[00:00.790 --> 00:04.110]  I didn't know... I couldn't figure out how to change the radio station.
[00:04.450 --> 00:05.090]  Oh, that's right.
[00:05.150 --> 00:06.810]  Greg was driving the big truck over here.
[00:07.010 --> 00:07.930]  I figured it out.
[00:08.050 --> 00:08.850]  I was listening to NPAI.
[00:09.010 --> 00:11.370]  I know you figured it out because it was WBAI.
[00:11.430 --> 00:12.370]  I'm not listening to my own station.
[00:12.510 --> 00:15.010]  But they were asking for money, and I wanted to listen to Ted Cruz.
[00:15.250 --> 00:15.390]  Yeah.
[00:16.490 --> 00:22.370]  I think the point is that you're... in this case, you just spend the money and you get the goods.
[00:22.530 --> 00:28.190]  You don't have to... you may or may not need to feel good about sustaining your favorite charity or anything like that.
[00:29.010 --> 00:29.370]  But...
[00:29.370 --> 00:29.830]  Okay.
[00:29.850 --> 00:33.730]  So, folks, I know it's midnight, and we're all tired, but there's a good number of people here.
[00:34.510 --> 00:37.470]  This is maybe the start of something new that we haven't done before.
[00:37.890 --> 00:38.970]  We've done it in different ways.
[00:39.090 --> 00:39.850]  We've done lightning talks.
[00:40.010 --> 00:44.230]  We've done... we're still doing the unscheduled track in the Hoover Room.
[00:45.270 --> 00:46.610]  And this is open mic.
[00:46.730 --> 00:52.590]  This is a midnight session where basically you get a chance to talk for 15 minutes or less if you so feel like it.
[00:52.690 --> 00:53.810]  Some people signed up downstairs.
[00:54.010 --> 00:55.190]  You don't have to sign up.
[00:55.710 --> 00:59.930]  We do have some names of people, and I know at least one of us wants to give a talk as well.
[01:00.490 --> 01:03.530]  And it's a chance to be heard and recorded for posterity.
[01:04.490 --> 01:07.810]  But the important thing is that it's another experience at HOPE.
[01:07.810 --> 01:09.610]  And I hope you're all having fun.
[01:10.470 --> 01:11.150]  Are you?
[01:11.670 --> 01:12.070]  Yeah.
[01:12.330 --> 01:12.570]  Okay.
[01:13.410 --> 01:15.730]  Tired chairs, but they're still there.
[01:15.930 --> 01:16.630]  They're with us.
[01:16.850 --> 01:17.050]  Go ahead.
[01:17.490 --> 01:18.250]  You could be in Cleveland.
[01:18.650 --> 01:19.930]  Is the projector needed?
[01:20.390 --> 01:21.690]  Is the projector needed?
[01:21.870 --> 01:23.310]  I don't think... I'm not sure.
[01:23.310 --> 01:25.630]  For my thing, I want to do the projector.
[01:25.730 --> 01:25.890]  Okay.
[01:25.970 --> 01:28.650]  Aesthetics wants to do... So I guess the answer is yes.
[01:28.790 --> 01:29.470]  Who's asking the question?
[01:29.710 --> 01:30.290]  Are you starting Aesthetics?
[01:30.310 --> 01:31.030]  Oh, you're asking the question.
[01:31.210 --> 01:32.350]  Are you starting Aesthetics?
[01:32.850 --> 01:35.930]  I think we should all introduce ourselves just to say a few words.
[01:36.150 --> 01:36.390]  Oh, hi.
[01:36.510 --> 01:37.190]  I'm Kyle.
[01:39.110 --> 01:41.070]  Kyle's responsible for the network, by the way.
[01:41.530 --> 01:45.950]  He managed to figure out how to get 10 gigs into the hotel two years ago.
[01:47.610 --> 01:48.410]  So... Guilty.
[01:48.450 --> 01:49.890]  Use more bandwidth, folks.
[01:49.990 --> 01:50.390]  Come on.
[01:50.390 --> 01:50.890]  Oh, yeah.
[01:51.110 --> 01:51.310]  Definitely.
[01:51.570 --> 01:55.450]  We would encourage everyone to use as much bandwidth as you can.
[01:55.710 --> 01:59.390]  I think we're using about a tenth of what we could...
[01:59.390 --> 01:59.830]  A tenth.
[02:00.050 --> 02:02.210]  ...at our peaks, which is kind of what we did last time.
[02:02.290 --> 02:05.630]  I think it went to 1.5 gigabit when we had Snowden.
[02:06.210 --> 02:10.590]  So please use the resource that we're offering creative ways, all kinds of ways.
[02:10.890 --> 02:12.630]  And we are streaming around the world.
[02:12.630 --> 02:13.850]  We are streaming around the world, right?
[02:13.930 --> 02:14.210]  Right now?
[02:14.770 --> 02:14.890]  Yes.
[02:14.890 --> 02:15.350]  It's still on?
[02:15.510 --> 02:16.070]  Hello, world.
[02:16.290 --> 02:16.850]  We're here.
[02:17.610 --> 02:25.030]  A lot of people who couldn't make it to the States, couldn't make it to HOPE, are able to see us for free, which I think is pretty awesome.
[02:25.130 --> 02:28.310]  And that's all because of us having this insane amount of bandwidth.
[02:29.210 --> 02:32.050]  But again, we can do whatever we want with this.
[02:32.410 --> 02:35.230]  And so far, it's all been really positive and constructive.
[02:35.410 --> 02:37.170]  But you can do more of that.
[02:38.890 --> 02:39.770]  Who else do we have here?
[02:40.310 --> 02:40.990]  I'm Lindsay.
[02:40.990 --> 02:43.150]  I'm not even supposed to be here right now.
[02:43.730 --> 02:45.270]  If you're a volunteer, you know Lindsay.
[02:46.210 --> 02:51.810]  Wait, I want to be in on that a little bit.
[02:51.970 --> 02:53.130]  But I am here.
[02:55.210 --> 02:56.330]  Are you supposed to be?
[02:57.050 --> 02:58.590]  I don't know if I'm supposed to be.
[02:58.670 --> 02:59.430]  It's voluntary.
[02:59.770 --> 03:00.710]  Yeah, you got pulled up on stage.
[03:00.710 --> 03:01.510]  I enjoy being here.
[03:02.110 --> 03:02.750]  You are, great.
[03:02.970 --> 03:04.890]  And we have Aesthetics over there.
[03:05.130 --> 03:06.370]  This really is open mic.
[03:06.770 --> 03:07.870]  Yeah, hi, I'm Aesthetics.
[03:07.890 --> 03:09.250]  And if you're on drugs, don't tell me.
[03:09.410 --> 03:10.130]  Please don't tell me.
[03:11.750 --> 03:12.750]  And that there is Greg.
[03:13.050 --> 03:14.490]  Has anyone seen Cheshire Catalyst?
[03:14.590 --> 03:15.310]  Your mic's not on.
[03:16.390 --> 03:17.230]  Yeah, that's true.
[03:17.470 --> 03:17.730]  Yeah.
[03:18.390 --> 03:18.830]  Oh, it's not?
[03:18.950 --> 03:19.790]  It wasn't before?
[03:20.410 --> 03:22.490]  Has anyone seen Cheshire Catalyst in the last hour or two?
[03:22.670 --> 03:22.850]  No?
[03:23.750 --> 03:24.650]  We've been looking for him.
[03:25.070 --> 03:26.930]  We need to do a drug intervention.
[03:26.930 --> 03:28.470]  You just reminded me.
[03:29.050 --> 03:29.250]  A little...
[03:30.110 --> 03:30.830]  For what?
[03:31.330 --> 03:31.690]  Who?
[03:31.930 --> 03:32.370]  With Cheshire.
[03:33.330 --> 03:33.730]  With Cheshire.
[03:33.850 --> 03:34.950]  We're looking for him.
[03:35.230 --> 03:36.450]  We're telling everybody that here?
[03:36.570 --> 03:38.290]  I'm telling everyone if you happen to see him.
[03:38.490 --> 03:39.330]  We need to do a drug intervention.
[03:39.770 --> 03:40.610]  I don't know what that means.
[03:41.210 --> 03:41.570]  There's...
[03:41.570 --> 03:42.930]  I did not see him on drugs.
[03:43.730 --> 03:44.230]  All right.
[03:44.590 --> 03:45.470]  That's the problem.
[03:45.830 --> 03:46.170]  Oh, okay.
[03:46.170 --> 03:47.030]  We haven't seen him.
[03:47.250 --> 03:48.010]  I saw him.
[03:48.110 --> 03:49.150]  I did see him.
[03:49.210 --> 03:50.230]  Wait, why are we talking about this on the mic?
[03:50.230 --> 03:51.290]  I want to see him on drugs.
[03:51.290 --> 03:52.610]  I was just asking if anyone saw it.
[03:52.850 --> 03:53.610]  Wait, the format is loose.
[03:53.630 --> 03:54.270]  Not that loose.
[03:54.470 --> 03:54.810]  Come on.
[03:54.870 --> 03:56.650]  This is a guy's personal life we're talking about.
[03:56.650 --> 03:57.430]  And I don't want to...
[03:57.430 --> 03:57.610]  Don't run.
[03:57.610 --> 03:58.110]  I don't want to burst a bubble.
[03:58.190 --> 03:59.650]  I don't want to burst a bubble, but it turns out...
[03:59.650 --> 04:02.010]  Plus, if you're all here in this room, we're the only ones that aren't going to see him.
[04:02.030 --> 04:02.790]  He's out there somewhere.
[04:02.990 --> 04:04.450]  You might have seen him right before you walked in.
[04:04.490 --> 04:05.150]  What about Dr. Trump on drugs?
[04:05.150 --> 04:06.530]  That is something we could talk about for a while.
[04:06.790 --> 04:07.450]  But I want to...
[04:07.450 --> 04:11.870]  There's an important point of correction, which is that ISOC only streamed until midnight.
[04:12.470 --> 04:12.590]  Oh.
[04:12.590 --> 04:13.030]  So we're not...
[04:13.030 --> 04:14.250]  Unfortunately, we're not being streamed.
[04:14.310 --> 04:15.450]  Oh, that's so sad.
[04:15.630 --> 04:16.950]  We're being recorded for posterity.
[04:17.090 --> 04:18.170]  That's the best part of the conference.
[04:18.430 --> 04:18.770]  Yeah, I know.
[04:18.930 --> 04:20.350]  We're being recorded for posterity.
[04:20.530 --> 04:24.030]  So, embarrassments will happen, but it'll be a delayed, you know...
[04:24.030 --> 04:26.430]  Wouldn't that help find Cheshire if we were streaming around the world?
[04:26.590 --> 04:28.110]  He could have gotten pretty far by now.
[04:28.310 --> 04:30.870]  We were streaming before and it didn't help, but maybe it would.
[04:31.050 --> 04:31.790]  We all have his number.
[04:31.790 --> 04:32.890]  How long have you been saying this?
[04:32.990 --> 04:33.350]  I didn't know.
[04:33.350 --> 04:34.590]  Everyone knows his number.
[04:36.310 --> 04:36.670]  That's right.
[04:36.850 --> 04:37.830]  Three to one liftoff.
[04:38.290 --> 04:39.430]  Okay, so cool story.
[04:39.530 --> 04:40.010]  He'll tell it to you.
[04:40.010 --> 04:50.250]  I did see him and I asked him, you know, if he was having a good time, if he was having fun, and I think his answer was a little cryptic, but he was smiling.
[04:50.510 --> 04:51.150]  It sounded like it was a great time.
[04:51.150 --> 04:52.510]  Was he trying to solve the lanyard?
[04:52.970 --> 04:54.010]  Maybe that's why it's cryptic.
[04:54.050 --> 04:57.770]  They had a difference between open mic and a conversation between what should be two people.
[04:58.070 --> 04:59.990]  They've been successful with the...
[04:59.990 --> 05:02.330]  This is what it's like to plan this conference.
[05:03.610 --> 05:06.490]  Big thanks to the Internet Society, though, for the streaming.
[05:06.770 --> 05:07.650]  Even though we're not.
[05:07.910 --> 05:13.190]  They did pick up the ISS overflights, or the space station overflights.
[05:13.190 --> 05:14.110]  ISS is watching us?
[05:14.310 --> 05:14.510]  Really?
[05:14.690 --> 05:16.410]  So we communicated with ISS?
[05:16.730 --> 05:16.830]  No, no, no.
[05:16.830 --> 05:17.730]  Through W2H, yeah.
[05:17.850 --> 05:18.190]  Brilliant.
[05:18.930 --> 05:19.570]  That's cool.
[05:19.710 --> 05:22.050]  By the way, if you're friendly, you should send cat photos to volunteers.
[05:22.770 --> 05:23.170]  No.
[05:23.430 --> 05:23.830]  No.
[05:24.430 --> 05:25.070]  Don't do that.
[05:25.130 --> 05:26.510]  You'll get kicked out of this conference.
[05:26.750 --> 05:27.330]  It's open mic.
[05:27.410 --> 05:27.990]  Not open mics.
[05:28.450 --> 05:29.890]  So one at a time.
[05:31.070 --> 05:32.750]  These rules are changing so much.
[05:32.850 --> 05:33.670]  But everyone loves cat.
[05:33.710 --> 05:34.810]  I'm still introducing aesthetics.
[05:35.130 --> 05:36.430]  Over there is aesthetics.
[05:36.830 --> 05:37.950]  That was the introduction, right?
[05:38.010 --> 05:38.170]  God's sake.
[05:38.290 --> 05:38.830]  Yeah, I'm trying.
[05:39.030 --> 05:39.370]  I'm trying.
[05:39.490 --> 05:39.850]  It's still going.
[05:39.950 --> 05:41.070]  Lindsay keeps interrupting.
[05:41.070 --> 05:41.910]  Oh, yeah.
[05:42.430 --> 05:43.430]  Oh, yeah.
[05:43.690 --> 05:44.570]  So, yeah.
[05:45.490 --> 05:47.990]  And aesthetics is key in the conference as well.
[05:48.990 --> 05:52.190]  If you've seen the website, he's largely responsible for getting that done.
[05:52.450 --> 05:53.310]  Not the designer.
[05:53.530 --> 05:55.550]  That's Winnie, who's awesome, over in Germany.
[05:56.690 --> 05:57.190]  And...
[05:57.190 --> 05:58.490]  You don't want me designing things.
[05:59.230 --> 05:59.550]  No.
[05:59.750 --> 05:59.970]  No.
[06:00.310 --> 06:02.070]  But organizing, we do.
[06:02.290 --> 06:03.090]  We definitely do.
[06:03.530 --> 06:05.430]  And if anybody's wondering, I wrote it in VIM.
[06:05.430 --> 06:06.430]  Do you have a question for the open mic?
[06:06.550 --> 06:08.450]  Well, actually, I have to wait your turn for open mic.
[06:08.510 --> 06:08.850]  Excuse me.
[06:08.850 --> 06:10.570]  You can't just barge up to the microphone.
[06:10.830 --> 06:11.190]  Sir...
[06:11.190 --> 06:12.650]  This is not the VMA Awards.
[06:14.550 --> 06:15.050]  I'm waiting.
[06:16.290 --> 06:17.390]  Greg, do you have anything else?
[06:17.810 --> 06:18.590]  No, I'm just...
[06:18.590 --> 06:20.110]  I'm keeping an eye on things.
[06:20.410 --> 06:20.910]  Okay, cool.
[06:20.910 --> 06:22.590]  Should we take this question first, or...?
[06:22.890 --> 06:23.550]  We have a question?
[06:24.410 --> 06:24.770]  Question?
[06:24.950 --> 06:25.670]  He's waiting questions.
[06:26.030 --> 06:26.450]  What the f*ck, people?
[06:26.870 --> 06:28.050]  Open mic, it's so simple.
[06:28.050 --> 06:28.290]  Don't tell me.
[06:28.930 --> 06:29.750]  It's Q&A.
[06:30.130 --> 06:32.050]  All right, I'm still waiting for sign-ups, too.
[06:32.250 --> 06:32.970]  If you want to sign-ups.
[06:32.990 --> 06:33.790]  What's your question?
[06:33.790 --> 06:35.030]  Who has a question?
[06:35.210 --> 06:35.570]  42.
[06:35.970 --> 06:36.630]  I have a question.
[06:37.310 --> 06:37.650]  Fine.
[06:37.790 --> 06:38.270]  All right, question.
[06:38.410 --> 06:39.730]  But that counts as open mic.
[06:40.050 --> 06:41.050]  You can't come back.
[06:41.150 --> 06:41.790]  You can't do another...
[06:41.790 --> 06:42.370]  This is your talk.
[06:42.610 --> 06:42.730]  Yeah, that's fine.
[06:42.730 --> 06:43.510]  Yeah, so even...
[06:43.510 --> 06:44.490]  It's a talk in the form of a question.
[06:44.930 --> 06:50.150]  My question is, why did 2600 never get a television show?
[06:50.510 --> 06:52.310]  Did any projects ever come up?
[06:52.450 --> 06:53.570]  Look at us, for God's sake.
[06:53.850 --> 06:54.930]  Why would you ask that?
[06:55.150 --> 06:56.490]  Well, do you think people want to see this?
[06:56.610 --> 06:57.350]  Look at PBS.
[06:57.550 --> 06:58.130]  They're all pretty ugly.
[06:58.390 --> 06:58.730]  They have an audience.
[06:59.010 --> 06:59.550]  No offense.
[07:00.690 --> 07:03.970]  Are you suggesting, like, Muppet style then?
[07:04.290 --> 07:04.970]  Because then...
[07:04.970 --> 07:05.930]  Dude, what would we do?
[07:06.030 --> 07:08.150]  Dial a telephone and look at it?
[07:08.630 --> 07:18.250]  I'm wondering if anybody ever tried to put projects together for 2600 off the hook for television, and what became of that sort of stuff, if that ever happened.
[07:18.250 --> 07:18.910]  Yeah, please...
[07:18.910 --> 07:19.490]  That is my question.
[07:19.630 --> 07:20.110]  We can...
[07:20.110 --> 07:26.030]  Okay, there's a sort of imaginative side of that, answer-wise, and there's a very serious side of that.
[07:26.250 --> 07:36.290]  So, video itself is something we're interested in, and we do do a bit of that internally, and are hoping to be able to put some stuff together.
[07:36.790 --> 07:38.330]  So, that is a very serious thing.
[07:38.410 --> 07:44.210]  As far as a show format, we haven't really explored that as much as more like documentary-type stuff.
[07:45.050 --> 07:56.350]  The imaginative side, I think, like animated things and adapting some of the cool stuff, we do and enjoy with radio to other visual forms, like you said, puppets.
[07:56.490 --> 08:03.470]  But that would be a little... maybe more involved than animation or other kinds of fun things like that.
[08:03.630 --> 08:06.750]  But it's something we haven't spent a lot of time looking into.
[08:06.990 --> 08:08.490]  Because we don't have a lot of time.
[08:08.490 --> 08:17.530]  Yeah, we've been a little bit more focused on documenting a lot of the crazy, crazy stuff that's been happening like in the last five years in hacking and high technology.
[08:18.010 --> 08:19.670]  So, that's kind of the serious answer.
[08:20.410 --> 08:21.290]  It's a lot of work.
[08:21.410 --> 08:26.890]  I mean, we put out a magazine, and we do a radio show, and we do a conference, and everything else.
[08:27.350 --> 08:32.170]  And doing that, you know, I'm all in favor of people following us around with cameras if they really want to do that.
[08:32.370 --> 08:35.850]  But us doing it, it's so much work, and I don't know how we would do it.
[08:35.850 --> 08:39.130]  Yeah, field production, even documentary stuff.
[08:39.270 --> 08:46.030]  I mean, it's a lot of the equipment's getting very small and easy to carry and produce very, like, high production value stuff.
[08:46.030 --> 08:47.670]  But it's still a lot of work.
[08:47.670 --> 08:52.770]  It's helpful to have an audio guy with a boom, you know, focusing on audio.
[08:53.090 --> 08:53.830]  Stuff like that.
[08:54.090 --> 08:55.870]  It's more a question to a manual...
[08:55.870 --> 08:57.130]  We can't... nobody can hear you.
[08:57.410 --> 08:58.490]  You have to use the microphone.
[08:58.630 --> 08:58.790]  Yeah, wait a minute.
[08:58.790 --> 09:01.190]  Open microphone, not talking into air.
[09:01.410 --> 09:05.790]  It was more a question of, to you, did anything ever attempt to come together?
[09:05.790 --> 09:06.910]  In the 80s or 90s.
[09:07.690 --> 09:08.050]  Okay.
[09:08.470 --> 09:08.830]  Historically.
[09:09.430 --> 09:09.790]  Historically.
[09:09.930 --> 09:12.290]  Did anybody ever try to do a TV show?
[09:12.450 --> 09:13.730]  Did we try to do a TV show in the 80s?
[09:13.770 --> 09:14.530]  I don't think we did.
[09:15.010 --> 09:15.110]  Okay.
[09:15.850 --> 09:17.170]  Pretty sure we didn't try to do that.
[09:17.370 --> 09:18.090]  That's very specific.
[09:18.250 --> 09:19.110]  What makes you ask that question?
[09:19.310 --> 09:27.290]  Well, because of the movie Hackers and the TV show in the movie, I was wondering if anything was ever related to a project that didn't happen.
[09:27.290 --> 09:30.510]  By the way, did you know that Phantom Phreaker from Hackers came here today?
[09:30.970 --> 09:32.030]  And he's at the conference.
[09:32.230 --> 09:32.310]  Yeah.
[09:32.450 --> 09:33.430]  It was really cool seeing him again.
[09:33.610 --> 09:34.350]  It was really cool to talk to him.
[09:34.370 --> 09:36.610]  I told him, you know, in Hackers, you're still in prison.
[09:36.630 --> 09:37.590]  They never released you.
[09:37.770 --> 09:38.850]  They forgot to release you.
[09:38.930 --> 09:39.250]  It's true.
[09:39.350 --> 09:43.270]  And I learned from him that they actually did film a scene where he got released, but they cut it from the film.
[09:43.450 --> 09:43.650]  Yeah.
[09:43.650 --> 09:44.950]  I love it when they do things like that.
[09:45.190 --> 09:46.610]  There's another scene in that film.
[09:46.850 --> 09:47.950]  You've all seen Hackers, right?
[09:48.270 --> 09:48.470]  Yeah.
[09:48.470 --> 09:54.030]  If you watch it, you see the Secret Service agent, you know, the guy from The Wire and Treme?
[09:54.490 --> 09:54.830]  Bunk.
[09:54.990 --> 09:55.590]  Bunk, yeah.
[09:56.850 --> 10:03.090]  He's at one point where he's finding out that he's dead and that his credit card doesn't work, you see a car being towed behind him.
[10:03.150 --> 10:03.790]  And that's his car.
[10:03.910 --> 10:05.430]  But they don't ever explain that.
[10:05.570 --> 10:07.070]  It was cut from the film as well.
[10:07.210 --> 10:07.910]  So that's kind of cool.
[10:08.110 --> 10:09.310]  Bernie, the original Bernie S is here.
[10:09.310 --> 10:09.930]  I have a question.
[10:10.490 --> 10:13.090]  I just have an anecdote about the film Hackers.
[10:13.090 --> 10:18.190]  I saw it for the first time while I was locked in a 5x8 prison cell.
[10:18.470 --> 10:33.410]  And I didn't have a TV at the time, so I had a small plastic mirror that I purchased from the commissary that I held out between the bars to see a mirror image of the film in the cell next to me that had a TV that was watching the film.
[10:33.590 --> 10:36.350]  And I just thought, this is f*cking ridiculous.
[10:37.590 --> 10:39.570]  Was it on tape or being like...
[10:39.570 --> 10:40.830]  It was on like a pay-per-view...
[10:40.830 --> 10:41.630]  It was on like...
[10:41.630 --> 10:42.310]  I don't know.
[10:42.390 --> 10:43.650]  Like on Showtime or something.
[10:43.830 --> 10:44.250]  I don't know.
[10:44.450 --> 10:44.570]  Yeah.
[10:44.950 --> 10:52.090]  And I'm like, this is f*cking ludicrous that I had to watch this film from a 5x8 cage with a plastic mirror.
[10:52.330 --> 10:54.950]  They only gave us your plastic mirror so you can't break them and turn them into nice.
[10:54.950 --> 10:56.630]  What is a 5x8 cell?
[10:56.890 --> 10:58.430]  It was 5 feet by 8 feet.
[10:58.870 --> 10:59.490]  And that included...
[10:59.490 --> 10:59.730]  5 feet?
[10:59.810 --> 11:03.430]  No, that included not only the bed, but a...
[11:03.430 --> 11:03.810]  Facility.
[11:03.810 --> 11:11.190]  A sink and a toilet, which is a combination stainless steel appliance, and a little metal cabin for you to put all your belongings in.
[11:11.210 --> 11:14.150]  And now they call that tiny houses, because people are really into that.
[11:14.270 --> 11:16.770]  Well, I think those are much bigger than 5x8.
[11:17.030 --> 11:17.850]  But anyway...
[11:17.850 --> 11:18.950]  Yeah, that was in Northampton County.
[11:19.330 --> 11:20.670]  We came up there in Northampton County.
[11:20.750 --> 11:21.590]  Remember Easton, Pennsylvania?
[11:21.690 --> 11:22.610]  That was part of my tour.
[11:23.190 --> 11:23.930]  But anyhow, I just...
[11:23.930 --> 11:24.470]  That was my...
[11:24.470 --> 11:25.850]  That was my screening of the film.
[11:25.930 --> 11:27.210]  Watching it through a plastic mirror.
[11:28.490 --> 11:29.050]  Outside prison...
[11:29.050 --> 11:29.990]  Like, holding it outside.
[11:30.270 --> 11:30.510]  And it was...
[11:31.490 --> 11:31.930]  It was...
[11:31.930 --> 11:33.470]  Well, you were in a Phantom Phreaker, right?
[11:33.470 --> 11:34.090]  Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
[11:34.150 --> 11:34.590]  And he's here.
[11:34.670 --> 11:35.530]  I know, I know, I know.
[11:35.590 --> 11:37.230]  I didn't see him, but it's cool.
[11:37.330 --> 11:37.950]  He's out of prison.
[11:37.950 --> 11:38.630]  It's cool.
[11:39.850 --> 11:40.130]  Yeah.
[11:40.250 --> 11:42.750]  The irony there was that you had to hack your own solution.
[11:43.290 --> 11:44.190]  Yeah, I had to...
[11:44.190 --> 11:45.390]  I don't think Greg's mic is on.
[11:45.510 --> 11:47.010]  I don't think the guy is there to turn it on.
[11:48.270 --> 11:50.370]  Greg just said I had to hack my own solution to see the movie.
[11:50.410 --> 11:52.090]  Yes, I got a plastic mirror.
[11:52.230 --> 11:55.050]  I held it at the bars, prison bars, to reflect it.
[11:55.190 --> 11:55.590]  And I was...
[11:55.590 --> 11:59.090]  My arm got tired for a couple hours to hold it out to see the reflection of the movie.
[11:59.150 --> 12:02.110]  But I could hear the audio, and I kept telling the guy, Don't change the channel.
[12:02.150 --> 12:02.570]  Leave it on.
[12:02.690 --> 12:03.910]  Have you seen it since then?
[12:03.990 --> 12:04.670]  Yeah, I was just gonna ask.
[12:04.690 --> 12:05.190]  I have.
[12:05.250 --> 12:07.570]  I got to enjoy it better on a real TV set.
[12:07.570 --> 12:08.990]  Did you use a better mirror this time?
[12:09.710 --> 12:10.050]  Yeah, it's better...
[12:10.050 --> 12:11.010]  It's better in a home.
[12:11.170 --> 12:13.130]  Yeah, it was better in a couch or something.
[12:13.330 --> 12:13.950]  With your feet up.
[12:14.550 --> 12:16.290]  Yeah, I was on a surf and having a good time.
[12:16.450 --> 12:20.370]  So the idea here is for you to participate, not us, and talk up there.
[12:20.490 --> 12:21.970]  But your mic's not on, and the guy's on.
[12:22.350 --> 12:24.230]  Bernie asks, do you want to sign up for an open mic spot?
[12:24.230 --> 12:24.850]  I don't think your mic is on.
[12:25.790 --> 12:26.730]  What do I talk about?
[12:26.830 --> 12:27.430]  I mean, I don't know.
[12:27.510 --> 12:28.370]  You guys are...
[12:28.370 --> 12:29.330]  Put this together.
[12:29.890 --> 12:30.990]  You got plenty to talk about it.
[12:30.990 --> 12:32.730]  I'm just saying we have a couple more openings.
[12:33.570 --> 12:33.950]  All right.
[12:34.350 --> 12:35.530]  Let's go to the bathroom first.
[12:36.370 --> 12:38.250]  I don't think Lex should be touching the equipment.
[12:38.770 --> 12:39.650]  Lex, what are you doing?
[12:39.990 --> 12:40.690]  Oh, my God.
[12:41.270 --> 12:42.130]  Is your mic on now?
[12:42.250 --> 12:42.790]  He might have turned the mic on.
[12:42.790 --> 12:43.370]  I was pushing buttons.
[12:44.930 --> 12:45.830]  Yeah, the guy's not there.
[12:45.890 --> 12:47.470]  You can't see because of the lights being shown.
[12:47.490 --> 12:48.390]  He could leave at midnight.
[12:48.610 --> 12:49.370]  So that's okay.
[12:49.370 --> 12:50.290]  You got to talk into the microphone.
[12:50.390 --> 12:51.010]  Yeah, I told you.
[12:51.190 --> 12:51.630]  There you go.
[12:52.630 --> 12:53.190]  That's a...
[12:53.990 --> 12:54.270]  Sorry.
[12:54.270 --> 12:55.390]  It's a nice word.
[12:56.190 --> 13:00.430]  The idea is that people want to give talk...
[13:00.430 --> 13:01.590]  Because you're facing the audience.
[13:01.870 --> 13:02.110]  Yes.
[13:02.290 --> 13:05.550]  And we'll tell you when 15 minutes are up or you'll stop before then.
[13:05.910 --> 13:06.150]  All right.
[13:06.170 --> 13:06.410]  Wait.
[13:06.570 --> 13:07.750]  We're not going to leave this stage.
[13:07.930 --> 13:08.790]  We're not judging.
[13:08.790 --> 13:09.650]  We're just going to wait.
[13:09.790 --> 13:10.350]  No, we're not judging.
[13:10.350 --> 13:10.950]  That's tomorrow.
[13:11.090 --> 13:14.250]  We're going to be part of this whole captive audience while they speak.
[13:14.550 --> 13:15.010]  Well, yeah.
[13:15.090 --> 13:15.810]  I want to hear what they say.
[13:15.930 --> 13:16.110]  Right.
[13:16.110 --> 13:16.650]  I'll listen.
[13:16.930 --> 13:27.830]  But for tomorrow with the Hackers Got Talent show, we want to have people perform or just show off some of their skills or hacks or things like that.
[13:27.930 --> 13:32.690]  I know Aesthetics, you have some ideas as to how that might work with what people can do.
[13:32.870 --> 13:33.010]  Yeah.
[13:33.190 --> 13:33.690]  Well, one of the...
[13:33.690 --> 13:35.770]  How many of you have seen the show America's Got Talent?
[13:37.370 --> 13:37.910]  I'm embarrassed.
[13:37.910 --> 13:38.990]  Because we came up with this idea.
[13:39.150 --> 13:40.870]  We actually haven't seen the show, I think.
[13:41.030 --> 13:43.210]  So this makes it a little difficult to figure it out.
[13:43.210 --> 13:50.090]  Like, I'm aware of maybe how it might work structurally and that it's part of a whole genre of shows like that, but...
[13:50.090 --> 13:50.890]  It's a talent show, right?
[13:50.910 --> 13:52.070]  How hard can a talent show be?
[13:52.170 --> 13:54.810]  I think there's a key concept which we'll have to think of.
[13:54.870 --> 14:08.650]  I don't know if people have opinions on this, is I believe in America's Got Talent, but some of those shows it's more like the gong show where they're basically, you know, letting people go until someone is dissatisfied and then presses a buzzer and gives them a big X and they're gone from the whole competition.
[14:08.670 --> 14:10.630]  That's going to be a really short feature then.
[14:10.830 --> 14:11.890]  Someone's going to get dissatisfied quickly.
[14:11.890 --> 14:15.110]  Actually, if there's a mime at the conference, I would love to see a mime at the talent show.
[14:15.170 --> 14:16.230]  I would buzz that so fast.
[14:16.410 --> 14:17.930]  Anyway, the other...
[14:17.930 --> 14:20.930]  We haven't gone all the buzzers, so I don't know how we can do this.
[14:21.030 --> 14:25.710]  The alternative view, though, is just let whoever's on stage finish.
[14:25.950 --> 14:27.330]  So give them, you know, it'll be short, right?
[14:27.370 --> 14:30.330]  It'll be maybe two minutes, but let them finish and then do scoring.
[14:30.490 --> 14:33.350]  So that's more like a, you know, more of a real competition.
[14:33.350 --> 14:34.590]  I think that's a fundamental...
[14:34.590 --> 14:35.370]  Do we have an example?
[14:35.370 --> 14:35.790]  The scores will go to 11.
[14:36.150 --> 14:38.270]  Yeah, and we're limited to 11 contestants.
[14:38.630 --> 14:42.430]  But do we have an idea as to what kind of entry would be like a typical entry?
[14:43.310 --> 14:45.510]  From, like, what type of things people will do?
[14:45.650 --> 14:45.870]  Yes.
[14:45.990 --> 14:47.210]  Well, obviously, there's stand-up comedy.
[14:47.790 --> 14:48.050]  Okay.
[14:48.210 --> 14:50.050]  But it has to be related to hacking somehow, right?
[14:50.050 --> 14:51.070]  There's stand-up comedy by hackers.
[14:51.290 --> 14:51.310]  We just did some.
[14:51.310 --> 14:56.870]  You can hack something with your eyes closed or something with one hand or behind your...
[14:56.870 --> 14:57.530]  I don't know.
[14:58.470 --> 15:00.250]  Is Adam Prado here?
[15:00.730 --> 15:02.690]  The Rubik's Cube would be awesome.
[15:02.710 --> 15:02.830]  Sure.
[15:03.190 --> 15:03.530]  Okay.
[15:03.730 --> 15:04.450]  So I have a Rubik's Cube.
[15:05.150 --> 15:06.110]  That's a perfect example.
[15:06.110 --> 15:06.930]  A lockpick.
[15:07.730 --> 15:09.210]  A lockpick would be, you know...
[15:09.210 --> 15:10.330]  A lockpick would be nice.
[15:10.470 --> 15:14.090]  Or plug your computer in and hack into the Department of Defense and show us.
[15:14.410 --> 15:18.270]  We'll give that a good grade and then you'll have a nice trip afterwards.
[15:18.690 --> 15:20.170]  Would you oppose a Donald Trump impersonator?
[15:20.990 --> 15:21.950]  I don't want to...
[15:21.950 --> 15:22.530]  Why would you want to see that?
[15:22.630 --> 15:23.730]  Why would anybody want to see that?
[15:23.890 --> 15:24.850]  The original's bad enough.
[15:24.910 --> 15:26.010]  Why would you want an impersonator?
[15:26.590 --> 15:27.190]  Good guy.
[15:27.690 --> 15:29.690]  So, before we start, we have a sign-up sheet.
[15:30.090 --> 15:34.610]  That can't be any worse than like America's Greatest Maker, which I had to suffer through.
[15:34.870 --> 15:36.370]  Did you say America's Greatest Sphincter?
[15:36.510 --> 15:37.390]  I never saw that.
[15:37.890 --> 15:39.030]  America's Greatest Maker.
[15:39.450 --> 15:41.010]  It was really...
[15:42.230 --> 15:42.630]  Awful?
[15:42.770 --> 15:43.650]  It was pretty awful.
[15:43.830 --> 15:44.030]  Yeah.
[15:44.310 --> 15:45.110]  It was pretty awful.
[15:45.230 --> 15:49.490]  They kicked us out of a tech shop in San Francisco for like almost two months to film it.
[15:49.630 --> 15:55.310]  And then I saw the result and it was not worth not being able to get in there.
[15:55.310 --> 15:56.090]  It was really pretty.
[15:56.290 --> 15:56.850]  So, I don't know.
[15:57.650 --> 15:58.290]  Maybe we can do...
[15:58.290 --> 15:59.950]  Maybe hackers here can do better.
[16:00.830 --> 16:04.830]  Anyway, if you want to be part of this, all you have to do is sign up downstairs at the info desk.
[16:04.970 --> 16:06.650]  But we are limiting it to 11 people.
[16:06.830 --> 16:07.090]  Yes.
[16:07.090 --> 16:08.090]  For some reason.
[16:09.730 --> 16:10.450]  And we'll...
[16:10.450 --> 16:12.190]  Oh, the grand prize.
[16:12.390 --> 16:12.510]  Yes.
[16:12.570 --> 16:14.090]  Yeah, it is a grand prize for the first place.
[16:14.630 --> 16:18.090]  We have a gift bag from Mr. Robot that just got delivered today.
[16:18.090 --> 16:18.770]  It's really awesome.
[16:18.910 --> 16:20.310]  It's got a Mr. Robot hoodie.
[16:21.170 --> 16:23.630]  It's got, what, earbuds that Elliot wears?
[16:23.730 --> 16:27.510]  Yes, it has some very, very fancy headphones.
[16:27.950 --> 16:29.530]  It's got a Mr. Robot mask.
[16:30.050 --> 16:30.990]  It's really, really cool.
[16:31.090 --> 16:31.970]  And there's only one of them.
[16:32.130 --> 16:33.030]  A whole bunch of stuff.
[16:33.030 --> 16:36.450]  You do the best Hackers Got Talent and you take that home.
[16:36.970 --> 16:38.270]  Oh, I have an idea for one.
[16:38.910 --> 16:41.630]  Whoever can come up with the most creative way to destroy a computer.
[16:41.850 --> 16:43.410]  I'd be very interested to see this.
[16:43.590 --> 16:43.770]  What?
[16:44.890 --> 16:45.750]  Your own computer.
[16:45.870 --> 16:47.030]  It can't be somebody else's computer.
[16:47.950 --> 16:48.470]  Why not?
[16:48.770 --> 16:49.790]  Well, it depends.
[16:49.930 --> 16:50.910]  It's a hacker convention, though.
[16:50.930 --> 16:52.450]  You might want to have limits on that.
[16:53.610 --> 16:57.830]  We do have the main prohibition is hazardous substances, open flame.
[16:58.010 --> 16:58.110]  Yeah, no flames, please.
[16:58.510 --> 16:58.710]  Yeah.
[16:58.830 --> 16:59.610]  Yeah, we can't do that.
[16:59.690 --> 16:59.870]  Yeah.
[17:00.110 --> 17:00.290]  Right.
[17:01.170 --> 17:03.170]  Unless it's part of your personality, then it's different.
[17:03.310 --> 17:05.110]  Open flames at any velocity are forbidden.
[17:05.330 --> 17:07.370]  I'd say you also might want to roll out caustics.
[17:07.950 --> 17:08.030]  Yeah.
[17:08.530 --> 17:08.770]  All right.
[17:08.890 --> 17:12.610]  So, shall we begin with open microphone or shall we banter for another 20 minutes?
[17:12.810 --> 17:13.610]  Please, take it away aesthetics.
[17:13.610 --> 17:16.590]  I think we should either let aesthetics do the first one or we have at least two others.
[17:16.590 --> 17:18.370]  Because he's up on stage, he gets to go first.
[17:18.650 --> 17:18.730]  Oh, shit.
[17:18.730 --> 17:19.770]  Is that how we're going to do things?
[17:19.930 --> 17:20.510]  Well, he's ready.
[17:20.570 --> 17:22.090]  He's ready and he can be the lead off.
[17:22.510 --> 17:22.590]  Are you ready?
[17:23.290 --> 17:23.850]  Yeah, sure.
[17:24.110 --> 17:27.250]  How about, you know, maybe someone goes first and then he goes?
[17:28.250 --> 17:29.010]  That guy, how about you?
[17:29.010 --> 17:29.130]  Yeah.
[17:29.130 --> 17:29.530]  I like that.
[17:29.650 --> 17:30.370]  I think you have a point in there.
[17:30.690 --> 17:32.350]  I think, you know, the audience should...
[17:32.350 --> 17:32.610]  Sure.
[17:32.810 --> 17:33.390]  There we go.
[17:33.490 --> 17:33.730]  Okay.
[17:33.730 --> 17:33.970]  All right.
[17:34.030 --> 17:35.590]  We have our first double microphone.
[17:40.330 --> 17:42.250]  It takes courage to come up on this stage.
[17:42.410 --> 17:43.230]  Do you want slides?
[17:43.370 --> 17:43.730]  Do you want slides?
[17:44.390 --> 17:45.470]  Does anybody have tomatoes?
[17:45.470 --> 17:46.850]  So, I'm just doing this off the cuff.
[17:47.010 --> 17:47.230]  Okay.
[17:47.430 --> 17:47.590]  That's fine.
[17:47.710 --> 17:48.110]  Hi.
[17:48.370 --> 17:49.870]  I'm doing this off the cuff.
[17:50.110 --> 17:51.010]  So, I don't have slides.
[17:51.290 --> 17:52.410]  So, deal with it.
[17:52.490 --> 17:56.550]  And if you can't hear me, well, just tell me and I'll just say it louder and slower.
[17:58.170 --> 18:03.810]  So, I volunteer a lot in a makerspace in upstate New York and Troy, New York, the Tech Valley Center of Gravity.
[18:03.950 --> 18:07.950]  You could possibly see it on my shirt depending on your angle or quite possibly not.
[18:08.250 --> 18:10.350]  And I'm the volunteer coordinator there.
[18:11.290 --> 18:27.790]  And makerspaces are great places where you find people that are similarly minded that are either working on interesting stuff or if you have a social night, you can hang out and talk about stuff similar to, like, the environment you get outside of the talks here at HOPE,
[18:27.890 --> 18:34.330]  but, you know, on a much smaller scale because you don't have the sheer square footage of many rooms, et cetera.
[18:34.330 --> 18:59.450]  And so, what I would encourage you to do is hang out at makerspaces in the cities and towns that you come from, but also, if you're a member of a makerspace, I'd be interested to talk to you, particularly, like, how your particular makerspace organization does volunteering and volunteering coordination because I find this is the single hardest thing to do because it's basically under the topic of
[18:59.450 --> 19:00.450]  herding cats.
[19:00.450 --> 19:04.450]  So, does anyone here work with volunteer organizations or...
[19:04.450 --> 19:05.330]  I do.
[19:05.710 --> 19:05.970]  You do?
[19:06.390 --> 19:06.830]  Yeah.
[19:06.830 --> 19:08.690]  Tell us more about these volunteer organizations.
[19:08.990 --> 19:09.210]  Yeah.
[19:09.410 --> 19:19.950]  Oh, you know, the stories of, you know, dealing with people who are volunteers, people at many different skill levels with different levels of communication that they can all talk to each other.
[19:20.290 --> 19:26.490]  And then you being in the middle of it getting to, you know, talk to them, it's actually a complex people problem.
[19:26.830 --> 19:39.630]  And my day job is I'm a systems administrator and for a bunch of that time I've also worked in academia as a systems administrator directly with students in, like, engineering and computer science departments.
[19:39.910 --> 19:42.090]  So, you can get an idea.
[19:42.290 --> 19:45.730]  Like, systems administrators in that environment get used to saying no a lot.
[19:46.450 --> 19:47.490]  But, you know...
[19:47.490 --> 19:48.810]  That sounds familiar.
[19:48.810 --> 19:50.170]  No, it's my name.
[19:50.930 --> 19:51.350]  But...
[19:51.350 --> 19:52.770]  No, but that's a sidetrack.
[19:52.870 --> 19:59.890]  But one of the things I'd be interested in is if anyone else is in a makerspace is it's the sheer task of coordination.
[20:00.350 --> 20:17.450]  And I know we're working on slowly, like, writing better software to deal with things like enabling a volunteer to sign up for a time slot that they volunteer for, reporting in that they're there, let people know that, hey, someone is there in the makerspace so it's okay to use it.
[20:17.450 --> 20:26.730]  And in our environment we have it that, like, certain classes of machines can't be used unless there's a volunteer on duty because it might be a mill or a lathe or et cetera.
[20:26.890 --> 20:28.550]  You know, it's a large, dangerous piece of...
[20:28.550 --> 20:28.570]  Or a Segway.
[20:29.810 --> 20:30.490]  Or a Segway.
[20:30.530 --> 20:32.930]  I would say more like a mill, lathe, chop saw.
[20:33.070 --> 20:33.410]  Yeah, a mill.
[20:33.410 --> 20:39.930]  It's some heavy equipment where, like, you legitimately need another person there in case you get hurt, you know, because something bad could happen.
[20:40.370 --> 20:43.590]  And, you know, then someone could know, like, hey, there's someone there.
[20:43.610 --> 20:45.270]  I can go use the makerspace.
[20:45.270 --> 20:50.630]  I can mill that piece of, you know, piece I need out of precision aluminum, you know.
[20:51.170 --> 20:53.770]  Very nice alloy that I need, you know, et cetera.
[20:54.010 --> 20:57.210]  And so if there's any like-minded individuals here, you know, come see me.
[20:57.870 --> 20:58.590]  I'll be here.
[20:58.730 --> 20:59.850]  You know, the day is here.
[20:59.990 --> 21:01.290]  You know, just look for me, Tom.
[21:01.290 --> 21:04.750]  I'm probably fairly unique, you know, six-foot-two guy.
[21:05.170 --> 21:10.090]  But usually I'm taller and statistically taller than most of the people around me.
[21:12.050 --> 21:13.170]  And just come find me.
[21:13.290 --> 21:15.270]  Also, they're generally cool places to hang out.
[21:15.390 --> 21:19.070]  You'll find like-minded individuals similar to here but on a way smaller scale.
[21:19.870 --> 21:20.970]  And that's the end of it.
[21:20.970 --> 21:22.150]  I'm not going to belabor my point.
[21:23.010 --> 21:24.550]  Any questions from the audience?
[21:24.950 --> 21:25.730]  I'll make a comment.
[21:27.210 --> 21:28.070]  This is on, right?
[21:28.770 --> 21:29.650]  I can't hear it.
[21:29.770 --> 21:30.490]  I can't hear it.
[21:30.650 --> 21:32.110]  I'll work on the board.
[21:32.470 --> 21:37.130]  The barrier to entry, like for a volunteer...
[21:37.530 --> 21:37.810]  It's Cheshire.
[21:38.290 --> 21:38.430]  Sorry.
[21:39.050 --> 21:39.370]  All right.
[21:39.730 --> 21:40.830]  Hey, Cheshire, we found you.
[21:40.830 --> 21:42.050]  See, I told you.
[21:42.830 --> 21:44.150]  And we have a happy ending.
[21:44.810 --> 21:51.450]  So the barriers to entry are such a deterrent to volunteers and making it easy.
[21:51.590 --> 21:57.630]  But that first time when they show up and they can't do some work or they volunteer, there's no one to coach them or anything like that, and they're just gone.
[21:58.210 --> 22:04.330]  You know, so that's the onboarding, that sort of thing, I feel is one of the most valuable things you can get out of this type of project.
[22:04.530 --> 22:04.770]  Yeah.
[22:05.350 --> 22:17.050]  What we do at R Makerspace is I try to ensure that the first time someone's volunteering, they're paired with a well-seasoned volunteer that can show them how to do things so that they don't feel like they're being thrown to the wolves.
[22:17.230 --> 22:17.370]  Yeah.
[22:18.310 --> 22:18.690]  Thanks for that.
[22:19.770 --> 22:20.930]  I think you raise a good point.
[22:21.050 --> 22:24.410]  I mean, keeping inertia going and you have, like, you kind of have an ebb and flow.
[22:24.790 --> 22:32.370]  I've had very similar experiences with hackerspaces and same kind of situation using, like, mills and stuff like that.
[22:32.370 --> 22:38.190]  You'll have a training day, only certain people will be able to show up, and you'd have to have that on a recurring basis.
[22:38.190 --> 22:50.590]  The other thing I'd note or comment about is, like, a lot of hackerspaces model after other ones, but pretty much all hackerspaces are different, and they tackle these problems.
[22:50.750 --> 22:52.810]  They create systems in all different ways.
[22:53.130 --> 23:04.130]  And I think creating sign-ups or ways you can automate some of that stuff, ways you can anticipate the kind of ebb or flow.
[23:04.130 --> 23:12.670]  You anticipate the problem, okay, we might not see a lot of people this weekend because it's Thanksgiving, or we might, you know, whatever it is, you can kind of schedule.
[23:12.970 --> 23:18.090]  And it also helps to have a good group of committed people that can support each other.
[23:18.110 --> 23:25.890]  If somebody can't be at the space one week, you can kind of share the responsibility and build that community out.
[23:25.890 --> 23:27.550]  But it is a tricky problem.
[23:27.830 --> 23:29.010]  That's what we try to do.
[23:29.270 --> 23:41.290]  One of the big things to help staff the space is we have the concept of super volunteers that volunteer for a set number of slots every week in exchange for a complete 24-7 full access membership.
[23:42.150 --> 23:42.490]  Brilliant.
[23:42.710 --> 23:45.350]  Yeah, gamifying certain aspects of it.
[23:45.350 --> 23:51.810]  But I mean, I'm a member of a space that's been trying to put access control on the door for like 10 years.
[23:52.690 --> 23:54.870]  Because everybody has a different way of building it.
[23:55.010 --> 23:57.190]  And that would allow people to come at all hours.
[23:57.210 --> 23:59.750]  But of course, it's not done, so people can't do that.
[23:59.830 --> 24:02.670]  So now we have a key holder system, and it's just...
[24:02.670 --> 24:06.210]  You belong to a hacker space that hasn't figured out how to open its own door.
[24:06.210 --> 24:06.990]  Pretty much.
[24:07.190 --> 24:07.790]  Oh, we have an RFID system.
[24:07.790 --> 24:10.510]  So I mean, you get these problems that then get kind of...
[24:11.430 --> 24:15.710]  They kind of fragment and get lost in the priorities of these things.
[24:15.810 --> 24:26.250]  So you really have to keep the momentum, keep the energy up when it kind of feels like it's lagging a bit or maybe you're losing direction as a group.
[24:26.530 --> 24:27.750]  I had a funny story about that.
[24:27.810 --> 24:30.330]  We have an RFID system in our new space.
[24:30.930 --> 24:38.090]  And when it was run, it's a long run of unshielded Cat5, so it tends to pick up a lot of ambient RF.
[24:38.510 --> 24:38.650]  So...
[24:38.650 --> 24:39.510]  Tesla coils.
[24:39.810 --> 24:51.590]  Until someone very aggressively dealt with the problem and basically hand-built a system to deal with reading and getting the data out of it, we used to get a lot of misreads.
[24:51.650 --> 24:54.370]  So it tended to be just rejected reads and you couldn't get into the space.
[24:54.510 --> 24:59.010]  And maybe like on the 17th time you waved your badge in front of it, it let you in.
[24:59.990 --> 25:02.610]  Sounds like a high barrier tech tree in a very little...
[25:02.610 --> 25:03.610]  Sounds like a Heisenberg.
[25:03.710 --> 25:04.590]  High barrier tech tree.
[25:05.530 --> 25:05.970]  Yeah.
[25:06.030 --> 25:08.310]  Yeah, but any further questions?
[25:08.510 --> 25:12.770]  But no, it's very interesting to hear that another space is having problems with access control.
[25:12.910 --> 25:14.510]  Even what we actually did...
[25:14.510 --> 25:19.790]  So we started off in a much smaller space that was literally in the basement of a parking garage in downtown Troy.
[25:20.890 --> 25:29.330]  And then eventually we were slowly able to build up and get some loans from the community to move into a much larger and nicer space.
[25:29.330 --> 25:32.710]  And we used to jokingly refer to the old space as a hacker dungeon.
[25:32.750 --> 25:36.910]  Because it was like the bottom corner of a parking lot, there was always a roof leak.
[25:36.910 --> 25:39.930]  And the joke was the leak is never twice in the same space.
[25:42.010 --> 25:42.390]  So...
[25:42.390 --> 25:44.010]  How do you get loans from the community?
[25:44.190 --> 25:44.970]  I'm curious about that.
[25:45.890 --> 25:46.650]  We had...
[25:46.650 --> 25:50.470]  Well, like one of the credit unions helped us with some stuff.
[25:50.550 --> 25:52.430]  And I think there was other fundraising.
[25:52.430 --> 25:55.810]  I think there was also like an industrial development grant or something like that.
[25:55.830 --> 25:57.230]  I'm not on the financial side of it.
[25:57.230 --> 25:58.490]  But on...
[25:58.490 --> 26:02.010]  So the basement and the first floor are the primary parts of the maker space.
[26:02.210 --> 26:06.830]  But on the second floor, there's office space for rent.
[26:06.930 --> 26:13.490]  And I think there's a negotiation with like the landlord that people who lease there, it's like sort of a tech incubator.
[26:13.650 --> 26:16.930]  And their employees could get to use the maker space.
[26:17.430 --> 26:24.710]  And we don't have any weird like we get part of your intellectual property garbage like most tech incubators have.
[26:24.710 --> 26:27.930]  It's like so you can just... your company can develop what they want.
[26:27.990 --> 26:30.010]  And we have no rights to it.
[26:30.050 --> 26:30.530]  We don't care.
[26:30.670 --> 26:32.690]  But you probably are going to hang out with us anyway.
[26:33.550 --> 26:34.150]  I'm curious.
[26:34.150 --> 26:37.410]  How many people in the audience are part of a hacker space of one sort or another?
[26:38.390 --> 26:40.390]  Okay, I'd say about maybe half.
[26:40.590 --> 26:41.230]  A little less than half.
[26:41.330 --> 26:41.850]  I'm not in the audience.
[26:42.110 --> 26:43.070]  You're not in the audience, no.
[26:43.250 --> 26:43.670]  Yeah, you are.
[26:43.670 --> 26:43.990]  That's good.
[26:44.130 --> 26:45.250]  That's a good thing to be a part of.
[26:46.690 --> 26:48.490]  Any other remarks or...?
[26:48.490 --> 26:49.690]  Anyone have any questions?
[26:50.130 --> 26:54.150]  I'm pretty good about dealing with things off the cuff running through countless training sessions.
[26:54.930 --> 26:55.810]  I see a hand.
[26:55.870 --> 26:56.530]  There's a hand there.
[26:56.610 --> 26:57.610]  But you got to go up to the microphone.
[26:57.970 --> 26:59.070]  Go up to the mic so we can hear you.
[26:59.110 --> 27:00.970]  The theme of this talk is microphones.
[27:01.650 --> 27:07.170]  I'm used to talking loud to compete with the Miller lathe in the background from the old space, but it probably won't get recorded.
[27:10.010 --> 27:10.370]  Hi.
[27:10.630 --> 27:13.030]  I'm out of the pseudo room hacker space in Oakland.
[27:13.350 --> 27:16.210]  And right now we're in a big space with some other collectors.
[27:16.370 --> 27:17.510]  We went in on a big space together.
[27:17.790 --> 27:22.310]  We're trying to buy this building that we've been renting for the past two years.
[27:22.310 --> 27:24.950]  We have a price lock for three years.
[27:25.050 --> 27:26.490]  We have one year left to buy it.
[27:26.890 --> 27:31.550]  I'm wondering if anyone has any experience getting a business mortgage for a hacker space.
[27:31.790 --> 27:36.030]  Basically, we have a donor that's willing to give us $1 million.
[27:37.510 --> 27:41.250]  And if we can come up with a loan for the other million dollars to buy the building.
[27:43.290 --> 27:44.190]  That's a good deal.
[27:45.990 --> 27:49.950]  But convincing someone to lend us a million dollars is proving difficult.
[27:50.130 --> 27:52.770]  So you can get a million dollars if you can get another million dollars.
[27:52.870 --> 27:54.270]  Yeah, and the second only has to be a loan.
[27:54.410 --> 27:59.870]  The concept of having actual ownership of the building or of your space is pretty enticing too.
[28:00.170 --> 28:04.090]  I mean, that gives you a lot of flexibility as far as, like I said, that ebb and flow.
[28:04.090 --> 28:09.990]  So keeping numbers of people there as members who maybe pay a little or donate, whatever that ends up being.
[28:10.490 --> 28:18.290]  You know, there's some people at one of the vendor tables downstairs from an organization known as the Tesla Museum.
[28:18.430 --> 28:20.230]  Tesla, that's her name?
[28:20.410 --> 28:20.570]  Yeah.
[28:20.910 --> 28:21.830]  Okay, out on Long Island.
[28:22.390 --> 28:27.270]  And they were trying to buy the old site.
[28:27.670 --> 28:28.170]  Wardenclyffe.
[28:28.290 --> 28:28.790]  Wardenclyffe.
[28:28.970 --> 28:30.050]  Laboratory of...
[28:30.050 --> 28:32.290]  Where Nikola Tesla performed experiments.
[28:33.690 --> 28:35.610]  And it seemed impossible.
[28:35.930 --> 28:37.350]  The buildings were all falling apart.
[28:37.890 --> 28:40.390]  And surely it would have gone to some commercial developer.
[28:40.630 --> 28:42.250]  But it got the attention of the Internet.
[28:42.810 --> 28:46.070]  And who was the cartoonist in Seattle that was...
[28:46.070 --> 28:47.130]  The guy who does the oatmeal.
[28:47.290 --> 28:48.990]  Yeah, the guy who does the oatmeal.
[28:49.050 --> 28:49.950]  Yeah, the oatmeal guy.
[28:50.150 --> 28:50.990]  The oatmeal guy.
[28:50.990 --> 28:54.470]  And when he talked about it, all of a sudden all these donations started pouring in.
[28:54.830 --> 28:55.730]  And they bought it.
[28:55.850 --> 28:57.110]  They were able to buy Wardenclyffe.
[28:57.810 --> 28:58.970]  And they're developing it now.
[28:59.290 --> 29:00.030]  And you should talk to them.
[29:00.110 --> 29:00.570]  They're downstairs.
[29:01.390 --> 29:09.010]  And maybe they can give you some advice as to how, apart from getting the oatmeal guy to say something, other ways that they might have gotten word out.
[29:09.110 --> 29:11.710]  Because it sounds like you have a really awesome project in mind.
[29:12.110 --> 29:12.410]  Cool.
[29:12.710 --> 29:13.050]  Thanks.
[29:13.230 --> 29:13.970]  Don't give up.
[29:15.370 --> 29:15.730]  Yeah.
[29:15.830 --> 29:23.070]  Also, you might want to speak with me afterward if you want me to try and put you in contact with the members of the board who are involved with dealing with the business side of things.
[29:25.470 --> 29:25.870]  Okay.
[29:25.890 --> 29:28.510]  I think we're ready for our next open mic speaker.
[29:28.810 --> 29:29.910]  And I guess that's aesthetics.
[29:30.190 --> 29:30.350]  Okay.
[29:30.510 --> 29:30.810]  Thank you.
[29:31.510 --> 29:31.910]  Thanks.
[29:34.070 --> 29:36.130]  Can you plug me into the thingy?
[29:36.950 --> 29:37.210]  Here.
[29:37.350 --> 29:40.130]  I have a thingy to go into the other thingy.
[29:40.670 --> 29:40.870]  Or the...
[29:40.870 --> 29:42.250]  Greg's going to plug you into the thingy.
[29:42.410 --> 29:42.950]  I'm not sure which.
[29:43.070 --> 29:44.170]  There's HDMI up there.
[29:44.330 --> 29:45.930]  I have a VGA, so...
[29:45.930 --> 29:46.330]  It's right here.
[29:46.930 --> 29:47.130]  Thanks.
[29:47.410 --> 29:48.110]  The treasure's got it.
[29:48.430 --> 29:48.730]  All right.
[29:49.630 --> 29:50.470]  Let me do this.
[29:50.470 --> 29:51.670]  I think I might need to twiddle the projector.
[29:51.830 --> 29:52.490]  We'll see what happens.
[29:53.150 --> 29:53.590]  Yeah.
[29:53.910 --> 29:54.550]  I believe...
[29:54.550 --> 29:55.290]  I guess I'll move up and...
[29:55.290 --> 29:55.870]  I believe it was left on.
[29:55.870 --> 29:57.550]  He's better words than twiddle and thingy.
[29:57.570 --> 29:58.310]  I think it was left on.
[29:58.350 --> 29:58.930]  Professionals here.
[29:58.930 --> 29:59.090]  Yeah.
[29:59.150 --> 30:00.250]  It's in technical terms.
[30:00.550 --> 30:03.930]  He's going to verify that it is in standby mode.
[30:05.930 --> 30:06.250]  All right.
[30:07.210 --> 30:07.610]  Does it work?
[30:07.850 --> 30:08.590]  He's only receiving HDMI.
[30:09.230 --> 30:09.830]  That's true.
[30:10.430 --> 30:10.870]  Okay.
[30:11.430 --> 30:13.370]  The cord is just barely hung out.
[30:14.010 --> 30:14.450]  There.
[30:14.770 --> 30:15.790]  Have some more cord.
[30:16.050 --> 30:17.730]  It's a little bit longer and it'll be good.
[30:18.190 --> 30:18.630]  For God's sake.
[30:18.690 --> 30:18.990]  Test.
[30:19.210 --> 30:19.870]  Donald Trump.
[30:19.990 --> 30:20.270]  Donald Trump.
[30:20.270 --> 30:20.470]  Okay.
[30:21.630 --> 30:22.610]  Stop saying that.
[30:24.970 --> 30:25.510]  What is it?
[30:25.570 --> 30:27.410]  Like you say it three times into a mirror and he goes away?
[30:27.590 --> 30:28.770]  I was just thinking that.
[30:31.330 --> 30:32.230]  I've tried that.
[30:32.570 --> 30:32.830]  Trust me.
[30:34.050 --> 30:34.650]  All right.
[30:34.990 --> 30:35.370]  Let's see.
[30:35.430 --> 30:36.490]  Let me try this one more time.
[30:37.110 --> 30:39.290]  I can do this talk without slides.
[30:39.470 --> 30:44.690]  So just to give a preface on what this talk is, it is called Why I Hate PGP.
[30:45.070 --> 30:46.210]  And I've never...
[30:46.210 --> 30:47.910]  I've given this twice in Europe.
[30:48.010 --> 30:49.710]  I've never actually given this talk in the U.S. though.
[30:52.570 --> 30:55.770]  And apparently the talk is not going to give itself, so...
[30:55.770 --> 31:01.610]  We can't see the slides on stage and probably the people watching at home can't either because the camera's pointed at us and there's no camera guy.
[31:02.530 --> 31:04.170]  But you could describe them, I'm sure.
[31:04.290 --> 31:04.670]  Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[31:04.890 --> 31:08.230]  I can basically wing it and I will try to give it within 15 minutes.
[31:08.430 --> 31:10.510]  And there's a couple of interesting projects I'm working with.
[31:10.650 --> 31:15.290]  So before I start, how many of you know of or have used PGP before?
[31:17.470 --> 31:17.870]  Okay.
[31:18.390 --> 31:20.130]  And how many of you hate it?
[31:21.350 --> 31:21.750]  Okay.
[31:22.090 --> 31:23.330]  What are the reasons that you hate it?
[31:24.130 --> 31:25.170]  Your eye sucks.
[31:25.550 --> 31:26.110]  All right.
[31:26.390 --> 31:27.630]  I knew that was going to be...
[31:27.630 --> 31:27.930]  Your eye sucks.
[31:28.070 --> 31:31.130]  I knew that was going to be the thing and that's actually not why I hate it.
[31:31.590 --> 31:32.670]  I think...
[31:32.670 --> 31:34.310]  The attack surface is so huge.
[31:34.810 --> 31:37.310]  Well, there's an attack surface issue, but here's what I'm going to say.
[31:38.390 --> 31:41.890]  PGP, the protocol is fundamentally shit and you cannot...
[31:41.890 --> 31:45.270]  I mean, I guess you actually can polish a turd if you freeze it, but that's another story.
[31:47.610 --> 31:47.970]  Okay.
[31:49.770 --> 31:54.250]  If you freeze a turd, you can polish it, but I don't want to f*cking polish turd on your mantle.
[31:54.470 --> 31:54.970]  That's not...
[31:54.970 --> 32:05.130]  I hate it because half the time I spend talking to people via PGP is figuring out how to read the PGP because they send using the wrong version or the wrong key or something else.
[32:05.770 --> 32:08.390]  And it's literally wasting so much time.
[32:08.610 --> 32:10.450]  It can be great, but it should be the default.
[32:10.610 --> 32:11.550]  It should always be used.
[32:12.210 --> 32:15.670]  So there's a couple of reasons I started exploring this territory.
[32:15.670 --> 32:22.150]  And I would say that the big one is because all of you know about PGP, it's been getting a lot of popularity.
[32:22.310 --> 32:27.190]  Honestly, Snowden really helped and all these people want to know about cryptography and they want to know about encrypting their data.
[32:27.190 --> 32:30.790]  So I'll preface this by saying that PGP is good for encryption.
[32:30.970 --> 32:32.390]  It sucks for privacy.
[32:32.590 --> 32:34.190]  And a lot of people are using it for privacy.
[32:34.430 --> 32:38.770]  And you're actually making yourself more vulnerable by doing that.
[32:39.470 --> 32:39.870]  What?
[32:40.210 --> 32:41.310]  What the f*ck is that?
[32:41.490 --> 32:42.290]  I have...
[32:42.290 --> 32:43.010]  Statism?
[32:43.810 --> 32:44.930]  No, that is...
[32:44.930 --> 32:45.930]  Oh, that's...
[32:45.930 --> 32:47.390]  Things you don't want seen, right?
[32:47.730 --> 32:47.910]  Okay.
[32:47.910 --> 32:48.610]  Close your eyes, yeah?
[32:49.010 --> 32:49.410]  Okay.
[32:50.610 --> 32:51.570]  That's your device?
[32:51.810 --> 32:53.890]  No, this is not me, I think.
[32:54.050 --> 32:56.010]  Let me try to unplug it and re-plug it back in.
[32:57.070 --> 32:57.430]  Oops.
[32:58.610 --> 33:00.150]  Okay, maybe that was not so smart.
[33:00.370 --> 33:04.450]  So as I continue, I will go over the fundamental...
[33:04.850 --> 33:05.210]  So...
[33:08.270 --> 33:08.630]  Okay.
[33:09.190 --> 33:10.710]  Is this like whose slide is it anyway?
[33:11.550 --> 33:12.370]  Oh, there we go.
[33:12.590 --> 33:12.810]  Yeah.
[33:13.150 --> 33:13.530]  All right.
[33:13.670 --> 33:14.510]  And let me tap this.
[33:14.570 --> 33:18.130]  This gave me an idea for another feature, random slides from people's devices.
[33:18.590 --> 33:18.950]  Okay.
[33:19.150 --> 33:20.710]  Even they don't know it's gonna show up on the screen.
[33:20.710 --> 33:27.150]  So this talk is not going to match the slides exactly, partly because I need to skip over a bunch of, like, fillery detail.
[33:27.270 --> 33:31.070]  And I think a lot of you guys are probably smart enough to not need some of the extra filler.
[33:31.270 --> 33:35.430]  So, the question is, why is PGP a thing?
[33:35.590 --> 33:39.410]  So, go back to classical cryptography, that cryptography, AKA symmetric.
[33:39.410 --> 33:41.010]  I have a secret message.
[33:41.170 --> 33:41.770]  I have a key.
[33:41.910 --> 33:43.090]  I encrypt it with the key.
[33:43.250 --> 33:45.850]  And then I send it to, you know, whoever across the world.
[33:46.010 --> 33:49.170]  And they take that same key and they decrypt the message and they get it.
[33:49.510 --> 33:52.650]  That's called symmetric key cryptography because it's using the same key.
[33:52.770 --> 33:53.270]  It's symmetrical.
[33:54.830 --> 33:59.790]  So, there's a problem with this, which is, how do you get the key across the world to your body?
[34:00.210 --> 34:02.490]  And this has been an unsolved problem for a very...
[34:02.490 --> 34:16.030]  Oh, it was an unsolved problem for a very long time, up until basically 1976, which is the cutoff point, when Whitfield, Diffie, and Marty Hellman realized that if you split the key into two, you would have what's called a public key and a private key.
[34:16.510 --> 34:22.730]  So, the idea is the public key, you put it up, or it out on the Internet, and it becomes a public thing, and anybody can download it.
[34:23.050 --> 34:31.310]  And they can download this public key, they can encrypt a message with it, and then they can send it to you, and you can use your key, your private key, that never leaves your possession and you can decrypt it.
[34:31.770 --> 34:33.830]  So, that solves the key distribution problem.
[34:33.990 --> 34:36.610]  Can anyone tell me what the new issue this opens up is?
[34:39.130 --> 34:39.550]  Trust.
[34:39.550 --> 34:39.970]  Trust.
[34:40.790 --> 34:50.690]  By which I mean, how do I know that the key that's up on the random website really belongs to the person that I'm trying to send an encrypted message to?
[34:51.350 --> 34:53.750]  And so, GPG and...
[34:53.750 --> 34:59.530]  So, PGP kind of came up with a workaround for this, which was what they called the key signing.
[34:59.690 --> 35:01.470]  Have you guys heard of the idea of key signing?
[35:01.570 --> 35:03.470]  You might have heard of key signing parties and so on.
[35:04.090 --> 35:07.270]  So, one of the reasons I started looking into this is because...
[35:07.270 --> 35:08.170]  In a lot of...
[35:08.170 --> 35:11.650]  In fact, I will pull up the slide on this because I want to rub it in.
[35:12.470 --> 35:13.370]  Blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.
[35:13.890 --> 35:14.670]  Do, do, do, do, do.
[35:15.170 --> 35:15.890]  Is that the...
[35:15.890 --> 35:16.470]  Ah, yes.
[35:16.610 --> 35:17.030]  This slide.
[35:17.870 --> 35:25.490]  So, you will see at the bottom of this page, and a lot of people who are especially new to Linux are going to use Ubuntu because it's a very user-friendly operating system.
[35:25.490 --> 35:27.410]  And for a lot of purposes, it's great.
[35:28.370 --> 35:30.710]  On Ubuntu's website, if you click on...
[35:30.710 --> 35:33.210]  They have a key sign-in party guideline.
[35:33.490 --> 35:46.130]  So, what a key sign-in party is, is a bunch of people get together and they want to exchange keys because they want to make sure that the key that they're sending something to, or at least the key signature, matches so that they're sending the encrypted data to the right person.
[35:46.210 --> 35:47.450]  Especially if it's really sensitive.
[35:47.650 --> 35:50.990]  You don't want to send it to the wrong person and have it, like, get out of control.
[35:50.990 --> 35:52.590]  So, if you see somebody...
[35:52.590 --> 35:57.390]  A lot of people at this conference may be passing out business cards that have that PGP signature on it.
[35:57.590 --> 36:02.170]  That's the purpose of it, to make sure that the key that you download off of the key server is the correct key.
[36:02.990 --> 36:12.530]  So, there's a big issue with this, which is that a lot of these key server parties, including the one on Ubuntu's website, requires you to show government-issued ID.
[36:12.710 --> 36:13.950]  Has anyone encountered this?
[36:14.310 --> 36:17.190]  So, can anyone tell me why it is that I have a problem with that?
[36:21.150 --> 36:21.870]  You're good.
[36:23.070 --> 36:23.510]  Okay.
[36:23.590 --> 36:24.510]  Yeah, it's...
[36:24.510 --> 36:26.430]  He said, you might want to have other identities.
[36:26.430 --> 36:27.830]  You might want to have other identities.
[36:28.090 --> 36:30.210]  And it's actually a little more complicated than that.
[36:30.470 --> 36:30.890]  Wait a minute.
[36:30.890 --> 36:31.910]  You're the NIMWAR guy.
[36:32.170 --> 36:32.410]  What?
[36:32.790 --> 36:33.650]  You're the NIMWAR guy.
[36:33.650 --> 36:33.890]  Oh, yeah.
[36:33.970 --> 36:35.070]  Years ago, I was doing...
[36:35.070 --> 36:36.110]  What's the question?
[36:36.510 --> 36:38.070]  Acronyms and synonyms.
[36:38.970 --> 36:46.250]  If it's in a country that tends to crack down on dissidents, that tends to be rather undemocratic, you may be signing your death warrant.
[36:46.470 --> 36:46.770]  Yep.
[36:47.150 --> 36:47.750]  There's that, too.
[36:47.930 --> 36:48.610]  Repeat that.
[36:48.930 --> 36:49.710]  If you were...
[36:49.710 --> 36:50.470]  People should come to the microphone.
[36:50.470 --> 36:53.470]  Yeah, go to the microphone and say that again so I don't f*ck up what you said.
[36:53.590 --> 36:55.030]  With the same ominous tone you used.
[36:56.110 --> 37:03.030]  If it's in the context of a rather undemocratic country and you have to bring your national ID with you, you may pretty much be signing your own death warrant.
[37:03.510 --> 37:03.730]  Yep.
[37:03.890 --> 37:05.250]  Actually, this gets interesting.
[37:05.370 --> 37:06.930]  I think it's in Japan.
[37:08.070 --> 37:09.290]  It's either Japan or China.
[37:09.290 --> 37:10.270]  I don't remember which.
[37:10.270 --> 37:13.330]  But if you look at the bottom of any webpage that's on the...
[37:13.330 --> 37:15.670]  It's either the .cn or .jp domain name.
[37:15.870 --> 37:18.250]  You'll see an ID number at the very bottom.
[37:18.470 --> 37:32.110]  If you want to make a webpage or put something up on the Internet that's within the domain of that country, you have to register with the centralized government and everything that you post on there must spare the ID number of that government at the very bottom.
[37:32.110 --> 37:33.770]  And it's a very different...
[37:33.770 --> 37:37.690]  I mean, there are issues with centralized web infrastructure here.
[37:37.850 --> 37:40.710]  But holy shit, it's so much better than what they're doing, in my opinion.
[37:44.810 --> 37:49.290]  So, the next question is, what is the purpose of showing a government-issued ID?
[37:49.510 --> 37:51.410]  It is effectively to establish trust.
[37:51.510 --> 37:55.210]  And this gets into the different types of trust and so on, which I don't know where in the slides that was.
[37:55.590 --> 37:57.630]  Long story short, there are three types of trust.
[37:59.070 --> 38:01.170]  One is basically direct.
[38:01.170 --> 38:03.150]  That's like, I see you and I trust you, right?
[38:03.910 --> 38:07.130]  Another is transitive, where I trust somebody and they trust somebody else.
[38:07.270 --> 38:11.410]  And therefore, we can have this kind of a mutualistic linked list of trust.
[38:12.030 --> 38:14.670]  The other one is higher...
[38:14.670 --> 38:15.530]  Was that...?
[38:15.530 --> 38:16.910]  Okay, so that works.
[38:16.990 --> 38:18.370]  There's also hierarchical trust.
[38:18.530 --> 38:25.550]  If you guys know about the SSL certificate authority system, which I have a whole bunch of issues with, but it serves the purpose.
[38:26.050 --> 38:27.630]  You have this central authority.
[38:27.630 --> 38:32.990]  Maybe it issues a trust grant in either chain and then signs your key and so on.
[38:34.210 --> 38:37.730]  So, there's also something I really like, which is cumulative trust.
[38:38.070 --> 38:43.510]  And the idea there is that you have a bunch of different types of trust that you yourself pick.
[38:43.770 --> 38:46.950]  And the more that you have, the greater the trust is.
[38:47.090 --> 38:49.990]  And in my opinion, I think that's what PGP was trying to do.
[38:49.990 --> 38:53.770]  Because if you look at the original RFC, I think it's RFC 4880.
[38:53.770 --> 38:55.410]  I can't remember for GNU PG.
[38:56.350 --> 38:57.610]  This is how they define it.
[38:57.710 --> 38:58.850]  They don't really...
[38:58.850 --> 39:02.170]  I looked at a couple of different websites trying to figure out what trust levels mean.
[39:02.390 --> 39:06.070]  If you're signing somebody's key, it says, do you want to trust it?
[39:06.150 --> 39:06.630]  Not at all.
[39:06.890 --> 39:09.090]  Why would you sign somebody's key if you don't trust them?
[39:09.130 --> 39:09.990]  That makes no sense to me.
[39:10.190 --> 39:10.970]  And yet, it is an option.
[39:10.970 --> 39:16.730]  You can fully trust them or you can trust them somewhat, which doesn't make any sense to me.
[39:16.990 --> 39:18.210]  And I spent a lot of time trying to...
[39:18.210 --> 39:22.110]  And this is three different websites that have three different examples of what all of this means.
[39:22.490 --> 39:24.810]  And the actual RFC is not much better.
[39:25.550 --> 39:27.810]  And I think I may have a thing of the RFC.
[39:28.290 --> 39:28.930]  Do I?
[39:29.010 --> 39:29.790]  I cannot remember.
[39:30.270 --> 39:31.810]  Oh, and here's the thing I just talked about.
[39:31.910 --> 39:33.610]  Direct hierarchical and cumulative trust.
[39:34.290 --> 39:34.690]  And...
[39:34.690 --> 39:35.930]  Ah, so yes.
[39:36.130 --> 39:38.890]  Here is how it is actually specified within the RFC.
[39:38.890 --> 39:40.990]  Sorry, the guys on stage can't see this.
[39:41.610 --> 39:45.210]  But basically, the word unused...
[39:45.210 --> 39:46.650]  It is...
[39:48.330 --> 39:48.930]  Right.
[39:49.110 --> 39:52.230]  The issuer of this certificate has not done any verification.
[39:52.550 --> 39:55.830]  The issuer of this certificate has done some casual verification.
[39:56.150 --> 39:58.890]  The issuer has done substantial verification.
[40:01.010 --> 40:01.610]  So...
[40:01.610 --> 40:02.890]  And that's the RFC.
[40:03.030 --> 40:04.790]  So it's kind of ambiguous as to what that means.
[40:04.790 --> 40:10.030]  And in my opinion, it means they leave it up to the key signing parties to figure out what it means.
[40:10.170 --> 40:11.330]  It's to leave it up to the individual.
[40:11.550 --> 40:12.350]  Especially keep...
[40:12.350 --> 40:19.830]  My PGP was created in the early 90s during the 90s crypto wars as an active dissent against the U.S. government.
[40:20.030 --> 40:24.590]  So why the f*ck would they ask you to enforce government issued ID to sign somebody's key?
[40:25.290 --> 40:27.130]  So there's another issue that comes up.
[40:28.310 --> 40:33.270]  And this is just an example of somebody's key and all the people that have signed the key.
[40:33.730 --> 40:34.210]  So...
[40:35.090 --> 40:41.830]  What this is doing, it is making your trust relationship, as in all of your friends and everything, public and broadcasting it to the world.
[40:44.350 --> 40:44.970]  Let's see.
[40:44.970 --> 40:45.670]  So, okay.
[40:45.770 --> 40:47.510]  This gets into a tool that I wrote.
[40:47.710 --> 40:49.010]  And basically what this did...
[40:49.010 --> 40:58.490]  I was doing some data mining because what I realized is that taking it from one of the big key stores, the public key stores, SKS in this case, I downloaded it.
[40:58.570 --> 40:59.750]  It's about five gigs total.
[40:59.930 --> 41:02.530]  And I stripped out all the actual keys.
[41:02.670 --> 41:03.650]  And I was looking at the data.
[41:03.670 --> 41:05.230]  So I have a key ID.
[41:05.610 --> 41:08.430]  These, you know, these five keys have signed it.
[41:08.770 --> 41:13.150]  And I actually wrote a script that took this, stripped it out and imported it into a database.
[41:13.150 --> 41:15.490]  And it started doing some interesting data mining on it.
[41:15.810 --> 41:20.590]  And this gets into some of the technical details behind the protocol and all the back and forth they had to do.
[41:22.010 --> 41:23.410]  So there's some of the code.
[41:24.610 --> 41:27.090]  And here's just some of the data mining things that I did.
[41:27.790 --> 41:28.150]  So...
[41:30.070 --> 41:31.790]  It's really complicated because...
[41:31.790 --> 41:33.250]  I mean, what the f*ck does this even mean?
[41:33.250 --> 41:36.550]  Because the email addresses that are in the key server, there's no verification.
[41:36.790 --> 41:38.010]  That doesn't, like, email you to verify.
[41:38.210 --> 41:39.390]  It's actually an email.
[41:39.390 --> 41:45.710]  Which is why, if you look for, say, NSA.gov, there are, like, 50 Ed Snowden at NSA.govs.
[41:46.190 --> 41:46.990]  And so on.
[41:47.970 --> 41:48.370]  So...
[41:49.110 --> 41:51.890]  There are problems with inserting keys into the key store.
[41:52.050 --> 41:52.570]  Okay, great.
[41:52.750 --> 41:55.270]  And I think I posted the code for this on GitHub.
[41:55.470 --> 41:57.010]  And I'll go to the slide in a moment.
[41:57.110 --> 41:58.250]  I did a whole bunch of stuff with this.
[41:58.350 --> 42:01.390]  And I got bored with it because I actually wanted to have more fun.
[42:02.350 --> 42:02.750]  So...
[42:02.750 --> 42:03.350]  Where is it?
[42:03.430 --> 42:03.630]  Ah!
[42:03.830 --> 42:05.550]  So here's a little script that I wrote.
[42:06.070 --> 42:11.030]  Because, to me, the other problem with key signing is it's one directional.
[42:11.330 --> 42:12.570]  As in, I sign your key.
[42:12.730 --> 42:13.530]  You can do...
[42:13.530 --> 42:14.550]  You have no recourse.
[42:14.670 --> 42:16.170]  You can't deny that key signature.
[42:16.370 --> 42:17.110]  You can do nothing.
[42:17.210 --> 42:21.270]  In fact, if I revoke a key, it just makes this little mark that says revoked in the key server.
[42:21.470 --> 42:22.310]  And it's still there.
[42:22.550 --> 42:23.150]  It just...
[42:23.150 --> 42:24.590]  It's on your permanent record.
[42:24.810 --> 42:26.650]  So I decided to have a little bit of fun.
[42:26.650 --> 42:28.990]  And I made a little script in Python.
[42:28.990 --> 42:29.710]  This is on GitHub.
[42:29.970 --> 42:30.530]  Open source.
[42:30.890 --> 42:31.010]  Free.
[42:31.210 --> 42:31.410]  Whatever.
[42:32.130 --> 42:32.530]  That...
[42:33.370 --> 42:34.490]  You can basically...
[42:34.490 --> 42:40.170]  There's a YAML file and a config where you can specify a user ID and an email address of a random...
[42:40.170 --> 42:41.150]  Of a key that you want.
[42:41.270 --> 42:42.210]  It generates it on the spot.
[42:42.470 --> 42:45.270]  And then you pick a pattern for it to match.
[42:45.410 --> 42:49.510]  And it will go and find every key in the key store that matches that pattern and auto-sign them.
[42:50.750 --> 42:52.850]  So there's a lot of fun things you can do with this.
[42:52.850 --> 42:56.710]  And the people who you sign, there's nothing they can do about it.
[43:00.770 --> 43:02.790]  So, there's some other things that I've been working on.
[43:02.970 --> 43:07.590]  For example, GPG is entirely client-side validation.
[43:08.050 --> 43:13.810]  And so if you've ever tried to make a key, you might, like, try to put in some gobbledygook and it says, oh, you can't do that.
[43:13.850 --> 43:15.150]  It has to fit within this restriction.
[43:15.410 --> 43:16.970]  Well, the damn thing is open source.
[43:17.170 --> 43:22.430]  So you can download that source and comment out those restrictions, recompile it, and do whatever you want.
[43:22.790 --> 43:26.490]  And that's how I was able to actually make a public key and private key that...
[43:26.490 --> 43:30.030]  I think the email address is France and the user ID is we surrender.
[43:30.370 --> 43:31.250]  And I've actually...
[43:32.250 --> 43:38.010]  And I've been working on playing with that and going through and signing a whole bunch of German keys in the key server with it.
[43:38.090 --> 43:39.410]  Because I think it would be funny.
[43:41.190 --> 43:43.590]  But there's a whole bunch of funny things you can do with that.
[43:44.090 --> 43:45.910]  Something else that I'm working on...
[43:45.910 --> 43:47.070]  I created...
[43:47.070 --> 43:48.570]  I don't have it up here.
[43:49.970 --> 43:50.450]  But...
[43:50.450 --> 43:51.130]  So...
[43:52.690 --> 43:53.170]  GPG...
[43:53.170 --> 43:55.650]  This is why client-side validation is bad.
[43:56.590 --> 43:59.030]  They do have a size limit for different things.
[43:59.170 --> 44:01.790]  Like, there's usually a field limit for the user ID field.
[44:01.970 --> 44:04.390]  But if you comment that out of the code, it's no longer there.
[44:04.610 --> 44:06.830]  So I went ahead and commented that out.
[44:07.010 --> 44:11.050]  And then I used DD to create, like, about a megabyte of random data.
[44:11.050 --> 44:12.970]  And I put it in.
[44:13.270 --> 44:18.510]  And I basically created a public key that was 1.4 megs in size.
[44:19.110 --> 44:21.550]  And then I looked around the key servers.
[44:21.870 --> 44:23.770]  Because this is actually really interesting.
[44:24.670 --> 44:27.310]  There's no real security on any of the key servers.
[44:27.410 --> 44:30.410]  They just have to, like, trust that the data has integrity and whatnot.
[44:32.650 --> 44:35.110]  And I had to try...
[44:35.110 --> 44:36.630]  Because they're all configured differently.
[44:36.910 --> 44:38.310]  So some might have timeouts.
[44:38.930 --> 44:40.330]  Some might have certain file sizes.
[44:40.330 --> 44:43.010]  So I went and found the most insecure one I could.
[44:43.190 --> 44:46.370]  And I experimented with the size of keys I could find and uploaded them to.
[44:46.450 --> 44:47.750]  And I found one that was really insecure.
[44:47.930 --> 44:52.770]  And from that point on, every time I got pissed off at something, I would just upload another key to the key server.
[44:53.830 --> 44:56.430]  Because what happens is you upload the keys to the key server.
[44:57.810 --> 44:59.610]  And because it's in the trusted...
[44:59.610 --> 45:03.550]  Like, the web of trust of all the key servers, it gets propagated to all the other key servers.
[45:03.550 --> 45:11.670]  So even though all these other key servers have good security, that one idiot that is not secure, you just upload it through that and it gets delivered automatically.
[45:12.790 --> 45:13.190]  So...
[45:13.190 --> 45:15.070]  I think people have been looking for you.
[45:17.030 --> 45:18.050]  Well, one of my...
[45:18.610 --> 45:19.710]  Yeah, one of my goals...
[45:19.710 --> 45:26.790]  See, the thing about broadcasting your social network out into the world, I have a big problem with that.
[45:26.870 --> 45:36.610]  And further, I think that these things about encouraging people to use PGP without giving them the information of what it is and what can happen, actually puts them at risk.
[45:36.950 --> 45:39.710]  So, I think that public key servers should go away.
[45:40.290 --> 45:46.170]  And I could either, like, say things and be philosophical or just make fun tools and let other people do it for me.
[45:47.590 --> 45:51.430]  I have a couple of other things that I'm working on that I'm not ready to announce here.
[45:51.550 --> 45:53.250]  But I thought that was kind of funny.
[45:53.250 --> 46:02.470]  And if you're interested in downloading this key, or this project, I threw it together in about a weekend so that I could do it at a...
[46:03.750 --> 46:04.750]  I don't know...
[46:04.750 --> 46:05.270]  Presented...
[46:05.270 --> 46:07.550]  The only other place I've presented this at is BerlinSides.
[46:07.830 --> 46:10.590]  So, this is the first time in the United States I've shown this off.
[46:10.810 --> 46:16.230]  So, if you guys want to play around with this and modify it, it's open source and I'm accepting pull requests.
[46:16.590 --> 46:17.470]  So, yeah.
[46:17.670 --> 46:18.370]  F*ck the key servers.
[46:18.770 --> 46:19.690]  Can I ask a question?
[46:19.930 --> 46:20.030]  Yes.
[46:20.570 --> 46:25.410]  Do you have a theory as to why they have done things like this?
[46:25.710 --> 46:28.250]  Is it just because they're naive?
[46:29.270 --> 46:29.910]  Or...
[46:29.910 --> 46:31.130]  Who has done what?
[46:31.310 --> 46:41.890]  The people behind these bad decisions of making things too public, making things not secure enough, making things reveal information, trusting government IDs.
[46:42.290 --> 46:42.810]  Why?
[46:43.210 --> 46:45.010]  This is something I've thought a lot about.
[46:45.010 --> 46:47.130]  I think there's a couple.
[46:47.490 --> 46:52.110]  So, with PGP, the one that was released in the early 90s, I think that was...
[46:52.110 --> 46:55.250]  They were just trying to get something out and they just wanted to get it to the public.
[46:55.450 --> 46:57.030]  And there's a public good to that.
[46:57.150 --> 47:00.910]  On the other hand, there's also maintenance that should have been done.
[47:01.170 --> 47:03.230]  And there's a lot of interesting things that...
[47:03.230 --> 47:05.290]  So, for example, if you also disable...
[47:05.790 --> 47:07.090]  And this is something else I'm planning with.
[47:07.150 --> 47:15.470]  If you disable the client-side validation, you can also possibly insert cross-site scripting attacks into that and upload that to the key server too.
[47:16.010 --> 47:29.730]  Now, if you think about it, like if you use Thunderbird and you use Ignigmal or other clients like that, and you enter in a key ID and it comes back with a user ID that has malicious code in it, then you could actually pwn somebody's system with this.
[47:29.730 --> 47:30.890]  Thanks, key servers.
[47:32.730 --> 47:33.730]  I haven't actually...
[47:33.730 --> 47:36.790]  I don't have a working proof of concept of that yet, but it's something I was playing with.
[47:38.150 --> 47:39.010]  Any other questions?
[47:40.050 --> 47:41.810]  You have to come all the way up here to the microphone.
[47:41.910 --> 47:42.210]  Yeah, come to the mic.
[47:42.390 --> 47:42.670]  Sorry.
[47:42.890 --> 47:44.030]  You're sitting very far away.
[47:51.490 --> 47:52.690]  Very short question too.
[47:52.990 --> 47:53.790]  He's almost here.
[47:55.470 --> 47:57.110]  What do you think about Keybase?
[47:58.310 --> 47:58.570]  So...
[47:58.570 --> 47:59.210]  Go back now.
[48:00.210 --> 48:01.430]  Keybase is interesting.
[48:01.750 --> 48:04.090]  My biggest complaint about them is I always...
[48:04.090 --> 48:08.790]  I didn't want to write all this code myself and I was trying to use their API, but their API sucks.
[48:09.170 --> 48:13.650]  Because what's better to use to destroy the key servers than Keybase's own API?
[48:14.410 --> 48:16.330]  There's also some interesting things about...
[48:16.330 --> 48:19.670]  So the key servers I've been working with are SKS, which are public.
[48:20.170 --> 48:21.850]  I don't think Keybase's is.
[48:21.890 --> 48:24.310]  I was trying to find a way to download it and I couldn't find it.
[48:24.310 --> 48:25.490]  I could fix that.
[48:25.630 --> 48:25.930]  What?
[48:26.610 --> 48:27.870]  I could probably help you with that.
[48:27.970 --> 48:28.610]  That would be awesome.
[48:28.830 --> 48:28.930]  Yeah.
[48:29.370 --> 48:29.930]  So...
[48:29.930 --> 48:34.250]  No, here's the problem with Keybase also is that it...
[48:35.650 --> 48:37.390]  It takes this stuff and it...
[48:37.390 --> 48:38.190]  It enhance...
[48:38.190 --> 48:47.310]  Instead of magnifying the secure cryptography and encryption part of PGP, it enhances the social part of it, which is bad in my opinion for...
[48:49.830 --> 48:55.250]  Well, let's say that you have signed somebody's key or somebody has signed your key and then they wind up getting subpoenaed for something.
[48:55.530 --> 48:56.730]  That f*cking sucks.
[48:56.990 --> 49:01.770]  And that has happened and there's really...
[49:02.190 --> 49:07.950]  Or if somebody signs your key with a fake ID and how will people know about it?
[49:08.090 --> 49:08.550]  So...
[49:08.550 --> 49:11.290]  Yeah, the whole social thing and I hate Keybase.
[49:12.250 --> 49:12.730]  So...
[49:12.730 --> 49:17.370]  That's why one of the other titles of this talk is, there's no way it will not sign your f*cking public key.
[49:18.470 --> 49:19.270]  Another question?
[49:19.910 --> 49:21.510]  I actually have two questions.
[49:21.690 --> 49:21.830]  Yes.
[49:22.450 --> 49:22.970]  One...
[49:23.550 --> 49:28.050]  There are definitely some very big downsides to having public signatures.
[49:28.430 --> 49:34.230]  But it also seems like you could have very good upsides to them.
[49:34.430 --> 49:39.310]  Like if you want to show affiliation or if you want to...
[49:39.850 --> 49:42.050]  Basically use it as a modern letter of introduction.
[49:42.490 --> 49:48.690]  Would it be possible to have a system where some signatures are only visible if you know to look for that specific signature?
[49:50.330 --> 49:51.090]  Well, it depends.
[49:51.290 --> 49:56.210]  So what you're describing sounds like a discovery challenge in terms of I have a bunch of data.
[49:56.270 --> 49:58.650]  How do I find what it is that I'm looking for within that data?
[49:58.810 --> 49:59.090]  Is that...
[49:59.090 --> 49:59.970]  Does that sound about right?
[49:59.970 --> 50:11.850]  More like, let's say I've signed two keys for different people and they meet and they want to check that they're the right people and they both know they know me.
[50:12.190 --> 50:15.830]  So they can compare their keys and it'll show up, okay, you've both been signed by the same person.
[50:16.750 --> 50:20.430]  So the way that the solution I recommend to that...
[50:20.430 --> 50:20.950]  What I'm...
[50:20.950 --> 50:22.210]  I'm not saying don't use key servers.
[50:22.370 --> 50:23.870]  I'm saying don't use public key servers.
[50:24.510 --> 50:27.690]  And this gets into questions about access control and so on.
[50:27.770 --> 50:33.850]  But I think you could totally use a privately controlled access server or key server for that.
[50:34.630 --> 50:35.110]  Okay.
[50:35.350 --> 50:37.030]  And the other question is...
[50:37.030 --> 50:42.970]  Since there seems to be some very glaring problems with PGP, is there a good alternative?
[50:42.970 --> 50:45.110]  Maybe one that's more accessible?
[50:45.350 --> 50:48.910]  Well, it depends on what the glaring issues are.
[50:49.770 --> 50:53.370]  I mean, basically the issue I'm pointing out here, it's not that PGP sucks.
[50:53.510 --> 50:55.970]  It's that if you use PGP for the wrong thing, it sucks.
[50:56.330 --> 50:56.970]  That's fair.
[50:58.870 --> 50:59.650]  More questions?
[51:02.910 --> 51:03.870]  Have you...
[51:03.870 --> 51:10.970]  I guess since you're doing some data mining, have you looked at who, I guess, does signs get code with PGP?
[51:12.110 --> 51:12.710]  Signs what code?
[51:12.970 --> 51:13.390]  Get.
[51:13.770 --> 51:16.470]  So you can sign your commits with the...
[51:17.150 --> 51:18.450]  Well, you can sign your commits.
[51:18.450 --> 51:18.950]  No, I haven't.
[51:19.510 --> 51:19.910]  So...
[51:19.910 --> 51:21.030]  So, yeah.
[51:21.150 --> 51:26.090]  If you want to download the SKS key store and download some of the code and do it, do it.
[51:26.790 --> 51:26.950]  Okay.
[51:27.310 --> 51:29.810]  Yeah, I was just wondering if you had done any of that research.
[51:30.110 --> 51:30.670]  I have not.
[51:30.890 --> 51:30.990]  Yeah.
[51:33.430 --> 51:35.530]  Have you played with interfacing this with Fuse at all?
[51:36.830 --> 51:37.230]  Fuse?
[51:37.330 --> 51:38.530]  Oh, that would be really interesting.
[51:38.890 --> 51:39.750]  Yeah, I think so too.
[51:40.830 --> 51:43.350]  But it sounds like you have more to suggest based on that.
[51:43.510 --> 51:46.210]  Oh, just as soon as you mentioned that this will...
[51:46.210 --> 51:50.510]  That once you remove the restriction, you could put 1.5 megabytes of data there.
[51:50.690 --> 51:51.590]  Oh, I see what you're saying.
[51:51.690 --> 51:52.810]  Yes, that's what I...
[51:52.810 --> 51:54.310]  That's one of the things I'm playing with right now.
[51:54.650 --> 51:55.090]  Let's make a file system.
[51:55.090 --> 51:56.390]  Yeah, exactly.
[51:56.870 --> 51:58.730]  PGPFS is one of the things I'm playing with, so...
[51:58.730 --> 51:59.230]  Great.
[51:59.650 --> 51:59.770]  Yeah.
[52:01.970 --> 52:05.330]  Not only a distributed file system, but other people back it up for you.
[52:06.290 --> 52:07.950]  Well, actually, one quick thing.
[52:08.150 --> 52:14.910]  Here's the funny part about it, is the grand total size of the SKS key server, when you download it, is about 5 gigs.
[52:14.910 --> 52:20.030]  So, when you upload a couple of megabyte files, you can see...
[52:20.970 --> 52:30.770]  If you can add a single gigabyte of random useless crap data to the key server, that adds, I want to say, 20% to the entire size of it.
[52:30.770 --> 52:35.090]  And this creates a number of interesting problems.
[52:35.350 --> 52:35.890]  Go on.
[52:36.470 --> 52:41.010]  To the person who asked about the alternatives for PGP things.
[52:41.330 --> 52:46.710]  So, one of the glaring problems for me is the massive amount of code in it.
[52:47.190 --> 52:47.230]  Yes.
[52:47.230 --> 52:51.110]  The massive complexity of RFC 4880.
[52:51.790 --> 52:52.350]  The...
[52:52.350 --> 53:04.650]  In particular, the massive complexity of the OpenPGP implementation of it is, in my opinion, unacceptable, for what I would want to use it for.
[53:04.970 --> 53:05.810]  And so, the question was...
[53:06.570 --> 53:07.290]  Thank you.
[53:08.490 --> 53:11.210]  The thing was, it depends what your glaring...
[53:11.210 --> 53:12.990]  What your definition of the glaring problems are.
[53:13.150 --> 53:15.090]  I want to see if I have something else, but keep going.
[53:15.330 --> 53:22.350]  There's also the web of trust, and exactly as you mentioned, the trust levels, and what do those actually mean.
[53:24.990 --> 53:25.790]  So, there's...
[53:27.130 --> 53:38.930]  A little while ago, in the OpenBSD community, they said, hey, we want to have verified integrity and authenticity of the software that we're distributing.
[53:38.930 --> 53:44.410]  And we don't want to have this massive thing, this...
[53:44.410 --> 53:45.630]  Well, GPL license, different...
[53:45.630 --> 53:45.730]  Anyway.
[53:46.190 --> 53:58.030]  We don't have this massive dependency in our trusted computing base of OpenPGP, because that would inflate the sheer amount of complexity by, I don't know, an order of magnitude or so.
[54:00.930 --> 54:11.630]  So, they took GGB's NACL, Assault, whatever, and wrote kind of a wrapper on that, and they called it Signify.
[54:12.090 --> 54:17.830]  So, it is about as simple as you can possibly get of a signing and verification utility.
[54:18.090 --> 54:19.110]  And that's all it does.
[54:19.470 --> 54:20.610]  That's all it will ever do.
[54:20.610 --> 54:22.890]  And it is small.
[54:23.130 --> 54:24.270]  I have read the entire thing.
[54:24.490 --> 54:31.010]  I have gone through the papers from GGB explaining the crypto and then walked through that.
[54:31.530 --> 54:36.170]  And which took, I don't know, like a couple weeks, but it's definitely a tractable thing.
[54:36.830 --> 54:37.750]  And then if you want encryption...
[54:38.210 --> 54:39.090]  So, that's just signing.
[54:39.270 --> 54:41.170]  That's as simple as it can possibly get.
[54:41.170 --> 54:46.970]  But if you want encryption, someone wrote this little tool called Reop.
[54:47.130 --> 54:49.270]  Same author, originally at least.
[54:50.190 --> 54:59.390]  Which stands for Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, which is basically the rest of Crypto Secret Box from SALT to do encryption.
[54:59.650 --> 55:09.750]  And so, there's this small community of people who have started taking this and kind of building a web of trust around it and using it for our emails and such.
[55:10.390 --> 55:19.270]  But signing, instead of being this massive B64 blob that you put on some key servers and doesn't really mean much anyway, and the web...
[55:19.270 --> 55:19.870]  Well, anyway.
[55:21.490 --> 55:22.010]  It's...
[55:22.010 --> 55:24.130]  You type a message of plain whatever.
[55:24.890 --> 55:27.850]  Text, human readable, hey, this is how I verified it.
[55:27.970 --> 55:29.490]  And you dump it on some place.
[55:31.830 --> 55:38.210]  And then you can verify with human readability that chain and what it actually meant at each stage.
[55:40.970 --> 55:41.550]  So, yeah.
[55:41.710 --> 55:50.350]  Small, minimal, BSD licensed, as small of a trusted computing base as you can possibly get for accomplishing roughly the same goals.
[55:50.470 --> 55:51.770]  There's Sinify and there's Reop.
[55:53.130 --> 55:53.330]  Cool.
[55:53.330 --> 55:57.330]  So, I just wanted to, like, kind of increase the awareness of the existence of those things.
[55:57.670 --> 55:57.790]  No, thank you.
[55:57.790 --> 56:03.730]  So, my one response comment to that, if you think GNUPG's source code is bad, you should read Vim.
[56:04.950 --> 56:05.950]  Uh, no thanks.
[56:07.410 --> 56:09.130]  There's a whole lot of if-def's in it.
[56:10.430 --> 56:11.490]  Your time is up.
[56:11.790 --> 56:12.530]  Oh, f*ck.
[56:12.690 --> 56:12.850]  Okay.
[56:13.690 --> 56:16.110]  Do we have any other people for open microphone?
[56:16.490 --> 56:18.370]  Okay, we have at least two.
[56:18.370 --> 56:20.750]  So, um, you're first.
[56:21.190 --> 56:21.910]  You're next.
[56:22.170 --> 56:24.330]  And for anybody else, you have up to 15 minutes.
[56:24.730 --> 56:25.370]  In the back.
[56:25.430 --> 56:25.850]  In the back.
[56:26.010 --> 56:26.750]  So, we have three people.
[56:26.750 --> 56:28.270]  We don't have a guitar tonight, do we?
[56:28.550 --> 56:30.690]  Well, the guitar is for talent show tomorrow.
[56:30.990 --> 56:32.310]  So, we'll save that.
[56:32.350 --> 56:33.230]  We saw your note.
[56:33.430 --> 56:33.610]  Yeah.
[56:34.510 --> 56:35.710]  We don't have a guitar though.
[56:38.330 --> 56:39.770]  Well, now I know my equipment works.
[56:41.950 --> 56:42.910]  Good night, everyone.
[56:44.310 --> 56:45.190]  Are you leaving us?
[56:45.370 --> 56:46.170]  I'm tired.
[56:46.390 --> 56:46.570]  Okay.
[56:46.810 --> 56:47.270]  Look at me.
[56:47.750 --> 56:48.930]  Lindsay's signing off for the night.
[56:49.030 --> 56:49.570]  Lindsay's leaving.
[56:49.790 --> 56:52.050]  By the way, I want to give a quick shameless plug.
[56:52.050 --> 56:57.250]  I'm doing a talk unrelated on anti surveillance policy stuff.
[56:57.410 --> 56:59.690]  We did in Oakland on Sunday at 3 p.m.
[56:59.810 --> 57:00.830]  So, you guys should check that out too.
[57:03.030 --> 57:03.790]  No Donald Trump.
[57:04.490 --> 57:05.230]  Oh, my God.
[57:06.110 --> 57:06.770]  One second.
[57:08.530 --> 57:09.590]  For a second, I thought...
[57:10.090 --> 57:10.790]  Hey, guys.
[57:10.810 --> 57:12.270]  I was getting drunk in the other room.
[57:12.570 --> 57:13.530]  But someone grabbed me.
[57:13.650 --> 57:14.910]  Because I heard we were talking about open PGP.
[57:15.150 --> 57:15.870]  And I'm super into that.
[57:17.170 --> 57:17.850]  My second phase.
[57:18.190 --> 57:18.770]  For, yeah.
[57:19.050 --> 57:21.010]  No, I mean like I've made a lot of terrible life decisions.
[57:21.010 --> 57:22.030]  This is one.
[57:25.070 --> 57:31.170]  And I was wondering if anyone talked about long or short key IDs and how they're like super terrible and no one should ever use them.
[57:31.690 --> 57:39.650]  Because for funsies, I collided the short ID of the hope signing key and uploaded it to keys over because I thought it was hilarious.
[57:40.910 --> 57:41.150]  And...
[57:41.150 --> 57:44.250]  So, just to comment on that, Michael Lee wrote...
[57:44.250 --> 57:46.790]  He did a talk a few years ago called Troll in the Web of Trust.
[57:46.890 --> 57:48.530]  And he actually wrote a tool to automate that.
[57:48.770 --> 57:48.930]  Yeah.
[57:48.930 --> 57:51.470]  And I've actually used that for a couple of funny, hilarious things.
[57:52.390 --> 57:52.870]  So...
[57:53.710 --> 57:54.410]  Ready to go?
[57:54.830 --> 57:55.310]  Yes.
[57:55.490 --> 57:55.730]  Okay.
[57:56.210 --> 57:57.570]  Now for something completely different.
[57:57.850 --> 57:58.390]  Good luck.
[57:59.730 --> 58:06.490]  So, how many people here have been following the elections or the primaries or whatever you want to call them?
[58:13.730 --> 58:14.210]  Jesus.
[58:15.010 --> 58:16.350]  No, I just like the steak.
[58:17.490 --> 58:18.870]  How about Hillary Clinton?
[58:20.050 --> 58:24.770]  So, one of those two people is going to be the president of the United States of America.
[58:25.410 --> 58:31.670]  And not a single person in this room seems to be at all on board with that.
[58:31.870 --> 58:32.750]  Just dying.
[58:33.310 --> 58:33.970]  Just dying.
[58:34.070 --> 58:36.650]  Does not stand a mathematical chance.
[58:36.790 --> 58:36.930]  Just dying.
[58:36.930 --> 58:37.710]  I'm sorry.
[58:37.710 --> 58:37.830]  I'm sorry.
[58:38.850 --> 58:40.710]  And there's a reason for that.
[58:40.790 --> 58:43.630]  And it's called first past the post.
[58:43.970 --> 58:46.090]  It's how we vote in this country.
[58:46.730 --> 58:55.090]  And before finance reform, before closed primaries, before anything else, that is what's standing between us and a representative government.
[58:55.090 --> 58:58.390]  But there are solutions to it.
[58:58.810 --> 59:01.530]  And they don't actually require going through Congress.
[59:01.930 --> 59:05.290]  Which means they can actually... you can do things with them.
[59:06.810 --> 59:13.730]  So, to start with, FTPT is what most people think of when they think of voting.
[59:14.190 --> 59:17.450]  Everyone can cast one vote for one candidate.
[59:17.730 --> 59:20.890]  And whatever candidate walks away with the most votes wins.
[59:20.890 --> 59:28.010]  And the electoral college sort of messes with things a little bit at the presidential level.
[59:28.270 --> 59:30.210]  But the basic rules stay the same.
[59:30.510 --> 59:33.190]  And this is a horribly flawed system.
[59:34.570 --> 59:36.770]  I cannot emphasize that enough.
[59:36.970 --> 59:41.650]  It's a system where the least popular candidate can win.
[59:41.650 --> 59:47.710]  If you picture an election where one candidate has 45% of the vote.
[59:48.010 --> 59:50.730]  One candidate has... and they're conservative.
[59:51.070 --> 59:54.430]  You have a liberal candidate with 35% of the vote.
[59:54.590 --> 59:59.010]  And you have a very liberal candidate with 20% of the vote.
[59:59.610 --> 01:00:03.170]  In that election, the conservative candidate will win.
[01:00:03.170 --> 01:00:08.130]  Because they have more than the second most people... second most candidates.
[01:00:08.510 --> 01:00:16.530]  But if you look at what the electorate is actually telling you, 55% of the people there want a liberal candidate of some stripe.
[01:00:16.950 --> 01:00:19.630]  The conservative is the least popular option.
[01:00:20.610 --> 01:00:23.690]  This is the concept of a spoiler candidate.
[01:00:24.190 --> 01:00:28.870]  Not too long ago, we had Gore and Nader stealing votes from each other.
[01:00:28.870 --> 01:00:31.090]  Before that, we had Barry Goldwater.
[01:00:31.470 --> 01:00:35.890]  And the problem is, the more candidates you have, the worse this gets.
[01:00:36.610 --> 01:00:39.470]  You don't really want a candidate winning with 20% of the vote.
[01:00:39.990 --> 01:00:41.570]  But that's what we can have.
[01:00:44.830 --> 01:00:45.830]  And some...
[01:00:45.830 --> 01:00:53.050]  So, if you have first-past-the-post voting, it will always drive towards two main parties.
[01:00:53.070 --> 01:00:54.930]  Because people cotton on to this.
[01:00:55.050 --> 01:00:57.190]  And they stop voting for third parties.
[01:00:57.190 --> 01:00:58.790]  And they vote for the lesser evil.
[01:00:58.950 --> 01:01:00.750]  Because the lesser evil might actually win.
[01:01:00.910 --> 01:01:03.250]  And it's still better than the absolute evil.
[01:01:04.870 --> 01:01:08.590]  And some people say primaries help mitigate this.
[01:01:08.850 --> 01:01:11.530]  That you can vote for whoever you want in a primary.
[01:01:11.890 --> 01:01:13.790]  But there's a lot of problems with that, too.
[01:01:14.390 --> 01:01:16.730]  First, it still fit first-past-the-post voting.
[01:01:17.570 --> 01:01:25.130]  And second, their primary is technically held by private organizations.
[01:01:26.030 --> 01:01:27.410]  So, that doesn't really work.
[01:01:27.690 --> 01:01:29.550]  It's a hack, and it's a bad one.
[01:01:30.830 --> 01:01:36.410]  And before I explain how to solve this, I feel I should talk about how we judge voting systems.
[01:01:36.710 --> 01:01:38.770]  There's five basic criteria we can look at.
[01:01:39.050 --> 01:01:48.690]  There's the majority criterion, which basically says, if you can straight-up win more than 50% of the vote, you should actually win.
[01:01:49.570 --> 01:01:51.050]  That's pretty straightforward.
[01:01:51.490 --> 01:01:53.870]  The next one is called the spoiler effect.
[01:01:54.090 --> 01:01:55.230]  I just talked about it.
[01:01:55.390 --> 01:02:01.490]  If a candidate isn't going to win, they should not cause another candidate to lose.
[01:02:02.590 --> 01:02:05.310]  Gore or Nader should not be able to cause the other to lose.
[01:02:05.990 --> 01:02:09.270]  They should not cause Bush to win.
[01:02:10.110 --> 01:02:12.310]  The next is called the center squeeze.
[01:02:12.850 --> 01:02:26.770]  It basically means that if you have a candidate that's ultimately the most popular, maybe they're everyone's second choice, but only a few people's first choice, they shouldn't get eliminated in an early round of voting.
[01:02:28.330 --> 01:02:35.010]  That's only a problem for some types of voting systems, and I'll get to that later.
[01:02:35.010 --> 01:02:38.070]  The next is called monotonicity.
[01:02:38.370 --> 01:02:48.270]  It's a very fancy name that basically means you should not be able to make things worse for your favorite candidate by actually listing them as your favorite candidates.
[01:02:48.930 --> 01:02:50.830]  Again, fairly self-explanatory.
[01:02:51.150 --> 01:02:52.190]  He's my favorite.
[01:02:52.430 --> 01:02:54.910]  I want him, so I'm not going to vote.
[01:02:55.110 --> 01:02:57.190]  Should be no one's response ever.
[01:02:58.290 --> 01:03:01.930]  And the final is called the later no harm criterion.
[01:03:01.930 --> 01:03:16.330]  Basically, it means that if you are ranking multiple candidates, giving points to a second or third favorite candidate should not actually hurt your most favorite candidates' odds.
[01:03:17.830 --> 01:03:27.290]  And there are a lot of alternative systems that address these criteria in different ways, and I have nowhere near enough time to go over them at all.
[01:03:27.290 --> 01:03:30.870]  So I am going to look at three of them very briefly.
[01:03:31.150 --> 01:03:33.530]  The first is called condorset voting.
[01:03:33.890 --> 01:03:40.310]  Basically, you rank your candidates, and then every candidate has a head-to-head matchup against every other candidate.
[01:03:40.790 --> 01:03:47.390]  And the degree of your ranking only matters between those two candidates, and you cannot rank a candidate if you want.
[01:03:47.750 --> 01:03:49.110]  And it works just fine.
[01:03:49.110 --> 01:03:55.670]  And a condorset winner is the winner who wins all of the matchups.
[01:03:56.170 --> 01:03:58.390]  And there usually will be a condorset winner.
[01:03:58.610 --> 01:04:01.730]  But one of the flaws of the system is sometimes there aren't.
[01:04:01.870 --> 01:04:03.550]  And then you need a fallback system.
[01:04:03.710 --> 01:04:04.830]  And you can do that.
[01:04:05.630 --> 01:04:07.050]  But pros and cons.
[01:04:07.710 --> 01:04:10.350]  Next is called range or score voting.
[01:04:10.350 --> 01:04:13.950]  Basically, think Amazon reviews, Netflix reviews.
[01:04:14.370 --> 01:04:15.870]  You get some sort of range.
[01:04:16.070 --> 01:04:17.050]  Negative one to one.
[01:04:17.230 --> 01:04:17.930]  One to a hundred.
[01:04:18.250 --> 01:04:18.830]  Five stars.
[01:04:19.110 --> 01:04:19.790]  Doesn't matter.
[01:04:20.910 --> 01:04:24.610]  And you assign as many candidates as you want a score.
[01:04:24.790 --> 01:04:26.690]  And you can assign multiple candidates to the same score.
[01:04:27.830 --> 01:04:30.670]  And the scores then get averaged.
[01:04:30.870 --> 01:04:32.590]  And whoever has the highest average wins.
[01:04:32.590 --> 01:04:38.630]  And you can do things like give every candidate a base number of scores.
[01:04:38.990 --> 01:04:42.270]  Like so, a hundred twos.
[01:04:42.710 --> 01:04:45.270]  Just to drown out loud minorities.
[01:04:46.690 --> 01:04:55.490]  So if one candidate only has two people voting for them, but they're both giving them five stars, you generally don't want that candidate to automatically win.
[01:04:57.270 --> 01:04:59.230]  But yeah, you can get around that.
[01:04:59.430 --> 01:05:05.410]  And approval voting is basically just range voting, but instead of giving them scores, you just say give them your vote.
[01:05:05.530 --> 01:05:06.750]  And whoever has the most vote wins.
[01:05:07.290 --> 01:05:09.270]  And you can vote for as many people as you want.
[01:05:10.050 --> 01:05:20.630]  And the last method that you see brought up a lot is called instant runoff voting or the alternative vote.
[01:05:20.790 --> 01:05:21.950]  It's very popular.
[01:05:22.130 --> 01:05:23.230]  You hear about it a lot.
[01:05:23.590 --> 01:05:31.330]  And it's almost as bad as first-past-the-post voting, largely because it will almost immediately evolve into first-past-the-post voting.
[01:05:31.330 --> 01:05:36.790]  It is the type of voting that is susceptible to the squeeze clause.
[01:05:37.150 --> 01:05:53.910]  Basically, if you have three people running, and you knock out the second most popular candidate first, because there are not many people's first choice, you can then have a less popular candidate win.
[01:05:53.910 --> 01:06:07.110]  And going off of that, you can actually help get a more preferable candidate to you by staying home and not voting, which is just terrible.
[01:06:09.510 --> 01:06:23.270]  But the good news is, with a lot of these, once you get passed, first-past-the-post voting and alternative votes, is in real-world scenarios, they all perform fairly well, actually.
[01:06:23.490 --> 01:06:28.490]  So if you want to start doing experiments in different states, go for it.
[01:06:28.690 --> 01:06:31.850]  And you're probably not looking at a bad, worst-case scenario.
[01:06:32.750 --> 01:06:40.750]  And as for what we can do, well, voting isn't controlled at the constitutional or federal levels, despite what some people think.
[01:06:40.750 --> 01:06:43.610]  It's entirely up to your state.
[01:06:44.050 --> 01:06:57.970]  Which means you can lobby state legislators, and you can push for ballot initiatives to try and get your state onto a different kind of voting, whether you favor Condorcet or range.
[01:06:59.050 --> 01:07:06.570]  And then for Senate and Congress, it doesn't really matter if you're using something different from other people.
[01:07:06.570 --> 01:07:12.010]  And for presidential, we can actually make use of the Electoral College to do something good for once.
[01:07:12.230 --> 01:07:14.510]  We can use it as a translator for different states.
[01:07:15.070 --> 01:07:21.650]  Just have a clause that says, until enough other people are using the system, we'll have this fallback.
[01:07:23.870 --> 01:07:47.730]  But the big thing is, if we want to start fixing our electoral system, we need to start raising awareness in our communities and with our local legislators, who do tend to be a lot more responsive than the ones off in Washington, about this issue, and about the fact that we actually care about it and want this to change.
[01:07:49.410 --> 01:07:51.170]  And that's it for my talk.
[01:07:51.410 --> 01:07:53.770]  So if you have any questions, please.
[01:08:00.990 --> 01:08:02.070]  We're screwed, right?
[01:08:04.710 --> 01:08:06.910]  I have one question about the...
[01:08:06.910 --> 01:08:07.550]  Oh, is that a question?
[01:08:07.770 --> 01:08:08.830]  No, it's just a statement.
[01:08:09.010 --> 01:08:09.230]  That's all right.
[01:08:09.690 --> 01:08:10.530]  No, you might want to...
[01:08:10.530 --> 01:08:11.830]  I think you're starting to answer it anyway.
[01:08:12.050 --> 01:08:12.450]  So that's all right.
[01:08:12.830 --> 01:08:13.190]  I'll...
[01:08:14.030 --> 01:08:15.250]  For a given definition.
[01:08:16.750 --> 01:08:19.210]  No, at least we don't have to deal with Washington gridlock.
[01:08:20.090 --> 01:08:20.870]  That's always good.
[01:08:21.650 --> 01:08:21.830]  Yeah.
[01:08:23.070 --> 01:08:25.350]  I have a question about the parameter space.
[01:08:25.510 --> 01:08:27.770]  It seems that you could model this.
[01:08:27.990 --> 01:08:30.170]  You could model all the variations computationally.
[01:08:30.170 --> 01:08:33.050]  And I wonder if that's been done and what it looks like.
[01:08:33.250 --> 01:08:34.490]  It has.
[01:08:34.630 --> 01:08:36.870]  And people do it in all different ways.
[01:08:37.510 --> 01:08:41.350]  There's a few groups who look at what they call Bayesian regret.
[01:08:41.930 --> 01:08:54.950]  And they try and rank the differences between an ideal candidate and how different candidates or how different systems will get close to that, either with sincere voting or tactical voting.
[01:08:55.170 --> 01:09:05.890]  For people who don't know, tactical voting is when you have something like, I'm going to vote for Hillary Clinton because I really don't want Trump to win.
[01:09:06.370 --> 01:09:12.330]  And voting for Jill Stein isn't going to help that happen.
[01:09:13.010 --> 01:09:14.210]  That's tactical voting.
[01:09:14.490 --> 01:09:19.370]  It's not what you want your populace to do, but some systems cause it.
[01:09:20.130 --> 01:09:25.910]  And ideally you want the range between a sincere voter and a tactical voter to be as small as possible.
[01:09:26.350 --> 01:09:26.670]  Yeah.
[01:09:26.810 --> 01:09:29.930]  I mean, the squishy human part is the part that...
[01:09:30.710 --> 01:09:32.450]  Again, I think you can parameterize it, right?
[01:09:32.590 --> 01:09:32.630]  Oh, yeah.
[01:09:32.630 --> 01:09:35.350]  But obviously it's going to be a big deal, especially if you get in a...
[01:09:35.350 --> 01:09:39.910]  I think we have some of this now, sort of voter disgust or voter disdain or, you know, whatever.
[01:09:40.130 --> 01:09:42.770]  People deciding not to vote for whatever reason.
[01:09:42.950 --> 01:09:44.430]  And these are things that, again, you can...
[01:09:44.430 --> 01:09:47.970]  I think you can parameterize, but those are things that...
[01:09:47.970 --> 01:09:49.010]  Like you can't...
[01:09:49.010 --> 01:09:50.570]  I'm sure you're thinking of this.
[01:09:50.710 --> 01:09:53.410]  You can never assume there's a logical voter, right?
[01:09:53.630 --> 01:09:55.610]  Actually, you can.
[01:09:55.810 --> 01:09:57.090]  That's like a rational consumer.
[01:09:57.230 --> 01:09:58.030]  Rational consumer.
[01:09:58.170 --> 01:09:59.170]  Like a rational consumer.
[01:09:59.310 --> 01:10:00.610]  Actually, it's the reverse.
[01:10:00.630 --> 01:10:02.390]  We see a lot of logical voters.
[01:10:02.690 --> 01:10:17.330]  That's why people aren't voting for third-party candidates, because they are logically looking at the numbers and saying, if I want something at least close to my preferences getting into office, I logically need to vote for one of the top two candidates.
[01:10:18.010 --> 01:10:26.870]  And some people don't do that, but they're either in safe states or they're in a very small minority, and they can't.
[01:10:27.270 --> 01:10:32.790]  They're like dissuaded by that logic because they don't feel like they'll have power.
[01:10:32.930 --> 01:10:35.170]  They won't have... they won't affect the process.
[01:10:35.470 --> 01:10:35.890]  Yeah.
[01:10:36.270 --> 01:10:41.270]  And we see when people think they might have power, when they might be able to affect the process.
[01:10:41.270 --> 01:10:44.370]  Like in the primaries this year, people were getting up in arms.
[01:10:44.510 --> 01:10:54.470]  People were all over the place, especially at least from what I was reading in the Democratic side, where, you know, it looks like you have a real choice between Bernie and Clinton.
[01:10:55.050 --> 01:10:59.330]  And with these systems, you don't need to have primaries to do that.
[01:11:01.370 --> 01:11:01.810]  Question?
[01:11:02.290 --> 01:11:02.510]  So, yeah.
[01:11:02.630 --> 01:11:07.350]  This is just a rephrasing of the first question, essentially, which is, are we f*cked?
[01:11:09.590 --> 01:11:10.690]  Are we f*cked?
[01:11:10.830 --> 01:11:11.390]  Are we f*cked?
[01:11:11.650 --> 01:11:12.530]  In the...
[01:11:13.410 --> 01:11:24.590]  I observed the Democratic platform getting passed, and they didn't really discuss electoral reform substantially to even this degree of depth.
[01:11:24.710 --> 01:11:25.650]  You only covered three things.
[01:11:25.870 --> 01:11:36.170]  What is the incentive for any established political party or political candidate, however local, to implement a more representative voting system?
[01:11:36.790 --> 01:11:39.510]  It seems like that would be inherently not in there.
[01:11:39.850 --> 01:11:45.790]  So, there's two answers to this, depending on how you want to go about it.
[01:11:46.110 --> 01:11:55.370]  In some states, there are things called ballot initiatives, where if you get enough signatures from citizens, it goes up for a vote, regardless of what the people in power want.
[01:11:55.370 --> 01:12:00.810]  So, in that case, the answer is, we don't really care what their incentives are.
[01:12:01.030 --> 01:12:01.750]  They don't get a say.
[01:12:03.430 --> 01:12:07.410]  And the other way is, if you can lobby a senator.
[01:12:08.090 --> 01:12:16.250]  And with local legislators, they tend to have to be more responsive, because, one, they have a lot less money going to them.
[01:12:16.250 --> 01:12:22.910]  So, if someone gets annoyed enough and wants to challenge them, one, their next election is coming up probably a lot sooner.
[01:12:23.670 --> 01:12:25.990]  And two, they're a lot easier to campaign against.
[01:12:25.990 --> 01:12:29.010]  You're not working against the entire democratic machine.
[01:12:29.190 --> 01:12:34.270]  You're not trying to pit yourself against Hillary Clinton or Trump.
[01:12:34.850 --> 01:12:39.650]  You're trying to pit yourself against this other very no-name guy, wherever you live.
[01:12:43.850 --> 01:12:44.650]  So, we're f*cked.
[01:12:45.210 --> 01:12:45.750]  We're f*cked.
[01:12:48.270 --> 01:12:48.730]  All right.
[01:12:48.910 --> 01:12:49.690]  Thanks very much.
[01:12:55.360 --> 01:12:55.920]  Next speaker.
[01:12:57.820 --> 01:12:59.180]  And do we have any more after that?
[01:12:59.540 --> 01:13:00.700]  We have one in the back.
[01:13:00.860 --> 01:13:01.000]  Okay.
[01:13:03.120 --> 01:13:04.460]  And are you waving your hand?
[01:13:04.700 --> 01:13:05.060]  Okay.
[01:13:05.200 --> 01:13:05.980]  So, we have two more.
[01:13:06.720 --> 01:13:07.400]  Anyone else?
[01:13:07.780 --> 01:13:08.140]  Okay.
[01:13:08.320 --> 01:13:11.040]  So, two more after this one here.
[01:13:11.640 --> 01:13:13.160]  And that's going to be our cutoff.
[01:13:13.840 --> 01:13:14.280]  All right.
[01:13:14.380 --> 01:13:15.040]  So, looks...
[01:13:15.920 --> 01:13:16.240]  Okay.
[01:13:16.960 --> 01:13:18.500]  This would actually go...
[01:13:18.500 --> 01:13:19.940]  You guys can sit over here now.
[01:13:20.140 --> 01:13:20.740]  Yeah, we should...
[01:13:20.740 --> 01:13:21.560]  Well, you should...
[01:13:21.560 --> 01:13:22.740]  It's a lopsided panel now.
[01:13:22.800 --> 01:13:23.680]  Let's all just move.
[01:13:23.820 --> 01:13:24.720]  We'll all move down one.
[01:13:25.180 --> 01:13:25.240]  Okay.
[01:13:25.280 --> 01:13:28.200]  So, like everyone else, I didn't really have a whole lot of time to...
[01:13:28.200 --> 01:13:28.660]  Yeah, let me sit down.
[01:13:29.200 --> 01:13:29.560]  Hi.
[01:13:29.960 --> 01:13:30.680]  Oh, wow.
[01:13:30.860 --> 01:13:31.180]  Okay.
[01:13:31.680 --> 01:13:34.500]  So, like everyone else, I didn't really have a whole lot of time to prepare for this.
[01:13:34.660 --> 01:13:35.880]  So, this would go better with pictures.
[01:13:36.600 --> 01:13:39.600]  And believe me, I have a ton of them come see me about that afterwards.
[01:13:39.600 --> 01:13:41.040]  If you're interested.
[01:13:41.360 --> 01:13:46.600]  But, I'm just going to go ahead and babble to you for about...
[01:13:52.020 --> 01:14:02.320]  Babble to you for 15 minutes about one of my more dorky hobbies or difficulties.
[01:14:02.800 --> 01:14:04.000]  I'm actually a pretty...
[01:14:04.000 --> 01:14:04.260]  Hi.
[01:14:04.400 --> 01:14:04.820]  I'm Dillow.
[01:14:05.420 --> 01:14:07.380]  I'm a pretty simple geek.
[01:14:08.780 --> 01:14:09.660]  I like robots.
[01:14:09.980 --> 01:14:10.500]  I like airplanes.
[01:14:10.660 --> 01:14:11.240]  I like dinosaurs.
[01:14:11.520 --> 01:14:12.740]  If it's not one, it's the other.
[01:14:12.880 --> 01:14:13.980]  And if it's not that, it's the other.
[01:14:15.180 --> 01:14:17.680]  How many people here flew to get to the conference?
[01:14:19.540 --> 01:14:20.080]  Okay.
[01:14:20.520 --> 01:14:23.240]  So, this is...
[01:14:24.140 --> 01:14:25.300]  I'm calling this...
[01:14:25.300 --> 01:14:25.900]  And this is like...
[01:14:25.900 --> 01:14:27.180]  I'm kind of trying this out.
[01:14:27.420 --> 01:14:31.020]  I'm thinking about maybe sending it to another conference as like a real talk.
[01:14:31.560 --> 01:14:32.480]  Plane spotting.
[01:14:32.620 --> 01:14:34.420]  Sniffing the global air transport network.
[01:14:35.820 --> 01:14:41.680]  When you got on your plane to come out here, you were part of a system.
[01:14:41.680 --> 01:14:51.400]  You got sucked into a network that had as its goal to get you as efficiently and quickly as possible from one end through the system out to the other.
[01:14:51.560 --> 01:15:05.560]  It's actually really pretty incredible when you think about it that there are thousands of people involved in making sure that you get from... to basically take care of you and make sure you get from point A to point B through point C.
[01:15:05.700 --> 01:15:06.400]  Oh, okay.
[01:15:06.540 --> 01:15:07.120]  All right.
[01:15:07.400 --> 01:15:07.920]  Yeah.
[01:15:08.180 --> 01:15:08.300]  Okay.
[01:15:08.300 --> 01:15:11.740]  So, through point C.
[01:15:11.920 --> 01:15:13.340]  And I can even talk like this.
[01:15:13.820 --> 01:15:14.980]  Through point C.
[01:15:15.840 --> 01:15:21.380]  And the security guys think of them as like the firewall, you know, packet assembly, disassembly, you're the packet.
[01:15:22.800 --> 01:15:24.540]  But that's like...
[01:15:25.680 --> 01:15:26.240]  So...
[01:15:26.240 --> 01:15:28.880]  And there's a lot behind that.
[01:15:29.060 --> 01:15:35.060]  And you can figure this out partially by downloading a bunch of apps.
[01:15:35.060 --> 01:15:55.980]  You can turn to technologies like ADS-B, which is the transponder... advanced transponder system for aircraft identifying themselves and identifying their call sign, the airline, their aircraft type, where they're going, their waypoints that they've been across,
[01:15:56.160 --> 01:15:56.800]  things like that.
[01:15:57.600 --> 01:16:09.040]  There is an app called LiveATC, which is streamed air traffic control voice traffic from pretty much any airport in the U.S.
[01:16:09.180 --> 01:16:10.380]  and other parts of the world.
[01:16:10.640 --> 01:16:15.500]  Or you can do what I do, which is a combination of all of those and actually go out to the airport and watch.
[01:16:15.500 --> 01:16:18.940]  And just watch the planes come and go and take off and land.
[01:16:19.540 --> 01:16:21.040]  And do that a couple times...
[01:16:21.040 --> 01:16:23.680]  And do that like I do a couple times a week over a couple years.
[01:16:23.740 --> 01:16:29.880]  And you start to get sort of like the ebb and the flow of when things happen, when things are out of the ordinary.
[01:16:30.760 --> 01:16:34.060]  Oh, look, there's the London flight just landing.
[01:16:34.200 --> 01:16:35.140]  Oh, look, there's the other one.
[01:16:35.280 --> 01:16:36.100]  Hey, wait a second.
[01:16:36.120 --> 01:16:37.300]  We've got a fourth London flight.
[01:16:37.440 --> 01:16:40.060]  United just added, you know, or like something I noticed this summer.
[01:16:40.300 --> 01:16:43.220]  British swapped out their 747s for triple sevens.
[01:16:43.220 --> 01:16:44.220]  They're retiring 747s.
[01:16:44.920 --> 01:16:48.620]  All airlines are dropping them because it turns out four engines are...
[01:16:49.200 --> 01:16:54.020]  Four engines are more complicated and more expensive to maintain than just two.
[01:16:55.920 --> 01:17:00.360]  So they added... they swapped out their 747 for a triple seven.
[01:17:00.560 --> 01:17:07.680]  And they added an A380 because San Francisco, which is where I'm from, SFO, is actually getting quite busy these days.
[01:17:09.280 --> 01:17:21.800]  So there's a lot behind this other than just kind of like dorky identifying tail numbers and, you know, 747, 432 from a 4330 or something like that.
[01:17:22.520 --> 01:17:26.520]  Frank Zappa once said, in order to be a real country, you need two things.
[01:17:26.520 --> 01:17:28.040]  You need a beer and an airline.
[01:17:30.180 --> 01:17:31.780]  And all airlines...
[01:17:31.780 --> 01:17:32.720]  I'm just going to say this right now.
[01:17:32.920 --> 01:17:36.720]  All airlines are a projection of state power.
[01:17:37.960 --> 01:17:40.460]  They're a very obvious symbol of state power.
[01:17:40.660 --> 01:17:45.620]  Pan Am was, for the U.S., the 50... you know, during the Cold War, Pan Am.
[01:17:46.500 --> 01:17:57.300]  There was actually a debate as to whether or not the president would fly on Pan Am versus Air Force One before there was actually really an Air Force One jet.
[01:17:57.460 --> 01:17:59.880]  It was that much of a symbol of America.
[01:18:01.140 --> 01:18:06.080]  All state airlines get state support from their governments, including the U.S.
[01:18:06.320 --> 01:18:10.300]  It's just in the U.S., we back them when they go bankrupt as opposed to when they're operating.
[01:18:11.820 --> 01:18:25.760]  So, anytime you see a plane, particularly international flights, like big prestige carriers like Lufthansa, British, Emirates, China Air, there's like five different Chinese airlines.
[01:18:26.840 --> 01:18:31.400]  Emirates, Qatar, Etihad, Virgin Atlantic...
[01:18:32.020 --> 01:18:32.620]  Alitalia?
[01:18:33.260 --> 01:18:37.800]  Alitalia, which is actually owned mostly by Etihad now, and we'll get to that in a minute.
[01:18:39.120 --> 01:18:48.880]  These are all, like, their countries are, you know, represented in one big huge piece of metal is that country.
[01:18:51.480 --> 01:18:59.320]  So, what do you see when you're, like I do, sit out at the airport and just continuously watch things come and go?
[01:19:00.040 --> 01:19:18.240]  I can tell you when the President is coming to San Francisco, because the Secret Service Advance team flies the limos out in a big C-17 transporter about a week before he actually shows up, because they have to secure the site and they have to secure the place that they're going to store the limos and the black vans.
[01:19:18.240 --> 01:19:21.340]  And they fly all of those out on a big huge C-17.
[01:19:21.680 --> 01:19:30.880]  So, if I see a C-17 sitting out at this little pad off to the side of the maintenance facility, check the newspapers, guess what?
[01:19:30.980 --> 01:19:32.720]  Obama's going to be in town in three days.
[01:19:36.800 --> 01:19:39.660]  There is... Turkey has been in the news a lot.
[01:19:39.780 --> 01:19:41.620]  Let's talk about Turkey for a minute.
[01:19:42.680 --> 01:19:48.060]  Erdogan, everybody knows, is quite... turning out to be quite the autocrat.
[01:19:49.300 --> 01:19:57.200]  He is on a... he's been on a campaign for a while to turn Turkey from a regional power into a global power.
[01:19:58.300 --> 01:20:02.380]  And that also includes Turkish Airlines.
[01:20:05.980 --> 01:20:24.460]  Erdogan has spent a lot of money, first of all, spent a couple hundred million dollars, a brand new shiny terminal at Ataturk Airport to expand out the capacity so that you could start having non-stop direct flights to global hubs like here in the U.S. and not just in Europe and not just in Asia.
[01:20:24.700 --> 01:20:34.840]  So, you could get a move away from like the A320s and the 737s and the A330s to A380s, triple sevens, really long range, ultra long haul.
[01:20:34.840 --> 01:20:47.920]  Not just the two and the three and the five hour flights that you get from going around Central Europe and Central Asia, but you can start racking those 15, 16 hour flights.
[01:20:49.140 --> 01:21:05.380]  So, now SFO, as of last year, has a non-stop from Istanbul to SFO on a 777-300, courtesy of the Turkish government, because the other thing that you do after you spend, you know, airport is you want flights to...
[01:21:06.600 --> 01:21:12.660]  you want, you know, the big traffic to fill all those new gates.
[01:21:12.880 --> 01:21:24.680]  And so, he spent a crap ton of money both on building out the current airport, building a new one, and also pouring a lot of money into expanding out Turkish Airlines.
[01:21:25.980 --> 01:21:33.360]  So, we have...last spring, April 2015, SFO started getting a non-stop flight from Istanbul.
[01:21:33.680 --> 01:21:34.460]  Why Istanbul?
[01:21:36.780 --> 01:21:37.500]  I don't know.
[01:21:37.640 --> 01:21:43.260]  This is one of the things about this being about power, is that a guy decides that he wants to do this.
[01:21:43.420 --> 01:21:45.540]  The government decides that they want to do that.
[01:21:45.540 --> 01:21:54.700]  Another example of this is Emirates Airlines, which is based in Dubai, part of the United Arab Emirates.
[01:21:55.000 --> 01:21:58.740]  They were flying into SFO for a number of years.
[01:21:58.760 --> 01:22:03.800]  They were the only Middle Eastern carrier that would fly into San Francisco.
[01:22:04.820 --> 01:22:06.540]  And they did it on 777.
[01:22:07.460 --> 01:22:18.420]  ETHOD, the one thing you have to understand about the Gulf carriers is, like everything else, they try to like out-compete and out-prestige each other at every possible point.
[01:22:18.780 --> 01:22:26.700]  If somebody has like gold leaf on their 777, they will make like an entire gold bath for their Airy 380.
[01:22:26.940 --> 01:22:32.980]  They have competed back and forth on who can have the most just opulent first-class interior.
[01:22:33.440 --> 01:22:35.100]  They don't even have seats anymore.
[01:22:35.240 --> 01:22:38.740]  They have entire cabins with your own butler and your own cook.
[01:22:40.920 --> 01:22:44.600]  So, Emirates was flying a 777 into San Francisco for a number of years.
[01:22:46.160 --> 01:22:50.640]  And I've got tons of pictures of that, and I watched it come and go, and I watched it come and go.
[01:22:50.880 --> 01:22:54.860]  And then one day, I noticed that, was it December?
[01:22:55.300 --> 01:22:57.580]  I think it was December 2014.
[01:22:57.720 --> 01:23:02.940]  I noticed that they brought in an A380, which is the largest commercial aircraft in the world.
[01:23:02.940 --> 01:23:10.620]  There's really no reason to bring an A380 into San Francisco from that far away.
[01:23:12.040 --> 01:23:14.260]  Lufthansa does it because they kind of have to.
[01:23:14.620 --> 01:23:19.860]  British does it because it's the summertime, but these kind of come and go, and then they go back to the smaller planes.
[01:23:20.180 --> 01:23:34.420]  Turns out that about a week or two before I saw that A380, Etihad, which is the state airline of Abu Dhabi, started flying a non-stop from Abu Dhabi into San Francisco.
[01:23:34.740 --> 01:23:42.820]  And they just cannot, cannot have that, you know, let that basically intrusion into their market kind of go unanswered.
[01:23:44.160 --> 01:23:54.240]  So, they're competing with each other, you know, and why are they coming to SFO?
[01:23:54.240 --> 01:23:57.400]  Turns out that the holding company...
[01:23:57.400 --> 01:23:59.700]  This is kind of one of the things that I found out.
[01:23:59.760 --> 01:24:03.020]  This is one of the things I do after I take the pictures and after I spot the plane.
[01:24:03.180 --> 01:24:13.780]  And I see something unusual, go off and look at the web, see when the flight was announced, see who's behind it, see what else is kind of going on.
[01:24:14.060 --> 01:24:24.060]  And it turns out the holding group for Emirates actually has an investment bank in Menlo Park, right smack in the middle of Silicon Valley.
[01:24:26.320 --> 01:24:38.880]  And there is an investment group from Abu Dhabi who has a VC firm and a bank and a bunch of legal offices, also in Menlo Park and Sunnyvale.
[01:24:39.420 --> 01:24:40.140]  Why?
[01:24:40.140 --> 01:25:10.800]  Because if you are a Gulf state and you are not totally, completely tied, if you're involved in oil but not totally, completely tied to oil, you know that the jig is up and you are very quietly and quickly beating your way towards the exit out of oil as a major source of your income and trying to diversify as rapidly as you can and get the billions and trillions of dollars you have stowed away out
[01:25:10.800 --> 01:25:16.380]  of the country as quick as you can into other investments before everything just completely goes south on being a petro economy.
[01:25:21.790 --> 01:25:23.330]  Why else should you do this?
[01:25:23.410 --> 01:25:26.390]  Because it's very hackerly and it's also kind of patriotic.
[01:25:27.550 --> 01:25:40.610]  We found out about the CIA rendition program where they're taking people from maximum security in Colorado and Utah and flying them to Bulgaria and places that were more morally flexible towards torture.
[01:25:41.010 --> 01:25:51.650]  We found out about that through plane spotters, through guys watching at their local airports, noticing Gulf Streams and 737s show up at small little regional airports.
[01:25:51.790 --> 01:25:54.710]  Sure, they had the runway, but you never saw that before.
[01:25:55.450 --> 01:25:58.270]  And so these guys are just, oh, hey, that's something interesting.
[01:25:58.670 --> 01:26:01.250]  I didn't know we could land a 737 here.
[01:26:01.610 --> 01:26:02.030]  Cool.
[01:26:02.270 --> 01:26:03.590]  Guy writes down the tail number.
[01:26:03.590 --> 01:26:07.450]  And there are websites like Planespotters.net.
[01:26:07.590 --> 01:26:09.410]  There's airliners.net.
[01:26:09.630 --> 01:26:22.670]  There's a bunch of different forums that you can participate in and which I'm signed up on where people post what they spotted and, you know, exactly down to like to the subtype and the model number and the tail number and everything.
[01:26:22.990 --> 01:26:24.930]  There is registrations, the FAA.
[01:26:25.270 --> 01:26:30.250]  You can go out and you can type in a tail number into the FAA registration database.
[01:26:30.250 --> 01:26:32.630]  Everybody has to have one, even the CIA.
[01:26:34.150 --> 01:26:35.730]  And it will tell you everything.
[01:26:35.850 --> 01:26:36.770]  It's like a car record.
[01:26:36.950 --> 01:26:40.990]  It's like a record when you look up to see like if the car you're going to buy is when it was in an accident.
[01:26:41.190 --> 01:26:43.590]  It has a whole history of the plane in there.
[01:26:43.690 --> 01:26:45.990]  And so these guys started writing down tail numbers.
[01:26:46.590 --> 01:26:50.770]  And they started showing up in really interesting places in really short amounts of time.
[01:26:50.770 --> 01:26:55.910]  You wouldn't think that it would make any sense for like if you're...
[01:26:56.890 --> 01:27:11.290]  Somebody is flying a Gulfstream charter and it leaves Utah and winds up in Sofia, you know, like 18 hours later, that less than 30 hours later would you be back in Utah or Colorado again.
[01:27:11.290 --> 01:27:17.630]  And it turns out that some of these planes were investigated.
[01:27:17.810 --> 01:27:19.490]  And there's a... you can Google this.
[01:27:20.090 --> 01:27:23.610]  There is... the Guardian actually has a really interesting article on it.
[01:27:24.190 --> 01:27:30.690]  But the long story short is some investigative journalists started noticing this.
[01:27:30.810 --> 01:27:33.070]  And some plane spotters contacted these guys.
[01:27:33.210 --> 01:27:34.270]  And they're like, hey, this is kind of unusual.
[01:27:34.450 --> 01:27:35.110]  What's going on here?
[01:27:35.110 --> 01:27:42.470]  It turns out that some of those jets are owned by say like ABC Aviation, which is a subcompany.
[01:27:42.670 --> 01:28:04.130]  You know, which is a wholly owned company of Bob's Aviation, which is, you know, wholly owned company of Jones Holdings, which you know, A1 rent, A1 aviation rentals, and shell company after shell company after shell company, that leads you right back to the CIA.
[01:28:05.810 --> 01:28:26.970]  And so a bunch of guys, a bunch of nerds watching airplanes, taking down tail numbers, all completely legal, all completely, you know, just engaged in their hobby, told us that the CIA was taking people out of this country, out of other Western countries,
[01:28:27.730 --> 01:28:33.750]  taking them to, you know, rendering them to places that were...
[01:28:34.390 --> 01:28:44.530]  more, you know, more amiable to, what is it, more direct measures of interrogation, or more intense measures of interrogation, and then flying them back.
[01:28:44.650 --> 01:28:47.230]  And this is going back and forth, and back and forth, and back and forth.
[01:28:47.410 --> 01:28:49.350]  So plane spotting is also patriotic.
[01:28:50.650 --> 01:28:58.090]  And these are, this is all from just sitting there watching things coming and going.
[01:28:58.270 --> 01:29:18.550]  It's sort of like if flight radar 24 and live ATC and flight stats, if those are sort of like the TCP dump of monitoring this network, then watching individual planes is sort of like picking through it with a filter.
[01:29:19.370 --> 01:29:24.390]  And that is... I have a ton of pictures I can show you if you want.
[01:29:25.750 --> 01:29:29.150]  That is pretty much about it.
[01:29:31.690 --> 01:29:32.830]  How am I doing for time?
[01:29:33.770 --> 01:29:35.230]  I'm pretty much up, I think.
[01:29:35.310 --> 01:29:35.610]  15.
[01:29:35.870 --> 01:29:36.010]  Yeah.
[01:29:36.470 --> 01:29:36.610]  Okay.
[01:29:36.770 --> 01:29:36.990]  All right.
[01:29:37.050 --> 01:29:37.750]  So I've had my 15.
[01:29:38.010 --> 01:29:38.530]  Any questions?
[01:29:39.990 --> 01:29:43.170]  Do you think they're using planes that are not normal...
[01:29:43.170 --> 01:29:43.570]  Microphone?
[01:29:43.890 --> 01:29:44.610]  Can you use the microphone?
[01:29:45.190 --> 01:29:46.190]  Can I use the microphone?
[01:29:46.370 --> 01:29:49.130]  So, the Concorde used to be the fastest plane that I knew about.
[01:29:49.250 --> 01:29:53.210]  Do you think that they're actually using technology that we don't know about to move?
[01:29:54.850 --> 01:30:01.670]  That would be, especially these days, that would actually be pretty hard to keep secret.
[01:30:07.110 --> 01:30:18.850]  20... almost 25 years ago, one of my first jobs out of college was I worked for a government contractor that had the air traffic control contracts for the FAA.
[01:30:18.850 --> 01:30:23.990]  I got to see a lot of that data when it was actually sensitive.
[01:30:24.350 --> 01:30:26.810]  It wasn't classified, but it was sensitive.
[01:30:27.870 --> 01:30:43.910]  And it would have been easier back then, but now because it's published out there, and it's live, and everybody has to have a transponder on your plane to essentially keep them from running into each other.
[01:30:44.430 --> 01:30:49.210]  Because even if you're on a secret government mission, you want to make sure that the other guys stay away from you.
[01:30:51.190 --> 01:30:58.910]  So, I think it's a lot harder now, especially because you could see...
[01:31:01.750 --> 01:31:02.950]  Somebody would find out.
[01:31:03.150 --> 01:31:10.110]  Somebody would look at the data coming through, and the data that hasn't been washed, or they would see it go overhead.
[01:31:11.350 --> 01:31:14.630]  And I think it's a lot harder now than it might have been.
[01:31:17.410 --> 01:31:19.330]  It's also really expensive.
[01:31:20.070 --> 01:31:22.750]  The Concorde was really, really expensive.
[01:31:22.750 --> 01:31:24.130]  It's really noisy.
[01:31:25.370 --> 01:31:37.430]  And they were... and as I was just saying, the CIA was able to completely carry this on with sort of general aviation, you know, corporate jets, talker sidleys, Gulfstreams, things like that.
[01:31:38.650 --> 01:31:39.570]  One more question?
[01:31:39.810 --> 01:31:41.510]  Do you know if Conair is still flying?
[01:31:43.330 --> 01:31:44.530]  I don't think so.
[01:31:46.330 --> 01:31:47.370]  Those are...
[01:31:50.820 --> 01:31:53.480]  Those tend to be done by state aircraft now.
[01:31:54.280 --> 01:32:05.520]  States have gotten a lot of money from the government, and a lot of surplus equipment, some of which has been general aviation aircraft.
[01:32:06.370 --> 01:32:06.840]  So...
[01:32:08.630 --> 01:32:10.960]  And they also tend to, like, bust them a lot.
[01:32:11.060 --> 01:32:12.280]  I don't think they're operational anymore.
[01:32:12.300 --> 01:32:15.120]  I think that kind of thing has gone away.
[01:32:17.550 --> 01:32:18.980]  But I can't be sure.
[01:32:20.250 --> 01:32:21.460]  Okay, thanks very much.
[01:32:21.460 --> 01:32:21.960]  Okay.
[01:32:22.160 --> 01:32:22.440]  Thank you.
[01:32:23.520 --> 01:32:23.960]  Yeah.
[01:32:24.180 --> 01:32:26.180]  And feedback, would you guys...
[01:32:26.180 --> 01:32:30.680]  Would you, just really quick, would you sit through this?
[01:32:30.720 --> 01:32:33.860]  And if it was, like, a more detailed with pictures...
[01:32:33.860 --> 01:32:34.020]  Yes.
[01:32:34.240 --> 01:32:35.820]  ...technical details kind of talk?
[01:32:36.000 --> 01:32:40.140]  Well, this is what hacking is all about, noticing things.
[01:32:40.560 --> 01:32:49.760]  And the things that other people think are a waste of time, and just figuring it out, figuring out a system, seeing what doesn't make sense, and exposing it.
[01:32:49.760 --> 01:32:52.020]  That's, you couldn't get more into the hacker world than that.
[01:32:52.120 --> 01:32:52.920]  So, yes, I think so.
[01:32:53.060 --> 01:32:53.620]  Okay, thank you.
[01:32:53.900 --> 01:32:54.100]  Yeah.
[01:32:54.660 --> 01:32:55.380]  Wait, don't go...
[01:32:55.380 --> 01:32:56.280]  Say it again?
[01:32:56.460 --> 01:32:58.000]  The First Amendment protects you.
[01:32:58.080 --> 01:32:59.220]  I used to be a stupid lawyer.
[01:32:59.380 --> 01:32:59.640]  Yes.
[01:32:59.680 --> 01:33:00.080]  Yes.
[01:33:00.260 --> 01:33:01.500]  This is totally legal.
[01:33:01.760 --> 01:33:05.080]  You can, as long as you are not, like...
[01:33:05.080 --> 01:33:20.860]  And this is the other thing, is I've gone into a lot of places, stood on parking garages, stood outside, train terminals, you know, tugged my head around gates and things like that, and never got caught, never got caught, never got caught.
[01:33:21.160 --> 01:33:22.300]  Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait.
[01:33:22.760 --> 01:33:23.160]  No.
[01:33:23.280 --> 01:33:24.340]  I just want to give some feedback.
[01:33:24.480 --> 01:33:26.160]  I think this is really, really interesting stuff.
[01:33:26.500 --> 01:33:30.120]  I grew up around several different airports in Seattle.
[01:33:30.260 --> 01:33:30.400]  Yeah.
[01:33:30.560 --> 01:33:35.960]  And there's a really, really, really big aircraft industry there people might be familiar with.
[01:33:35.960 --> 01:33:42.760]  And I noticed, you spoke, like, I thought of the Boeing aircraft holding companies.
[01:33:43.100 --> 01:33:43.200]  Yeah.
[01:33:43.340 --> 01:33:46.340]  Pretty much all of them are held by their own holding company.
[01:33:46.720 --> 01:33:49.160]  And they manage all the sales and leasing for that.
[01:33:49.460 --> 01:33:49.580]  Yeah.
[01:33:49.840 --> 01:33:54.300]  I also think of the Boeing Military Flight Center and the P3 Poseidons.
[01:33:54.620 --> 01:33:55.500]  You mentioned Turkey.
[01:33:55.940 --> 01:33:56.020]  Yeah.
[01:33:56.040 --> 01:33:58.280]  Turkey has one that's maintained by Boeing.
[01:33:58.900 --> 01:33:59.940]  Saudi Arabia does.
[01:34:00.160 --> 01:34:01.120]  Australia does.
[01:34:01.120 --> 01:34:03.800]  And I think that's it.
[01:34:04.300 --> 01:34:09.140]  I actually have a picture of a Turkish 737 AWACS.
[01:34:09.180 --> 01:34:09.580]  Brilliant.
[01:34:09.920 --> 01:34:12.620]  Flying into Boeing Field for service.
[01:34:12.800 --> 01:34:13.160]  Fully.
[01:34:13.360 --> 01:34:13.480]  Yeah.
[01:34:13.600 --> 01:34:14.380]  It's all maintained there.
[01:34:14.620 --> 01:34:14.840]  Okay.
[01:34:14.840 --> 01:34:15.600]  We have two more speakers.
[01:34:15.720 --> 01:34:17.580]  Let's do the speaker in the back first.
[01:34:17.600 --> 01:34:20.860]  And then we'll have the speaker from the side finish up.
[01:34:21.080 --> 01:34:24.520]  So the speaker in the back is still ready to go?
[01:34:24.660 --> 01:34:25.120]  That wasn't me.
[01:34:25.220 --> 01:34:25.960]  I just walked over here.
[01:34:26.140 --> 01:34:26.840]  Oh, that was you.
[01:34:26.920 --> 01:34:27.200]  Okay.
[01:34:27.420 --> 01:34:28.280]  Now you're in the front.
[01:34:28.420 --> 01:34:28.820]  Confusing.
[01:34:28.820 --> 01:34:29.500]  Okay.
[01:34:29.740 --> 01:34:30.820]  Well, now the speaker in the front.
[01:34:31.020 --> 01:34:32.100]  No, we only have two more speakers.
[01:34:32.360 --> 01:34:32.700]  No, it's not.
[01:34:33.120 --> 01:34:34.120]  Somebody dropped $20.
[01:34:34.540 --> 01:34:35.600]  Somebody dropped $20?
[01:34:36.220 --> 01:34:36.720]  Yeah, that's fine.
[01:34:37.080 --> 01:34:39.940]  Everybody rush towards the guy with the $20 now if you think it's yours.
[01:34:39.940 --> 01:34:40.560]  Did you see...
[01:34:41.300 --> 01:34:42.160]  How could it be yours?
[01:34:42.160 --> 01:34:42.940]  You're all the way over there.
[01:34:44.620 --> 01:34:47.340]  You should probably hang on to it for safekeeping.
[01:34:47.900 --> 01:34:48.280]  Try not...
[01:34:48.280 --> 01:34:49.480]  Invest it wisely.
[01:34:49.720 --> 01:34:50.820]  I don't know what this...
[01:34:50.820 --> 01:34:53.020]  I mean, you've been sitting there the whole time, right?
[01:34:53.200 --> 01:34:54.260]  No, I was sitting up there.
[01:34:54.380 --> 01:34:54.780]  I was watching.
[01:34:54.960 --> 01:34:55.260]  Oh.
[01:34:55.540 --> 01:34:58.540]  Well, it's your lucky day, I guess, unless somebody comes running back in here.
[01:34:58.540 --> 01:35:00.480]  I think, to the winner, the spoils.
[01:35:00.760 --> 01:35:03.940]  But if somebody reports $20 missing, go give it to them.
[01:35:05.250 --> 01:35:05.520]  Good.
[01:35:05.620 --> 01:35:06.460]  They'll hear this, though.
[01:35:06.580 --> 01:35:07.560]  Of course, they'll report it missing.
[01:35:09.160 --> 01:35:09.480]  All right.
[01:35:09.580 --> 01:35:09.760]  Go ahead.
[01:35:09.900 --> 01:35:10.000]  Sorry.
[01:35:10.580 --> 01:35:11.840]  We'll watch and see what's wrong, right?
[01:35:11.940 --> 01:35:12.580]  Can you guys hear me?
[01:35:14.180 --> 01:35:15.180]  Maybe a little bit closer, right?
[01:35:15.320 --> 01:35:15.580]  A little bit.
[01:35:15.580 --> 01:35:16.140]  Can you hear me now?
[01:35:16.140 --> 01:35:16.660]  Yes.
[01:35:17.420 --> 01:35:18.140]  Not too close.
[01:35:18.140 --> 01:35:18.520]  What happens is...
[01:35:20.600 --> 01:35:23.820]  The speakers project out, so if you...
[01:35:23.820 --> 01:35:25.920]  You don't have to get up too close and they'll be able to hear.
[01:35:26.340 --> 01:35:26.700]  Okay.
[01:35:26.960 --> 01:35:30.180]  Yeah, you won't hear yourself that loudly because the speakers are way up there.
[01:35:30.440 --> 01:35:30.760]  Fantastic.
[01:35:30.940 --> 01:35:31.040]  All right.
[01:35:31.040 --> 01:35:32.560]  Neither will us, but it'll be okay.
[01:35:32.820 --> 01:35:33.340]  I tested it.
[01:35:34.140 --> 01:35:35.920]  Someone yell out if it's not adequately loud.
[01:35:36.080 --> 01:35:36.560]  I think it'll be good.
[01:35:36.660 --> 01:35:37.700]  Greg figures out everything.
[01:35:38.140 --> 01:35:38.360]  All right.
[01:35:38.360 --> 01:35:38.720]  So, hi.
[01:35:38.860 --> 01:35:40.460]  I'm Kyle, and I have a problem.
[01:35:41.140 --> 01:35:45.240]  How would you play peer-to-peer poker without a trusted third party?
[01:35:47.050 --> 01:35:57.660]  So, if you wanted a deck that could be shuffled and encrypted, so neither player could look through the deck and see the order of the cards, that is actually a very difficult problem, and I don't have a solution.
[01:36:00.260 --> 01:36:05.320]  I can walk through a couple of dead ends, and I would love to get your thoughts if anybody knows an approach that I might have missed.
[01:36:06.100 --> 01:36:12.420]  The first naive approach is for both players to just XOR a key with each card individually.
[01:36:13.380 --> 01:36:21.720]  Unfortunately, if you use the same key for every card, as soon as you decrypt one card, all the other cards could be decrypted.
[01:36:22.280 --> 01:36:31.980]  And if you used a different key for every card, then as soon as you decrypted a card, you would know which one you handed your opponent or the other player.
[01:36:32.140 --> 01:36:33.780]  So, you can't just XOR a card.
[01:36:36.300 --> 01:36:43.120]  So, the reason that would work better than the other ones is because that one, the order of decryption doesn't matter if you're XORing.
[01:36:46.600 --> 01:37:00.740]  The other solution that one might want to try is having two decks of cards, and having one person encrypt one deck first and have the other person encrypt a second deck first, and then swapping.
[01:37:01.290 --> 01:37:08.560]  You can't swap right away because then you've got the encryption with the order of the cards, and then you know what the encryption looks like.
[01:37:09.380 --> 01:37:17.580]  So, you have to somehow shuffle the cards, but if you shuffle the cards different from the way your opponent shuffles them, now the two decks don't match, and they are of no use to you.
[01:37:18.660 --> 01:37:25.480]  So, you would need some sort of asymmetric key that the order of decryption doesn't matter.
[01:37:25.680 --> 01:37:29.880]  So, there is some sort of solution somewhere with some sort of three-pass protocol or something.
[01:37:30.300 --> 01:37:32.100]  And I have no idea what it is.
[01:37:32.840 --> 01:37:33.360]  Yes?
[01:37:34.980 --> 01:37:35.940]  Microphone, please.
[01:37:35.940 --> 01:37:36.500]  Right.
[01:37:38.940 --> 01:37:42.160]  I've spent a fair amount of time thinking about this problem, and I've asked a couple of people.
[01:37:42.280 --> 01:37:42.920]  I'd love to hear what you thought.
[01:37:43.120 --> 01:37:56.500]  So, rather than have an actual deck, why not get a noise source, maybe mouse movement from both players, or something like that, and use it to generate each card individually.
[01:37:57.300 --> 01:38:08.060]  And if it generates a card that's... and you can have a database of cards that have already been generated, and have it check against those, maybe with its own key that neither player has.
[01:38:08.580 --> 01:38:09.580]  Check against those.
[01:38:09.680 --> 01:38:12.780]  If it's already generated, run the process again until it gets a new card.
[01:38:13.160 --> 01:38:14.960]  And then, give out that card.
[01:38:15.920 --> 01:38:17.520]  So, there is no deck to check.
[01:38:18.820 --> 01:38:21.380]  So, just generate each card as it comes up?
[01:38:21.520 --> 01:38:21.780]  Yes.
[01:38:23.580 --> 01:38:24.540]  That's a...
[01:38:25.820 --> 01:38:28.020]  Which computer would you generate cards on?
[01:38:29.200 --> 01:38:30.280]  Is there a way of...
[01:38:30.280 --> 01:38:33.820]  I would say give both computers the same algorithm.
[01:38:33.820 --> 01:38:37.060]  But have the noise source come from both computers.
[01:38:46.490 --> 01:38:47.850]  Could you repeat what he's saying?
[01:38:48.570 --> 01:38:54.050]  He said you could generate two different decks on either side with different seeds and then exchange them.
[01:38:57.530 --> 01:38:58.670]  Sorry, say that one more time?
[01:38:59.250 --> 01:39:05.750]  Yeah, he suggested you could generate two different decks on either side with different seeds and then exchange them.
[01:39:06.210 --> 01:39:08.230]  Exchange... you've got two different decks then, right?
[01:39:08.250 --> 01:39:10.390]  Yeah, I'm not actually sure how that works.
[01:39:11.530 --> 01:39:14.430]  No, no, you want one deck shared between two people.
[01:39:14.570 --> 01:39:26.250]  Your suggestion was basically a combinatorial problem where you're going to simply select randomly without replacement until all 52 permutations have been identified.
[01:39:26.590 --> 01:39:29.530]  So it's not quite the same as shuffling a virtual deck.
[01:39:29.730 --> 01:39:32.270]  It's basically working through a permutation space, I think.
[01:39:32.350 --> 01:39:33.210]  I don't know if that's what I heard.
[01:39:33.490 --> 01:39:37.050]  Yeah, and you technically wouldn't have any shuffling in my thing because there is no deck.
[01:39:37.270 --> 01:39:38.130]  Well, you wouldn't actually have a deck.
[01:39:38.290 --> 01:39:38.370]  Yeah.
[01:39:38.370 --> 01:39:43.010]  You would just keep doing random selection until you identified all, you know, 52 cards or any cards.
[01:39:43.010 --> 01:39:44.170]  Or until you don't need any more.
[01:39:44.390 --> 01:39:44.550]  But yeah.
[01:39:45.310 --> 01:39:45.610]  All right.
[01:39:46.250 --> 01:39:46.650]  Thank you.
[01:39:46.830 --> 01:39:47.250]  All right.
[01:39:47.310 --> 01:39:47.830]  This is a problem.
[01:39:48.570 --> 01:39:49.310]  Did that help?
[01:39:49.430 --> 01:39:50.950]  Was that useful?
[01:39:51.990 --> 01:39:52.530]  I suppose.
[01:39:52.530 --> 01:39:53.230]  Gave you some ideas?
[01:39:53.390 --> 01:39:53.650]  All right.
[01:39:53.790 --> 01:39:54.050]  Good.
[01:39:54.210 --> 01:39:54.770]  Thanks for sharing.
[01:39:56.090 --> 01:39:56.490]  Thanks.
[01:40:00.780 --> 01:40:02.100]  Is our final speaker ready?
[01:40:13.760 --> 01:40:14.160]  Hello.
[01:40:14.920 --> 01:40:15.440]  Go ahead.
[01:40:15.760 --> 01:40:16.020]  Hey.
[01:40:16.500 --> 01:40:17.520]  I'm Mark Newell.
[01:40:17.520 --> 01:40:22.720]  I'm from the Oakland Hackerspace Suderoom and the Oakland Biohackerspace Counterculture Labs.
[01:40:24.040 --> 01:40:27.440]  I just wanted to briefly mention a few projects we have going on there.
[01:40:28.380 --> 01:40:31.240]  And one of them is a mesh network.
[01:40:31.540 --> 01:40:35.320]  How many of you have participated in a mesh network at some point?
[01:40:36.880 --> 01:40:37.240]  Okay.
[01:40:37.400 --> 01:40:37.540]  A few.
[01:40:39.100 --> 01:40:39.460]  Yeah.
[01:40:39.580 --> 01:40:43.440]  So we started this mesh network we started working on about three years ago.
[01:40:43.680 --> 01:40:45.280]  There's a lot of people who worked on mesh networks.
[01:40:45.520 --> 01:40:48.980]  There's quite a few of them around the world, very few active ones in the U.S.
[01:40:49.100 --> 01:40:49.380]  right now.
[01:40:50.060 --> 01:40:51.200]  Quite a few defunct ones.
[01:40:53.380 --> 01:40:57.540]  There's a lot of misconceptions out there about what a mesh network is and what it can be.
[01:40:58.180 --> 01:41:04.720]  So I wanted to just briefly touch on some of the innovations that we have implemented in our network.
[01:41:04.860 --> 01:41:05.800]  And not all of them are ours.
[01:41:05.880 --> 01:41:07.460]  Many of them are borrowed from around the world.
[01:41:07.960 --> 01:41:11.140]  A lot of them are from the Slovenian mesh network, VLAN Slovenia.
[01:41:12.640 --> 01:41:15.020]  So basically, mesh networks are hard to do.
[01:41:15.680 --> 01:41:22.800]  They're especially hard to do if you want them to be fast and basically be a viable replacement for last mile connectivity.
[01:41:24.500 --> 01:41:32.080]  We started this project called the People's Open Network in the San Francisco East Bay because there's a lot of people who don't have connectivity or have poor connectivity.
[01:41:32.780 --> 01:41:34.660]  And connectivity is way too expensive.
[01:41:34.800 --> 01:41:46.880]  So we're trying to solve the problem of how can a small group of people using open source and off-the-shelf hardware connect, basically provide last mile-to-mile connectivity for a large urban area.
[01:41:47.180 --> 01:41:58.240]  Lots of people who may not have technical knowledge and kind of compete with the existing solutions, maybe even get it to a point where people, most people don't pay anything to be online.
[01:41:59.900 --> 01:42:02.460]  Turns out that getting critical mass on a mesh network is really hard.
[01:42:03.520 --> 01:42:04.440]  Wi-Fi is limited.
[01:42:04.720 --> 01:42:05.100]  You don't...
[01:42:05.100 --> 01:42:09.340]  It's hard to get connectivity because you basically need line of sight for most connections.
[01:42:09.700 --> 01:42:12.220]  So when you're starting out, you...
[01:42:12.220 --> 01:42:13.260]  It's hard to get people on.
[01:42:13.260 --> 01:42:16.180]  Everyone wants to join the network, but no one can see anyone else's node.
[01:42:16.640 --> 01:42:18.040]  Like, no one has line of sight to anyone.
[01:42:19.560 --> 01:42:26.520]  So solving that problem, getting people excited about running a single node that's not connected to anything, that's the first thing to solve.
[01:42:26.720 --> 01:42:41.380]  And the solution that other people came up with and we've re-implemented in our own fashion is let, since a lot of people do have Internet connectivity and a lot of people who are interested in working on that kind of stuff and get excited about it early have Internet already.
[01:42:41.380 --> 01:42:42.640]  Just kind of cheat.
[01:42:43.060 --> 01:42:48.860]  Just have everyone mesh via the Internet via VPN until you can get the actual mesh working.
[01:42:49.160 --> 01:42:57.540]  And that has the bonus that every time you get someone on the mesh that has their own connectivity, you can... they can share it with the world.
[01:42:57.820 --> 01:43:01.480]  So every new node... in the beginning you're not building a mesh.
[01:43:01.480 --> 01:43:08.700]  You're building a collection of... of like mesh nodes that aren't meshing over the Internet.
[01:43:09.000 --> 01:43:10.160]  But basically they're just hotspots.
[01:43:10.280 --> 01:43:13.660]  So you're setting up free hotspots across the city that don't talk directly to each other.
[01:43:13.800 --> 01:43:14.960]  They talk over the Internet.
[01:43:15.100 --> 01:43:15.820]  The Internet goes down.
[01:43:15.980 --> 01:43:16.500]  There's nothing.
[01:43:16.500 --> 01:43:16.560]  There's nothing.
[01:43:17.180 --> 01:43:19.400]  But then you start broadcasting your SSID.
[01:43:20.460 --> 01:43:22.840]  And that's a... that's a nice free advertising.
[01:43:23.100 --> 01:43:25.440]  You're... people are walking around and, oh, there's free Wi-Fi here.
[01:43:25.580 --> 01:43:26.300]  There's no password.
[01:43:26.500 --> 01:43:26.720]  Right?
[01:43:26.900 --> 01:43:27.340]  That's cool.
[01:43:27.740 --> 01:43:30.300]  And then start maybe accessing the website and seeing what you're doing.
[01:43:30.580 --> 01:43:34.980]  We've got a few people who showed up for our weekly meetups just because they saw SSID.
[01:43:36.820 --> 01:43:38.100]  That adds some problems, of course.
[01:43:38.240 --> 01:43:41.620]  People are not happy about sharing their Internet connectivity.
[01:43:41.620 --> 01:43:43.360]  And there's a few reasons why.
[01:43:43.680 --> 01:43:46.760]  The first one is, what if someone does something bad on my connection?
[01:43:46.980 --> 01:43:47.680]  Do I get in trouble?
[01:43:48.020 --> 01:43:48.440]  Do I have to...
[01:43:48.440 --> 01:43:52.620]  Even if I don't get in trouble, do I have to deal with bullshit like DMCA takedown notices?
[01:43:53.160 --> 01:43:53.500]  How do I...
[01:43:53.500 --> 01:43:54.560]  No one wants to deal with that.
[01:43:55.000 --> 01:44:02.180]  So the solution is that we, as an organization, we're trying to make this as non-hierarchical as possible.
[01:44:02.380 --> 01:44:03.180]  So we're...
[01:44:03.180 --> 01:44:03.620]  If we...
[01:44:03.620 --> 01:44:05.940]  Someone takes down our organization, doesn't take down the mesh.
[01:44:06.940 --> 01:44:13.580]  So the solution is, someone, anyone, but currently us, runs one of these VPNs.
[01:44:14.220 --> 01:44:18.360]  And then when people connect to a hotspot, all the traffic goes through the VPN.
[01:44:19.560 --> 01:44:23.060]  So people get these mesh nodes, stick in their homes, they create hotspots.
[01:44:23.120 --> 01:44:25.320]  When people connect, all the traffic goes through our VPN.
[01:44:25.960 --> 01:44:28.140]  We get DMCA takedown notices, just got one today.
[01:44:28.780 --> 01:44:33.020]  We send a nice form letter based on the one that Tor has for people to use as a template.
[01:44:33.820 --> 01:44:38.040]  I'm trying to automate that right now so we don't have to actually manually answer all the DMCA takedown requests.
[01:44:38.380 --> 01:44:42.760]  If there's a more serious inquiry, we just say like, sorry, we're basically like a Tor node.
[01:44:43.060 --> 01:44:44.300]  We don't log anything.
[01:44:44.300 --> 01:44:45.360]  We're just relaying.
[01:44:45.440 --> 01:44:46.600]  And then they have to back off.
[01:44:46.820 --> 01:44:50.740]  And the EFF has a nice page on their openwireless.org, I believe it is.
[01:44:50.860 --> 01:44:54.240]  They have a nice page about how that's basically...
[01:44:54.240 --> 01:44:56.820]  You're basically protected in the U.S. and you don't have to log.
[01:44:57.160 --> 01:44:59.240]  And you can just say, well, we don't log, sorry.
[01:45:01.120 --> 01:45:01.920]  So that's great.
[01:45:02.460 --> 01:45:07.220]  Then the next thing that people worry about is bandwidth, if people are going to take all my bandwidth.
[01:45:07.780 --> 01:45:09.980]  So we just limit the bandwidth usage.
[01:45:10.200 --> 01:45:12.340]  And the nice thing about having a VPN is that...
[01:45:12.340 --> 01:45:23.440]  So one of the problems with limiting bandwidth usage is when you're having downstream traffic coming in, it's hard to limit that because if you're limiting at the Wi-Fi router after the DSL modem, then it's...
[01:45:23.440 --> 01:45:25.920]  You're trying to limit something after it reached you.
[01:45:26.000 --> 01:45:26.440]  That's hard.
[01:45:27.980 --> 01:45:31.200]  So if you have VPN, you can actually do really good limiting.
[01:45:31.400 --> 01:45:36.840]  Because you can sell the VPN to limit the stream before it even hits the hot spot.
[01:45:37.080 --> 01:45:40.340]  So you have really good bandwidth limitations.
[01:45:40.540 --> 01:45:52.120]  There are some really good patches to OpenWRT that make it actually much better than most people's home routers at dealing with the problems like someone's torrenting like crazy, and someone wants to do voice over IP, and the latency goes up.
[01:45:52.500 --> 01:45:53.860]  There's been a lot of work on that.
[01:45:54.640 --> 01:45:58.260]  And that means that these hot spots, they work really well for people.
[01:45:58.560 --> 01:45:59.340]  They don't...
[01:45:59.340 --> 01:46:01.840]  You can share just like a megabit or something.
[01:46:02.060 --> 01:46:05.960]  Just enough that people can get basic connectivity, and it doesn't affect your experience at home.
[01:46:07.500 --> 01:46:09.260]  So that's the bootstrapping method.
[01:46:10.120 --> 01:46:11.600]  And then there's another thing.
[01:46:12.300 --> 01:46:14.980]  How do you get people to actually invest in the gear?
[01:46:15.200 --> 01:46:16.640]  Now, it's not like super expensive gear.
[01:46:16.760 --> 01:46:25.700]  In fact, we got a lot of routers off of Woot from Western Digital that were being sold for $10 a pop because they stopped selling network gear and decided to go out of that business.
[01:46:26.880 --> 01:46:27.740]  Very nice ones.
[01:46:28.040 --> 01:46:30.840]  And we've been reselling those at about cost.
[01:46:31.740 --> 01:46:38.500]  So that's not a big investment, but going forward, it might become more expensive, especially there's some problems with the FCC trying to lock down some of the stuff.
[01:46:38.680 --> 01:46:45.320]  So we're having to go out and buy more expensive stuff, and we might have to, you know, for a while, we might have to use some different gear.
[01:46:45.440 --> 01:46:48.260]  So anyway, how do you get people to do the initial investment?
[01:46:48.500 --> 01:46:51.260]  Well, people upgrade their Wi-Fi equipment all the time.
[01:46:51.360 --> 01:46:55.080]  A lot of people have shitty Wi-Fi at home, or they aren't dissatisfied with the coverage or something like that.
[01:46:55.080 --> 01:47:05.220]  So what you tell them is just, well, you know, you can do as many virtual networks on one of these as you want, if you have a good chipset, a good Wi-Fi chipset that supports that.
[01:47:05.440 --> 01:47:12.420]  So we just added a private Wi-Fi SSID where you set your WPA2 password, and it works exactly like a normal router.
[01:47:12.600 --> 01:47:14.620]  It just works in parallel with all the mesh stuff.
[01:47:14.860 --> 01:47:17.400]  So when people ask us, hey, what new router should I get?
[01:47:17.580 --> 01:47:18.200]  Well, you get ours.
[01:47:18.480 --> 01:47:19.820]  You don't have to use the mesh stuff.
[01:47:19.840 --> 01:47:20.500]  It's just there.
[01:47:20.500 --> 01:47:22.320]  You can choose not to share your Internet.
[01:47:24.420 --> 01:47:29.940]  So that kind of negates the cost of the initial investment because, man, you needed a Wi-Fi router anyway.
[01:47:32.280 --> 01:47:37.620]  Then the next problem is that Wi-Fi meshes or meshes suck.
[01:47:37.860 --> 01:47:46.160]  Like people have this conception that meshes are really bad because the traditional notion of a mesh network is that they operate on one channel.
[01:47:46.160 --> 01:47:52.500]  And that means that every time you get a message, everyone around you has to shut up while you're receiving the message or the packet.
[01:47:52.700 --> 01:47:58.160]  And then when you want to send out the packet to the next one, to the next node, everyone has to shut up while you're sending the packet to the next node.
[01:47:58.360 --> 01:48:05.120]  That means that you actually, every node you add in the network, you're degrading the bandwidth, and the latency you get is worse.
[01:48:06.080 --> 01:48:07.680]  So, yeah, mesh networks suck.
[01:48:07.860 --> 01:48:11.480]  But that's because you're using one channel, and that's terrible.
[01:48:11.760 --> 01:48:13.760]  You should never do a mesh network with one channel.
[01:48:13.760 --> 01:48:16.460]  You should do a mesh network with multiple channels on different frequencies.
[01:48:16.780 --> 01:48:26.160]  And we have these things called dual band routers now, so we just decided straight off the bat that we're never going to give anyone a mesh router that doesn't have at least two channels on different frequencies.
[01:48:28.020 --> 01:48:34.400]  And then in addition to that, we made it really easy for people to add on single channel radio nodes.
[01:48:34.700 --> 01:48:44.460]  And they're in these nice off-the-shelf pieces of equipment from Ubiquiti and Microtic and different companies like this that are very inexpensive, down to like $50 for a directional high-speed node.
[01:48:44.820 --> 01:48:47.900]  So we made a system whereby you can buy these, flash them with our firmware.
[01:48:48.200 --> 01:48:51.600]  You don't even need to configure them, you just flash the same firmware on all of them.
[01:48:51.600 --> 01:49:00.580]  When you then hook them in with an Ethernet cable to your basic home node, they just get kind of slaved to the home node and act as extender nodes.
[01:49:00.700 --> 01:49:01.820]  They act as extra antennas.
[01:49:01.960 --> 01:49:04.860]  So you get two antennas to begin with, but you can add more.
[01:49:05.260 --> 01:49:08.780]  And there are nice mesh routing protocols right now.
[01:49:08.900 --> 01:49:11.060]  Like, we're using one called Babel out of France.
[01:49:11.320 --> 01:49:14.600]  And it actually understands the different channels.
[01:49:14.600 --> 01:49:23.600]  So if it's receiving something on one channel, and it can see the node that it needs to forward to on multiple channels, it'll pick the one that it's not receiving on.
[01:49:24.040 --> 01:49:25.060]  So it's intelligent.
[01:49:25.760 --> 01:49:27.300]  It'll... latency goes down.
[01:49:27.560 --> 01:49:30.380]  Latency is the speed that you can forward with.
[01:49:31.240 --> 01:49:36.040]  Based on the hardware or not, there's no inherent problem with waiting for the channel to clear up.
[01:49:39.200 --> 01:49:44.000]  Of course, you know, it's still difficult to get the links up and get people's houses connected.
[01:49:44.180 --> 01:49:48.600]  We've been doing stuff like getting these telescoping aluminum flagpoles from Harbor Freight that go up 25 feet.
[01:49:48.720 --> 01:49:49.560]  They're like 60 bucks.
[01:49:49.680 --> 01:49:51.420]  You strap them to someone's, like, fence or something.
[01:49:51.660 --> 01:49:55.520]  And then you strap a node to them and you telescope them up, and then suddenly you have a better link.
[01:49:55.700 --> 01:50:00.020]  But, yeah, basically those are the things that we're doing to make mesh networks more viable.
[01:50:01.500 --> 01:50:10.640]  We're trying right now to get some high-speed bandwidth pipe into our mesh to see if we can get a gigabit connection, get some people pooling money together.
[01:50:10.820 --> 01:50:14.400]  We can start providing people real connectivity that is an alternative to Comcast.
[01:50:14.680 --> 01:50:26.360]  Right now we have a few, like, Comcast and AT&T lines that are fairly high speed, close to where they have their, what do you call them, DSLAMs, stuff like that.
[01:50:26.540 --> 01:50:29.600]  And we're just kind of sharing them amongst a few people.
[01:50:30.180 --> 01:50:39.640]  But it would be great to get to the point where we get, like, Hurricane Electric gigabit speed, like, I think they're like $400 a month line, and piped into the mesh.
[01:50:39.800 --> 01:50:42.480]  The problem is that we don't have anyone who's willing to sell us cheap bandwidth.
[01:50:42.820 --> 01:50:46.320]  You'd think in the Bay Area that wouldn't be a problem near where we are.
[01:50:47.060 --> 01:50:56.760]  So if anyone knows how to do that, they had hookups to where we could get affordable bandwidth from someone who's non-evil, or at least less evil, that would be great.
[01:51:01.820 --> 01:51:03.040]  Yeah, maybe I'm out of time.
[01:51:04.180 --> 01:51:04.540]  Close.
[01:51:05.000 --> 01:51:07.620]  Yeah, I mean, you're getting out of time.
[01:51:07.700 --> 01:51:09.040]  But I have a question about the VPN.
[01:51:09.380 --> 01:51:14.320]  So commercial VPN concentrators are pretty expensive hardware items.
[01:51:14.840 --> 01:51:19.680]  I was going to ask what you're using if you had a cheaper software solution, but it sounds like you don't actually have that much bandwidth.
[01:51:19.860 --> 01:51:21.760]  So you might just be using a server-side solution.
[01:51:21.760 --> 01:51:23.880]  But I was curious about the VPN concentrate.
[01:51:23.960 --> 01:51:32.720]  Yeah, so our solution is that right now we don't have that many users, so we're using just a single dedicated server, and we're also using very thin VPN protocol.
[01:51:33.040 --> 01:51:36.120]  Because we don't care about security, really, or authentication, at least.
[01:51:36.420 --> 01:51:39.700]  And we don't care about encryption, because people should be making their own end-to-end encryption.
[01:51:39.900 --> 01:51:47.940]  So we just have a link that anyone can... it's a VPN endpoint using the L2TP protocol, which is built into the kernel, so it's really, really efficient.
[01:51:48.960 --> 01:51:57.760]  So the people in Slovenia, which have also now Croatia hooked up, and I think a few hundred nodes, haven't run into a problem, and they're using one single dedicated server.
[01:51:58.840 --> 01:52:01.460]  So at some point we will, but then we're just going to add more servers.
[01:52:01.660 --> 01:52:02.500]  So it's all software.
[01:52:02.720 --> 01:52:03.800]  Okay, I guess that makes sense.
[01:52:03.920 --> 01:52:08.440]  But I think if you were to get to a couple of gigabits, you'd probably need a more sophisticated solution.
[01:52:08.560 --> 01:52:14.100]  And at that point we'd probably just have more servers with more VPNs, because there's no reason to have a single VPN.
[01:52:14.240 --> 01:52:16.740]  Actually, it's a single point of failure right now that you want to avoid.
[01:52:16.740 --> 01:52:16.860]  Right.
[01:52:17.180 --> 01:52:17.640]  Yeah, of course.
[01:52:17.840 --> 01:52:27.180]  So I guess the other thing I was curious about, I think it's the other side of the same question, is you were really talking about quality of service earlier, when you were talking about like VOIP priority over BitTorrent.
[01:52:27.760 --> 01:52:28.460]  And where does that occur?
[01:52:28.720 --> 01:52:31.440]  Well, we're not really doing quality of service at this point.
[01:52:31.780 --> 01:52:41.600]  There's some stuff, there's a patch set that was implemented, that was integrated into OpenWrt a while back, that are called the buffer upload patches.
[01:52:42.160 --> 01:52:43.880]  And they don't really...
[01:52:43.880 --> 01:52:44.940]  It's not quality of service.
[01:52:45.040 --> 01:52:57.720]  What it does is it basically makes some different decisions in the IP stack of the kernel about how communication should happen and what priorities should be.
[01:52:58.020 --> 01:53:03.060]  Because it used to be that decisions were always made based on you shouldn't drop packets.
[01:53:03.420 --> 01:53:04.660]  Dropping packets is bad.
[01:53:04.900 --> 01:53:06.260]  And maybe that used to be the case.
[01:53:06.500 --> 01:53:08.040]  But nowadays we have...
[01:53:08.040 --> 01:53:10.780]  A lot of people care more about the fact that...
[01:53:10.780 --> 01:53:15.240]  A lot of the higher level protocol is the care of the packet drop.
[01:53:15.880 --> 01:53:17.760]  And people care more about latency.
[01:53:18.120 --> 01:53:39.200]  So if you just decide that when your buffers are completely saturated because someone's torrenting and someone else has a connection, then it's time to start dropping packets, then it turns out it actually really improves the latency for the voice over IP connection without making any choices about what kind of traffic you're dealing with.
[01:53:39.440 --> 01:53:39.760]  Okay.
[01:53:39.900 --> 01:53:41.840]  So you're not doing payload inspection though.
[01:53:41.920 --> 01:53:45.600]  You're just looking at headers and like ports and stuff like that.
[01:53:45.820 --> 01:53:45.980]  Yeah.
[01:53:47.620 --> 01:53:50.320]  It's actually just a change in just.
[01:53:50.540 --> 01:53:54.080]  It's like a little change in how the packet...
[01:53:55.220 --> 01:53:55.940]  What do you call it?
[01:53:56.440 --> 01:53:56.580]  Ah.
[01:53:58.700 --> 01:54:01.340]  I am not read out well enough on exactly how it works.
[01:54:01.420 --> 01:54:03.160]  You should check out the buffer load patches.
[01:54:03.280 --> 01:54:04.120]  I'm sure you can find them.
[01:54:05.240 --> 01:54:13.540]  Basically someone forked OpenWrt to run a series of research experiments on how to improve, how to not make Wi-Fi and Internet connectivity suck.
[01:54:14.000 --> 01:54:18.600]  And then once they had the solution, they ported it back over and we just took their patches and enabled the feature.
[01:54:18.940 --> 01:54:21.840]  So it's like for us, there was no thinking and we tested it out.
[01:54:21.920 --> 01:54:22.580]  It works really well.
[01:54:23.520 --> 01:54:28.640]  But basically what it does is it's shortened the buffers and drops packets much harder than usually.
[01:54:29.380 --> 01:54:30.060]  Do you...
[01:54:30.060 --> 01:54:33.260]  Just a totally unrelated policy question.
[01:54:33.540 --> 01:54:39.240]  Do you do any kind of, I don't know, port blocking or packet inspection or anything at all as far as filtering?
[01:54:40.100 --> 01:54:41.960]  Currently we do nothing of that sort.
[01:54:42.740 --> 01:54:46.460]  You know, SMTP port 25 we should probably block, but it hasn't been a problem.
[01:54:47.040 --> 01:54:47.240]  Okay.
[01:54:47.500 --> 01:54:47.840]  Thanks.
[01:54:49.140 --> 01:54:49.700]  Thanks.
[01:54:50.480 --> 01:54:51.040]  Okay.
[01:54:51.960 --> 01:54:52.440]  Other questions?
[01:54:52.660 --> 01:54:52.980]  Great.
[01:54:56.370 --> 01:54:58.170]  Well, that's it for open microphone.
[01:54:58.390 --> 01:55:00.690]  Thanks everybody who stayed until 2 in the morning.
[01:55:01.570 --> 01:55:07.930]  And don't forget, tomorrow we have the Hackers Got Talent show at the same time.
[01:55:08.330 --> 01:55:09.770]  And that's going to be pretty lively.
[01:55:09.770 --> 01:55:14.890]  The grand prize is a gift bag from Mr. Robot.
[01:55:15.110 --> 01:55:17.290]  So spread the word and we'll see you at midnight.
[01:55:17.710 --> 01:55:18.830]  And get some sleep.
[01:55:19.030 --> 01:55:20.370]  Enjoy the rest of the conference tomorrow.
[01:55:20.990 --> 01:55:21.670]  Thanks everyone.
[01:55:21.890 --> 01:55:22.130]  Good night.
[01:55:22.130 --> 01:55:22.370]  Thank you.
[01:55:23.030 --> 01:55:23.450]  That
[01:55:33.660 --> 01:55:34.160]  was interesting.
[01:55:34.520 --> 01:55:35.300]  Good sign.
[01:55:35.300 --> 01:55:36.680]  Thank
[01:55:55.990 --> 01:56:19.890]  you.
[01:56:24.610 --> 01:56:27.470]  I was not worried about it, but there was a little bit of a problem.
[01:56:28.230 --> 01:56:30.090]  So, uh, so...
[01:56:32.370 --> 01:56:32.850]  So,
[01:56:36.530 --> 01:56:38.190]  they'll want to instruct you.
[01:56:39.190 --> 01:56:40.290]  Oh, well, yeah.
[01:56:43.410 --> 01:56:45.150]  Actually, I can tell you this.
[01:56:46.210 --> 01:56:48.030]  If I have it, it's already.
[01:56:50.830 --> 01:56:51.970]  I do it, too.
[01:56:55.810 --> 01:56:56.790]  First of all, you don't think.
[01:56:57.430 --> 01:57:00.590]  And then you don't want to get a drink and it's like...
[01:57:03.830 --> 01:57:05.070]  That's the back story on that.
[01:57:05.330 --> 01:57:09.050]  So, I know it sounds weird, but I'm going to go to the room.
[01:57:09.050 --> 01:57:09.190]  Thank you.
[01:57:10.010 --> 01:57:10.290]  Thank you.