DONALD C. RANDOLPH, ESQ., California State Bar Number: 62468
RANDOLPH & LEVANAS
A Professional Corporation
1717 Fourth Street, Third Floor
Santa Monica, California  90401-3319
Telephone:  310/395-7900


Attorneys for Defendant
KEVIN DAVID MITNICK




	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA





UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,     	
				CASE NO. CR 96-881-MRP

Plaintiff, 			MOTION TO BIFURCATE THE HEARING ON RESTITUTION

v.  				DATE: May 10, 1999
				TIME: 1:30 p.m.
KEVIN DAVID MITNICK, et. al, 	COURT: 12

Defendants.





TO ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, AND TO HIS ASSISTANTS, DAVID
SCHINDLER AND CHRISTOPHER PAINTER: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 10, 1999, at 1:30
p.m., or at a date and time convenient to the Court and counsel, defendant, KEVIN
DAVID MITNICK, by and through his attorney of record, Donald C. Randolph, will move
this Court to bifurcate the hearing on Restitution into, first, a hearing on the
Defendant's Ability to Pay, and second, if necessary, a hearing on the Amount of
Restitution.

This motion is based upon the following Memoranda of Points and Authorities, the
attached Exhibits, and any oral and documentary evidence which may be presented at
hearing on this matter.

DATED:	April 26, 1999		Respectfully submitted,
RANDOLPH & LEVANAS

By:	______________________________
Donald C. Randolph
Attorneys for Defendant
KEVIN DAVID MITNICK

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 

I.

INTRODUCTION

By this motion, the defendant requests that the Court bifurcate the hearing on
Restitution into, first, a hearing on the Defendant's Ability to Pay, and second,
if necessary, a hearing on the Amount of Restitution.  This motion is based on the
previous findings of this Court, 18 U.S.C. §3664, and the 1995 U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines §5E1.1(b).

The defense presents this issue before the Court at this time because of the
potential expenditure of time and expense in litigating the issue of loss, as
discussed below.  As set forth in the pending defense Motion for Discovery1
relating to restitution, the government has provided the defense with discovery
asserting losses suffered by the victim companies totaling hundreds of millions of
dollars. (See Exhibit A)  While the government has the burden of proving loss, and
thus, the amount of restitution, the defense must rebut this evidence.  To do so,
the defense will be required to retain an expert in the fields of economics and
intellectual property. This expert would be expected to analyze the government's
evidence, including what steps were taken to put the company back to its position
before the breach in security, what losses were "sunk costs" (costs the company had
already spent),consequential costs, and "out-of-pocket" costs.  In addition, expert
assistance is needed in evaluating purported losses associated with merely copying
source code without disclosure, an issue of first impression for this Court. A
motion requesting the appointment of an expert economist is being filed
contemporaneously with this Motion.  The defense believes in good faith that for an
economist to review documentation and discovery relating to loss as will be
necessary for the litigation of this issue, the costs would far exceed any amount
that Mr. Mitnick may be able to pay in restitution, if indeed, he had the ability
to pay.  Given the costs associated with litigating the issue of restitution, the
defense proposes that, first, this Court consider the economic circumstances of Mr.
Mitnick.  If the Court finds Mr. Mitnick has no ability to pay restitution,
presently, or in the future, then the issue of loss need not be litigated, and
substantial time and expense may be avoided.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In the Presentence Report dictated on April 14, 1989, in Docket Number 88-01031(B),
the Probation Officer, Frank Gulla, stated that "At the present time, it does not
appear that the defendant could pay a fine."  (See 1989 Presentence Report, Exhibit
B, at page 18).  On June 27, 1997, in Docket Number CR-95-603-MRP, this Court found
that the defendant had no ability to pay, stating "Restitution has not been ordered
in view of the defendant's lack of resources and limited future earning ability."
(See Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order at Exhibit C, page 21).

The defense does not believe that the issues relating to Mr. Mitnick's present and
future ability to pay have materially changed since the Court's finding two years
ago.  As the Court is aware, Mr. Mitnick has continued to remain in custody since
that time.

III.

ARGUMENT

A. The Controlling Statute, the 1995 Version of 18 U.S.C. §3664 Requires
Consideration of the Defendant's Ability to Pay When Ordering Restitution.

18 U.S.C. §3664 requires that the Court, when determining whether to order
restitution, "shall consider the . . . financial resources of the defendant, the
financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's
dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate."  18 U.S.C.
§3664(a)  In addition, in numerous cases, Courts have found that "Under the Victim
and Witness Protection Act, the court must consider the financial resources of the
defendant and his earning ability when ordering restitution."  U.S. v. Jackson, 983
F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 1992) See also U.S. v. Newman, 6 F.3d 623, 631 (9th Cir.
1993); and U.S. v. Ramilo, 986 F.2d 333,336 (9th Cir. 1993).  To the extent that
the government suggests Mr. Mitnick may be susceptible to a windfall in the near
future, this is not relevant to the determination of restitution.  According to the
Court in U.S. v. Baggett (125 F.3d 1319, 9th Cir. 1997), "restitution orders 'must
be based on some evidence that [the defendant] may be able to pay the amount fixed
when required to do so - the possibility of an unforeseeable windfall is not
enough.'" Baggett at 1323, quoting U.S. v. Ramilo, 986 F.2d 333, 335 (9th Cir.
1993).

Additionally, to the extent that funds are earned by Mr. Mitnick because of the
notoriety of the case, this scenario is specifically covered by the Assignment
Agreement presented to the Court at the change of plea hearing on March 26, 1999.  
The apportionment of any funds that the government receives through this Agreement
can easily be accomplished by the preparation of a list of victim companies2,
listed in the order of priority to receive compensation.  The determination of how
funds obtained through the Assignment Agreement are distributed has nothing to do
with the Court's determination of the defendant's ability to pay.
 
B.  The Complication and Prolongation of the Sentencing Process Resulting from the
Fashioning of a Restitution Requirement Outweighs the Need to Provide Restitution.

Per the applicable Sentencing Guidelines, at §5E1.1(b)(2)(b), if the Court finds
that the process of ordering restitution becomes too cumbersome and costly, the
Court may decline to order restitution.  This guideline is codified in 18 U.S.C.
3663(d), stating that, The court shall impose an order of restitution to the extent
that such order is as fair as possible to the victim and the imposition of such
order will not unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.


Here, as outlined above, the issue of restitution is complicated by the number of
victim companies and the issue of first impression regarding loss associated with
merely copying source code.  This case is one in which the costs of litigating the
issue of restitution may be higher than the amount set, if any, by the Court as
restitution.  As such, this case is certainly a case in which the complication of
the issues, as well as the expense may preclude the Court from ordering
restitution.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the defendant respectfully requests that this Court
bifurcate the Restitution hearing, holding an initial hearing to determine the
Defendant's Ability to Pay, as the Court's decision on this issue will be pivotal
to the remaining proceedings.


DATED:	April 26, 1999		Respectfully submitted,
RANDOLPH & LEVANAS
By:	__________________________
Donald C. Randolph
Attorneys for Defendant
KEVIN DAVID MITNICK

1  This Motion has been scheduled for hearing on May 10, 1999 at 1:30 p.m.
2  Neither the Court, nor the defense are required to participate in this process.







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