[00:00.000 --> 00:09.940]  The title here is incomplete because what it really should say is how one city, that city Oakland, California, stood up to the Department of Homeland Security and won.
[00:10.400 --> 00:13.580]  And we have some really amazing stories about this.
[00:13.780 --> 00:18.100]  And we couldn't have won without the people that, among others, who are in this picture that was taken by Brian.
[00:18.240 --> 00:22.700]  This was the glowy LEDs, whatever that was, and this was outside of City Hall.
[00:22.920 --> 00:28.880]  And if I recall, there were at least a couple of City Hall nights where they were also inside the City Hall chambers.
[00:29.360 --> 00:32.740]  So the City Council got to see it as they were deliberate in this process.
[00:32.940 --> 00:35.140]  So the picture was taken by my co-speaker, Brian.
[00:35.820 --> 00:46.040]  So one of the things that we want to address in this talk, there is currently a massive chasm in basically the world between technology and law.
[00:46.240 --> 00:48.800]  Anybody who's followed the crypto wars and other things is aware of this.
[00:49.020 --> 00:56.800]  There are a number of groups that are doing fantastic work to try to bridge this chasm, EFF, and Access Now and other places.
[00:56.800 --> 01:00.100]  And we're throwing ourselves into the ring with this.
[01:00.520 --> 01:04.780]  So in terms of representing that chasm, I'm aestetix.
[01:04.860 --> 01:07.720]  I'm one of the technologists and my co-presenter, Brian.
[01:08.600 --> 01:09.900]  You're a lawyer, basically, right?
[01:10.320 --> 01:10.660]  Basically.
[01:11.740 --> 01:12.180]  Yeah.
[01:12.340 --> 01:12.900]  I don't know.
[01:12.940 --> 01:13.600]  I don't know the law.
[01:13.920 --> 01:14.960]  Well, sort of.
[01:15.100 --> 01:16.640]  I sat on a committee with lawyers.
[01:16.640 --> 01:17.160]  It was weird.
[01:18.900 --> 01:25.300]  So one of the things that we'll get into is that we had basically a call to action because a lot of crazy things began to happen.
[01:25.500 --> 01:31.240]  And the citizens of Oakland basically rose up in this great community as we'll see some examples of.
[01:32.500 --> 01:38.540]  And after lots and lots of protests, the city hall created basically a citizens' privacy committee.
[01:38.860 --> 01:42.040]  And I mention this because I sat on this committee and it lasted like a year.
[01:43.000 --> 01:47.100]  Like really going to city hall every week for a year was kind of grueling for me, not for you.
[01:47.740 --> 01:53.440]  And I sat on the committee as a technology expert and Brian was actually the chair of the committee.
[01:53.440 --> 01:55.040]  So thank you, Brian, for all your work.
[01:55.240 --> 01:55.560]  Thanks.
[01:56.400 --> 02:00.580]  So the other thing that we're going to cover, because the policy that we'll be detailing...
[02:00.580 --> 02:01.320]  And we'll...
[02:01.320 --> 02:04.980]  We have a workshop after this where we get into the legal nitty-gritty for people that are interested.
[02:05.700 --> 02:07.180]  The policy was...
[02:07.180 --> 02:07.780]  How do you say it?
[02:07.780 --> 02:10.860]  Was it enacted in the law or ordinance or what is the term?
[02:11.220 --> 02:11.620]  Yes.
[02:11.620 --> 02:15.240]  It's an ordinance, which is the municipal version of the law.
[02:15.500 --> 02:15.820]  Okay.
[02:16.200 --> 02:16.940]  I didn't know that.
[02:17.100 --> 02:20.080]  So it is an ordinance as of about a year ago.
[02:20.080 --> 02:27.740]  And we're also going to cover a little bit of the effects and socially and legally that this policy has had over the last year.
[02:28.000 --> 02:29.080]  And some interesting updates.
[02:29.480 --> 02:32.060]  So that's kind of the summary of the talk.
[02:32.700 --> 02:35.780]  And to get straight to the point, fantasy has become reality.
[02:35.960 --> 02:39.160]  And what I mean by this, how many of you have heard of the website Facebook?
[02:40.640 --> 02:41.120]  Okay.
[02:41.760 --> 02:42.900]  There's one or two maybe.
[02:43.240 --> 02:48.580]  So if you think about back in the dark ages before Facebook, a.k.a. the Internet, when you would go to, say, a university, and you didn't really know how to meet each other, and they would have these things called Facebooks.
[03:00.180 --> 03:01.560]  The yearbooks serve the same purposes.
[03:01.740 --> 03:03.760]  It's a way that you can find out who each other is.
[03:04.380 --> 03:10.360]  And in these dark ages, all of us had dreams of how things could be, and what could we use technology for in the future.
[03:10.500 --> 03:11.000]  And this is...
[03:11.000 --> 03:14.140]  We see this reflected in sci-fi from the 40s and 50s as well.
[03:14.140 --> 03:18.560]  And we had a lot of really cool ideas and imaginations about it, and now it's a reality.
[03:18.820 --> 03:20.020]  So here's the problem.
[03:21.000 --> 03:23.800]  Law enforcement has this reality, too.
[03:24.100 --> 03:33.140]  And one of the problems with this is the way law enforcement has been using these technologies disrupts something called the social contract.
[03:34.300 --> 03:41.300]  By which I mean, if you've ever seen on a police car that sign that says to serve and protect, yeah, they're supposed to work for us.
[03:41.860 --> 03:43.100]  And clearly that's not working.
[03:43.100 --> 03:45.140]  We've seen a lot of issues with police lately.
[03:45.440 --> 03:50.060]  And I think that one of the things we want to do is encourage people that it's time to fight back.
[03:50.300 --> 03:55.960]  And yeah, there's this hierarchy where the government works for the people, and the police work for the government.
[03:56.160 --> 04:00.340]  So I say, instead of going to the police, let's bypass them and go straight to the government.
[04:00.360 --> 04:01.500]  And that's kind of what we did.
[04:02.280 --> 04:02.680]  So...
[04:04.040 --> 04:04.640]  Come on.
[04:06.120 --> 04:07.660]  We're going to teach you how to stop it.
[04:07.660 --> 04:09.920]  We spent over a year...
[04:09.920 --> 04:17.400]  Actually, the things that we're presenting is the culmination of several years of work and deliberations and uncovering a bunch of really interesting things.
[04:18.260 --> 04:28.300]  And one of our goals is that each and every one of you can take our policy as a framework to our own local city hall and get a similar policy passed to tell these motherf*ckers from the DHS to go f*ck themselves.
[04:32.770 --> 04:34.630]  I can say this because I'm not the lawyer.
[04:34.630 --> 04:37.520]  I just wanted them.
[04:37.840 --> 04:38.140]  Yeah.
[04:40.020 --> 04:45.440]  So, for those who are not familiar with what a fusion center is, have you seen the TV show Person of Interest?
[04:45.800 --> 04:46.720]  Anyone in the room?
[04:47.780 --> 04:53.200]  So, just to give some background, if you've seen, these are your friends John Reese and Harold and Root and a bunch of others.
[04:53.420 --> 04:57.640]  And the premise of this is after 9-11, Harold was one of the engineers of a bunch of people.
[04:57.640 --> 05:08.140]  They created this basically a fusion center to monitor a whole bunch of things and naturally with any fictional story things go wrong and it raises a bunch of interesting moral and ethical questions.
[05:08.340 --> 05:13.060]  One of the other interesting things about this show is that it takes place and it's filmed in New York City.
[05:14.280 --> 05:18.000]  And so, there's something else that takes place and it's filmed in New York City.
[05:18.000 --> 05:20.400]  And that's a fusion center called VidSys.
[05:20.680 --> 05:26.320]  And we know about this because VidSys, they're also the contractor that would be implementing our stuff, right?
[05:26.520 --> 05:26.640]  Yeah.
[05:26.920 --> 05:27.060]  Yeah.
[05:27.500 --> 05:29.020]  So, what we say...
[05:29.020 --> 05:33.040]  Well, actually, can you go into details on what kind of things are implemented into a fusion center?
[05:33.260 --> 05:33.560]  Yes.
[05:33.820 --> 05:35.700]  So, the Domain Awareness Center...
[05:35.700 --> 05:38.640]  And first, I think it's important to point out the funding source.
[05:38.900 --> 05:47.720]  Department of Homeland Security has created multiple grant streams to provide money to local law enforcement to purchase this equipment.
[05:48.000 --> 05:52.780]  And that kind of takes away a local taxpayer argument when the feds are just handing out money for free.
[05:53.260 --> 05:57.260]  It's, you know, brilliant on their end and very concerning on our end.
[05:57.820 --> 06:04.140]  In a place like Oakland, which always has budget concerns, we fund our police force basically by grants.
[06:04.580 --> 06:11.480]  And the Urban Area Securities Initiative is the funnel through which most of these funds come through.
[06:11.660 --> 06:16.080]  They fund New York Police Department purchases of surveillance equipment.
[06:16.080 --> 06:21.380]  So, what the Domain Awareness Center is a sort of junior varsity version of a fusion center.
[06:21.620 --> 06:21.980]  Most...
[06:21.980 --> 06:25.740]  Well, all the fusion centers are federal owned and operated.
[06:26.040 --> 06:34.300]  This was sort of one of the first local smaller versions of a fusion center.
[06:34.540 --> 06:37.260]  So, can you tell, like, what specific things get implemented into it?
[06:37.260 --> 06:37.400]  Yeah.
[06:37.720 --> 06:44.740]  And so, at full scope, it was anticipated to have facial recognition software, automated license plate readers, shot spotter.
[06:44.960 --> 06:54.300]  It had 300 terabytes of storage, 700 cameras throughout the city, the Oakland Housing Authority and Oakland Public School District system.
[06:54.320 --> 07:03.620]  And there are no privacy policies in place at all in Oakland at this point in time as this project is being brought out to our attention.
[07:03.620 --> 07:07.600]  And as you can see, this is fully operational in New York City.
[07:07.780 --> 07:14.240]  So, if you step outside of the Hotel Pennsylvania, well, hi, you're on candid camera and you don't even know it.
[07:14.680 --> 07:20.240]  And in fact, VidSys seems to like New York City so much that they included a picture of it and their own f*cking sales brochure.
[07:20.920 --> 07:22.340]  So, great.
[07:22.340 --> 07:26.680]  So, a second introductory question we want to ask is, well, why Oakland?
[07:27.160 --> 07:29.020]  Why would the DHS even approach Oakland?
[07:29.140 --> 07:31.760]  Well, it turns out that Oakland is a massive international port.
[07:31.940 --> 07:33.700]  It's the sixth biggest in North America.
[07:33.980 --> 07:36.140]  And there's two reasons that this becomes interesting.
[07:36.680 --> 07:40.440]  First, there is a genuine valid security concern about things coming in.
[07:40.520 --> 07:43.540]  You know, you have cargo ships from all over the world that are coming into Oakland.
[07:43.820 --> 07:45.020]  We don't actually...
[07:46.480 --> 07:49.080]  We want to make sure that everything that comes in there is safe.
[07:49.080 --> 07:51.100]  We don't want to see, like, nuclear weapons.
[07:51.200 --> 07:52.640]  We don't want to see contraband and so on.
[07:52.760 --> 07:56.640]  So, it actually makes a lot of sense that you want to have enhanced security at the port.
[07:56.940 --> 08:03.220]  The other thing that makes this really interesting is that because it's an international port, the jurisdiction gets really interesting.
[08:03.420 --> 08:10.820]  So, the city of Oakland has its own jurisdiction and the port has its own weird legal international jurisdiction that Brian could get into more.
[08:12.260 --> 08:14.560]  Another issue with Oakland is...
[08:14.560 --> 08:18.180]  Maybe you've heard of groups like the Black Panthers or Occupy Oakland and so on.
[08:18.740 --> 08:23.440]  Oakland does have major problems with crime and there's also budget concerns.
[08:23.660 --> 08:24.420]  So, if you think about...
[08:24.420 --> 08:34.000]  Put yourself in the seat of one of the city council members and let's say that you're getting a lot of complaints from your district about incidents happening, break-ins and whatnot.
[08:34.300 --> 08:36.000]  And you're like, well, we've got to do something to solve this.
[08:36.220 --> 08:48.900]  And then somebody from DHS or one of their shadow government groups comes along and says, hey, we'll give you this huge bundle of money to install the surveillance system to cut down on crime and you can run on your, you know, one of the safety candidates for the next election.
[08:49.220 --> 08:53.280]  Now, the problem with this is that Oakland also has a really strong activism community.
[08:53.500 --> 08:57.320]  And when they learned about this, as we will see, they fought back against it.
[08:57.480 --> 08:59.460]  So, suddenly you've got kind of a catch-22.
[08:59.900 --> 09:05.840]  Because if you implement this security apparatus, then okay, great, you're cutting down on crime.
[09:06.020 --> 09:09.400]  However, you're violating civil liberties and getting a lot of negative press.
[09:09.400 --> 09:12.540]  Okay, so let's respect civil liberties.
[09:12.800 --> 09:15.940]  Well, suddenly you're soft on crime and your opponent's going to hammer you on the election.
[09:16.120 --> 09:18.480]  So this kind of created this gridlock.
[09:18.800 --> 09:25.340]  And the other thing is you may have noticed in the news that Oakland has a bit of a problem called the Oakland Police Department.
[09:26.560 --> 09:28.360]  So this is a long-standing issue.
[09:28.760 --> 09:31.680]  This is back... maybe people are... what?
[09:32.240 --> 09:34.800]  Sorry, just like the recent news from Oakland, not good.
[09:35.040 --> 09:35.660]  Oh, yeah, yeah.
[09:35.660 --> 09:39.060]  What I'm trying to suggest is that that's nothing new.
[09:39.260 --> 09:40.880]  They have a long history of this shit.
[09:41.160 --> 09:42.620]  And we want to stop it too.
[09:44.400 --> 09:50.560]  So, in this case, this is a news article from Occupy Oakland right after Occupy was beginning.
[09:50.720 --> 09:55.580]  There was an Iraq war veteran, Scott Olson, who got popped in the head and he almost died because of it.
[09:56.080 --> 09:58.100]  And one of the things that I want to reflect on...
[09:58.100 --> 10:01.200]  I was actually there that night at the protest as a legal observer.
[10:01.200 --> 10:05.900]  And I did not witness this, partly because they launched a whole bunch of tear gas.
[10:06.020 --> 10:06.900]  And I was like, oh shit.
[10:06.920 --> 10:09.260]  And I ran down the block because I don't like tear gas.
[10:11.720 --> 10:12.780]  So here's what...
[10:13.720 --> 10:19.760]  A short version, legal observers are trained by the National Lawyers Guild to go to protest and watch what the cops are doing.
[10:20.020 --> 10:25.380]  So in this particular incident, I remember this because there was all kinds of crazy stuff that happened after it.
[10:25.380 --> 10:29.080]  We're like, well, this guy got hit and other things happened.
[10:29.220 --> 10:29.900]  Well, who did it?
[10:29.980 --> 10:35.160]  Well, it turns out that this night, the city of Oakland is surrounded by a bunch of other municipalities.
[10:35.220 --> 10:37.960]  And they pulled in like a dozen or two of their buddies.
[10:38.380 --> 10:43.820]  So they interlaced the different departments along the police line.
[10:43.920 --> 10:44.960]  You can kind of see in that picture.
[10:45.240 --> 10:49.800]  So what happened was we're trying to figure out, okay, something bad happened, but who did it?
[10:49.880 --> 10:54.400]  Because you can't actually press charges against the police department if you don't have solid proof that it was them.
[10:54.400 --> 11:02.520]  And if you've got like three different municipalities, but in this case, it's more like 16, it becomes really hard to get legal accountability for that.
[11:02.740 --> 11:04.040]  And that's not all.
[11:04.240 --> 11:09.880]  Because keep in mind, when this happened, the mayor of Oakland was actually out of town in Washington, D.C.
[11:10.260 --> 11:12.840]  And I think, was it the chief of police or who was it?
[11:12.940 --> 11:13.460]  The city official...
[11:14.480 --> 11:14.780]  Administrator.
[11:14.880 --> 11:18.420]  The city administrator had only been in office for three weeks.
[11:18.420 --> 11:21.580]  So they were already kind of doing sort of a rotate on authority figures.
[11:21.580 --> 11:32.020]  So this was so f*cked up that literally two weeks later, Dan Siegel, Mara Kwan's chief legal advisor, basically resigned over Occupy.
[11:32.500 --> 11:34.260]  And it gets even better.
[11:34.920 --> 11:41.500]  A few months later, basically, Oakland PD went into this thing called federal...
[11:41.500 --> 11:44.020]  They have a federal monitor going into federal receivership.
[11:44.140 --> 11:45.520]  And that's... what is that again?
[11:45.520 --> 11:49.620]  Well, we've actually been under a consent decree for a number of years.
[11:49.840 --> 11:53.520]  This just sort of lengthened the period of time that we were under federal monitoring.
[11:54.920 --> 11:58.520]  Yeah, so basically, the police are not behaving themselves.
[11:58.520 --> 12:01.320]  So the federal government has to step in and whip them into shape.
[12:01.480 --> 12:03.420]  And they're clearly... that's clearly not working either.
[12:04.500 --> 12:09.500]  So that's kind of a background of where we're coming from and why people are rightfully pissed off.
[12:09.500 --> 12:19.020]  And actually, if you see at the very bottom of the news article, it mentions that one of the other reasons is because the police have been accused of, like, planting evidence to, like, wrongfully convict people and such.
[12:19.920 --> 12:26.220]  So fast forward to the timeline of events that went into the surveillance center that the city is trying to push on us.
[12:26.540 --> 12:31.400]  So back in... this goes all the way back to, like, 2009 and probably earlier than that.
[12:31.400 --> 12:35.960]  So this is when an agreement between the city of Oakland and the port of Oakland...
[12:35.960 --> 12:40.720]  Remember how I said there's the international jurisdiction of the port and then the separate jurisdiction of the city.
[12:40.740 --> 12:45.800]  So they had to have this memorandum of agreement, a legal structure.
[12:46.180 --> 12:52.760]  And it created the groundwork for what became what we call the Domain Awareness Center, or as we'll refer to it in this talk, the DAC.
[12:53.260 --> 12:56.860]  Fast forward a little bit, and they get the grant money that we mentioned before.
[12:56.860 --> 13:01.800]  And a little bit more, and it starts to get into some of the legal structures as it's growing some legs.
[13:02.180 --> 13:06.940]  One thing I want to point out, because a lot of people are thinking maybe, well, why did this take so long to do anything?
[13:07.160 --> 13:09.040]  I mean, government moves slow, but not that slow.
[13:09.180 --> 13:10.740]  Why wasn't there a public outcry before?
[13:11.180 --> 13:16.080]  Well, if you can see on the screenshot I've included there...
[13:16.080 --> 13:16.800]  What is it?
[13:17.220 --> 13:19.940]  Did the item title for this thing eventually turn to the DAC?
[13:20.420 --> 13:21.420]  It's... what is it?
[13:21.620 --> 13:24.800]  Financials for Fiscal Year 09 and 010 PSGP.
[13:24.800 --> 13:25.940]  It's like, what the f*ck does that mean?
[13:25.980 --> 13:27.280]  I almost fall asleep reading that.
[13:28.340 --> 13:33.040]  And maybe this is a tactic of, like, when by being really boring that the government uses.
[13:33.180 --> 13:34.580]  I don't know, but...
[13:34.580 --> 13:37.760]  I mean, do you really, you see an item that says that?
[13:37.940 --> 13:40.080]  Are you encouraged to go to City Hall and think about that?
[13:40.120 --> 13:41.960]  Or you just want to fall asleep and turn the news on?
[13:42.060 --> 13:42.740]  I mean...
[13:43.100 --> 13:45.640]  So this is one of the tactics that we have seen used.
[13:46.820 --> 13:48.540]  So, is there something you want to add to this?
[13:48.540 --> 13:54.240]  Well, I'll just say, PSGP, that is another funding mechanism port security grant program.
[13:54.440 --> 14:01.700]  It's funding surveillance items, surveillance equipment purchases, and all the port areas across the U.S.
[14:02.320 --> 14:04.420]  So, the timeline continues a bit.
[14:04.500 --> 14:06.540]  And this is when it starts to get more to the public eye.
[14:06.540 --> 14:08.760]  There was the agreement signed in March 2012.
[14:09.560 --> 14:12.200]  And then in October was the...
[14:12.580 --> 14:14.720]  Well, there's the phases that we can go into in a moment.
[14:14.800 --> 14:19.000]  But here's something I really want to stress, because a lot of people are like, oh, you know, Snowden did all these things, whatever.
[14:19.360 --> 14:25.980]  We have direct evidence that we personally think that we would not have gotten anywhere near as far as we did without Ed Snowden.
[14:26.180 --> 14:29.300]  And if you see here, on June 9th, 2013, he went public.
[14:29.800 --> 14:34.520]  And in July 9th, that was when all the pub...
[14:34.520 --> 14:36.020]  Oh, God, that gets interesting.
[14:36.260 --> 14:39.060]  So, that's basically when the negotiations happened.
[14:39.200 --> 14:39.860]  They settled on...
[14:39.860 --> 14:44.020]  In order to instantiate a system like this, you have to have a subcontractor do it for you.
[14:44.200 --> 14:46.100]  And in this case, they chose SAIC.
[14:46.380 --> 14:48.500]  Is anybody familiar with SAIC in the room?
[14:49.620 --> 14:51.120]  Okay, I see a few hands.
[14:51.260 --> 14:51.560]  That's great.
[14:52.740 --> 14:55.140]  So, now we're going to get into the first nut job of the night.
[14:55.520 --> 14:56.500]  This is going to be funny.
[14:57.060 --> 15:06.800]  And just to highlight a point, this July 2013 Public Safety Committee meeting is the first time that the public becomes aware of this project.
[15:06.800 --> 15:09.960]  And that it actually was a publicly noticed agenda item.
[15:10.820 --> 15:11.860]  All right, let's see.
[15:12.100 --> 15:15.100]  We have a video, so we're going to test out the sound and see if it works.
[15:15.520 --> 15:17.580]  And this is a real gem.
[15:17.580 --> 15:22.400]  If you're not oppressed, well, I almost went to Vietnam.
[15:23.140 --> 15:26.920]  Except I was a resistor against imperialist war.
[15:29.620 --> 15:36.600]  I'd like to see you raise your hands if you support Julian Assange.
[15:37.460 --> 15:38.620]  Raise your hands.
[15:39.600 --> 15:42.800]  Raise your hands if you support Edward Snowden.
[15:42.800 --> 15:43.860]  I don't see no hands.
[15:44.060 --> 15:44.780]  I don't see no hands.
[15:44.780 --> 15:45.360]  Edward Snowden.
[15:45.480 --> 15:46.500]  Raise your hands.
[15:46.920 --> 15:49.700]  Raise your hands if you support Bradley Manning.
[15:50.060 --> 15:51.460]  Raise your hands.
[15:51.880 --> 15:56.180]  Raise your hands if you support Trayvon Martin.
[15:57.860 --> 16:00.900]  Raise your hands if you support Alan Bluford.
[16:03.060 --> 16:05.640]  You don't support anybody except yourself.
[16:05.640 --> 16:06.680]  You're just mouths.
[16:07.680 --> 16:11.880]  You're just pieces of meat with mouths, like those newscasters.
[16:13.620 --> 16:15.020]  Sir, your time is expired.
[16:15.020 --> 16:16.440]  My girlfriend wrote this song.
[16:17.520 --> 16:21.040]  They're gonna drone you when you're walking down the street.
[16:22.260 --> 16:25.320]  Gonna drone you when you're on your seat.
[16:26.360 --> 16:30.820]  Gonna drone you when you're in a pie.
[16:31.280 --> 16:33.600]  You're gonna have to occupy.
[16:34.560 --> 16:37.900]  I said I wouldn't be so alone.
[16:40.140 --> 16:42.240]  Everybody must get thrown.
[16:45.340 --> 16:49.000]  So one of the other things I want to suggest and encourage people.
[16:49.280 --> 16:52.320]  City Hall, you should turn it into your own vaudeville act.
[16:54.280 --> 17:02.300]  And a side note on this, I looked all over trying to find out who this guy was because you're supposed to enter a name to be on the speaker list.
[17:02.300 --> 17:04.400]  I think he actually just walked up and did that.
[17:07.820 --> 17:20.180]  And if I could just mention, so Oakland Privacy Working Group, which I'm a member, it was really motivated by this DAC project.
[17:20.180 --> 17:24.360]  And the founding members were sort of the Occupy folks that were still around.
[17:25.160 --> 17:27.400]  Occupy basically ended in 2012 in Oakland.
[17:27.600 --> 17:30.880]  But there was still a large number of people around the Bay Area.
[17:31.120 --> 17:33.300]  And so they coalesced around this issue.
[17:33.340 --> 17:38.260]  And that's really what started raising opposition to this project was July 2013.
[17:39.320 --> 17:43.140]  And one other thing, you guys might think that this guy's a nut job because he looks funny.
[17:43.300 --> 17:44.940]  But keep in mind, he was right.
[17:44.940 --> 17:46.760]  And he did this before anyone else did.
[17:46.840 --> 17:48.120]  So he deserves a round of applause.
[17:48.300 --> 17:49.420]  I don't actually know his name.
[17:54.120 --> 17:54.720]  Let's see.
[17:54.940 --> 17:55.260]  Okay.
[17:55.260 --> 17:57.720]  So note the date on there.
[17:57.900 --> 17:59.240]  It's July 16th.
[17:59.480 --> 18:03.380]  So fast forward, what was it, to the next where they actually approved this into law.
[18:03.560 --> 18:06.900]  So the very next day, yeah, this happened.
[18:07.120 --> 18:10.260]  So maybe you guys have heard of the Snowden leak X key score.
[18:10.600 --> 18:11.940]  Maybe familiar with it.
[18:12.020 --> 18:21.460]  Well, this is also the day that this came out the day after Oakland decided to invite this privacy, or not the privacy policy, but this fusion center.
[18:21.460 --> 18:24.240]  So this is one of those examples of look left and look right.
[18:25.660 --> 18:28.420]  And this started to get people to ask a lot of questions.
[18:28.720 --> 18:31.220]  And this is why I must say, thank you, Ed Snowden.
[18:31.320 --> 18:32.760]  Without you, this would not have been possible.
[18:38.970 --> 18:43.350]  And so I don't know if the sound will start before I get into this next one.
[18:43.350 --> 18:51.610]  So I'll just preface it by saying, in November 19th, there was the first ever vote against the Domain Awareness Center in City Council.
[18:51.890 --> 18:53.210]  And let's see if it just goes.
[18:54.070 --> 18:55.290]  Is it just going to start?
[18:56.430 --> 18:57.890]  Okay, I might need to tap it.
[18:58.210 --> 18:58.950]  Let's try that again.
[18:59.310 --> 19:05.510]  Oakland is forging ahead with its plan to build a data center that critics fear will be used for blanket surveillance.
[19:05.950 --> 19:14.210]  Last night's city council meeting was charged as dozens of opponents stayed until one in the morning to voice their opposition to the Domain Awareness Center.
[19:14.210 --> 19:16.770]  Many testified under pseudonyms.
[19:16.970 --> 19:22.930]  A man who called himself aestetix asked a series of questions that council members were unable to answer.
[19:23.190 --> 19:26.890]  As a constituent, will I be able to query all the data about me?
[19:27.070 --> 19:28.990]  How long is the data retained for?
[19:29.370 --> 19:30.510]  And how is it secured?
[19:30.750 --> 19:33.970]  And finally, really important, what happens if there's a data breach?
[19:33.970 --> 19:37.970]  Protesters shouted as council president Patricia Kernahan spoke.
[19:38.250 --> 19:41.090]  She said they do not represent Oakland as a whole.
[19:41.930 --> 19:51.690]  We are elected by thousands of people, a tiny fraction of whom actually attend city council meetings.
[19:52.030 --> 19:57.190]  Council members voted 6-1 to solicit bids from private contractors to help build the center.
[19:58.250 --> 20:00.690]  And by the way, notice that that vote was 6-1.
[20:00.910 --> 20:04.190]  That was the first vote ever cast against any of the surveillance stuff.
[20:04.390 --> 20:06.770]  So, Council Member McElhenney is awesome.
[20:07.590 --> 20:12.410]  So, also, something to note, at the very end, they mentioned this bit about private contractors.
[20:12.550 --> 20:15.090]  And you saw something about SAIC earlier.
[20:15.430 --> 20:16.450]  So, let's see if this goes.
[20:17.050 --> 20:17.490]  Right.
[20:17.650 --> 20:18.970]  So, this gets fun.
[20:19.690 --> 20:25.890]  And this is also why local citizens, do your research, find out what the laws are.
[20:25.890 --> 20:30.210]  Because it turns out that in the late 80s, I think Josh dug this up, right?
[20:30.910 --> 20:31.070]  Yeah.
[20:31.110 --> 20:41.850]  In the late 80s, Oakland passed an ordinance that prohibits contracts from being awarded to companies that are involved in nuclear weapons work, which SAIC is.
[20:42.290 --> 20:48.170]  The city of Oakland basically just did a Google search, pretended not to find anything relevant.
[20:48.170 --> 20:48.850]  This is their full research.
[20:48.990 --> 20:50.390]  It's a screenshot of a Google search.
[20:50.530 --> 20:50.690]  Yeah.
[20:50.930 --> 20:59.170]  They said this in public hearing that they just did a Google search, and then they just awarded this contract to a rather sizable company.
[20:59.390 --> 20:59.690]  Yeah.
[20:59.910 --> 21:03.770]  So, what happens next is even more interesting, because they said...
[21:03.770 --> 21:06.130]  Basically, I think Josh went to the...
[21:06.550 --> 21:08.190]  Was it East Bay Express or somebody else?
[21:08.210 --> 21:17.650]  Went to the media, and all this news came out that, holy shit, we've just signed a contract with an organization that we're not legally allowed to sign a contract with, and this created a problem for City Hall.
[21:17.650 --> 21:28.670]  So, Josh, he's referring to as a founding member of Oakland Privacy, and what he and others have successfully done, and what we encourage you guys to do, is use public record requests.
[21:29.070 --> 21:42.350]  We basically got the entire document dumped for this project, and that's when we started going through, you know, the internal emails and seeing that it wasn't about public safety, but they were specifically mentioning Occupy Oakland.
[21:42.710 --> 21:50.210]  And that's where we were able to start showing the First Amendment impact of this project, and that's what really started getting the media attention.
[21:50.630 --> 21:58.150]  And one other thing to add to that is to just demonstrate how shitty their research capabilities seem to be, or efforts and whatnot.
[21:58.930 --> 22:04.170]  So, they had this conflict, so they clearly had to drop SAIC as a contractor because they couldn't do any work with them.
[22:04.170 --> 22:09.710]  So, later on, they decided to, round two, pick up another contractor called Schneider Electric.
[22:10.090 --> 22:11.390]  And we did some more, dang it.
[22:11.510 --> 22:14.630]  It turns out Schneider Electric is also involved in nuclear munitions.
[22:15.750 --> 22:22.550]  And at that point, Oakland, I believe they were considering whether they wanted to waive it or not, but you can't do that because that opens you up to a lawsuit.
[22:22.770 --> 22:28.070]  So, Oakland was basically f*cked because they need to do this, but they don't actually have a means by which to do it.
[22:28.170 --> 22:30.830]  So, thank you, Occupy, Oakland Privacy for that.
[22:32.230 --> 22:36.110]  So, the next slide I'm going to get into, this one was fun.
[22:36.150 --> 22:36.890]  You remember this night?
[22:37.450 --> 22:38.930]  Yeah, I was up for 26 hours.
[22:39.150 --> 22:39.330]  Yeah.
[22:39.970 --> 22:47.270]  So, everyone's all pissed off, and we're spending time doing research, and in the meantime, City Council is trying to get themselves together.
[22:47.270 --> 22:50.850]  So, the next time the item came up on the agenda was in March 4th, 2014.
[22:52.170 --> 22:52.570]  And...
[22:52.570 --> 22:54.610]  Well, let me interrupt a little bit because...
[22:54.610 --> 22:54.730]  Oh.
[22:54.730 --> 22:56.570]  So, that was the final vote.
[22:56.570 --> 22:57.090]  But...
[22:57.090 --> 22:59.810]  So, January 28th was...
[23:00.430 --> 23:04.730]  The Phase 2 contract was being awarded at the Public Safety Committee level.
[23:04.910 --> 23:11.890]  And that's actually when I joined Oakland Privacy, and we were threatening a lawsuit over the anti-nuclear weapons ordinance.
[23:12.390 --> 23:16.830]  And, you know, when you start threatening lawsuits, that's when all the press gets excited.
[23:18.210 --> 23:19.830]  And, you know, it's kind of funny.
[23:19.830 --> 23:27.010]  I actually don't remember that line that Council President Kernahan said about being elected by thousands and thousands of people, and there's no opposition.
[23:27.370 --> 23:30.550]  We had maybe 200 public speakers in January.
[23:30.570 --> 23:32.030]  That's not very sizable.
[23:32.590 --> 23:36.490]  It went to full council on February 18th.
[23:36.650 --> 23:39.810]  There was maybe about 500 people there.
[23:39.950 --> 23:48.430]  We had a joint opposition letter that had about 30 community groups at that point, which, including the larger labor unions, probably represented about half of Oakland.
[23:48.430 --> 23:54.490]  And so, the longer this kept going, the more postponed votes that occurred.
[23:54.530 --> 23:56.390]  Our coalition just built.
[23:56.590 --> 24:06.330]  I mean, it was left-right center groups that, as we continued to educate them on what this project was, and we were able to do that because we had their documents, the opposition built.
[24:06.590 --> 24:12.550]  So, by the time we hit March 4th, our final joint opposition letter had over 60 groups signed on to it.
[24:12.710 --> 24:15.150]  It had people like Norman Solomon, you know, who's in Berkeley.
[24:16.690 --> 24:18.970]  And the opposition was overwhelming.
[24:19.250 --> 24:20.930]  It was impossible to ignore at that point.
[24:21.130 --> 24:22.350]  But we still had fun with it.
[24:23.830 --> 24:33.010]  So, I will preface this next video that we're going to show by saying that the city of Oakland has a website you can use to sign up if you want to speak at a city hall meeting.
[24:33.010 --> 24:39.790]  And they don't... it's not super technical as you fill out your name and the item number you want to speak at and so on.
[24:40.170 --> 24:53.170]  And because they don't, like, limit it by IP address or anything, I decided to show a bit of civil disobedience by registering all the members of the declaration... all the signers of the Declaration of Independence to speak.
[24:53.670 --> 24:55.710]  And there's a couple of reasons for this.
[24:55.790 --> 25:01.050]  And one of them is that if you have people who are on a list, they basically get to speak.
[25:01.190 --> 25:02.810]  And we can also cede time.
[25:02.810 --> 25:11.130]  So that if you're up on stage and you're trying to say something to city council and you run out of time, somebody else who is also on the list can cede their time to you.
[25:11.130 --> 25:20.010]  So if you think about this, if there's a whole bunch of people that are showing up to... or just showing up, if you have just a whole bunch of random names on the list, you can just, like, pick and choose.
[25:20.030 --> 25:22.310]  And, like, somebody raises their hand and says, yep, that's me.
[25:22.810 --> 25:24.670]  And city council doesn't know any better.
[25:24.770 --> 25:27.230]  And this is a great way that you can...
[25:28.050 --> 25:33.890]  And what we're saying is there are legal structures that you can use to your advantage to, like, make people do what they should.
[25:34.150 --> 25:35.790]  So let's see if I can get this going.
[25:36.670 --> 25:37.150]  All right.
[25:37.150 --> 25:39.890]  With that, we are going to go to the public speakers.
[25:43.340 --> 25:45.540]  I'll be calling names in batches.
[25:45.700 --> 25:47.040]  I ask your patience with me.
[25:47.660 --> 26:14.160]  Brian Hofer, Roger Sherman, Susan Harmon, David Colburn, Jacob Gelander, Dan Siegel, Linda Lye, Phil Wolfe, Josiah Bartlett, William Whipple, Matthew Thornton, Samuel Adams, John Adams, John Hancock, Robert Trey Payne, Elbridge Gerry, Stephen Hawkins,
[26:14.760 --> 26:19.080]  William Ellery, Samuel Huntington, and William Williams.
[26:19.300 --> 26:19.960]  I'll stop there.
[26:22.140 --> 26:24.520]  So yes, I trolled city hall and got away with it.
[26:27.520 --> 26:28.860]  Or city council, yes.
[26:29.160 --> 26:29.980]  So let's go with them.
[26:30.460 --> 26:34.840]  So at the conclusion of this meeting, which it was not just us, there was the Islamic group.
[26:35.340 --> 26:35.640]  I don't remember.
[26:35.900 --> 26:36.480]  Lighthouse mosque.
[26:36.480 --> 26:43.460]  Yeah, but like, I mean, Oakland is, it's a huge melting pot with all kinds of different people, all of whom are pissed off about this.
[26:43.660 --> 26:46.380]  And city hall got, or city council got to deal with it that night.
[26:46.580 --> 26:50.400]  So at the very end of it, we saw what was called the Brooks resolution.
[26:50.660 --> 26:51.560]  That was Desley Brooks.
[26:51.680 --> 26:54.100]  She basically said, okay, we need to do something.
[26:54.460 --> 26:57.540]  And let's step back and think about this.
[26:57.660 --> 27:01.500]  And number one, restricted the DAC geographically to the port only.
[27:01.500 --> 27:05.800]  Remember that all these items over the past years are trying to expand it more and more.
[27:06.040 --> 27:08.180]  This just pushed it all the way back to the beginning.
[27:08.400 --> 27:15.140]  I can't actually think of any city council decision in modern U.S. history that has done this.
[27:15.400 --> 27:17.220]  So that alone is worth commendation.
[27:17.600 --> 27:24.600]  And within that same bullet point, facial recognition, ALPR, shot spotter, those things were all removed.
[27:24.840 --> 27:28.240]  They basically had the same video cameras that the port already had.
[27:28.240 --> 27:31.620]  Yeah, so basically they had a couple of things that they had disabled.
[27:31.740 --> 27:33.480]  And they're still disabled as far as I know.
[27:33.840 --> 27:38.900]  So number two, and I included this in its full text because you wouldn't believe it otherwise.
[27:40.220 --> 27:49.020]  And something I think is very useful for everyone here, the difference between data and information is very misunderstood and very important.
[27:49.180 --> 27:56.460]  And the example I could use is if you have a phone and you take a picture to upload to Facebook, that's data collection.
[27:57.000 --> 28:03.640]  If Facebook then takes it and, like, just extracts, like, facial recognition, determines, oh, it adds the tags to it, that's information.
[28:03.960 --> 28:09.620]  So it's basically you have the raw data that comes in and there's some kind of a process that creates more data out of it.
[28:09.860 --> 28:14.820]  So, yeah, so data sharing and information sharing are actually very, very different.
[28:14.820 --> 28:25.440]  And as you can see here, this basically said no data sharing with any local, state, or federal agency without a written memorandum of understanding.
[28:26.040 --> 28:29.540]  Which basically means that, okay, you can do data sharing.
[28:29.640 --> 28:34.640]  Like, we do want to help public safety, but we want to do it transparently and in the public eye.
[28:34.880 --> 28:37.780]  And I'm not actually aware of anything else like this.
[28:37.860 --> 28:39.140]  Maybe you are, but...
[28:39.560 --> 28:49.380]  And then the next one, this is really great, because in the policy we have a very robustly delineated list of all the technologies that count as part of the Oakland Act system.
[28:49.620 --> 28:53.380]  That was, like, a month's worth of meetings in the council to figure that out.
[28:53.760 --> 28:57.020]  And this says, no new systems can be added without council approval.
[28:57.580 --> 29:06.280]  So basically, any additions has to be completely public and go through the same process so that everyone who is a citizen and a voting member can come and have a say.
[29:06.280 --> 29:12.640]  And then the fourth point here, the data retention and privacy policy, blah, blah, blah.
[29:12.800 --> 29:14.480]  The citizens' privacy committee.
[29:14.860 --> 29:24.540]  And this is where they created the privacy committee that Brian and I both sat on and had to endure, like, a grueling year or so of work on, which created the policy.
[29:24.680 --> 29:29.740]  And as you can see, this was still pretty much a split decision on the city council.
[29:30.000 --> 29:33.160]  But we went from, like, one vote in our favor to five.
[29:33.420 --> 29:35.380]  And five is all you need to get it passed.
[29:36.220 --> 29:40.020]  And because this starts to get into the policy stuff, this is where I have to hand things over to Brian.
[29:41.140 --> 29:52.660]  And so just to highlight, to have a citizens' commission that has control over writing the use policies that govern surveillance equipment, to my knowledge, has not been done in the U.S.
[29:52.660 --> 29:54.600]  at federal, state, or local level.
[29:54.840 --> 30:12.120]  So it was a pretty dramatic turnaround from two unanimous votes to go full speed ahead with this wide-blown surveillance network system to suddenly being dramatically restricted back and basically given over to the citizens to write a policy for it.
[30:13.180 --> 30:15.280]  I don't think they thought we would actually do it.
[30:17.020 --> 30:18.580]  I think it was just unknown.
[30:18.840 --> 30:24.060]  I think it led to some unintended consequences, which worked out in our favor.
[30:25.280 --> 30:32.200]  Because we were an ad hoc committee, it's now a standing committee, and we've got all sorts of policies in the works.
[30:32.200 --> 30:35.580]  So it's greatly expanded from what they initially intended.
[30:36.220 --> 30:40.780]  But so we tried to look for other policy models to look at.
[30:40.920 --> 30:47.140]  And there was just nothing robust, nothing that had really hit all the points that we needed it to.
[30:47.360 --> 30:51.440]  Some policies focused on data retention, but they didn't talk about data sharing.
[30:52.220 --> 30:54.300]  Nothing really had specific uses.
[30:54.600 --> 30:58.600]  It was just sort of wide-open, generic law enforcement business.
[30:58.600 --> 31:02.800]  And I just want to add, this assumes that a city running these things has a policy to begin with.
[31:03.000 --> 31:03.480]  Right, yeah.
[31:03.680 --> 31:09.060]  In Oakland, at this point, we had no privacy policies at all, and certainly none done with public input.
[31:11.800 --> 31:13.380]  So this is a screenshot.
[31:13.380 --> 31:15.800]  It's inside the Emergency Operations Center building.
[31:16.120 --> 31:19.900]  You know, it looks like just all the things you've seen on TV as far as fusion centers.
[31:20.840 --> 31:23.320]  Big monitors, people would be sitting down there.
[31:24.220 --> 31:35.280]  And like those earlier VidSys screenshots showed, it would help them analyze multiple inputs, which have actually been mostly eliminated with the March 4th vote.
[31:35.540 --> 31:47.380]  So what survived was a lot of, you know, benign weather monitoring, you know, ship traffic, earthquakes, tsunami monitoring, that type of stuff that you would expect at a port.
[31:49.180 --> 31:50.980]  So, yeah, I can cover this for a moment.
[31:51.580 --> 31:54.360]  Because one of the questions was, what is the DAC?
[31:54.560 --> 31:55.740]  And we didn't really know.
[31:56.100 --> 32:03.600]  And, I mean, it actually took us a bunch of push-in, and I finally got to have a brief meeting with, what's the guy's name?
[32:03.800 --> 32:04.080]  Asan.
[32:04.220 --> 32:07.080]  Asan, who is the technologist behind all of this stuff.
[32:07.360 --> 32:12.500]  So one thing that's really interesting here is that, in our case, technology follows policy.
[32:13.620 --> 32:18.300]  So, by their own structures, we create the policy, and then they build the technology to reflect that.
[32:18.520 --> 32:23.460]  And I don't trust that at all, but that's why we have some of the accountability steps built into the policy.
[32:23.700 --> 32:28.680]  So, in terms of the structure of the DAC itself, as I said in the very beginning, we have the two different jurisdictions.
[32:29.240 --> 32:30.840]  The city of Oakland and the port of Oakland.
[32:31.260 --> 32:37.500]  We do, by we I mean this policy, has jurisdiction over the city of Oakland, but none over the port.
[32:38.480 --> 32:42.540]  So, what's going on in this picture, on the right side, I hope you like my MS Paint job.
[32:43.180 --> 32:48.580]  On the right side, you have what's the jurisdiction of the port, and they're the ones that have the surveillance cameras set up.
[32:49.200 --> 32:52.260]  And remember, the Brooks resolution did limit this to the port.
[32:53.040 --> 33:00.500]  And these ports are basically streaming video to what the best thing that we can describe at this point is a YouTube-like web browser.
[33:00.500 --> 33:08.160]  So, the reason we use that analogy is because if you've ever used YouTube, you know that you load up the web page and you click on play and the video starts to play.
[33:08.460 --> 33:15.060]  It's not actually stored, I mean there's buffering and so on, but it's not actually like, you're not downloading the video and then watching it on your own.
[33:15.180 --> 33:16.600]  It's stored and it's streamed.
[33:16.840 --> 33:18.420]  So, it's very similar to that.
[33:18.640 --> 33:21.380]  And then I think what's really important is also the bookmarking.
[33:21.380 --> 33:26.920]  So, if... and maybe you want to touch into the standards, the reasonable suspicion and so on?
[33:27.460 --> 33:30.360]  Yeah, when we get to the policy stuff a little bit later.
[33:30.580 --> 33:42.220]  Yes, so basically you have... and also it's important to note for the DAC that we have control over, no Internet access, so they can't like go look at porn or something while they're watching everyone else, which does happen.
[33:42.720 --> 33:46.180]  And there's other concerns like whether somebody hacks it and breaks into it.
[33:46.180 --> 33:56.180]  Well, it turns out that the only data that's actually being collected is when you see something happening and it meets the standards that Brian will get into, you make what's called a bookmark.
[33:56.320 --> 34:03.780]  Basically, you create a little tab that says what the date, time and location was and what had happened and why.
[34:04.300 --> 34:05.840]  And this is how they were selling it.
[34:05.920 --> 34:13.760]  They wanted it... you know, it was aggregating all these data inputs and they wanted to be able to quickly retrieve this information.
[34:14.100 --> 34:17.840]  And it could even be emailed or texted out to mobile units.
[34:18.000 --> 34:23.960]  So an officer in the field, if you needed, you know, a photo of a fleeing vehicle, they could send that to them.
[34:24.520 --> 34:27.520]  And so that's kind of the marketing message they were using.
[34:27.780 --> 34:31.400]  Even though their internal emails are like, hey, we need to shut down Occupy.
[34:31.980 --> 34:37.440]  Yeah, this actually creates an issue for a technologist like me because I'm all about, like, getting data security.
[34:37.620 --> 34:43.760]  But there's not... because of this, there's not really collecting much except these bookmarks, which is fantastic for civil liberties.
[34:44.040 --> 34:47.000]  Unfortunately, I can't, like, suggest, like, cryptography algorithms and such.
[34:47.180 --> 34:48.180]  So, oh well.
[34:49.060 --> 34:49.540]  Okay.
[34:51.480 --> 34:55.380]  And just, you know, we're at 37 after right now.
[34:55.420 --> 34:57.540]  So I'm going to go through these a little bit quickly.
[34:57.540 --> 35:01.980]  But I do encourage you, if you want to really see what our policies look like, we have a workshop at 430.
[35:03.680 --> 35:07.500]  The bedrock of any policy should be purpose specification.
[35:08.360 --> 35:10.940]  This is really where we try to minimize risk.
[35:11.420 --> 35:13.580]  What is the goal of this tool that you're using?
[35:13.860 --> 35:18.000]  What data do you need to capture to allow it to be successful?
[35:18.000 --> 35:21.180]  How long do you need to retain it in order to achieve that goal?
[35:21.340 --> 35:24.900]  And how do you ensure that you don't collect anymore or retain it any longer?
[35:25.060 --> 35:27.240]  And that's what's built in through our policies.
[35:27.700 --> 35:31.140]  I don't know how many of you have ever seen an automated license plate reader photo.
[35:31.380 --> 35:34.580]  There's actually two cameras, at least, in every housing unit.
[35:34.700 --> 35:36.740]  It doesn't just pick up a license plate image.
[35:36.900 --> 35:44.220]  We have photos of Oakland privacy activists that have requested and received their own information.
[35:44.220 --> 35:47.380]  And the photos are a large area.
[35:47.380 --> 35:54.120]  You can see houses, bodies, you know, a whole lot more information than just a little license plate image.
[35:54.480 --> 36:00.660]  So this is what we really try to put inside of all of our templates.
[36:02.680 --> 36:08.080]  You know, we believe it's important to have clear definitions to go over, you know, who can access it.
[36:08.680 --> 36:10.440]  You know, the data that can be collected.
[36:10.480 --> 36:12.380]  Under what standards can it be shared?
[36:12.380 --> 36:23.260]  We're really trying to impress upon law enforcement in the Bay Area, some entities we've had more success than others, but specific allowable uses.
[36:23.720 --> 36:25.320]  We have a screenshot there.
[36:25.500 --> 36:30.260]  This is a second privacy policy we worked on for the FLIR, which is a thermal imaging camera.
[36:30.260 --> 36:31.740]  It's connected to the helicopter.
[36:32.200 --> 36:39.240]  So if there's an active shooter or, you know, some of these other search and rescue or fire suppression type, they can use the equipment.
[36:39.680 --> 36:44.260]  Prior to this, as I mentioned, they just use this sort of generic law enforcement purpose.
[36:44.540 --> 36:46.320]  You know, I don't know what that means.
[36:47.500 --> 36:52.720]  And so we're really trying to narrow the use that this equipment can be used.
[36:52.880 --> 36:58.320]  Because anything, you know, if you paid attention to Stingray or anything else, the mission creep is pretty unbelievable.
[36:58.660 --> 37:05.080]  It was, you know, first to capture, you know, an alleged terrorist in the desert, and now it's being used domestically.
[37:05.080 --> 37:07.220]  You might have seen the Baltimore headline.
[37:07.400 --> 37:09.040]  They went after the Hamburglar.
[37:09.180 --> 37:11.140]  Some guy that stole $50 worth of fast food.
[37:11.820 --> 37:16.400]  And that's because there's no restriction on use.
[37:16.640 --> 37:21.160]  That it's now just going to be used in any manner if there's no limitations.
[37:21.180 --> 37:22.440]  I want to add one thing to that.
[37:22.560 --> 37:29.480]  You'll notice in, what is it, point A right there, where it says the following are the only allowable uses.
[37:29.720 --> 37:36.020]  I think a good half of the debates that we had in the year or so that we were doing this was whether to include the word only or not.
[37:36.820 --> 37:46.480]  And it's also much easier to say what it can only be used for than to try to anticipate unallowable uses.
[37:47.040 --> 37:54.760]  So, you know, in your own jurisdictions, if you start working on this, law enforcement will definitely try to flip that on its head.
[37:54.920 --> 37:57.120]  Just, you know, I encourage you to do it this way.
[37:58.120 --> 38:00.480]  It works out in a privacy activist's favor.
[38:01.780 --> 38:12.240]  A couple of those other bullet points, the efficacy reporting, annual reports, every policy I've worked on, law enforcement gets up there and say, oh, this is a clear and proven success.
[38:12.380 --> 38:12.820]  How?
[38:13.380 --> 38:15.120]  How are you demonstrating success?
[38:15.120 --> 38:21.200]  You have zero metrics to come to that conclusion based on.
[38:21.200 --> 38:36.720]  And so what we're building on and we'll talk more in our workshop afterwards are some really robust metrics that they must demonstrate in order for continued use or expanded use or whatever the question is at that time.
[38:36.920 --> 38:39.920]  They've got to justify the use of that equipment.
[38:41.220 --> 38:46.180]  Our bigger goal was to change the entire process itself.
[38:46.660 --> 38:51.680]  And with the DAC, we built it first and then did a privacy policy afterwards.
[38:52.000 --> 38:54.600]  And what we're really trying to do is flip that on its head entirely.
[38:54.600 --> 38:56.740]  We have a public discussion at the beginning.
[38:57.520 --> 38:59.960]  Let's talk about the impact to civil liberties.
[38:59.960 --> 39:03.920]  More than half the council, when they were voting, publicly admitted.
[39:04.080 --> 39:05.460]  They had no idea what the DAC was.
[39:05.520 --> 39:08.020]  They had no idea what the FLIR was when they were voting on it.
[39:08.180 --> 39:17.180]  These items were on the consent calendar, which if you have consent calendars in your cities, you know that it's just for ceremonial, non-controversial items.
[39:17.200 --> 39:19.880]  They just do a big mass motion, lump everything in together.
[39:20.040 --> 39:20.880]  There's no discussion.
[39:20.880 --> 39:29.500]  And to have a multi-million dollar system with facial recognition software and ALPR and all those other things be considered non-controversial, it's absurd.
[39:30.180 --> 39:34.400]  But there was no policy dictating that some other process occur.
[39:34.780 --> 39:44.100]  So what we've been working on with a large coalition of community groups is a mechanism to change the process.
[39:44.280 --> 39:46.140]  And those bullet points are right there.
[39:46.280 --> 39:47.520]  You have that discussion.
[39:47.520 --> 39:52.500]  If the council considers that the benefits outweigh the concerns, you go forward.
[39:52.760 --> 39:54.960]  I'll give you an example where it didn't...
[39:55.520 --> 40:03.760]  The determination went against law enforcement with Santa Clara County, which I'll talk about in a second, because they're the first one to adopt this ordinance in the U.S.
[40:03.980 --> 40:10.820]  But Harris Corporation refused to meet the transparency requirements for the hailstorm stingray.
[40:11.040 --> 40:12.660]  So Santa Clara sent it back.
[40:12.820 --> 40:16.820]  And that's the first time I've ever heard of somebody rejecting surveillance equipment.
[40:16.820 --> 40:20.920]  And it's exactly because this process occurred.
[40:21.560 --> 40:26.460]  So this model, this template here, Santa Clara County is the first one.
[40:26.560 --> 40:28.260]  And it was by unanimous vote.
[40:28.280 --> 40:33.780]  And it took, I don't know, 11 months of a lot of fighting with the sheriff and the district attorney.
[40:33.780 --> 40:44.940]  But it is the first county in America to have established this as law, as a process for procurement, possible procurement of surveillance equipment.
[40:45.200 --> 40:50.960]  And we're now working with Alameda County, with the cities of Berkeley, Palo Alto, Santa Cruz.
[40:53.020 --> 40:55.120]  And BART, which was our subway system...
[40:55.500 --> 40:57.080]  For those of you that haven't been down to the Bay Area.
[40:57.200 --> 41:05.440]  They actually invited Oakland privacy and the ACLU in to write the ordinance because they got so much bad press over their license plate reader pilot program.
[41:07.760 --> 41:10.400]  This, I think, is a game changer.
[41:10.660 --> 41:15.000]  It allows us, at minimum, to slow down the spread of surveillance equipment.
[41:15.000 --> 41:18.840]  It certainly increases transparency into the use.
[41:19.720 --> 41:24.900]  Oakland is a co-applicant with Alameda County for the new hailstorm.
[41:25.020 --> 41:35.320]  And while we're not happy that there's a hailstorm in our community, we worked with the district attorney to create what I believe is the most restrictive use policy in the U.S.
[41:35.440 --> 41:37.300]  And Oakland has to follow that.
[41:37.660 --> 41:43.000]  We went a little bit further by increasing even more reporting.
[41:43.360 --> 41:47.200]  So every single use is going to come through the Privacy Commission.
[41:47.220 --> 41:50.460]  We're going to know what the justification was for.
[41:51.180 --> 41:53.200]  It's all pursuant to a warrant.
[41:53.580 --> 42:02.740]  And there's just a whole lot of steps that have to occur and also have to be demonstrated later to the public for each use.
[42:02.740 --> 42:07.420]  So, you know, will the Hamburglar happen in Oakland?
[42:07.640 --> 42:08.900]  No, that's not going to happen.
[42:09.300 --> 42:12.320]  There's just too many people watching and we've built good policies.
[42:12.540 --> 42:17.180]  And if we can get other jurisdictions to do this, we can really come, I think, to a tipping point.
[42:17.740 --> 42:18.920]  California is certainly there.
[42:18.920 --> 42:22.780]  We've had two statewide bills that now regulate stingrays and ALPR.
[42:23.680 --> 42:31.500]  In the Bay Area, we'll have at least three counties and six cities that will, by the end of the year, have adopted this ordinance.
[42:32.000 --> 42:40.640]  So if we can get other people on the bandwagon, you know, we can actually start saying no to some of the surveillance equipment or at least pushing it back.
[42:40.640 --> 42:45.700]  And we can certainly say no to unregulated use and increase oversight.
[42:46.320 --> 42:48.300]  And we've got a part in song for you.
[42:48.300 --> 42:48.320]  That's a full song for you.
[42:48.540 --> 42:49.420]  This is...
[42:49.420 --> 42:50.620]  Apologies to the Eagles.
[42:51.560 --> 43:17.720]  Well, the NSA sure seemed to find out early How to open our files without a key They didn't let the Constitution bother them Or the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy They say if you're innocent, then you got nothing to fear So why not let us into the corners of your mind?
[43:18.720 --> 43:44.120]  You don't have to worry, you can trust us Just don't be thinking thoughts we find unkind And my oh my, they sure know how to scare us To convince us to give up our liberty But old Ben Franklin got it right the first time He said don't give it up for false security Now the government... I'm almost done.
[43:44.220 --> 44:19.420]  Now the government says they're ready to debate us About FISA Prism and whether we're still free But we know there wouldn't be much to discuss Without Edward Snowden's love for his country They can't hide their spying eyes And their smile's a thin disguise I thought by now they'd realize There ain't no way to hide their spying eyes.
[44:20.160 --> 44:21.500]  What can't you say?
[44:24.320 --> 44:25.560]  So, yeah.
[44:28.200 --> 44:29.880]  That's Mike Ruffo.
[44:30.060 --> 44:33.700]  He's a board member of the Bill of Rights Defense Committee defending dissent.
[44:34.600 --> 44:35.920]  Yeah, we actually know who that guy is.
[44:36.860 --> 44:42.500]  And I just want to say, you know, we've got some Restore the Fourth members in here, ACLU, EFF.
[44:42.500 --> 44:49.020]  I mean, we've all been working together with, you know, a lot of, you know, smaller groups that you just won't recognize the names.
[44:49.140 --> 44:53.060]  But we've got a great coalition in the Bay, and you guys can do it where you live.
[44:53.720 --> 44:55.340]  So I have one thing I want to say.
[44:56.260 --> 44:57.620]  New York, what the f*ck?
[44:57.760 --> 44:58.900]  Oakland beat you to the punch.
[44:58.960 --> 44:59.800]  You gonna let that stand?
[45:08.520 --> 45:08.880]  Yeah.
[45:11.820 --> 45:17.000]  I will say, you know, there's multiple ways to slow down or kill surveillance projects.
[45:17.000 --> 45:20.980]  And I think the annual compliance reports and efficacy reporting is a great way to go.
[45:21.180 --> 45:27.300]  Because, you know, especially here in New York, Bratton's baby shot spotter is snake oil.
[45:27.460 --> 45:27.840]  It's useless.
[45:28.080 --> 45:28.840]  It doesn't do anything.
[45:28.840 --> 45:30.520]  But it's getting more and more expensive.
[45:30.940 --> 45:37.740]  And so that's one argument, you know, where you might not get certain people to support you on a 1A type argument.
[45:38.140 --> 45:39.800]  Get them with the taxpayer concerns.
[45:40.000 --> 45:41.400]  It's just a complete waste of money.
[45:41.680 --> 45:43.540]  But we'll talk more in our workshop.
[45:43.740 --> 45:49.100]  It's also worth noting that there will be more information on that website, oaklandprivacy.org, within a week.
[45:49.360 --> 45:49.640]  So...
[45:49.640 --> 45:49.680]  Yeah.
[45:51.620 --> 45:52.080]  All right.
[45:52.160 --> 45:52.400]  Questions?
[45:54.260 --> 45:54.660]  Okay.
[45:55.560 --> 45:57.180]  Can I turn the mic on for the question?
[46:00.670 --> 46:01.070]  Hello?
[46:01.390 --> 46:01.570]  Okay.
[46:02.790 --> 46:03.950]  Yeah, I have two questions.
[46:03.950 --> 46:14.250]  One, is there anything written in your policies that establishes any consequences for a public official who violates the policy?
[46:14.790 --> 46:15.210]  Yes.
[46:15.350 --> 46:15.770]  Oh, yeah.
[46:15.950 --> 46:16.210]  Yes.
[46:16.510 --> 46:17.650]  And, yeah.
[46:17.870 --> 46:20.190]  And we'll get more into the nitty-gritty in the workshop.
[46:20.190 --> 46:22.590]  But, yes, all of our policies are enforceable.
[46:22.890 --> 46:28.990]  And depending on which, like if we're talking about the Santa Clara or the Oakland versions, it could be a misdemeanor.
[46:29.110 --> 46:30.150]  There could be civil penalties.
[46:30.150 --> 46:34.290]  There's private rights of action built in so that we can enforce or get injunctive relief.
[46:36.410 --> 46:36.930]  Okay.
[46:37.190 --> 46:43.690]  And the second question, I understand that there's a complete surveillance center for New York City in operation.
[46:43.690 --> 46:45.930]  I got a whole building up on Northeast somewhere.
[46:46.530 --> 46:52.850]  Do you know of any efforts around here that could be joined to work against them?
[46:54.350 --> 46:56.350]  I'm not familiar with New York enough.
[46:56.350 --> 47:03.250]  We did a panel at the Left Forum last month, and we had some New Yorkers there, and they gave out a bunch of names of people that are working on this stuff.
[47:03.470 --> 47:09.130]  If you go to oaklandprivacy.org, we're going to post all the information from that panel on there within this next week.
[47:09.430 --> 47:15.590]  And we're trying to use our website as sort of like a resource center to share all our templates and letters and things.
[47:15.590 --> 47:20.170]  So if you go on there, just email us through and we can get you some contact info.
[47:20.510 --> 47:21.390]  Okay, thank you.
[47:21.630 --> 47:21.950]  Thanks.
[47:24.530 --> 47:24.830]  Hi.
[47:24.990 --> 47:29.930]  I feel really inadequate not being able to pose this question in the form of a folksy protest song.
[47:29.930 --> 47:30.750]  You can sing, yeah.
[47:30.750 --> 47:31.730]  But I'll go for it anyways.
[47:32.050 --> 47:32.670]  You can sing, yeah.
[47:32.670 --> 47:50.810]  In 2012, the Senate Homeland Security Committee released a report on fusion centers, which found, amongst other things, that in addition to the DHS agents not always factually representing what they could do, it also found that the DHS assigned detailies to the fusion centers forwarded and,
[47:50.930 --> 47:54.850]  in quotes, intelligence of uneven quality, oftentimes shoddy.
[47:54.990 --> 47:59.770]  It also found that they had contributed to disrupting zero terror plots in the period that they analyzed.
[48:00.130 --> 48:18.330]  My question to you is, did you find that it was, for any groups or all groups, helpful to push an argument not of civil liberties and privacy protections against the domain awareness system, but that it didn't actually help our security in any ways?
[48:18.330 --> 48:26.090]  And if so, how did you sort of mesh the privacy and civil liberties arguments with the arguments against the efficacy of this as a security tool?
[48:26.350 --> 48:28.470]  Yeah, Senator Coburn's report is great.
[48:28.670 --> 48:33.110]  It showed what a charade or whatever most of this is.
[48:33.490 --> 48:40.650]  We certainly made different arguments based on the different audience that we were speaking to.
[48:40.850 --> 48:57.210]  And that's why I was saying these annual compliance reports and efficacy reporting is one such mechanism, and that was one message we had to use to people that, you know, really didn't care about privacy, but they cared about their taxes being wasted.
[49:01.590 --> 49:02.870]  I'm not going to sing either.
[49:03.210 --> 49:04.890]  I just look like Dennis Joplin.
[49:04.970 --> 49:05.610]  I don't sound like her.
[49:07.790 --> 49:13.470]  I'm from New York, and in defense of my beloved home, we have a problem that you guys don't have.
[49:13.470 --> 49:15.230]  It's called Wall Street.
[49:16.090 --> 49:18.110]  And they got a lot of money to throw around.
[49:18.290 --> 49:21.690]  And they're highly interested in defending themselves and their own interests.
[49:22.530 --> 49:30.930]  Anybody who hadn't sold out by 9-11 got intimidated or decided to jump on that gravy train after 9-11.
[49:31.130 --> 49:32.730]  And we've got that problem, too.
[49:33.210 --> 49:38.390]  Still, there were a lot of lies involved with 9-11 and the wars that followed.
[49:40.490 --> 49:43.970]  This is very much our problem, and we're on the front lines.
[49:44.670 --> 49:48.130]  So the work you've done is wonderful, and I salute you.
[49:48.290 --> 49:49.690]  But please be mindful.
[49:50.130 --> 49:54.790]  We've got big problems here, right in our backyard, that you guys don't have.
[49:55.110 --> 49:56.610]  And we have to fight those people.
[49:56.970 --> 49:59.250]  And we're willing and able to do it.
[49:59.250 --> 50:00.730]  But it's a total order.
[50:01.750 --> 50:02.570]  Just saying.
[50:03.130 --> 50:03.590]  Thanks.
[50:06.430 --> 50:17.770]  So you were saying when you first got this initiative started that you were individual people in small groups, but then you got a bunch of stakeholders involved in other groups.
[50:17.930 --> 50:23.550]  Can you say anything about organizing in between groups that were unaffiliated and just kind of random?
[50:24.730 --> 50:31.550]  I think one advantage in the East Bay is that it's just small, certainly compared to New York.
[50:31.790 --> 50:33.310]  So people tend to know each other.
[50:34.250 --> 50:43.730]  When I first showed up in January 2014, you know, we'd have 100 people at an Oakland Privacy meeting, and they'd be from all different groups.
[50:44.030 --> 50:52.230]  And so we sort of became a focal point or, you know, kind of the spearhead, I guess, for all these different groups.
[50:52.230 --> 51:03.830]  And so we were able to reach out to labor or to a Muslim group or, you know, to the teachers union because we had a representative from all those different groups.
[51:04.270 --> 51:09.210]  And they would go and reach out to them and communicate and get those groups on board.
[51:10.250 --> 51:17.770]  So, you know, personal relationships is kind of always what it comes down to, is being able to build that community and reach out to those people.
[51:17.990 --> 51:20.670]  And, you know, in Oakland, they come through.
[51:24.360 --> 51:24.880]  Hi.
[51:25.260 --> 51:28.040]  I'm curious about state-level activism.
[51:28.540 --> 51:33.400]  So I hear that the money is flowing from the federal level straight to the local jurisdictions.
[51:33.740 --> 51:37.200]  And so that's where you're focusing in this case.
[51:37.540 --> 51:41.060]  But I'm from Massachusetts, and we have 351 cities in town.
[51:41.060 --> 51:45.080]  So it seems daunting to, like, start going town by town and city by city to address this.
[51:45.080 --> 51:49.560]  So I'm wondering to what extent is there any possibility to work at the state level?
[51:49.800 --> 51:52.380]  What can be done a little more efficiently that way?
[51:53.860 --> 51:55.880]  I mean, I can't speak for all 50 states.
[51:56.020 --> 51:59.640]  I think the smaller the state, you probably have a chance of being effective.
[52:00.040 --> 52:02.880]  Your representative is maybe more approachable.
[52:02.880 --> 52:04.520]  You have less people to convince.
[52:04.760 --> 52:08.080]  In California, we're just too big.
[52:08.360 --> 52:11.520]  By the time it's at the state level, it's watered down.
[52:11.900 --> 52:17.540]  I did mention that we had SB 34 and 741, which respectively govern ALPR and Stingrays.
[52:17.540 --> 52:19.540]  I'm not a big fan of either one.
[52:19.740 --> 52:24.980]  They do require a public hearing and then a policy get put into place, which, you know, we've used to our advantage.
[52:25.240 --> 52:28.080]  But they're still not very robust state laws.
[52:28.520 --> 52:30.940]  But I think in a small state, it could work.
[52:31.740 --> 52:38.940]  You know, if you have adequate resources and you can get a congressperson motivated, you know, it might be a quicker route.
[52:39.660 --> 52:40.900]  Looks like we have one minute left.
[52:41.300 --> 52:41.420]  Okay.
[52:41.420 --> 52:42.580]  Is this for one more question?
[52:42.900 --> 52:43.340]  One minute.
[52:43.460 --> 52:43.980]  Oh, one minute?
[52:44.100 --> 52:44.260]  Okay.
[52:45.340 --> 52:47.600]  This is less a question than a point of clarification.
[52:47.600 --> 52:51.340]  You mentioned ShotSpotter as Bill Braddon's baby.
[52:52.360 --> 52:56.820]  To be clear, ShotSpotter is in use not just in New York, but in several East Coast cities.
[52:57.160 --> 53:01.020]  Newark, Camden, Baltimore, D.C., and several West Coast cities.
[53:01.820 --> 53:02.560]  And I believe...
[53:02.560 --> 53:03.140]  Sorry.
[53:03.300 --> 53:05.000]  ShotSpotter is a gunshot detection system.
[53:05.120 --> 53:06.840]  It's basically a bunch of microphones that are always on.
[53:07.600 --> 53:11.820]  And also it has picked up voices and that has been used as evidence to put people in jail.
[53:12.520 --> 53:16.040]  So, yeah, it is widely deployed and it's not unique to New York or the NYPD.
[53:16.420 --> 53:16.780]  Yeah.
[53:16.860 --> 53:21.300]  When I said baby, I meant because he's a board member and basically pushing it, pushing it everywhere.
[53:21.800 --> 53:21.920]  Yeah.
[53:22.560 --> 53:22.740]  Hi.
[53:22.800 --> 53:25.260]  It was just a comment about New York City.
[53:25.520 --> 53:30.400]  Just wanted to let you know that something small exists here in New York City and it's called the community board.
[53:30.400 --> 53:31.300]  the community board.
[53:31.300 --> 53:38.680]  And the community board, there is a little committee where even the police has to tell the people who are there what they're doing.
[53:39.020 --> 53:45.180]  And anyone here from New York City is welcome to come and talk and ask questions.
[53:45.400 --> 53:49.180]  So, check it out on Wikipedia, community board.
[53:49.400 --> 53:50.140]  We'll see you there.
[53:50.320 --> 53:50.940]  Thank you for that.
[53:51.540 --> 53:51.700]  Thanks.
[53:53.960 --> 53:54.300]  All right.
[53:54.400 --> 53:55.120]  I think we're out of time.
[53:55.360 --> 53:55.520]  Oh, wait.
[53:55.600 --> 53:56.340]  Is there one more question?
[53:57.000 --> 53:57.260]  Yeah.
[53:57.360 --> 53:58.040]  Lex, can we do that?
[53:58.560 --> 53:58.680]  Yeah.
[54:00.320 --> 54:01.020]  I think we're good.
[54:01.160 --> 54:02.480]  I think the guy is sitting down.
[54:02.660 --> 54:02.840]  Okay.
[54:02.940 --> 54:03.220]  So, we're good.
[54:03.340 --> 54:03.980]  Thank you so much.
[54:04.180 --> 54:04.440]  Thank you.