordinarily
expected to be computer proficient, and, except perhaps in a very limited way, do
not come into contact with company computers, they are not usually considered
when designing training of this kind. However, social engineers can deceive
security guards or others into allowing them into a building or office, or into
performing an action that results in a computer intrusion. While members of the
guard force certainly don't need the full training of personnel who operate or use
computers, nonetheless they must not be overlooked in the security awareness
program.

Within the corporate world there are probably few subjects about which all
employees need to be educated that are simultaneously as important and as
inherently dull as security. The best designed information security training
programs must both inform and capture the attention and enthusiasm of the
learners.

The aim should be to make security information awareness and training an
engaging and interactive experience. Techniques could include demonstrating
social engineering methods through role-playing; reviewing media reports of
recent attacks on other less fortunate businesses and discussing the ways the
companies could have prevented the loss; or showing a security video that's
entertaining and educational at the same time. There are several security
awareness companies that market videos and related materials.


NOTE
For those businesses that do not have the resources to develop a program in-
house, there are several training companies that offer security awareness training
services. Trade shows such as Secure World Expo (www.secureworldexpo.com)
are gathering places for these companies

The stories in this book provide plenty of material to explain the methods and
tactics of social engineering, to raise awareness of the threat, and to demonstrate
the vulnerabilities in human behavior. Consider using their scenarios as a basis
for role-playing activities. The stories also offer colorful opportunities for lively
discussion on how the victims could have responded differently to prevent the
attacks from being successful.

A skillful course developer and skillful trainers will find plenty of challenges, but
also plenty of opportunities, for keeping the classroom time lively, and, in the
process, motivate people to become part of the solution.

Structure of the Training
A basic security awareness training program should be developed that all
employees are required to attend. New employees should be required to attend
the training as part of their initial indoctrination. I recommend that no employee
be provided computer access until he has attended a basic security awareness
session.
For this initial awareness and training, I suggest a session focused enough to hold
attention, and short enough that the important messages will be remembered.
While the amount of material to be covered certainly justifies longer training, the
importance of providing awareness and motivation along with a reasonable
number of essential messages in my view outweighs any notion of half-day or
full-day sessions that leave people numb with too much information.

The emphasis of these sessions should be on conveying an appreciation of the
harm that can be done to the company, and to employees individually, unless all
employees follow good security work habits. More important than learning about
specific security practices is the motivation that leads employees to accept
personal responsibility for security.

In situations where some employees cannot readily attend classroom sessions, the
company should consider developing awareness training using other forms of
instruction, such as videos, computer-based training, online courses, or written
materials.

After the initial short training session, longer sessions should be designed to
educate employees about specific vulnerabilities and attack techniques relative to
their position in the company. Refresher training should be required at least once
a year. The nature of the threat and the methods used to exploit people are ever-
changing, so the content of the program should be kept up to date. Moreover,
people's awareness and alertness diminish over time, so training must be repeated
at reasonable intervals to reinforce security principles. Here again the emphasis
needs to be as much on keeping employees convinced of the importance of
security policies and motivated to adhere to them, as on exposing specific threats
and social engineering methods.

Managers must allow reasonable time for their subordinates to become familiar
with security policies and procedures, and to participate in the security awareness
program. Employees should not be expected to study security policies or attend
security classes on their own time. New employees should be given ample time to
review security policies and published security practices prior to beginning their
job responsibilities.

Employees who change positions within the organization to a job that involves
access to sensitive information or computer systems should, of course, be
required to complete a security training program tailored to their new
responsibilities. For example, when a computer operator becomes a systems
administrator, or a receptionist becomes an administrative assistant, new training
is required.
Training Course Contents
When reduced to their fundamentals, all social engineering attacks have the same
common element: deception. The victim is led to believe that the attacker is a
fellow employee or some other person who is authorized to access sensitive
information, or authorized to give the victim instructions that involve taking
actions with a computer or computer-related equipment. Almost all of these
attacks could be foiled if the targeted employee simply follows two steps:

Verify the identity of the person making the request: Is the person making the
request really who he claims to be?

Verify whether the person is authorized: Does the person have the need to know,
or is he otherwise authorized to make this request?


NOTE
Because security awareness and training are never perfect, use security
technologies whenever possible to create a system of defense in depth. This
means that the security measure is provided by the technology rather than by
individual employees, for example, when the operating system is configured to
prevent employees from downloading software from the Internet, or choosing a
short, easily guessed password.

If awareness training sessions could change behavior so that each employee
would always be consistent about testing any request against these criteria, the
risk associated with social engineering attacks would be dramatically reduced.

A practical information security awareness and training program that addresses
human behavior and social engineering aspects should include the following:

A description of how attackers use social engineering skills to deceive people.

The methods used by social engineers to accomplish their objectives.

How to recognize a possible social engineering attack.

The procedure for handling a suspicious request.

Where to report social engineering attempts or successful attacks.

The importance of challenging anyone who makes a suspicious request,
regardless of the person's claimed position or importance.
The fact that they should not implicitly trust others without proper verification,
even though their impulse is to give others the benefit of the doubt.

The importance of verifying the identity and authority of any person making a
request for information or action. (See "Verification and Authorization
Procedures," Chapter 16, for ways to verify identity.)

Procedures for protecting sensitive information, including familiarity with any
data classification system.

The location of the company's security policies and procedures, and their
importance to the protection of information and corporate information systems.

A summary of key security policies and an explanation of their meaning. For
example, every employee should be instructed in how to devise a difficult-to-
guess password.

The obligation of every employee to comply with the policies, and the
consequences for non-compliance.

Social engineering by definition involves some kind of human interaction. An
attacker will very frequently use a variety of communication methods and
technologies in attempting to achieve his or her goal. For this reason, a well-
rounded awareness program should attempt to cover some or all of the following:

Security policies related to computer and voice mail passwords.

The procedure for disclosing sensitive information or materials.

Email usage policy, including the safeguards to prevent malicious code attacks
including viruses, worms, and Trojan Horses.

Physical security requirements such as wearing a badge.

The responsibility to challenge people on the premises who aren't wearing a
badge.

Best security practices of voice mail usage.

How to determine the classification of information, and the proper safeguards for
protecting sensitive information.
Proper disposal of sensitive documents and computer media that contain, or have
at any time in the past contained, confidential materials.

Also, if the company plans to use penetration testing to determine the
effectiveness of defenses against social engineering attacks, a warning should be
given putting employees on notice of this practice. Let employees know that at
some time they may receive a phone call or other communication using an
attacker's techniques as part of such a test. Use the results of those tests not to
punish, bur to define the need for additional training in some areas.

Details concerning all of the above items will be found in Chapter 16.


TESTING
Your company may want to test employees on their mastery of the information
presented in the security awareness training, before allowing computer system
access. If you design tests to be given on line, many assessment design software
programs allow you to readily analyze test results to determine areas of the
training that need to be strengthened.

Your company may also consider providing a certificate testifying to the
completion of the security training as a reward and employee motivator.

As a routine part of completing the program, it is recommended that each
employee be asked to sign an agreement to abide by the security policies and
principles taught in the program. Research suggests that a person who makes the
commitment of signing such an agreement is more likely to make an effort to
abide by the procedures.

ONGOING AWARENESS
Most people are aware that learning, even about important matters, tends to fade
unless reinforced periodically. Because of the importance of keeping employees
up to speed on the subject of defending against social engineering attacks, an
ongoing awareness program is vital.

One method to keep security at the forefront of employee thinking is to make
information security a specific job responsibility for every person in the
enterprise. This encourages employees to recognize their crucial role in the
overall security of the company. Otherwise there is a strong tendency to feel that
security "is not my job."

While overall responsibility for an information security program is normally
assigned to a person in the security department or the information technology
department, development of an information security awareness program is
probably best structured as a joint project with the training department.

The ongoing awareness program needs to be creative and use every available
channel for communicating security messages in ways that are memorable so that
employees are constantly reminded about good security habits. Methods should
use all of the traditional channels, plus as many non-traditional ones as the people
assigned to develop and implement the program can imagine. As with traditional
advertising, humor and cleverness help. Varying the wording of messages keeps
them from becoming so familiar that they are ignored.

The list of possibilities for an ongoing awareness program might include:

Providing copies of this book to all employees.
Including informational items in the company newsletter: articles, boxed
reminders (preferably short, attention-getting items), or cartoons, for example.

Posting a picture of the Security Employee of the Month.

Hanging posters in employee areas.

Posting bulletin-board notices.

Providing printed enclosures in paycheck envelopes.

Sending email reminders.

Using security-related screen savers.

Broadcasting security reminder announcements through the voice mail system.

Printing phone stickers with messages such as "Is your caller who he says he is?'!

Setting up reminder messages to appear on the computer when logging in, such
as "If you are sending confidential information in an email, encrypt it."

Including security awareness as a standard item on employee performance reports
and annual reviews.

Providing security awareness reminders on the intranet, perhaps using cartoons or
humor, or in some other way enticing employees to read them.
Using an electronic message display board in the cafeteria, with a frequently
changing security reminder.

Distributing flyers or brochures.

And think gimmicks, such as free fortune cookies in the cafeteria,           each
containing a security reminder instead of a fortune.

The threat is constant; the reminders must be constant as well.

WHAT'S IN IT FOR ME?"
In addition to security awareness and training programs, I strongly recommend an
active and well-publicized reward program. You must acknowledge employees
who have detected and prevented an attempted social engineering attack, or in
some other way significantly contributed to the success of the information
security program. The existence of the reward program should be made known to
employees at all security awareness sessions, and security violations should be
widely publicized throughout the organization.

On the other side of the coin, people must be made aware of the consequences of
failing to abide by information security policies, whether through carelessness or
resistance. Though we all make mistakes, repeated violations of security
procedures must not be tolerated.
Chapter 16
Recommended Corporate Information Security Policies

Nine out of every ten large corporations and government agencies have been
attacked by computer intruders, to judge from the results of a survey conducted
by the FBI and reported by the Associated Press in April 2002. Interestingly, the
study found that only about one company in three reported or publicly
acknowledged any attacks. That reticence to reveal their victimization makes
sense. To avoid loss of customer confidence and to prevent further attacks by
intruders who learn that a company may be vulnerable, most businesses do not
publicly report computer security incidents.

It appears that there are no statistics on social engineering attacks, and if there
were, the numbers would be highly unreliable; in most cases a company never
knows when a social engineer has "stolen" information, so many attacks go
unnoticed and unreported.

Effective countermeasures can be put into place against most types of social
engineering attacks. But let's face reality here--unless everyone in the enterprise
understands that security is important and makes it his or her business to know
and adhere to a company's security policies, social engineering attacks will
always present a grave risk to the enterprise.

In fact, as improvements are made if I the technological weapons against security
breaches, the social engineering approach to using people to access proprietary
company information or penetrate the corporate network will almost certainly
become significantly more frequent and attractive to information thieves. An
industrial spy will naturally attempt to accomplish his or her objective using the
easiest method and the one involving the least risk of detection. As a matter of
fact, a company that has protected its computer systems and network by
deploying state-of the-art security technologies may thereafter be at more risk
from attackers who use social engineering strategies, methods, and tactics to
accomplish their objectives.

This chapter presents specific policies designed to minimize a company's risk
with respect to social engineering attacks. The policies address attacks that are
based not strictly on exploiting technical vulnerabilities. They involve using some
kind of pretext or ruse to deceive a trusted employee into providing information
or performing an action that gives the perpetrator access to sensitive business
information or to enterprise computer systems and networks.
WHAT IS A SECURITY POLICY?
Security policies are clear instructions that provide the guidelines for employee
behavior for safeguarding information, and are a fundamental building block in
developing effective controls to counter potential security threats. These policies
are even more significant when it comes to preventing and detecting social
engineering attacks.

Effective security controls are implemented by training employees with well-
documented policies and procedures. However, it is important to note that
security policies, even if religiously followed by all employees, are not
guaranteed to prevent every social engineering attack. Rather, the reasonable goal
is always to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level.

The policies presented here include measures that, while not strictly focused on
social engineering issues, nonetheless belong here because they deal with
techniques commonly used in social engineering attacks. For example, policies
about opening email attachments--which could install malicious Trojan Horse
software allowing the attacker to take over the victim's computer--address a
method frequently used by computer intruders.

Steps to Developing a Program
A comprehensive information security program usually starts with a risk
assessment aimed at determining:

What enterprise information assets need to be protected?

What specific threats exist against these assets?

What damage would be caused to the enterprise if these potential threats were to
materialize?

The primary goal of risk assessment is to prioritize which information assets are
in need of immediate safeguards, and whether instituting safeguards will be cost-
effective based on a cost-benefit analysis. Simply put, what assets are going to be
protected first, and how much money should be spent to protect these assets?

It's essential that senior management buy into and strongly support the necessity
of developing security policies and an information security program. As with any
other corporate program, if a security program is to succeed, management must
do more than merely provide an endorsement, it must demonstrate a commitment
by personal example. Employees need to be aware that management strongly
subscribes to the belief that information security is vital to the company's
operation, that protection of company business information is essential for the
company to remain in business, and that every employee's job may depend on the
success of the program.

The person assigned to draft information security policies needs to understand
that the policies should be written in a style free of technical jargon and readily
understood by the non-technical employee. It's also important that the document
make clear why each policy is important; otherwise employees may disregard
some policies as a waste of time. The policy writer should create a document that
presents the policies, and a separate document for procedures, because policies
will probably change much less frequently than the specific procedures used to
implement them.

In addition, the policy writer should be aware of ways in which security
technologies can be used to enforce good information security practices. For
example, most operating systems make it possible to require that user passwords
conform to certain specifications such as length. In some companies, a policy
prohibiting users from downloading programs can be controlled via local or
global policy settings within the operating system. The policies should require
use of security technology whenever cost-effective to remove human-based
decision-making.

Employees must be advised of the consequences for failing to comply with
security policies and procedures. A set of appropriate consequences for violating
the policies should be developed and widely publicized. Also, a reward program
should be created for employees who demonstrate good security practices or who
recognize and report a security incident. Whenever an employee is rewarded for
foiling a security breach, it should be widely publicized throughout the company,
for example in an article in the company newsletter.

One goal of a security awareness program is to communicate the importance of
security policies and the harm that can result from failure to follow such rules.
Given human nature, employees will, at times, ignore or circumvent policies that
appear unjustified or too time-consuming. It is a management responsibility to
insure that employees understand the importance of the policies and are
motivated to comply, rather than treating them as obstacles to be circumvented.

It's important to note that information security policies cannot be written in stone.
As business needs change, as new security technologies come to market, and as
security vulnerabilities evolve, the policies need to be modified or supplemented.
A process for regular review and updating should be put into place. Make the
corporate security policies and procedures available via the corporate intranet or
maintain such policies in a publicly available folder. This increases the likelihood
that such policies and procedures will be reviewed more frequently, and provides
a convenient method for employees to quickly find the answer to any
information-security related question.

Finally, periodic penetration tests and vulnerability assessments using social
engineering methods and tactics should be conducted to expose any weakness in
training or lack of adherence to company policies and procedures. Prior to using
any deceptive penetration-testing tactics, employees should be put on notice that
such testing may occur from time to time.

How to Use These Policies
The detailed policies presented in this chapter represent only a subset of the
information security policies I believe are necessary to mitigate all security risks.
Accordingly, the policies included here should not be considered as a
comprehensive list of information security policies. Rather, they are the basis for
building a comprehensive body of security policies appropriate to the specific
needs of your company.

Policy writers for an organization will have to choose the policies that are
appropriate based on their company's unique environment and business goals.
Each organization, having different security requirements based on business
needs, legal requirements, organizational culture, and the information systems
used by the company, will take what it needs from the policies presented, and
omit the rest.
There are also choices to be made about how stringent policies will be in each
category. A smaller company located in a single facility where most employees
know one another does not need to be much concerned about an attacker calling
on the phone and pretending to be an employee (although of course an imposter
may masquerade as a vendor). Also, despite the increased risks, a company
framed around a casual, relaxed corporate culture may wish to adopt only a
limited subset of recommended policies to meet its security objectives.



DATA CLASSIFICATION
A data classification policy is fundamental to protecting an organization's
information assets, and sets up categories for governing the release of sensitive
information. This policy provides a framework for protecting corporate
information by making all employees aware of the level of sensitivity of each
piece of information.

Operating without a data classification policy--the status quo in almost all
companies today--leaves most of these decisions in the hands of individual
workers. Naturally, employee decisions are largely based on subjective factors,
rather than on the sensitivity, criticality, and value of information. Information is
also released because employees are ignorant of the possibility that in responding
to a request for the information, they may be putting it into the hands of an
attacker.

The data classification policy sets forth guidelines for classifying valuable
information into one of several levels. With each item assigned a classification,
employees can follow a set of data-handling procedures that protect the company
from inadvertent or careless release of sensitive information. These procedures
mitigate the possibility that employees will be duped into revealing sensitive
information to unauthorized persons.

Every employee must be trained on the corporate data classification policy,
including those who do not typically use computers or corporate communications
systems. Because every member of the corporate workforce--including the
cleaning crew, building guards, and copy-room staff, as well as consultants,
contractors, and even interns--may have access to sensitive information, anyone
could be the target of an attack.

Management must assign an Information Owner to be responsible for any
information that is currently in use at the company. Among other things, the
Information Owner is responsible for the protection of the information assets.
Ordinarily, the Owner decides what level of classification to assign based on the
need to protect the information, periodically reassesses the classification level
assigned, and decides if any changes are needed. The Information Owner may
also delegate the responsibility of protecting the data to a Custodian or Designee.

Classification Categories. and Definitions
Information should be separated into varying levels of classification based on its
sensitivity. Once a particular classification system is set up, it's an expensive and
time-consuming process to reclassify information into new categories. In our
example policy I chose four classification levels, which is appropriate for most
medium-to-large businesses. Depending on the number and types of sensitive
information, business may choose to add more categories to further control
specific types of information. In smaller businesses, a three-level classification
scheme may be sufficient. Remember--the more complex the classification
scheme, the more expense to the organization in training employees and
enforcing the system.

Confidential. This category of information is the most sensitive. Confidential
information is intended for use only within the organization. In most cases, it
should only be shared with a very limited number of people with an absolute
need to know. The nature of Confidential information is such that any
unauthorized disclosure could seriously impact the company, its shareholders, its
business partners, and/or its customers. Items of Confidential information
generally fall into one of these categories:

Information concerning trade secrets, proprietary source code, technical or
functional specifications, or product information that could be of advantage to a
competitor.

Marketing and financial information not available to the public.

Any other information that is vital to the operation of the company such as future
business strategies.

Private. This category covers information of a personal nature that is intended
for use only within the organization. Any unauthorized disclosure of Private
information could seriously impact employees, or the company if obtained by any
unauthorized persons (especially social engineers). Items of Private information
would include employee medical history, health benefits, bank account
information, salary history, or any other personal identifying information that is
not of public record.

NOTE
The Internal category of information is often termed Sensitive by security
personnel. I have to use Internal because the term itself explains the intented
audience. I have used the term Sensitive not as a security classification but as a
convenient method of referring to Confidential, Private, and Internal information;
put another way, Sensitive refers to any company information that is not
specifically designated as Public.

Internal. This category of information can be freely provided to any persons
employed by the organization. Ordinarily, unauthorized disclosure of Internal
information is not expected to cause serious harm to the company, its
shareholders, its business partners, its customers, or its employees. However,
persons adept in social engineering skills can use this information to masquerade
as an authorized employee, contractor, or vendor to deceive unsuspecting
personnel into providing more sensitive information that would result in
unauthorized access to corporate computer systems.

A confidentiality agreement must be signed before Internal information may be
disclosed to third parties, such as employees of vendor firms, contractor labor,
partner firms, and so on. Internal information generally includes anything used in
the course of daily business activity that should not be released to outsiders, such
as corporate organizational charts, network dial-up numbers, internal system
names, remote access procedures, cost center codes, and so on.

Public. Information that is specifically designated for release to the public. This
type of information can be freely distributed to anyone, such as press releases,
customer-support contact information, or product brochures. Note that any
information not specifically designated as Public should be treated as Sensitive
information.

Classified Data Terminology
Based on its classification, data should be distributed to certain categories of
people. A number of policies in this chapter refer to information being given to
an Unverified Person. For the purposes of these policies, an Unverified Person is
someone whom the employee does not personally know to be an active employee
or to b an employee with the proper rank to have access to information, or who
has not been vouched for by a trusted third party.

For the purposes of these policies, a Trusted Person is a person you have met
face-to-face who is known to you as a company employee, customer, or
consultant to the company with the proper rank to have access to information. A
Trusted Person might also be an employee of a company having an established
relationship, with your company (for example, a customer, vendor, or strategic
business partner that has signed a nondisclosure agreement).

In third party vouching, a Trusted Person provides verification of a person's
employment or status, and the person's authority to request information or an
action. Note that in some instances, these policies require you to verify that the
Trusted Person is still employed by the company before responding to a request
for information or action by someone for whom they have vouched.

A privileged account is a computer or other account requiring access permission
beyond the basic user account, such as a systems administrator account.
Employees with privileged accounts typically have the ability to modify user
privileges or perform system functions.

A general departmental mailbox is a voice mailbox answered with a generic
message for the department. Such a mailbox is used in order to protect names and
phone extensions of employees who work in a particular department.

VERIFICATION AND AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES
Information thieves commonly use deceptive tactics to access or obtain
confidential business information by masquerading as legitimate employees,
contractors, vendors, or business partners. To maintain effective information
security, an employee receiving a request to perform an action or provide
sensitive information must positively identify the caller and verify his authority
prior to granting a request.

The recommended procedures given in this chapter are designed to help an
employee who receives a request via any communication method such as
telephone, email, or fax to determine whether the request and the person making
it are legitimate.

Requests from a Trusted Person
A request for information or action from a Trusted Person may require:

Verification that the company actively employs or has a relationship with the
person where such a relationship is a condition of access to this category of
information. This is to prevent terminated employees, vendors, contractors, and
others who no longer are associated with the company from masquerading as
active personnel.

Verification that the person has a need to know, and is authorized to have access
to the information or to request the action.

Requests from an Unverified Person
When a request is made by an Unverified Person, a reasonable verification
process must be deployed to positively identify the person making the request as
authorized to receive the requested information, especially when the request in
any way involves computers or computer-related equipment. This process is the
fundamental control to prevent successful social engineering attacks: If these
verification procedures are followed, they will dramatically reduce successful
social engineering attacks.

It is important that you not make the process so cumbersome that it is cost-
prohibitive, or that employees ignore it.

As detailed below, the verification process involves three steps:

Verifying that the person is who he or she claims to be.

Determining that the requester is currently employed or shares a need-to-know
relationship with the company.

Determining that the person is authorized to receive the specific information or to
call for the requested action.
Step One: Verification of Identity
The recommended steps for verification are listed below in order of
effectiveness--the higher the number, the more effective the method. Also
included with each item is a statemen.t about the weakness of that particular
method, and the way in which a social engineer can defeat or circumvent the
method to deceive an employee.

1. Caller ID (assuming this feature is included in the company telephone
   system). From the caller ID display, ascertain whether the call is from inside
   or outside the company, and that the name or telephone number displayed
   matches the identity provided by the caller.

Weakness: External caller ID information can be falsified by anyone with access
to a PBX or telephone switch connected to digital phone service.

2. Callback. Look up the requester in the company directory,and call back to the
   listed extension to verify that therequester is an employee.

Weakness: An attacker with sufficient knowledge can call-forward a company
extension so that, when the employee places the verification call to the listed
phone number, the call is transferred to the attacker's outside phone number.

3. Vouching. A Trusted Person who vouches for the requester's identity verifies
   the requester.

Weakness: Attackers using a pretext are frequently able to convince another
employee of their identity, and get that employee to vouch for them.

4. Shared Secret. Use an enterprise-wide shared secret, such as apassword or
   daily code.

Weakness." If many people know the shared secret, it may be easy for an attacker
to learn it.

5. Employee's Supervisor/Manager.         Telephone    the   employee'simmediate
   supervisor and request verification.

Weakness: If the requester has provided the telephone number for reaching his or
her manager, the person the employee reaches when calling the number may not
be the real manager but may, in fact, be an accomplice of the attacker.

6. Secure Email. Request a digitally signed message.
Weakness: If an attacker has already compromised an employee's computer and
installed a keystroke logger to obtain the employee's pass phrase, he can send
digitally signed email that appears to be from the employee.

7. Personal Voice Recognition. The person receiving the request has dealt with
   the requester (preferably face-to-face),knows for certain that the person
   actually is a Trusted Person, and is familiar enough with the person to
   recognize his or her voice on the telephone.

Weakness: This is a fairly secure method, not easily circumvented by an attacker,
but is of no use if the person receiving the request has never met or spoken with
the requester.

8. Dynamic Password Solution. The requester authenticates himself or herself
   through the use of a dynamic password solution such as a Secure ID.

Weakness: To defeat this method, an attacker would have to obtain one of the
dynamic password devices, as well the accompanying PIN of the employee to
whom the device rightfully belongs, or would have to deceive an employee into
reading the information on the display of the device and providing the PIN.

9. In Person with ID. The requester appears in person andpresents an employee
   badge or other suitable identification,preferably a picture ID.

Weakness: Attackers are often able to steal an employee badge, or create a phony
badge that appears authentic; however, attackers generally shun this approach
because appearing in person puts the attacker at significant risk of being
identified and apprehended.

Step Two: Verification of Employment Status

The greatest information security threat is not from the professional social
engineer, nor from the skilled computer intruder, but from someone much closer:
the just-fired employee seeking revenge or hoping to set himself up in business
using information stolen from the company. (Note that a version of this procedure
can also be used to verify that someone still enjoys another kind of business
relationship with your company, such as a vendor, consultant, or contract
worker.)

Before providing Sensitive information to another person or accepting
instructions for actions involving the computer or computer-related equipment,
verify that the requester is still a current employee by using one of these methods:
Employee Directory Check. If the company maintains an online employee
directory that accurately reflects active employees, verify that the requester is
still listed.

Requester's Manager Verification. Call the requester's manager using a phone
number listed in the company directory, not a number provided by the requester.

Requester's Department or Workgroup Verification. Call the requester's
department or workgroup and determine from anyone in that department or
workgroup that the requester is still employed by the company.

Step Three: Verification of Need to Know
Beyond verifying that the requester is a current employee or has a relationship
with your company, there still remains the issue of whether the requester is
authorized to have access to the information being requested, or is authorized to
request that specific actions affecting computers or computer-related equipment
be                                                                         taken.

This determination may be made by using one of these methods:

Consult job title/workgroup/responsibilities lists. A company can provide ready
access to authorization information by publishing lists of which employees are
entitled to what information. These lists may be organized in terms of employee
job title, employee departments and workgroups, employee responsibilities, or by
some combination of these. Such lists would need to be maintained on line to be
kept current and provide quick access to authorization information. Ordinarily,
Information Owners would be responsible for overseeing the creation and
maintenance of the lists for access to information under the Owner's control.

NOTE
It is important to note that maintaining such lists is an invitation to the social
engineer. Consider: If an attacker targets a company becomes aware that the
company maintains such lists, there is a strong motivation to obtain one. Once in
hand, such a list opens many doors to the attacker and puts the company at
serious risk.

Obtain Authority from a Manager. An employee contacts his or her own
manager, or the manager of the requester, for authority to comply with the
request.

Obtain Authority from the Information Owner or a Designee. The information
Owner is the ultimate judge of whether a particular person should be granted
access. The process for computer-based access control is for the employee to
contact his or her immediate manager to approve a request for access to
information based on existing job profiles. If such a profile does not exist, it is the
manager's responsibility to contact the relevant data Owner for permission. This
chain of command should be followed so that Information Owners are not
barraged with requests when there is a frequent need to know.
Obtain Authority by Means of a Proprietary Software Package. For a large
company in a highly competitive industry, it may be practical to develop a
proprietary software package that provides need-to-know authorization. Such a
database stores employee names and access privileges to classified information.
Users would not be able to look up each individual's access rights, but instead
would enter the requester's name, and the identifier associated with the
information being sought. The software then provides a response indicating
whether or not the employee is authorized to access such information. This
alternative avoids the danger of creating a list of personnel with respective access
rights to valuable, critical, or sensitive information that could be stolen.
MANAGEMENT POLICIES
The following policies pertain to management-level employees. These are
divided into the areas of Data Classification, Information Disclosure, Phone
Administration, and Miscellaneous Policies. Note that each category of policies
uses a unique numbering structure for easy identification of individual policies.

Data Classification Policies
Data Classification refers to how your company classifies the sensitivity of
information and who should have access to that information.

1-1 Assign data classification
Policy: All valuable, sensitive, or critical business information must be assigned
to a classification category by the designated Information Owner or delegate.

Explanation/Notes: The designated Owner or delegate will assign the appropriate
data classification to any information routinely used to accomplish business
goals. The Owner also controls who can access such information and what use
can be made of it. The Owner of the information may reassign the classification
and may designate a time period for automatic declassification.
Any item not otherwise marked should be classified as Sensitive.

1-2 Publish classified handling procedures
Policy: The company must establish procedures governing the release of
information in each category.

Explanation/Notes." Once classifications are established, procedures for release
of information to employees and to outsiders must be set up, as detailed in the
Verification and Authorization Procedures outlined earlier in this chapter.

1-3 Label all items
Policy." Clearly mark both printed materials and media storage containing
Confidential, Private, or Internal information to show the appropriate data
classification.

Explanation/Notes." Hard copy documents must have a cover sheet, with a
classification label prominently displayed, and a classification label on every
page that is visible when the document is open.

All electronic files that cannot easily be labeled with appropriate data
classifications (database or raw data files) must be protected via access controls
to insure that such information is not improperly disclosed, and that it cannot be
changed, destroyed, or made inaccessible.
All computer media such as floppy disks, tapes, and CD-ROMs must be labeled
with the highest classification of any information contained therein.

Information Disclosure
Information disclosure involves the release of information to various parties
based on their identity and need to know.

2-1 Employee verification procedure
Policy: The company should establish comprehensive procedures to be
used by employees for verifying the identity, employment status, and
authorization of an individual before releasing Confidential or Sensitive
information or performing any task that involves use of any computer hardware
or software.

Explanation/Notes: Where justified by size of company and security needs,
advanced security technologies should be used to authenticate identity. The best
security practice would be to deploy authentication tokens in combination with a
shared secret to positively identify persons making requests. While this practice
would substantially minimize risk, the cost may be prohibitive for some
businesses. In those circumstances, the company should use a company-wide
shared secret, such as a daily password or code.

2-2 Release of information to third parties
Policy: A set of recommended information disclosure procedures must
be made available and all employees should be trained to follow them.

Explanation/Notes: Generally, distribution procedures need to be established for:

Information made available within the company.

Distribution of information to individuals and employees of organizations having
an established relationship with the company, such as consultants, temporary
workers, interns, employees of organizations that have a vendor relationship or
strategic partnership arrangement with the company, and so on.
Information made available outside the company.

Information at each classification level, when the information is being delivered
in person, by telephone, by email, by facsimile, by voice mail, by postal service,
by signature delivery service, and by electronic transfer.
2-3 Distribution of Confidential information
Policy: Confidential information, which is company information that could cause
substantial harm if obtained by unauthorized persons, may be delivered only to a
Trusted Person who is authorized to receive it.

Explanation/Notes: Confidential information in a physical form (that is, printed
copy or on a removable storage medium) may be delivered:

In person.

By internal mail, sealed and marked with the Confidential classification.

Outside the company by a reputable delivery service (that is, FedEx, UPS, and so
on) with signature of recipient required, or by a postal service using a certified or
registered class of mail.

Confidential information in electronic form (computer files, database files, email)
may be delivered:

Within the body of encrypted email.

By email attachment, as an encrypted file.

By electronic transfer to a server within the company internal network.

By a fax program from a computer, provided that only the intended recipient uses
the destination machine, or that the intended recipient is waiting at the destination
machine while the fax is being sent. As an alternative, facsimiles can be sent
without the recipient present if sent over an encrypted telephone link to a
password-protected fax server.

Confidential information may be discussed in person; by telephone within the
company; by telephone outside the company if encrypted; by encrypted satellite
transmission; by encrypted videoconferencing link; and by encrypted Voice Over
Internet Protocol (VoIP).

For transmission by fax machine, the recommended method calls for the sender
to transmit a cover page; the recipient, on receiving the page, transmits a page in
response, demonstrating that he/she is at the fax machine. The sender then
transmits the fax.

The following means of communication are not acceptable for discussing or
distributing Confidential information: unencrypted email, voice mail message,
regular mail, or any wireless communication method (cellular, Short Message
Service, or cordless).

2-4 Distribution of Private information
Policy: Private information, which is personal information about an employee or
employees that, if disclosed, could be used to harm employees or the company,
may be delivered only to a Trusted Person who is authorized to receive it.

Explanation/Notes: Private information in a physical form (that is, hard-copy or
data on a removable storage medium) may be delivered:

In person

By internal mail, sealed and marked with the Private classification

By regular mail

Private information in electronic form (computer files, database files, email) may
be delivered:

By internal email.

By electronic transfer to a server within the company internal network.

By facsimile, provided that only the intended recipient uses the destination
machine, or that the intended recipient is waiting at the destination machine while
the fax is being sent. Facsimiles can also be sent to password-protected fax
servers. As an alternative, facsimiles can be sent without the recipient present if
sent over an encrypted telephone link to a password-protected fax server.

Private information may be discussed in person; by telephone; by satellite
transmission; by videoconferencing link; and by encrypted Vole

The following means of communication are not acceptable for discussing or
distributing Private information: unencrypted email, voice mail message, regular
mail, and by any wireless communication method (cellular, SMS, or cordless).

2-5 Distribution of Internal information
Policy: Internal information is information to be shared only within the company
or with other Trusted persons who have signed a nondisclosure agreement. You
must establish guidelines for the distribution of Internal information.
Explanation/Notes: Internal information may be distributed in any form,
including internal email, but may not be distributed outside the company in email
form unless encrypted.

2-6 Discussing Sensitive information over the telephone
Policy: Prior to releasing any information that is not designated as Public over the
telephone, the person releasing such information must personally recognize the
requester's voice through prior business contact, or the company phone system
must identify the call as being from an internal telephone number that has been
assigned                     to                     the                   requester.

Explanation/Notes: If the requester's voice is not known, call the requester's
internal phone number to verify the requester voice through a recorded voice mail
message, or have the requester's manager verify the requester's identity and need
to know.

2-7 Lobby or reception personnel procedures
Policy: Lobby personnel must obtain photo identification prior to releasing any
package to any person who is not known to be an active employee. A log should
be kept for recording the person's name, driver's license number, birth date, the
item picked up, and the date and time of such pickup.

Explanation/Notes: This policy also applies to handing over outgoing packages to
any messenger or courier service such as FedEx, UPS, or Airborne Express.
These companies issue identification cards that can be used to verify employee
identity.

2-8 Transfer of software to third parties
Policy: Prior to the transfer or disclosure of any software, program, or computer
instructions, the requester's identity must be positively verified, and it must be
established whether such release is consistent with the data classification
assigned to such information. Ordinarily, software developed in-house in source-
code format is considered highly proprietary, and classified Confidential.

Explanation/Notes: Determination of authorization is usually based on whether
the requester needs access to the software to do his or her job.

2-9 Sales and marketing qualification of customer leads
Policy: Sales and marketing personnel must qualify leads before releasing
internal callback numbers, product plans, product group contacts, or other
Sensitive information to any potential customer.
Explanation/Notes: It is a common tactic for industrial spies to contact a sales and
marketing representative and make him believe that a big purchase may be in the
offing. In an effort to take advantage of the sales opportunity, sales and marketing
reps often release information that can be used by the attacker as a poker chip to
obtain access to Sensitive information.

2-10 Transfer of files or data
Policy: Files or other electronic data should not be transferred to any removable
media unless the requester is a Trusted Person whose identity has been verified
and who has a need to have such data in that format.

Explanation/Notes: A social engineer can easily dupe an employee by providing a
plausible request for having Sensitive information copied to a tape, Zip disc, or
other removable media, and sent to him or held in the lobby for pickup.

Phone Administration
Phone administration policies ensure that employees can verify caller identity,
and protect their own contact information from those calling into the company.

3-1 Call forwarding on dial-up or fax numbers
Policy: Call forwarding services that permit forwarding calls to external
telephone numbers will not be placed on any dial-up modem or fax telephone
numbers within the company.

Explanation/Notes: Sophisticated attackers may attempt to dupe telephone
company personnel or internal telecom workers into forwarding internal numbers
to an external phone line under control of an attacker. This attack allows the
intruder to intercept faxes, request Confidential information to be faxed within
the company (personnel assume that faxing within the organization must be safe)
or dupe dial-in users into providing their account passwords by forwarding the
dial-up lines to a decoy computer that simulates the login process.

Depending on the telephone service used within the company, the call forwarding
feature may be under control of the communications provider, rather than the
telecommunications department. In such circumstances, a request will be made to
the communications provider to insure the call forwarding feature is not present
on the telephone numbers assigned to dial-up and fax lines.

3-2 Caller ID
Policy: The corporate telephone system must provide caller line identification
(caller ID) on all internal telephone sets, and, if possible, enable distinctive
ringing to indicate when a call is from outside the company.
Explanation/Notes: If employees can verify the identity of telephone calls from
outside the company it may help them prevent an attack, or identify the attacker
to appropriate security personnel.

3-3 Courtesy phones
Policy: To prevent visitors from masquerading as company workers, every
courtesy telephone will clearly indicate the location of the caller (for example,
"Lobby") on the recipient's caller ID.

Explanation/Notes." If the caller ID for internal calls shows extension number
only, appropriate provision must be made for calls placed from company phones
in the reception area and any other public areas. It must not be possible for an
attacker to place a call from one of these phones and
 deceive an employee into believing that the call has been placed internally from
an employee telephone.

3-4 Manufacturer default passwords shipped with phone systems
Policy: The voice mail administrator should change all default passwords that
were shipped with the phone system prior to use by company personnel.

Explanation/Notes: Social engineers can obtain lists of default passwords from
manufacturers and use these to access administrator accounts.

3-5 Department voice mailboxes
Policy." Set up a generic voice mailbox for every department that ordinarily has
contact with the public.

Explanation/Notes: The first step of social engineering involves gathering
information about the target company and its personnel. By limiting the
accessibility of the names and telephone numbers of employees, a company
makes it more difficult for the social engineer to identify targets in the company,
or names of legitimate employees for use in deceiving other personnel.

3-6 Verification of telephone system vendor
Policy: No vendor-support technicians will be permitted to remotely access the
company telephone system without positive identification of vendor and
authorization to perform such work.

Explanation/Notes: Computer intruders who gain access to corporate telephone
systems gain the ability to create voice mailboxes, intercept messages intended
for other users, or make free phone calls at the corporation's expense.
3-7 Configuration of phone system
Policy." The voice mail administrator will enforce security requirements by
configuring the appropriate security parameters in the telephone system.

Explanation/Notes: Phone systems can be set up with greater or lesser degrees of
security for voice mail messages. The administrator should be aware of company
security concerns, and work with security personnel to configure the phone
system to protect Sensitive data.

3-8 Call trace feature
Policy: Depending on limitations of the communications provider, the call trace
feature will be enabled globally to allow employees to activate the trap-and-trace
feature when the caller is suspected of being an attacker.

Explanation/Notes: Employees must be trained on call trace usage and the
appropriate circumstances when it should be used. A call trace should be initiated
when the caller is clearly attempting to gain unauthorized access to corporate
computer systems or requesting Sensitive information. Whenever an employee
activates the call trace feature, immediate notification must be sent to the Incident
Reporting Group.

3-9 Automated phone systems
Policy." If the company uses an automated phone answering system, the system
must be programmed so that telephone extensions are not announced when
transferring a call to an employee or department.

Explanation/Notes: Attackers can use a company's automated telephone system
to map employee names to telephone extensions. Attackers can then use
knowledge of those extensions to convince call recipients that they are employees
with a right to insider information.

3-10 Voice mailboxes to become disabled after successive invalid access
attempts
Policy: Program the corporate telephone system to lock out any voice mail
account whenever a specified number of successive invalid access attempts have
been made.

Explanation/Notes." The Telecommunications administrator must lock out a
voice mailbox after five successive invalid attempts to log in. The administrator
must then reset any voice mail lockouts manually.

3-11 Restricted telephone extensions
Policy." All internal telephone extensions to departments or workgroups that
ordinarily do not receive calls from external callers (help desk, computer room,
employee technical support, and so on) should be programmed so that these
telephones can be reached only from internal extensions. Alternately, they can be
password-protected so that employees and other authorized persons calling from
the outside must enter the correct password.

Explanation/Notes: While use of this policy will block most attempts by amateur
social engineers to reach their likely targets, it should be noted that a determined
attacker will sometimes be able to talk an employee into calling the restricted
extension and asking the person who answers the phone to call the attacker, or
simply conference in the restricted extension. During security training, this
method of tricking employees into assisting the intruder should be discussed to
raise employee awareness about these tactics.

Miscellaneous
4-1 Employee badge design
Policy: Employee badges must be designed to include a large photo that can be
recognized from a distance.

Explanation/Notes: The photograph on corporate ID badges of standard design is,
for security purposes, only slightly better than worthless. The distance between a
person entering the building and the guard or receptionist who has the
responsibility to check identification is usually great enough that the picture is
too small to recognize when the person walks by. For the photo to be of value in
this situation, a redesign of the badge is necessary.

4-2 Access rights review when changing position or responsibilities
Policy: Whenever a company employee changes positions or is given increased
or decreased job responsibilities, the employee's manager will notify IT of the
change in the employee's responsibilities so that the appropriate security profile
can be assigned.

Explanation/Notes: Managing the access rights of personnel is necessary
 to limit disclosure of protected information. The rule of least privilege will
apply: The access rights assigned to users will be the minimum necessary to
perform their jobs. Any requests for changes that result in elevated access rights
must be in accordance with a policy on granting elevated access rights.

The worker's manager or the human resources department will have the
responsibility of notifying the information technology department to properly
adjust the account holder's access rights as needed.
4-3 Special identification for non employees
Policy: Your company should issue a special photo company badge to trusted
delivery people and non employees who have a business need to enter company
premises on a regular basis.

Explanation/Notes: Non employees who need to enter the building regularly (for
example, to make food or beverage deliveries to the cafeteria, or to repair
copying machines or make telephone installations) can pose a threat to your
company. In addition to issuing identification to these visitors, make sure your
employees are trained to spot a visitor without a badge and know how to act in
that situation.

4-4 Disabling computer accounts for contractors
Policy: Whenever a contractor who has been issued a computer account
has completed his or her assignment, or when the contract expires, the
responsible manager will immediately notify the information technology
department to disable the contractor's computer accounts, including any accounts
used for database access, dial-up, or Internet access from remote locations.

Explanation/Notes: W-hen a worker's employment is terminated, there is a
danger that he or she will use knowledge of your company's systems and
procedures to gain access to data. All computer accounts used by or known to the
worker must be promptly disabled. This includes accounts that provide access to
production databases, remote dial-in accounts, and any accounts used to access
computer-related devices.

4-5 Incident reporting organization
Policy: An incident reporting organization must be established or, in smaller
companies, an incident reporting individual and backup person designated, for
receiving and distributing alerts concerning possible security incidents in
progress.

Explanation/Notes: By centralizing the reporting of suspected security incidents,
an attack that may otherwise have gone unnoticed can be detected. In the event
that systematic attacks across the organization are detected and reported, the
incident reporting organization may be able to determine what the attacker is
targeting so that special efforts can be made to protect those assets.

Employees assigned to receive incident reports must become familiar with social
engineering methods and tactics, enabling them to evaluate to reports      and
recognize when an attack may be in progress.
4-6 Incident reporting hotline
Policy: A hotline to the incident reporting organization or person, which may
consist of an easy-to-remember phone extension, must be established.

Explanation/Notes: When employees suspect that they are the target of a social
engineering attack, they must be able to immediately notify the incident reporting
organization. In order for the notification to be timely, all company telephone
operators and receptionists must have the number posted or otherwise
immediately available to them.

A company-wide early warning system can substantially aid the organization in
detecting and responding to an ongoing attack. Employees must be sufficiently
well trained that one who suspects he or she has been the target of a social
engineering attack will immediately call the incident reporting hotline. In
accordance with published procedures, the incident reporting personnel will
immediately notify the targeted groups that an intrusion may be in progress so
personnel will be on alert. In order for the notification to be timely, the reporting
hotline number must be widely distributed throughout the company.

4-7 Sensitive areas must be secured
Policy: A security guard will screen access to sensitive or secure areas and should
require two forms of authentication.

Explanation/Notes: One acceptable form of authentication uses a digital
electronic lock that requires an employee to swipe his employee badge and enter
an access code. The best method to secure sensitive areas is to post a security
guard who observes any access-controlled entry. In organizations where this is
not cost-effective, two forms of authentication should be used to validate identity.
Depending on risk and cost, a biometric-enabled access card is recommended.

4-8 Network and phone cabinets
Policy: Cabinets, closets, or rooms containing network cabling, phone wiring, or
network access points must be secured at all times.

Explanation/Notes: Only authorized personnel will be permitted
access to telephone and network closets, rooms, or cabinets. Any outside
maintenance people or vendor personnel must be positively identified using the
procedures published by the department responsible for information security.
Access to phone lines, network hubs, switches, bridges, or other related
equipment could be used by an attacker to compromise computer and network
security.
4-9 Intracompany mail bins
Policy: Intracompany mail bins must not be located in publicly accessible areas.

Explanation/Notes: Industrial spies or computer intruders who have
access to any intracompany mail pickup points can easily send forged
authorization letters or internal forms that authorize personnel to release
Confidential information or to perform .an action that assists the attacker.
Additionally, the attacker can mail a floppy disk or electronic media with
instructions to install a software update, or open a file that has embedded macro
commands that serve the intruder's objectives. Naturally, any request received by
intracompany mail is assumed to be authentic by the party who receives it.

4-10 The company bulletin board

Policy: Bulletin boards for the benefit of company workers should not be posted
in locations where the public has access.

Explanation/Notes: Many businesses have bulletin boards where private company
or personnel information is posted for anyone to read. Employer notices,
employee lists, internal memorandums, employee home contact numbers listed in
advertisements, and other, similar information are frequently posted on the board.

Bulletin boards may be located near company cafeterias, or in close proximity to
smoking or break areas where visitors have free access. This type of information
should not be made available to visitors or the public.

4-11 Computer center entrance
Policy: The computer room or data center should be locked at all times and
personnel must authenticate their identity prior to entering.

Explanation/Notes: Corporate security ought to consider deploying an electronic
badge or access card reader so all entries can be electronically logged and
audited.

4-12 Customer accounts with service providers
Policy: Company personnel who place service orders with vendors that supply
critical services to the company must set up an account password to prevent
unauthorized persons from placing orders on behalf of the company.

Explanation/Notes: Utility companies and many other vendors allow customers to
set up a password on request; the company should establish passwords with all
vendors that provide mission-critical services. This policy is especially critical to
telecommunication and Internet services. Any time critical services can be
affected, a shared secret is necessary to verify that the caller is authorized to place
such orders. Note, too, identifiers such as social security number, corporate
taxpayer identification number, mother's maiden name, or similar identifiers must
not be used. A social engineer might, for example, call the telephone company
and give orders to add features such as call forwarding to dial-in modem lines,
or make a request to the Internet Service Provider to change translation
information to provide a bogus IP address when users perform a hostname
lookup.

4-13 Departmental contact person
Policy: Your company may institute a program under which each department or
workgroup assigns an employee the responsibility of acting as a point contact so
that any personnel can easily verify the identity of unknown persons claiming to
be from that department. For example, the help desk may contact the
departmental point person to verify the identity of an employee who is requesting
support.

Explanation/Notes: This method of verifying identity reduces the pool of
employees who are authorized to vouch for employees within their department
when such employees request support such as resetting passwords or other
computer account-related issues.

Social engineering attacks are successful in part because technical support
personnel are pressed for time and do not properly verify the identity of
requesters. Typically support staff cannot personally recognize all authorized
personnel because of the number of employees in larger organizations. The point-
person method of vouching limits the number of employees that technical support
staff need to be personally familiar with for verification purposes.

4-14 Customer passwords
Policy: Customer service representatives shall not have the ability to retrieve
customer account passwords.

Explanation/Notes: Social engineers frequently call customer service departments
and, under a pretext, attempt to obtain a customer's authentication information,
such as the password or social security number. With this information, the social
engineer can then call another service representative, pretend to be the customer,
and obtain information or place fraudulent orders.
To prevent these attempts from succeeding, customer service software
must be designed so that representatives can only type in the authentication
information provided by the caller, and receive a response from the system
indicating whether the password is correct or not.
4-15 Vulnerability testing
Policy: Notification of company use of social engineering tactics to test security
vulnerabilities is required during security awareness training and employee
orientation.

Explanation/Notes: Without notification of social engineering-penetration testing,
company personnel may suffer embarrassment, anger, or other emotional trauma
from the use of deceptive tactics used against them by other employees or
contractors. By placing new hires on notice during the orientation process that
they may be subject to this testing, you prevent such conflict.

4-16 Display of company Confidential information
Policy: Company information not designated for public release shall not be
displayed in any publicly accessible areas.

Explanation/Notes: In addition to Confidential product or procedure information,
internal contact information such as internal telephone or employee lists, or
building rosters that contain a list of management personnel for each department
within the company must also be kept out of view.

4-17 Security awareness training
Policy: All persons employed by the company must complete a security
awareness training course during employee orientation. Furthermore, each
employee must take a security awareness refresher course at periodic intervals,
not to exceed twelve months, as required by the department assigned with
security-training responsibility.

Explanation/Notes: Many organizations disregard end-user awareness training
altogether. According to the 2001 Global Information Security Survey, only 30
percent of the surveyed organizations spend money on awareness training for
their user-community. Awareness training is an essential requirement to mitigate
successful security breaches utilizing social engineering techniques.

4-18 Security training course for computer access
Policy: Personnel must attend and successfully complete a security information
course before being given access to any corporate computer systems.

Explanation/Notes: Social engineers frequently target new employees, knowing
that as a group they are generally the people least likely to be aware of the
company's security policies and the proper procedures to determine classification
and handling of sensitive information.
Training should include an opportunity for employees to ask questions about
security policies. After training, the account holder should be required to sign a
document acknowledging their understanding of the security policies, and their
agreement to abide by the policies.

4-19 Employee badge must be color-coded
Policy: Identification badges must be color-coded to indicate whether the badge
holder is an employee, contractor, temporary, vendor, consultant, visitor, or
intern.
Explanation/Notes: The color of the badge is an excellent way to determine
 the status of a person from a distance. An alternative would be to use large
lettering to indicate the badge holder's status, but using a color-coded scheme is
unmistakable and easier to see.

A common social engineering tactic to gain access to a physical building is to
dress up as a delivery person or repair technician. Once inside the facility, the
attacker will masquerade as another employee or lie about his status to obtain
cooperation from unsuspecting employees. The purpose of this policy is to
prevent people from entering the building legitimately and then entering areas
they should not have access to. For example, a person entering the facility as a
telephone repair technician would not be able to masquerade as an employee: The
color of the badge would give him away.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY POLICIES
The information technology department of any company has a special need for
policies that help it protect the organizations information assets. To reflect the
typical structure of IT operations in an organization, I have divided the IT
policies into General, Help Desk, Computer Administration, and Computer
Operations.


General
5-1 IT department employee contact information
Policy: Phone numbers and email addresses of individual IT department
employees should not be disclosed to any person without a need to know.

Explanation/Notes: The purpose of this policy is to prevent contact information
from being abused by social engineers. By only disclosing a general contact
number or email address for IT, outsiders will be blocked from contacting IT
department personnel directly. The email address for site administrative and
technical contacts should only consist of generic names such as
admin@companyname.com; published telephone numbers should connect to a
departmental voice mailbox, not to individual workers.
When direct contact information is available, it becomes easy for a computer
intruder to reach specific IT employees and trick them into providing information
that can be used in an attack, or to impersonate IT employees by using their
names and contact information.

5-2 Technical support requests
Policy: All technical support requests must be referred to the group that handles
such requests.

Explanation/Notes: Social engineers may attempt to target IT personnel who do
not ordinarily handle technical support issues, and who may not be aware of the
proper security procedures when handling such requests. Accordingly, IT staff
must be trained to deny these requests and refer the caller to the group that has
the responsibility of providing support.

Help Desk
6-1 Remote access procedures
Policy: Help desk personnel must not divulge details or instructions regarding
remote access, including external network access points or dialup numbers,
unless the requester has been:

Verified as authorized to receive Internal information; and,

Verified as authorized to connect to the corporate network as an external user.
Unless known on a person-to-person basis, the requester must be positively
identified in accordance with the Verification and Authorization Procedures
outlined at the beginning of this chapter.

Explanation/Notes: The corporate help desk is often a primary target for the
social engineer, both because the nature of their work is to assist users with
computer-related issues, and because they usually have elevated system
privileges. All help desk personnel must be trained to act as a human firewall to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of information that will assist any unauthorized
persons from gaining access to company resources. The simple rule is to never
disclose remote access procedures to anyone until positive verification of identity
has been made.

6-2 Resetting passwords
Policy: The password to a user account may be reset only at the request of the
account holder.

Explanation/Notes: The most common ploy used by social engineers is to have
another person's account password reset or changed. The attacker poses as the
employee using the pretext that their password was lost or forgotten. In an effort
to reduce the success of this type of attack, an IT employee receiving a request
for a password reset must call the employee back prior to taking any action; the
call back must not be made to a phone number provided by the requester, but to a
number obtained from the employee telephone directory. See Verification and
Authorization Procedures for more about this procedure.

6-3 Changing access privileges
Policy: All requests to increase a user's privileges or access rights must be
approved in writing by the account holder's manager. When the change is made a
confirmation must be sent to the requesting manager via intracompany mail.
Furthermore, such requests must be verified as authentic in accordance with the
Verification and Authorization Procedures.

Explanation/Notes: Once a computer intruder has compromised a standard user
account, the next step is to elevate his or her privileges so that the attacker has
complete control over the compromised system. An attacker who has knowledge
of the authorization process can spoof an authorized request when email, fax, or
telephone are used to transmit it. For example, the attacker may phone technical
support or the help desk and attempt to persuade a technician to grant additional
access rights to the compromised account.

6-4 New account authorization
Policy: A request to create a new account for an employee, contractor,
or other authorized person must be made either in writing and signed by the
employee's manager, or sent by digitally signed electronic mail. These requests
must also be verified by sending a confirmation of the request through
intracompany mail.

Explanation/Notes: Because passwords and other information useful in breaking
into computer systems are the highest priority targets of information thieves for
gaining access, special precautions are necessary. The intention of this policy is
to prevent computer intruders from impersonating authorized personnel or
forging requests for new accounts. Therefore, all such requests must be positively
verified using the Verification and Authorization Procedures.

6-5 Delivery of new passwords
Policy: New passwords must be handled as company Confidential information,
delivered by secure methods including in person; by a signature-required delivery
service such as registered mail; or by UPS or FedEx. See policies concerning
distribution of Confidential information.
Explanation/Notes: Intracompany mail may also be used, but it is recommended
that passwords be sent in secure envelopes that obscure the content. A suggested
method is to establish a computer point person in each department who has the
responsibility of handling distribution of new account details and vouching for
the identity of personnel who lose or forget their passwords. In these
circumstances, support personnel would always be working with a smaller group
of employees that would be personally recognized.

6-6 Disabling an account
Policy: Prior to disabling a user's account you must require positive verification
that the request was made by authorized personnel.

Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to prevent an attacker from
spoofing a request to disable an account, and then calling to troubleshoot the
user's inability to access the computer system. When the social engineer calls
posing as a technician with pre-existing knowledge of the user's inability to log
in, the victim often complies with a request to reveal his or her password during
the troubleshooting process.

6-7 Disabling network ports or devices
Policy: No employee should disable any network device or port for any
unverified technical support personnel.

Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to prevent an attacker from
spoofing a request to disable a network port, and then calling the worker to
troubleshoot his or her inability to access the network.

When the social engineer, posing as a helpful technician, calls with pre-existing
knowledge of the user's network problem, the victim often complies with a
request to reveal his or her password during the troubleshooting process.

6-8 Disclosure of procedures for wireless access
Policy: No personnel should disclose procedures for accessing company systems
over wireless networks to any parties not authorized to connect to the wireless
network.

Explanation/Notes: Always obtain prior verification of a requester as a person
authorized to connect to the corporate network as an external user before
releasing wireless access information. See Verification and Authorization
Procedures.
6-9 User trouble tickets

Policy: The names of any employees who have reported computer-related
problems should not be revealed outside the information technology department.

Explanation/Notes: In a typical attack, a social engineer will call the
help desk and request the names of any personnel who have reported recent
computer problems. The caller may pretend to be an employee, vendor, or an
employee of the telephone company. Once he obtains the names of persons
reporting trouble, the social engineer, posing as a help desk or technical support
person, contacts the employee and says he/she is calling to troubleshoot the
problem. During the call, the attacker deceives the victim into providing the
desired information or into performing an action that facilitates the attacker's
objective.

6-10 Initiating execute commands or running programs
Policy: Personnel employed in the IT department who have privileged accounts
should not execute any commands or run any application programs at the request
of any person not personally known to them.

Explanation/Notes: A common method attackers use to install a Trojan Horse
program or other malicious software is to change the name of an existing
program, and then call the help desk complaining that an error message is
displayed whenever an attempt is made to run the program. The attacker
persuades the help desk technician to run the program himself. When the
technician complies, the malicious software inherits the privileges of the user
executing the program and performs a task, which gives the attacker the same
computer privileges as the help desk employee. This may allow the attacker to
take control of the company system.
This policy establishes a countermeasure to this tactic by requiring that support
personnel verify employment status prior to running any program at the request
of a caller.

Computer Administration
7-1 Changing global access rights
Policy: A request to change the global access rights associated with an electronic
job profile must be approved by the group assigned the responsibility of
managing access rights on the corporate network.

Explanation/Notes: Authorized personnel will analyze each such request to
determine whether the change might entail a threat to information security. If so,
the responsible employee will address the pertinent issues with the requester and
jointly arrive at a decision about the changes to be made.
7-2 Remote access requests
Policy: Remote computer access will only be provided to personnel who have a
demonstrated need to access corporate computer systems from off-site locations.
The request must be made by an employee's manager and verified as described in
the Verification and Authorization Procedures section.

Explanation/Notes: Recognizing the need for off-site access into the corporate
network by authorized personnel, limiting such access only to people with a need
may dramatically reduce risk and management of remote access users. The
smaller the number of people with external dialup privileges, the smaller the
pool of potential targets for an attacker. Never forget that the attacker also may
target remote users with the intent of hijacking their connection into the corporate
network, or by masquerading as them during a pretext call.

7-3 Resetting privileged account passwords
Policy: A request to reset a password to a privileged account must be approved
by the system manager or administrator responsible for the computer on which
the account exists. The new password must be sent through intracompany mail or
delivered in person.

Explanation/Notes." Privileged accounts have access to all system resources and
files stored on the computer system. Naturally, these accounts deserve the
greatest protection possible.

7-4 Outside support personnel remote access
Policy: No outside support person (such as software or hardware vendor
personnel) may be given any remote access information or be allowed to access
any company computer system or related devices without positive verification of
identity and authorization to perform such services. If the vendor requires
privileged access to provide support services, the password to the account used
by the vendor shall be changed immediately after the vendor services have been
completed.

Explanation/Notes: Computer attackers may pose as vendors to gain access to
corporate computer or telecommunication networks. Therefore, it is essential that
the identity of the vendor be verified in addition to their authorization to perform
any work on the system. Moreover, the doors into the system must be slammed
shut once their job is done by changing the account password used by the vendor.

No vendor should be allowed to pick his or her own password for any account,
even temporarily. Some vendors have been known to use the same or similar
passwords across multiple customer systems. For example, one network security
company set up privileged accounts on all their customers' systems with the same
password, and, to add insult to injury, with outside Telnet access enabled.

7-5 Strong authentication for remote access to corporate systems
Policy: All connection points into the corporate network from remote locations
must be protected through the use of strong authentication devices, such as
dynamic passwords or biometrics.

Explanation/Notes: Many businesses rely on static passwords as the sole means
of authentication for remote users. This practice is dangerous because it is
insecure: computer intruders target any remote access point that might be the
weak link in the victim's network. Remember that you never know when
someone else knows your password.

Accordingly, any remote access points must be protected with strong
authentication such as time-based tokens, smart cards, or biometric devices, so
that intercepted passwords are of no value to an attacker.

When authentication based on dynamic passwords is impractical, computer users
must religiously adhere to the policy for choosing hard-to- guess passwords.

7-6 Operating system configuration
Policy: Systems administrators shall ensure that, wherever possible, operating
systems are configured so that they are consistent with all pertinent security
policies and procedures.

Explanation/Notes: Drafting and distributing security policies is a fundamental
step toward reducing risk, but in most cases, compliance is necessarily left up to
the individual employee. There are, however, any number of computer-related
policies that can be made mandatory through operating-system settings, such as
the required length of passwords. Automating security policies by configuration
of operating system parameters effectively takes the decision out of the human
element's hands, increasing the overall security of the organization.

7-7 Mandatory expiration
Policy: All computer accounts must be set to expire after one year.

Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to eliminate the existence of
computer accounts that are no longer being used, since computer intruders
commonly target dormant accounts. The process insures that to any computer
accounts belonging to former employees or contractors that have been
inadvertently left in place are automatically disabled.
At management discretion, you may require that employees must take a security
refresher training course at renewal time, or must review information security
policies and sign an acknowledgment of their agreement to adhere to them.

7-8 Generic email addresses
Policy: The information technology department shall set up a generic email
address for each department within the organization that ordinarily communicates
with the. public.

Explanation/Notes: The generic email address can be released to the public by the
telephone receptionist or published on the company Web site. Otherwise, each
employee shall only disclose his or her personal email address to people who
have genuine need to know.

During the first phase of a social engineering attack, the attacker often tries to
obtain telephone numbers, names, and titles of employees. In most cases, this
information is publicly available on the company Web site or just for the asking.
Creation of generic voice mailboxes and/or email addresses makes it difficult to
associate employee names with particular departments or responsibilities.

7-9 Contact information for domain registrations
Policy: When registering for acquisition of Internet address space or
host names, the contact information for administrative, technical, or other
personnel should not identify any individual personnel by name. Instead, you
should list a generic email address and the main corporate telephone number.

Explanation/Notes: The purpose of this policy is to prevent contact information
from being abused by a computer intruder. When the names and phone numbers
of individuals are provided, an intruder can use this information to contact the
individuals and attempt to deceive them into revealing system information, or to
perform an action item that facilitates an attacker's objective. Or the social
engineer can impersonate a listed person in an effort to deceive other company
personnel.
Instead of an email address to a particular employee, contact information
 must be in the form of administrator@company.com. Telecommunications
department personnel can establish a generic voice mailbox for administrative or
technical contacts so as to limit information disclosure that would be useful in a
social engineering attack.

7-10 Installation of security and operating system updates
Policy: All security patches for operating system and application software shall
be installed as soon as they become available. If this policy conflicts with the
operation of mission-critical productions systems, such updates should be
performed as soon as practicable.

Explanation/Notes: Once a vulnerability has been identified, the software
manufacturer should be contacted immediately to determine whether a
patch or a temporary fix ha been made available to close the vulnerability.
An un-patched computer system represents one of the greatest security
threats to the enterprise. When system administrators procrastinate about
applying the necessary fixes, the window of exposure is open wide so that
any attacker can climb through.

Dozens of security vulnerabilities are identified and published weekly on the
Internet. Until information technology staff are vigilant in their efforts to apply
all security patches and fixes as soon as practical, despite these systems being
behind the company firewall, the corporate network will always be at risk of
suffering a security incident. It is extremely important to keep apprised of
published security vulnerabilities identified in the operating system or any
application programs used during the course of business.

7-11 Contact information on Web sites
Policy: The company's external Web site shall not reveal any details of corporate
structure or identify any employees by name.

Explanation/Notes: Corporate structure information such as organization charts,
hierarchy charts, employee or departmental lists, reporting structure, names,
positions, internal contact numbers, employee numbers, or similar information
that is used for internal processes should not be made available on publicly
accessible Web sites.

Computer intruders often obtain very useful information on a target's Web site.
The attacker uses this information to appear as a knowledgeable 206 employee
when using a pretext or ruse. The social engineer is more likely to establish
credibility by having this information at his or her disposal.
Moreover, the attacker can analyze this information to find out the likely targets
who have access to valuable, sensitive, or critical information.

7-12 Creation of privileged accounts
Policy." No privileged account should be created or system privileges granted to
any account unless authorized by the system administrator or system manager.

Explanation/Notes." Computer intruders frequently pose as hardware or software
vendors in an attempt to dupe information technology personnel into creating
unauthorized accounts. The intention of this policy is to block these attacks by
establishing greater control over the creation of privileged accounts. The system
manager or administrator of the computer system must approve any request to
create an account with elevated privileges.

7-13 Guest accounts
Policy: Guest accounts on any computer systems or related networked devices
shall be disabled or removed, except for an FTP (file transfer protocol) server
approved by management with anonymous access enabled.

Explanation/Notes: The intention of the guest account is to provide temporary
access for persons who do not need to have their own account. Several operating
systems are installed by default with a guest account enabled. Guest accounts
should always be disabled because their existence violates the principle of user
accountability. IT should be able to audit any computer-related activity and relate
it to a specific user.

Social engineers are easily able to take advantage of these guest accounts for
gaining unauthorized access, either directly or by duping authorized personnel
into using a guest account.

7-14 Encryption of off-site backup data
Policy: Any company data that is stored off site should be encrypted to prevent
unauthorized access.

Explanation/Notes: Operations staff must insure that all data is recoverable in the
event that any information needs to be restored. This requires regular test
decryption of a random sampling of encrypted files to make sure the data can be
recovered. Furthermore, keys used to encrypt data shall be escrowed with a
trusted manager in the event the encryption keys are lost or unavailable.

7-15 Visitor access to network connections
Policy: All publicly accessible Ethernet access points must be on a segmented
network to prevent unauthorized access to the internal network.

Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to prevent any outsiders from
connecting to the internal network when on company premises. Ethernet jacks
installed in conference rooms, the cafeteria, training centers, or other areas
accessible to visitors shall be filtered to prevent unauthorized access by visitors to
the corporate computer systems.

The network or security administrator may choose to set up a virtual
LAN in a switch, if available, to control access from these locations.
7-16 Dial-in modems
Policy: Modems used for dial-in calls shall be set to answer no earlier
than the fourth ring.

Explanation/Notes: As depicted in the movie War Games, hackers use a
technique known as war dialing to locate telephone lines that have modems
connected to them. The process begins with the attacker identifying the telephone
prefixes used in the area where the target company is located. A scanning
program is then used to try every telephone number in those prefixes, to locate
those that answer with a modem. To speed up the process, these programs are
configured to wait for one or two rings for a modem response before going on to
try the next number. When a company sets the auto answer on modem lines to at
least four rings, scanning programs will fail to recognize the line as a modem
line.

7-17 Antivirus software
Policy: Every computer system shall have current versions of antivirus software
installed and activated.

Explanation/Notes: For those businesses that do not automatically push down
antivirus software and pattern files (programs that recognize patterns common to
virus software to recognize new viruses) to user desktops or workstations,
individual users must take the responsibility for installing and maintaining the
software on their own systems, including any computer systems used for
accessing the corporate network remotely.

If feasible, this software must be set for automatic update of virus and Trojan
signatures nightly. When pattern or signature flies are not pushed down to user
desktops, computer users shall have the responsibility to update pattern files at
least on a weekly basis.

These provisions apply to all desktop machines and laptops used to access
company computer systems, and apply whether the computer is company
property or personally owned.

7-18 Incoming email attachments (high security requirements)
Policy: In an organization with high security requirements, the corporate firewall
shall be configured to filter out all email attachments.

Explanation/Notes: This policy applies only to businesses with high security
requirements, or to those that have no business need to receive attachments
through electronic mail.
7-19 Authentication of software
Policy: All new software or software fixes or upgrades, whether on physical
media or obtained over the Internet, must be verified as authentic prior to
installation. This policy is especially relevant to the information technology
department when installing any software that requires system privileges.

Explanation/Notes: Computer software referred to in this policy includes
operating system components, application software, hot fixes, patches, or any
software updates. Many software manufacturers have implemented methods
whereby customers can check the integrity of any distribution, usually by a
digital signature. In any case where the integrity cannot be verified, the
manufacturer must be consulted to verify that the software is authentic.

Computer attackers have been known to send software to a victim, packaged to
appear as if the software manufacturer had produced it and shipped it to the
company. It is essential that you verify any software you receive as authentic,
especially if unsolicited, before installing it on company systems.
Note that a sophisticated attacker might find out that your organization has
ordered software from a manufacturer. With that information in hand, the attacker
can cancel the order with the real manufacturer, and order the software himself.
The software is then modified to perform some malicious function, and is shipped
or delivered to your company, in the original packaging, with shrink-wrapping if
necessary. Once the product is installed, the attacker is in control.

7-20 Default passwords
Policy: All operating system software and hardware devices that initially
have a password set to a default value must have their passwords reset in
accordance with the company password policy.

Explanation/Notes: Several operating systems and computer-related devices are
shipped with default passwords--that is, with the same password enabled on
every unit sold. Failure to change default passwords is a grave mistake that places
the company at risk.
Default passwords are widely known and are available on Internet Web
sites. In an attack, the first password an intruder tries is the manufacturer s default
password.

7-21 Invalid access attempts lockout (low to medium security)
Policy: Especially in an organization with low to medium security requirements,
whenever a specified number of successive invalid login attempts to a particular
account have been made, the account should be locked out for a period of time.

Explanation/Notes: All company workstations and servers must be set
to limit the number of successive invalid attempts to sign in. This policy is
necessary to prevent password guessing by trial and error, dictionary attacks, or
brute force attempts to gain unauthorized access.

The system administrator must configure the security settings to lock out an
account whenever the desired threshold of successive invalid attempts has been
reached. It is recommended that an account be locked out for at least thirty
minutes after seven successive login attempts.

7-22 Invalid access attempts account disabled (high security)
Policy: In an organization with high security requirements, whenever a specified
number of successive invalid login attempts to a particular account has been
made, the account should be disabled until reset by the group responsible for
providing account support.

Explanation/Notes: All company workstations and servers must be set to limit the
number of successive invalid attempts to sign in. This policy is a necessary
control to prevent password guessing by trial and error, dictionary attacks, or
brute force attempts to gain unauthorized access.

The system administrator must configure the security settings to disable the
account after five invalid login attempts. Following such an attack, the account
holder will need to call technical support or the group responsible for account
support to enable the account. Prior to resetting the account, the department
responsible must positively identify the account holder, following the
Verification and Authorization Procedures.

7-23 Periodic change of privileged
Policy: All privileged account holders shall be required to change their passwords
at least every thirty days.

Explanation/Notes: Depending on operating system limitations, the systems
administrator must enforce this policy by configuration of security parameters in
system software.

7-24 Periodic change of user passwords
Policy: All account holders must change their passwords at least every sixty days.

Explanation/Notes: With operating systems that provide this feature, the systems
administrator must enforce this policy by configuration of security parameters in
the software.
7-25 New account password set up
Policy: New computer accounts must be established with an initial password that
is pre-expired, requiring the account holder to select a new password upon initial
use.

Explanation/Notes: This requirement ensures that only the account holder will
have knowledge of his or her password.

7-26 Boot-up passwords
Policy: All computer systems must be configured to require a bootup password.

Explanation/Notes: Computers must be configured so that when the computer is
turned on, a password is required before the operating system will boot. This
prevents any unauthorized person from turning on and using another person's
computer. This policy applies to all computers on company premises.

7-27 Password requirements for privileged accounts
Policy: M1 privileged accounts must have a strong password: The password
must:
Not be a word found in a dictionary in any language
Be mixed upper and lower case with at least one letter, one symbol, and one
numeral
Be at least 12 characters in length
Not be related to the company or individual in any way.

Explanation/Notes: In most cases computer intruders will target specific accounts
that have system privileges. Occasionally the attacker will exploit other
vulnerabilities to gain full control over the system.

The first passwords an intruder will try are the simple, commonly used words
found in a dictionary. Selecting strong passwords enhances the security by
reducing the chance an attacker will find the password by trial and error,
dictionary attack, or brute force attack.

7-28 Wireless access points
Policy: All users who access a wireless network must use VPN (Virtual Private
Network) technology to protect the corporate network.

Explanation/Notes: Wireless networks are being attacked by a new technique
called war driving. This technique involves simply driving or walking around
with a laptop equipped with an 802.11B NIC card until a wireless network is
detected.
Many companies have deployed wireless networks without even enabling WEP
(wireless equivalency protocol), which is used to secure the wireless connection
through use of encryption. But even when activated, the current version of WEP
(mid-2002) is ineffective: It has been cracked wide open, and several Web sites
are devoted to providing the means for locating open wireless systems and
cracking WEP-enabled wireless access points.

Accordingly, it is essential to add a layer of protection around the 802.11B
protocol by deploying VPN technology.

7-29 Updating antivirus pattern files
Policy: Every computer system must be programmed to automatically update
antivirus/anti-Trojan pattern files.

Explanation/Notes: At a minimum, such updates shall occur at least weekly. In
businesses where employees leave their computers turned on, it 302 is highly
recommended that pattern files be updated on a nightly basis.

Antivirus software is ineffective if it is not updated to detect all new forms of
malicious code. Since the threat of virus, worm, and Trojan Horse infections is
substantially increased if pattern files are not updated, it is essential that antivirus
or malicious code products be kept up to date.

Computer Operations
8-1 Entering commands or running programs
Policy.: Computer operations personnel must not enter commands or run
programs at the request of any person not known to them. If a situation arises
where an Unverified Person seems to have reason to make such a request, it
should not be complied with without first getting manager approval.

Explanation/Notes.: Computer operations employees are popular targets of social
engineers, since their positions usually require privileged account access, and the
attacker expects that they will be less experienced and less knowledgeable about
company procedures than other IT workers. The intention of this policy is to add
an appropriate check and balance to prevent social engineers from duping
computer operations personnel.

8-2 Workers with privileged accounts
Policy: Employees with privileged accounts must not provide assistance or
information to any Unverified Person. In particular this refers to not providing
computer help (such as training on application use), accessing any company
database, downloading software, or revealing names of personnel who have
remote access capabilities,
Explanation/Notes: Social engineers often target employees with privileged
accounts. The intent of this policy is to direct IT staff with privileged accounts to
successfully handle calls that might represent social engineering attacks.

8-3 Internal systems information
Policy: Computer Operations staff must never disclose any information related to
enterprise computer systems or related devices without positively verifying the
identity of the requester.

Explanation/Notes: Computer intruders often contact computer operations
employees to obtain valuable information such as system access procedures,
external points for remote access, and dial-in telephone numbers that are of
substantial value to the attacker.

In companies that have technical support staff or a help desk, requests
to the computer operations staff for information about computer systems or
related devices should be considered unusual. Any information request should be
scrutinized under the corporate data classification policy to determine whether
the requester is authorized to have such information. When the class of
information cannot be determined, the information should be considered to be
Internal.

In some cases, outside vendor technical support will need to communicate with
persons who have access to enterprise computer systems. Vendors must have
specific contacts in the IT department so that those individuals can recognize
each other for verification purposes.

8-4 Disclosure of passwords
Policy: Computer operations staff must never reveal their password, or
any other passwords entrusted to them, without prior approval of an information
technology manager.

Explanation/Notes: In general terms, revealing any password to another is strictly
prohibited. This policy recognizes that operations personnel may need to disclose
a password to a third party when exigent situations arise. This exception to the
general policy prohibiting disclosure of any password requires specific approval
of an information technology manager. For extra precaution, this responsibility of
disclosing authentication information should be limited to a small group of
individuals who have received special training on verification procedures.

8-5 Electronic media
Policy: All electronic media that contains information not designated for public
release shall be locked in a physically secure location.
Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to prevent physical theft of
Sensitive information stored on electronic media.
8-6 Backup media
Policy: Operations personnel should store backup media in a company safe or
other secure location.

Explanation/Notes: Backup media is another prime target of computer intruders.
An attacker is not going to spend time attempting to compromise a computer
system or network when the weakest link in the chain might be physically
unprotected backup media. Once backup media is stolen, the attacker can
compromise the confidentiality of any data stored on it, unless the data is
encrypted. Therefore, physically securing backup media is an essential process to
protect the confidentiality of corporate information.


POLICIES FOR ALL EMPLOYEES
Whether in IT or human resources, the accounting department, or the
maintenance staff, there are certain security policies that every employee of your
company must know. These policies fall into the categories of General, Computer
Use, Email Use, policies for Telecommuters, Phone Use, Fax Use, Voice Mail
Use, and Passwords.

General
9-1 Reporting suspicious calls
Policy: Employees who suspect that they may be the subject of a security
violation, including any suspicious requests to disclose information or to perform
action items on a computer, must immediately report the event to the company's
incident reporting group.

Explanation/Notes.: When a social engineer fails to convince his or her target to
comply with a demand, the attacker will always try someone else. By reporting a
suspicious call or event, an employee takes the first step in alerting the company
that an attack may be under way. Thus, individual employees are the first line of
defense against social engineering attacks.

9-2 Documenting suspicious calls

Policy: In the event of a suspicious phone call that appears to be a social
engineering attack, the employee shall, to the extent practical, draw out the caller
to learn details that might reveal what the attacker is attempting to accomplish,
and make notes of these details for reporting purposes.
Explanation/Notes: When reported to the incident reporting group, such details
can help them spot the object or pattern of an attack.

9-3 Disclosure of dial-up numbers
Policy: Company personnel must not disclose company modem telephone
numbers, but should always refer such requests to the help desk or to technical
support personnel.

Explanation/Notes: Dial-up telephone numbers must be treated as Internal
information, to be provided only to employees who have a need to know such
information to carry out their job responsibilities.
Social engineers routinely target employees or departments that are likely to be
less protective of the requested information. For example, the attacker may call
the accounts payable department masquerading as a telephone company
employee who is trying to resolve a billing problem. The attacker then asks for
any known fax or dial-in numbers in order to resolve the problem. The intruder
often targets an employee who is unlikely to realize the danger of releasing such
information, or who lacks training with respect to company disclosure policy and
procedures.

9-4 Corporate ID badges
Policy: Except when in their immediate office area, all company personnel,
including management and executive staff, must wear their employee badges at
all times.

Explanation/Notes: All workers, including corporate executives, should be
trained and motivated to understand that wearing an ID badge is mandatory
everywhere on company premises other than public areas and the person's own
office or workgroup area.

9-5 Challenging ID badge violations
Policy: All employees must immediately challenge any unfamiliar person who is
not wearing an employee badge or visitor's badge.

Explanation/Notes: While no company wants to create a culture where eagle-
eyed employees look for a way to ensnare co-workers for venturing into the
hallway without their badges, nonetheless any company concerned with
protecting its information needs to take seriously the threat of a social engineer
wandering its facilities unchallenged. Motivation for employees who prove
diligent in helping enforce the badges-always policy may be acknowledged in
familiar ways, such as recognition in the company newspaper or on bulletin
boards; a few hours off with pay; or a letter of commendation in their personnel
records.
9-6 Piggybacking (passing through secure entrances)
Policy: Employees entering a building must not allow anyone not personally
known to them to follow behind them when they have used a secure means, such
as a card key, to gain entrance (piggybacking).

Explanation/Notes." Employees must understand that it is not rude to require
unknown persons to authenticate themselves before helping them enter a facility
or access a secure area.
Social engineers frequently use a technique known as piggybacking, in which
they lie in wait for another person who is entering a facility or Sensitive area, and
then simply enter with them. Most people feel uncomfortable challenging others,
assuming that they are probably legitimate employees. Another piggybacking
technique is to carry several boxes so that an unsuspecting worker opens or holds
the door to help.

9-7 Shredding Sensitive documents
Policy: Sensitive documents to be discarded must be cross-shredded; media
including hard drives that have ever contained Sensitive information or materials
must be destroyed in accordance with the procedures set forth by the group
responsible for information security.

Explanation/Notes: Standard shredders do not adequately destroy documents;
cross-shredders turn documents into pulp. The best security practice is to
presume that the organization's chief competitors will be rifling through
discarded materials looking for any intelligence that could be beneficial to them.

Industrial spies and computer attackers regularly obtain Sensitive information
from materials tossed in the trash. In some cases, business competitors have been
known to attempt bribery of cleaning crews to turn over company trash. In one
recent example, an employee at Goldman Sachs discovered items that were used
in an insider-trading scheme from the trash.

9-8 Personal identifiers
Policy: Personal identifiers such as employee number, social security number,
driver's license number, date and place of birth, and mother's maiden name
should never be used as a means of verifying identity. These identifiers are not
secret and can be obtained by numerous means.

Explanation/Notes: A social engineer can obtain other people's personal
identifiers for a price. And in fact, contrary to popular belief, anyone with a credit
card and access to the Internet can obtain these pieces of personal identification.
Yet despite the obvious danger, banks, utility companies, and credit card
companies commonly use these identifiers. This is one reason that identity theft is
the fastest growing crime of the decade.

9-9 Organization charts
Policy." Details shown on the company's organization chart must not be disclosed
to anyone other than company employees.

Explanation/Notes: Corporate structure information includes organization charts,
hierarchy charts, departmental employee lists, reporting structure, employee
names, employee positions, internal contact numbers, employee numbers, or
similar information.
In the first phase of a social engineering attack, the goal is to gather
information about the internal structure of the company. This information is then
used to strategize an attack plan. The attacker can also analyze this information to
determine which employees are likely to have access to the data that he seeks.
During the attack, the information makes the attacker appear as a knowledgeable
employee; making it more likely he'll dupe his victim into compliance.

9-10 Private information about employees
Policy.: Any requests for private employee information must be referred
to human resources.

Explanation/Notes: An exception to this policy may be the telephone number for
an employee who needs to be contacted regarding a work-related issue or who is
acting in an on-call role. However, it is always preferable to get the requester's
phone number, and have the employee call him or her back.

Computer Use
10-1 Entering commands into a computer
Policy: Company personnel should never enter commands into a computer or
computer-related equipment at the request of another person unless the requester
has been verified as an employee of the information technology department.

Explanation/Notes: One common ploy of social engineers is to request that an
employee enter a command that makes a change to the system's configuration,
allows the attacker to access the victim's computer without providing
authentication, or allows the attacker to retrieve information that can be used to
facilitate a technical attack.

10-2 Internal naming conventions
Policy: Employees must not disclose the internal names of computer systems or
databases without prior verification that the requester is employed by the
company.
Explanation/Notes: Social engineers will sometimes attempt to obtain the names
of company computer systems; once the names are known, the attacker places a
call to the company and masquerades as a legitimate employee having trouble
accessing or using one of the systems. By knowing the internal name assigned to
the particular system, the social engineer gains credibility.

10-3 Requests to run programs
Policy: Company personnel should never run any computer applications or
programs at the request of another person unless the requester has been verified
as an employee of the information technology department.

Explanation/Notes: Any request to run programs, applications, or perform any
activity on a computer must be refused unless the requester is positively
identified as an employee in the information technology department. If the
request involves revealing Confidential information from any file or electronic
message, responding to the request must be in accordance with the procedures for
releasing Confidential information. See Information Disclosure Policy.

Computer attackers deceive people into executing programs that enable the
intruder to gain control of the system. When an unsuspecting user runs a program
planted by an attacker, the result may give the intruder access to the victim's
computer system. Other programs record the activities of the computer user and
return that information to the attacker. While a social engineer can trick a person
into executing computer instructions that may do damage, a technically based
attack tricks the computer's operating system into executing computer
instructions that may cause the same sort of damage.

10-4 Downloading or installing software
Policy: Company personnel must never download or install software at the
request of another person, unless the requester has been verified as an employee
with the information technology department.

Explanation/Notes: Employees should be on the alert for any unusual request that
involves any sort of transaction with computer-related equipment.
A common tactic used by social engineers is to deceive unsuspecting victims into
downloading and installing a program that helps the attacker accomplish his or
her goal of compromising computer or network security. In some instances, the
program may covertly spy on the user or allow the attacker to take control of the
computer system through use of a covert remote control application.

10-5 Plain text passwords and email
Policy: Passwords shall not be sent through email unless encrypted.
Explanation/Notes: While it's discouraged, this policy may be waived
by e-commerce sites in certain limited circumstances, such as:
Sending passwords to customers who have registered on the site.

Sending passwords to customers who have lost or forgotten their passwords.

10-6 Security-related software
Policy: Company personnel must never remove or disable antivirus/ Trojan
Horse, firewall, or other security-related software without prior approval from the
information technology department.

Explanation/Notes: Computer users sometimes disable security-related software
without provocation, thinking it will increase the speed of their computer.

A social engineer may attempt to deceive an employee into disabling or removing
software that is needed to protect the company against security- related threats.

10-7 Installation of modems
Policy.. No modems may be connected to any computer until prior approval has
been obtained from the IT department.

Explanation/Notes.: It is important to recognize that modems on desktops or
workstations in the workplace pose a substantial security threat, especially if
connected to the corporate network. Accordingly, this policy controls modem
connection procedures.

Hackers use a technique called war dialing to identify any active modem lines
within a range of telephone numbers. The same technique may be used to locate
telephone numbers connected to modems within the enterprise. An attacker can
easily compromise the corporate network if he or she identifies a computer
system connected to a modem running vulnerable remote access software, which
is configured with an easily guessed password or no password at all.

10-8 Modems and auto-answer settings
Policy: M1 desktops or workstations with IT-approved modems shall have the
modem auto-answer feature disabled to prevent anyone from dialing into the
computer system.

Explanation/Notes.- Whenever feasible, the information technology department
should deploy a dial-out modem pool for those employees who need to dial out to
external computer systems via modem.
10-9 Cracking tools
Policy: Employees will not download or use any software tools designed to
defeat software protection mechanisms.

Explanation/Notes: The Internet has dozens of sites devoted to software designed
to crack shareware and commercial software products. The use of these tools not
only violates a software owner's copyright, but also is extremely dangerous.
Because these programs originate from unknown sources, they may contain
hidden malicious code that may cause damage to the user's computer or plant a
Trojan Horse that gives the author of the program access to the user's computer.

10-10 Posting company information on line
Policy: Employees shall not disclose any details regarding company hardware or
software in any public newsgroup, forum, or bulletin board, and shall not disclose
contact information other than in accordance with policy.

Explanation/Notes: Any message posted to the Usenet, on-line forums,
bulletin boards, or mailing lists can be searched to gather intelligence on a target
company or a target individual. During the research phase of a social engineering
attack, the attacker may search the Internet for any posts that contain useful
information about the company, its products or its people.

Some posts contain very useful tidbits of information that the attacker
can use to further an attack. For example, a network administrator may post a
question about configuring firewall filters on a particular brand and model of
firewall. An attacker who discovers this message will learn valuable information
about the type and configuration of the companys firewall that enables him to
circumvent it to gain access to the enterprise network.

This problem can be reduced or avoided by implementing a policy that
allows employees to post to newsgroups from anonymous accounts that do not
identify the company from which they originated. Naturally, the policy must
require employees not to include any contact information that may identify the
company.

10-11 Floppy disks and other electronic media
Policy: If media used to store computer information, such as floppy
disks or CD-ROMS have been left in a work area or on an employee's desk, and
that media is from an unknown source, it must not be inserted into any computer
system.

Explanation/Notes: One method used by attackers to install malicious code is to
place programs onto a floppy or CD-ROM and label it with something very
enticing (for example, "Personnel Payroll Data-- Confidential"). They then drop
several copies in areas used by employees. If a single copy is inserted into a
computer and the files on it opened, the attacker's malicious code is executed.
This may create a backdoor, which is used to compromise the system, or may
cause other damage to the network.

10-12 Discarding removable media
Policy: Before discarding any electronic media that ever contained Sensitive
company information, even if that information has been deleted, the item shall be
thoroughly degaussed or damaged beyond recovery.

Explanation/Notes: While shredding hard-copy documents is commonplace these
days, company workers may overlook the threat of discarding electronic media
that contained Sensitive data ar any rime. Computer attackers attempt to recover
any data stored on discarded electronic media. Workers may presume that by just
deleting files, they ensure that those files cannot be recovered. This presumption
is absolutely incorrect and can cause confidential business information to fall into
the wrong hands. Accordingly, all electronic media that contains or previously
contained information not designated as Public must be wiped clean or destroyed
using the procedures approved by the responsible group.

10-13 Password-protected screen savers
Policy: All computer users must set a screen saver password and the inactivity
time-out limit to lock the computer after a certain period of inactivity.

Explanation/Notes: All employees are responsible for setting a screen saver
password, and setting the inactivity timeout for no more than ten minutes. The
intention of this policy is to prevent any unauthorized person from using another
person's computer. Additionally, this policy protects company computer systems
from being easily accessed by outsiders who have gained access to the building.

10-14 Disclosure or sharing of passwords statement
Policy: Prior to creation of a new computer account, the employee or contractor
must sign a written statement acknowledging that he or she understands that
passwords must never be disclosed or shared with anyone, and that he or she
agrees to abide by this policy.

Explanation/Notes: The agreement should also include a notice that violation of
such agreement may lead to disciplinary action up to and including termination.

Email Use
11-1 Email attachments
Policy: Email attachments must not be opened unless the attachment was
expected in the course of business or was sent by a Trusted Person.

Explanation/Notes: All email attachments must be scrutinized closely. You may
require that prior notice be given by a Trusted Person that an email attachment is
being sent before the recipient opens any attachment. This will reduce the risk of
attackers using social engineering tactics to deceive people into opening
attachments.

One method of compromising a computer system is to trick an
employee into running a malicious program that creates a vulnerability, providing
the attacker with access to the system. By sending an email attachment that has
executable code or macros, the attacker may be able to gain control of the user's
computer.

A social engineer may send a malicious email attachment, then call and
attempt to persuade the recipient to open the attachment.


11-2 Automatic forwarding to external addresses
Policy: Automatic forwarding of incoming email to an external email address is
prohibited.

Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to prevent an outsider from
receiving email sent to an internal email address.

Employees occasionally set up email forwarding of their incoming mail to an
email address outside the company when they will be away from the office. Or an
attacker may be able to deceive an employee into setting up an internal email
address that forwards to an address outside the company. The attacker can then
pose as a legitimate insider by having an internal company email address and get
people to email Sensitive information to the internal email address.

11-3 Forwarding emails
Policy: Any request from an Unverified Person to relay an electronic mail
message to another Unverified Person requires verification of the requester's
identity.

11-4 Verifying email
Policy: An email message that appears to be from a Trusted Person that contains
a request to provide information not designated as Public, or to perform an action
with any computer-related equipment, requires an additional form of
authentication. See Verification and Authorization Procedures.
Explanation/Notes: An attacker can easily forge an email message and its header,
making it appear as if the message originated from another email address. An
attacker can also send an email message from a compromised computer system,
providing phony authorization to disclose information or perform an action. Even
by examining the header of an email message you cannot detect email messages
sent from a compromised internal computer system.

Phone Use
12-1 Participating in telephone surveys
Policy: Employees may not participate in surveys by answering any questions
from any outside organization or person. Such requests must be referred to the
public relations department or other designated person.

Explanation/Notes: A method used by social engineers to obtain valuable
information that may be used against the enterprise is to call an employee and
claim to be doing a survey. It's surprising how many people are happy to provide
information about the company and themselves to strangers when they believe
they're taking part in legitimate research. Among the innocuous questions, the
caller will insert a few questions that the attacker wants to know. Eventually,
such information may be used to compromise the corporate network.

12-2 Disclosure of internal telephone numbers
Policy: If an Unverified Person asks an employee for his phone number the
employee may make a reasonable determination of whether disclosure is
necessary to conduct company business.
Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to require employees to make a
considered decision on whether disclosure of their telephone extension is
necessary. When dealing with people who have not demonstrated a genuine need
to know the extension, the safest course is to require them to call the main
company phone number and be transferred.

12-3 Passwords in voice mail messages
Policy.: Leaving messages containing password information on anyone's voice
mailbox is prohibited.

Explanation/Notes: A social engineer can often gain access to an employee's
voice mailbox because it is inadequately protected with an easy-to-guess access
code. In one type of attack, a sophisticated computer intruder is able to create his
own phony voice mailbox and persuade another employee to leave a message
relaying password information. This policy defeats such a ruse.

Fax Use
13-1 Relaying faxes
Policy: No fax may be received and forwarded to another party without
verification of the requester's identity.

Explanation/Notes: Information thieves may trick trusted employees into faxing
sensitive information to a fax machine located on the company's premises. Prior
to the attacker giving the fax number to the victim, the imposter telephones an
unsuspecting employee, such as a secretary or administrative assistant, and asks if
a document can be faxed to them for later pickup. Subsequently, after the
unsuspecting employee receives the fax, the attacker telephones the employee
and requests that the fax be sent to another location, perhaps claiming that it is
needed for an urgent meeting. Since the person asked to relay the fax usually has
no understanding of the value of the information, he or she complies with the
request.

13-2 Verification of faxed authorizations
Policy: Prior to carrying out any instructions received by facsimile, the sender
must be verified as an employee or other Trusted Person. Placing a telephone call
to the sender to verify the request is usually sufficient.

Explanation/Notes: Employees must exercise caution when unusual requests are
sent by fax, such as a request to enter commands into a computer or disclose
information. The data in the header of a faxed document can be falsified by
changing the settings of the sending fax machine. Therefore the header on a fax
must not be accepted as a means of establishing identity or authorization.

13-3 Sending sensitive information by fax
Policy: Before sending Sensitive information by fax to a machine that is located
in an area accessible to other personnel, the sender shall transmit a cover page.
The recipient, on receiving the page, transmits a page in response, demonstrating
that he/he is physically present at the fax machine. The sender then transmits the
fax.

Explanation/Notes: This handshake process assures the sender that the recipient
is physically present at the receiving end. Moreover, this process verifies that the
receiving fax telephone number has not been forwarded to another location.

13-4 Faxing passwords prohibited
Policy: Passwords must not be sent via facsimile under any circumstances.

Explanation/Notes: Sending authentication information by facsimile is not secure.
Most fax machines are accessible to a number of employees. Furthermore, they
rely on the public telephone switched network, which can be manipulated by call
forwarding the phone number for the receiving fax machine so that the fax is
actually sent to the attacker at another number.

Voice Mail Use
14-1 Voice mail passwords
Policy: Voice mail passwords must never be disclosed to anyone for any purpose.
In addition, voice mail passwords must be changed every ninety days or sooner.
Explanation/Notes: Confidential company information may be left in voice mail
messages. To protect this information, employees should change their voice mail
passwords frequently, and never disclose them. In addition, voice mail users
should not use the same or similar voice mail passwords within a twelve-month
period.

14-2 Passwords on multiple systems
Policy.. Voice mail users must not use the same password on any other phone or
computer system, whether internal or external to the company.
Explanation/Notes." Use of a similar or identical password for multiple devices,
such as voice mail and computer, makes it easier for social engineers to guess all
the passwords of a user after identifying only one.

14-3 Setting voice mail passwords
Policy: Voice mail users and administrators must create voice mail passwords
that are difficult to guess. They must not be related in any way to the person
using it, or the company, and should not contain a predictable pattern that is
likely to be guessed.

Explanation/Notes: Passwords must not contain sequential or repeating digits (i.e.
1111, 1234, 1010), must not be the same as or based on the telephone extension
number, and must not be related to address, zip code, birth date, license plate,
phone number, weight, I.Q., or other predictable personal information.

14-4 Mail messages marked as "old"
Policy: When previously unheard voice mail messages are not marked as new
messages, the voice mail administrator must be notified of a possible security
violation and the voice mail password must immediately be changed.

Explanation/Notes: Social engineers may gain access to a voice mailbox in a
variety of ways. An employee who becomes aware that messages they have never
listened to are not being announced as new messages must assume that another
person has obtained unauthorized access to the voice mailbox and listened to the
messages themselves.
14-5 External voice mail greetings
Policy: Company workers shall limit their disclosure of information on their
external outgoing greeting on their voice mail. Ordinarily information related to a
worker's daily routine or travel schedule should not be disclosed.

Explanation/Notes: An external greeting (played to outside callers) should not
include last name, extension, or reason for absence (such as travel, vacation
schedule, or daily itinerary). An attacker can use this information to develop a
plausible story in his attempt to dupe other personnel.

14-6 Voice mail password patterns
Policy: Voice mail users shall not select a password where one part of the
password remains fixed, while another part changes in a predictable pattern.

Explanation/Notes: For example, do not use a password such as 743501, 743502,
743503, and so on, where the last two digits correspond to the current month.

14-7 Confidential or Private information
Policy: Confidential or Private information shall not be disclosed in a voice mail
message.

Explanation/Notes: The corporate telephone system is typically more vulnerable
than corporate computer systems. The passwords are usually a string of digits,
which substantially limits the number of possibilities for an attacker to guess.
Further, in some organizations, voice mail passwords may be shared with
secretaries or another administrative staff who have the responsibility of taking
messages for their managers. In light of the above, no Sensitive information
should ever be left on anyone's voice mail.

Passwords
15-1 Telephone security
Policy: Passwords shall not be disclosed over the telephone at any time.

Explanation/Notes: Attackers may find ways to listen in to phone conversations,
either in person or through a technological device.

15-2 Revealing computer passwords
Policy: Under no circumstances shall any computer user reveal his or her
password to anyone for any purpose without prior written consent of the
responsible information technology manager.

Explanation/Notes: The goal of many social engineering attacks involves
deceiving unsuspecting persons into revealing their account names and
passwords. This policy is a crucial step in reducing the risk of successful social
engineering attacks against the enterprise. Accordingly, this policy needs to be
followed religiously throughout the company.

15-3 Internet passwords
Policy: Personnel must never use a password that is the same as or similar to one
they are using on any corporate system on an Internet site.

Explanation/Notes: Malicious Web site operators may set up a site that purports
to offer something of value or the possibility of winning a prize. To register, a
visitor to the site must enter an email address, username, and password. Since
many people use the same or similar sign-on information repeatedly, the
malicious Web site operator will attempt to use the chosen password and
variations of it for attacking the target's work- or home- computer system. The
visitor's work computer can sometimes be identified by the email address entered
during the registration process.

15-4 Passwords on multiple systems
Policy: Company personnel must never use the same or a similar password in
more than one system. This policy pertains to various types of devices (computer
or voice mail); various locations of devices (home or work); and various types of
systems, devices (router or firewall), or programs (database or application).

Explanation/Notes: Attackers rely on human nature to break into computer
systems and networks. They know that, to avoid the hassle of keeping track of
several passwords, many people use the same or a similar password on every
system they access. As such, the intruder will attempt to learn the password of
one system where the target has an account. Once obtained, it's highly likely that
this password or a variation thereof will give access to other systems and devices
used by the employee.

15-5 Reusing passwords
Policy: No computer user shall use the same or a similar password within the
same eighteen-month period.

Explanation/Note: If an attacker does discover a user's password, frequent
changing of the password minimizes the damage that can be done. Making the
new password unique from previous passwords makes it harder for the attacker to
guess it.

15-6 Password patterns
Policy." Employees must not select a password where one part remains fixed, and
another element changes in a predictable pattern.
Explanation/Notes: For example, do not use a password such as Kevin01,
Kevin02, Kevin03, and so on, where the last two digits correspond to the current
month.

15-7 Choosing passwords
Policy: Computer users should create or choose a password that adheres
to the following requirements. The password must:

Be at least eight characters long for standard user accounts and at least twelve
characters long for privileged accounts.

Contain at least one number, at least one symbol (such as $, -, I, &), at least one
lowercase letter, and at least one upper-case letter (to the extent that such
variables are supported by the operating system).

Not be any of the following items: words in a dictionary in any language; any
word that is related to an employee's family, hobbies, vehicle, work, license plate,
social security number, address, telephone, pet's name, birthday, or phrases
containing those words.

Not be a variation of a previously used password, with one element remaining the
same and another element changing, such as kevin, kevin 1, kevin2; or kevinjan,
kevinfeb.

Explanation/Notes: The parameters listed above will produce a password that is
difficult for the social engineer to guess. Another option is the consonant-vowel
method, which provides an easy-to-remember and pronounceable password. To
construct this kind of password substitute consonants for each letter C and vowels
for the letter V, using the mask of "CVCVCVCV." Examples would be
MIXOCASO; CUSOJENA.

15-8 Writing passwords down
Policy: Employees should write passwords down only when they store them in a
secure location away from the computer or other password protected device.

Explanation/Notes: Employees are discouraged from ever writing down
passwords. Under certain conditions, however, it may be necessary; for
example, for an employee who has multiple accounts on different computer
systems. Any written passwords must be secured in a safe place     away from
the computer. Under no circumstances may a password be stored     under   the
keyboard or attached to the computer display.

15-9 Plaintext passwords in computer files
Policy: Plaintext passwords shall not be saved in any computer file or stored as
text called by pressing a function key. When necessary, passwords may be saved
using an encryption utility approved by the IT department to prevent any
unauthorized disclosures.

Explanation/Notes: Passwords can be easily recovered by an attacker if stored in
unencrypted form in computer data files, batch files, terminal function keys, login
files, macro or scripting programs, or any data files which contain passwords to
FTP sites.

POLICIES FOR TELECOMMUTERS
Telecommuters are outside the corporate firewall, and therefore more vulnerable
to attack. These policies will help you prevent social engineers from using your
telecommuter employees as a gateway to your data.

16-1 Thin clients
Policy: All company personnel who have been authorized to connect via remote
access shall use a thin client to connect to the corporate network.

Explanation/Notes: When an attacker analyzes an attack strategy, he or she will
try to identify users who access the corporate network from external locations. As
such, telecommuters are prime targets. Their computers are less likely to have
stringent security controls, and may be a weak link that may compromise the
corporate network.

Any computer that connects to a trusted network can be booby-trapped with
keystroke loggers, or their authenticated connection can be hijacked. A thin client
strategy can be used to avoid problems. A thin client is similar to a diskless
workstation or a dumb terminal; the remote computer does not have storage
capabilities but instead the operating system, application programs, and data all
reside on the corporate network. Accessing the network via a thin client
substantially reduces the risk posed by un-patched systems, outdated operating
systems, and malicious code. Accordingly, managing the security of
telecommuters is effective and made easier by centralizing security controls.
Rather than relying on the inexperienced telecommuter to properly manage
security-related issues, these responsibilities are better left with trained system,
network, or security administrators.
16-2 Security software for telecommuter computer systems
Policy: Any external computer system that is used to connect to the corporate
network must have antivirus software, anti-Trojan software, and a personal
firewall (hardware or software). Antivirus and anti-Trojan pattern files must be
updated at least weekly.
Explanation/Notes: Ordinarily, telecommuters are not skilled on security- related
issues, and may inadvertently" or negligently leave their computer system and the
corporate network open to attack. Telecommuters therefore pose a serious
security risk if they are not properly trained. In addition to installing antivirus and
anti-Trojan Horse software to protect against malicious code, a firewall is
necessary to block any hostile users from obtaining access to any services
enabled on the telecommuter's system.

The risk of not deploying the minimal security technologies to prevent malicious
code from propagating cannot be underestimated, as an attack on Microsoft
proves. A computer system belonging to a Microsoft telecommuter, used to
connect to Microsoft's corporate network, became infected with a Trojan Horse
program. The intruder or intruders were able to use the telecommuter's trusted
connection to Microsoft's development network to steal developmental source
code.

POLICIES FOR HUMAN RESOURCES
Human resources departments have a special charge to protect employees from
those attempting to discover personal information through their workplace. HR
professionals also have a responsibility to protect their company from the actions
of unhappy ex-employees.

17-1 Departing employees
Policy: Whenever a person employed by the company leaves or is terminated,
Human Resources must immediately do the following:

Remove the person's listing from the on-line employee/telephone directory and
disable or forward their voice mail;

Notify personnel at building entrances or company lobbies; and

Add the employee's name to the employee departure list, which shall be emailed
to all personnel no less often than once a week.

Explanation/Notes: Employees who are stationed at building entrances must be
notified to prevent a former employee from re-entering the premises. Further,
notifying other personnel may prevent the former employee from successfully
masquerading as an active employee and duping personnel into taking some
action damaging to the company.

In some circumstances, it may be necessary to require every user within the
former employee's department to change his or her passwords. (When I was
terminated from GTE solely because of my reputation as a hacker, the company
required all employees throughout the company to change their password.)

17-2 IT department notification
Policy: Whenever a person employed by the company leaves or is terminated,
Human Resources should immediately notify the information technology
department to disable the former employee's computer accounts, including any
accounts used for database access, dial-up, or Internet access from remote
locations.

Explanation/Notes: It's essential to disable any former worker's access to all
computer systems, network devices, databases, or any other computer- related
devices immediately upon termination. Otherwise, the company may leave the
door wide open for a disgruntled employee to access company computer systems
and cause significant damage.

17-3 Confidential information used in hiring process
Policy: Advertisements and other forms of public solicitation of candidates to fill
job openings should, to the extent possible, avoid identifying computer hardware
and software used by the company.

Explanation/Notes: Managers and human resources personnel should only
disclose information related to enterprise computer hardware and software that is
reasonably necessary to obtain resumes from qualified candidates.

Computer intruders read newspapers and company press releases, and visit
Internet sites, to find job listings. Often, companies disclose too much
information about the types of hardware and software used to attract prospective
employees. Once the intruder has knowledge of the target's information systems,
he is armed for the next phase of attack. For example, by knowing that a
particular company uses the VMS operating system, the attacker may place
pretext calls to determine the release version, and then send a phony emergency
security patch made to appear as if it came from the software developer. Once the
patch is installed, the attacker is in.

17-4 Employee personal information

Policy: The human resources department must never release personal information
about any current or former employee, contractor, consultant, temporary worker,
or intern, except with prior express written consent of the employee or human
resources manager.
Explanation/Notes: Head-hunters, private investigators, and identity thieves
target private employee information such as employee numbers, social security
numbers, birth dates, salary history, financial data including direct deposit
information, and health-related benefit information. The social engineer may
obtain this information so as to masquerade as the individual. In addition,
disclosing the names of new hires may be extremely valuable to information
thieves. New hires are likely to comply with any request by persons with
seniority or in a position of authority, or anyone claiming to be from corporate
security.

17-5 Background checks
Policy: A background check should be required for all new hires, contractors,
consultants, temporary workers, or interns prior to an offer of employment or
establishing of a contractual relationship.

Explanation/Notes: Because of cost considerations, the requirement for
background checks may be limited to specific positions of trust. Note, however,
that any person who is given physical access to corporate offices may be a
potential threat. For example, cleaning crews have access to personnel offices,
which gives them access to any computer systems located there. An attacker with
physical access to a computer can install a hardware keystroke logger in less than
a minute to capture passwords.

Computer intruders will sometimes go to the effort of obtaining a job as a means
of gaining access to a target company's computer systems and networks. An
attacker can easily obtain the name of a company's cleaning contractor by calling
the responsible employee at the target company, claiming to be from a janitorial
company looking for their business, and then obtaining the name of the company
that is currently providing such services.


POLICIES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY
Though social engineers try to avoid showing up in person at a workplace they
want to target, there are times when they will violate your space. These policies
will help you to keep your physical premises secure from threat.

18-1 Identification for non employees
Policy: Delivery people and other non employees who need to enter company
premises on a regular basis must have a special badge or other form of
identification in accordance with policy established by corporate security.

Explanation/Notes: Non employees who need to enter the building regularly (for
example, to make food or beverage deliveries to the cafeteria, or to repair
copying machines or install telephones) should be issued a special form of
company identification badge provided for this purpose. Others who need to enter
only occasionally or on a one-time basis must be treated as visitors and should be
escorted at all times.

18-2 Visitor identification
Policy: All visitors must present a valid driver's license or other picture
identification to be admitted to the premises.

Explanation/Notes: The security staff or receptionist should make a photocopy of
the identification document prior to issuing a visitor's badge. The copy should be
kept with the visitor's log. Alternatively, the identification information can be
recorded in the visitor's log by the receptionist or guard; visitors should not be
permitted to write down their own ID information.
Social engineers seeking to gain entrance to a building will always write
false information in the log. Even though it's not difficult to obtain false ID and to
learn the name of an employee he or she can claim to be visiting, requiring that
the responsible employee must log the entry adds one level of security to the
process.

18-3 Escorting visitors
Policy: Visitors must be escorted or in the company of an employee at all times.

Explanation/Notes.: One popular ruse of social engineers is to arrange
to visit a company employee (for example, visiting with a product engineer on
the pretext of being the employee of a strategic partner). After being escorted to
the initial meeting, the social engineer assures his host that he can find his own
way back to the lobby. By this means he gains the freedom to roam the building
and possibly gain access to Sensitive information.

18-4 Temporary badges
Policy: Company employees from-another location who do not have their
employee badges with them must present a valid driver's license or other picture
ID and be issued a temporary visitor's badge.

Explanation/Notes: Attackers often pose as employees from a different office or
branch of a company to gain entrance to a company.

18-5 Emergency evacuation
Policy: In any emergency situation or drill, security personnel must ensure that
everybody has evacuated the premises.
Explanation/Notes: Security personnel must check for any stragglers that may be
left behind in restrooms or office areas. As authorized by the fire department or
other authority in charge of the scene, the security force needs to be on the alert
for anyone departing the building long after the evacuation.

Industrial spies or sophisticated computer intruders may cause a diversion to gain
access to a building or secure area. One diversion used is to release a harmless
chemical known as butyl mercaptan into the air. The effect is to create the
impression that there is a natural gas leak. Once personnel start evacuation
procedures, the bold attacker uses this diversion to either steal information or to
gain access to enterprise computer systems. Another tactic used by information
thieves involves remaining behind, sometimes in a restroom or closet, at the time
of a scheduled evacuation drill, or after setting off a smoke flare or other device
to cause an emergency evacuation.

18-6 Visitors in mail room
Policy: No visitors should be permitted in the mail room without the supervision
of a company worker.

Explanation/Notes: The intention of this policy is to prevent an outsider from
exchanging, sending, or stealing intracompany mail.

18-7 Vehicle license plate numbers
Policy: If the company has a guarded parking area, security staff shall log vehicle
license plate numbers for any vehicle entering the area.
18-8 Trash Dumpsters
Policy: Trash Dumpsters must remain on company premises at all times and
should be inaccessible to the public.

Explanation/Notes: Computer attackers and industrial spies can obtain valuable
information from company trash bins. The courts have held that trash is
considered legally abandoned property, so the act of Dumpster diving is perfectly
legal, as long as the trash receptacles are on public property. For this reason, it is
important that trash receptacles be situated on

company property, where the company has a legal right to protect the containers
and their contents.

POLICIES FOR RECEPTIONISTS
Receptionists are often on the front lines when it comes to dealing with social
engineers, yet they are rarely given enough security training to recognize and stop
an invader. Institute these policies to help your receptionist better protect your
company and its data.
19-1 Internal directory
Policy: Disclosure of information in the internal company directory should be
limited to persons employed by the company.

Explanation/Notes: All employee titles, names, telephone numbers, and addresses
contained within the company directory should be considered               Internal
information, and should only be disclosed in accordance with the policy related to
data classification and Internal information.

Additionally, any calling party must have the name or extension of the party they
are trying to contact. Although the receptionist can put a call through to an
individual when a caller does not know the extension, telling the caller the
extension number should be prohibited. (For those curious folks who follow by
example, you can experience this procedure by calling any U.S. government
agency and asking the operator to provide an extension.)

19-2 Telephone numbers for specific departments/groups
Policy: Employees shall not provide direct telephone numbers for the company
help desk, telecommunications department, computer operations, or system
administrator personnel without verifying that the requester has a legitimate need
to contact these groups. The receptionist, when transferring a call to these groups,
must announce the caller's name.
Explanation/Notes: Although some organizations may find this policy overly
restrictive, this rule makes it more difficult for a social engineer to masquerade as
an employee by deceiving other employees into transferring the call from their
extension (which in some phone systems causes the call to appear to originate
from within the company), or demonstrating knowledge of these extensions to the
victim in order to create a sense of authenticity.

19-3 Relaying information
Policy: Telephone operators and receptionists should not take messages or relay
information on behalf of any party not personally known to be an active
employee.

Explanation/Notes: Social engineers are adept at deceiving employees into
inadvertently vouching for their identity. One social engineering trick is to obtain
the telephone number of the receptionist and, on a pretext, ask the receptionist to
take any messages that may come for him. Then, during a call to the victim, the
attacker pretends to be an employee, asks for some sensitive information or to
perform a task, and gives the main switchboard number as a call back number.
The attacker later calls back to the receptionist and is given any message left for
him by the unsuspecting victim.
19-4 Items left for pickup
Policy: Before releasing any item to a messenger or other Unverified Person, the
receptionist or security guard must obtain picture identification and enter the
identification information into the pickup log as required by approved
procedures.

Explanation/Notes." One social engineering tactic is to deceive an employee into
releasing sensitive materials to another supposedly authorized employee by
dropping off such materials at the receptionist or lobby desk for pickup.
Naturally, the receptionist or security guard assumes the package is authorized
for release. The social engineer either shows up himself or has a messenger
service pick up the package.

POLICIES FOR THE INCIDENT REPORTING GROUP
Every company should set up a centralized group that should be notified when
any form of attack on corporate security is identified. What follows are some
guidelines for setting up and structuring the activities of this group.


20-1 Incident reporting group
Policy: An individual or group must be designated and employees should be
instructed to report security incidents to them. All employees should be provided
with the contact information for the group.

Explanation/Notes: Employees must understand how to identify a security threat,
and be trained to report any threat to a specific incident reporting group. It is also
important that an organization establish specific procedures and authority for
such a group to act when a threat is reported.

20-2 Attacks in progress
Policy: Whenever the incident reporting group has received reports of an ongoing
social engineering attack they shall immediately initiate procedures for alerting
all employees assigned to the targeted groups.
Explanation/Notes: The incident reporting group or responsible manager should
also make a determination about whether to send a company wide alert. Once the
responsible person or group has a good faith belief that an attack may be in
progress, mitigation of damage must be made a priority by notifying company
personnel to be on their guard.
Security at a Glance

The lists and charts reference version of following provide quick social
engineering methods discussed in Chapters 2 to 14, and verification procedures
detailed in Chapter 16. Modify this information for your organization, and make
it available for employees to refer to when an information security question
arises.

IDENTIFYING A SECURITY ATTACK
These tables and checklists will assist you in spotting a social engineering attack.

The Social Engineering Cycle

ACTION / DESCRIPTION

Research
May include open source information such as SEC filings and annual reports,
marketing brochures, patent applications, press clippings, industry magazines,
Web site content. Also Dumpster diving.


Developing rapport and trust
Use of insider information, misrepresenting identity, citing those known to
victim, need for help, or authority.

Exploiting trust
Asking for information or an action on the part of the victim. In reverse sting,
manipulate victim to ask attacker for help.

Utilize information
If the information obtained is only a step to final goal, attacker returns to earlier
steps in cycle till goal is reached.

Common Social Engineering Methods

Posing as a fellow employee

Posing as an employee of a vendor, partner company, or law enforcement

Posing as someone in authority

Posing as a new employee requesting help
Posing as a vendor or systems manufacturer calling to offer a system patch or
update

Offering help if a problem occurs, then making the problem occur, thereby
manipulating the victim to call them for help

Sending free software or patch for victim to install

Sending a virus or Trojan Horse as an email attachment

Using a false pop-up window asking user to log in again or sign on with
password

Capturing victim keystrokes with expendable computer system or program

Leaving a floppy disk or CD around the workplace with malicious software on it

Using insider lingo and terminology to gain trust

Offering a prize for registering at a Web site with username and password

Dropping a document or file at company mail room for intraoffice delivery

Modifying fax machine heading to appear to come from an internal location

Asking receptionist to receive then forward a fax

Asking for a file to be transferred to an apparently internal location

Getting a voice mailbox set up so call backs perceive attacker as internal

Pretending to be from remote office and asking for email access locally

Warning Signs of an Attack

Refusal to give call back number

Out-of-ordinary request

Claim of authority

Stresses urgency
Threatens negative consequences of non compliance

Shows discomfort when questioned

Name dropping

Compliments or flattery

Flirting

Common Targets of Attacks
TARGET TYPE / EXAMPLES

Unaware of value of information
Receptionists, telephone operators, administrative assistants, security guards.

Special privileges
Help desk or technical support, system administrators, computer operators,
telephone system administrators.

Manufacturer / vendor
Computer hardware, software manufacturers, voice mail systems vendors.

Specific departments
Accounting, human resources.

Factors That Make Companies More Vulnerable to Attacks

Large number of employees

Multiple facilities

Information on employee whereabouts left in voice mail messages

Phone extension information made available

Lack of security training

Lack of data classification system

No incident reporting/response plan in place
VERIFICATION AN D DATA CLASSIFICATION
These tables and charts will help you to respond to requests for information or
action that may be social engineering attacks.

Verification of Identity Procedure
ACTION / DESCRIPTION
Caller ID
Verify call is internal, and name or extension number matches the identity of the
caller.

Callback
Look up requester in company directory and call back the listed extension.

Vouching
Ask a trusted employee to vouch for requester's identity.

Shared common secret
Request enterprise-wide shared secret, such as a password or daily code.

Supervisor or manager
Contact employee's immediate supervisor and request verification of identity and
employment status.

Secure email
Request a digitally signed message.

Personal voice recognition
For a caller known to employee, validate by caller's voice.

Dynamic passwords
Verify against a dynamic password solution such as Secure ID or other strong
authentication device.

In person
Require requester to appear in person with an employee badge or other
identification.


Verification of Employment Status Procedure
ACTION / DESCRIPTION
Employee directory check
Verify that requester is listed in online directory.
Requester's manager verification
Call requester's manager using phone number listed in company directory.

Requester's department or workgroup verification
Call requester's department or workgroup and determine that requester is still
employed by company.

Procedure to Determine Need to Know
ACTION / DESCRIPTION
Consult job tide/ workgroup/ responsibilities list
Check published lists of which employees are entitled to specific classified
information.

Obtain authority from manager
Contact your manager, or the manager of the requester, for authority to comply
with the request.

Obtain authority from the information Owner or designee
Ask Owner of information if requester has a need to know.

Obtain authority with an automated tool
Check proprietary software database for authorized personnel.

Criteria for Verifying Non-Employees
CRITERION / ACTION
Relationship
Verify that requester's firm has a vendor, strategic partner, or other appropriate
relationship.

Identity
Verify requester's identity and employment status at the vendor/partner firm.

Nondisclosure
Verify that the requester has a signed nondisclosure agreement on file.


Access
Refer the request to management when the information is classified above
Internal.

Data Classification
CLASSIFICATION             /       DESCRIPTION            /       PROCEDURE
Public
Can be freely released to the public

No need to verify.
Internal
For use within the company

Verify identity of requester as active employee or verify nondisclosure agreement
on file and management approval for non employees.

Data Classification (Continued)
CLASSIFICATION / DESCRIPTION / PROCEDURE
Private
Information of a personal nature intended for use only within the organization

Verify identity of requester as active employee or only within non employee with
the organization, authorization. Check with human resources department to
disclose Private information to authorized employees or external requesters.

Confidential
Shared only with people with an absolute need to know within the organization

Verify identity of requester and need to know from designated information
Owner. Release only with prior written consent of manager, or information
Owner or designee. Check for nondisclosure agreement on file. Only
management personnel may disclose to persons not employed by the company.
SOURCES

CHAPTER 1

BloomBecker, Buck. 1990. Spectacular Computer Crimes: What They Are and
How They Cost American Business Half a Billion Dollars a Dar. Irwin
Professional Publishing.

Littman, Jonathan. 1997. The Fugitive Game: Online with Kevin Mitnick. Little
Brown & Co.

Penenberg, Adam L. April 19, 1999. "The Demonizing of a Hacker." Forbes.

CHAPTER 2

The Stanley Rifldn story is based on the following accounts:

Computer Security Insitute. Undated. "Financial losses due to Internet intrusions,
trade secret theft and other cyber crimes soar." Press release. Epstein, Edward
Jay. Unpublished. "The Diamond Invention." Holwick, Rev. David. Unpublished
account.

Mr. Rifkin himself was gracious in acknowledging that accounts of his exploit
differ because he has protected his anonymity by declining to be interviewed.

CHAPTER 16

Cialdini, Robert B. 2000. Influence: Science and Practice, 4th edition. Allyn and
Bacon.

Cialdini, Robert B. February 2001. "The Science of Persuasion." Scientific
American. 284:2.

CHAPTER 17
Some policies in this chapter are based on ideas contained in: Wood, Charles
Cresson. 1999. "Information Security Policies Made Easy." Baseline Software.
Acknowledgments

FROM KEVIN MITNICK
True friendship has been defined as one mind in two bodies; not many people in
anyone's life can be called a true friend. Jack Biello was a loving and caring
person who spoke out against the extraordinary mistreatment I endured at the
hands of unethical journalists and overzealous government prosecutors. He was a
key voice in the Free Kevin movement and a writer who had an extraordinary
talent for writing compelling articles exposing the information that the
government doesn't want you to know. Jack was always there to fearlessly speak
out on my behalf and to work together with me preparing speeches and articles,
and, at one point, represented me as a media liaison.

This book is therefore dedicated with love to my dearest friend Jack Biello,
whose recent death from cancer just as we finished the manuscript has left me
feeling a great sense of loss and sadness.

This book would not have been possible without the love and support of my
family. My mother, Shelly Jaffe, and my grandmother, Reba Vartanian, have
given me unconditional love and support throughout my life. I am so fortunate to
have been raised by such a loving and dedicated mother, who I also consider my
best friend. My grandmother has been like a second morn to me, providing me
with the same nurturing and love that only a mother could give. As caring and
compassionate people, they've taught me the principles of caring about others and
lending a helping hand to the less fortunate. And o, by imitating the pattern of
giving and caring, I in a sense follow the paths of their lives. I hope they'll
forgive me for putting them in second place during the process of writing this
book, passing up chances to see them with the excuse of work and deadlines to
meet. This book would not have been possible without their continued love and
support that I'll forever hold close to my heart.

How I wish my dad, Alan Mitnick, and my brother, Adam Mitnick, would have
lived long enough to break open a bottle of champagne with me on the day this
book first appears in a bookstore. As a salesman and business owner, my father
taught me many of the finer things that I will never forget. During the last months
of my Dad's life I was fortunate enough to be able to be at his side to comfort him
the best I could, but it was a very painful experience from which I still have not
recovered.

My aunt Chickie Leventhal will always have a special place in my heart;
although she was disappointed with some of the stupid mistakes I've made,
nevertheless she was always there for me, offering her love and support. During
my intense devotion to writing this book, I sacrificed many opportunities to join
her, my cousin, Mitch Leventhal, and her boyfriend, Dr. Robert Berkowitz, for
our weekly Shabbat celebration.

I must also give my warmest thanks to my mother's boyfriend, Steven Knittle,
who was there to fill in for me and provide my mother with love and support.

My dad's brother clearly deserves much praise; one could say I inherited my craft
of social engineering from Uncle Mitchell, who knew how to manipulate the
world and its people in ways that I never even hope to understand, much less
master. Lucky for him, he never had my passion for computing technology
during the years he used his charming personality to influence anyone he desired.
He will always hold the title of the grand-master social engineer.

And as I write these acknowledgements, I realize I have so many people to thank
and to express appreciation to for offering their love, friendship, and support. I
cannot begin to remember the names of all the kind and generous people that I've
met in recent years, but suffice it to say I would need a computer to store them
all. There have been so many people from all over the world who have written to
me with words of encouragement, praise, and support. These words have meant a
great deal to me, especially during the times I needed it most.

I'm especially thankful to all my supporters who stood by me and spent their
valuable time and energy getting the word out to anyone who would listen,
voicing their concern and objection over my unfair treatment and the hyperbole
created by those who sought to profit from the "The Myth of Kevin Mitnick."

I have had the extraordinary fortune of being teamed up with best-selling author
Bill Simon, and we worked diligently together despite our different
work patterns. Bill is highly organized, rises early, and works in a deliberate and
well-planned style. I'm grateful that Bill was kind enough to accommodate my
late-night work schedule. My dedication to this project
and long working hours kept me up well into the early morning that conflicted
with Bill's regular working schedule.
Not only was I lucky to be teamed with someone who could transform my ideas
into sentences worthy of a sophisticated reader, but also Bill is (mostly) a very
patient man who put up with my programmer's style of focusing on the details.
Indeed we made it happen. Still, I want to apologize
to Bill in these acknowledgments that I will always regret being the one, because
of my orientation to accuracy and detail, who caused him to be late for a deadline
for the first and only time in his long writing career. He has a writer's pride that I
have finally come to understand and share; we hope to do other books together.
The delight of being at the Simon home in Rancho Santa Fe to work and to be
pampered by Bill's wife, Arynne, could be considered a highlight of this writing
project. Arynne's conversation and cooking will battle in my memory for first
place. She is a lady of quality and wisdom, full of fun, who has created a home of
warmth and beauty. And I'll never drink a diet soda again without hearing
Arynne's voice in the back of my mind admonishing me on the dangers of
Aspartame, Stacey Kirkland means a great deal to me. She has dedicated many
hours of her time assisting me on the Macintosh to design the charts and graphics
that helped give visual authority to my ideas. I admire her wonderful qualities;
she is truly a loving and compassionate person who deserves only the good things
in life. She gave me encouragement as a caring friend and is someone who I care
deeply about. I wish to thank her for all her loving support, and for being there
for me whenever I needed it.
Alex Kasper, Nexspace, is not only my best friend, but also a business partner
and colleague. Together we hosted a popular Internet talk radio show known as
"The Darkside of the Internet" on KFI AM 640 in Los Angeles under the skillful
guidance of Program Director David G. Hall. Alex graciously provided his
invaluable assistance and advice to this book project. His influence has always
been positive and helpful with a kindness and generosity that often extended far
beyond midnight. Alex and I recently completed a film/video to help businesses
train their people on preventing social engineering attacks.

Paul Dryman, Informed Decision, is a family friend and beyond. This highly
respected and trusted private investigator helped me to understand trends and
processes of conducting background investigations. Paul's knowledge and
experience helped me address the personnel security issues described in Part 4 of
this book.

One of my best friends, Candi Layman, has consistently offered me support and
love. She is truly a wonderful person who deserves the best out of life. During the
tragic days of my life, Candi always offered encouragement and friendship. I am
fortunate to have met such a wonderful, caring, and compassionate human being,
and want to thank her for being there for me.

Surely my first royalty check will go to my cellular phone company for all the
time I spent talking with Erin Finn. Without a doubt, Erin is like my soul mate.
We are alike in so many ways it's scary. We both have a love
for technology, the same tastes in food, music, and movies. AT&T Wireless is
definitely losing money for giving me all the "flee nights and weekend" calls to
her home in Chicago. At least I am not using the Kevin Mitnick plan anymore.
Her enthusiasm and belief in this book boosted my spirits. How lucky I am to
have her as a friend.
I'm eager to thank those people who represent my professional career and are
dedicated in extraordinary ways. My speaking engagements are managed by Amy
Gray (an honest and caring person who I admire and adore) David Fugate, of
Waterside Productions, is a book agent who went to bat for me on many
occasions before and after the book contract was signed; and Los Angeles
attorney Gregory Vinson, who was on my defense team during my years-long
battle with the government. I'm sure he can relate to Bill's understanding and
patience for my close attention to detail; he has had the same experience working
with me on legal briefs he has written on my behalf.

I have had too many experiences with lawyers but I am eager to have a place to
express my thanks for the lawyers who, during the years of my negative
interactions with the criminal justice system, stepped up and offered to help me
when I was in desperate need. From kind words to deep involvement with my
case, I met many who don't at all fit the stereotype of the self-centered attorney. I
have come to respect, admire, and appreciate the kindness and generosity of spirit
given to me so freely by so many. They each deserve to be acknowledged with a
paragraph of favorable words; I will at least mention them all by name, for every
one of them lives in my heart surrounded by appreciation: Greg Aclin, Bob
Carmen, John Dusenbury, Sherman Ellison, Omar Figueroa, Carolyn Hagin, Rob
Hale, Alvin Michaelson, Ralph Peretz, Vicki Podberesky, Donald C. Randolph,
Dave Roberts, Alan Rubin, Steven Sadowski, Tony Serra, Richard Sherman, Skip
Slates, Karen Smith, Richard Steingard, the Honorable Robert Talcott, Barry
Tarlow, John Yzurdiaga, and Gregory Vinson.

    I very much appreciate the opportunity that John Wiley & Sons has given me
to author this book, and for their confidence in a first-time author. I wish to thank
the following Wiley people who made this dream possible: Ellen Gerstein, Bob
Ipsen, Carol Long (my editor and fashion designer), and Nancy Stevenson.

   Other family members, personal friends, business associates who have given
me advice and support, and have reached out in many ways, are important to
recognize and acknowledge. They are: J. J. Abrams, David Agger, Bob Arkow,
Stephen Barnes, Dr. Robert Berkowitz, Dale Coddington, Evil Corley, Delin
Cormeny, Ed Cummings, Art Davis, Michelle Delio, Sam Downing, John
Draper, Paul Dryman, Nick Duva, Roy Eskapa, Alex Fielding, Lisa Flores, Brock
Frank, Steve Gibson, Jerry Greenblatt, Greg Grunberg, Bill Handle, David G.
Halt, Dave Harrison, Leslie Herman, Jim Hill, Dan Howard, Steve Hunt, Rez
Johar, Steve Knittle, Gary Kremen, Barry Krugel, Earl Krugel, Adrian Lamo, Leo
Laporte, Mitch Leventhal, Cynthia Levin, CJ Little, Jonathan Littman, Mark
Maifrett, Brian Martin, Forrest McDonald, Kerry McElwee, Alan McSwain,
Elliott Moore, Michael Morris, Eddie Munoz, Patrick Norton, Shawn Nunley,
Brenda Parker, Chris Pelton, Kevin Poulsen, Scott Press, Linda and Art Pryor,
Jennifer Reade, Israel and Rachel Rosencrantz, Mark Ross, William Royer, Irv
Rubin, Ryan Russell, Neil Saavedra, Wynn Schwartu, Pete Shipley, Joh Sift, Dan
Sokol, Trudy Spector, Matt Spergel, Eliza Amadea Sultan, Douglas Thomas, Roy
"Ihcker, Bryan Turbow, Ron Wetzel, Don David Wilson, Darci Wood, Kevin
Wortman, Steve Wozniak, and all my friends on the W6NUT (147.435 MHz)
repeater in Los Angeles.

And my probation officer, Larry Hawley, deserves special thanks for giving me
permission to act as advisor and consultant on security-related matters by
authoring this book.
And finally I must acknowledge the men and women of law enforcement. I
simply do not hold any malice towards these people who are just doing their jobs.
I firmly believe that putting the public's interest ahead of one's own and
dedicating your life to public service is something that deserves respect, and
while I've been arrogant at times, I want all of you to know that I love this
country, and will do everything in my power to help make it the safest place in
the world, which is precisely one of the reasons why I've written this book.

FROM BILL SIMON
I have this notion that there is a right person out there for everyone; it's just that
some people aren't lucky enough ever to find their Mr. or Ms. Right. Others get
lucky. I got lucky early enough in life to spend a good many years already (and
count on spending many more) with one of God's treasures, my wife, Arynne.. If
I ever forget how lucky I am, I only need to pay attention to how many people
seek and cherish her company. Arynne--I thank you for walking through life with
me.

During the writing of this book, I counted on the help of a loyal group of friends
who provided the assurance that Kevin and I were achieving our goal of
combining fact and fascination into this unusual book. Each of these people
represents true and loyal value and knows he or she may be called on as I get into
my next writing project. In alphabetical order: JeanClaude Beneventi, Linda
Brown, Walt Brown, It. Gen. Don Johnson, Dorothy Ryan, Guri Stark, Chris
Steep, Michael Steep, and John Votaw.
Special recognition goes to John Lucich, president of the Network Security
Group, who was willing to take time for a friend-of a-friend request, and to
Gordon Garb, who graciously fielded numerous phone calls about IT operations.

Sometimes in life, a friend earns an exalted place by introducing you to someone
else who becomes a good friend. At literary agency Waterside Productions, in
Cardiff, California, Agent David Fugate was responsible for conceiving the idea
for this book, and for putting me together with co-author-turned-friend Kevin.
Thanks, David. And to the head of Waterside, the incomparable Bill Gladstone,
who manages to keep me busy with one book project after another: I'm happy to
have             you               in              my                 corner.

In our home and my office-at-home, Arynne is helped by an able staff that
includes administrative assistant Jessica Dudgeon and housekeeper Josie
Rodriguez.

I thank my parents Marjorie and I. B. Simon, who I wish were here on earth to
enjoy my success as a writer. I also thank my daughter, Victoria. When I am with
her I realize how much I admire, respect, and take pride in who she is.

-----------------------------
Scanned by kineticstomp
-----------------------------
___________________________________________________________

                       _____________________________



                              Supplement
                                      by swift



[Chapter 1 -Banned Edition]
Kevin’s Story
By Kevin Mitnick

I was reluctant to write this section because I was sure it would sound self-
serving. Well, okay, it is self-serving. But I've been contacted by literally
hundreds of people who want to know "who is Kevin Mitnick?”. For those who
don't give a damn, please turn to Chapter 2. For everybody else, here, for what
it's worth, is my story.

Kevin Speaks Some hackers destroy people's files or entire bard drives; they're
called crackers or vandals. Some novice hackers don't bother learning the
technology, but simply download hacker tools to break into computer systems;
they're called script kiddies. More experienced hackers with programming skills
develop hacker programs and post them to the Web and to bulletin board
systems. And then there are individuals who have no interest in the technology,
but use the computer merely as a tool to aid them in stealing money, goods, or
services. Despite the media-created myth of Kevin Mitnick, I'm not a malicious
hacker. What I did wasn't even against the law when I began, but became a crime
after new legislation was passed. I continued anyway, and was caught. My
treatment by the federal government was based not on the crimes, but on making
an example of me. I did not deserve to be treated like a terrorist or violent
criminal: Having my residence searched with a blank search warrant; being
thrown into solitary for months; denied the fundamental Constitutional rights
guaranteed to anyone accused of a crime; being denied not only bail but a bail
hearing; and being forced to spend years fighting to obtain the government's
evidence so my court appointed attorney could prepare my defense.

What about my right to a speedy trial? For years I was given a choice every six
months: sign a paper waiving your Constitutional right to a speedy trial or go to
trial with an attorney who is unprepared; I chose to sign. But I'm getting ahead of
my story. Starting Out my path was probably set early in life. I was a happy-go-
lucky kid, but bored. After my father split when I was three, my mother worked
as a waitress to support us. To see me then an only child being raised by a
mother who put in long, harried days on a sometimes-erratic schedule would have
been to see a youngster on his own almost all his waking hours. I was my own
babysitter. Growing up in a San Fernando Valley community gave me the whole
of Los Angeles to explore, and by the age of twelve I had discovered a way to
travel free throughout the whole greater L.A. area. I realized one day while riding
the bus that the security of the bus transfer I had purchased relied on the unusual
pattern of the paper-punch that the drivers used to mark day, time and route on
the transfer slips. A friendly driver, answering my carefully-planted question, told
me where to buy that special type of punch. The transfers are meant to let you
change buses and continue a journey to your destination, but I worked out how to
use them to travel anywhere I wanted to go for free. Obtaining blank transfers
was a walk in the park: the trash bins at the bus terminals were always filled with
only-partly-used books of transfers that the drivers tossed away at the end of their
shifts. With a pad of blanks and the punch, I could mark my own transfers and
travel anywhere that L.A. buses went. Before long, I had all but memorized the
bus schedules of the entire system. This was an early example of my surprising
memory for certain types of information; still, today I can remember phone
numbers, passwords and other items as far back as my childhood. Another
personal interest that surfaced at an early age was my fascination with performing
magic. Once I learned how a new trick worked, I would practice, practice, and
practice until I mastered it. To an extent, it was through magic that I discovered
the enjoyment in fooling people. From Phone Phreak, to Hacker my first
encounter with what I would eventually learn to call social engineering came
about during my high school years, when I met another student who was caught
up in a hobby called phone phreaking. Phone phreaking is a type of hacking that
allows you to explore the telephone network by exploiting the phone systems and
phone company employees. He showed me neat tricks he could do with a
telephone, like obtaining any information the phone company had on any
customer, and using a secret test number to make long-distances calls for free
actually free only to us--I found out much later that it wasn't a secret test number
at all: the calls were in fact being billed to some poor company's MCI account).
That was my introduction to social engineering-my kindergarten, so to speak. He
and another phone phreaker I met shortly thereafter let me listen in as they each
made pretext calls to the phone company. I heard the things they said that made
them sound believable, I learned about different phone company offices, lingo
and procedures. But that "training" didn't last long; it didn't have to. Soon I was
doing it all on my own, learning as I went, doing it even better than those first
teachers. The course my life would follow for the next fifteen years had been set.

One of my all-time favorite pranks was gaining unauthorized access to the
telephone switch and changing the class of service of a fellow phone phreak.
When he'd attempt to make a call from home, he'd get a message telling him to
deposit a dime, because the telephone company switch received input that
indicated he was calling from a pay phone.

I became absorbed in everything about telephones-not only the electronics,
switches, and computers; but also the corporate organization, the procedures, and
the terminology. After a while, I probably knew more about the phone system
than any single employee.

And, I had developed my social engineering skills to the point that, at seventeen
years old, I was able to talk most Telco employees into almost anything, whether
I was speaking with them in person or by telephone. My hacking career started
when I was in high school. Back then we used the term hacker to mean a person
who spent a great deal of time tinkering with hardware and software, either to
develop more efficient programs or to bypass unnecessary steps and get the job
done more quickly. The term has now become a pejorative, carrying the meaning
of "malicious criminal." In these pages I use the term the way I have always used
it in its earlier, more benign sense. In late 1979, a group of fellow hacker types
who worked for the Los Angeles Unified School District dared me to try hacking
into The Ark, the computer system at Digital Equipment Corporation used for
developing their RSTS/E operating system software. I wanted to be accepted by
the guys in this hacker group so I could pick their brains to learn more about
operating systems. These new "friends" had managed to get their hands on the
dial-up number to the DEC computer system. But they knew the dial-up number
wouldn't do me any good: Without an account name and password, I'd never be
able to get in. They were about to find out that when you underestimate others, it
can come back to bite you in the butt. It turned out that, for me, even at that
young age, hacking into the DEC system was a pushover. Claiming to be Anton
Chernoff, one of the project's lead developers, I placed a simple phone call to the
system manager. I claimed I couldn't log into one of "my" accounts, and was
convincing enough to talk the guy into giving me accessing and allowing me to
select a password of my choice. As an extra level of protection, whenever
anyone dialed into the development system, the user also had to provide a dial-up
password. The system administrator told me the password. It was "buffoon,"
which I guess described what he must have felt like later on, when lie found out
what had happened. In less than five minutes, I had gained access to Digital's
RSTE/E development system. And I wasn't logged on as just as an ordinary user,
but as someone with all the privileges of a system developer. At first my new,
so-called friends refused to believe I had gained access to The Ark. One of them
dialed up the system and shoved the keyboard in front of me with a challenging
look on his face. His mouth dropped open as I matter-of-factly logged into a
privileged account. I found out later that they went off to another location and,
the same day, started downloading source-code components of the DEC
operating system. And then it was my turn to be floored. After they had
downloaded all the software they wanted, they called the corporate security
department at DEC and told them someone had hacked into the company's
corporate network. And they gave my name. My so-called friends first used my
access to copy highly sensitive source code, and then turned me in.

There was a lesson here, but not one I managed to learn easily. Through the years
to come, I would repeatedly get into trouble because I trusted people who I
thought were my friends. After high school I studied computers at the Computer
Learning Center in Los Angeles.

Within a few months, the school's computer manager realized I had found a
vulnerability in the operating system and gained full administrative privileges on
their IBM minicomputer. The best computer experts on their teaching staff
couldn't figure out how I had done this. In what may have been one of the earliest
examples of "hire the hacker," I was given an offer I couldn't refuse: Do an
honors project to enhance the school's computer security, or face suspension for
hacking the system. Of course I chose to do the honors project, and ended up
graduating Cum Laude with Honors. Becoming a Social Engineer some people
get out of bed each morning dreading their daily work routine at the proverbial
salt mines. I've been lucky enough to enjoy my work. In particular you can't
imagine the challenge, reward, and pleasure I had in the time I spent as a private
investigator. I was honing my talents in the performance art called social
engineering-getting people to do things they wouldn't ordinarily do for a stranger-
and being paid for it. For me it wasn't difficult becoming proficient in social
engineering. My father's side of the family had been in the sales field for
generations, so the art of influence and persuasion might have been an inherited
trait. When you combine an inclination for deceiving people with the talents of
influence and persuasion you arrive at the profile of a social engineer. You might
say there are two specialties within the job classification of con artist. Somebody
who swindles and cheats people out of their money belongs to one sub-specialty,
the grifter. Somebody who uses deception, influence, and persuasion against
businesses, usually targeting their information, belongs to the other sub-specialty,
the social engineer. From the time of my bus transfer trick, when I was too young
to know there was anything wrong with what I was doing, I had begun to
recognize a talent for finding out the secrets I wasn't supposed to have. I built on
that talent by using deception, knowing the lingo, and developing a well-honed
skill of manipulation.

One way I used to work on developing the skills in my craft (if I may call it a
craft) was to pick out some piece of information I didn't really care about and see
if I could talk somebody on the other end of the phone into providing it, just to
improve my talents. In the same way I used to practice my magic tricks, I
practiced pretexting. Through these rehearsals, I soon found I could acquire
virtually any information I targeted. In Congressional testimony before Senators
Lieberman and Thompson years later, I told them, "I have gained unauthorized
access to computer systems at some of the largest corporations on the planet, and
have successfully penetrated some of the most resilient computer systems ever
developed. I have used both technical and non-technical means to obtain the
source code to various operating systems and telecommunications devices to
study their vulnerabilities and their inner workings." All of this was really to
satisfy my own curiosity, see what I could do, and find out secret information
about operating systems, cell phones, and anything else that stirred my curiosity.
The train of events that would change my life started when I became the subject
of a July 4th, 1994 front-page, above-the-fold story in the New York Times.
Overnight, that one story turned my image from a little known nuisance of a
hacker into Public Enemy Number One of cyberspace. John Markoff, the
Media's grifter

"Combining technical wizardry with the ages-old guile of a grifter, Kevin
Mitnick is a computer programmer run amok." (The New York Times, 7/4/94.)
Combining the ages-old desire to attain undeserved fortune with the power to
publish false and defamatory stories about his subjects on the front page of the
New York Times, John Markoff was truly a technology reporter run amok.
Markoff was to earn himself over $1 million by single-handedly creating what I
label "The Myth of Kevin Mitnick." He became very wealthy through the very
same technique I used to compromise computer systems and networks around the
world: deception. In this case however, the victim of the deception wasn't a
single computer user or system administrator, it was every person who trusted the
news stories published in the pages of the New York Times.Cyberspace's Most
Wanted Markoff's Times article was clearly designed to land a contract for a
book about my life story. I've never met Markoff, and yet he has literally become
a millionaire through his libelous and defamatory "reporting" about me in the
Times and in his 1991 book, Cyberpunk. In his article, he included some dozens
of allegations about me that he stated as fact without citing his sources, and that
even a minimal process of fact-checking (which I thought all first-rate
newspapers required their reporters to do) would have revealed as being untrue or
unproven. In that single false and defamatory article, Markoff labeled me as
"cyberspace's most wanted," and as "one of the nation's most wanted computer
criminals," without justification, reason, or supporting evidence, using no more
discretion than a writer for a supermarket tabloid. In his slanderous article,
Markoff falsely claimed that I had wiretapped the FBI (I hadn't); that I had
broken into the computers at NORAD (which aren't even connected to any
network on the outside); and that I was a computer "vandal," despite the fact that
I had never intentionally damaged any computer I ever accessed. These, among
other outrageous allegations, were completely false and designed to create a
sense of fear about my capabilities. In yet another breach of journalistic ethics,
Markoff failed to disclose in that article and in all of his subsequent articles-a
pre-existing relationship with me, a personal animosity based on my having
refused to participate in the book Cyberpunk In addition, I had cost him a bundle
of potential revenue by refusing to renew an option for a movie based on the
book. Markoff's article was also clearly designed to taunt America's law
enforcement agencies.

"...Law enforcement," Markoff wrote, "cannot seem to catch up with him...." The
article was deliberately framed to cast me as cyberspace's Public Enemy Number
One in order to influence the Department of Justice to elevate the priority of my
case. A few months later, Markoff and his cohort Tsutomu Shimomura would
both participate as de facto government agents in my arrest, in violation of both
federal law and journalistic ethics. Both would be nearby when three blank
warrants were used in an illegal search of my residence, and be present at my
arrest. And, during their investigation of my activities, the two would also violate
federal law by intercepting a personal telephone call of mine. While making me
out to be a villain, Markoff, in a subsequent article, set up Shimomura as the
number one hero of cyberspace. Again he was violating journalistic ethics by not
disclosing a preexisting relationship: this hero in fact had been a personal friend
of Markoff's for years. My first encounter with Markoff had come in the late
eighties when he and his wife Katie Hafner contacted me while they were in the
process of writing Cyberpunk, which was to be the story of three hackers: a
German kid known as Pengo, Robert Morris, and myself.

What would my compensation be for participating? Nothing. I couldn't see the
point of giving them my story if they would profit from it and I wouldn't, so I
refused to help. Markoff gave me an ultimatum: either interview with us or
anything we hear from any source will be accepted as the truth. He was clearly
frustrated and annoyed that I would not cooperate, and was letting me know he
had the means to make me regret it. I chose to stand my ground and would not
cooperate despite his pressure tactics. When published, the book portrayed me as
"The Darkside Hacker." I concluded that the authors had intentionally included
unsupported, false statements in order to get back at me for not cooperating with
them. By making my character appear more sinister and casting me in a false
light, they probably increased the sales of the book. A movie producer phoned
with great news: Hollywood was interested in making a movie about the
Darkside Hacker depicted in Cyberpunk. I pointed out that the story was full of
inaccuracies and untruths about me, but he was still very excited about the
project. I accepted $5,000 for a two-year option, against an additional $45,000 if
they were able to get a production deal and move forward. When the option
expired, the production company asked for a six month extension. By this time I
was gainfully employed, and so had little motivation for seeing a movie produced
that showed me in such an unfavorable and false light. I refused to go along with
the extension. That killed the movie deal for everyone, including Markoff, who
had probably expected to make a great deal of money from the project. Here was
one more reason for John Markoff to be vindictive towards me. Around the time
Cyberpunk was published, Markoff had ongoing email correspondence with his
friend Shimomura. Both of them were strangely interested in my whereabouts
and what I was doing. Surprisingly, one e-mail message contained intelligence
that they had learned I was attending the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and
had use of the student computer lab. Could it be that Markoff and Shimomura
were interested in doing another book about me? Otherwise, why would they care
what I was up to? Markoff in Pursuit Take a step back to late 1992. I was nearing
the end of my supervised release for compromising Digital Equipment
Corporation's corporate network. Meanwhile I became aware that the government
was trying to put together another case against me, this one for conducting
counter-intelligence to find out why wiretaps had been placed on the phone lines
of a Los Angeles P.II firm. In my digging, I confirmed my suspicion: the Pacific
Bell security people were indeed investigating the firm. So was a computer-crime
deputy from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (That deputy turns
out to be, co-incidentally, the twin brother of my co-author on this book. Small
world.) About this time, the Feds set up a criminal informant and sent him out to
entrap me. They knew I always tried to keep tabs on any agency investigating
me. So they had this informant befriend me and tip me off that I was being
monitored. He also shared with me the details of a computer system used at
Pacific Bell that would let me do counter-surveillance of their monitoring. When
I discovered his plot, I quickly turned the tables on him and exposed him for
credit-card fraud he was conducting while working for the government in an
informant capacity. I'm sure the Feds appreciated that! My life changed on
Independence Day, 1994 when my pager woke me early in the morning. The
caller said I should immediately pick up a copy of the New York Times. I
couldn't believe it when I saw that Markoff had not only written an article about
me, but the Times had placed it on the front page. The first thought that came to
mind was for my personal safety-now the government would be substantially
increasing their efforts to find me. I was relieved that in an effort to demonize
me, the Times had used a very unbecoming picture. I wasn't fearful of being
recognized they had chosen a picture so out of date that it didn't look anything
like me! As I began to read the article, I realized that Markoff was setting
himself up to write the Kevin Mitnick book, just as he had always wanted. I
simply could not believe the New York Times would risk printing the
egregiously false statements that he had written about me. I felt helpless. Even if
I had been in a position to respond, I certainly would not have an audience equal
to the New York Times s to rebut Markoff's outrageous lies. While I can agree I
had been a pain in the ass, I had never destroyed information, nor used or
disclosed to others any information I had obtained. Actual losses by companies
from my hacking activities amounted to the cost of phone calls I had made at
phone-company expense, the money spent by companies to plug the security
vulnerabilities that my attacks had revealed, and in a few instances possibly
causing companies to reinstall their operating systems and applications for fear I
might have modified software in a way that would allow me future access. Those
companies would have remained vulnerable to far worse damage if my activities
hadn't made them aware of the weak links in their security chain. Though I had
caused some losses, my actions and intent were not malicious ... and then John
Markoff changed the world's perception of the danger I represented. The power
of one unethical reporter from such an influential newspaper to write a false and
defamatory story about anyone should haunt each and every one of us. The next
target might be you.

After my arrest I was transported to the County Jail in Smithfield, North
Carolina, where the U.S. Marshals Service ordered jailers to place me into `the
hole'-solitary confinement. Within a week, federal prosecutors and my attorney
reached an agreement that I couldn't refuse. I could be moved out of solitary on
the condition that I waived my fundamental rights and agreed to: a) no bail
hearing; b) no preliminary hearing; and, c) no phone calls, except to my attorney
and two family members. Sign, and I could get out of solitary. I signed.The
federal prosecutors in the case played every dirty trick in the book up until I was
released nearly five years later. I was repeatedly forced to waive my rights in
order to be treated like any other accused. But this was the Kevin Mitnick case:
There were no rules. No requirement to respect the Constitutional rights of the
accused. My case was not about justice, but about the government's
determination to win at all costs. The prosecutors had made vastly overblown
claims to the court about the damage I had caused and the threat I represented,
and the media had gone to town quoting the sensationalist statements; now it was
too late for the prosecutors to back down. The government could not afford to
lose the Mitnick case. The world was watching.

I believe that the courts bought into the fear generated by media coverage, since
many of the more ethical journalists had picked up the "facts" from the esteemed
New York Times and repeated them. The media-generated myth apparently even
scared law enforcement officials. A confidential document obtained by my
attorney showed that the U.S. Marshals Service had issued a warning to all law
enforcement agents never to reveal any personal information to me; otherwise,
they might find their lives electronically destroyed. Our Constitution requires
that the accused be presumed innocent before trial, thus granting all citizens the
right to a bail hearing, where the accused has the opportunity to be represented by
counsel, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. Unbelievably, the
government had been able to circumvent these protections based on the false
hysteria generated by irresponsible reporters like John Markoff. Without
precedent, I was held as a pre-trial detainee-a person in custody pending trial or
sentencing-for over four and a half years. The judge's refusal to grant me a bail
hearing was litigated all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. In the end, my
defense team advised me that I had set another precedent: I was the only federal
detainee in U.S. history denied a bail hearing. This meant the government never
had to meet the burden of proving that there were no conditions of release that
would reasonably assure my appearance in court. At least in this case, federal
prosecutors did not dare to allege that I could start a nuclear war by whistling into
a payphone, as other federal prosecutors had done in an earlier case. The most
serious charges against me were that I had copied proprietary source code for
various cellular phone handsets and popular operating systems. Yet the
prosecutors alleged publicly and to the court that I had caused collective losses
exceeding $300 million to several companies. The details of the loss amounts are
still under seal with the court, supposedly to protect the companies involved; my
defense team, though, believes the prosecution's request to seal the information
was initiated to cover up their gross malfeasance in my case. It's also worth
noting that none of the victims in my case had reported any losses to the
Securities and Exchange Commission as required by law. Either several
multinational companies violated Federal law-in the process deceiving the SEC,
stockholders, and analysts--or the losses attributable to my hacking were, in fact,
too trivial to be reported. In his book he Fugitive Game, Jonathan Li wan reports
that within a week of the New York Times front-page story, Markoff's agent had
"brokered a package deal" with the publisher Walt Disney Hyperion for a book
about the campaign to track me down. The advance was to be an estimated
$750,000. According to Littman, there was to be a Hollywood movie, as well,
with Miramax handing over $200,000 for the option and "a total $650,000 to be
paid upon commencement of filming." A confidential source has recently
informed me that Markoff's deal was in fact much more than Littman had
originally thought. So John Markoff got a million dollars, more or less, and I got
five years. One book that examines the legal aspects of my case was written by a
man who had himself been a prosecutor in the Los Angeles District Attorney's
office, a colleague of the attorneys who prosecuted me. In his book Spectacular
Computer Crimes, Buck Bloombecker wrote, "It grieves me to have to write
about my former colleagues in less than flattering terms.... I'm haunted by
Assistant United States Attorney James Asperger's admission that much of the
argument used to keep Mitnick behind bars was based on rumors which didn't
pan out." He goes on to say, "It was bad enough that the charges prosecutors
made in court were spread to millions of readers by newspapers around the
country. But it is much worse that these untrue allegations were a large part of the
basis for keeping Mitnick behind bars without the possibility of posting bail?" He
continues at some length, writing about the ethical standards that prosecutors
should live by, and then writes, "Mitnick's case suggests that the false allegations
used to keep him in custody also prejudiced the court's consideration of a fair
sentence." In his 1999 Forbes article, Adam L. Penenberg eloquently described
my situation this way: "Mitnick's crimes were curiously innocuous. He broke into
corporate computers, but no evidence indicates that he destroyed data. Or sold
anything he copied. Yes, he pilfered software but in doing so left it behind." The
article said that my crime was "To thumb his nose at the costly computer security
systems employed by large corporations." And in the book The Fugitive Game,
author Jonathan Littman noted, "Greed the government could understand. But a
hacker who wielded power for its own sake ... was something they couldn't
grasp." Elsewhere in the same book, Littman wrote: U.S. Attorney James
Sanders admitted to Judge Pfaelzer that Mitnick's damage to DEC was not the $4
million that had made the headlines but $160,000. Even that amount was not
damage done by Mitnick, but the rough cost of tracing the security weakness that
his incursions had brought to DEC's attention. The government acknowledged it
had no evidence of the wild claims that had helped hold Mitnick without bail and
in solitary confinement. No proof Mitnick had ever compromised the security of
the NSA. No proof that Mitnick had ever issued a false press release for Security
Pacific Bank. No proof that Mitnick ever changed the TRW credit report of a
judge. But the judge, perhaps influenced by the terrifying media coverage,
rejected the plea bargain and sentenced Mitnick to a longer term then even the
government wanted. Throughout the years spent as a hacker hobbyist, I've
gained unwanted notoriety, been written up in numerous news reports and
magazine articles, and had four books written about me. Markoff and
Shimomura's libelous book was made into a feature film called Takedown. When
the script found its way onto the Internet, many of my supporters picketed
Miramax Films to call public attention to the inaccurate and false characterization
of me. Without the help of many kind and generous people, the motion picture
would surely have falsely portrayed me as the Hannibal Lector of cyberspace.
Pressured by my supporters, the production company agreed to settle the case on
confidential terms to avoid me filing a libel action against them.

Final Thoughts

Despite John Markoff's outrageous and libelous descriptions of me, my
crimes were simple crimes of computer trespass and making free telephone calls.
I've acknowledged since my arrest that the actions I took were illegal, and that I
committed invasions of privacy. But to suggest, without justification, reason, or
proof, as did the Markoff articles, that I had deprived others of their money or
property by computer or wire fraud, is simply untrue, and unsupported by the
evidence. My misdeeds were motivated by curiosity: I wanted to know as much
as I could about how phone networks worked, and the ins and outs of computer
security. I went from being a kid who loved to perform magic tricks to becoming
the world's most notorious hacker, feared by corporations and the government.
As I reflect back on my life for the last thirty years, I admit I made some
extremely poor decisions, driven by my curiosity, the desire to learn about
technology, and a good intellectual challenge. I'm a changed person now. I'm
turning my talents and the extensive knowledge I've gathered about information
security and social engineering tactics to helping government, businesses and
individuals prevent, detect, and respond to information security threats. This
book is one more way that I can use my experience to help others avoid the
efforts of the malicious information thieves of the world. I think you will find the
stories enjoyable, eye-opening and educational.

Kevin Mitnick

                       _____________________________


Mitnick’s Lost Chapter Found
By Michelle Delio
wired.com, Nov. 05, 2002


A missing chapter from hacker Kevin Mitnick's recent book has been published
on the Internet.

The chapter was originally slated to be the first chapter in Mitnick's new book,
The Art of Deception, but was not included in the published version of the book.

Chapter One appeared only in about 300 unbound galley copies that publishing
company Wiley distributed to the media several months before releasing the
book, according to a Wiley spokeswoman.

The publisher decided to remove the chapter shortly before releasing the book.
Wiley representatives were unable to comment immediately on why the chapter
was pulled.

The chapter contains the first recounting by Mitnick of his life as a hacker and a
fugitive, as well as his arrest, trial and life in prison.

The chapter also includes allegations by Mitnick that John Markoff, technology
reporter for The New York Times, printed malicious stories about Mitnick during
the hacker's years as a fugitive.

The missing chapter was first made publicly available late Saturday in a Yahoo
discussion group called "Kevin's Story." It has since appeared on other websites.
Mitnick said he didn't know who had posted the chapter online. E-mails to the
yahoo.com address listed with the original post went unanswered.

"I feel pretty good about the chapter being available," Mitnick said. "For a long
time I was portrayed as the Osama bin Laden of the Internet and I really wanted
to be able to tell my side of the story. I wanted to be able to explain exactly what
I did and what I didn't do to people who thought they knew me."

Much of the material in the "missing chapter" details Mitnick's dealings with
Markoff.

Of primary concern to Mitnick is that Markoff "failed to acknowledge a pre-
existing relationship" with Mitnick in a July 4, 1994, story that appeared on the
front page of The New York Times.

Markoff's story described Mitnick as a highly dangerous hacker capable of
breaking into critical government computers and stressed that Mitnick had so far
easily evaded law enforcement officials.

Mitnick charges that Markoff was angry at him because of a failed movie deal
based on Markoff's 1991 book, Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the
Computer Frontier.

At the time of publication, Mitnick disputed the book's veracity but later accepted
$5,000 of a total $50,000 offer to act as a consultant for the movie based on the
book because he needed the money.

Two years later, when the studio wanted to renew the contract, Mitnick, by then
employed, refused to renew. That refusal, according to Mitnick and two sources
familiar with the incident, caused the deal to die.

Mitnick said Markoff should have mentioned the failed business deal in his
subsequent articles on Mitnick. He also contends that many of the hacks
attributed to him by Markoff never happened.

"But trying to prove that you didn't hack something is impossible if people
believe you're skilled enough to evade detection," Mitnick said.

Markoff flatly refused to comment on any of Mitnick's allegations in Chapter
One.

Mitnick said he wished the chapter could have been published with the book, but
that he respected his publisher's decision.
"But obviously, the Internet is a great way to get uncensored, unfiltered
information out to the world," Mitnick added. "I'm counting the days until I can
go online again."

Mitnick has been banned from using the Internet as a condition of his supervised
release. He's free to go online again on January 21, 2003, after close to eight
years offline.

The first site he'll visit is his girlfriend's blog.

"She tells me she's been documenting our entire relationship online," Mitnick
said. "I'd love to know what she's been saying about me."