DONALD C. RANDOLPH, ESQ., California State Bar Number: 62468
RANDOLPH & LEVANAS
A Professional Corporation
1717 Fourth Street, Third Floor
Santa Monica, California  90401-3319
     Telephone:  310/395-7900


Attorneys for Defendant
KEVIN DAVID MITNICK




                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                        CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	) CASE NO. CR 96-881-MRP
				)
               Plaintiff,	) REPLY TO GOVERNMENT'S
				) OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
     v.				) MOTION FOR ACCESS TO A
				) COMPUTER FOR REVIEW OF
KEVIN DAVID MITNICK, et. al,	) DISCOVERY; DECLARATION OF
				) DONALD C. RANDOLPH
               Defendants.	)
				) DATE: March 9, 1998
				) TIME: 1:30 p.m.
				) COURT: 12
				)
				)
________________________________)



     TO NORA M. MANELLA, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, AND TO HER ASSISTANT,

CHRIS PAINTER:

     The defendant, KEVIN DAVID MINTICK, by and through his attorney

of record, Donald C. Randolph, hereby responds to the government's

opposition to the motion for access to a computer filed previously

with this Court.

///
///
///
///

  This reply is based upon the attached memorandum of points and

authorities, the files and records in this matter, and upon any oral

or documentary evidence which may be presented at the hearing on this

matter.

DATED:    March 3, 1998            Respectfully submitted,
                                   RANDOLPH & LEVANAS


                              By:  ________________________________
                                   Donald C. Randolph
                                   Attorneys for Defendant
                                   KEVIN DAVID MITNICK



		MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

                                     I.

                                INTRODUCTION

     In seeking to deny the defendant access to a computer in this

case, the government resultingly attempts to deny him effective

assistance of counsel in the review of the discovery held against him. 

The government's professed assistance to defense counsel in this

regard has taken the form of obstruction from the evidence to which he

is lawfully entitled.

                                     II.

                                  ARGUMENT

     A.   The Government has Failed to Adequately Provide

          the Defense with the Ability to Inspect and Copy

          the Discovery in its Possession.

     The government attempts to absolve itself of all responsibilities

under Rule 16 on the plea that it has made this evidence "available

for inspection."  In actuality, the government has impermissibly

frustrated the defense's ability to review the unfathomable volume of

evidence in this case by precluding the defense from meaningful access

to this morass of information.

     The technical difficulties facing the defendants in accessing the

discovery in this case are compellingly articulated in the Reply to

Government Response Re Bill of Particulars and supporting

documentation submitted by defendant Lewis De Payne by and through his

attorney, Richard G. Sherman.  Defense counsel for defendant Mitnick

endured a similarly unproductive appointment to review this material

in June, 1997.  It became readily apparent after just one such

experience that future efforts to review the discovery in the manner

proposed by the government would prove entirely futile.

     In addition to these difficulties, the government's offers to

"assist" the defense by allowing review of the discovery at the FBI

offices must be considered disingenuous considering the total lack

privacy and confidentiality such review sessions would afford.  As

evidenced by the government's own investigation in this case, the act

of reviewing data on a computer system leaves a clear record

indicating which files were opened, for how long, and can even

indicate each individual stroke entered into the computer keyboard. 

By virtue of these capabilities, any review of the discovery on the

government's own computer system would irrevocably compromise the

defendant's attorney work-product privilege by exposing every detail

of the defense review of this material.

     B.   The Defendant is Entitled to All of the Discovery

          Held Against Him in this Case.



     There is no question that all of the discovery in the

government's possession falls within the ambit of Rule 16 and is

therefore required to be provided to the defense.  Nonetheless, the

government inexplicably feels entitled to withhold some of this

information, by its own designation, without either guidance or

authorization from the Court.

     Even had the government properly moved to restrict the

defendant's access to some information under the rubric of a

protective order, such a motion would be inappropriate in this case. 

The government has charged the defendant with fourteen counts of wire

fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and alleges in the indictment that the

defendant:

          "carried out a scheme to defraud, and to obtain property by

          means of false pretenses representations and promises,

          by...stealing, copying, and misappropriating proprietary

          computer software..."

     Indictment at 2.

     An elements of this crime is that the defendant obtained

property, thus in order to find the defendant guilty, the government

must prove the existence of such property.  In this case, the

government seeks to relieve itself of this burden by unilaterally

declaring that evidence in its possession constitutes "proprietary

computer software," and then denying the defense access to the

evidence necessary in order to refute such claim.  The government has

no authority to withhold this evidence.  See United States v. Kai-Lo

Hsu, 982 F.Supp. 1022 (E.D.Pa. 1997) (government's request for

protective order covering purported 'confidential trade secrets'

denied where proving existence of trade secret was element of crime.)

     Most audacious is the government's extortionate attempt to

predicate the disclosure of encrypted discovery upon the defendant's

willingness and ability to offer potentially self-incriminating

statements.  There is no authority to support a proposition that

simply because the government does not understand the material in its

own possession, it may lawfully withhold such material pending

explanation from the defense.  The Fifth Amendment dispels any

question about whether a defendant must decipher evidence, and thereby

potentially incriminate himself, in order to inspect evidence held

against him by the government.

     Finally, the government greatly overstates the difficulty

associated with providing a complete copy of the electronic discovery

in this case.  While the information is too vast to be comprehended by

a human in any brief period of time, the burden on human resources

associated with making a machine-readable copy is negligible.

     C.   Providing the Defendant with Access to a Computer

          is the Most Cost-Effective way of Allowing

          Meaningful Review of the Discovery.



     While the Court surely has legitimate concerns regarding the

public cost associated with the defendant's request for computer

equipment, the government's own proposal is the most cost-prohibitive

scenario possible.  Under the government's plan, the defendant,

accompanied by U.S. Marshals, would travel to the FBI to review the

data.  Obviously such review sessions could only take place in the

additional presence of defense counsel.  The Court has already

expressed its disapproval of such a mechanism for reasons unrelated to

the defendant's own objections.  [Transcript of Hearing 10/8/97,

Exhibit B].  In light of the extraordinary volume of data, and the

need for both defense counsel and U.S. Marshals to be present at all

times with the defendant, this method of review would likely be the

most costly.  Even if the Court were to decide that Mr. Mitnick was

not to personally conduct this review, the defense would, nonetheless,

be forced to seek appointment of an expert capable of both operating

these computer systems and understanding the nature of the data

contained therein, most likely at a comparable cost.

     The most cost-effective means of ensuring that Mr. Mitnick has

the opportunity to meaningfully review the evidence in this case is to

release Mr. Mitnick him on bail and thereby allow him to conduct such

review at the offices of defense counsel.  If otherwise unavailable,

all necessary equipment can be leased at a likely cost of less than

$1,000 per month.

     The second most cost-effective means of reviewing the discovery

in this case is to provide for Mr. Mitnick's access to the necessary

computer equipment at the Metropolitan Detention Center.  The

government opposes this scenario citing "security concerns" mentioned

by Warden W.H. Seifert, which "significantly limit the type of

equipment that inmates may access."  Government's Opposition at 7

(quoting letter from Warden W.H. Seifert dated February 2, 1998). 

Interestingly, the Warden stated no similar concerns concerning Mr.

Mitnick's access to a computer in response to a previous defense

request for the same.  [Letter dated January 27, 1997, Exhibit C]. 

Rather, his only concern lay with defense counsel transporting a

computer into the facility.  Thus, it appears that in reality there is

no compelling security concern associated with Mr. Mitnick's access to

an isolated computer system at the MDC.  Morever, Mr. Seifert's

objection to the defendant's latest request for computer access was

predicated upon a presumption of the Court's disapproval of such a

plan.  This consideration has no bearing on the viability of this

proposal for the purposes of ensuring prison security.


     The government misleads the Court regarding the authority it

cites in support of its position here.  The Supreme Court, in Pell v.

Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) examined the question of a convicted

inmate's visitation rights with members of the press but made no

inquiry into the interests of the Bureau of Prisons versus an inmate's

right to effective assistance of counsel.  Meanwhile, in United States

v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1990) the Ninth Circuit upheld

some restrictions on an inmate's ability to access legal materials

only after finding that the district court judge "went out of his way

to ensure Robinson 'meaningful access' to resources with which to

prepare his defense."  913 F.2d 712, 718.  The district court's

efforts in this regard included arrangements for the defendant's

documents to be transported back and forth every day from the

courthouse to the jail and appointing stand-by counsel.  Id., at 718

n. 4.

     Considering the technically complex nature of the evidence held

against him, Mr. Mitnick clearly has a compelling interest in

personally reviewing the electronic discovery in this case.  The mere

fact that Mr. Mitnick is represented by counsel does little to ensure

him effective assistance of counsel due to the specialized nature of

this evidence.  Mr. Mitnick can only receive effective assistance of

counsel if his attorney is able to first, actually review the

discovery in confidence and, secondly, consult with someone who can 

understand and explain the nature of the evidence.  Mr. Mitnick is

qualified to assist the defense in this capacity, at no additional

cost to taxpayers, provided he is given the equipment necessary to do

so.

                                III.

                             CONCLUSION

     For all the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for

computer access should be granted.



DATED:    March 3, 1998            Respectfully submitted,
                                   RANDOLPH & LEVANAS


                              By:  ____________________________
                                   Donald C. Randolph
                                   Attorneys for Defendant
                                   KEVIN DAVID MITNICK