[00:00.000 --> 00:00.380]  They do.
[00:00.780 --> 00:07.180]  So if you'll join me in, please, giving a very warm Eleventh HOPE welcome to the social engineering panel.
[00:16.020 --> 00:17.300]  Well, greetings everybody.
[00:17.300 --> 00:20.220]  Here we are again, the  Eleventh HOPE, social engineering.
[00:21.080 --> 00:27.200]  What we're going to do is introduce the panel, maybe tell a couple of stories, maybe try a few tricks.
[00:27.840 --> 00:36.100]  But mostly talk about the theory of what social engineering is all about, which to me is about building trust with people who really shouldn't be trusting you.
[00:36.100 --> 00:39.580]  But there is a lot of information.
[00:39.580 --> 00:46.380]  As long as people have the information, there is always going to be a weak point, no matter how many computer systems, no matter how much encryption you have.
[00:46.880 --> 00:53.760]  As long as you have one dimwit that will give you something they're not supposed to give you, you're going to be able to get in and affect all kinds of chaos.
[00:53.760 --> 00:55.480]  And, of course, that is the goal tonight.
[00:56.320 --> 01:00.800]  My name's Emmanuel, and I've been social engineering pretty much all my life.
[01:00.980 --> 01:03.460]  It's a fun way to get around and get things done.
[01:05.200 --> 01:08.500]  I'll tell a couple of stories, I guess, in a bit.
[01:08.660 --> 01:10.560]  But I want to introduce the other members of the panel.
[01:10.700 --> 01:12.100]  We have Kyle over here.
[01:12.520 --> 01:13.080]  Hello, hackers.
[01:13.220 --> 01:14.140]  I hope everyone's having fun.
[01:14.760 --> 01:15.600]  Thanks for coming.
[01:16.160 --> 01:17.000]  We have Alex.
[01:17.600 --> 01:18.420]  Hey, everybody.
[01:19.080 --> 01:20.420]  And we have Bernie S.
[01:20.960 --> 01:22.000]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[01:26.100 --> 01:28.700]  I probably sound better now than usual on the radio.
[01:28.700 --> 01:29.680]  Yeah, that's his tagline.
[01:29.780 --> 01:30.340]  You can't use it.
[01:31.040 --> 01:32.500]  So we're going to start with some stories.
[01:32.660 --> 01:43.900]  Bernie, why don't you start, since you're all the way over there, with a story of social engineering maybe that you have performed in your life at some point that either benefited you or did not benefit you.
[01:44.800 --> 01:45.200]  All right.
[01:45.280 --> 01:45.680]  Here's one.
[01:46.660 --> 01:50.920]  When you asked me recently, like a couple hours ago, whether I'd be on the panel, I was like, what am I talking about?
[01:50.920 --> 01:51.720]  Oh, all right.
[01:51.800 --> 02:02.780]  I've been working on this project since early last year in Philadelphia with a group of volunteers to build a nonprofit community FM radio station.
[02:03.100 --> 02:07.600]  And there's a really good social engineering story behind it.
[02:09.100 --> 02:18.820]  We got our FCC construction permit, which there was a lot of social engineering and pirate radio that led up to that over like 15 years before that, but that's a whole another story of social engineering.
[02:18.820 --> 02:20.820]  So we got our construction permit.
[02:20.960 --> 02:24.880]  We started building the transmitter equipment and so forth.
[02:24.980 --> 02:26.260]  And we needed a call sign.
[02:26.420 --> 02:28.000]  They don't just assign one to you randomly.
[02:28.260 --> 02:30.040]  You select from a database.
[02:30.340 --> 02:33.280]  Well, like Internet domain names, all the good ones are taken.
[02:33.460 --> 02:39.140]  And there's just... the only things left are like WXQZ or something that you can't...
[02:39.140 --> 02:40.540]  A useless acronym.
[02:40.700 --> 02:41.200]  I got that one.
[02:41.320 --> 02:41.420]  I have one.
[02:41.440 --> 02:42.740]  So you got that one?
[02:42.920 --> 02:43.980]  You got the good ones.
[02:44.780 --> 02:45.220]  So...
[02:45.220 --> 02:46.660]  You can't get four letters anything.
[02:47.520 --> 02:48.180]  Not anymore.
[02:49.180 --> 02:49.580]  So...
[02:50.620 --> 02:53.380]  This is going to be a people-powered media radio station.
[02:53.400 --> 02:55.700]  I thought like WPPM would be perfect.
[02:55.900 --> 02:59.120]  Of course, you check the FCC call sign query database.
[02:59.340 --> 03:00.480]  It's unavailable.
[03:02.060 --> 03:10.140]  Registered to U.S. Coast Guard to a cutter vessel called the Galatea, who was a Greek goddess who fell in love with the Cyclops.
[03:10.180 --> 03:10.820]  You screwed her over.
[03:10.900 --> 03:11.580]  But that's another story.
[03:12.640 --> 03:12.960]  And...
[03:14.460 --> 03:14.780]  So...
[03:14.780 --> 03:16.520]  Well, this ship, the Galatea...
[03:16.520 --> 03:17.500]  Like, let me research this.
[03:17.620 --> 03:21.480]  Turns out the Galatea was built right across the river from Philadelphia in Camden, New Jersey in 1933.
[03:21.880 --> 03:23.100]  Well, it was commissioned in 1933.
[03:23.300 --> 03:24.360]  Probably built a couple years before that.
[03:24.820 --> 03:29.320]  And its first mission was to do rum-running interdictions during Prohibition.
[03:29.420 --> 03:30.120]  I was like, well, this is cool.
[03:30.200 --> 03:31.240]  I'm going to read more up on this.
[03:31.240 --> 03:32.500]  So, um...
[03:32.500 --> 03:33.900]  Early war on drugs.
[03:35.460 --> 03:36.380]  And, uh...
[03:36.380 --> 03:37.420]  So, uh...
[03:37.420 --> 03:41.560]  The ship served that valiant mission, and then after alcohol became legal again...
[03:41.560 --> 03:43.600]  I think there was a speakeasy downstairs at one time.
[03:44.320 --> 03:44.780]  Um...
[03:44.780 --> 03:45.960]  They, uh...
[03:45.960 --> 03:46.920]  They decommissioned the ship.
[03:47.020 --> 03:49.780]  They ran some other missions, and then they decommissioned it in 1946.
[03:51.540 --> 03:52.000]  And...
[03:52.000 --> 03:53.460]  Oh, 1948, they decommissioned it.
[03:53.460 --> 03:57.220]  I'm like, well, this is what I found out from doing some research on the ship.
[03:57.220 --> 04:01.820]  So, the Coast Guard's been sitting on this unused call sign for, like, 68 years.
[04:02.080 --> 04:02.800]  Like, what are they doing?
[04:02.920 --> 04:04.000]  It's just sitting on a shelf.
[04:04.760 --> 04:06.220]  And nobody asked them for it.
[04:06.300 --> 04:07.740]  So, I, uh...
[04:07.740 --> 04:11.540]  I did some research online and found some radio people in the Coast Guard and called...
[04:11.540 --> 04:12.060]  Uh...
[04:12.060 --> 04:12.580]  Called around.
[04:12.860 --> 04:15.160]  Reached a guy named Jerry, who, uh...
[04:15.160 --> 04:17.060]  Turned out to be a ham radio operator like myself.
[04:17.540 --> 04:18.520]  And I didn't have to...
[04:18.520 --> 04:19.220]  I didn't, like...
[04:19.220 --> 04:20.300]  I used just my name, Bernie S.
[04:20.400 --> 04:22.160]  Not, like, my legal name.
[04:22.300 --> 04:22.980]  But, uh...
[04:22.980 --> 04:24.520]  You know, I told him that, uh...
[04:24.520 --> 04:26.720]  You know, I'm a ham like you, and, uh...
[04:26.720 --> 04:28.780]  Turns out he was the last Coast Guard, uh...
[04:28.780 --> 04:29.800]  Official to send a...
[04:29.800 --> 04:33.840]  A Coast Guard person to send a Morse code message when they got rid of Morse code in 95.
[04:34.020 --> 04:35.620]  So, we bonded over that and Morse code.
[04:35.900 --> 04:39.720]  And it's like, wouldn't it be great, Jerry, if this former FCC calls...
[04:40.240 --> 04:40.360]  Form...
[04:40.360 --> 04:41.100]  This former...
[04:41.100 --> 04:44.260]  If this Coast Guard call sign, WPPM, could...
[04:44.260 --> 04:46.040]  Could again live a...
[04:46.040 --> 04:46.940]  A...
[04:46.940 --> 04:47.460]  A...
[04:47.460 --> 04:48.700]  A mission for the...
[04:48.700 --> 04:49.900]  For the community in...
[04:49.900 --> 04:50.260]  Into...
[04:50.260 --> 04:50.480]  In...
[04:50.480 --> 04:52.680]  In consistency with the...
[04:52.680 --> 04:55.020]  The public service mission of the Coast Guard.
[04:56.020 --> 04:56.660]  And, uh...
[04:56.660 --> 04:58.540]  He's like, yeah, yeah, yeah, let's do that.
[04:58.680 --> 05:02.020]  So, he gave me a name of somebody in the Navy to call, who manages all...
[05:02.580 --> 05:03.500]  Call signs for all vessels.
[05:03.680 --> 05:04.860]  I called the person in the Coast Guard...
[05:04.860 --> 05:05.060]  In the...
[05:05.060 --> 05:05.500]  In the Navy.
[05:05.880 --> 05:08.540]  And he said, oh, no, you gotta call this other guy who's in the Coast Guard.
[05:08.660 --> 05:09.380]  And that guy was dead.
[05:09.720 --> 05:11.240]  So, they had to find somebody to replace him.
[05:12.660 --> 05:12.980]  And...
[05:13.900 --> 05:14.540]  Then, uh...
[05:14.540 --> 05:16.800]  So, I finally reached somebody they've replaced them with.
[05:16.800 --> 05:18.580]  And they said, no, you gotta talk to this person at the FCC.
[05:18.580 --> 05:22.720]  And then this person at the FCC said, you need to talk to this person at the Department of Homeland Security.
[05:22.820 --> 05:24.020]  Because the Coast Guard is part of that.
[05:24.420 --> 05:26.000]  And I talked to the Department of Homeland Security.
[05:26.180 --> 05:26.500]  Then back...
[05:26.500 --> 05:28.160]  It's typical government bureaucracy.
[05:28.300 --> 05:29.120]  Then back to the Coast Guard.
[05:29.240 --> 05:31.900]  I ended up talking about ten different people in four different federal...
[05:31.900 --> 05:34.360]  Four different federal agencies over, like, two or three months.
[05:34.360 --> 05:38.000]  Finally reached a guy, or actually a woman in the Coast Guard.
[05:38.120 --> 05:42.360]  I explained this whole public service mission of this...
[05:42.920 --> 05:44.700]  Of this call sign could be...
[05:44.700 --> 05:49.460]  Could come alive again in the form of a non-profit community radio station in Philadelphia.
[05:49.680 --> 05:52.480]  Right across the river from when the Galatea was first launched.
[05:53.000 --> 05:54.640]  And they're like, let me see what I can do.
[05:54.740 --> 05:55.240]  And she...
[05:55.240 --> 05:57.480]  She released it to the FCC.
[05:57.740 --> 05:58.220]  And I...
[05:58.220 --> 06:03.720]  I had her time in such a way that we applied for it at just the right time window.
[06:03.720 --> 06:06.780]  So it never showed up on the FCC's call site as available.
[06:07.000 --> 06:08.500]  It just went from registered U.S.
[06:08.580 --> 06:09.380]  Coast Guard to...
[06:11.240 --> 06:13.580]  To registered to Philadelphia Community Access Media.
[06:13.780 --> 06:14.560]  And we grabbed the...
[06:14.560 --> 06:15.420]  We got the call sign.
[06:15.540 --> 06:16.960]  So it's now people-powered media.
[06:17.120 --> 06:17.660]  And it wasn't...
[06:17.660 --> 06:18.840]  I didn't have to lie or anything.
[06:19.000 --> 06:20.840]  It was just social engineering this guy.
[06:21.180 --> 06:23.720]  Bonding the hams and the other radio people.
[06:23.980 --> 06:27.900]  And getting them to think that this would be a good mission for their call sign in the future.
[06:27.960 --> 06:29.060]  And they bought it.
[06:29.100 --> 06:30.020]  And we got a great call sign.
[06:30.120 --> 06:30.560]  I asked...
[06:30.560 --> 06:31.760]  I talked to people at commercial radio.
[06:31.900 --> 06:32.800]  Like, that's a great call sign.
[06:32.820 --> 06:33.440]  How did you get that?
[06:33.720 --> 06:34.800]  I was like, well, there's a story behind it.
[06:35.020 --> 06:36.040]  So at our launch party...
[06:36.040 --> 06:41.680]  Our launch party in a few weeks, we're going to have a big bowl of rum punch because of the rum running mission.
[06:41.880 --> 06:44.640]  But that's an example of social engineering where you don't have to lie.
[06:49.060 --> 06:49.880]  We all do this.
[06:49.940 --> 06:52.960]  I think we all started social engineering our parents when we were like two years old.
[06:53.220 --> 06:55.120]  So just different ways of doing it.
[06:55.200 --> 06:56.640]  This didn't involve any fraud or lying.
[06:56.680 --> 06:58.960]  But it was social engineering and it really...
[06:59.660 --> 07:01.900]  It accomplished something really useful for the community.
[07:01.900 --> 07:02.860]  So that's my story.
[07:03.760 --> 07:04.440]  Alex, you're up.
[07:04.820 --> 07:05.340]  I am.
[07:05.500 --> 07:05.740]  Okay.
[07:06.000 --> 07:06.360]  All right.
[07:06.500 --> 07:08.300]  Well, I think some of you...
[07:08.300 --> 07:08.980]  Thanks for that.
[07:09.100 --> 07:09.640]  Thanks for the warning.
[07:09.940 --> 07:10.480]  Appreciate it.
[07:11.580 --> 07:12.720]  He's good at that, isn't he?
[07:13.180 --> 07:15.000]  We're going to see him in action in a few minutes as well.
[07:15.080 --> 07:15.640]  That's going to be fun.
[07:15.720 --> 07:15.780]  Maybe.
[07:15.940 --> 07:16.040]  We'll see.
[07:16.040 --> 07:16.660]  Yeah, let's hope.
[07:16.880 --> 07:16.940]  Yeah.
[07:18.040 --> 07:20.180]  Anyhow, I think I recognize some of you.
[07:20.260 --> 07:22.540]  Some of you saw my talk yesterday on the Panama Papers.
[07:22.540 --> 07:24.460]  And if you haven't, thank you.
[07:25.680 --> 07:26.500]  I'm a lawyer.
[07:26.940 --> 07:28.180]  So I...
[07:28.180 --> 07:30.460]  Actually, a very good segue from what Bernie had mentioned.
[07:30.600 --> 07:33.720]  Sometimes I'm not allowed really to social engineer anymore.
[07:34.340 --> 07:36.620]  I did have a long history of this back in the day.
[07:36.720 --> 07:41.640]  But as a lawyer, we are not necessarily allowed to misrepresent who we are.
[07:41.640 --> 07:45.080]  There could be ethical implications with the bar committee for that.
[07:45.980 --> 07:49.500]  For basically saying you're somebody else when you're an attorney and getting information.
[07:49.680 --> 07:59.260]  Even in social media, we have very strict regulations about impersonating other people to acquire evidence or information that can then be used in court.
[07:59.300 --> 08:04.000]  And we can get into deep shit, basically, if we do something against those regulations.
[08:04.320 --> 08:06.280]  So I'm very constrained by that.
[08:06.360 --> 08:09.200]  But that doesn't mean that I have to be fraudulent.
[08:09.200 --> 08:10.500]  I can still social engineer.
[08:10.500 --> 08:16.440]  I can still essentially use the trust of other people to my advantage.
[08:16.800 --> 08:19.900]  And I have done so in many occasions, of course.
[08:20.100 --> 08:21.960]  One particular case comes to mind.
[08:22.200 --> 08:29.480]  And it's also another good segue because this was really in the public interest and it was a pro bono case that I had several years ago.
[08:29.580 --> 08:32.120]  And it wound up in the New York Post and the Daily News.
[08:32.440 --> 08:35.840]  And we were on 1010 wins and in New York Magazine.
[08:36.300 --> 08:38.680]  I represented a poor woman and her two kids.
[08:39.060 --> 08:41.340]  An indigent woman and her two kids that came out of a homeless shelter.
[08:41.720 --> 08:44.000]  And they lived in housing in Queens.
[08:44.600 --> 08:47.720]  And I inherited this case from an associate at my prior law firm.
[08:47.820 --> 08:48.280]  He left.
[08:48.280 --> 08:51.380]  And I thought, well, this will be a good experience.
[08:51.380 --> 08:52.300]  I'll go into court.
[08:52.620 --> 08:54.900]  I'll knock around the landlord's attorney for a little while.
[08:55.000 --> 08:56.480]  And, you know, this will be that.
[08:56.640 --> 08:58.120]  The house will be...
[08:58.120 --> 09:05.920]  You know, I'll get a judicial order compelling the landlord to fix the property so that this poor woman and her two kids can live in it and this will be done.
[09:06.220 --> 09:07.380]  But it wasn't that easy.
[09:07.600 --> 09:10.120]  This actually wound up dragging out over two years.
[09:10.560 --> 09:14.000]  I went to court 32 times on this matter.
[09:14.000 --> 09:21.740]  And I lost my bonus from my big law firm two years in a row because I spent too much time on this case and they wouldn't give me credit for it.
[09:22.000 --> 09:25.200]  So that's, you know, it cost me a lot of money as well.
[09:25.200 --> 09:37.420]  But one of the things that complicated this was that the landlord herself, I won't go into too many details about her, but was very sketchy.
[09:37.540 --> 09:53.120]  And when she showed up for court the first time, it was a young, fairly attractive, blonde sorority girl from a local university on Long Island owning a property in a predominantly black area in Queens, which kind of struck me as a little bit odd.
[09:54.080 --> 10:00.040]  So I started to try to co-opt her attorney and figure out what the hell is going on here.
[10:00.220 --> 10:02.000]  This is a very unusual situation.
[10:02.340 --> 10:06.700]  So we started talking about Long Island, various bars, Nassau County.
[10:07.540 --> 10:09.580]  And I got him to sort of trust me.
[10:09.760 --> 10:13.520]  And then I just presumed to know a few things, kind of guessing.
[10:14.640 --> 10:18.260]  And then he assumed that I knew these things because I guessed right about them.
[10:18.260 --> 10:22.760]  And he gave me a couple bits of information that I was then able to combine.
[10:22.760 --> 10:27.360]  These tiny little bits of information, namely actually mostly about addresses.
[10:27.700 --> 10:31.440]  And so it wasn't anything really confidential, but he gave me a couple addresses.
[10:31.440 --> 10:42.480]  And with those addresses, I was able to combine real property records from ACRIS, an online database in New York where you can look up real estate transactions going back basically about 100 years.
[10:42.480 --> 10:44.840]  It's actually pretty cool to just play around with.
[10:46.060 --> 10:59.080]  To determine that essentially this landlord had acquired the property that was in foreclosure and was in disrepair essentially through what appeared to be mortgage fraud.
[10:59.080 --> 11:11.560]  And not only was it this property, but when you traced out the transactions of the corporate entities of these particular parties in the transactions, it led to more mortgage fraud.
[11:11.560 --> 11:12.440]  Bless you, by the way.
[11:12.980 --> 11:13.060]  Bless you, by the way.
[11:13.060 --> 11:19.380]  And then when you trace out those transactions, it led to more mortgage fraud and more mortgage fraud and more mortgage fraud.
[11:19.520 --> 11:27.960]  And I basically stumbled on a mortgage fraud scandal worth tens of millions of dollars running all throughout Queens and Brooklyn.
[11:28.820 --> 11:41.300]  And I didn't know what the hell to do about this because my job was essentially to get the property in good repair so that my client and her kids didn't have to go back into a homeless shelter.
[11:42.400 --> 11:44.520]  And my job is not to enforce the law.
[11:44.580 --> 11:46.300]  My job is as an officer of the court.
[11:46.300 --> 11:49.940]  I have an obligation to the court to be truthful and make accurate representations.
[11:50.400 --> 11:57.660]  But at that point, I decided with the counsel of our own ethics lawyers inside that we weren't going to let this information out to the court.
[11:58.280 --> 12:06.040]  And that we were going to keep it under our hat and try to get them... basically try to force them to comply with the judge's orders.
[12:06.160 --> 12:07.380]  And this lasted a long time.
[12:07.680 --> 12:08.700]  The heat was shut off.
[12:08.820 --> 12:09.040]  I'm sorry.
[12:09.180 --> 12:10.320]  Yeah, the heat was shut off in the winter.
[12:10.680 --> 12:11.620]  She lost electricity.
[12:11.620 --> 12:14.340]  She almost lost her kids because ACS got involved.
[12:14.440 --> 12:17.080]  It's the Administration for Children's Services if you're not from New York.
[12:17.080 --> 12:21.340]  So that's why there were all these emergency situations that required me to go to court, jump into action.
[12:21.480 --> 12:22.520]  The house flooded with sewage.
[12:23.840 --> 12:27.000]  And at that point, mysteriously...
[12:27.000 --> 12:28.980]  Well, let me back up one second.
[12:29.140 --> 12:32.240]  I filed another lawsuit to hail her back into court.
[12:32.400 --> 12:33.240]  She started complaining.
[12:33.640 --> 12:34.600]  The landlord, that is.
[12:34.740 --> 12:38.540]  She didn't have an attorney at that point and couldn't afford one.
[12:38.880 --> 12:47.460]  Yet, my process servers, when I was hitting her with a subpoena, were writing down the license plate numbers of all the cars in the driveway, one of which was a brand new Mercedes.
[12:48.620 --> 12:50.500]  So I don't know what that was about.
[12:50.780 --> 12:54.100]  But then mysteriously, the house burned down.
[12:55.880 --> 13:01.460]  And I think they thought that if the house had burned down, that it would make the case go away.
[13:01.600 --> 13:04.400]  But I had already made the case about contempt.
[13:04.400 --> 13:10.880]  And I was asking the court to throw the landlord in jail at that particular moment for what she did to these two kids and her mother.
[13:12.560 --> 13:17.120]  And it became, again, a pretty contentious situation.
[13:17.300 --> 13:24.280]  But we had gotten in touch with the Daily News and the New York Post and let them know that in open court, we were going to break this mortgage fraud scandal.
[13:24.520 --> 13:27.040]  And so they were sitting there in the courtroom when we broke this.
[13:27.160 --> 13:30.940]  And they had the reporters outside waiting for her to come out of the courtroom.
[13:30.940 --> 13:38.860]  And then all these stories came out and we wound up settling the case and getting a decent amount of money so that this woman wouldn't have to essentially live her life back in a homeless shelter.
[13:39.100 --> 13:41.320]  But it was all because I co-opted this guy.
[13:41.500 --> 13:42.340]  I got his trust.
[13:42.560 --> 13:45.200]  He gave me a little bit of information.
[13:45.540 --> 13:48.520]  And I was able to use that entirely to my advantage.
[13:48.780 --> 13:50.780]  And I still do a lot of things like this.
[13:50.780 --> 13:53.420]  I don't want to say I'm an unscrupulous lawyer, but...
[13:55.740 --> 14:00.060]  You know, I think having a hacker background definitely makes a...
[14:00.980 --> 14:06.640]  makes a world of a difference in negotiating tactics, you know, in my life today.
[14:06.640 --> 14:07.720]  It definitely helps.
[14:07.920 --> 14:11.080]  And unscrupulous and lawyer are a contradiction in terms, right?
[14:11.260 --> 14:11.720]  That's right.
[14:11.880 --> 14:13.940]  It's like, yeah, oxymoron, right?
[14:14.060 --> 14:17.660]  Yeah, you mean, it's like good administrator, honest mechanic, right?
[14:17.660 --> 14:18.020]  Yeah.
[14:19.160 --> 14:19.960]  No, absolutely.
[14:20.680 --> 14:23.920]  This is... these are skills you can use in any profession.
[14:24.440 --> 14:28.740]  Just being alert, noticing things, being able to connect with people.
[14:29.360 --> 14:30.620]  That will get you very far.
[14:31.460 --> 14:32.820]  Kyle's going to talk to you in a moment.
[14:32.960 --> 14:36.620]  But I think first you want to do one little exercise here.
[14:41.410 --> 14:41.950]  All right.
[14:45.360 --> 14:47.020]  So, what do we have there?
[14:47.380 --> 14:48.420]  We have a tiny picture.
[14:48.560 --> 14:49.400]  Shouldn't it be the whole screen?
[14:51.020 --> 14:51.960]  Well, no, it's not you.
[14:52.940 --> 14:53.360]  It's...
[14:53.360 --> 14:53.840]  Okay.
[14:54.440 --> 14:55.620]  Can you guys see what that is?
[14:55.840 --> 14:56.080]  Yes.
[14:56.160 --> 14:56.780]  It's a truck.
[14:57.000 --> 14:57.080]  Okay.
[14:57.940 --> 14:59.060]  No, it's not even a truck.
[15:00.380 --> 15:01.140]  Is it a truck?
[15:01.340 --> 15:01.700]  There it is.
[15:01.740 --> 15:01.880]  Yeah.
[15:03.020 --> 15:03.760]  That's a truck.
[15:04.640 --> 15:08.980]  Now, you might see a truck like that all the time and not think anything of it.
[15:09.860 --> 15:16.760]  But if you're a hacker, you might see something and think, wow, okay, there's something more here.
[15:16.860 --> 15:17.960]  There's a system at work.
[15:18.480 --> 15:20.420]  We hear this so many times at this conference.
[15:20.580 --> 15:22.700]  I've heard it in so many different areas.
[15:23.580 --> 15:27.060]  Airplanes, trains, electronics, programming.
[15:27.320 --> 15:29.820]  We're always noticing things that nobody else cares about.
[15:30.560 --> 15:33.440]  And Kyle and I were walking around a few weeks ago.
[15:33.540 --> 15:34.680]  We noticed one of these trucks.
[15:34.960 --> 15:35.760]  That's tiny again.
[15:36.800 --> 15:39.300]  And we were wondering, okay, these trucks are everywhere.
[15:39.500 --> 15:40.060]  What are they doing?
[15:40.060 --> 15:41.180]  Because they're always...
[15:42.360 --> 15:45.440]  They're going around in the middle of the night and they're outside of Starbucks.
[15:46.080 --> 15:52.720]  So we figured out that this Bartlett company is actually the distributor for Starbucks in the Northeast.
[15:53.380 --> 15:58.340]  And so we figured, you know, how does that work exactly?
[15:58.440 --> 15:59.560]  How does that relationship work?
[15:59.700 --> 16:01.000]  It doesn't say Starbucks on it.
[16:01.000 --> 16:03.900]  They don't want people to know that they're delivering to Starbucks.
[16:04.500 --> 16:09.980]  But it's not hard to figure out because it's an 18-wheel truck parked outside of Starbucks for about half an hour.
[16:10.780 --> 16:14.820]  And we started wondering, okay, so how do these guys get into the Starbucks?
[16:15.080 --> 16:16.320]  You know, how does that work?
[16:16.440 --> 16:17.760]  Do they have a special kind of code?
[16:18.000 --> 16:19.620]  Is the key left under the mat?
[16:20.280 --> 16:22.220]  Is there an employee waiting for them someplace?
[16:22.900 --> 16:23.760]  We were curious.
[16:23.760 --> 16:24.940]  And that's really all it is.
[16:25.000 --> 16:25.720]  It's curiosity.
[16:25.720 --> 16:27.340]  We have no ill intent.
[16:28.100 --> 16:31.460]  We just, we see a system at work here and we're curious.
[16:31.660 --> 16:33.040]  How does that system work?
[16:33.680 --> 16:38.080]  Well, most people would just kind of give up at that point and say, well, I guess it's not meant to find out.
[16:38.800 --> 16:42.880]  But fortunately, we know of this thing called the Internet.
[16:44.780 --> 16:46.860]  And I decided to...
[16:46.860 --> 16:50.320]  We did this all within the last hour because we had nothing prepared as always.
[16:51.280 --> 16:55.240]  But that's appropriate because social engineering is not something you practice.
[16:55.240 --> 17:02.840]  However, research and pretexting is good to build on whatever kind of goal you're working on in the end.
[17:03.220 --> 17:05.480]  But it's better if it's fresh.
[17:05.820 --> 17:08.000]  So we've done this right away.
[17:08.280 --> 17:10.240]  It's all sort of our own digging.
[17:11.020 --> 17:13.340]  So keep in mind, we knew nothing.
[17:13.480 --> 17:14.780]  We still don't know very much about this.
[17:14.860 --> 17:17.800]  We're learning right now about this whole relationship.
[17:17.800 --> 17:25.320]  So we looked on the Internet to see if anybody was talking about the relationship between Starbucks and Bartlett.
[17:25.480 --> 17:30.500]  And we came upon this wonderful site known as Reddit, which we can make that big.
[17:30.660 --> 17:31.000]  That would be great.
[17:31.100 --> 17:31.600]  You'll see this.
[17:31.780 --> 17:44.800]  There are Starbucks employees here literally comparing stories about how their stores work, what time they open, when they check in, how they lock their doors, 4.30 a.m. to open at 5 a.m.
[17:46.460 --> 17:54.280]  And then they started talking about Bartlett down there somewhere, talking about how they screwed up and left the door open.
[17:54.680 --> 17:56.140]  How did you know Bartlett was on there?
[17:56.200 --> 17:57.180]  Did you do control F?
[17:57.280 --> 17:57.980]  You just searched for it?
[17:58.000 --> 18:00.840]  I used Google and searched for Starbucks and Bartlett.
[18:01.060 --> 18:02.620]  So you didn't even have to search the page.
[18:02.720 --> 18:03.360]  It was just there.
[18:03.480 --> 18:04.620]  I knew it was on the page someplace.
[18:05.000 --> 18:07.000]  And it's down here someplace.
[18:07.180 --> 18:08.060]  I'm not going to go through all the text.
[18:08.220 --> 18:09.360]  There's a whole lot of conversation here.
[18:09.360 --> 18:18.560]  But what this did was this told me that, yes indeed, at least in some cases, they have access to the place on their own because they can leave the door open when they leave.
[18:18.820 --> 18:20.480]  So obviously there's not an employee there.
[18:20.640 --> 18:21.080]  Right.
[18:21.220 --> 18:28.160]  But we still didn't have any real, like, they didn't reveal necessarily how they get in or the operational structure of how that works.
[18:28.160 --> 18:33.600]  But definitely the folly of having these guys there and the mistakes that are possible with that system.
[18:33.720 --> 18:37.000]  So now with social engineering, you pick up key phrases.
[18:37.000 --> 18:42.020]  You pick up words and people trust you because you know those words.
[18:42.260 --> 18:51.280]  So when I call a Starbucks and I say something that involves the word Bartlett, they're going to know that I know what I'm talking about because they know what Bartlett is.
[18:51.440 --> 18:55.140]  If I was to call them and say, yeah, do you leave your door unlocked at night?
[18:55.240 --> 19:00.360]  They're probably not going to believe that I am deserving of any more information from that point.
[19:01.000 --> 19:05.240]  But if I inject Bartlett into it, maybe they'll give me more information.
[19:05.420 --> 19:05.860]  I don't know.
[19:05.860 --> 19:06.580]  We have not tried.
[19:06.680 --> 19:07.700]  This is all untested.
[19:08.100 --> 19:12.820]  And this is an exercise in social engineering, which oftentimes, I think more times than not, fails.
[19:13.400 --> 19:16.720]  And you have to be able to cover your ass when you do fail.
[19:16.840 --> 19:23.620]  And in fact, I'm hoping we fail because that's an important part of it all is, you know, you don't say, oh, my God, you got me and hang up.
[19:23.720 --> 19:30.740]  No, you know, you back out of it gracefully so that they don't suspect anything beyond that one phone call.
[19:30.740 --> 19:32.680]  But your listening has to be tuned.
[19:33.000 --> 19:40.120]  Because in that failing, you could learn five different things you wouldn't have been able to glean from any other source.
[19:40.320 --> 19:43.260]  But it was revealed in the context of them correcting you.
[19:43.440 --> 19:44.440]  People like to be right.
[19:44.860 --> 19:46.140]  So they want to correct you.
[19:46.240 --> 19:50.540]  They want to say, no, no, actually, no, this goes at this time or whatever it is.
[19:50.540 --> 19:54.020]  So you must be keen with your hearing as well.
[19:54.280 --> 20:01.380]  So the third part of all this was a wonderful store locator site that Starbucks runs, which gives you every phone number for every store.
[20:01.600 --> 20:02.960]  So we can just go down the list.
[20:03.520 --> 20:04.280]  Have the dial tone?
[20:05.260 --> 20:07.580]  Okay, let's not blast the audience too much.
[20:08.940 --> 20:10.120]  I'm going to dial the number now.
[20:11.800 --> 20:13.200]  I don't care if the number gets out.
[20:17.640 --> 20:20.620]  Oh, and please try not to make too much noise while I'm talking.
[20:20.820 --> 20:23.120]  It's awfully hard to explain.
[20:23.280 --> 20:23.360]  Yeah.
[20:23.860 --> 20:25.900]  But when I'm talking, I mean...
[20:30.760 --> 20:32.340]  Cricket on Starbucks, this is Margaret speaking.
[20:32.460 --> 20:32.940]  How am I helping you?
[20:33.240 --> 20:34.820]  Hi, this is Ralph from Bartlett.
[20:35.380 --> 20:38.840]  I've been calling back about the problem we had with access the other day.
[20:39.560 --> 20:40.180]  What's that?
[20:40.440 --> 20:42.520]  We had some trouble with access the other day.
[20:42.620 --> 20:43.480]  I'm calling from Bartlett.
[20:44.040 --> 20:44.420]  Okay.
[20:45.260 --> 20:46.820]  Has anybody talked to you about that?
[20:47.360 --> 20:48.060]  No clue.
[20:49.040 --> 20:52.200]  Okay, because we don't want to have the problem again when we couldn't get in.
[20:53.000 --> 20:54.760]  The door was very difficult to open.
[20:56.080 --> 20:59.020]  You guys come to the store before we close.
[20:59.820 --> 21:00.180]  Right.
[21:00.180 --> 21:02.360]  We're always open when Bartlett comes, so you might have the wrong store.
[21:02.860 --> 21:03.840]  I'm sorry, say that again, please?
[21:04.140 --> 21:06.980]  I said, we're always open when Bartlett comes, so...
[21:08.100 --> 21:09.200]  Maybe I'm calling the wrong one.
[21:09.260 --> 21:10.200]  Which store is this?
[21:10.400 --> 21:11.200]  This is Crooked Hill.
[21:12.140 --> 21:13.440]  Oh, I think, yeah, I think you're right.
[21:13.440 --> 21:14.620]  I think we might have the wrong store.
[21:14.620 --> 21:17.280]  Yeah, because Bartlett's always here before we close.
[21:17.680 --> 21:18.080]  Okay.
[21:18.440 --> 21:19.120]  My mistake then.
[21:19.140 --> 21:19.400]  Sorry.
[21:20.060 --> 21:20.300]  All right.
[21:20.440 --> 21:20.620]  Bye-bye.
[21:20.980 --> 21:21.060]  Bye.
[21:21.400 --> 21:21.680]  Okay.
[21:21.940 --> 21:24.100]  Well, that kind of is exactly what I was talking about.
[21:30.420 --> 21:31.540]  Did she give you...
[21:31.540 --> 21:32.260]  I love this panel.
[21:32.420 --> 21:33.480]  I can fail and still get applause.
[21:33.760 --> 21:33.900]  Yeah?
[21:33.900 --> 21:33.940]  Yeah.
[21:34.960 --> 21:37.900]  But did she give you the name of a store that does close?
[21:38.240 --> 21:38.580]  Well, I did.
[21:38.900 --> 21:39.420]  Did she?
[21:39.580 --> 21:39.900]  Because I didn't hear it.
[21:39.900 --> 21:40.180]  I thought she did.
[21:40.420 --> 21:40.960]  Did we hear that?
[21:41.060 --> 21:41.560]  I think she...
[21:41.880 --> 21:44.600]  No, she said, you must have the wrong store.
[21:44.900 --> 21:45.220]  Okay.
[21:45.380 --> 21:46.860]  Which tells me a couple of things.
[21:47.000 --> 21:49.000]  There are stores where it is closed.
[21:49.220 --> 21:49.440]  Right.
[21:49.540 --> 21:50.980]  And when they come, but they're always open.
[21:51.060 --> 21:51.740]  So now I know that.
[21:51.880 --> 21:53.760]  I know when Bartlett comes, they're open.
[21:53.760 --> 22:01.900]  So, yeah, I'll try another store then and maybe I'll get lucky or maybe I'll find someone, another store that they're always open for.
[22:03.300 --> 22:06.940]  So, I don't have any specific stories because I have so many.
[22:07.180 --> 22:17.520]  I kind of maintain, in contrast to what Alex was saying, that we're already, we're always misrepresenting ourselves.
[22:17.520 --> 22:33.340]  I mean, I don't want to get too Shakespearean, but I think that that charisma, that empathy I've talked about on the panel in the past, those are part of all of our personalities and I dare say part of survival in a lot of ways.
[22:35.140 --> 22:41.600]  Whether it's, you know, getting your phone bill corrected or getting out of a situation.
[22:42.340 --> 22:50.060]  I mean, I think us telling NSA security we were looking for a restaurant by the museum there, I think that counts.
[22:50.540 --> 22:53.760]  Well, yeah, when you're pulled over by a bunch of NSA cops, you have to tell them something.
[22:54.000 --> 22:54.860]  Yeah, and...
[22:55.420 --> 23:02.540]  Well, and when you have, when you have a hundred millimeter, you know, I have a camera between, you know, and you're, you're definitely doing some, some capturing of imagery.
[23:02.580 --> 23:09.700]  And so that, that was a situation where, yeah, it was like, oh, the camera was on the floor, and I'm like trying not to be a journalist.
[23:09.740 --> 23:11.220]  And I, that's actually apropos.
[23:11.320 --> 23:12.880]  I think there's a lot going on with that now.
[23:13.160 --> 23:28.600]  And as someone who is a journalist, I kind of represent, I often, when we travel, represent myself myself or misrepresent myself as someone who is not in journalism because of, well, how things have been going and, and how they may go here in this country.
[23:29.380 --> 23:31.000]  Well, sweet talking cops, that's definitely...
[23:31.780 --> 23:32.080]  Absolutely.
[23:32.080 --> 23:33.740]  A good use of social engineering.
[23:33.980 --> 23:34.040]  Absolutely.
[23:34.040 --> 23:34.200]  The other one...
[23:34.200 --> 23:36.200]  Officer, I wasn't, I wasn't up to anything really.
[23:36.540 --> 23:36.680]  Yeah.
[23:37.380 --> 23:37.740]  And...
[23:38.020 --> 23:38.680]  Looking normal.
[23:38.860 --> 23:40.240]  It doesn't work when you go on the roof though.
[23:40.500 --> 23:41.860]  So don't, don't try it then.
[23:43.920 --> 23:44.280]  Yeah.
[23:44.740 --> 23:48.440]  The, the, the security, they'll, they'll, they'll give the story to the cops that, right from the video.
[23:48.540 --> 23:53.200]  But Alex, what you were talking about also process service, I was a process server at one point.
[23:53.200 --> 23:54.700]  And, and that's right for it.
[23:54.720 --> 23:55.700]  That doesn't surprise me.
[23:55.860 --> 23:56.300]  But...
[23:58.100 --> 23:59.720]  It was interesting work.
[23:59.860 --> 24:02.380]  But yeah, I mean, there are so many hats you can wear.
[24:02.520 --> 24:04.380]  So many different types of jobs.
[24:04.640 --> 24:04.800]  Yeah.
[24:04.920 --> 24:10.900]  To gain entry, to, to, to get a sense of what's on the other side.
[24:10.980 --> 24:24.940]  If it's the other side of the door, if it's a system, whatever that may be, you have a plethora of things you can be to someone else to, to get what, get at information or whatever the goal is.
[24:26.380 --> 24:28.900]  The important thing is to be seen as, as a trusted person.
[24:29.180 --> 24:29.300]  Yeah.
[24:29.300 --> 24:31.720]  For instance, okay, I'll give you an example.
[24:32.340 --> 24:33.720]  You walk into a bank.
[24:33.980 --> 24:34.740]  I've done this.
[24:34.860 --> 24:35.880]  I've, I've walked into many banks.
[24:37.160 --> 24:40.480]  And the, the, the bank that I use most often, they know me.
[24:40.580 --> 24:42.960]  So they don't ask me for ID when I, when I withdraw money.
[24:43.140 --> 24:44.800]  However, other branches don't.
[24:45.200 --> 24:47.840]  Um, so, uh, they would ask me for ID.
[24:48.060 --> 24:50.460]  But I try to, uh, I, I, I tried one time.
[24:50.640 --> 24:52.740]  I tried to, um, get around that system.
[24:52.820 --> 24:53.800]  What I did was I walked in.
[24:54.160 --> 24:56.480]  Uh, I know where the bank manager's office is.
[24:56.600 --> 24:57.180]  It was on the left.
[24:57.600 --> 24:59.040]  Uh, saw the bank manager, waved.
[24:59.440 --> 25:02.460]  Now you'd have to be a complete dick not to wave back when somebody waves at you.
[25:02.540 --> 25:03.540]  So they waved back at me.
[25:04.360 --> 25:05.160]  Teller sees this.
[25:05.300 --> 25:06.380]  Oh, he knows the bank manager.
[25:06.480 --> 25:07.580]  So they must be cool.
[25:08.380 --> 25:09.300]  Didn't ask for ID.
[25:09.520 --> 25:10.480]  Something as simple as that.
[25:10.540 --> 25:11.380]  And I didn't rob the bank.
[25:11.440 --> 25:12.300]  I took it out of my own account.
[25:12.440 --> 25:14.340]  But still, that's how you gain trust.
[25:14.340 --> 25:16.560]  A simple hand gesture sometimes can do it.
[25:16.980 --> 25:18.820]  Um, another thing that comes to mind is credentials.
[25:19.100 --> 25:21.700]  There's a lot of different types of things you can apply for.
[25:22.060 --> 25:24.180]  Uh, I got several different forms of identification.
[25:24.180 --> 25:25.180]  I'm not gonna get into it.
[25:25.300 --> 25:34.160]  But just by passing background checks, um, you can become someone who can go into all kinds of places and not necessarily be in any kind of industry.
[25:35.260 --> 25:43.520]  Um, specifically like with, uh, a lot of the logistics just to get supplies here and, uh, uh, create the event, uh, getting a CDL license.
[25:43.720 --> 25:46.620]  Now, I mean, that's, that's kind of sensitive right now.
[25:46.820 --> 25:53.680]  But driving trucks, uh, uh, all kinds of different, uh, levels of access become available.
[25:53.680 --> 26:10.460]  When maybe just a $5 application fee or something simple and, um, and passing right through whatever screening, you then become something else that might, or you might have some verification, some, some things to, uh, show that would support who you're,
[26:10.720 --> 26:25.640]  uh, who, whatever character you're creating to, to gain that trust and go down that sort of, that logical path and help them with their decision making as to, like, if they're gonna assist you if you're in distress or something's wrong, that, that kind of thing to,
[26:25.640 --> 26:29.240]  um, get them on your side and, and, and help you.
[26:29.240 --> 26:36.680]  Um, whether it's remote on the phone or, or in person, like, uh, at a security gate talking to somebody.
[26:36.960 --> 26:37.280]  I don't know.
[26:37.580 --> 26:37.780]  Yeah.
[26:38.500 --> 26:41.720]  Unless we're ready to make a phone call, I'll, I'll talk about...
[26:41.720 --> 26:43.280]  I'm always ready to make a phone call, but go ahead.
[26:43.440 --> 26:43.660]  Okay.
[26:43.820 --> 26:44.360]  I've got something.
[26:44.960 --> 26:45.360]  Always.
[26:45.660 --> 26:46.760]  I don't want to interrupt that.
[26:46.960 --> 26:48.200]  That's, that's why I'm here too.
[26:49.120 --> 26:53.680]  Uh, anyway, I, I think, uh, well, I'll, I'll, I'll take a poll.
[26:53.780 --> 26:56.780]  Do you guys want to hear why I think lawyers are susceptible to social engineering?
[26:56.780 --> 27:14.060]  I mean, in, in particular, and I think it's extremely dangerous and I need to preface it why, uh, why I'll tell you, tell you this actually, I don't want to get in trouble here, but, um, I think lawyers, and it is very dangerous and I put this out there so that other lawyers will become aware that this is a,
[27:14.060 --> 27:17.400]  I think a great tactic, you know, for social engineering lawyers.
[27:17.400 --> 27:24.520]  Uh, establishing that trust, establishing like the Bartlett name essentially is, is really all you need to do.
[27:24.660 --> 27:29.960]  If you were so inclined to try to social engineer a lawyer, you would really be able to capitalize.
[27:30.260 --> 27:36.220]  And I mean social engineer with the intention of, let's say, gaining access to a law firm network.
[27:36.420 --> 27:44.700]  This is why I think it's extremely dangerous and lawyers practices are inherently insecure because we love to friggin' write letters.
[27:44.940 --> 27:47.240]  We love to write letters to each other.
[27:47.380 --> 28:02.380]  And not just letters that, you know, in the form of an email, but always attached as an attachment as a PDF or something akin to that where we write emails to each other and we say, please see the attached correspondence in the above reference matter with the judge.
[28:02.620 --> 28:11.340]  And you say, you know, and you see, you see something come in, you say, oh shit, somebody sent a letter to the judge or to the court, I need to open this immediately.
[28:12.020 --> 28:14.180]  So, boom, you know, you can pop them that way.
[28:14.300 --> 28:26.300]  But if you really wanted to establish trust, it's extremely easy to find all the cases that a lawyer has been working on or is actively working on by using the PACER system, the public access to court records.
[28:26.720 --> 28:34.640]  And you can find a lawyer's active cases and you would look at who, which firm is his adversary.
[28:34.640 --> 28:55.100]  And at that point, once you have this knowledge of the lawyer's adversary, you could call a lawyer and impersonate that lawyer's PA, his personal assistant or paralegal from that law firm and say, we really need, we're trying desperately to send you an email that contains correspondence with the judge in the matter of Smith V.
[28:55.240 --> 28:56.640]  Wesson or something like that.
[28:57.120 --> 29:00.800]  And for some reason, it's getting bounced by your email server.
[29:00.800 --> 29:10.440]  So without even registering, let's say, a confusingly similar domain name that would impersonate the adversary's law firm, you could then say, I'm going to send this to you from our Gmail.
[29:10.440 --> 29:12.020]  I really hope that this gets through.
[29:12.580 --> 29:14.080]  It's an extremely important letter.
[29:14.400 --> 29:15.160]  You send it over.
[29:15.800 --> 29:17.760]  Obviously, you know what to put in the attachment.
[29:18.300 --> 29:21.060]  The lawyer would open it up and he would open up his law firm.
[29:21.100 --> 29:22.620]  It would pop his law firm immediately.
[29:22.640 --> 29:25.160]  You make your lateral moves inside and there you go.
[29:25.160 --> 29:29.720]  I mean, it's extremely, extremely easy to establish that level of trust.
[29:29.880 --> 29:31.240]  But then you would have to back up.
[29:31.340 --> 29:35.260]  You would have to call up again and say, and probably apologize.
[29:35.760 --> 29:37.330]  And say, I'm so sorry.
[29:38.080 --> 29:40.600]  I know you're a senior partner at this particular firm.
[29:40.720 --> 29:42.840]  I got our matters completely screwed up.
[29:42.940 --> 29:43.980]  I really screwed up.
[29:45.400 --> 29:47.520]  Could we just keep this to ourselves, please?
[29:47.540 --> 29:49.220]  Because my job is on the line here.
[29:49.300 --> 29:51.260]  And of course, the lawyer will say, don't worry about it.
[29:51.360 --> 29:51.580]  It's fine.
[29:51.580 --> 29:54.980]  He'll be relieved that there was no letter to the court in this particular matter.
[29:55.460 --> 29:58.880]  And have no idea, quite possibly, that he just popped his entire firm.
[29:59.100 --> 30:01.560]  I think it's incredibly easy to establish this trust.
[30:01.860 --> 30:12.140]  Another thing that is extremely dangerous with the way lawyers have operated for a very long period of time, is that in federal court, and every federal court has its own bar.
[30:12.320 --> 30:17.960]  So you need to be admitted to, here in New York, let's say the Southern District of New York, which is in Manhattan.
[30:17.960 --> 30:21.660]  And then the Eastern District of New York, which is Brooklyn and Long Island.
[30:21.920 --> 30:27.320]  Everyone has their own registration and their own registration number.
[30:27.540 --> 30:34.220]  But the number system is actually fairly consistent and hasn't changed until relatively recently.
[30:34.740 --> 30:48.320]  So you can go into previous filings and look at attorney's registration information, which is their first initial, their last initial, and then none other than the last four of their Social Security number.
[30:50.100 --> 30:53.040]  That makes things a little bit easier as well.
[30:54.240 --> 30:55.440]  Which is really bad.
[30:55.640 --> 30:57.540]  I mean, this is an incredibly bad practice.
[30:57.740 --> 30:59.380]  And now the federal courts have woken up to this.
[30:59.540 --> 31:03.540]  But these historical filings that contain that information are all there.
[31:03.660 --> 31:04.840]  And they're public records.
[31:05.240 --> 31:06.200]  That's a big problem.
[31:06.380 --> 31:08.440]  You can use that to establish trust very easily.
[31:08.440 --> 31:09.680]  Are we ready to make a phone call?
[31:09.860 --> 31:12.160]  Well, we're ready to at least think of something.
[31:12.460 --> 31:12.560]  Okay.
[31:12.720 --> 31:13.720]  Let me show you on the screen what we have here.
[31:14.160 --> 31:14.440]  I really...
[31:15.820 --> 31:17.340]  We've got a...
[31:17.340 --> 31:17.920]  Yeah.
[31:23.360 --> 31:24.600]  I want to f*ck with this guy.
[31:24.680 --> 31:25.140]  I really do.
[31:26.720 --> 31:29.700]  I mean, look, we've got a 10 gig network.
[31:29.940 --> 31:31.580]  We've got 3,000 hackers.
[31:33.020 --> 31:34.260]  The world's gone insane.
[31:34.260 --> 31:37.320]  So, you know, we have a moral responsibility to do something.
[31:40.620 --> 31:41.040]  All right.
[31:41.500 --> 31:41.780]  So...
[31:43.740 --> 31:45.120]  So, a couple of things first.
[31:45.540 --> 31:47.260]  There's a phone number on this website.
[31:48.380 --> 31:50.240]  I don't know what's going to happen if I call it.
[31:50.260 --> 31:50.900]  I'm going to try to call it.
[31:50.980 --> 31:52.080]  I don't know what I'm going to say if they answer.
[32:00.400 --> 32:03.740]  Thank you for calling Trump campaign headquarters.
[32:04.100 --> 32:07.340]  Our goal is to make America great again.
[32:07.760 --> 32:22.560]  For all information relating to Mr. Trump's campaign, press releases, or our event schedule, please visit our website at www.DonaldJTrump.com.
[32:22.660 --> 32:22.820]  Okay.
[32:23.360 --> 32:27.140]  For all other inquiries, please listen to the following options.
[32:27.960 --> 32:34.600]  If you would like to volunteer, please email volunteers at DonaldTrump.com.
[32:34.600 --> 32:36.200]  That's a good way of social engineering.
[32:36.640 --> 32:37.980]  Or press 1 and leave us a message.
[32:39.260 --> 32:47.600]  If you would like to offer advice or insight to the campaign, please email info at DonaldTrump.com.
[32:48.420 --> 32:50.920]  Or press 2 and leave us a message.
[32:52.020 --> 32:56.280]  If you are calling with a press inquiry, please press 3.
[32:57.020 --> 32:57.560]  Nice.
[32:57.700 --> 33:04.740]  For all other questions, or to speak with a member of our team, please press 4 and we will connect you.
[33:05.020 --> 33:05.560]  Okay.
[33:05.740 --> 33:06.520]  4 it is then.
[33:07.220 --> 33:07.380]  4.
[33:07.800 --> 33:08.080]  4.
[33:09.180 --> 33:11.140]  Please hold while I try to connect you.
[33:21.300 --> 33:24.020]  Just realized I have no idea what I'm going to say to these people.
[33:33.510 --> 33:34.030]  Hi.
[33:34.270 --> 33:35.990]  You've reached the Trump for President campaign.
[33:36.250 --> 33:37.290]  I'm afraid no one is available.
[33:37.410 --> 33:38.690]  It is Saturday night.
[33:38.810 --> 33:41.310]  If you leave your name and information, someone will be back shortly.
[33:41.310 --> 33:42.030]  Fat chance.
[33:42.290 --> 33:42.750]  Let's hit a start.
[33:42.950 --> 33:43.230]  Have a good day.
[33:43.970 --> 33:46.650]  Please enter your PIN and then press pound.
[33:48.130 --> 33:52.970]  This is the Trump campaign, so I'm going to try 1, 2, 3, 4.
[33:54.150 --> 33:55.010]  I'm sorry.
[33:55.250 --> 33:57.270]  You've entered an incorrect PIN.
[33:57.490 --> 34:00.370]  Please re-enter your PIN and then press pound.
[34:01.650 --> 34:02.470]  No, Trump!
[34:02.950 --> 34:04.190]  6, 6, 6.
[34:04.290 --> 34:04.550]  Yeah, Trump?
[34:04.750 --> 34:05.430]  I'm going to try Trump.
[34:05.530 --> 34:06.110]  That's a good one.
[34:08.990 --> 34:09.850]  I'm sorry.
[34:10.170 --> 34:10.890]  You've entered an incorrect PIN.
[34:10.890 --> 34:12.550]  Let's see how many times they let us strike.
[34:12.830 --> 34:12.850]  How about 3?
[34:13.530 --> 34:13.970]  2016.
[34:14.450 --> 34:15.370]  2016, okay.
[34:15.670 --> 34:16.310]  That's a good one.
[34:18.730 --> 34:19.550]  I'm sorry.
[34:19.810 --> 34:21.850]  You've entered an incorrect PIN.
[34:22.070 --> 34:22.330]  Goodbye.
[34:22.790 --> 34:23.190]  Okay.
[34:23.470 --> 34:23.790]  You get...
[34:25.190 --> 34:25.770]  Three tries.
[34:25.770 --> 34:26.010]  Three tries.
[34:26.750 --> 34:28.130]  But that wasn't really what I wanted to try.
[34:28.190 --> 34:29.450]  I didn't expect anybody to answer this.
[34:29.910 --> 34:34.550]  Let's try a cell phone, though, because that actually was publicized at one point.
[34:34.670 --> 34:35.590]  I don't think it still...
[34:36.430 --> 34:37.390]  It still works.
[34:40.570 --> 34:44.410]  Your call has been forwarded to an automated voice messaging system.
[34:45.090 --> 34:51.650]  9, 1, 7, 7, 5, 6, 8, 0, 0, 0.
[34:51.950 --> 34:53.050]  Is not available.
[34:53.370 --> 34:56.110]  The mailbox is full and cannot accept any...
[34:58.730 --> 34:59.390]  Oh, well.
[35:01.670 --> 35:03.310]  We don't have to disguise that number.
[35:03.670 --> 35:06.690]  It ended in 8,000, which is unbelievable.
[35:07.470 --> 35:08.050]  But, okay.
[35:08.210 --> 35:10.550]  Again, this wasn't what I was really thinking we could do.
[35:10.970 --> 35:14.130]  I figure, you know, they just had their little shindig out there in Cleveland.
[35:14.290 --> 35:16.270]  They must be planning some other activities.
[35:16.930 --> 35:18.030]  Tomorrow's Sunday, right?
[35:18.410 --> 35:20.710]  And Sunday is Meet the Press Day.
[35:21.250 --> 35:24.750]  And sure enough, on Meet the Press tomorrow, look who's appearing.
[35:25.350 --> 35:28.870]  None other than Donald Trump and Senator Bernie Sanders.
[35:29.670 --> 35:30.770]  So, not together.
[35:30.990 --> 35:32.070]  Not together, but...
[35:33.770 --> 35:35.190]  I thought it might be fun.
[35:35.310 --> 35:36.010]  Debate that never happened.
[35:36.150 --> 35:36.810]  We don't have a screen here, man.
[35:37.230 --> 35:38.270]  Oh, we need the screen.
[35:38.470 --> 35:38.630]  Please.
[35:39.270 --> 35:43.550]  On the cell phone, cell phone voicemail pressing town gets you the prompt for the finish.
[35:43.550 --> 35:43.730]  Okay.
[35:44.930 --> 35:45.810]  Is the screen there?
[35:47.510 --> 35:48.310]  I don't see it.
[35:50.010 --> 35:50.870]  Oh, straight up.
[35:50.890 --> 35:51.350]  Where is it?
[35:51.710 --> 35:52.310]  There we go.
[35:53.390 --> 35:53.630]  Yep.
[35:53.870 --> 35:54.410]  Now move it again.
[35:54.410 --> 35:54.870]  We just have the screen.
[35:55.170 --> 35:56.010]  We don't need us.
[35:56.170 --> 35:56.690]  We need the screen.
[35:57.430 --> 35:57.550]  Okay.
[35:58.430 --> 36:01.650]  So, as you can see, they have a schedule already for tomorrow's show.
[36:01.750 --> 36:03.370]  Donald Trump and Senator Sanders.
[36:04.210 --> 36:06.510]  And I have no doubt that's the order they're going to go in.
[36:07.190 --> 36:14.210]  Well, I thought it might be interesting if someone from the Trump campaign said, you know, we want to go... we don't want to get the last word.
[36:14.410 --> 36:15.730]  So, we want to flip that.
[36:16.290 --> 36:16.770]  All right?
[36:17.050 --> 36:17.370]  So...
[36:18.070 --> 36:19.030]  But we have to call them.
[36:19.110 --> 36:20.010]  So, how do we do that?
[36:20.010 --> 36:22.170]  Well, I did some searching online.
[36:23.090 --> 36:25.750]  I'm not going to show you what I searched for because I would show you the results.
[36:25.950 --> 36:30.870]  But I was able to find some numbers, some numbers in New York, some numbers in DC.
[36:31.390 --> 36:33.330]  And again, it's possible that nobody is there.
[36:33.430 --> 36:37.850]  But even if nobody's there, we can leave a message and maybe get the wheels in motion.
[36:37.910 --> 36:42.470]  Because sometimes in social engineering, you don't see the results, but you know you started the results.
[36:42.470 --> 36:48.210]  Back in college, I worked with some very mischievous people.
[36:48.730 --> 36:51.350]  We started a feud between two professors.
[36:53.730 --> 37:01.090]  Because our thing was cut and paste letterhead before desktop publishing.
[37:01.510 --> 37:05.150]  So, we took someone from the Department of Mathematics.
[37:05.670 --> 37:10.430]  We took that letterhead and typed a nasty letter to someone in the Department of Physics.
[37:12.370 --> 37:14.430]  I forget what the exact issue was.
[37:14.590 --> 37:15.670]  Maybe it was a parking space.
[37:15.670 --> 37:17.930]  Maybe it was something in a building.
[37:18.170 --> 37:18.810]  I don't know.
[37:18.990 --> 37:20.510]  But very nasty words were spoken.
[37:21.490 --> 37:24.470]  And it went through the intracampus mail.
[37:24.690 --> 37:26.870]  So, it wasn't traceable in any way.
[37:26.870 --> 37:28.370]  It just went from one box to another.
[37:28.550 --> 37:30.870]  And no doubt it was received by that physics professor.
[37:31.090 --> 37:35.390]  Who then sent a response equally nasty to the mathematics professor.
[37:35.530 --> 37:37.810]  The thing is, neither one of them sent either of those letters.
[37:38.350 --> 37:40.190]  But they both received them.
[37:41.990 --> 37:45.330]  And we know that something awkward happened after that.
[37:46.370 --> 37:47.570]  I don't know why we picked them.
[37:47.650 --> 37:49.010]  They did something that pissed us off.
[37:49.130 --> 37:49.630]  I don't know what it was.
[37:50.270 --> 37:50.710]  So, anyway.
[37:50.950 --> 37:52.070]  That's the idea here.
[37:52.210 --> 37:53.910]  Is to get wheels in motion.
[37:54.070 --> 37:57.110]  To have somebody at NBC saying, What the f*ck does Trump want to do now?
[37:59.410 --> 38:01.070]  And even if we get voicemail, we're gonna...
[38:01.070 --> 38:01.850]  I need a name.
[38:01.950 --> 38:02.530]  I don't have a name.
[38:02.670 --> 38:03.470]  What name should I use?
[38:03.950 --> 38:04.350]  Royer.
[38:04.690 --> 38:05.090]  What?
[38:06.130 --> 38:06.530]  Drew.
[38:07.050 --> 38:07.870]  Drew is good.
[38:08.030 --> 38:08.470]  I like Drew.
[38:08.890 --> 38:09.130]  Drew.
[38:10.350 --> 38:11.950]  I can't hear you when you shout out.
[38:12.130 --> 38:12.970]  John Miller.
[38:13.470 --> 38:14.270]  John Miller?
[38:14.870 --> 38:15.270]  That's...
[38:15.270 --> 38:16.670]  I know like 30 John Millers.
[38:16.810 --> 38:16.970]  Okay.
[38:17.310 --> 38:17.590]  Yeah.
[38:17.610 --> 38:18.550]  That was his pseudonym.
[38:18.670 --> 38:19.290]  Oh, that was his pseudonym.
[38:19.430 --> 38:19.630]  Yeah.
[38:19.710 --> 38:20.330]  What are you, crazy?
[38:20.550 --> 38:21.270]  I kind of...
[38:21.270 --> 38:22.770]  I want to ask for John Miller.
[38:22.950 --> 38:24.830]  Like, that's a different thing.
[38:24.930 --> 38:27.030]  But somebody's got to ask for him to see if he actually...
[38:27.030 --> 38:29.390]  You know, you'll have eight years to play these games.
[38:29.390 --> 38:30.130]  Oh, God.
[38:30.370 --> 38:30.390]  No.
[38:30.890 --> 38:31.930]  Careful what you ask for.
[38:32.050 --> 38:32.170]  Yeah.
[38:33.470 --> 38:34.230]  You got suggestions?
[38:34.530 --> 38:36.910]  I was just saying that was Trump social engineering by...
[38:36.910 --> 38:37.730]  No, but do you have a name?
[38:37.790 --> 38:38.510]  Do you have a name for us?
[38:39.290 --> 38:39.650]  I don't know.
[38:39.650 --> 38:40.970]  Are we looking for a name associated with Trump?
[38:40.970 --> 38:41.290]  Just a name.
[38:41.450 --> 38:42.030]  For God's sake, people.
[38:42.050 --> 38:42.590]  This is an easy one.
[38:43.670 --> 38:44.750]  Jonathan Guile, Roy.
[38:45.310 --> 38:45.950]  Jonathan Guile?
[38:45.990 --> 38:46.370]  I don't know.
[38:46.530 --> 38:47.330]  Where'd you come up with that one?
[38:47.370 --> 38:48.230]  I have no idea.
[38:48.750 --> 38:49.070]  Guile.
[38:49.270 --> 38:49.530]  Guile.
[38:49.650 --> 38:50.410]  Last name Guile.
[38:50.550 --> 38:51.110]  It's a little bit...
[38:51.110 --> 38:51.910]  A little bit of a pun.
[38:52.270 --> 38:52.590]  Not...
[38:52.590 --> 38:53.530]  I mean, but...
[38:53.990 --> 38:54.310]  Okay.
[38:54.510 --> 38:54.790]  All right.
[38:56.450 --> 38:57.450]  I like Jonathan.
[38:57.850 --> 39:00.710]  You're probably unlikely to find a Mexican name on the mainland.
[39:00.730 --> 39:01.290]  John Guile.
[39:01.470 --> 39:01.790]  How about that?
[39:02.090 --> 39:03.450]  Jonathan is just too...
[39:03.450 --> 39:04.410]  How about that?
[39:04.710 --> 39:04.850]  All right.
[39:05.390 --> 39:05.950]  Drew Guile.
[39:06.230 --> 39:06.990]  I like Drew.
[39:07.150 --> 39:08.090]  I like Drew at first.
[39:08.150 --> 39:08.810]  I don't like it anymore.
[39:09.250 --> 39:09.490]  Yeah.
[39:10.250 --> 39:12.490]  Drew sounds like somebody who should be on a yacht.
[39:12.830 --> 39:13.510]  Here's the thing.
[39:13.590 --> 39:13.790]  Okay.
[39:14.630 --> 39:18.790]  I searched for NBC internal numbers online and I found them.
[39:19.230 --> 39:19.350]  Okay.
[39:19.610 --> 39:23.850]  Someone had their list of NBC internal numbers and there it is online.
[39:23.850 --> 39:26.190]  So I was able to get a number for Meet the Press.
[39:26.990 --> 39:27.950]  So let's...
[39:28.930 --> 39:30.050]  Let's try this.
[39:35.040 --> 39:36.260]  I can't read my own writing.
[39:36.980 --> 39:37.960]  I think that's a five.
[40:01.410 --> 40:03.910]  Your call is being answered by Audix.
[40:04.410 --> 40:05.370]  Meet the Press.
[40:05.910 --> 40:06.970]  Is not available.
[40:07.410 --> 40:08.190]  Make a message.
[40:08.370 --> 40:09.190]  Wait for the tone.
[40:09.190 --> 40:12.390]  When finished recording, press TOWN.
[40:13.210 --> 40:16.190]  Otherwise for assistance, press zero now.
[40:16.710 --> 40:17.730]  Record at the tone.
[40:19.030 --> 40:19.790]  Yes.
[40:19.850 --> 40:20.110]  Hi.
[40:20.270 --> 40:20.790]  This is...
[40:20.790 --> 40:23.490]  John Dial over at Trump campaign.
[40:24.290 --> 40:25.050]  We...
[40:25.050 --> 40:27.430]  We were in touch before...
[40:27.430 --> 40:27.970]  Excuse me.
[40:28.370 --> 40:32.710]  We were in touch before about the swap in the interview tomorrow.
[40:33.530 --> 40:34.330]  Mr. Sanders.
[40:34.830 --> 40:36.010]  As I mentioned, if I could go.
[40:42.300 --> 40:42.780]  I'm boring.
[40:42.880 --> 40:43.160]  I'm boring.
[40:45.560 --> 40:46.860]  That was the weirdest thing ever.
[40:47.040 --> 40:48.000]  I don't know...
[40:48.000 --> 40:48.780]  I don't know what happened there.
[40:48.880 --> 40:49.320]  Am I up?
[40:49.700 --> 40:49.920]  Okay.
[40:50.180 --> 40:50.880]  I don't know what happened.
[40:52.100 --> 40:57.040]  In the middle of my message, she said, you have 45 seconds to finish talking.
[40:57.280 --> 40:58.300]  And then gave me another beep.
[40:58.480 --> 40:59.340]  So I was all confused.
[40:59.340 --> 41:00.980]  So that didn't go well at all.
[41:04.400 --> 41:09.400]  But, you know, if it did go well, we had the right tools at our disposal to be able to do that.
[41:09.480 --> 41:10.220]  We had the right phone number.
[41:10.300 --> 41:11.140]  We could have left a message.
[41:11.240 --> 41:12.780]  And maybe, maybe something will come of this.
[41:13.440 --> 41:14.800]  There is another half to all this.
[41:14.900 --> 41:17.800]  But I'll let other people talk for a moment while I gather myself.
[41:22.140 --> 41:23.400]  You got your mouth full there.
[41:23.720 --> 41:24.640]  I'm chewing on a mint.
[41:26.540 --> 41:29.060]  Are we still targeting Trump or looking for Trump ideas?
[41:29.060 --> 41:29.920]  Yes.
[41:30.180 --> 41:30.260]  Yes.
[41:30.900 --> 41:32.300]  I've got plenty of ideas.
[41:32.520 --> 41:33.780]  But go ahead.
[41:33.880 --> 41:34.780]  Tell a story or something.
[41:35.020 --> 41:35.260]  Or...
[41:35.260 --> 41:35.920]  I'll just...
[41:35.920 --> 41:36.120]  Go ahead.
[41:36.120 --> 41:36.900]  Just to go with...
[41:36.900 --> 41:40.480]  When you run into situations like that, you've got your name.
[41:40.760 --> 41:42.620]  You've come up with this persona.
[41:43.200 --> 41:47.820]  Like, speaking to accoutrement of the character you're creating.
[41:48.980 --> 41:54.880]  I've spoken about voices in the past, but mood is a really critical thing.
[41:54.880 --> 42:00.720]  I mean, you can have a character and maybe a drawl or whatever their name is and so on.
[42:00.820 --> 42:02.560]  But what's going on with them?
[42:02.640 --> 42:03.800]  What's their state?
[42:03.960 --> 42:04.700]  Are they in a hurry?
[42:04.960 --> 42:10.460]  That kind of stuff is really critical to the believability and so on.
[42:10.860 --> 42:20.700]  You might have been able to save that if you were anticipating some disruption by saying you have bad connection or you're driving or something.
[42:20.700 --> 42:23.200]  Stuff like that helps because it builds out the believability.
[42:23.200 --> 42:23.860]  Well, it is hard.
[42:24.000 --> 42:26.820]  You sound like you're going through, you know, the Woodstock PA system.
[42:27.000 --> 42:28.780]  It's a little hard to explain that.
[42:28.940 --> 42:30.020]  That's what threw me off.
[42:31.020 --> 42:33.560]  So, maybe the next call I make if...
[42:33.560 --> 42:40.740]  I know it's really difficult to get the balance right, but if I could be heard but also not sound like I'm going through speakers.
[42:41.240 --> 42:42.060]  We'll do our best.
[42:42.180 --> 42:42.980]  Maybe hold the phone.
[42:43.580 --> 42:44.260]  I don't know.
[42:44.460 --> 42:45.060]  This is...
[42:45.060 --> 42:46.280]  You have to keep the receipt.
[42:46.280 --> 42:47.400]  It's an unusual way to do things.
[42:47.440 --> 42:52.680]  Usually, you're sitting on a phone by yourself and you have all the time in the world.
[42:52.740 --> 42:53.660]  It doesn't take a few minutes.
[42:54.800 --> 42:57.180]  Okay, so now, Kyle, you actually found this one.
[42:57.440 --> 42:57.660]  Yes.
[42:57.840 --> 42:59.380]  We were looking for Trump people.
[43:00.360 --> 43:04.920]  And you found a list, I believe, of important people.
[43:08.580 --> 43:09.000]  Yeah.
[43:09.320 --> 43:13.240]  So, I was thinking about, okay, so you need to...
[43:13.240 --> 43:18.110]  This is part of pretexting, part of doing your research, being prepared for eventualities.
[43:18.840 --> 43:26.140]  You want to know a little bit more than you have to know so that if something does come up, you can pivot or react and keep that up.
[43:26.960 --> 43:31.580]  So, I was coming up with, so what would you want to know about the organization?
[43:31.580 --> 43:32.480]  You need to know the structure.
[43:32.760 --> 43:40.400]  So, because it's this behemoth or whatever it is, it's got characters, actors within it.
[43:40.720 --> 43:46.580]  And media relations departments and communications directors and...
[43:46.580 --> 43:47.020]  Check it out.
[43:47.100 --> 43:47.440]  Check it out.
[43:47.500 --> 43:48.300]  Under communications.
[43:48.920 --> 43:49.700]  You see that person there?
[43:50.260 --> 43:51.260]  Hope Hicks.
[43:54.360 --> 43:55.340]  Hope Hicks.
[43:55.500 --> 43:56.060]  Come on.
[43:56.260 --> 43:57.280]  Is that not an invitation?
[43:57.720 --> 43:58.240]  So...
[44:01.700 --> 44:05.200]  So, I searched for Trump media staff.
[44:05.980 --> 44:08.820]  And we found a pretty good...
[44:08.820 --> 44:11.320]  It's called Ballotpedia or something.
[44:11.620 --> 44:13.460]  But Hope Hicks came up.
[44:13.680 --> 44:14.020]  Yeah.
[44:14.200 --> 44:14.780]  I like that.
[44:16.020 --> 44:18.180]  The mystifying triumph of Hope Hicks.
[44:18.960 --> 44:20.520]  There's a lot of press about her.
[44:20.720 --> 44:22.220]  Donald Trump's right-hand woman.
[44:22.660 --> 44:23.380]  Right-hand woman.
[44:24.540 --> 44:25.680]  So, there's all this information.
[44:25.720 --> 44:26.760]  We have this person now.
[44:26.800 --> 44:27.260]  We have a name.
[44:27.400 --> 44:29.680]  Obviously, we're not going to be able to call Donald Trump's cell phone.
[44:29.680 --> 44:32.240]  We're not going to be able to reach him at the campaign headquarters.
[44:32.420 --> 44:35.160]  But we can look at Hope Hicks a little bit.
[44:35.320 --> 44:36.600]  And maybe learn some things.
[44:37.540 --> 44:39.840]  And there's this article all about her.
[44:40.040 --> 44:43.180]  About how this is a big change for her.
[44:45.420 --> 44:46.780]  Donald Trump introducing her.
[44:46.900 --> 44:48.040]  Saying, this is hope.
[44:48.160 --> 44:48.660]  This is hope.
[44:48.740 --> 44:49.180]  This is hope.
[44:49.200 --> 44:49.880]  In that way of his.
[44:50.300 --> 44:51.620]  But he's saying, this is hope.
[44:51.660 --> 44:52.620]  Which I think is really funny.
[44:52.620 --> 44:56.840]  And we basically, we scrolled down through this whole article.
[44:57.720 --> 45:00.580]  Which is really a very long article about this one person.
[45:01.320 --> 45:03.140]  And if you look down here.
[45:04.000 --> 45:08.480]  The demands of her schedule led to a breakup with her boyfriend of six years.
[45:09.680 --> 45:12.580]  And while she technically still lives in Greenwich.
[45:13.240 --> 45:15.880]  With her sister, Mary Grace.
[45:16.580 --> 45:19.020]  When she's not traveling on Trump Force One.
[45:20.060 --> 45:22.160]  She stays in New York.
[45:22.160 --> 45:23.860]  In a Trump apartment provided by the campaign.
[45:24.040 --> 45:24.360]  Well, okay.
[45:24.440 --> 45:25.040]  What have we learned here?
[45:25.220 --> 45:26.840]  We've learned she has a sister.
[45:27.200 --> 45:28.440]  Named Mary Grace.
[45:28.940 --> 45:30.880]  Who lives in Greenwich.
[45:31.040 --> 45:31.700]  Which is in Connecticut.
[45:32.680 --> 45:34.000]  And it doesn't take much.
[45:34.360 --> 45:37.180]  To go to whitepages.com.
[45:39.240 --> 45:40.760]  And look up Mary Hicks.
[45:40.760 --> 45:42.420]  And look, there's her address.
[45:42.640 --> 45:43.880]  Right there in Greenwich, Connecticut.
[45:45.300 --> 45:46.680]  Now you can't get the phone number.
[45:47.200 --> 45:49.820]  Because if you click on phone number, you have to sign up for something.
[45:49.960 --> 45:50.760]  And you get all this malware.
[45:51.000 --> 45:52.040]  And various other things.
[45:53.320 --> 45:56.240]  But, but you can look up the address.
[45:56.560 --> 45:57.620]  On Yellow Pages.
[45:58.100 --> 45:58.900]  And bingo.
[45:59.220 --> 46:01.760]  Hope Hicks shows up with a phone number.
[46:02.020 --> 46:04.440]  So, if I were so inclined.
[46:04.600 --> 46:05.780]  And I really don't want to get into this.
[46:05.960 --> 46:09.780]  But I could call Hope Hicks at home at 10 o'clock at night on a Saturday.
[46:10.660 --> 46:13.780]  And say, hey, this is Meet the Press.
[46:13.980 --> 46:14.980]  We have to reschedule.
[46:15.340 --> 46:17.380]  And, you know, cause all kinds of mayhem.
[46:23.940 --> 46:24.880]  All right, all right.
[46:25.620 --> 46:26.680]  I'll give it a shot.
[46:27.320 --> 46:29.340]  But, but, let's keep the speaker down.
[46:29.620 --> 46:31.160]  I'm going to dial star six, seven this time.
[46:31.290 --> 46:32.800]  Which I forgot to do the other two times.
[46:33.180 --> 46:35.120]  Do you know, when, when...
[46:35.120 --> 46:36.380]  Oh yeah, this is really weird.
[46:36.540 --> 46:39.440]  When you call out on this phone, do you know what the caller ID says?
[46:39.500 --> 46:40.080]  It says hope.
[46:41.700 --> 46:42.060]  Now...
[46:44.020 --> 46:44.660]  Holy shit.
[46:44.820 --> 46:47.790]  If I call her house, and it says hope on it...
[46:49.260 --> 46:50.240]  Someone's going to think it's her.
[46:50.440 --> 46:52.200]  And they're not going to know why it doesn't say her last name.
[46:52.640 --> 46:54.200]  But that's going to, that's going to be weird.
[46:54.340 --> 46:54.500]  Okay.
[46:58.260 --> 46:59.200]  Let's give it a shot.
[46:59.440 --> 47:00.020]  I mean, why not?
[47:00.020 --> 47:01.640]  Do you want to have a name from someone?
[47:01.860 --> 47:02.220]  Can I be seen?
[47:02.300 --> 47:03.520]  No, it'll be John Guile again.
[47:03.600 --> 47:03.920]  Why not?
[47:04.060 --> 47:06.100]  I mean, let them confuse themselves.
[47:07.040 --> 47:09.020]  Wait, is John Guile your guy or our guy?
[47:09.260 --> 47:11.460]  You know, at some point it just doesn't matter anymore.
[47:13.840 --> 47:14.640]  Okay, so...
[47:17.930 --> 47:19.130]  Not getting a dial tone.
[47:31.230 --> 47:32.330]  What's the number?
[47:55.180 --> 47:55.660]  Hello?
[47:56.300 --> 47:56.960]  Uh, hello.
[47:57.180 --> 47:58.700]  We're looking for HOPE X.
[47:59.560 --> 48:03.340]  You're calling me at this hour of the night, and Hope doesn't even live here?
[48:03.540 --> 48:04.320]  Oh, I'm sorry.
[48:04.400 --> 48:05.740]  This is the only number that we have.
[48:05.840 --> 48:06.140]  I apologize.
[48:06.640 --> 48:07.680]  This is Meet the Press.
[48:07.780 --> 48:08.180]  I'm sorry.
[48:08.260 --> 48:08.920]  We have this number.
[48:10.160 --> 48:10.640]  Hello?
[48:11.900 --> 48:12.300]  Hello?
[48:13.820 --> 48:14.220]  Well...
[48:16.360 --> 48:16.760]  What...
[48:17.600 --> 48:18.940]  What did we learn from that?
[48:19.160 --> 48:19.720]  He doesn't live here.
[48:19.940 --> 48:20.500]  He's the right person.
[48:20.640 --> 48:21.360]  This happens all the time.
[48:21.360 --> 48:26.120]  We learned that Mary, Grace, and Hope aren't on the best of terms right now.
[48:28.080 --> 48:30.200]  Because she didn't even offer to take a message.
[48:30.680 --> 48:32.480]  And for God's sake, she works for Trump.
[48:32.660 --> 48:32.940]  You know?
[48:33.160 --> 48:34.120]  This could be important.
[48:34.940 --> 48:35.340]  Okay.
[48:35.560 --> 48:37.580]  Well, I know I've caused a little bit of mayhem.
[48:37.580 --> 48:40.680]  And I'm good with that if you are.
[48:48.700 --> 48:50.240]  Oh, but Donald, it's just beginning.
[48:50.440 --> 48:51.020]  It's just beginning.
[48:51.160 --> 48:52.240]  We have all kinds of things planned.
[48:55.180 --> 48:55.900]  Any questions?
[48:56.180 --> 48:57.080]  Do we have a microphone there?
[48:57.200 --> 49:00.260]  If anybody wants to come up and tell their story or ask a question of us.
[49:01.580 --> 49:03.060]  Can you guess Trump's pin?
[49:03.060 --> 49:04.280]  Use the microphones right there.
[49:04.560 --> 49:04.980]  Not far.
[49:08.790 --> 49:10.910]  Can you guess Trump's pin?
[49:11.170 --> 49:12.730]  You have his cell phone number.
[49:12.890 --> 49:13.950]  It goes to voicemail.
[49:14.430 --> 49:15.370]  Can you guess his PIN?
[49:15.470 --> 49:17.370]  Well, not in front of an audience in five minutes.
[49:17.530 --> 49:18.270]  No, but...
[49:18.270 --> 49:19.210]  It only gave us three tries.
[49:19.430 --> 49:20.330]  It only gave us three tries.
[49:20.690 --> 49:22.630]  You know, put me in a hotel room for a weekend.
[49:22.630 --> 49:23.210]  Maybe I could.
[49:23.350 --> 49:23.550]  Yes.
[49:24.990 --> 49:25.950]  Let's all try.
[49:26.310 --> 49:26.670]  Microphone.
[49:26.950 --> 49:27.870]  I'm not listening to people.
[49:28.050 --> 49:28.930]  Just shout out from the audience.
[49:29.170 --> 49:29.470]  Attack.
[49:30.870 --> 49:31.630]  Anyone else?
[49:32.490 --> 49:33.730]  You're a shy bunch.
[49:35.550 --> 49:36.290]  No questions?
[49:36.810 --> 49:37.270]  Overwhelmed.
[49:38.250 --> 49:38.430]  Okay.
[49:38.510 --> 49:38.630]  Yeah.
[49:38.710 --> 49:39.050]  You're stunned.
[49:39.210 --> 49:40.090]  You're shocked.
[49:40.430 --> 49:40.730]  Starbucks.
[49:41.330 --> 49:41.770]  We have a question.
[49:41.770 --> 49:42.510]  Starbucks headquarters.
[49:43.630 --> 49:45.230]  Ask if your refrigerator is running.
[49:45.550 --> 49:46.010]  Okay.
[49:46.170 --> 49:46.390]  All right.
[49:46.830 --> 49:48.530]  We're a little bit beyond that.
[49:48.590 --> 49:49.010]  All right.
[49:49.710 --> 49:56.470]  Well, I think that this meet the press scenario, if it wasn't so impromptu, and you literally had a couple of hours of preparation...
[49:56.470 --> 49:57.530]  It wasn't 10 o'clock at night on a Saturday.
[49:57.530 --> 50:03.970]  It could be really highly effective to just prepare it with one email to this meet the press person.
[50:04.270 --> 50:04.310]  Of course.
[50:04.410 --> 50:04.590]  Yeah.
[50:04.790 --> 50:07.050]  I see that you have some numbers and names here on...
[50:07.050 --> 50:12.870]  These are the numbers that we got just from an hour ago, looking it up on Google and looking at people's names and things like that.
[50:12.890 --> 50:19.290]  But you see how easy it was to reach somebody who was one step away from someone of influence.
[50:19.650 --> 50:20.670]  Not hard at all.
[50:20.810 --> 50:27.550]  We didn't wind up doing anything, and we might have just basically gotten a whole lot of suspicion, but we did get to those people.
[50:28.110 --> 50:31.330]  If you leave anything on the Internet, you can be gotten to as well.
[50:31.530 --> 50:33.290]  It's really, really easy.
[50:33.490 --> 50:35.770]  There are very few people that can cover their tracks.
[50:36.870 --> 50:39.030]  But it's not hard to cover your tracks.
[50:39.150 --> 50:41.830]  You don't have to give your phone number out on your Facebook account.
[50:41.910 --> 50:43.790]  You don't have to use real information.
[50:43.790 --> 50:49.010]  You can confuse the system as much as possible and give fake info and fake details.
[50:49.250 --> 50:54.290]  And that way, when people try and start mischief with you, it might be a little bit more difficult.
[50:54.730 --> 50:56.110]  Eventually, they could get something.
[50:56.450 --> 51:02.950]  But if you have fake information out there, maybe you'll be safe for a little longer.
[51:03.090 --> 51:05.370]  Or maybe you'll know somebody is trying something.
[51:05.530 --> 51:06.250]  You'll get hints.
[51:06.450 --> 51:06.890]  You have a question?
[51:06.990 --> 51:07.150]  Go ahead.
[51:07.690 --> 51:11.630]  What are your feelings on responsible disclosure in social engineering?
[51:12.330 --> 51:12.930]  Such as?
[51:13.170 --> 51:14.770]  Do we have responsible disclosure?
[51:15.170 --> 51:18.950]  Do we have a responsibility to disclose if we find significant vulnerabilities?
[51:19.510 --> 51:21.110]  How do you draw that line?
[51:21.310 --> 51:24.430]  It depends what you are doing it for.
[51:24.630 --> 51:29.690]  I mean, if you're doing it for nefarious purposes, obviously, that's not going to be high on your list.
[51:30.690 --> 51:36.170]  Someone in the hacker community, well, what we do is we print it in a magazine when we find out things.
[51:36.170 --> 51:37.870]  So I consider that to be disclosure.
[51:38.290 --> 51:39.230]  We're telling people things.
[51:39.990 --> 51:43.290]  Keeping it to yourself, I don't think that's really very responsible.
[51:43.310 --> 51:43.950]  It's a bit selfish.
[51:44.790 --> 51:51.910]  But sharing security vulnerabilities, including social engineering ones, I think, is something that we need to learn from.
[51:51.910 --> 51:55.750]  And that other people benefit from others' failings.
[51:56.870 --> 51:57.610]  Anyone else?
[51:57.750 --> 52:00.930]  Maybe I was imagining it because no one else commented on it.
[52:00.930 --> 52:07.550]  But when you were on the meet-the-press call, didn't it say, or press zero if you need assistance?
[52:08.770 --> 52:12.570]  Okay, I would have gotten a meet-the-press operator, but probably I would have gotten another voicemail at this hour.
[52:12.690 --> 52:13.030]  You think so?
[52:13.190 --> 52:13.370]  Yeah.
[52:13.750 --> 52:14.450]  Probably would have.
[52:15.570 --> 52:22.270]  Again, I wasn't really trying to screw it up so much, but more demonstrate how easy it is to get to the right people.
[52:23.330 --> 52:27.570]  I feel if it had succeeded, it probably would have been worse than if it had failed.
[52:28.170 --> 52:29.610]  I mean, I don't know.
[52:29.750 --> 52:31.330]  I'm not sure how they would have reacted to that.
[52:31.650 --> 52:31.870]  Go ahead.
[52:32.510 --> 52:43.750]  Someone's avoiding the call, so I made up a name that sounded like a descendant of a former president, like Ulysses something, Grant something or other, and started getting through with things like that.
[52:45.190 --> 52:45.510]  Okay.
[52:46.070 --> 52:47.470]  I don't really understand that, but all right.
[52:47.830 --> 52:54.070]  I think he's saying historically speaking, there's been precedence and precedence with presidents.
[52:55.650 --> 52:56.230]  I don't know.
[52:57.130 --> 52:58.430]  How do we have an incoming call?
[52:58.570 --> 52:58.650]  Thank you.
[52:58.650 --> 52:58.970]  You know what?
[52:59.010 --> 53:00.210]  It's probably Mary Grace calling back.
[53:00.330 --> 53:01.270]  I'm sorry, Mary Grace.
[53:01.330 --> 53:02.410]  I really feel bad about this.
[53:02.730 --> 53:03.670]  No, I am not.
[53:03.890 --> 53:04.750]  No, no, no, no.
[53:05.470 --> 53:05.790]  Fine.
[53:05.910 --> 53:06.230]  Fine.
[53:06.370 --> 53:06.530]  Fine.
[53:06.690 --> 53:06.770]  Fine.
[53:08.430 --> 53:08.750]  Hello?
[53:09.870 --> 53:11.210]  I'm calling from Meet the Press.
[53:11.410 --> 53:12.430]  I'm going for returning your phone call.
[53:12.430 --> 53:13.250]  Are you in a real life?
[53:16.330 --> 53:16.690]  Well...
[53:26.430 --> 53:27.050]  That's revenge.
[53:27.350 --> 53:29.490]  Go back to the very first social engineering panel.
[53:29.550 --> 53:29.690]  He trusted me.
[53:29.690 --> 53:33.530]  The very first HOPE in 1994, and I pulled the same trick on SN.
[53:33.570 --> 53:34.010]  Did you really?
[53:34.010 --> 53:34.370]  Yes.
[53:35.810 --> 53:36.830]  It was funny then.
[53:36.890 --> 53:38.290]  It's not funny now, but it was funny then.
[53:38.410 --> 53:39.390]  History repeats itself.
[53:39.550 --> 53:40.670]  History repeats itself.
[53:41.610 --> 53:42.250]  All right, folks.
[53:42.350 --> 53:42.930]  Closing commentary.
[53:42.930 --> 53:43.250]  Anybody?
[53:43.770 --> 53:45.170]  Do you have to be on another panel?
[53:45.390 --> 53:46.070]  Yes, I do.
[53:46.130 --> 53:46.270]  You're in the other room.
[53:46.350 --> 53:46.970]  Get out of here.
[53:46.970 --> 53:47.290]  All right, yep.
[53:47.750 --> 53:48.430]  See you guys later.
[53:48.530 --> 53:49.550]  All right, go to Alex's panel across the room.
[53:49.550 --> 53:50.110]  Thank you, guys.
[53:50.570 --> 53:51.030]  Thank you.
[53:51.190 --> 53:52.010]  Go watch the panel.
[53:53.490 --> 54:01.310]  Please continue having fun at HOPE, and we have lots of panels left to go, and we have Hackers Got Talent at midnight in the other room.
[54:01.570 --> 54:01.850]  Yes.
[54:01.990 --> 54:02.190]  Thank you.
[54:02.290 --> 54:02.630]  Check it out.
[54:04.330 --> 54:04.570]  Thank you.
[54:04.650 --> 54:05.030]  Thank you so much for everything.
[54:05.030 --> 54:05.850]  So, this is a highlight, of the moment.
[54:06.570 --> 54:06.950]  Oh, they...
[54:06.950 --> 54:07.050]  Oh, thank you.