[00:34.470 --> 00:35.490]  All right, you know what?
[00:35.830 --> 00:40.710]  Let's start and pray for a live connection in the next 10 minutes.
[00:41.850 --> 00:43.370]  My name is Steve Rombom.
[00:44.010 --> 00:45.210]  I am an investigator.
[00:47.870 --> 00:53.030]  Many of the people in this room know me, have worked with me for the past 15 or 20 years.
[00:55.170 --> 00:59.290]  For the one fellow who thought he won the Spot the Fed contest, where is he?
[01:00.890 --> 01:02.010]  Guess again.
[01:05.090 --> 01:08.810]  Hackers and private investigators have an enormous amount in common.
[01:09.710 --> 01:21.610]  The most important thing in common is that we all not just believe, but know how important open information is to create a level playing field.
[01:23.650 --> 01:33.310]  Today, the most important grantor and guarantor of power is information.
[01:33.790 --> 01:41.150]  If information is closed, the few people that have access to it will have nearly unlimited power from its use.
[01:42.010 --> 02:03.750]  If we get a live connection, I'm going to demonstrate to you some private databases out there that, frankly, allow everyone to work as their own private investigator, allow moms to collect from deadbeat dads, background investigations, what have you, without having to rely on law enforcement or,
[02:03.970 --> 02:05.390]  even worse, the government.
[02:07.550 --> 02:27.830]  There is now a movement by so-called privacy advocates to close all information in the U.S., everything from driving records to vehicle records to property records to corporation ownership to permissible portions of your credit report, typically called credit headers.
[02:28.530 --> 02:36.590]  And the privacy advocates, because their argument sounds great, have been almost universally successful.
[02:36.970 --> 02:44.450]  You cannot access driving records anymore unless you go through a private investigator or you have a subpoena.
[02:45.070 --> 02:48.430]  An act was passed called the Driver Privacy Protection Act.
[02:48.930 --> 02:54.670]  You cannot, in the state of California, for example, access voter registration records.
[02:56.410 --> 03:06.450]  Real property records are in the process of being closed in Washington, D.C., which I guess is at the behest of all of the elected individuals that own property.
[03:07.710 --> 03:13.290]  After November 12th, every portion of credit records will be closed.
[03:13.290 --> 03:26.490]  You will need the same justification, Fair Credit Act justification, to obtain even a Social Security number verification that you now need to obtain a full credit report.
[03:27.090 --> 03:41.190]  The end result of this is going to be that the average person, 99.9% of the people in this country, will have no legal access to fairly essential data sources and information.
[03:41.190 --> 03:52.650]  Information which allows them to check the background of a nanny, collect the debt, verify that the person driving their school bus doesn't have a DUI conviction.
[03:53.710 --> 03:57.950]  Let me give you an example of some people who've slipped through the cracks.
[03:59.450 --> 04:18.590]  I just did a case in Washington where the administrative director of a law firm, when we redid his background investigation because he had just passed the bar and he wanted to become an attorney for the firm, we found out that the Bar Association had missed two prior convictions in Iowa,
[04:18.810 --> 04:20.510]  that he was a two-time loser.
[04:21.490 --> 04:26.090]  I'll give you the headlines from some newspaper articles.
[04:27.510 --> 04:33.450]  A former Orthodox priest was accused of stealing nearly $200,000 from his former employer.
[04:35.210 --> 04:40.350]  A former Green Run high school security officer was convicted of four misdemeanor charges.
[04:41.730 --> 04:44.990]  Teacher facing abuse charges can't tutor kids.
[04:47.950 --> 04:53.410]  A Monroe City nursing home administrator sentenced to life in prison without parole for a stabbing death.
[04:54.430 --> 05:08.870]  All of these people had prior arrests that would have shown up had their employer or the people responsible for screening them prior to hiring them had they been able to check background.
[05:13.350 --> 05:23.170]  While data is being closed, bizarrely, there is now more data available than ever, which ideally would be available to the masses.
[05:23.570 --> 05:34.070]  I know that DoubleClick and cookies and various other types of data gathering methods have been in the press lately.
[05:34.070 --> 05:47.990]  But the fact is, there are much better methods of gathering information that are being used today that provide a complete dossier on almost everyone in this room without their knowledge.
[05:48.730 --> 05:57.630]  Every computer today has a GUID, a universal identifier, which tracks that user's every step on the internet.
[05:57.630 --> 06:03.490]  It doesn't matter if they delete cookies after every session, that GUID is still reachable.
[06:03.810 --> 06:14.110]  If you've bought a Pentium 3 and you haven't actually taken the steps to turn off the Pentium chips serial number, that tracks you.
[06:14.490 --> 06:25.930]  If you have a high speed connection, especially DSL, ISDN, in your home, everywhere you go, your unique IP address tracks everything you've done.
[06:25.930 --> 06:32.370]  You can delete cookies, you can avoid DoubleClick, you can turn banners off, it won't help.
[06:33.650 --> 06:44.330]  In addition to that, for the past 20 years, every major marketing company in America has been developing and perfecting something called psychographics.
[06:44.630 --> 06:46.290]  I'm sure you've all heard of demographics.
[06:47.270 --> 06:49.650]  Demographics is ancient history.
[06:50.270 --> 06:51.750]  Psychographics is the way to go.
[06:51.750 --> 07:01.770]  For example, a million dollar study discovered that people who own cats and drive Volkswagens like Skippy Peanut Butter.
[07:02.830 --> 07:04.270]  It's an actual study.
[07:04.490 --> 07:11.910]  The vast majority of the people who own cats and drive Volkswagens, the Beetle, like Skippy Peanut Butter.
[07:12.210 --> 07:15.230]  Skippy Peanut Butter has marketed the hell out of those people.
[07:15.770 --> 07:21.750]  It is an innocent marketing study, but it's an example of what's possible.
[07:22.670 --> 07:23.630]  Mailing lists.
[07:24.570 --> 07:29.030]  If you are a member of the NRA, you probably own a gun.
[07:29.150 --> 07:31.290]  It's not guaranteed, but you probably own a gun.
[07:32.370 --> 07:36.530]  If you are a member of the AARP, you have certain characteristics.
[07:36.530 --> 07:41.210]  If you subscribe to Cat Fancier journal, you have certain characteristics.
[07:41.490 --> 07:43.130]  By the way, that's how the study was done.
[07:43.410 --> 08:03.530]  A company called RL Polk took all of the Volkswagen Beetle registrations from the country and cross-referenced it with people who either subscribe to various types of magazines and journals concerning cats, or who have purchased medication for cats, that sort of thing.
[08:03.710 --> 08:06.770]  And they were able to identify these people and market to them.
[08:07.730 --> 08:13.890]  If you subscribe to Soldier of Fortune magazine, you have a certain profile.
[08:14.130 --> 08:20.290]  If you subscribe to a journal for gay people, you are almost certainly gay.
[08:21.990 --> 08:32.650]  Today, anyone doing the minimal amount of research and spending a minimal amount of money can find out your likes, your dislikes, your sexual orientation, for sure your religion.
[08:33.610 --> 08:38.570]  I'm jewish and I have to tell you, every JEw in this country is on a mailing list.
[08:38.570 --> 08:53.450]  If you are jewish, you get just a remarkable number of solicitations from everything from the UJA to the Jewish Defense League to what have you.
[08:55.490 --> 08:57.770]  We may have a live connection.
[09:01.980 --> 09:05.060]  And you're saying this does not have a key logging program?
[09:09.790 --> 09:11.870]  Well, this is a demo account anyway.
[09:12.670 --> 09:14.030]  No, no, no, don't pull the wire.
[09:14.250 --> 09:15.030]  Please don't pull the wire.
[09:23.640 --> 09:24.000]  Well...
[09:26.200 --> 09:28.080]  Yes, and that's as far as we're getting.
[09:32.490 --> 09:33.350]  I'll tell you what you do.
[09:33.490 --> 09:37.170]  Take this laptop and try to connect to peoplefinder.net.
[09:37.570 --> 09:39.810]  When you connect, give it back to me.
[09:43.050 --> 09:47.770]  Let me tell you a little bit about peoplefinder.net in case by some miracle we actually get a connection.
[09:49.050 --> 09:57.470]  As an investigator, my company was just a massive consumer of every type of data possible.
[09:57.830 --> 10:06.850]  If you can locate someone or background someone or what have you without leaving your office, more the better.
[10:07.130 --> 10:13.270]  If before you go and interview a witness, you can find out everything possible about that witness, more the better.
[10:15.330 --> 10:31.090]  When databases first came into being, when I started out as an investigator more than 20 years ago, the technologically advanced investigators were the people who bought Kohl's directories and had them in their office and used them for crisscross and used them to reverse numbers.
[10:32.610 --> 10:41.110]  I would go to the New York Public Library on 42nd Street at least once a week because Kohl's directories were a thousand bucks back then.
[10:41.230 --> 10:43.550]  And I was a poor starving investigator.
[10:44.550 --> 10:51.410]  I would go down there and use their Nassau County reverse directory or their Queens reverse directory, which I couldn't afford.
[10:53.330 --> 11:05.770]  In 1992, when PhoneDisc came into being and you could reverse any number in the United States from your office, this was for me like the parting of the Red Sea.
[11:05.910 --> 11:06.550]  It was a miracle.
[11:07.310 --> 11:12.550]  And we realized that there was a trend that more and more data was going to become computer accessible.
[11:12.750 --> 11:14.090]  And we wanted it all.
[11:14.730 --> 11:19.430]  And we started buying up and back then this was before Bill Clinton was president.
[11:19.670 --> 11:21.710]  So records were pretty much open.
[11:21.930 --> 11:35.670]  We started buying up every driver license file from every state, every motor vehicle file, every voter registration file, every corporate file, every fictitious business name, every UCC file.
[11:35.790 --> 11:43.910]  For those of you who don't know what UCCs are, these are one of the best sources of investigative data on the planet.
[11:44.950 --> 11:45.930]  My hero.
[11:50.870 --> 11:51.890]  Bear with me.
[12:12.650 --> 12:14.110]  You know, I was going to impress everyone.
[12:14.110 --> 12:18.250]  I came with a wireless cellular modem and a laptop and I was going to walk around.
[12:25.890 --> 12:27.270]  I can't even log in.
[12:29.510 --> 12:37.070]  There's a guy, for those of you who can't see this, there's a guy holding together the phone jack with his thumb while I try to log on.
[12:37.190 --> 12:38.130]  I mean, this is pitiful.
[12:42.290 --> 12:50.990]  Well, if we get this working, let me tell you today, Diogenes has four point, which is what we named our database.
[12:51.430 --> 12:56.830]  Diogenes, the seeker after truth, has 4.1 billion records.
[12:57.170 --> 13:01.090]  Every single person in this room is in this database.
[13:01.710 --> 13:04.110]  This database is linked to every credit bureau.
[13:04.110 --> 13:14.430]  This database is linked to every corporate record, every property record, every voter registration record, which if someone can please help me log on, I will demonstrate.
[13:16.350 --> 13:17.850]  Anybody know anything about computers?
[13:21.130 --> 13:22.950]  My straight man over there.
[13:24.330 --> 13:27.210]  I see all sorts of tools coming over here.
[13:30.130 --> 13:32.850]  Hopefully, in about one second, I'm going to demonstrate this.
[13:33.950 --> 13:51.870]  Today, without leaving my office, I can find out where you live, where you work, who you live with, who you work with, more likely than not, your level of education, if not the school you attended, what you majored in.
[13:51.870 --> 13:54.750]  There are massive mailing lists for that sort of thing.
[13:55.570 --> 14:02.670]  And by the way, those of you that are starting college or in college now, do not reply to those credit card solicitations.
[14:03.010 --> 14:08.690]  Do not reply to those free student rate subscriptions, because we'll own you once you do.
[14:08.950 --> 14:10.710]  We will have everything on you.
[14:10.810 --> 14:12.630]  And we will track you forever.
[14:14.750 --> 14:17.770]  Today, sadly, something even I don't agree with.
[14:17.870 --> 14:21.330]  And I think all information should be gathered and be available.
[14:22.170 --> 14:26.130]  Thanks to the net and kid websites and that sort of thing.
[14:26.310 --> 14:30.290]  People are now being tracked from the age of as young as they can type.
[14:30.830 --> 14:32.290]  Seven or eight or nine or 10.
[14:33.410 --> 14:44.890]  By the time they actually turn 18 and start using their social security number, which they now have to apply for at birth instead of when they applied for a job.
[14:46.310 --> 14:49.350]  By the time they turn 18, we'll know everything about them.
[14:51.110 --> 15:03.750]  For those of you that have logged on to Amazon after you've deleted your cookies and they still tell you, well, based on your last logins, we know that you're interested in Chinese cooking and murder mysteries.
[15:04.290 --> 15:07.250]  It's because they keep massive data files of you.
[15:07.250 --> 15:08.970]  They don't need to check a cookie.
[15:09.510 --> 15:20.810]  For those of you that log on to eBay and you're directed to an auction on Japanese flatware, it's because they've kept track of who you are based on your login.
[15:21.310 --> 15:32.850]  And if you've in any way, shape or form connected your name to your login, email address and password, it's there in a database by your name.
[15:35.450 --> 15:51.210]  It is child's play, as I'm sure everyone in this room knows better than me, to determine just from a name where you're living, what node you're logging on from, and very, very easily correlating that to the most likely address.
[15:51.210 --> 15:59.030]  If your name is Bob Jones and you're logging in from Ottumwa, Iowa, there's a limited number of possibilities who you are.
[16:01.410 --> 16:16.190]  I can find out if you are gay or straight, if you're a jewish, Muslim, or Catholic, if you are a deadbeat or if you pay your debts, what your profession is, who you contribute to.
[16:16.690 --> 16:30.270]  And by the way, everyone who contributes to a political party and pays more than a fairly minuscule amount of money, your name, your address, your employer, and your position at that employer is now public record.
[16:30.270 --> 16:36.630]  I can go to fec.gov, download the file from your state, do a text search, and I got you.
[16:39.830 --> 16:49.230]  I just did a project with a, let's say an anti-fascist group, where I provided them with the name and address of everyone contributing to Lyndon LaRouche.
[16:49.590 --> 16:58.410]  For those of you who don't know who Lyndon LaRouche is, he sued the B'nai B'rith for calling him a small-time Hitler.
[16:58.410 --> 16:59.370]  He lost.
[17:00.090 --> 17:02.750]  He is, in fact, a small-time Hitler.
[17:05.230 --> 17:11.630]  Now everyone who's contributed to his campaign will be receiving a letter asking why.
[17:12.150 --> 17:14.070]  And hopefully they won't contribute again.
[17:14.570 --> 17:21.170]  I know it's not exactly supportive of the general political process, but what can I tell you?
[17:21.990 --> 17:23.030]  Are we connected?
[17:23.350 --> 17:23.750]  We are.
[17:23.870 --> 17:25.810]  I'm just trying to get to the site again to make sure.
[17:25.810 --> 17:26.250]  Okay.
[17:27.850 --> 17:36.610]  What I'm going to do while I say a quick, silent prayer to the logon gods is take some questions.
[17:36.970 --> 17:40.990]  Because this chat did not go exactly the way that I was hoping it would.
[17:41.150 --> 17:43.010]  I don't have a live connection.
[17:43.010 --> 17:51.930]  What I was hoping to do was walk everyone through a logon and then actually run some of you in the room, which, God willing, we'll do.
[17:53.070 --> 17:53.530]  24K.
[17:54.050 --> 17:54.830]  That's fine.
[17:55.470 --> 17:57.190]  There's no graphics on the website.
[17:57.870 --> 18:00.410]  If I can do one search, that's fine.
[18:03.070 --> 18:03.990]  Or not.
[18:05.490 --> 18:05.950]  Questions?
[18:06.930 --> 18:08.250]  Front row and I'll work my way back.
[18:08.250 --> 18:09.650]  If you want to find someone, you've got a name.
[18:09.850 --> 18:10.410]  Where do you find a name?
[18:10.910 --> 18:11.530]  Phone book.
[18:13.050 --> 18:13.850]  No joke.
[18:14.230 --> 18:14.610]  No joke.
[18:14.830 --> 18:15.230]  Phone book.
[18:15.610 --> 18:16.750]  Let me tell you, I did...
[18:16.750 --> 18:17.630]  What's the question?
[18:20.230 --> 18:21.490]  Please repeat a question.
[18:22.290 --> 18:23.010]  Oh, okay.
[18:23.230 --> 18:27.230]  The question is, if you have only a name and you want to find someone, where do you start?
[18:27.490 --> 18:28.910]  And the answer is the phone book.
[18:29.150 --> 18:33.190]  The vast majority of the people that you're looking for, believe it or not, are going to be in the phone book.
[18:33.190 --> 18:36.410]  I did a war crimes investigation up in Canada.
[18:36.770 --> 18:41.190]  We found 161 war criminals, over half of them in the phone book.
[18:41.470 --> 18:46.090]  Of course, we looked on the war criminal common Nazi, but...
[18:46.090 --> 18:46.950]  No, no.
[18:47.450 --> 18:49.790]  Bad, bad, bad, bad joke.
[18:50.170 --> 19:00.750]  We actually did find more than half of the war criminals we were looking for, just by taking phone disks, Canada databases.
[19:00.750 --> 19:04.750]  This was before Canada 411 was on the net and looking.
[19:04.990 --> 19:14.910]  And the rest we found through real property records, voter registration records, corporate records, driving records, motor vehicle records.
[19:15.350 --> 19:17.190]  These are all public records.
[19:19.310 --> 19:19.950]  No.
[19:21.450 --> 19:24.830]  But it's possible to access them for as little as a buck a lookup.
[19:24.830 --> 19:26.430]  So, don't be greedy.
[19:28.490 --> 19:29.510]  Tell who the question?
[19:30.390 --> 19:31.830]  You can't hear the question.
[19:32.050 --> 19:32.290]  Okay.
[19:32.510 --> 19:35.010]  His question, which I answered, so you're getting the question.
[19:35.090 --> 19:36.050]  I'm not going to answer it again.
[19:36.450 --> 19:38.190]  You're going to get the question after the answer.
[19:38.290 --> 19:42.530]  He wanted to know if you only have a name, how do you start looking for the person?
[19:42.890 --> 19:48.950]  And my suggestion to him was start with the phone book, and then move on to more difficult public records.
[19:48.950 --> 19:50.130]  Next question.
[19:51.030 --> 19:54.430]  If they're closing the gates on all info...
[19:54.430 --> 19:54.710]  Right.
[19:55.570 --> 20:01.390]  Then my question is, where do we stand since we're not you and you are?
[20:02.510 --> 20:05.170]  You are essentially screwed.
[20:06.070 --> 20:06.790]  Unless...
[20:06.790 --> 20:08.230]  Ah, repeat the question.
[20:08.670 --> 20:10.090]  You have to...
[20:10.090 --> 20:13.070]  Everybody asking you a question, remind me to repeat the question.
[20:14.370 --> 20:22.270]  His question was, since we are not you, meaning investigators, where do we stand as far as access to information?
[20:22.410 --> 20:23.590]  And the answer is, you're screwed.
[20:24.910 --> 20:30.410]  Unless the next Congress can be talked to, unless the next president, which...
[20:30.410 --> 20:33.490]  I'm not going to tell you who I hope it is, because I'll get booed.
[20:34.670 --> 20:35.390]  George Bush.
[20:37.090 --> 20:37.590]  Unless...
[20:37.590 --> 20:38.130]  Unless...
[20:38.710 --> 20:39.210]  Unless...
[20:39.210 --> 20:41.930]  Unless someone other than a Democrat is elected, I don't...
[20:41.930 --> 20:43.930]  Ralph Nader would be just fine with me.
[20:44.510 --> 20:48.290]  But someone other than a Democrat, so records will stay open.
[20:48.710 --> 20:50.410]  I mean, it's perverse.
[20:50.610 --> 20:54.070]  You know, Democrats are supposed to be the men of the people, but they close all the records.
[20:54.210 --> 20:55.590]  Under Republicans, they're all open.
[20:55.750 --> 20:57.230]  I haven't figured that out yet.
[20:58.510 --> 20:59.010]  Um...
[20:59.010 --> 21:09.090]  You will still be able to go onto the net and do searches through PeopleFinder.net, through Noex, through Merlin data.
[21:09.930 --> 21:11.190]  Merlin's really high-priced.
[21:11.270 --> 21:11.890]  Don't go to them.
[21:12.990 --> 21:13.470]  Uh...
[21:13.470 --> 21:14.450]  Through, uh...
[21:15.150 --> 21:16.690]  LocateFast, outfits like that.
[21:16.930 --> 21:24.590]  But you're going to be paying per lookup, and once the records are firmly closed, I guarantee you everybody's prices are going to quadruple.
[21:25.050 --> 21:31.270]  So it's going to cost you a hundred bucks to do a trace that right now you can do for nothing, and nobody even knows you're doing the trace.
[21:31.270 --> 21:32.850]  which is as it should be.
[21:33.070 --> 21:34.230]  Why are you entitled?
[21:34.710 --> 21:35.990]  Why am I entitled?
[21:36.090 --> 21:36.710]  After they close.
[21:37.790 --> 21:39.610]  Well, first of all, because I own the company.
[21:40.630 --> 21:45.030]  And I spent a ton of money building this database, buying up data.
[21:45.830 --> 21:46.350]  Uh...
[21:46.350 --> 21:48.010]  I own the data in-house.
[21:48.210 --> 21:52.270]  I bought it legally, and there's a guy playing with the laptop.
[21:52.530 --> 21:54.130]  Hopefully you will see the database.
[21:55.070 --> 21:55.590]  Um...
[21:55.590 --> 21:56.530]  PeopleFinder.net?
[21:57.230 --> 21:58.210]  PeopleFinder.net.
[21:58.950 --> 21:59.710]  PeopleFinder.net.
[22:01.410 --> 22:01.950]  Um...
[22:01.950 --> 22:07.210]  In addition, certain records are open to certain licensed classes of people.
[22:07.550 --> 22:09.430]  Let me tell you what I had to do to be an investigator.
[22:09.810 --> 22:14.570]  I had to have three years of law enforcement experience above the rank of patrolman.
[22:14.570 --> 22:17.630]  I had to submit my fingerprints, my photograph.
[22:18.550 --> 22:24.430]  Not just to the state of New York, and the state of Texas, and the state of Louisiana, and the state of California.
[22:24.770 --> 22:28.910]  Each place where you're licensed, you have to submit another license application.
[22:29.870 --> 22:31.590]  I had to go through a background check.
[22:31.750 --> 22:33.970]  The FBI ran my prints each time.
[22:34.170 --> 22:36.750]  I had to submit five reference affidavits.
[22:36.890 --> 22:38.910]  I had to submit three background affidavits.
[22:40.070 --> 22:42.690]  Basically, I had to go through a proctology exam.
[22:44.290 --> 22:44.810]  Um...
[22:44.810 --> 22:45.450]  Pretty close.
[22:45.450 --> 22:48.070]  That may eventually come to be.
[22:49.950 --> 22:50.510]  Uh...
[22:51.110 --> 22:54.570]  And the only benefit of that is, um...
[22:54.570 --> 22:59.450]  I can wear this suit, have a short haircut, and get driver license records.
[22:59.690 --> 23:00.430]  That's about it.
[23:02.050 --> 23:02.490]  Um...
[23:02.490 --> 23:03.830]  A question on that case.
[23:04.310 --> 23:09.830]  So, at the back pages of publications like Soldier of Fortune, which I did not subscribe to, but...
[23:09.830 --> 23:13.110]  Actually, you need to raise your hand, but I will take your question.
[23:13.250 --> 23:13.510]  Okay.
[23:13.810 --> 23:18.490]  At the back pages, they have advertisements for something like...
[23:19.830 --> 23:22.670]  Yes, I actually subscribe to Soldier of Fortune.
[23:22.830 --> 23:23.430]  Okay, well...
[23:24.030 --> 23:25.470]  You're in the database, I'm not.
[23:25.570 --> 23:25.970]  But I...
[23:25.970 --> 23:26.890]  Just to read the articles.
[23:27.490 --> 23:27.650]  Yeah.
[23:28.490 --> 23:31.950]  They have advertisements for private investigation courses.
[23:32.170 --> 23:32.350]  Yes.
[23:32.850 --> 23:34.230]  It would something like...
[23:34.230 --> 23:35.670]  Useless and a scam.
[23:36.150 --> 23:36.470]  Okay.
[23:36.530 --> 23:42.750]  There's a guy, in fact, right now, by the name of John Grogan, who's being investigated in the state of California, I'm told, is a result of that.
[23:43.990 --> 23:49.850]  That does not give you the slightest iota of qualification for licensing.
[23:50.170 --> 23:55.330]  At least not in the state of New York, or Texas, or Florida, or California, or any place that I know about.
[23:55.330 --> 23:59.630]  You have to have actual, honest-to-God, prior investigative experience.
[24:00.370 --> 24:01.170]  It's a scam.
[24:01.650 --> 24:04.790]  And by the way, you don't learn any...
[24:04.790 --> 24:10.530]  Frankly, the most mediocre hacker could go in there and teach a better course.
[24:10.730 --> 24:12.410]  So, don't waste your money.
[24:12.410 --> 24:13.470]  Okay.
[24:13.470 --> 24:13.590]  Ma 'am.
[24:13.850 --> 24:14.450]  Yes, thank you.
[24:14.910 --> 24:15.270]  Question.
[24:16.310 --> 24:24.390]  This lady's child was taken from her at birth 30 years ago in Washington, D.C.
[24:24.390 --> 24:24.910]  Okay.
[24:25.230 --> 24:31.970]  And adopted immediately at birth 30 years ago.
[24:32.010 --> 24:34.170]  You're saying with her consent or without her consent?
[24:35.830 --> 24:36.830]  I'm sure.
[24:37.170 --> 24:39.850]  So, it's my friend's sister.
[24:39.850 --> 24:42.310]  She has her sister's name, who is D.C.
[24:43.710 --> 24:44.270]  And...
[24:44.270 --> 24:46.450]  In other words, how do we find this person?
[24:46.510 --> 24:46.850]  Right?
[24:47.210 --> 25:00.190]  This is a really good question because it leads into a whole discussion about not only how massive data is available now, but how it's cross-referenced in ways never dreamed of.
[25:00.890 --> 25:03.570]  There is a rule of databases.
[25:04.130 --> 25:10.450]  Data always gets used for all kinds of purposes it was never intended to be used for.
[25:11.650 --> 25:15.450]  We have records in our system now that can be searched.
[25:15.650 --> 25:16.490]  And not just us.
[25:16.770 --> 25:20.530]  All the credit bureaus, all of the bigger companies.
[25:23.950 --> 25:24.550]  Okay.
[25:25.050 --> 25:29.030]  Once you connect to peoplefinder.net, what you're going to do is disconnect that.
[25:29.030 --> 25:31.210]  So the whole room doesn't see my login.
[25:32.630 --> 25:33.270]  Nothing.
[25:33.450 --> 25:34.950]  Nothing personal, guys.
[25:39.990 --> 25:41.710]  Yeah, everyone cover your eyes.
[25:46.870 --> 25:47.510]  Well...
[25:48.270 --> 25:48.910]  Great.
[25:49.690 --> 25:50.710]  You know what?
[25:50.930 --> 25:52.010]  The laptop crashed.
[25:55.790 --> 25:56.990]  It's acting up.
[25:58.190 --> 26:04.310]  The honor of the Apple users group is in your hands.
[26:07.090 --> 26:09.010]  The Macintosh Apple users group.
[26:09.810 --> 26:12.290]  Which, now you know why I quit ten years ago.
[26:14.310 --> 26:20.930]  It is now possible to search, for example, for a female just by first name and date of birth.
[26:22.130 --> 26:25.310]  It is now possible to search just by date of birth.
[26:25.530 --> 26:30.570]  The answer to your question is, by the way, when you adopt somebody, they keep the same date of birth.
[26:31.490 --> 26:32.990]  Even if their name is changed.
[26:32.990 --> 26:44.270]  And while actually you're talking about the easiest type of search, the hardest type of search is someone who says, I've been adopted, please find my birth parents.
[26:44.850 --> 26:49.830]  Because then you have to do all kinds of monkey business, which I won't admit to in this room.
[26:50.530 --> 27:00.630]  What you're telling me is, you actually know that this person was adopted, you know their date of birth, and you know the place and date of adoption.
[27:00.630 --> 27:01.970]  You don't know the date of birth.
[27:02.750 --> 27:05.870]  You don't know when the child was born?
[27:06.050 --> 27:08.670]  He does not know when her sister gave birth.
[27:09.490 --> 27:11.010]  Is her sister now dead?
[27:11.170 --> 27:11.470]  Yes.
[27:11.870 --> 27:12.350]  Uh huh.
[27:13.570 --> 27:13.850]  Really?
[27:14.810 --> 27:15.650]  Very sad.
[27:16.310 --> 27:17.770]  I can find the kid for you.
[27:17.910 --> 27:25.450]  And let me tell you, without trying to be the man from behind the curtain in Oz, let me tell you exactly how I would do it.
[27:26.790 --> 27:30.050]  I would send you, ideally, so I wouldn't have to charge you.
[27:30.050 --> 27:35.950]  Down to the courthouse to search all the adoptions within a three or four month period.
[27:36.770 --> 27:40.630]  The adoption records of who did the adoption are open.
[27:41.170 --> 27:43.110]  Who gave birth is what's closed.
[27:43.510 --> 27:49.890]  But since you're only trying to find the person, you get the name of the person, you get the date of birth of the person.
[27:50.390 --> 27:52.830]  I can run that name and date of birth nationwide.
[27:54.930 --> 27:57.770]  In 45 seconds, I'll have the person's address for you.
[27:58.830 --> 28:01.350]  You couldn't do that five years ago or ten years ago.
[28:01.590 --> 28:03.130]  You couldn't do it five years ago.
[28:03.950 --> 28:09.190]  Now, the average investigator who calls you up and says, you know, this was a really hard case.
[28:09.930 --> 28:13.090]  I found this person all the way out in Milwaukee.
[28:13.510 --> 28:15.510]  You go, oh, my God, this is incredible.
[28:15.650 --> 28:20.010]  This $5,000 bill he's presenting me is unbelievably reasonable.
[28:20.250 --> 28:28.010]  What he did was is, he looked in the book of public record researchers, called up somebody in the local courthouse, sent him down there.
[28:28.010 --> 28:38.910]  They pulled the record, charged them $40 plus parking, faxed them the information, he spent another $5 on databases, he charged you $5,000 bucks.
[28:39.910 --> 28:45.270]  Every single person in this room has a right to have access to that type of information and that type of ability.
[28:45.270 --> 28:47.990]  Now, there are some exceptions.
[28:49.450 --> 28:55.990]  There has to be, clearly there has to be, new penalties for misuse of information.
[28:57.110 --> 29:10.490]  I wouldn't want every James Bardo, who is the person who pulled Rebecca Schaefer's driver's license and tracked her down and shot her, I wouldn't want every James Bardo to have access to every possible information source.
[29:11.630 --> 29:21.090]  But 99.999% of the people, maybe not in this room, but in the world at large, are not a danger to access information.
[29:23.770 --> 29:26.270]  I know that was a longer answer than you wanted.
[29:26.610 --> 29:32.990]  Come and talk to me afterwards, I'll give you my card, you do the hard work, I'll run it through my database for nothing.
[29:35.370 --> 29:40.590]  You seem quite convinced that you can dredge up all this information based on the name.
[29:40.770 --> 29:41.210]  Yes.
[29:41.430 --> 29:42.130]  I guarantee your
[29:45.620 --> 29:47.140]  name is not a unique identifier.
[29:47.700 --> 29:53.440]  I often receive bills for student loans that I allegedly...
[29:53.440 --> 29:55.000]  Yeah, and you claim they're not yours, huh?
[29:55.400 --> 29:55.640]  Right.
[29:56.440 --> 29:57.240]  They're not.
[29:57.700 --> 29:59.180]  That's the point I'm trying to make.
[29:59.300 --> 29:59.940]  Please address...
[29:59.940 --> 30:00.920]  There are...
[30:02.400 --> 30:18.160]  Well, let me tell you, anybody that works on a name alone, unless it's something like Antanas Kentstavichius, which was an actual case of mine, is of course a pretty piss poor investigator.
[30:18.620 --> 30:21.200]  You have to use what's known as identifiers.
[30:21.820 --> 30:27.260]  Identifiers can be anything from a date of birth, a social security number, a last known address.
[30:27.260 --> 30:31.960]  And believe me, with a name and any identifier, I own you.
[30:32.700 --> 30:35.840]  With your name and address, I can get your date of birth.
[30:36.100 --> 30:39.560]  With your name and address and date of birth, I can get your social security number.
[30:39.840 --> 30:44.640]  It will cost me a maximum of six bucks to do that.
[30:45.340 --> 30:51.080]  And it will take me a maximum of two 60-second searches, so two minutes.
[30:51.560 --> 30:58.760]  Once I've got your name, your date of birth, and your social security number, I think you'll agree I can pretty much get anything.
[31:00.260 --> 31:01.500]  You're absolutely correct.
[31:01.740 --> 31:04.820]  Operating on just the name is slipshot investigation.
[31:05.400 --> 31:06.460]  Maybe not your name.
[31:13.740 --> 31:18.100]  I think they've been as careful as me for the past hundred years.
[31:18.420 --> 31:22.820]  For the past hundred years, it has been legal for me to get your driving record.
[31:23.000 --> 31:26.520]  It has been legal for me to get your voter registration record.
[31:26.520 --> 31:33.040]  It has been legal for me to get your motor vehicle, property, corporations, so on and so forth.
[31:33.260 --> 31:41.060]  Don't you think it's appropriate, for example, that before I extend you a loan, I should know your financial history and your payment history?
[31:41.340 --> 31:49.200]  Before I hire you to drive my kid's school bus or be my kid's nanny, I should check your driving record and your criminal record?
[31:49.700 --> 31:55.800]  If you are a deadbeat dad, and that's why you're not paying your student loans, shouldn't I be able to collect from you?
[31:57.480 --> 32:02.580]  If you... I do a lot of investigation of what's called sophisticated financial frauds.
[32:03.200 --> 32:12.820]  And you would be astounded how easy it is to set up an alter ego, a new identity, just by using a corporation and giving a phony personal name.
[32:12.820 --> 32:25.380]  Shouldn't I be able to find out who really owns that corporation and do other things that lead me to you and allow me to deliver to the police a packet that they can't avoid?
[32:25.600 --> 32:26.440]  Let me tell you something.
[32:26.740 --> 32:30.200]  There is nothing that I can do that the police can't do a hundred times better.
[32:31.400 --> 32:37.640]  The problem is the police aren't interested in most things that you and I would consider significant.
[32:39.240 --> 32:41.000]  I'm doing a case for a woman right now.
[32:41.120 --> 32:42.120]  I won't give you her last name.
[32:42.380 --> 32:43.440]  Our first name is Rita.
[32:45.520 --> 32:47.740]  Rita's husband was a psychiatrist.
[32:48.960 --> 32:51.160]  They lived in a beautiful Park Avenue apartment.
[32:52.700 --> 32:53.760]  Multi-millionaires.
[32:54.160 --> 32:58.020]  He was on the side.
[32:58.140 --> 33:01.200]  He was, let's say, a talent agent for a big rock group.
[33:01.800 --> 33:06.020]  One day he embezzled $15 million from the rock group and off he went to The Hague.
[33:07.240 --> 33:08.920]  Rita's now living in a homeless shelter.
[33:09.180 --> 33:10.860]  Her kids are scattered with relatives.
[33:11.140 --> 33:13.080]  She has no way to track this guy down.
[33:13.280 --> 33:16.260]  By using databases, I was able to track the guy down.
[33:16.540 --> 33:22.160]  By going on Martindale-Hubble, I was able to find her a lawyer in France, which is where he's living now.
[33:23.240 --> 33:29.840]  The judgment against him, which is entered in the US, which is useless here, will be entered in France.
[33:29.840 --> 33:33.660]  And using just public record databases, we're going to be able to collect the debt.
[33:33.920 --> 33:40.160]  We will also be able to tell the Marshal Service where this guy is and goose him along into arresting him.
[33:41.240 --> 33:45.020]  Most things that you consider important, the police don't consider important.
[33:45.340 --> 33:47.380]  Someone scammed you out of $15,000?
[33:47.940 --> 33:49.040]  That's your problem.
[33:49.280 --> 33:50.780]  We've got murders to worry about.
[33:54.120 --> 33:56.500]  Your nanny may have molested your kid.
[33:56.760 --> 33:57.640]  Well, you know what?
[33:57.880 --> 34:00.540]  We've got honest-to-God rapes and you've only got a maybe.
[34:00.840 --> 34:02.180]  And so on and so forth.
[34:02.780 --> 34:05.740]  You need to be able to access information yourself.
[34:06.180 --> 34:12.820]  You need to be able to find out what you need to know to be safe, to be happy, to protect your interests.
[34:12.820 --> 34:15.080]  It's just common sense.
[34:15.220 --> 34:16.720]  It's called empowering the common man.
[34:18.120 --> 34:18.960]  You know what?
[34:19.120 --> 34:20.860]  The best analogy is guns.
[34:22.320 --> 34:25.520]  There are 80 million legal... I don't know where you stand on guns.
[34:25.800 --> 34:26.900]  Don't really care.
[34:27.600 --> 34:30.420]  There are 80 million legal guns in this country.
[34:31.160 --> 34:35.280]  The vast, vast majority of gun owners are not running around shooting people.
[34:35.660 --> 34:41.760]  The vast majority of people who are shooting people are felons who couldn't own guns in the first place.
[34:41.760 --> 34:44.160]  And they're using stolen or illegally obtained guns.
[34:44.660 --> 34:49.400]  That's absolutely analogous to the situation with information right now.
[34:49.820 --> 35:04.040]  Any good hacker, any unscrupulous investigator, any so-called information broker can get your credit card bills, can get your phone bills, can do all sorts of things, everything you can imagine.
[35:05.120 --> 35:06.340]  It's not legal.
[35:06.340 --> 35:11.360]  But somebody who wants to legally protect their rights and interests can't.
[35:12.320 --> 35:13.580]  So, next question.
[35:15.780 --> 35:20.040]  You spoke about the possibility of remaining anonymous on the internet.
[35:20.480 --> 35:22.780]  In terms of remaining anonymous on the internet.
[35:22.840 --> 35:23.980]  Remaining anonymous on the internet.
[35:24.320 --> 35:28.220]  Do you know anything about zero-knowledge systems and their freedom network?
[35:28.220 --> 35:31.840]  All of these systems are...
[35:32.480 --> 35:34.260]  Look, there are some outfits...
[35:35.040 --> 35:39.000]  I've actually never used zero-knowledge because I'm a Mac guy and they only have Windows software.
[35:39.980 --> 35:42.480]  Although after today, I'm no longer a Mac guy.
[35:43.440 --> 35:44.840]  I'm sorry, there's a Mac beta?
[35:45.180 --> 35:51.460]  Okay, well, then I'll be able to speak more authoritatively about it once I've got the Mac system.
[35:51.460 --> 36:00.420]  But I can tell you, almost certainly, anyone determined to break through that type of proxy firewall is going to be able to do it.
[36:00.880 --> 36:04.500]  They're going to be able to do it by seeing where you surf.
[36:05.520 --> 36:07.600]  Sooner or later, you're going to send out email.
[36:07.700 --> 36:13.080]  Even if it's filtered through their email address, there's going to be something in the text of that email.
[36:13.080 --> 36:20.900]  And unless you're using zero-knowledge and PGP and a public terminal in a cybercafe, you've got no hope.
[36:22.820 --> 36:25.560]  The GUID on your system is going to turn you in.
[36:26.840 --> 36:31.060]  The chips that are appearing on all Intel machines are going to turn you in.
[36:31.820 --> 36:37.580]  Where you go, what you do, your email, the contents of your email, it's all going to turn you in.
[36:37.580 --> 36:43.620]  And by the way, if you want to post to a news group, forget about it.
[36:45.500 --> 36:50.020]  All Usenet postings can now be scanned by anyone.
[36:50.340 --> 36:51.880]  I mean, forget about Deja News.
[36:52.160 --> 37:02.880]  Any newsreader can scan all Newsnet postings, all Newsgroup postings, all Net postings, by any keyword, by any name, by any combination of keywords.
[37:02.880 --> 37:16.500]  If they're looking for a guy, Bob in Milwaukee, it's possible to do an intelligent information search and find you no matter what proxy firewall you're using, what bogus email address you're using.
[37:16.680 --> 37:18.400]  It's just not possible.
[37:18.620 --> 37:24.800]  And one of the things that makes it really not possible is the massive amount of computing power available to anyone.
[37:25.280 --> 37:32.000]  The computing power in my office right now is greater than what was available to the credit bureaus five years ago.
[37:32.000 --> 37:38.820]  The computing power of the credit bureaus today is really on a par with the CIA.
[37:39.220 --> 37:41.760]  Forget about Big Brothers, CIA, NSA.
[37:43.220 --> 37:47.240]  Yes, it's true, they gather every scrap of knowledge that's out there.
[37:47.520 --> 37:49.140]  But they never look at it.
[37:49.300 --> 37:52.440]  And if they do look at it, they don't know what the hell it is.
[37:52.440 --> 38:04.560]  The people for you to worry about are private industry, private companies who have a financial interest in looking up your behind, in knowing everything about you.
[38:04.740 --> 38:11.640]  The CIA, unless you're a terrorist or planning... not even a hacker, let me tell you that...
[38:12.320 --> 38:17.620]  Unless you're a good hacker, a really good hacker, and then they only want to identify you to hire you.
[38:17.620 --> 38:24.400]  So, CIA really doesn't care about that unless you're in the process of committing a crime.
[38:26.300 --> 38:32.500]  Private industry desperately wants to know who you are, your likes, your dislikes, your residents, everyone in your family.
[38:32.500 --> 38:33.640]  Do you have small children?
[38:34.040 --> 38:35.460]  Does your wife have diabetes?
[38:35.460 --> 38:40.220]  The most intrusive thing you can imagine is worth money to them.
[38:40.660 --> 38:42.300]  And money makes the world go round.
[38:42.460 --> 38:52.080]  So they are going to use that profit motive to gather up every scrap of information about you and extrapolate out using unbelievably accurate psychographics.
[38:52.500 --> 38:53.720]  Unbelievably accurate.
[38:55.120 --> 38:59.560]  Take a really accurate profile of you, match it to your name and address.
[38:59.720 --> 39:00.140]  Forget it.
[39:00.240 --> 39:01.520]  They've got your name and address.
[39:01.520 --> 39:03.080]  And your date of birth.
[39:03.560 --> 39:05.240]  And your social security number.
[39:05.680 --> 39:07.420]  And they're going to mark it like mad to you.
[39:08.560 --> 39:10.340]  So, that's what you need to worry about.
[39:12.320 --> 39:13.460]  You shouldn't care.
[39:13.940 --> 39:15.040]  You shouldn't care.
[39:15.160 --> 39:16.420]  And that's a point I want to make.
[39:16.900 --> 39:29.020]  I know that everybody here is running around with some kind of screen name on their badge and worried about Big Brother or Little Sister or what have you.
[39:29.340 --> 39:32.720]  A normal person has no real reason to hide.
[39:34.080 --> 39:38.720]  A normal person should not care if I know you like Skippy Peanut Butter.
[39:39.000 --> 39:45.120]  A normal person should not care if I know that you have an 80% mortgage on your house.
[39:45.120 --> 39:47.340]  All right, it's kind of embarrassing, but big deal.
[39:48.520 --> 39:51.560]  A normal person should not be concerned about this.
[39:51.720 --> 39:59.780]  Now, mind you, there are extreme examples where you really deserve your privacy.
[39:59.780 --> 40:02.380]  And the people who intrude into it are scum.
[40:03.820 --> 40:07.760]  Anti-abortion groups who copy down license plates at abortion clinics.
[40:07.760 --> 40:17.180]  And then, after this unbelievably traumatic experience that the woman has gone through, sends them a letter saying, before you kill your next child, and so on and so forth.
[40:17.340 --> 40:21.420]  This was one of the reasons why they closed driver license records, sadly.
[40:23.020 --> 40:25.020]  That's well, well beyond the line.
[40:25.180 --> 40:30.780]  But most of you, unless you're a career criminal, you've got nothing to worry about.
[40:30.860 --> 40:34.900]  And if you are a career criminal, speaking as an investigator, I want to know everything about you.
[40:36.240 --> 40:37.820]  One more follow-up.
[40:38.440 --> 40:45.020]  What's the motivation behind those who want to close things up?
[40:46.180 --> 40:48.280]  That's a phenomenal question.
[40:49.240 --> 40:50.580]  No, I'm not going to do that.
[40:50.700 --> 40:52.380]  It was a phenomenal question if you didn't hear it.
[40:52.500 --> 40:52.760]  No.
[40:53.820 --> 40:57.280]  What's the motivation behind the people who want to close the records?
[40:58.080 --> 40:59.000]  You know what?
[40:59.320 --> 41:14.280]  First of all, there is a certain political mindset among people who are frozen in amber in the 60s, who believe that the individual must be anonymous.
[41:15.220 --> 41:18.940]  Big Brother is out there looking at everyone.
[41:20.920 --> 41:22.640]  Tell her I'll be done in a couple of minutes.
[41:23.240 --> 41:27.300]  Big Brother is out there looking at everyone, and we have to close all these records.
[41:27.560 --> 41:28.620]  Let me tell you something.
[41:28.740 --> 41:30.800]  These are records that are maintained by Big Brother.
[41:30.800 --> 41:34.380]  So all you're doing is hurting the private citizen.
[41:34.640 --> 41:36.820]  And disempowering the private citizen.
[41:37.020 --> 41:38.920]  There's that type of person.
[41:39.460 --> 41:42.280]  Then there are people who, honest to God, have something to hide.
[41:42.460 --> 41:44.860]  And they've got a hideously selfish motive.
[41:45.860 --> 41:47.120]  Bless you, my son.
[41:49.220 --> 41:50.420]  All right.
[41:51.200 --> 41:52.260]  Let's see.
[41:52.260 --> 41:54.220]  What's that hideous selfish motive?
[41:54.940 --> 41:57.700]  They want to hide negative things about themselves.
[41:58.240 --> 42:00.360]  I just got to see if this logs on.
[42:00.520 --> 42:02.540]  And I will finish answering the question.
[42:05.440 --> 42:06.440]  Please work.
[42:08.920 --> 42:09.440]  Wait.
[42:18.040 --> 42:19.100]  Wait, wait, wait.
[42:19.440 --> 42:20.760]  I press log on.
[42:20.880 --> 42:21.960]  I've got the little hourglass.
[42:22.200 --> 42:23.340]  It's doing nothing.
[42:23.880 --> 42:24.220]  Yeah?
[42:25.120 --> 42:26.160]  Well, hook it up.
[42:26.160 --> 42:27.620]  Let's see what happens.
[42:29.180 --> 42:32.860]  You can all share my annoyance on the screen.
[42:34.420 --> 42:35.680]  Back to your question.
[42:35.980 --> 42:37.740]  There are people who are misguided.
[42:37.920 --> 42:39.540]  There are people who have selfish motives.
[42:39.860 --> 42:44.980]  And there are people who have bought into the argument that privacy is great.
[42:45.300 --> 42:47.380]  People deserve their anonymity.
[42:47.480 --> 42:50.900]  You know, in the words of the Supreme Court Justice, the right to be left alone.
[42:51.660 --> 42:52.660]  It's bull.
[42:52.660 --> 42:54.600]  It's absolute bull.
[42:54.860 --> 43:00.480]  When you close these records, the only people that you're denying access to are you.
[43:01.080 --> 43:02.720]  Government will still have complete access.
[43:02.920 --> 43:03.520]  Believe me.
[43:04.700 --> 43:06.380]  Hackers will still have complete access.
[43:06.560 --> 43:07.620]  That may be you anyway.
[43:07.860 --> 43:10.280]  But hackers will still have complete access.
[43:10.620 --> 43:13.420]  People willing to break the law will still have complete access.
[43:13.620 --> 43:14.760]  I can get your phone bill.
[43:14.860 --> 43:15.880]  I can get your credit card bill.
[43:15.940 --> 43:16.540]  It's not legal.
[43:16.900 --> 43:17.860]  I can get it.
[43:17.960 --> 43:19.820]  I can get it with a phone call.
[43:21.160 --> 43:25.260]  The only people that you're hurting are the decent private citizens.
[43:25.780 --> 43:34.560]  So I think it's a combination of people with a weaselly political agenda, or people with something to hide, or misguided people.
[43:34.740 --> 43:44.400]  I cannot think of a single good reason to close the type of public record data that's out there now.
[43:49.960 --> 43:50.840]  All right.
[43:52.580 --> 43:55.540]  Yes, I'm up there, but the screen is dead here.
[43:56.420 --> 43:59.920]  Well, let's see if I can... This is like Chinese water torture.
[44:02.940 --> 44:03.500]  Okay.
[44:04.600 --> 44:09.520]  As this takes like one hour to pull up the search screen, I'll take another question.
[44:10.400 --> 44:10.960]  Somebody.
[44:12.280 --> 44:13.000]  Ma'am.
[44:13.720 --> 44:14.440]  Ma'am.
[44:15.160 --> 44:16.260]  I'm being polite.
[44:17.500 --> 44:19.920]  I spent too... Oh, you're a guy?
[44:20.160 --> 44:20.440]  No.
[44:20.880 --> 44:21.480]  Oh, okay.
[44:22.960 --> 44:25.220]  You're from New York and you're surprised I was polite.
[44:27.620 --> 44:28.020]  Okay.
[44:28.020 --> 44:29.660]  I will never call you ma'am again.
[44:29.860 --> 44:30.640]  Yo, what do you want?
[44:32.360 --> 44:41.600]  I want to know if there's any way that, with my permission, we can look at everything that you can find in your database when you're saying about me today.
[44:41.800 --> 44:44.780]  Not here, but I'll give you my card and we'll talk about it.
[44:44.780 --> 44:47.620]  Okay, for free, because I just want to know what the...
[44:48.840 --> 44:52.060]  You know, that for free just slips in there, boy.
[44:52.840 --> 44:54.000]  We'll talk about it.
[44:58.240 --> 45:00.220]  What if you only have a girl's maiden name?
[45:00.400 --> 45:01.620]  Do you have her date of birth?
[45:03.520 --> 45:03.960]  No.
[45:04.420 --> 45:08.280]  Does she have a really unique first name like Morticia?
[45:10.240 --> 45:11.180]  What's her first name?
[45:12.880 --> 45:13.280]  Ernestine.
[45:13.280 --> 45:13.300]  Ernestine?
[45:13.540 --> 45:14.060]  Good luck.
[45:14.780 --> 45:16.260]  All you know is I'm looking for...
[45:16.260 --> 45:19.320]  In other words, you're basically want to check every Ernestine in America?
[45:19.680 --> 45:22.940]  Well, I would assume she's still in New York and have to get an address.
[45:23.360 --> 45:23.700]  Oh.
[45:24.400 --> 45:24.800]  Yes.
[45:25.680 --> 45:26.860]  I would run her address.
[45:27.060 --> 45:29.200]  We'll do her as a test case in a second.
[45:31.460 --> 45:32.920]  Don't, don't, don't...
[45:32.920 --> 45:33.520]  Oh, wait a second.
[45:33.680 --> 45:34.060]  Are you...
[45:34.060 --> 45:35.580]  Can I, can I see some ID please?
[45:36.200 --> 45:36.600]  No, no, no.
[45:37.080 --> 45:40.920]  This isn't like someone who served you with a restraining order, is it?
[45:41.580 --> 45:42.020]  All right.
[45:42.980 --> 45:46.420]  I'm going to take two more questions and then I'm going to demo a couple of searches.
[45:46.920 --> 45:52.200]  Just let me, before this thing disconnects, let me go to trace person.
[45:54.380 --> 45:54.840]  Okay.
[45:56.600 --> 45:57.880]  This is ridiculous.
[46:00.180 --> 46:05.040]  You know, we have two T1s in my office and I'm reduced to a 2400 line.
[46:05.240 --> 46:05.960]  It's amazing.
[46:06.480 --> 46:06.940]  Okay.
[46:07.220 --> 46:08.200]  Uh, is that a question?
[46:11.580 --> 46:12.600]  Where would I start?
[46:12.800 --> 46:13.960]  I would run her address.
[46:14.220 --> 46:17.020]  I would look at everybody at her last known address.
[46:17.500 --> 46:19.780]  Cause we've got 15 years of data in here.
[46:20.020 --> 46:21.800]  I would find her first name.
[46:22.760 --> 46:24.580]  I would then have her last name.
[46:24.860 --> 46:27.860]  And with her last name and her address, I would move on.
[46:27.980 --> 46:30.480]  And by the way, in my database, I'd also have her date of birth.
[46:30.860 --> 46:34.820]  And I could run just her first name and her date of birth and get her new name.
[46:35.120 --> 46:40.520]  That's without spending a whole $2.75 and pulling her credit header.
[46:41.260 --> 46:41.700]  Yeah.
[46:41.840 --> 46:42.520]  I have a question.
[46:42.900 --> 46:46.480]  All of these corporations already have all of this data on us, right?
[46:47.040 --> 46:50.200]  Um, some corporations have some.
[46:50.200 --> 46:51.980]  Some corporations have others.
[46:52.260 --> 46:52.960]  Or they compile.
[46:53.080 --> 46:56.640]  The, the marketers cross-reference and compile.
[46:57.100 --> 47:01.340]  So why would the government, the Democrats, I can just mention.
[47:01.980 --> 47:02.960]  Where are you from?
[47:03.220 --> 47:03.640]  Canada.
[47:05.720 --> 47:07.740]  161 war criminals I found in Canada.
[47:07.740 --> 47:09.240]  You're lucky that's all you found.
[47:09.440 --> 47:09.680]  Yep.
[47:10.080 --> 47:11.120]  Anyways, back to the point.
[47:11.680 --> 47:13.040]  They have this information.
[47:13.240 --> 47:14.020]  They use it for marketing.
[47:14.580 --> 47:21.880]  Why doesn't the government say they need permission from the person to market to him?
[47:22.100 --> 47:26.280]  Or to distribute or resell the information?
[47:26.280 --> 47:34.420]  Because in America, we believe, or the question is why doesn't the government tell marketing companies you need their permission to market to them?
[47:34.540 --> 47:35.560]  I need my permission.
[47:35.620 --> 47:45.600]  Because this is, even though Canada is a wonderful place and the people are nice and Molson beer is delicious and, you know, friendly moose and all of that.
[47:47.460 --> 47:51.940]  Our, our philosophy of government is, thank God, different from yours.
[47:52.240 --> 47:54.340]  You have a privacy commissioner up there.
[47:54.600 --> 47:58.120]  You just trust too damn much to the government.
[47:58.260 --> 47:59.520]  Well, we're a policy socialist.
[47:59.660 --> 48:00.580]  Well, that's right.
[48:00.740 --> 48:03.180]  And you can see what that did to your health care system.
[48:05.480 --> 48:11.640]  So, the bottom line is, in this country, we like to trust people.
[48:12.020 --> 48:14.060]  We like self-regulation.
[48:14.060 --> 48:19.220]  That's why there's a direct marketing association, which are occasionally a bunch of weasels.
[48:19.400 --> 48:30.260]  But if you opt out, if you give them your name, every one of their members, which, by the way, is the vast majority of the marketing outfits, will take you off their mailing lists.
[48:30.660 --> 48:33.980]  In Canada, you have to enact the law.
[48:34.240 --> 48:36.360]  I think our way is a hell of a lot better.
[48:37.860 --> 48:39.960]  I'm saying personal philosophy of government.
[48:39.960 --> 48:40.380]  Okay.
[48:40.620 --> 48:44.200]  In the States, if I want my name removed from...
[48:44.200 --> 48:46.580]  Contact the Direct Marketing Association.
[48:46.780 --> 48:50.380]  It's walking distance from here, although I'm sure they're closed today.
[48:50.600 --> 48:52.940]  Unless there's a representative in the audience somewhere.
[48:53.240 --> 48:53.380]  You just have to ask.
[48:53.600 --> 48:54.960]  Yes, you just have to ask.
[48:55.220 --> 48:55.960]  And I'll remove you.
[48:56.020 --> 48:56.300]  Yes.
[48:56.300 --> 48:56.340]  Yes.
[48:57.420 --> 49:05.900]  What I do on the few cases when that doesn't work is I take that prepaid envelope, which they have to pay for, and I put a little note in there.
[49:06.360 --> 49:09.340]  Take me off your list or I'm going to keep sending back these envelopes.
[49:09.420 --> 49:10.680]  And believe me, I never get another one.
[49:10.680 --> 49:13.520]  So, just a little technique.
[49:13.920 --> 49:14.520]  Oh.
[49:15.200 --> 49:15.620]  Okay.
[49:15.880 --> 49:16.400]  Who's...
[49:16.400 --> 49:19.800]  Before this thing crashes, who's looking for someone?
[49:20.400 --> 49:21.080]  Al Gore.
[49:23.480 --> 49:24.440]  Why not?
[49:25.020 --> 49:25.880]  Why not?
[49:25.880 --> 49:26.780]  I'm a Republican.
[49:29.900 --> 49:30.500]  Gore.
[49:32.900 --> 49:34.780]  What's his real first name, by the way?
[49:35.120 --> 49:35.720]  Albert.
[49:36.120 --> 49:36.880]  Okay, you know what?
[49:36.880 --> 49:38.280]  We don't know that.
[49:38.460 --> 49:40.580]  We've been living in a cave with the Unabomber.
[49:41.020 --> 49:43.600]  So, we're going to do Al asterisk.
[49:44.620 --> 49:45.920]  And we're going to do...
[49:45.920 --> 49:46.660]  Oh, jeez.
[49:48.760 --> 49:49.200]  Um...
[49:49.200 --> 49:50.620]  Boy, I'd love a scroll bar.
[49:54.580 --> 49:55.020]  Um...
[49:55.660 --> 49:56.940]  Okay, here's what I need to do.
[49:57.020 --> 49:59.800]  I need to get down to the bottom and press the submit button.
[50:00.800 --> 50:02.140]  Oh, good for you.
[50:05.320 --> 50:10.260]  By the way, this program is not this big a pain in the ass in real life.
[50:11.480 --> 50:17.420]  Okay, while we're looking for Al and Tipper and everyone else...
[50:19.020 --> 50:21.900]  God, is this like...
[50:21.900 --> 50:24.740]  Who just turned these lights back on?
[50:24.740 --> 50:26.000]  Very dark, yeah.
[50:26.180 --> 50:26.800]  You know what?
[50:26.920 --> 50:27.200]  Good.
[50:27.580 --> 50:28.720]  I'm blinded.
[50:28.820 --> 50:31.480]  Unless someone wants to give me some Secret Service sunglasses.
[50:34.200 --> 50:34.660]  Um...
[50:34.660 --> 50:36.360]  What is this thing that just popped up?
[50:38.840 --> 50:41.120]  This is a free internet service, I'm guessing.
[50:42.980 --> 50:43.440]  Here.
[50:46.560 --> 50:47.620]  I'm an investigator.
[50:47.980 --> 50:49.480]  I don't work for the Style Police.
[50:51.920 --> 50:53.580]  What do I do about this?
[50:54.240 --> 50:55.560]  Do I ignore it?
[50:56.300 --> 50:57.700]  Okay, I'm ignoring it.
[50:57.760 --> 50:58.380]  Next question.
[50:59.140 --> 50:59.680]  Sir.
[51:05.140 --> 51:08.380]  Oh, it's you, the troublemaker at the projector.
[51:12.300 --> 51:13.840]  Okay, your question is...
[51:14.900 --> 51:18.020]  How can we project ourselves against getting into medical records?
[51:18.660 --> 51:23.280]  Okay, medical records are an exception to every single thing I've said here today.
[51:23.940 --> 51:27.480]  First of all, let me tell you, there's an outfit up in Massachusetts called the MIB.
[51:27.780 --> 51:28.800]  Not Men in Black.
[51:29.020 --> 51:29.720]  It's Medical...
[51:29.720 --> 51:31.680]  Medical Information Bureau.
[51:32.900 --> 51:33.500]  Um...
[51:33.500 --> 51:36.780]  They are the repository of...
[51:37.600 --> 51:40.200]  Every hemorrhoid you ever had and got treated.
[51:40.540 --> 51:46.060]  They know every jot and tittle of your medical history.
[51:46.900 --> 51:47.340]  Uh...
[51:47.340 --> 51:47.480]  Uh...
[51:47.480 --> 51:48.000]  What is it, Si?
[51:48.820 --> 51:49.520]  It worked out.
[51:49.940 --> 51:50.900]  All right, well...
[51:50.900 --> 51:51.540]  We try it.
[51:51.700 --> 51:52.680]  We try it.
[51:52.780 --> 51:53.360]  We try it.
[51:53.440 --> 51:56.900]  Whoever's over at the projector, don't hit those little arrow keys.
[51:57.240 --> 51:57.840]  Oh, no.
[51:58.420 --> 51:59.340]  All right.
[51:59.500 --> 52:00.420]  Hold on, hold on.
[52:00.540 --> 52:01.680]  Let's try submit again.
[52:09.600 --> 52:10.280]  It did?
[52:15.560 --> 52:19.800]  The modem disconnected, we have to go through all of this again because of the set...
[52:26.720 --> 52:27.480]  You know what?
[52:27.620 --> 52:28.780]  We'll make one more attempt.
[52:29.020 --> 52:29.260]  Who's...
[52:29.260 --> 52:30.240]  Who was monkeying with us?
[52:31.100 --> 52:32.060]  So it's gonna be a group now.
[52:32.400 --> 52:37.940]  We've got another group that's supposed to be in here 20 minutes ago.
[52:38.200 --> 52:39.260]  Well, okay.
[52:39.680 --> 52:40.380]  I started late.
[52:41.660 --> 52:42.420]  All right, you know what?
[52:42.420 --> 52:48.760]  I'm getting thrown off the stage despite the fact that we had a tear gas the people who were on before me.
[52:48.920 --> 52:49.720]  And I started late.
[52:49.740 --> 52:50.320]  That's what's happening.
[52:50.600 --> 52:51.560]  You know what?
[52:52.180 --> 52:53.280]  I'm gonna take...
[52:53.280 --> 52:54.040]  I'm gonna take...
[52:54.040 --> 52:54.420]  No, no.
[52:54.560 --> 52:55.440]  I'm gonna take...
[52:55.440 --> 52:58.720]  Before this guy kicks my ass, I'm gonna take three more questions.
[52:58.960 --> 53:04.980]  And then I will go over somewhere on the side and run searches for people.
[53:05.080 --> 53:06.240]  Can you finish on MIB?
[53:06.900 --> 53:07.240]  Yes.
[53:08.880 --> 53:09.360]  MIB.
[53:09.900 --> 53:11.260]  Medical Information Bureau.
[53:11.260 --> 53:15.960]  They are essentially the Medical Records Credit Bureau, for lack of a better way to put it.
[53:16.120 --> 53:19.580]  They are the repository of a ton of information about you.
[53:20.220 --> 53:25.420]  You need to request your MIB report about once every two years.
[53:25.540 --> 53:46.200]  In addition, you need to send return receipt, a letter to your HMO, if God forbid you have an HMO, or your company health plan, or whoever you have delegated responsibility for your health and welfare to, a letter, a return receipt letter, with a copy to somebody,
[53:46.560 --> 53:54.720]  ideally your lawyer if you have one, saying, never, never, never share my data with anyone, despite what's in your agreement.
[53:54.720 --> 54:03.780]  If you share data with anyone, I will sue your butt off, love and kisses, your health care participant, Fred, or whatever your name is.
[54:04.680 --> 54:07.220]  MIB, nasty letter to your HMO.
[54:07.460 --> 54:09.880]  That will close 95% of your problems.
[54:09.880 --> 54:12.560]  Now, by the way, a guy like me will still get your medical records.
[54:13.560 --> 54:15.300]  But, we'll have to break the law to do it.
[54:15.400 --> 54:16.540]  So, I won't do it.
[54:18.520 --> 54:19.140]  Someone will.
[54:20.760 --> 54:21.400]  Oh, boy.
[54:21.480 --> 54:22.880]  How many more questions do we have?
[54:23.080 --> 54:25.380]  Because this guy wants me to get off the stage.
[54:26.780 --> 54:28.160]  Records in other parts of the world.
[54:28.280 --> 54:29.560]  Records in other parts of the world.
[54:29.640 --> 54:31.460]  I'm guessing you're going to ask about the United Kingdom?
[54:31.460 --> 54:31.780]  Yes.
[54:32.400 --> 54:33.360]  How did I guess?
[54:33.740 --> 54:34.080]  What was it?
[54:34.320 --> 54:36.620]  Do you have a specific question, or is it a general question?
[54:36.760 --> 54:37.500]  How easy is it?
[54:38.780 --> 54:40.800]  Legally, not illegally.
[54:41.180 --> 54:42.080]  Same as the U.S.
[54:44.360 --> 54:52.920]  Phone records, people have now cracked the British Telecom disk, so you can reverse phone numbers and addresses.
[54:53.380 --> 55:02.240]  And people have been sneakily buying up property records and voter rolls and setting up servers in the Channel Islands, which is good for them.
[55:02.920 --> 55:08.520]  But it's like smuggling cocaine in England, getting information out.
[55:08.880 --> 55:10.540]  It is a felony.
[55:10.780 --> 55:19.080]  To misuse a database in the United Kingdom is the same criminal penalty as personal possession of cocaine.
[55:19.320 --> 55:20.640]  That's absolutely true.
[55:21.240 --> 55:23.140]  So, yes, you can get it all.
[55:24.240 --> 55:28.920]  And Parliament is packed full of dummies, in my opinion.
[55:30.160 --> 55:33.540]  I'm sorry if I was so abrupt, but I want to take a couple more.
[55:34.240 --> 55:37.120]  And who's speaking next?
[55:37.480 --> 55:39.900]  Just let me apologize to you personally, wherever you are.
[55:39.900 --> 55:41.000]  Right over there, they're getting nervous.
[55:41.320 --> 55:42.460]  I'm sorry, guys.
[55:42.680 --> 55:44.060]  I'll just take...
[55:44.540 --> 55:46.660]  Who didn't... who actually didn't ask a question?
[55:46.960 --> 55:47.260]  You?
[55:47.940 --> 55:48.340]  You.
[55:48.460 --> 55:49.760]  You're the guy who thought I was a fed.
[55:50.860 --> 55:51.260]  You.
[55:52.140 --> 55:53.860]  Aren't you the guy who was standing here?
[55:54.680 --> 55:55.160]  Yeah.
[55:55.160 --> 55:55.400]  Yeah.
[55:55.460 --> 55:55.700]  Yeah.
[55:57.040 --> 55:58.180]  Did you have a question?
[55:58.400 --> 55:58.760]  Yeah.
[55:58.940 --> 55:59.800]  What's the question?
[56:00.200 --> 56:01.320]  Well, first thing...
[56:01.320 --> 56:02.880]  By the way, you really don't.
[56:03.540 --> 56:04.300]  But... never mind.
[56:04.400 --> 56:04.760]  Go ahead.
[56:05.320 --> 56:10.960]  First thing, whoever owns that laptop might have your keystrokes and have your passwords.
[56:11.960 --> 56:13.760]  It's... you're absolutely right.
[56:13.920 --> 56:15.520]  I was making jokes about that.
[56:15.620 --> 56:17.900]  But it's a test account with $75 credit.
[56:18.120 --> 56:19.440]  So they're welcome to it.
[56:19.840 --> 56:20.620]  You're, you're right.
[56:20.740 --> 56:24.020]  And I'm sufficiently paranoid that I planned for that.
[56:24.760 --> 56:26.500]  Uh, was there a question?
[56:26.660 --> 56:26.820]  Yeah.
[56:27.000 --> 56:27.000]  Yeah.
[56:27.160 --> 56:27.300]  Yeah.
[56:27.300 --> 56:27.360]  Okay.
[56:28.080 --> 56:30.940]  Does it cost you like five or six months per search?
[56:31.120 --> 56:32.240]  What does it cost the end of the day?
[56:34.020 --> 56:35.000]  Depends on the search.
[56:35.160 --> 56:36.420]  You know, you know the joke, right?
[56:36.560 --> 56:40.940]  About the guy who pulls the car into the garage and he says, I've been to 17 people.
[56:41.040 --> 56:44.660]  I can't figure out how to get rid of this goddamn noise under my hood.
[56:45.280 --> 56:48.700]  And the guy mechanic says, I'll fix it for you for $500.
[56:49.380 --> 56:52.180]  Guy says, if you can fix this, I'll give you 500 bucks.
[56:52.460 --> 56:53.520]  How long do I have to leave it?
[56:53.560 --> 56:54.480]  The guy says, you don't have to leave it.
[56:54.540 --> 56:54.940]  Open your hood.
[56:55.480 --> 56:56.260]  Takes out a wrench.
[56:56.360 --> 56:57.100]  You go, bong.
[56:57.260 --> 56:57.960]  The noise stops.
[56:58.060 --> 56:58.720]  He says, $500.
[57:00.600 --> 57:01.740]  Guy says, well, what, are you crazy?
[57:01.740 --> 57:04.640]  I'm going to pay you $500 for 30 seconds work?
[57:04.720 --> 57:05.280]  He says, no.
[57:05.800 --> 57:11.240]  You're paying me $1 for the 30 seconds work, $499 for knowing where to hit.
[57:12.280 --> 57:14.080]  And that's really the way it goes.
[57:14.260 --> 57:20.200]  I mean, the database that I have in my office costs far in excess of a million dollars to compile.
[57:20.560 --> 57:22.380]  It would be nice if I made some of it back.
[57:22.480 --> 57:23.360]  And I do.
[57:25.340 --> 57:28.020]  There are extortionate charges out there.
[57:28.140 --> 57:29.640]  I mean, markups you wouldn't believe.
[57:29.740 --> 57:33.320]  And in the investigative industry, we call it the information food chain.
[57:34.280 --> 57:38.080]  A credit bureau will charge $1.20 for a social trace.
[57:38.560 --> 57:42.120]  They'll sell it to a reseller to cover their ass legally.
[57:42.380 --> 57:45.060]  The reseller will sell it for $2.85.
[57:45.780 --> 57:53.200]  The reseller will then sell it to somebody who allows you to access it and you get charged $20 bucks or $40 bucks.
[57:53.360 --> 58:07.100]  Or if you go to just horrible criminal weasels like US search, you'll pay $49 for them running $1.20 social trace.
[58:07.720 --> 58:14.540]  So information food chain, always try to be as high as possible on the food chain when it comes to information.
[58:14.540 --> 58:15.380]  And in life.
[58:15.560 --> 58:18.280]  That's your lesson for the day.
[58:18.880 --> 58:20.420]  One more question and I'm done.
[58:20.840 --> 58:22.080]  Did you ask one before?
[58:22.700 --> 58:23.620]  You liar.
[58:23.760 --> 58:24.360]  What's the question?
[58:24.620 --> 58:25.580]  I got a couple of things.
[58:27.200 --> 58:29.080]  First thing with internet security.
[58:29.580 --> 58:30.260]  Say what?
[58:30.840 --> 58:32.280]  First thing with internet security.
[58:32.500 --> 58:37.180]  Well, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act makes really little reverse engineer stuff like NID, CSS.
[58:38.200 --> 58:44.400]  So taking the GUID off the pending through processors does violate the word of law.
[58:44.640 --> 58:45.660]  No, it doesn't.
[58:45.860 --> 58:46.680]  It does violate the word of law.
[58:46.680 --> 58:47.440]  No, it doesn't.
[58:47.440 --> 58:48.200]  It does violate the word of law.
[58:48.320 --> 58:49.260]  Because you're reverse engineering.
[58:49.760 --> 59:00.940]  The first person that says you must turn on your GUID to access this website and the innocent person goes, uh, okay.
[59:01.240 --> 59:01.860]  Word of law.
[59:02.040 --> 59:02.720]  Are they going to enforce that?
[59:02.720 --> 59:03.160]  No.
[59:03.660 --> 59:07.440]  First of all, GUID is not reverse engineering anything.
[59:07.760 --> 59:10.720]  It was designed to generate a GUID.
[59:11.400 --> 59:11.920]  If the Pentium...
[59:12.320 --> 59:14.040]  First of all, GUID is not the chip.
[59:14.160 --> 59:15.200]  You're talking about two different things.
[59:15.520 --> 59:18.760]  GUID is what's embedded in a lot of software programs.
[59:19.080 --> 59:24.180]  That gives a unique identifier to every document you generate and so on and so forth.
[59:24.180 --> 59:37.280]  The Pentium chip, the new Pentium 3 chip, and everybody else's chips that are coming out, despite what everyone else tells you, generate unique social, uh, excuse me, serial numbers.
[59:37.380 --> 59:37.960]  I was going to say so.
[59:38.600 --> 59:40.480]  The investigator and me kicked in there.
[59:41.000 --> 59:42.100]  Uh, serial numbers.
[59:42.500 --> 59:47.120]  So, number one, it's not reverse engineering by any stretch of the imagination of law.
[59:47.120 --> 59:50.620]  And number two, go ahead and try to prosecute.
[59:50.780 --> 59:51.100]  Exactly.
[59:51.520 --> 59:55.380]  Uh, you know, I, I, I would be...
[59:55.380 --> 59:57.480]  It doesn't do enough just to wipe out your cookies.
[59:57.860 --> 59:58.480]  There's a new exploit.
[59:58.700 --> 01:00:06.260]  They figured out what companies can do is they can look at the last dates that you refresh the hash, and they can still track and see that.
[01:00:06.680 --> 01:00:10.160]  And that is, in fact, the least efficient way to do it.
[01:00:10.160 --> 01:00:12.820]  There are many, many, many other ways.
[01:00:12.920 --> 01:00:30.220]  For example, if you take advantage of the Netscape, uh, uh, programming that allows you to drag an URL to the top of your Netscape bar and keep it as one of your favorites, almost every website that uses Java now can pull those favorites down.
[01:00:30.500 --> 01:00:37.540]  Almost every website can see what you've programmed as your email identity, even if you don't send out email.
[01:00:38.480 --> 01:00:41.080]  Um, there's just a million other examples.
[01:00:41.220 --> 01:00:43.000]  These guys are going to kill me if I don't get off the stage.
[01:00:43.540 --> 01:00:48.660]  I will be, where will, hold on, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, where, where, where can I go to...
[01:00:48.660 --> 01:00:55.940]  Okay, you know what, I'm going to go to the network room and maybe find a network connection and I'll run stuff for you guys.
[01:00:55.940 --> 01:00:56.420]  Thank you.
[01:00:56.420 --> 01:00:57.040]  Thank you.