[00:00.000 --> 00:02.680]  Thank you so many women, actually, at this conference.
[00:02.960 --> 00:05.220]  The five of you that showed up, I really appreciate it.
[00:06.560 --> 00:07.860]  No, I'm just kidding.
[00:09.380 --> 00:10.200]  I'm just kidding.
[00:10.300 --> 00:10.640]  There's ten.
[00:10.860 --> 00:11.040]  Okay.
[00:13.180 --> 00:14.460]  And it's Annalee, yes?
[00:14.620 --> 00:15.180]  Annalee, yes.
[00:15.280 --> 00:16.600]  We're waiting for Wendy Seltzer.
[00:16.780 --> 00:18.180]  Well, we're going to go ahead and get started.
[00:19.260 --> 00:24.860]  We have Annalee of the EFF, who I encourage all of you to please join.
[00:26.000 --> 00:34.860]  There's some pretty tough fights out there, and if everybody kicks in ten bucks, twenty bucks, these guys will have the resources to keep the man out of your house.
[00:36.180 --> 00:37.140]  We also have Doc.
[00:38.000 --> 00:39.060]  So, Doc, take it away.
[00:44.450 --> 00:45.390]  Sit, stand.
[00:45.490 --> 00:46.490]  Do you want to stand up there?
[00:46.990 --> 00:47.570]  There we go.
[00:47.930 --> 00:48.630]  That's all I wanted.
[00:50.010 --> 00:50.410]  All right.
[00:50.550 --> 00:52.270]  I'm going to have to go through this pretty quick.
[00:52.570 --> 00:55.850]  Not as much detail as I'd like, but, you know, you want to hear more interesting people.
[00:56.470 --> 00:58.910]  The thing about the Patriot Act is we heard a lot of hype.
[00:59.050 --> 01:01.770]  We've heard a lot of good analysis, and we don't really know what it means.
[01:02.130 --> 01:06.590]  So, what I've tried to do is draw it together in the context of all the previous law that it's modified.
[01:07.270 --> 01:10.850]  And that takes about an hour, and I've got about fifteen minutes, so I'm going to get started.
[01:12.410 --> 01:12.870]  All right.
[01:13.110 --> 01:14.970]  When you consider the seizure of electronic evidence...
[01:15.730 --> 01:18.870]  And, by the way, you've got to know how they take it if you want to protect it.
[01:19.750 --> 01:22.390]  We're dealing with four primary laws here.
[01:22.610 --> 01:24.770]  There are other laws, yes, but these are the big ones.
[01:24.770 --> 01:34.110]  Title III, the wiretap order, the Pen Trace statute, the ECPA, and finally the USA PATRIOT Act that we've heard so much about recently.
[01:38.280 --> 01:47.420]  The thing to consider about each of the instruments defined by these laws is that they establish a different set of legal standards before a search instrument can be issued.
[01:47.420 --> 01:50.440]  And I use the term instrument very specifically because they're not all warrants.
[01:51.200 --> 01:52.720]  The Title III order...
[01:52.720 --> 01:55.560]  Now, this is from the highest burden to law enforcement to the lowest.
[01:55.880 --> 01:58.040]  The Title III order has the highest burden.
[01:58.240 --> 02:01.060]  There's a lot of administrative oversight, and I'll get to that in just a second.
[02:01.480 --> 02:12.220]  But you have to meet the full search warrant standard of probable cause with a Title III warrant, plus there are minimization procedures and reporting procedures that have to go into it, and they're monitored.
[02:13.320 --> 02:17.460]  Second is a federal rule of criminal procedure 41B search warrant.
[02:17.580 --> 02:19.400]  This is the federal version of a search warrant.
[02:19.560 --> 02:24.220]  It meets the protections that we've come to expect in our search and seizure law.
[02:25.800 --> 02:28.000]  And that is the simple probable cause standard.
[02:28.140 --> 02:30.020]  I'll get to more about that in a second here.
[02:30.780 --> 02:38.040]  The next burdensome, you know, going down the list on burden to law enforcement, you have the ECPA 2703 order.
[02:39.200 --> 02:47.700]  This requires that law enforcement state specific and articulable facts showing reasonable grounds to believe that the records are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.
[02:48.060 --> 02:49.660]  That's not a high standard to meet.
[02:50.040 --> 02:50.520]  Right?
[02:50.720 --> 02:56.640]  However, the information that can be derived from that order is less than a search warrant or less than a Title III warrant.
[02:56.640 --> 02:58.100]  So let me go down one more.
[02:59.320 --> 02:59.760]  Right?
[03:00.060 --> 03:02.960]  We have the pen register or trap-and-trace device order.
[03:03.220 --> 03:11.100]  And the requirement that law enforcement has to meet with this one is that it's relevant to a criminal investigation.
[03:12.300 --> 03:14.320]  That is an extremely easy standard to meet.
[03:15.480 --> 03:17.680]  The next instrument is a subpoena with notice.
[03:17.860 --> 03:21.480]  This is notice given to the person whose records are subpoenaed from a third party.
[03:22.540 --> 03:27.180]  And the requirement that law enforcement has to meet with that is delivering a piece of paper to the court.
[03:27.540 --> 03:28.200]  That's it.
[03:28.880 --> 03:32.720]  Or the electronic content via fax or whatever other mechanism the court allows.
[03:33.700 --> 03:38.060]  Finally, the least burden to law enforcement would be a subpoena with delayed notice.
[03:38.060 --> 03:52.180]  And in this case, law enforcement can obtain records from, let's say, an ISP and not have that ISP notify the owner of those records for up to 90 days with an easy extension, which basically involves, hey, can we have an extension?
[03:53.880 --> 04:04.780]  And this requires, upon written certification of a supervisory official, read any sergeant, any corporal in a local PD on up the food chain.
[04:05.660 --> 04:11.260]  That there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of the subpoena may have an adverse result.
[04:11.580 --> 04:15.400]  And an adverse result is left up to law enforcement to decide.
[04:17.620 --> 04:24.480]  With that understanding in place, I'd like to mention a little bit more about the burden of Title III on law enforcement.
[04:24.960 --> 04:31.160]  And that is, all applications for the Title III wiretap orders are submitted through the U.S.
[04:31.420 --> 04:32.560]  Attorney's Office, generally.
[04:33.940 --> 04:39.760]  Title III requires that all domestic wiretap applications be reported to the administrative offices of the United States courts.
[04:39.760 --> 04:47.800]  And you can get these reports back to, I believe, you know, I don't remember right off the bat, 60?
[04:49.320 --> 04:51.040]  Hang on a second, I've got it on another overhead.
[04:52.580 --> 04:53.700]  You can get these reports.
[04:53.840 --> 04:54.540]  They're available on the web.
[04:54.720 --> 04:56.900]  You can go see how many reports have been issued.
[04:57.040 --> 04:58.600]  That's part of this reporting requirement.
[04:59.960 --> 05:07.580]  And I'd also like to mention that under the Clinton administration, the Department of Justice was directed to reduce the number of applications and increase the productivity of orders granted.
[05:07.580 --> 05:15.900]  What that means is there was a push in justice to get the number down and the number that produced prosecutions up, right?
[05:16.000 --> 05:21.400]  So you don't just have a Title III order sitting out there having people's lines monitored with nothing coming of it.
[05:21.540 --> 05:24.660]  It was a little bit of accountability that this kind of reporting added to it.
[05:24.840 --> 05:27.220]  I'm trying to show you that there were some teeth to it.
[05:30.620 --> 05:31.900]  This is from one of those reports.
[05:31.900 --> 05:40.400]  You can see the number of requests from federal law enforcement actually starting to taper off there at the very end once the Clinton administration issued that order.
[05:43.160 --> 05:45.120]  And here I've summarized it in numbers.
[05:46.300 --> 05:50.380]  There were fewer wiretap requests, almost 1,200 of them in the year 2000.
[05:51.260 --> 05:53.900]  They were completed that year.
[05:54.000 --> 05:54.840]  That's down 5%.
[05:54.840 --> 05:57.360]  So that reporting requirement does have some teeth.
[05:57.360 --> 05:59.260]  It's not just for show.
[05:59.480 --> 06:01.660]  It's not perfect, but it's there.
[06:01.840 --> 06:03.580]  And it has some effect when we put it in place.
[06:04.520 --> 06:07.140]  There was greater precision in wiretapping during that year.
[06:07.640 --> 06:12.420]  For example, wiretaps were in effect 15% fewer days per order than in 1999.
[06:12.840 --> 06:16.480]  And I think everyone would agree that there are times when wiretaps should exist.
[06:19.640 --> 06:20.000]  If...
[06:20.000 --> 06:20.440]  If...
[06:20.440 --> 06:20.560]  Thank you.
[06:20.780 --> 06:21.460]  Everyone but...
[06:21.460 --> 06:21.780]  Yeah, okay.
[06:21.980 --> 06:22.420]  I should know.
[06:22.500 --> 06:22.820]  Not everyone.
[06:23.940 --> 06:25.500]  Almost everyone would agree there are sometimes.
[06:25.700 --> 06:27.160]  Some of them may be very extreme cases.
[06:27.160 --> 06:27.820]  Some of them may not.
[06:28.180 --> 06:32.880]  But the fact of the matter is it certainly should be reviewed by an objective third party as required by our law.
[06:33.140 --> 06:36.260]  And it certainly should be monitored and we certainly should be aware of it.
[06:36.760 --> 06:39.760]  At the very least, we need to know that it's going on, how much of it's going on.
[06:41.640 --> 06:46.980]  Incriminating intercepts per wiretap, which means that there was actually a crime afoot that was detected with that wiretap.
[06:47.100 --> 06:51.080]  And frankly, if they're going to issue them, I hope they at least catch somebody committing a crime with them.
[06:51.160 --> 06:54.120]  As opposed to just listening into innocent people's conversations.
[06:55.040 --> 06:55.780]  We're up 3%.
[07:00.250 --> 07:01.630]  This is another thing to think about.
[07:01.970 --> 07:03.470]  Now, last year I was working...
[07:03.470 --> 07:04.670]  I'm going to digress just for a minute.
[07:04.970 --> 07:09.510]  Last time I was working the information desk and a guy came up and said, Hey, I think I spotted a fed.
[07:09.710 --> 07:10.390]  I was like, really?
[07:10.470 --> 07:11.090]  Who do you think it is?
[07:11.370 --> 07:12.570]  He's like, that guy over there.
[07:12.930 --> 07:14.170]  I'm like, yeah, okay.
[07:14.290 --> 07:14.510]  Yeah, sure.
[07:14.590 --> 07:15.170]  He looks like a fed.
[07:15.390 --> 07:16.010]  Here's your prize.
[07:16.150 --> 07:19.330]  So I wrote out, the average federal wiretap costs $55,000.
[07:19.930 --> 07:20.910]  You're not worth it.
[07:21.470 --> 07:22.430]  And I gave it to him.
[07:22.530 --> 07:24.630]  And I was hoping that that knowledge would set him free.
[07:27.640 --> 07:28.040]  Right?
[07:28.300 --> 07:31.700]  But that's one agent's year's pay per wiretap.
[07:32.000 --> 07:34.080]  These things aren't just getting distributed around...
[07:34.080 --> 07:36.520]  I'm not talking about FISA wiretaps here.
[07:36.660 --> 07:38.840]  Just domestic Title III wiretaps.
[07:39.000 --> 07:41.340]  These things are expensive and they need to be controlled.
[07:41.340 --> 07:43.960]  I don't want my tax dollars going for these things.
[07:45.480 --> 07:45.980]  Right?
[07:46.260 --> 07:48.820]  The average cost is about $54,829.
[07:49.320 --> 07:53.520]  And the average cost was down 5% because they were in effect fewer days.
[07:55.400 --> 07:58.760]  For the year, domestic wiretaps cost the U.S.
[07:58.840 --> 08:00.220]  taxpayers $65 million.
[08:04.160 --> 08:04.640]  Right?
[08:04.780 --> 08:07.260]  Oh, by the way, all that information is publicly available.
[08:07.600 --> 08:09.320]  The Administrative Office of the U.S.
[08:09.380 --> 08:10.400]  Courts provides it for you.
[08:10.580 --> 08:11.520]  Go take a look at it.
[08:11.620 --> 08:11.880]  It's there.
[08:14.740 --> 08:24.860]  Minimization procedures exist with Title III orders to keep the, you know, keep law enforcement from listening to conversations that are not relevant to a criminal investigation.
[08:25.400 --> 08:32.040]  One of the techniques they use is called polling, where they'll listen in for 30 seconds every two minutes until they hear something that's relevant to the investigation.
[08:34.720 --> 08:36.220]  Now, that's what's recorded.
[08:37.220 --> 08:38.430]  Does it work other ways?
[08:38.580 --> 08:40.580]  Yes, I think we all understand that it does.
[08:40.790 --> 08:42.580]  That agents may be listening in.
[08:42.580 --> 08:47.640]  But they're not recording them because there is an audit trail available should people want to look into it.
[08:48.540 --> 08:48.920]  Right?
[08:49.040 --> 08:52.180]  So they have to turn off the recorder if it's not relevant to a criminal investigation.
[08:52.800 --> 08:54.720]  That's part of the minimization procedure.
[08:54.900 --> 08:57.960]  It's required by the order issued to them to tap that wire.
[09:00.240 --> 09:04.400]  And one of the reasons wiretaps are so expensive is because it requires full-time monitoring.
[09:04.400 --> 09:18.860]  That's part of the stink about carnivore in legal circles, kind of the arcane legal reasons carnivore was so detestable, was that it was full-time monitoring and there was no mechanism to turn it off because it was all filtered by the equivalent, the electronic equivalent of a person listening to it.
[09:19.280 --> 09:19.500]  Right?
[09:19.600 --> 09:25.680]  Now, that's an extremely esoteric point of law, but it's relevant because it would have changed the precedent of that law.
[09:28.540 --> 09:34.200]  One of the things to consider about search and seizure law is the huge distinction between transmittal information and content.
[09:34.840 --> 09:39.680]  Now, the government first recognized that information, like on a letter...
[09:39.680 --> 09:42.200]  I don't know if you can make it out, but that's Abby Hoffman on the stamp.
[09:43.640 --> 09:45.640]  It's a little small and dim, but he's there.
[09:46.700 --> 09:48.940]  The information on the outside of the letter is public information.
[09:49.100 --> 09:50.000]  It's like writing a postcard.
[09:50.400 --> 09:55.260]  The address, who you're sending it to, where it's coming from, whatever you choose to write on it, is really not private.
[09:55.260 --> 09:58.640]  You don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy for the outside of a letter.
[09:59.100 --> 10:03.420]  However, you do have a reasonable expectation of privacy for the contents of that letter.
[10:03.660 --> 10:13.960]  If you want to write a letter to grandma, nobody needs to know what you're saying to grandma, unless they have a warrant and a detached third party has agreed that it could lead to a legitimate prosecution.
[10:14.220 --> 10:17.780]  And there was probable cause to believe it will produce evidence of a crime.
[10:19.440 --> 10:22.720]  This distinction continues to this very day, and it's a very important one.
[10:26.970 --> 10:31.410]  That is what... that is the maze that you navigate... don't worry, don't copy this down.
[10:32.510 --> 10:38.830]  This is the maze you navigate to figure out what particular search device you need given the type of information you want.
[10:39.390 --> 10:41.970]  This started out as a stack of law books this tall.
[10:42.290 --> 10:47.090]  A U.S. attorney named Oren Kier reduced it to a report about an inch thick.
[10:47.090 --> 10:48.730]  I reduced it to one page.
[10:49.430 --> 10:51.270]  Because I didn't want to read that much.
[10:53.630 --> 10:58.270]  What I'm going to do here is point out certain decision paths, and I'll read this one out to you.
[10:58.930 --> 11:00.570]  You start with an ongoing investigation.
[11:00.870 --> 11:02.630]  You determine that you want telephonic evidence.
[11:02.890 --> 11:04.550]  The type of evidence you want is content.
[11:04.850 --> 11:11.250]  So the instrument you must use is a Title III order, which means you have to meet the full requirements of the Title III to get that order.
[11:11.250 --> 11:20.210]  If you can't meet the requirements, you can't establish probable cause, you can't convince the magistrate that you're going to minimize the search, you don't get it as law enforcement.
[11:25.410 --> 11:28.290]  I'm going to go a little bit more quickly through this one.
[11:28.290 --> 11:33.030]  I want to point out that there are exceptions to the Title III protections that are offered.
[11:33.670 --> 11:35.870]  You know, all of this, of course, is public information.
[11:35.870 --> 11:37.950]  If you want to know the details, it's out there.
[11:39.190 --> 11:41.530]  Let me see if I've...
[11:42.230 --> 11:47.450]  Yeah, if you want to look it up, it's in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, sections 2510 to 2522.
[11:48.290 --> 11:51.070]  I recommend Cornell Laws Legal Information Institute.
[11:51.070 --> 11:53.890]  They have a nice, easy-to-use site for finding law.
[11:56.110 --> 11:58.450]  We'll go quick through those cause, who cares?
[11:59.490 --> 12:00.570]  Here's the important part.
[12:01.250 --> 12:03.810]  Title III has a statutory suppression mechanism.
[12:04.030 --> 12:07.670]  If you violate Title III, you don't get to use the evidence.
[12:08.390 --> 12:08.830]  Right?
[12:08.970 --> 12:09.690]  It says so.
[12:09.810 --> 12:10.410]  It's the law.
[12:10.630 --> 12:13.470]  It's not just a good idea and it's not just to fit a peak by a judge.
[12:14.270 --> 12:16.010]  Wow, I'm really running short here.
[12:16.170 --> 12:17.190]  Don't worry about that pen trap.
[12:17.330 --> 12:18.190]  We all know about that, right?
[12:18.690 --> 12:22.030]  Basically, that's the transmittal information of a telephone call.
[12:24.690 --> 12:26.110]  What did the Patriot Act do?
[12:26.530 --> 12:30.670]  It redefined certain aspects of this previously established set of laws that we had.
[12:30.830 --> 12:32.890]  It allowed the government to collect more information.
[12:32.890 --> 12:34.570]  In some cases, it was very reasonable.
[12:34.850 --> 12:39.790]  It updated the types of information and it didn't violate the trends that we'd established in laws.
[12:40.490 --> 12:41.830]  Not in all cases.
[12:43.770 --> 12:44.210]  Right?
[12:44.390 --> 12:47.110]  One of the things that cleared up was a long-standing debate about voicemail.
[12:47.110 --> 12:48.250]  What is voicemail?
[12:48.370 --> 12:51.210]  Is it stored electronic communication or is it telephonic content?
[12:51.530 --> 12:51.930]  Right?
[12:52.210 --> 12:53.490]  The Patriot Act defined that.
[12:53.630 --> 12:56.190]  And frankly, I'd rather live without the confusion in my life.
[12:56.790 --> 13:01.710]  And best of all, it continued the protections that would reasonably be extended to it.
[13:02.670 --> 13:04.230]  Of course, I'm not a litigator.
[13:04.470 --> 13:09.530]  So, you know, regular search warrant.
[13:09.750 --> 13:10.670]  We all know about search warrants.
[13:10.670 --> 13:11.750]  If we don't, we can learn elsewhere.
[13:12.130 --> 13:12.750]  Here it is.
[13:13.310 --> 13:17.390]  What did Patriot Act expand in some of the basic subscriber information?
[13:17.510 --> 13:18.690]  Now, again, this is not content.
[13:18.890 --> 13:22.910]  These are the terms of service that you have with a third-party provider like an ISP.
[13:23.350 --> 13:38.030]  They can now obtain the length of service, the types of services you subscribe to or used, temporary assigned network addresses, dynamic IPs, and the means and source of payment, meaning the money trail back to you.
[13:43.520 --> 13:44.180]  ECPA...
[13:45.160 --> 13:46.580]  I'll deal with this quickly.
[13:47.240 --> 13:48.600]  Basically, three kinds of information.
[13:49.020 --> 13:51.080]  Subscriber information that we went over above.
[13:51.740 --> 13:55.320]  Records or logs maintained by that provider about you.
[13:55.620 --> 13:57.240]  And finally, the contents.
[13:59.180 --> 13:59.840]  Right?
[14:00.500 --> 14:02.340]  ECPA was good for us.
[14:02.660 --> 14:08.420]  It protected us from having our information released by third-party service providers.
[14:08.420 --> 14:12.360]  It increased the burden on law enforcement and clarified their duties in many cases.
[14:13.780 --> 14:16.240]  If you want content, you still need to get a search warrant.
[14:16.340 --> 14:17.760]  You still have to meet probable cause.
[14:20.040 --> 14:22.460]  It does not provide a statutory suppression remedy.
[14:22.620 --> 14:27.380]  Of course, constitutional violations ordinarily result in suppression of evidence wrongfully obtained.
[14:27.900 --> 14:28.400]  Blah, blah, blah.
[14:33.280 --> 14:35.320]  Last thing, voluntary disclosure.
[14:36.080 --> 14:41.560]  Third-party providers, public providers, are not allowed to release your information voluntarily.
[14:43.060 --> 14:43.500]  Formerly.
[14:44.240 --> 14:44.800]  Right?
[14:45.180 --> 14:53.340]  Now, private providers like, you know, if you have a company account, let's say you work for AT&T, your email account may be provided to law enforcement.
[14:53.340 --> 14:58.540]  If you subscribe to a service provided by AT&T and you pay for it, they may not disclose it.
[14:59.240 --> 14:59.960]  Until Patriot.
[15:03.470 --> 15:05.830]  There were some recognized exceptions to that.
[15:05.990 --> 15:09.050]  For example, the Child Protection and Sexual Predator Punishment Act.
[15:09.290 --> 15:09.990]  You know, and I...
[15:10.490 --> 15:13.550]  I don't know if everybody would agree, but it seems like a reasonable...
[15:13.550 --> 15:16.110]  I'm willing to give up my rights for that.
[15:16.190 --> 15:17.450]  As long as it's used for that.
[15:17.470 --> 15:18.390]  As long as it's monitored.
[15:18.630 --> 15:20.450]  You may not be, and I don't insist that you be.
[15:22.550 --> 15:25.130]  I'm gonna read it off of here because I don't want to drill down to that slide.
[15:25.310 --> 15:27.250]  I think I'm encroaching on some other people's time here.
[15:28.290 --> 15:29.790]  Disclosure may be voluntary.
[15:30.250 --> 15:30.690]  Right?
[15:30.830 --> 15:31.550]  Formerly it was not.
[15:31.710 --> 15:32.850]  It wasn't allowed under ECPA.
[15:33.070 --> 15:34.090]  Thanks to Patriot.
[15:34.650 --> 15:43.470]  Disclosure may be voluntary if ECPA 2702B or USA PATRIOT Act Section 212 or 505 exists.
[15:43.810 --> 15:48.670]  Basically, that's if someone in a very nebulous way decides you might be a threat to national security.
[15:48.670 --> 15:53.350]  If you were a cyber terrorist, for instance, right?
[15:53.610 --> 15:55.290]  What does it take to get labeled a cyber terrorist?
[15:56.730 --> 15:58.250]  I'm probably one right now.
[15:58.810 --> 16:06.570]  I mean, just standing here talking to you, I'm pretty sure that someone would consider me a cyber terrorist for enabling you by teaching you about search and seizure law.
[16:07.650 --> 16:15.530]  So, it is worrisome, but to understand the real threat of Patriot, you have to understand all the legislation that it modified.
[16:15.530 --> 16:28.730]  One of the first drafts of Patriot simply removed a couple words from some of the laws that protected us and reduced the protections for content down to the same as they are for a pen register for transmittal information.
[16:29.370 --> 16:31.430]  That one got shot down, thank goodness.
[16:32.490 --> 16:38.510]  But it only takes a couple words, and nobody really understands them unless you know all the underlying legislation that's behind it.
[16:38.570 --> 16:41.210]  I certainly don't, but in this one narrow area.
[16:41.950 --> 16:44.090]  You know, I hope I've laid it out for you here.
[16:44.850 --> 16:46.090]  And I'm over.
[17:04.090 --> 17:05.970]  Wendy is still putting her slides together.
[17:06.290 --> 17:08.350]  This is an amazing race against time.
[17:09.770 --> 17:12.570]  I completed my graphic here at this table.
[17:12.810 --> 17:14.910]  Let's see how fast you can type the word trademark.
[17:16.410 --> 17:17.150]  All right.
[17:26.420 --> 17:27.840]  Is that your first slide?
[17:49.120 --> 17:56.880]  Well, we've got bare bones slides here because the meat of this presentation is really going to be questions and answers from you in the audience.
[17:57.260 --> 18:03.540]  So, as the slides are getting themselves up online, I can start talking here.
[18:03.540 --> 18:06.740]  Wendy Seltzer from Electronic Frontier Foundation.
[18:06.920 --> 18:09.340]  I'm one of now eight staff attorneys there.
[18:10.100 --> 18:10.240]  And
[18:17.670 --> 18:29.890]  thanks, and thanks especially to you because it's our members that make us strong and it's contributions from our members that keep us as a nonprofit organization going.
[18:30.130 --> 18:35.430]  So, thank you and thanks to all of you who have stopped by and all of you who are planning to stop by our table in the back.
[18:37.490 --> 18:39.970]  Now on to protecting your online rights.
[18:39.970 --> 18:46.350]  I think there are two important components to protecting your rights online and your rights.
[18:47.270 --> 18:49.010]  That's first, know the law.
[18:49.170 --> 18:50.870]  And second, know your rights.
[18:51.290 --> 18:52.170]  Now, know the law.
[18:52.410 --> 18:55.690]  Reverse engineering is a minefield.
[18:58.130 --> 19:04.010]  Reverse engineering is the freedom to tinker, to understand, to interoperate, to innovate, to discover.
[19:04.010 --> 19:10.170]  But it's under attack from laws like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
[19:13.930 --> 19:14.730]  Thank you.
[19:19.790 --> 19:27.090]  Because, pre-DMCA, you pretty much had the right to take home a product and tinker with it and figure out how it worked.
[19:27.090 --> 19:29.350]  As long as you had bought it, it was yours.
[19:29.590 --> 19:31.410]  And you could play with it and you could open it up.
[19:31.530 --> 19:37.650]  And you could discover the schematics even if the television manufacturer hadn't provided them to you along with the machine.
[19:37.970 --> 19:43.190]  And you could discover how the early computers worked and you could discover how early computer software worked.
[19:43.270 --> 19:45.010]  Because you might even be given the source code.
[19:46.050 --> 19:58.810]  Well, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act gives publishers a new way to lock up content and to prevent you from tinkering with it to discover how it works or to discover how the players work.
[19:58.970 --> 20:02.210]  All in the name of preventing piracy of digital media.
[20:02.950 --> 20:12.690]  So, preventing circumvention of technological protection measures means that the movie studios can tell you how to build your DVD players.
[20:12.690 --> 20:19.070]  And can tell you that no, you can't watch DVDs on a system powered by the Linux operating system.
[20:19.290 --> 20:25.510]  No, you can't watch DVDs from Europe on the same machine that you watch your American DVDs.
[20:25.970 --> 20:34.590]  EFF defended 2600 Magazine a few years ago when 2600 published and then linked to the code for DeCSS.
[20:34.590 --> 20:43.490]  In news reports telling people this fabled security system from the movie studios is pretty weak.
[20:43.670 --> 20:45.170]  Here's how you can get around it.
[20:45.210 --> 20:48.730]  Here's how you could play DVDs on an open source operating system.
[20:49.010 --> 20:55.330]  The movie studios sued and the court said that's really what the law says.
[20:55.470 --> 20:59.870]  The law really does prohibit tinkering with your own entertainment system.
[21:02.010 --> 21:05.910]  We lost that case, but we haven't stopped fighting the law.
[21:14.560 --> 21:29.320]  We helped Professor Ed Felton and his research team after the Hack SDMI contest when they were told at first that they couldn't publish their results because that might be circumventing the watermarks on digital music samples.
[21:29.600 --> 21:32.180]  Eventually they were allowed to publish their research.
[21:32.180 --> 21:38.560]  Bunny Huang, whose book Hacking the Xbox is available at the back of the room from No Starch Press.
[21:38.800 --> 21:42.060]  Initially he tried to go with a different publisher.
[21:42.360 --> 21:55.760]  Wiley was afraid that Microsoft might come after them under the DMCA because Hacking the Xbox might be, they thought, deemed to circumvent technological protection measures in that system.
[21:55.760 --> 22:16.620]  We were confident that this book was a serious work of technology and research and were willing to defend it if it came to court over that DMCA threat and Microsoft, to its credit, hasn't threatened under the DMCA.
[22:16.620 --> 22:27.280]  But the very fact that authors have to ask their lawyers before bringing technology and research to publication is a scary trend.
[22:28.800 --> 22:32.280]  Dmitry Sklarov, Alex Halderman, other people who have...
[22:32.280 --> 22:43.660]  Dmitry was thrown in jail for several months after demonstrating the insecurities of Adobe's e-book encryption.
[22:43.660 --> 22:51.500]  Alex Halderman got threatened threats when he published that some of the new copy protected CDs could be...
[22:51.500 --> 22:58.450]  The copy protection could be avoided if you simply held down the shift key on your computer when you put the CD into the drive.
[22:58.820 --> 23:11.660]  You get one of those Mediacom CDs and hold down shift the first time you load it up because otherwise it's going to take over your operating system and pretend to prevent the copying.
[23:12.720 --> 23:16.280]  He got threat letters over saying, hold down the shift key.
[23:20.540 --> 23:41.580]  Reverse engineering, we also find it threatened by click-wrap contracts, the end-user license agreements, the huge pages and pages or screens and screens of legalese that come at the front of software packages, often claim to prohibit reverse engineering,
[23:41.940 --> 23:49.560]  and we're still fighting in the courts again on whether companies can take by contract what copyright law doesn't give them.
[23:50.760 --> 24:06.080]  Copyright law doesn't protect facts, it doesn't protect methods and processes, but companies are trying through contract to lock those things up again to prevent you from figuring out how an online game works.
[24:06.080 --> 24:16.400]  We've been defending the creators of the BnetD project, which is an open source game server that interoperates with Blizzard's Warcraft and Starcraft games.
[24:16.700 --> 24:19.640]  They wanted to give people a different place to play games online.
[24:19.960 --> 24:24.680]  They read the protocol as it was going over the network.
[24:24.680 --> 24:34.960]  They looked at the way their games functioned and without copying any of Blizzard's code, they built their own game server to work with games that people had purchased.
[24:34.960 --> 24:47.700]  Blizzard sued anyhow, saying that this was circumvention of technological protections and breach of the contract that they had clicked through when installing the game on their machines.
[24:48.300 --> 24:55.480]  We're still fighting that case as well, hoping to win a victory there for reverse engineering as fair use.
[24:59.790 --> 25:24.090]  On the flip side, although there are lots of ways that you can get tangled up in the law, we also can continue to fight if you know your rights and know that despite the entangling tentacles of the law and corporate interpretations of the law, not all of those interpretations are correct.
[25:24.310 --> 25:28.590]  And just because somebody says it in a fancy lawyer letter doesn't mean it's true.
[25:29.690 --> 25:36.250]  We have won several victories proclaiming that the First Amendment protects code as speech.
[25:36.550 --> 25:46.810]  So the government can't lock up encryption code by claiming that it's a munition to be controlled by export controls.
[25:47.750 --> 25:54.150]  Code describing the way an encryption system works is speech that's fully protected under the First Amendment.
[25:54.150 --> 26:01.570]  The courts recognized that even as they were trying to lock up pieces of code as anti-circumvention devices.
[26:01.910 --> 26:06.250]  And this is an important precedent and one that we're going to keep pushing forward.
[26:08.550 --> 26:12.510]  Copyright law doesn't protect systems, processes, and methods of operation.
[26:12.510 --> 26:23.230]  Just because someone has a copyright doesn't mean that they get to control everything you do with a piece of software or with a piece of technology.
[26:27.070 --> 26:37.910]  Copyright law still permits you to figure out how that technology works as long as you're being careful to avoid the anti-circumvention laws.
[26:38.390 --> 26:40.730]  Copyright law still has fair use exceptions.
[26:41.070 --> 26:48.870]  And so, still, if you want to criticize a book or a movie, you can take an excerpt from that and include it in your own negative review.
[26:48.870 --> 26:59.110]  And no matter how nastily they come after you, you can assert fair use rights.
[26:59.770 --> 27:08.990]  And these rights are under attack as much because people aren't asserting them as because corporations are bearing down saying they don't exist.
[27:08.990 --> 27:14.130]  If you're an author, encourage your publisher to understand fair use.
[27:14.350 --> 27:20.850]  Understand that you don't need to ask permission to take a ten-line quotation from a book.
[27:22.650 --> 27:31.790]  Understand that if you're making online multimedia art, that if you want to clip a scene from a movie, a few frames is fair use.
[27:33.470 --> 27:35.790]  Trademark law has fair use exceptions, too.
[27:36.070 --> 27:48.870]  If you're not using the trademark to promote a competing product or you're not using it to mislead somebody that the trademark owner endorses your site, you can still set up a website that says Verizon really sucks.
[27:59.110 --> 28:04.130]  Finally, a couple of other projects that we can take on right now.
[28:04.650 --> 28:10.210]  Currently in Congress is the Digital Media Consumer Rights Act, the DMCRA.
[28:10.790 --> 28:14.850]  That's an effort sponsored by Representative Rick Boucher of Virginia.
[28:17.170 --> 28:19.930]  Yeah, let's give him credit for that.
[28:20.370 --> 28:24.030]  It's saying put the fair use rights back into the DMCA.
[28:24.030 --> 28:35.750]  It's saying instead of letting publishers lock up more than copyright law gives them, let's say that it's not against the law to circumvent or to help someone circumvent for the purposes of fair use.
[28:37.110 --> 28:51.210]  It's saying that if you produce tools that help people make fair use of their books or their videos or their music, those tools should be within the law, not outside of the way the DMCA would say.
[28:52.570 --> 29:00.670]  And finally, I'd also encourage you to come check out EFF's Digital Television Liberation Front.
[29:01.110 --> 29:08.170]  Because we have one year until the broadcast flag takes effect on high definition digital television.
[29:08.170 --> 29:17.730]  And in that one year period, you can buy tuner devices that are fully capable of recording and outputting high quality digital signals.
[29:18.150 --> 29:22.830]  As soon as June 1, 2005 rolls around, you won't be able to do that.
[29:23.070 --> 29:41.950]  The broadcast flag mandate is a sweeping technology mandate that says that any technology that interoperates, any technology that receives and demodulates a digital television signal must be broadcast flag compliant and robust against user modification.
[29:42.370 --> 29:57.930]  So that means no tinkering, no finding out how it works, no finding out how to extract the full high definition signal, and even no using that tuner with open source software that might be modified not to respect the broadcast flag.
[29:58.710 --> 30:01.430]  But there are tuners being made now.
[30:01.610 --> 30:11.690]  And if you visit EFF's site, we've got a broadcast flag page telling you how you can beat the broadcast flag and get the most out of your television signals.
[30:20.790 --> 30:23.190]  So I'm going to sit down and leave time for questions, I hope.
[30:25.510 --> 30:28.470]  Okay, we've got one more presentation that I'm going to do, and then we're going to have questions.
[30:28.570 --> 30:31.370]  And we're going to see if I can operate this.
[30:46.700 --> 30:48.600]  My fabulous colleague, Annalee Newitz.
[30:56.890 --> 30:57.950]  I'm Annalee Newitz.
[30:58.130 --> 31:01.670]  I'm the first ever policy analyst at the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
[31:01.670 --> 31:08.870]  And today I'm going to talk to you about two issues that EFF works on and which are also near and dear to my heart, obscenity and anonymity.
[31:12.510 --> 31:15.790]  And dear to all of our hearts, I think, here at this conference.
[31:16.770 --> 31:20.710]  Basically, I want to talk about the current legal connections between these two issues.
[31:22.070 --> 31:28.790]  Historically, privacy has been connected a lot with obscenity because you should be allowed to be as obscene as you like in your own home.
[31:28.790 --> 31:39.870]  But these days, anonymity, especially online, is much more under threat from some current legal cases that EFF has been concerned about that deal with obscenity.
[31:40.070 --> 31:41.590]  And I'll talk about those in a minute.
[31:43.650 --> 31:57.110]  Basically, the question is whether or not you're able to look at obscene materials online and when you do, whether or not you can remain anonymous, or if you're putting the materials online yourself, whether you can remain anonymous.
[31:57.110 --> 32:01.930]  I think it's obvious why people dealing with obscene materials might want some anonymity.
[32:02.390 --> 32:06.630]  But I'll talk later about other reasons why you might also want to be anonymous.
[32:07.790 --> 32:22.670]  Basically, a couple of court issues are making it possible that porn, which is the primary category of speech that gets defined as obscene, may actually break crypto online better than the NSA ever could.
[32:25.150 --> 32:26.570]  Yeah, that's kind of scary.
[32:27.450 --> 32:28.970]  So, how does this work?
[32:29.090 --> 32:31.670]  How is it that porn could break your crypto?
[32:32.090 --> 32:39.170]  It all boils down to something called community standards, which I put in red, because we should all remember that, you know, the red light behind community standards.
[32:40.510 --> 32:48.410]  Most obscenity is defined, and I'll get into the legal definitions of obscenity in a minute, but most of it is defined in terms of community standards.
[32:48.710 --> 32:52.310]  There's no United States national standard of what is obscene.
[32:52.570 --> 33:07.590]  And the idea is that that would prevent us from having a lowest common denominator standard of what's obscene, so that the most conservative or the most fearful of sexual and excretory images...
[33:07.590 --> 33:09.250]  Basically, sex and shit, okay?
[33:10.490 --> 33:13.050]  I can never say excretory.
[33:13.110 --> 33:13.710]  I don't know why.
[33:14.030 --> 33:15.650]  Maybe it's because I like to say shit so much.
[33:15.750 --> 33:16.030]  I don't know.
[33:16.670 --> 33:23.630]  So, basically, the idea is to prevent the community that's most disturbed by those issues from setting the standard for the nation.
[33:23.630 --> 33:35.450]  And in the past, when courts have dealt with obscenity cases, this has made sense, because obscenity has generally been in the form of magazines being sold at stores, videos being sold at stores.
[33:35.650 --> 33:45.570]  So, there was a local community that could set a standard and could say, no, in our community, we don't want to have images of anal penetration, but in San Francisco, that's A-OK.
[33:47.070 --> 33:49.150]  Which it is, by the way.
[33:50.170 --> 33:50.650]  Yes?
[33:53.910 --> 34:00.530]  So, the question that comes up is, of course, how do you determine community standards on the internet?
[34:00.850 --> 34:01.070]  Right?
[34:01.550 --> 34:05.250]  Because, do you say the internet itself is a community standard?
[34:05.450 --> 34:07.290]  You know, that there's one community on the internet?
[34:07.290 --> 34:14.830]  In which case, how do we decide that community's ability to deal with obscene images or obscene expressions?
[34:15.890 --> 34:25.770]  The other thing that's difficult about that is, say I'm an adult webmaster, and I have a website that has materials on it that could possibly be deemed obscene.
[34:26.070 --> 34:31.030]  I have no way of knowing what communities people are coming from when they come to my website.
[34:31.190 --> 34:31.270]  Right?
[34:31.350 --> 34:37.410]  I can't say, well, this person's from New York, this person's from New Jersey, people from New Jersey don't get that, people from New York do.
[34:37.410 --> 34:39.850]  Although this is actually changing, of course.
[34:40.510 --> 34:45.670]  The other concern is that a lot of people want to be anonymous online.
[34:45.930 --> 34:55.530]  So they don't, even if I could figure out whether they were from New York or New Jersey, they don't want me to, and they're taking technological steps to prevent me from knowing that.
[34:55.830 --> 35:02.750]  So those are two things that make it extremely difficult to determine what a community standard for obscenity would be online.
[35:04.830 --> 35:12.550]  So just keep that in the back of your mind as I take you on a quick tour through definitions of obscenity from our fabulous Supreme Court.
[35:12.970 --> 35:16.030]  Well, not this current super unfabulous Supreme Court.
[35:17.050 --> 35:23.610]  So basically when people talk about obscenity, what they're talking about is a form of expression which is illegal, okay?
[35:23.750 --> 35:27.270]  It is not ever alright to have obscene materials, they're illegal.
[35:27.910 --> 35:32.730]  And it must be sexual or excretory in nature.
[35:32.970 --> 35:33.530]  I did it.
[35:35.050 --> 35:36.290]  And it's...
[35:36.290 --> 35:37.370]  Thank you, yes.
[35:39.150 --> 35:40.910]  You can all congratulate me later.
[35:42.110 --> 35:48.310]  So there's three prongs to the so-called Miller Test, which came out of a case, Miller v.
[35:48.430 --> 35:49.560]  California, in 1973.
[35:50.190 --> 35:56.670]  First, it must appeal to the prurient interest of an average person basing this on community standards.
[35:56.670 --> 36:02.550]  So it has to be the prurient interest of a person in San Francisco versus, say, a person in Alaska.
[36:02.550 --> 36:05.990]  Because people in Alaska have very different sexual appetites, apparently.
[36:07.210 --> 36:09.570]  Prurient interest just means it turns you on.
[36:10.170 --> 36:14.750]  It must contain offensive sex and or excretions.
[36:14.950 --> 36:17.550]  Again, based on contemporary community standards.
[36:17.950 --> 36:20.970]  There's always been controversy on what does offensive mean.
[36:20.970 --> 36:23.830]  The answer is generally, I know it when I see it.
[36:24.650 --> 36:29.330]  And again, it's all based on what you believe that your community would consider offensive.
[36:30.450 --> 36:39.310]  Also, and then the famous provision in Miller is the slap provision that it can have no social, literary, or artistic value taken as a whole.
[36:39.310 --> 36:42.370]  So that means that you have to look at the work as a whole.
[36:42.530 --> 36:48.330]  You can't say, because there's, like, hardcore butt-fucking in this one scene, the entire book is obscene.
[36:48.510 --> 36:53.510]  You have to say, well, actually, this is a book that's considering what it means to be gay in the 1960s.
[36:53.510 --> 36:55.010]  And there's all these political issues.
[36:55.030 --> 36:56.790]  And yeah, there's this one little butt-fucking scene.
[36:57.050 --> 37:00.650]  So the whole book isn't just, you know, just butt-fucking.
[37:03.110 --> 37:04.470]  So that's Miller.
[37:04.790 --> 37:08.610]  And again, those standards are used all the time for determining what's obscene.
[37:09.070 --> 37:13.530]  Now, there's another important case to consider, which impacts a lot of stuff that comes later.
[37:13.730 --> 37:16.010]  In 1982, we had New York versus Ferber.
[37:16.270 --> 37:20.610]  The Ferber case basically just made all child pornography illegal.
[37:21.550 --> 37:32.350]  Now, it's important to remember, especially since we just recently had the child morphing porn law, which did get struck down, that all this means is people under 18 are not allowed to be in pornography.
[37:32.930 --> 37:35.630]  It's basically an anti-child exploitation law.
[37:35.750 --> 37:37.290]  I think we can all kind of get behind that.
[37:37.810 --> 37:40.110]  No kids should be forced to have sex on camera.
[37:41.890 --> 37:49.870]  But if your child porn is a fictional representation and no children were harmed in the making of it, there's a big legal gray area there.
[37:50.130 --> 38:00.470]  So if you have morphed images of teenagers and no teenagers are involved, it's just you and your Photoshop program, then it may not be obscene.
[38:00.630 --> 38:12.410]  And the final amendment to that is that there was a case, the Pacifica case, which stated that broadcasts are not subject to these same rules and are much more strongly regulated.
[38:12.410 --> 38:16.470]  So that's why you can have the butt-fucking scene in the book, but not on the radio.
[38:18.270 --> 38:18.790]  Okay.
[38:19.070 --> 38:24.110]  So the two recent obscenity cases that we've been concerned about, one is Ashcroft v.
[38:24.310 --> 38:24.870]  ACLU.
[38:24.970 --> 38:27.850]  The Supreme Court just issued a decision on this a couple of weeks ago.
[38:27.970 --> 38:28.730]  You might have heard about it.
[38:28.750 --> 38:29.710]  This is the Copa case.
[38:30.070 --> 38:34.450]  The Supreme Court upheld a preliminary injunction against enforcing the case.
[38:35.550 --> 38:48.590]  Basically, the Child Online Protection Act creates a kind of Miller test for what is obscene on the internet, but it adds harmful to minors to the end of that statement, of each of those prongs.
[38:48.590 --> 38:52.630]  So it has to be prurient interest in respect to minors, prurient interest...
[38:52.630 --> 38:56.010]  and then, you know, no social literatistic value with respect to minors.
[38:56.430 --> 39:15.130]  And also, what it does is anyone whose main business, and how main business is defined, is also somewhat murky, is providing these kinds of expressions, and that they're somehow deemed harmful to minors, those people will be fined and possibly imprisoned.
[39:15.130 --> 39:20.430]  So, there's that case, which is very interesting.
[39:22.170 --> 39:30.870]  And the other case, which is actually currently in process, is Barbara Nitke's case.
[39:31.130 --> 39:36.310]  She's a New York artist who takes a lot of pictures of people having sex with bondage equipment.
[39:36.890 --> 39:40.390]  It's pretty tame stuff for New Yorkers and for San Franciscans.
[39:40.970 --> 39:48.190]  But, you know, for a lot of people who are accessing the stuff online who are not in those cities, there's been concerns that it may be obscene.
[39:48.290 --> 40:03.430]  So what Nitke has done is preemptively challenged the obscenity provision of the good old Communications Decency Act, which you thought we'd seen the last of, but indeed we haven't, because all that's been struck down from CDA are the indecency provisions,
[40:03.710 --> 40:05.010]  not the obscenity provisions.
[40:05.290 --> 40:10.190]  And her question specifically, in this case, specifically involves the question of community standards.
[40:10.470 --> 40:19.010]  The question is, how can she, you know, make sure that, you know, communities that deem her work obscene can't get a hold of it on the internet?
[40:19.030 --> 40:27.330]  Her point is, as a webmaster, having these images on her site, she has no way of knowing who's coming to her site, and so why should the burden be on her?
[40:27.670 --> 40:36.610]  Why should she have to pay a fine if some county in Tennessee decides that, you know, pictures of women in pony outfits are obscene?
[40:40.090 --> 40:43.570]  Alright, so let's talk a little bit about anonymity and then wrap it up.
[40:44.370 --> 40:50.310]  The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to mean that everyone has the right to anonymous free speech.
[40:50.310 --> 40:52.470]  This includes anonymous speech online.
[40:52.730 --> 40:54.910]  And you'll see how this fits into pornography in a minute.
[40:55.790 --> 40:57.490]  What is anonymity online?
[40:57.750 --> 41:04.270]  Just a quick refresher course for those of you who haven't already, sort of, availed yourself of anonymity online at great length.
[41:05.570 --> 41:11.850]  You can use a pseudonym to do almost anything online except buy things with a credit card.
[41:12.130 --> 41:16.650]  And actually, I suppose you could be anonymous with a credit card if you had a fake credit card somehow.
[41:17.070 --> 41:18.310]  I'm not going to get into that.
[41:20.430 --> 41:22.790]  Then there's also being geographically anonymous.
[41:22.790 --> 41:26.450]  And this is obviously very important in terms of those community standards issues.
[41:26.910 --> 41:28.790]  Nobody knows where you're coming from online.
[41:29.050 --> 41:33.310]  You can register for services, although this may change with the ICANN stuff.
[41:33.810 --> 41:42.550]  You can register for services without giving personally identifiable information, including getting a domain name, but ICANN may change that.
[41:43.590 --> 41:52.870]  And also, you have to remember that all these things which we take for granted online now about being anonymous, they have never been explicitly granted to us in a court of law.
[41:53.050 --> 42:00.750]  It's simply people interpreting what the Supreme Court has already said is anonymous free speech, but none of it has been explicitly interpreted in the online context.
[42:01.010 --> 42:06.570]  There's no affirmative ruling saying, absolutely, yes, you have the right to be geographically anonymous online.
[42:07.350 --> 42:09.690]  We just are geographically anonymous online.
[42:09.930 --> 42:16.110]  So this is how some obscenity rulings that are coming up may break our online anonymity, which we love so much.
[42:17.310 --> 42:37.150]  In the Nitke case, one of the things that's come up in the course of that case is the possibility that in order to enforce community standards, webmasters like Nitke or other adult webmasters will be forced to use geolocation software to figure out the communities where people are coming from to look at her stuff.
[42:37.530 --> 42:42.410]  And so if they are in a community that is not allowed to view this kind of sexual material, they will be turned away.
[42:43.310 --> 42:58.390]  Now, there's a way to get around that if you're using an anonymous proxy, but a lot of geolocation software is set up to detect proxies, and also people are encouraged to turn visitors who are using anonymous proxies away from their websites.
[42:59.630 --> 43:10.650]  So that's a concern, is that soon you will not be geographically anonymous online, especially if you want to access unpopular speech or speech that might be deemed obscene by your local community.
[43:11.410 --> 43:31.770]  The other thing is that in the COPA ruling, one of the things that Justice Kennedy said in his decision two weeks ago was that the reason why the court was upholding the injunction against enforcing COPA right away is that there were other less restrictive ways of preventing minors gaining access to quote-unquote harmful materials.
[43:32.290 --> 43:36.550]  Specifically, they mentioned over and over sensorware and filtering software.
[43:36.810 --> 43:46.150]  You're old friends from the public libraries in New York City, which keep you from looking at things like breast cancer websites and other great stuff that has naughty words in it.
[43:47.010 --> 44:04.630]  So basically, the problem is that if you have a regime where instead of censoring websites at the source for having potentially harmful material instead, what you do is censor it at the end points with filterware or sensorware, the only way that, for example,
[44:04.750 --> 44:19.470]  if you're in a library that has sensorware, the only way you can get around that is to actually physically walk up to the librarian and say, please turn off the filtering software I want to go to one of these websites that's filtered, which kind of breaks the whole anonymity thing.
[44:20.890 --> 44:23.110]  So that's actually a really big issue, too.
[44:23.310 --> 44:27.070]  And also, of course, filtering software can be used to identify you in other ways.
[44:27.330 --> 44:41.530]  And I just noted at the bottom that one of the ways that these things will be enforced is that people who are disseminating this unpopular material, this potentially obscene material, will be punished if they aren't, for example, allowing for situations where they filter.
[44:42.050 --> 44:43.350]  And I'm almost done.
[44:45.350 --> 44:47.090]  I think that speaks for itself.
[44:48.430 --> 45:00.970]  And I just wanted to conclude with a quick to-do list for hackers who are concerned about maintaining anonymity and also maintaining people's ability to engage in free, unfettered speech online.
[45:01.790 --> 45:09.290]  First of all, you can help develop proxy services like Tor, which allow people to surf the web anonymously.
[45:09.450 --> 45:14.870]  So if they do go to a website that's using geolocation software, it won't know where you're coming from.
[45:15.090 --> 45:19.130]  It'll say, oh, it's someone coming from New York, when you're actually coming from Alaska.
[45:20.050 --> 45:24.490]  You can also help set up anonymous remailers so that people can stay anonymous that way.
[45:25.310 --> 45:31.930]  I'd be very, very interested if anybody would like to help out finding ways to sabotage geolocation software.
[45:32.750 --> 45:38.650]  One of the things about geolocation software right now is that it also involves data mining.
[45:38.990 --> 45:58.590]  And so sometimes if you're, say, filling in your zip code online, these geolocation services will find out what your zip code is, correlate it with your IP address, and then they will correlate that with an IP block, so that you actually give away the geographical location of other people using your ISP or using your IP block,
[45:58.770 --> 46:02.870]  because they'll correlate together, say, four or five people using the same ISP.
[46:02.870 --> 46:10.870]  They'll correlate that with your zip codes and say, oh, there's a 95% probability that the people from this ISP are in Buffalo.
[46:11.170 --> 46:12.710]  And then you're fucked.
[46:12.710 --> 46:16.290]  So I'd really like to find out ways around that.
[46:16.690 --> 46:23.450]  And finally, please, if you have a hosting service and you have the ability to do this, host unpopular speech.
[46:23.810 --> 46:26.830]  Please host anonymous unpopular speech on your sites.
[46:27.290 --> 46:35.490]  Because people who are trying to disseminate unpopular ideas or ideas that might be considered obscene in some communities need as much help as they can get.
[46:35.690 --> 46:39.610]  We have some great pornographers here at the conference today that we really need to support.
[46:39.610 --> 46:41.170]  There's the guys who do...
[46:42.450 --> 46:43.650]  I just want to...
[46:44.790 --> 46:47.830]  I just want to give a shout out to the people who do Haxor.
[46:48.010 --> 46:49.530]  That's spelled with three X's.
[46:49.950 --> 46:51.090]  They're floating around.
[46:51.090 --> 46:53.190]  They have DVDs that are very sexy.
[46:53.550 --> 46:58.010]  The woman who runs the vegetarian porn website, vegporn.com, is here.
[46:58.170 --> 46:59.730]  So give those people your support.
[46:59.730 --> 47:04.570]  They're out there on the front lines fighting for free speech and fighting for your right to get that speech anonymously.
[47:15.760 --> 47:18.160]  So we can take questions now for about ten minutes.
[47:18.160 --> 47:18.560]  No.
[47:20.020 --> 47:20.280]  Two.
[47:20.280 --> 47:20.600]  Two minutes.
[47:21.020 --> 47:21.160]  Okay.
[47:21.440 --> 47:23.340]  Well, ask a two minute question.
[47:24.880 --> 47:26.000]  A very quick question.
[47:28.800 --> 47:31.260]  Question about reverse engineering porn or...
[47:32.680 --> 47:33.660]  Wire tapping.
[47:35.980 --> 47:36.620]  Yeah.
[47:39.740 --> 47:40.380]  Question.
[47:40.740 --> 47:43.680]  Voucher, of course, has done a lot of great things the last few years.
[47:43.680 --> 47:47.680]  He can't be the only cognizant representative we have.
[47:48.000 --> 47:59.760]  Is there any way to share some of the congressmen, senators' offices with a plus or a minus rating for where we can put our efforts for helping educate and then writing letters and emails and trying to get some education in there?
[48:03.330 --> 48:08.550]  EFF has an action center where we try to invite people.
[48:08.950 --> 48:25.090]  Anyone can come to action.eff.org and we've got an engine behind that that will send your comments to your congressional offices, encouraging, for example, encouraging them to co-sponsor the voucher Doolittle bill.
[48:25.910 --> 48:33.550]  A few other representatives, Doolittle, Barton, and others have signed on to that bill.
[48:34.030 --> 48:43.270]  And the more support they hear from their constituents for these positions, the more likely they are to realize that Hollywood isn't the only one with an interest in these fights.
[48:49.950 --> 48:58.010]  My question is, if you run a Freenet node on your machine, are you currently in violation of any law?
[48:58.370 --> 49:04.730]  And are there any laws that are about to be passed that would make it a violation to run a Freenet node?
[49:06.510 --> 49:07.870]  Do you know what Freenet is?
[49:08.010 --> 49:09.290]  Sure, I do know what Freenet is.
[49:09.290 --> 49:19.110]  Yes, Freenet is a great anonymous hosting and browsing service and a protocol that allows you to build anonymous applications on top of it.
[49:20.570 --> 49:27.230]  I believe that using Freenet is entirely legal and hosting a Freenet node is entirely legal.
[49:27.470 --> 49:36.350]  This is a piece of software with substantial non-infringing uses and substantial lawful uses allowing dissidents to get their voices heard.
[49:36.350 --> 49:42.250]  And so, under current law, that's fine and dandy.
[49:42.470 --> 49:57.650]  Under something scary that's circulating in Congress called the Induce Act, or it was called the Induce Act, now it's called the Inducing Infringments of Copyright Act, that could be deemed to be aiding and abetting copyright infringement.
[49:57.870 --> 50:01.630]  And so, might be under more question.
[50:01.630 --> 50:11.350]  So, if you're looking for something to do, you can call up your senator's offices and ask that they oppose the Inducing Infringments of Copyright Act.
[50:11.550 --> 50:14.350]  But for now, Freenet is legal and a great project.
[50:17.960 --> 50:22.980]  Recently, there was a Supreme Court ruling that if you're stopped on the streets, you have to tell the cops your name.
[50:22.980 --> 50:26.540]  I was curious if you guys know full out, do you have to tell them, like, your full name or your first name?
[50:26.860 --> 50:29.180]  And aside from that, I was curious if you could give me, like, a quick rundown.
[50:29.280 --> 50:36.300]  Like, what's changed since H2K to, from, like, the abusing authority panel as far as, like, what are your day-to-day rights when you're stopped on the street?
[50:40.450 --> 50:43.030]  Yeah, you're speaking about the High Bell case.
[50:43.650 --> 50:47.750]  You have to provide your accurate name if state law requires it.
[50:49.950 --> 50:50.410]  Hello?
[50:50.670 --> 50:50.910]  Okay.
[50:51.270 --> 50:55.250]  You're talking about the High Bell case, and you have to provide your accurate name if state law requires it.
[50:55.350 --> 50:59.290]  Basically, what the court said was that states may pass laws that require that.
[50:59.550 --> 51:02.390]  So, you know, your mileage may vary depending on where you're from.
[51:04.010 --> 51:05.890]  What are your rights when stopped on the street?
[51:05.890 --> 51:08.170]  I do about three days on that.
[51:09.130 --> 51:23.550]  Stop and frisk is pretty... you'd be surprised what the standard is for shaking you down and how easy it is to mistake a small bag of marijuana for a large handgun in many search cases that actually go through.
[51:25.030 --> 51:25.330]  Yeah.
[51:26.070 --> 51:26.450]  Last question.
[51:27.570 --> 51:27.870]  Cool.
[51:27.930 --> 51:28.270]  Next one.
[51:28.530 --> 51:29.090]  Thank you.
[51:29.390 --> 51:31.630]  We're being told that it's time for the next group to move in.
[51:31.990 --> 51:33.870]  Appreciate your attendance, and...
[51:33.870 --> 51:34.750]  Thanks a lot.
[51:34.750 --> 51:35.250]  Thank you.