[00:01.900 --> 00:02.860]  ...at H2K2.
[00:04.040 --> 00:07.020]  Obviously we've had a few issues with the sound system.
[00:07.760 --> 00:10.520]  I was just downstairs speaking with Emanuel Goldstein.
[00:11.000 --> 00:17.820]  Evidently there's already memos circulating at AT&T about this conference to be careful.
[00:18.060 --> 00:21.520]  Yes, two years ago we had the same thing.
[00:21.880 --> 00:25.660]  So there's going to be some social engineering going on this weekend.
[00:26.860 --> 00:28.620]  I'm not going to take up these guys' time.
[00:28.800 --> 00:30.320]  We've already started a little bit late.
[00:31.040 --> 00:33.180]  This is John Young and Deborah Natsios.
[00:33.400 --> 00:36.760]  They are with Cryptome.org and Cartome.org.
[00:36.760 --> 00:40.780]  They are sites regarding freedom of forbidden information.
[00:41.400 --> 00:43.140]  So without further ado-adieu.
[00:45.440 --> 00:46.340]  Here they are.
[00:53.900 --> 00:54.820]  Thank you, Leslie.
[00:57.640 --> 01:04.880]  Well, I heard earlier in the summer that HOPE has got a thing about the Hotel Pennsylvania.
[01:04.880 --> 01:08.440]  And I've been wondering what that was all about.
[01:09.240 --> 01:27.220]  I know that Pennsylvania's got a really intriguing history, particularly a history that captures the interest of architects and urbanists of the sort John Young and I are, were brick-and-mortar architects practicing here in New York over the last 20, 30 years.
[01:28.660 --> 01:43.440]  And regarding the Pennsylvania, I'm not talking about the intrigues and valiances that have undoubtedly taken place under its sheets over the years, because there's been plenty of that since its construction in 1919.
[01:43.440 --> 01:53.640]  And I'm sure there will be probably more of that this weekend, assuming H2K2 inspires the appropriate passions, as promised.
[01:54.940 --> 02:06.060]  I didn't really think the Pennsylvania was a place for celebrity spotting, although this white-stretch limo on their website image suggests that that might be the case.
[02:06.660 --> 02:12.320]  It seems to be idling there with the prospects of some good gossip in the offing.
[02:12.720 --> 02:15.860]  Of course, H2K2 could change all of that.
[02:19.820 --> 02:21.640]  Yeah, I think that was the model.
[02:22.580 --> 02:25.700]  And it's clearly from the all-star limousine service.
[02:35.230 --> 02:45.390]  Well, then John Young finally pointed out to me this little anagrammatic hope embedded in the Pennsylvania's name, and I thought, Well, that's pretty cute.
[02:46.170 --> 03:01.570]  But I really prefer to think of our presence at Hotel Pennsylvania today as having to do more with its own embedded history relating to emergent technologies and the inevitable corollary related prohibitions, interdictions, and taboos.
[03:03.190 --> 03:13.070]  This reward poster illustrates Western Union's ire at the growing problem of outlaws interfering with wires, insulators, poles, and lines.
[03:14.490 --> 03:16.530]  Wow, 25 bucks.
[03:16.710 --> 03:18.450]  That must have gotten a lot of cooperation.
[03:23.910 --> 03:32.650]  This history of emergent technologies, prohibitions, and taboos is carved into the damaged but still chain figure we see here.
[03:39.330 --> 03:57.970]  Before it was destroyed in 1963 by the wrecking balls of real estate clubs and profiteers that only New York knows how to produce, this ornamental statuary graced the main portal leading into a massive eight-acre building that used to stand directly across the street from where we're sitting today.
[03:58.310 --> 03:59.770]  Old Pennsylvania Station.
[04:00.490 --> 04:01.930]  The old railroad station.
[04:02.070 --> 04:10.450]  If you look across out the windows due west, you'll see a mediocrity of more recent vintage, which supplanted that older building.
[04:11.150 --> 04:23.370]  It was built between 1904 and 1910 and was, I think you'll agree, quite a majestic culmination of the industrial work of the noted New York architects, McKim, Mead, and White.
[04:25.950 --> 04:28.530]  That's a pretty spectacular nighttime view.
[04:28.750 --> 04:35.650]  And there we are, actually, on the upper balcony level up there.
[04:36.410 --> 04:42.690]  McKim, Mead, and White were also the architects of this hotel, working for the very same client, the Pennsylvania Railroad.
[04:42.690 --> 04:56.730]  To put it simply, the Hotel Pennsylvania was an extension of the train depot and its waiting room, where travelers could catch some Z's before proceeding into the roaring city to conduct business or before heading out west.
[04:59.410 --> 05:12.510]  Despite the railroad being the 19th century preeminent symbol of progress and new technology, the station's vast interior spaces were based on historical models thought more appropriate to urbane civic imagery.
[05:12.730 --> 05:19.510]  The ancient Roman baths of Caracalla, the colonnade of St. Peter's Cathedral, the structures of the Italian Renaissance.
[05:20.230 --> 05:32.350]  Some might see this form of stylistic duplicity as a reflection of the obfuscations of the Gilded Age's own unrepentant Enron spirit.
[05:32.350 --> 05:42.170]  And McKim, Mead, and White were very much the ornamenters of the industrial robber barons of that period.
[05:42.370 --> 05:46.770]  You see this spectacular waiting room here, lit by natural clerestory light.
[05:47.230 --> 05:53.070]  The waiting room today of Amtrak bears little resemblance.
[06:00.420 --> 06:07.140]  Despite the depot's antiquarian styling, novel technologies had been developed in conjunction with the construction of the station.
[06:07.140 --> 06:17.400]  The Pennsylvania Railroad's powerful new electric locomotives inspired new efforts to finally tunnel under what was considered to be the unbridgeable Hudson River.
[06:18.940 --> 06:25.560]  Previously, train passengers had to board ferries on the New Jersey side of the river and crossed Manhattan by boat.
[06:26.260 --> 06:35.380]  Tunnel engineering efforts began in the 1870s, but were not successful until 1910, coincident with the completion of the station.
[06:39.350 --> 06:54.790]  And you see diagrams of the kinds of air shafts and underground systems and retaining structures that were inspired by this task of tunneling under the river and were quite unique and innovative.
[06:55.370 --> 06:59.810]  Massive civil engineering details and systems.
[07:02.410 --> 07:09.790]  But with respect to the railroad's relation to new communication and information technologies, that's the interest of us here today.
[07:10.170 --> 07:12.030]  And I'm a pretty good guess.
[07:12.450 --> 07:14.950]  The telegraph was key, so to speak.
[07:15.570 --> 07:19.110]  We're all aware of the interlaced relations between railroad and telegraph.
[07:19.250 --> 07:25.270]  Telegraph lines took advantage of existing railroad rights of way as they were installed in cross-country networks.
[07:25.270 --> 07:35.690]  The running of the railroad itself, the coordinated national web of train arrivals, departures, schedules, was inextricably bound with telegraphy, communiques, and apparatus.
[07:37.930 --> 07:45.810]  Telegraph offices were typically located in train stations, and the station master of smaller depots also acted as a resident telegrapher.
[07:45.810 --> 07:51.430]  The Pennsylvania Railroad owned and operated its own Pennsylvania telegraph company.
[07:52.530 --> 08:05.670]  Prohibitions against vandalism and sabotage itemized in the reward poster were a reflection of growing spirit of interference that was challenging powerful monopolies who controlled lines, wires, installation, poles.
[08:06.010 --> 08:09.990]  Hardware that kept the dissemination of information in privileged hands.
[08:12.250 --> 08:12.890]  And these gates.
[08:12.890 --> 08:28.250]  And these gorgeous keys, which do bear some resemblance to the architecture of the concourse area, where you see the latest kind of glass and steel crystal palace engineering and the great sheds the trains would pull into.
[08:30.530 --> 08:32.330]  And there's the concourse again.
[08:40.090 --> 08:49.510]  Old Pennsylvania Station was demolished in 1963 in the face of protests that led to subsequent founding of New York City's Landmarks Preservation Commission.
[08:49.890 --> 09:03.170]  In later years, the New York Times architecture critic Paul Goldberger would call the demolition of Old Penn Station the greatest single act of architectural vandalism New York has ever seen.
[09:03.990 --> 09:11.490]  Disputes over the meaning of words like vandalism, sabotage, disobedience, or terrorism continue today.
[09:11.990 --> 09:21.990]  These words have historically been deployed in defining the service of the wielding of power and authority and the wielding of control of information, processes, and technologies.
[09:24.170 --> 09:34.830]  The ongoing disputes over words like outlaw or vandal brings me back to Hotel Pennsylvania in the context of other intriguing links to historical issues of information technologies.
[09:34.830 --> 09:40.210]  These are links in the garment district within which Pennsylvania is squarely centered.
[09:40.450 --> 09:46.170]  The zone running roughly between 25th and 40th streets and between 6th and 9th avenues.
[09:46.530 --> 09:59.770]  Center of the so-called rag trade where you'll find clustered together businesses dealing with everything from retail to wholesale, ready-to-wear, apparel, fabrics, buttons, zippers, notions, trimmings, linings, sewing machine repair, garment jobbers,
[09:59.890 --> 10:00.830]  and allied trades.
[10:00.830 --> 10:10.030]  To what degree the garment district might beam H2K2's fashion sensibilities and act of ready-to-wear vandalism is a question I won't go near today.
[10:14.600 --> 10:21.600]  During the garment district's golden age, accessible train servants provided a crucial and endless supply of workers and goods.
[10:27.580 --> 10:30.960]  And these images from the museum in the city of New York's collection.
[10:37.870 --> 10:47.490]  The garment district reminds us that standing up to authority, the title given this talk by H2K2, is to a good degree standing on the shoulders of others.
[10:47.730 --> 10:51.750]  The shoulders of others being a kind of cumulative infrastructure of resistance.
[10:51.750 --> 11:06.170]  In her day, this woman, I know, looks like her third grade teacher, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, was deemed by the powers that be to be a vandal, a saboteur, a proto-domestic terrorist, if you will.
[11:06.510 --> 11:14.710]  She was a fierce and eloquent activist and orator, with special focus on free speech, public speech, and First Amendment issues.
[11:17.090 --> 11:21.930]  A song written for her, titled Rebel Girl, her nom de gab.
[11:24.780 --> 11:45.760]  At the age of 26, as an agitator for the radical IWW, Industrial Workers of the World, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn penned a slim 10-cent pamphlet with the title Sabotage, in which he advocated a labor practice that had been legitimated by French workers in 1897.
[11:46.340 --> 11:51.800]  We see on the pamphlet cover the wooden clog worn by French workers, the saboteur.
[11:52.600 --> 11:55.760]  The table of contents is a provocative outline.
[11:56.040 --> 12:01.980]  I like in particular the line, quote, used sabotage but didn't know what to call it.
[12:04.160 --> 12:16.640]  Flynn's pamphlet invoked in particular the recurrent strikes of silk mill workers of a venerable industrial center, Patterson, New Jersey, also called Silk City, 18 miles due west of us.
[12:16.820 --> 12:21.680]  Most of Patterson's silk was destined for this neighborhood of New York City, the garment district.
[12:24.490 --> 12:36.910]  Some of the big strikes in Patterson that occurred through the late 19th, early 20th century, led to major labor arrangements such as shortening work weeks and so on and so forth.
[12:38.510 --> 12:48.590]  Gurley Flynn's pamphlet is evocative of Henry David Thoreau's famous essay on civil disobedience case that had been published some 60 years previously in this small journal, Aesthetic Papers.
[12:48.730 --> 13:00.550]  I think it was Elizabeth Peabody's only issue of that journal, in which the industrial age's mechanistic imagery is used to characterize political action.
[13:00.670 --> 13:04.270]  In this case, when Thoreau says, I say, break the law.
[13:04.430 --> 13:07.510]  Let your life be a counter-friction to stop the machine.
[13:07.650 --> 13:11.590]  He's referring to the machine of onerous and obdurate government.
[13:12.710 --> 13:40.450]  So it's on the shoulders of these earlier individuals that Krypton and the allied site Karton have developed an infrastructure to make available open source or FOIA freedom of information materials and other documents that find difficulty in being published elsewhere.
[13:44.300 --> 14:05.560]  Outlaws such as Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, who supported information technologies of independent publications, were the kinds of agitators and pamphleteers and essayists that really provide this First Amendment solid base on which we are thankfully, we're the beneficiaries of all that hard work.
[14:06.700 --> 14:28.110]  And so from the crypto site, some recent items, and something that was up last year, the complete transcripts from the Osama Bin Laden Embassy bombing trial, which was played out in New York starting in late spring, early summer of last year.
[14:28.110 --> 14:44.950]  John and I attended a session of the trial in which Al-Qaeda informant was spilling the beans on his employer, and John decided to start purchasing the transcripts from the court reporter's office and make them available to the public.
[14:46.910 --> 15:06.470]  And so there are thousands of pages of provocative and very illuminating text, particularly now in retrospect, as one reads through data that is chilling this year, in year 2002.
[15:09.970 --> 15:32.470]  And so this abundance of text, textual kind of data on the site, is implemented and complemented by a graphicity of cartoon, which deals with certain spatial imaging materials.
[15:32.780 --> 15:47.180]  And this John's eyeballing series on cryptone showing sites of a rather sensitive national security nature, but publishing remote sense imagery of these sites that are available in open source sources.
[15:48.900 --> 15:54.700]  Dams, and great detail of high resolution aerial imagery.
[15:56.960 --> 16:12.320]  Naval installations showing their relationship to local roads, and so providing visitors an accessible map, map, and also detailed disposition of the installations.
[16:19.490 --> 16:23.610]  In Texas, the Pentex Warhead Assembly Plant.
[16:24.750 --> 16:40.490]  And as architects, it's of great interest to see how these installations are assembled, and sometimes it seems an ad hoc and certainly not a grand design scheme that planned cities thrive on.
[16:40.490 --> 16:45.090]  So it's an interesting urbanist settlement.
[16:50.530 --> 17:12.850]  So this God's eye view, so called, of the remote sensing, this overview that promises to see, to see all, is something that then is rebutted readers finding an exception with the dissemination of what is now, after last fall, thought to be sensitive material.
[17:12.850 --> 17:17.550]  Why do you think it necessary to put all this military info on the site, on the net?
[17:17.730 --> 17:20.770]  The average Joe six-pack could care less where it's stored.
[17:21.270 --> 17:23.430]  You're making it very easy for the terrorists.
[17:23.750 --> 17:24.750]  Don't help the enemy.
[17:25.650 --> 17:26.690]  USAF retired.
[17:31.580 --> 17:52.380]  Earlier this year, we got a helicopter and flew out to the Freshkills landfill, where all the material from the World Trade Center was being transposed for filtering, for review, assembled in these large fields where hazmat uniformed folk would rake it over,
[17:52.640 --> 17:56.460]  temporary morgues and decontamination center.
[17:56.640 --> 17:59.840]  All of this has been taken down on Monday by the U.S.
[18:00.080 --> 18:03.100]  Army Corps of Engineers, the task out there having been complete.
[18:04.280 --> 18:20.720]  Structural girders stored on site in the corner, piles of private vehicles crushed during the collapse, piles of fire department vehicles crushed or damaged during the collapse.
[18:32.730 --> 18:46.850]  At the World Trade Center site now, some of you may have already visited, the new Tabula Rasa is a subterranean datum, a 3D void that intersects with the remains of historic and contemporary technologies and infrastructures.
[18:46.850 --> 18:46.950]  Structural girders.
[18:49.090 --> 18:49.810]  Structural girders.
[18:49.810 --> 18:52.590]  The void that once contained this material.
[18:55.210 --> 19:00.810]  John took these...oh, an anonymous person took these photographs on site.
[19:01.130 --> 19:11.770]  The elevator motor, he was actually detained on site and these images were erased from his digital camera.
[19:11.770 --> 19:23.150]  Or I should say the photographer, or I should say the photographer, the anonymous photographer, was detained on site, grilled, the imagery erased from the chip, but of course later retrieved.
[19:23.770 --> 19:24.430]  And so...
[19:31.250 --> 19:39.410]  I believe John made an appeal to Seapunk's list and was provided with the proper assistance.
[19:40.610 --> 20:05.390]  Now, as an architect, John on site also was able to make a visual inspection of the material and come to certain conclusions about the cause of structural collapse that he made public immediately and that have since come to be quite an accurate description of the failure of structural members and the floor slack pancaking and so on.
[20:05.390 --> 20:05.750]  That's not something.
[20:05.950 --> 20:11.390]  As you know, the authorities here immediately began destroying girders and material from fresh kills.
[20:11.550 --> 20:15.530]  They sent it right out to a scrap yard in New Jersey for sale to China and elsewhere.
[20:16.350 --> 20:24.630]  Really erasing the evidence because the Port Authority is quite culpable for levels of negligence of how they managed those buildings.
[20:26.250 --> 20:30.470]  The tenants were at risk in ways they never imagined.
[20:35.830 --> 20:51.790]  So a century after the Penn Station excavations, the technologies and constructs of tunneling and the underground digging are revoked in the first rehabilitative step taken at the site, the reconstruction of the destroyed number one IRT station.
[20:51.790 --> 21:09.270]  And so just as Cryptome shows the God's eye view of remote sensing or the satellite, high resolution satellite imagery, there's also the metaphor of the digging underground, the underground, the material, the infrastructures that are hidden from civilian life,
[21:09.270 --> 21:26.910]  the things that are buried, the things that few people are aware of in the subsurface, and yet that comprise a very significant matrix that is sort of, you know, the machine code for this city that is the visible, phenomenal city, but is actually supported by whole different code systems,
[21:27.090 --> 21:29.750]  including the building codes and fire codes.
[21:32.690 --> 21:50.470]  So the damage to the IRT after last fall bears quite a kinship to the original constructive violence against the terrain, the digging, and the work, the work in that zone and substrate layer of the city.
[21:54.830 --> 22:04.550]  And archival photographs from the museum of New York, I believe it is, of the earlier construction phase.
[22:38.360 --> 22:49.440]  And so finally, the need for open dissemination of transparent information has never been greater, even in this phase of filling that void hole downtown.
[22:49.440 --> 23:10.540]  The interlaced matrix of the old and new technologies and infrastructures is not just an opportunity for a nostalgic historic reverie, but is really a complex, multi-layered, meta-infrastructure that requires close vigilance.
[23:12.400 --> 23:21.180]  A federal report in December of 2000 cited potentially disastrous fire and safety conditions in 16 miles of aging tunnels that serve Penn Station.
[23:21.520 --> 23:25.760]  More than 750 trains carrying 300,000 people use the tunnels daily.
[23:26.360 --> 23:35.500]  Emergency accesses through these 90-year-old spiral staircases that are 10 stories high and too narrow to allow firefighters to get through during evacuations.
[23:35.500 --> 23:40.840]  Tunnels lack modern ventilation to remove smoke and pump in fresh air at the same time.
[23:41.140 --> 23:43.800]  And have only limited water-standpipe connections.
[23:44.560 --> 23:52.540]  At the time, in December of 2000, New York Fire Commissioner warned that firefighters might be unable to prevent catastrophe.
[23:54.180 --> 24:03.040]  Despite the chilling description, which haunts us all the more now, a couple years later, no remedial action has yet been taken.
[24:03.040 --> 24:12.400]  We've repositioned the report on Krypton and Karton in the last few weeks to get it back out in the public.
[24:17.660 --> 24:22.400]  All Americans need to trust their leaders, otherwise the terrorists will win.
[24:25.390 --> 24:27.010]  The fog of war.
[24:31.390 --> 24:34.830]  We need surveillance to find out what the masses really think.
[24:34.830 --> 24:37.470]  Isn't that what elections are for?
[24:41.490 --> 24:42.710]  Hackers from hell.
[24:43.090 --> 24:44.070]  Welcome to heaven.
[24:44.370 --> 24:45.170]  We're in.
[24:47.950 --> 24:49.190]  All right, now.
[24:51.970 --> 25:04.310]  John, I think you'll join us with a few words and perhaps entertain some discussion from the carpeted, this elaborately carpeted area of the room.
[25:25.480 --> 25:29.060]  We've got a couple dozen CDs of our archive.
[25:29.720 --> 25:40.610]  We want to get this distributed as widely as we can, which is what we do to keep them getting shut down, tribute widely before we put it up.
[25:40.610 --> 25:45.570]  And so that's about the only way we can assure that we can shut down the material remains available.
[25:46.390 --> 25:50.210]  And so we'd like to get these CDs out, you know, from here from outside the U.S.
[25:50.290 --> 25:51.830]  and material, to get this stuff out.
[25:52.330 --> 25:54.010]  Just hold on to those media.
[25:55.090 --> 26:04.230]  And so the idea of having subterranean means of communication is important to keep a satellite like Carton and Cryptome going.
[26:04.230 --> 26:09.470]  Otherwise, we have had some threats that we can shut down by ISP or authorities.
[26:09.570 --> 26:10.390]  Here in the back.
[26:10.910 --> 26:11.310]  Mike.
[26:11.550 --> 26:13.330]  If you can speak a little closer to the microphone.
[26:13.630 --> 26:13.890]  Okay.
[26:14.550 --> 26:20.870]  I'd just like to say that the key to our not getting shut down is to get the information out such that shutting us down will not stop the information.
[26:21.570 --> 26:29.590]  As you know, we copy any number of other sites like Federation of American Scientists, the National Security Archive, several sites overseas.
[26:29.890 --> 26:32.450]  There are quite a number of sites who long preceded what we were doing.
[26:33.250 --> 26:38.370]  And we try to fill in gaps of publishing stuff that's not going to have been along these longer, more stable sites.
[26:38.830 --> 26:43.170]  And the key, though, is to not become vulnerable by being the only source of that information.
[26:43.830 --> 26:50.990]  And so we've learned a lot from fellow subterranean workers on how to get information out such that it can't be shut down.
[26:53.990 --> 26:56.970]  So we're very receptive to other ideas like that.
[26:57.170 --> 27:00.250]  And so we say, you know, my contribution will be to offer these CDs.
[27:00.350 --> 27:01.150]  We only have two dozen.
[27:01.730 --> 27:06.050]  And I hope that they'll get confidence spread around giving questions.
[27:06.550 --> 27:07.190]  Thank you.
[27:09.390 --> 27:11.410]  We have a microphone if you want questions.
[27:16.780 --> 27:17.980]  How did you get started?
[27:18.340 --> 27:19.860]  What was the first thing that you did?
[27:22.680 --> 27:24.000]  The question is how we got started.
[27:24.620 --> 27:26.240]  And what was the first things we did?
[27:30.480 --> 27:32.760]  We were inspired by being on the Cypherpunks list.
[27:33.080 --> 27:35.540]  And some folks there had some information.
[27:35.740 --> 27:38.620]  They wanted to be made public but didn't want to be associated with it.
[27:38.700 --> 27:40.360]  So we offered to put it on our site.
[27:40.400 --> 27:41.440]  And that started the process.
[27:42.260 --> 27:44.420]  And the key here is that we don't know what we're publishing.
[27:45.360 --> 27:49.320]  We're not technical experts like other people who really have access to good information.
[27:49.580 --> 27:52.520]  And one of the best things about us is we don't know whether it's good or bad.
[27:52.700 --> 27:54.520]  So we put it up and let others decide.
[27:54.700 --> 27:56.380]  So we don't vet this information.
[27:58.640 --> 28:01.180]  And that's different from the way other things are done usually.
[28:02.180 --> 28:09.780]  We think that people should decide for themselves whether the stuff one is authentic, worthwhile, a bunch of crap or whatever.
[28:12.100 --> 28:16.540]  So that's one thing we don't do is present ourselves as authority on the material we put up.
[28:17.780 --> 28:24.380]  John, is there anything that you've been received and not put up for fear of your press or whatever?
[28:24.620 --> 28:26.760]  And what kind of stuff wouldn't you put up on your site?
[28:27.180 --> 28:31.780]  Like national security stuff or terrorism stuff or kiddie porn or whatever?
[28:40.650 --> 28:41.450]  Give us a try.
[28:45.260 --> 28:46.320]  We think about that.
[28:46.760 --> 28:47.740]  Sometimes we ask a question.
[28:47.900 --> 28:53.400]  So far we haven't got anything that we think is too bad to be put up
[29:03.600 --> 29:04.080]  for all we know.
[29:04.280 --> 29:07.540]  We certainly know that kiddie porn is being buried and all kinds of stuff these days.
[29:07.540 --> 29:17.740]  We've also learned a lot about being used as a means to put up forbidden stuff that authorities want up but don't want to be traced back to them.
[29:18.080 --> 29:24.280]  So we've learned about the fact that there's things called honeypots where stuff is put up to attract a honeypot or not.
[29:28.890 --> 29:35.070]  We certainly know that RISP has FBI people stationed in Dallas watching everything that goes through their site.
[29:36.030 --> 29:37.690]  We've been told that by CISN men.
[29:40.490 --> 29:43.890]  But we also know that people lie about what they're doing or not doing.
[29:44.590 --> 29:47.850]  And so we're quite happy to put this up and let others decide whether it's bad or not.
[29:48.490 --> 29:54.910]  We think that at the moment the idea that something is so bad it shouldn't be made available to the public is a canard.
[29:55.430 --> 29:56.570]  We'd like to test that.
[29:57.810 --> 30:00.330]  But we don't want to be the one to decide that ahead of time.
[30:00.570 --> 30:01.850]  We'd like others to decide.
[30:02.210 --> 30:06.950]  And I know that right now there's a racket going on in which reputable publishers don't publish bad stuff.
[30:18.300 --> 30:22.640]  So, so far we've not got anything that we would put except we do get some really crazy stuff.
[30:23.240 --> 30:31.380]  And one way we decide is that if we find out that it's been widely spread to all sorts of people already, we don't bother putting it up and we get a fair amount of that.
[30:32.600 --> 30:38.940]  And so we worry about we're centering someone, but we do check to see if it's out there already.
[30:39.480 --> 30:44.360]  And we don't say you need to be one of 50 people who are publishing forbidden information.
[30:48.550 --> 30:52.490]  How much time do you spend sorting through the stuff people send you?
[30:52.670 --> 30:54.570]  And what's involved in I send you stuff?
[30:55.350 --> 30:56.390]  Do you know them to you?
[30:58.870 --> 31:00.590]  We don't spend too much time sorting through stuff.
[31:00.710 --> 31:03.010]  If it comes in a digital form, we'll be up with it in hour.
[31:04.570 --> 31:16.050]  We spend a fair amount of time scanning hardcopy and sort of getting badly organized stuff in shape for publishing, but not too much, so we like best stuff we put up right away.
[31:17.950 --> 31:24.830]  And we spend more of our time massaging the site that we do when viewing the material.
[31:28.410 --> 31:29.990]  Don't forget, we don't know what we're doing.
[31:31.450 --> 31:47.990]  One of your slides had a comment from a military personnel stating that you are publishing pictures and photographs of sensitive areas in the United States that might be helping terrorists, or how do you comment on that?
[31:49.830 --> 31:53.790]  Well, we publish the message that we think people should think about that.
[31:55.210 --> 31:57.550]  The material that we publish is easily available.
[31:57.890 --> 31:59.250]  We want to show that it's easily available.
[32:00.330 --> 32:01.910]  We didn't know it was there until we went looking.
[32:02.050 --> 32:05.550]  In fact, we discovered that a good bit of stuff we put up is very difficult to find on the internet.
[32:05.910 --> 32:12.830]  If you just are a little bit patient and don't rely upon traditional means of finding out what's out there, and that's an amazing animal.
[32:13.550 --> 32:16.730]  And so we run across this stuff and put it up.
[32:17.010 --> 32:19.410]  And by the way, a lot of...
[32:22.210 --> 32:26.590]  We don't like to talk about this coming to our site, but let's just say that material is very heavily studied by the authorities.
[32:27.510 --> 32:29.090]  And so they're well aware it's there.
[32:29.250 --> 32:32.350]  We hope they're reading it with thoughtfulness and recognize that it's there.
[32:32.350 --> 32:33.910]  It's available and anyone can do this.
[32:34.070 --> 32:35.150]  We're not experts at this.
[32:35.310 --> 32:36.410]  Experts can do far better.
[32:37.590 --> 32:40.990]  And we're quite frankly surprised at what you can find on the internet.
[32:41.170 --> 32:43.550]  But it's a delicious thing that's happening.
[32:43.790 --> 32:45.870]  And I'm saying I think people are going to learn to make their own judgments.
[32:46.310 --> 32:52.870]  Some of the folks who write us, I think, probably do have a notion that responsible people should decide what others should see and what they shouldn't see.
[32:52.990 --> 32:54.030]  We don't want to be part of that.
[32:54.190 --> 32:55.950]  So our usual answer is unicide.
[32:56.070 --> 32:57.870]  We don't want to decide what you're doing to not read.
[32:57.870 --> 33:00.970]  If you don't like what we're putting up, write in and tell us about it.
[33:01.050 --> 33:01.830]  Go publish your message.
[33:02.090 --> 33:06.950]  Let others decide whether your message is legitimate or if you've got a beef or some stake in not publishing this stuff.
[33:07.650 --> 33:13.070]  And we notice that military people really do think they've got a higher role to play in protecting American people.
[33:13.470 --> 33:14.630]  And the rest of us do.
[33:14.730 --> 33:17.050]  We think that we've got to learn to protect ourselves.
[33:17.930 --> 33:26.830]  And we think it's an important role that people in American other countries learn to protect themselves and not rely upon people who actually spend most of their time protecting their own agencies and their own departments.
[33:26.830 --> 33:30.390]  The military is much better protected in America than the American people are.
[33:31.010 --> 33:33.210]  And our leaders are much better protected than we are.
[33:34.470 --> 33:37.210]  And we think that's the message that needs to be gotten out there.
[33:37.310 --> 33:38.410]  You better watch out for yourself.
[33:39.550 --> 33:42.610]  And we need to know where those tools are, where the information is.
[33:42.690 --> 33:46.030]  If you live near one of these threatened sites, you need to know about it.
[33:46.850 --> 33:48.130]  Many people don't know where these are.
[33:49.630 --> 33:53.290]  They have no idea where the most likely targets in America are located.
[33:53.550 --> 33:54.790]  Because it's kept quiet.
[33:54.990 --> 33:55.490]  It's not secret.
[33:55.650 --> 33:56.390]  It's just kept quiet.
[33:56.990 --> 33:59.570]  And we notice that mainstream publishers don't publish this material.
[33:59.730 --> 34:00.470]  We think they should.
[34:00.890 --> 34:05.930]  If you're being put at risk by these targets being near your home, you should know about it.
[34:05.970 --> 34:06.890]  You should know what the risk is.
[34:07.010 --> 34:14.970]  We put up all these nuclear plants around America and found that not a single one of them are in compliance with the law of notifying the public the risk they're facing.
[34:15.650 --> 34:18.010]  Not a single one is in compliance with the law.
[34:18.910 --> 34:20.090]  And so we...
[34:21.050 --> 34:23.170]  And the military department states that.
[34:23.250 --> 34:24.750]  So we put that up along with the information.
[34:25.590 --> 34:34.090]  We also know that all the military bases, for example, that store nuclear weapons are much more concerned with their security than they are with security than people who move around those weapons.
[34:34.830 --> 34:39.550]  So the fact is, is that there's something of a con job going on about security in America.
[34:40.250 --> 34:46.190]  And we would like to see that discussed more openly in these times of so-called great peril.
[34:46.810 --> 34:48.510]  Right now we're finding that a lot of information is
[34:57.710 --> 34:58.870]  questionable if not wrong.
[34:59.330 --> 35:06.990]  In our own field of architecture, we're being asked to sign more and more disclosure agreements about threats to buildings and facilities.
[35:07.330 --> 35:10.830]  And if you don't sign those, you're not given information about what those threats are.
[35:12.010 --> 35:13.330]  And we wonder about that.
[35:14.210 --> 35:18.190]  So you say, right now there's a time when more information is being withdrawn rather than being offered.
[35:18.290 --> 35:21.910]  And so, as Deborah said, now's the time to offer more information rather than less.
[35:22.510 --> 35:29.390]  Because every moment of crisis in our history has been when information was withdrawn and put us at greater risk by doing so.
[35:29.690 --> 35:33.050]  But it also protected our haters more so by withdrawing the information.
[35:33.050 --> 35:35.930]  And we find that very ironic and causing questions.
[35:37.450 --> 35:41.790]  By the way, we're like the 10,000th person who's ever said that in America.
[35:43.390 --> 35:44.750]  Keep getting forgotten about.
[35:47.010 --> 35:52.810]  Have you received threats from anyone other than your ISP over what you put on the RPA?
[35:52.810 --> 35:54.030]  I would say.
[35:55.690 --> 35:57.690]  Only one physical
[36:03.960 --> 36:04.580]  threat involved.
[36:05.100 --> 36:12.080]  And by the way, the RISP, whose burial, or NTT slash burial, it's not called, has never been a threat.
[36:12.200 --> 36:13.280]  They've only had inquiries.
[36:13.560 --> 36:15.140]  They've passed on inquiries from others.
[36:15.480 --> 36:17.780]  British government from the FBI and others.
[36:17.960 --> 36:18.320]  And the U.S.
[36:18.340 --> 36:22.000]  passed on and said, what is your answer to their challenge to what you put on it?
[36:22.180 --> 36:23.000]  We gave our answer.
[36:23.120 --> 36:24.360]  They said, fine, sounds good to us.
[36:24.480 --> 36:25.160]  They left it alone.
[36:26.320 --> 36:28.780]  So, and by the way, we always report those incidents.
[36:28.980 --> 36:32.220]  Because we think a lot of this withdrawal of the mission is being done over quiet.
[36:32.640 --> 36:38.440]  And we like to publicize every time people try to get us to do something privately.
[36:39.700 --> 36:49.740]  And, but I have had to say that the ISP that told us about the FBI, one of the people that really knows traffic, did advise us, says, why don't you check with the FBI before you put stuff out.
[36:49.880 --> 36:50.980]  Don't you think they are being wise?
[36:51.500 --> 36:53.260]  Would you like to be on the good side?
[36:53.540 --> 36:54.240]  And I said, no.
[36:54.900 --> 36:55.720]  No, thank you.
[36:58.120 --> 37:03.560]  Only because we've been told about people who are, quote, once on the good side, says, don't fall for that.
[37:04.000 --> 37:05.160]  That's standard language.
[37:05.760 --> 37:08.920]  Induce you to think that you need us to know what's the right thing to do.
[37:09.380 --> 37:12.660]  So if you fall for that, that's, they just know you're a chunk.
[37:13.880 --> 37:15.380]  They don't know what the right side is.
[37:15.620 --> 37:15.680]  Thank you.
[37:25.660 --> 37:26.240]  Over here.
[37:27.580 --> 37:28.340]  What's your hand?
[37:32.100 --> 37:32.760]  It's classified.
[37:37.290 --> 37:39.190]  However, I should say, we're right at the limit all the time.
[37:39.370 --> 37:40.930]  And very often keep sending us notices.
[37:40.930 --> 37:42.450]  You're hitting the ball again.
[37:42.610 --> 37:43.390]  You're hitting the wall again.
[37:43.850 --> 37:44.290]  You're hitting the wall again.
[37:44.290 --> 37:45.430]  And so we shift some stuff around.
[37:45.670 --> 37:48.890]  We set up some little sites elsewhere to ease it.
[37:49.490 --> 37:51.090]  Or we send out a plea for help.
[37:51.270 --> 37:53.250]  And other people are taking the material and we're spreading it around.
[37:53.450 --> 37:56.970]  So we've upgraded two or three times with variable likes.
[37:57.350 --> 37:59.590]  And so we say, hmm, interesting.
[38:03.110 --> 38:04.670]  So it's, I don't know actually.
[38:04.790 --> 38:05.230]  Don't forget it.
[38:05.290 --> 38:06.050]  We don't know what we're doing.
[38:06.630 --> 38:09.130]  But I have a rough idea of what you're talking about.
[38:09.870 --> 38:12.750]  And there are times when we get jammed up and you just can't get on the site.
[38:12.950 --> 38:14.170]  Usually when slashed offices.
[38:14.910 --> 38:16.190]  So we all know what that's like.
[38:18.430 --> 38:18.790]  Thanks.
[38:19.690 --> 38:29.170]  You had a couple of examples of manageable issues and more vocal issues from the presentation such as the subways discoverer.
[38:29.290 --> 38:35.350]  Do you have a unit on the scope of the kind of information that's hidden that you want to be able to get out?
[38:35.610 --> 38:39.130]  If something happens at the local level, we're in relation to the office.
[38:39.310 --> 38:47.930]  Do you think decisions about what information is worthy of putting out versus what isn't based on how many people reflects?
[38:53.910 --> 38:56.850]  Well, I wish I had a rational answer.
[38:58.490 --> 39:01.930]  The thought comes to mind that the local is global.
[39:02.350 --> 39:12.530]  I mean, there's this kind of equation now that has blurred the boundaries between that discussion about terrain.
[39:14.370 --> 39:21.190]  Folks used to think this little 16 acres of downtown New York was a strictly local little place in the corner.
[39:22.050 --> 39:22.170]  You know?
[39:22.650 --> 39:37.350]  And then all of a sudden it's been projected and amplified and extrapolated into a mythology that certainly has gone beyond its immediate neighborhood.
[39:38.390 --> 39:50.870]  So that's a very good question and it actually opens up the door to this whole discourse on the boundaries of terrain in this particular moment.
[39:52.050 --> 39:52.990]  Well, I'd add to that.
[39:53.110 --> 39:55.390]  The world was looking for something local to do.
[39:56.490 --> 40:00.390]  And for a number of years it wasn't much happening in New York that seemed to appeal to the difficult world.
[40:02.910 --> 40:04.210]  It's grown a good bit.
[40:05.230 --> 40:09.630]  And one of the things we've been trying to do just recently is take another look at the New York telephone system.
[40:09.630 --> 40:10.610]  of course.
[40:10.610 --> 40:24.670]  And since we moved from mythology from sea pumps right into national security issues and intelligence issues, you know, there's a tremendous intelligence business in the university of both economic as well as national security.
[40:25.290 --> 40:32.730]  And, of course, we have a fabulous telephone system here which has been tapped ever since the first world war.
[40:33.190 --> 40:37.910]  And so we are interested in where economics and politics and technology all come together.
[40:37.910 --> 40:40.170]  We have to think that a lot of that comes together in New York City.
[40:40.650 --> 40:43.290]  Much more than it does on the west coast or in Washington D.C.
[40:43.510 --> 40:44.130]  or anywhere else.
[40:44.170 --> 40:45.730]  We think that's here and it's not well known.
[40:45.890 --> 40:53.410]  We think that there's a lot more of that going on here than most people are aware of and want because it is a very lucrative business to be in.
[40:53.590 --> 40:55.030]  And we've met a few people here.
[40:55.750 --> 41:01.510]  I mean, online always, of course, who talk about this world in New York.
[41:02.330 --> 41:10.450]  And so that, it's apropos, I think, I think that the phreakers and hackers probably could get into this system.
[41:11.590 --> 41:19.690]  They might take better technology than they have now because some of the stuff that's the best technology that America has is being used in New York City for intelligent purposes.
[41:20.750 --> 41:24.050]  And not only because of the UN but because of the financial center.
[41:25.190 --> 41:34.210]  And, of course, there's an initially thriving spy trade in New York City that is actually more sophisticated than that in Washington D.C.
[41:35.190 --> 41:36.970]  You know, because the stakes are higher here.
[41:37.870 --> 41:43.670]  And a lot of that brings off the communication systems that are available here, as opposed to both the open as well as the covert.
[41:44.490 --> 41:55.250]  And so, as some of you may know, we've been putting a series of things about the trans-societic telecommunications systems in their hubs here in New York.
[41:56.190 --> 42:04.610]  And that, we've kind of slow come into that, but it's important to recognize that that has been the hub of telecommunications for the world that's been here in New York City.
[42:06.270 --> 42:09.050]  And, which we meet there, yet to be looked at.
[42:09.430 --> 42:15.990]  And it turns out that some of the foreign people that we know here know more about that than intelligent people do.
[42:17.310 --> 42:20.510]  And they have access to systems that are pretty phenomenal stuff.
[42:21.250 --> 42:23.510]  And they only want to know how to get into it.
[42:23.710 --> 42:25.330]  Intelligent people do not know how to.
[42:25.330 --> 42:26.550]  They have to go to them to get in.
[42:27.650 --> 42:34.990]  The question is, those folks are unregulated by national security law, which is legislated by their job.
[42:36.050 --> 42:37.290]  And it's interesting stuff.
[42:37.810 --> 42:45.310]  That's why you know a lot of stories about people who service these phone companies and intelligence agencies and government agencies who run their systems.
[42:46.490 --> 42:50.210]  So it's kind of an underbelly of people who really know this stuff very well.
[42:50.890 --> 42:57.230]  Below encryption, below traffic analysis, below all the other techniques that are used by the agencies to do their work.
[42:57.530 --> 42:59.370]  And it's known by these technoids.
[43:00.330 --> 43:01.430]  Probably some of this room.
[43:05.090 --> 43:06.570]  Information needs to be gotten out.
[43:07.050 --> 43:15.530]  And as far as I know, while there's provisions against government agencies for revealing this provision, there's absolutely nothing against these phone technicians for revealing it.
[43:15.690 --> 43:17.170]  It's strictly an honor system of their own.
[43:17.950 --> 43:19.470]  And it's between them and their bosses.
[43:21.330 --> 43:23.210]  These are the folks who run the systems.
[43:24.790 --> 43:27.410]  Not the ones who are now testifying before Congress.
[43:27.410 --> 43:29.330]  And it's interesting as to what one...
[43:29.850 --> 43:40.530]  They'll do what these low-level NSA people did in the 70s when they started talking to the church committee and told what was really happening in the way of interceptions from American citizens and others because they were doing it.
[43:41.270 --> 43:46.450]  Not what the legal counsel was saying and the heads of agencies were saying but what the people in the field were actually doing.
[43:46.650 --> 43:48.090]  They started telling them what was happening.
[43:48.390 --> 43:51.730]  Because they said, we'll not get up there and lie like those folks are.
[43:53.410 --> 44:00.410]  So if someone will subpoena one of these telecommunications technicians or Congress, they'll find out about what's going on.
[44:00.950 --> 44:05.910]  And the way they're snooping on people, they'll never get to the heads of these organizations or the heads of agencies.
[44:06.070 --> 44:06.590]  They don't know.
[44:07.410 --> 44:08.050]  And why?
[44:08.170 --> 44:09.350]  Because they say, don't tell us.
[44:09.950 --> 44:11.790]  We don't want to know what you're going to have there.
[44:14.370 --> 44:18.190]  What do you think is the scariest thing that you post on Cryptome?
[44:19.350 --> 44:20.130]  Scariest to you?
[44:20.670 --> 44:21.510]  Sorry, say again?
[44:21.870 --> 44:26.150]  What do you think is the most frightening thing that you've ever stored on Cryptome?
[44:31.320 --> 44:34.280]  We're running out of time, so we're going to shut this down and get it shut.
[44:35.200 --> 44:37.260]  Because I don't think anything is frightening on Cryptome.
[44:39.440 --> 44:40.240]  Nothing is frightening.
[44:40.440 --> 44:42.140]  It's all wonderful material.
[44:43.740 --> 44:45.440]  Young people should be in that particular.
[44:46.860 --> 44:48.200]  But everyone else too.
[44:48.520 --> 44:49.360]  And so that...
[44:49.800 --> 44:51.740]  ARCA said another way, everything is frightening.
[44:52.660 --> 44:54.300]  Don't read it no matter what you read.
[44:54.500 --> 44:55.520]  Don't ever go near it.
[44:56.160 --> 44:57.340]  Don't take these CDs.
[44:57.560 --> 44:58.300]  Don't pass them on.
[44:58.680 --> 45:02.200]  Do not let vulnerable people know about this stuff.
[45:02.660 --> 45:03.820]  It will scare them to death.
[45:04.980 --> 45:05.850]  But it will also...
[45:16.600 --> 45:17.520]  Three minutes.
[45:17.880 --> 45:20.540]  Okay, so I'll try to ask a brief question.
[45:22.140 --> 45:25.420]  I'm sorry for being so frank, but if you don't hide anything...
[45:25.420 --> 45:26.420]  Who supports it?
[45:26.500 --> 45:28.660]  Who would support the helicopter to take pictures?
[45:28.660 --> 45:31.940]  Who would put his money for such...
[45:31.940 --> 45:32.680]  No but less?
[45:34.840 --> 45:35.440]  Well...
[45:37.370 --> 45:38.450]  We pay for it a second.
[45:38.690 --> 45:39.790]  For personal money?
[45:52.940 --> 45:54.080]  That's just...
[45:54.080 --> 45:55.580]  That's architectural practice.
[45:56.060 --> 46:03.620]  This is our public service, our pro bono, if you will, sector of our urbanist and architectural practice.
[46:03.920 --> 46:08.440]  So it's what many professionals do when they perform public service work.
[46:08.440 --> 46:11.860]  So it's in that category, in the context of our practice.
[46:11.860 --> 46:12.720]  Not...
[46:12.720 --> 46:14.200]  Not inherited wealth.
[46:14.760 --> 46:15.860]  By any means.
[46:16.180 --> 46:17.540]  Let me just say, though, but...
[46:17.540 --> 46:18.560]  It's an excellent question.
[46:18.720 --> 46:20.440]  Because that's why most people can't do what we do.
[46:21.880 --> 46:24.020]  They choke off the money and that stops it.
[46:24.160 --> 46:24.900]  They get fired.
[46:25.240 --> 46:26.320]  The funding gets cut off.
[46:26.680 --> 46:27.860]  They gotta take a job.
[46:28.500 --> 46:34.860]  And so they say, that's probably the key more than anything else, why we don't get shut down by economic circumstances, that...
[46:39.390 --> 46:39.830]  Okay.
[46:40.030 --> 46:41.230]  That doesn't mean we're not susceptible.
[46:42.350 --> 46:43.370]  We can be happy.
[46:43.610 --> 46:44.130]  We can be bought.
[46:46.870 --> 46:47.630]  We're waiting.
[46:51.440 --> 46:52.420]  Thanks very much.
[46:52.420 --> 46:52.440]  Thank you.
[46:52.840 --> 46:53.440]  Thank you.
[46:53.440 --> 46:53.480]  Thank you.