I'm telling you until the day I die.
You have reached the Kremlin.
In order to report the unconstitutional suspension of a legally elected parliament, press 1.
In order to report the bloody suppression of resistance to the unconstitutional suspension of a legally elected parliament, press 2.
In order to report the unanimous support of the unconstitutional suspension of a legally elected parliament by the morally bankrupt leadership of the Western democracies, press 3.
For all of the above, press 4.
You have selected option 4, all of the above.
All of our unprincipled collaborators with Western business interests are busy right now.
Please wait until the regime has had time to consolidate its power and try your call again.
And we give you permission, if you ever hear a system like that at WBAI, you can do whatever it is you feel necessary at that point because that will be the end of the world.
It's the beginning of off the hook though.
The telephone keeps ringing
The telephone keeps ringing
So I ripped it off the wall
I cut myself while shaving
Now I can't make a cough
It couldn't get much worse
But if there could be wood
From Biggly Bump
But the best expect the worst
I hope that's understood
From Biggly Bump
We've been saying
Here is Estado
St söyleye
It's the end of the road
erem
And a good evening to one and all.
This is Off the Hook.
Emmanuel Goldstein with you until 11 o'clock.
Talking about high technology and the various advances and regressions that we suffer almost each and every week.
Last week we had a fascinating program.
We had somebody on the air who was one of the people behind the clipper chip.
The clipper chip being the standard or the government standard to be that we're all going to be faced with if nothing happens.
So that was a fascinating show.
And there were a couple of things in there that were really revealing and really kind of scary.
And we had some really good callers too that asked some very pertinent questions.
And I think we brought the issue to a head in a way that it hasn't been done before.
Actually speaking with somebody from the other side.
It was a bit scary, I know, but I think we pulled through it okay.
I'll be talking about that in a moment.
First, because of last week's show, we forgot something that we were supposed to do that I promised that we were going to do.
And I don't usually break my promises, but I totally forgot about this.
If you recall, a couple of weeks earlier, we decided to test out a system, a carrier access code system that allows people to pass caller ID data.
Well, it doesn't really allow them to pass it.
It forces them to pass it.
We're talking about WillTel and the carrier access code of 10555.
And what we discovered, quite by accident, was basically the same thing we discovered by accident with cable and wireless.
They will pass data along to various remote phones from anywhere in the country.
Scary thought, especially when nobody knows about it.
So we had a little experiment two weeks ago where we invited listeners to call in to a particular number that was forwarding to a caller ID device.
Well, not everybody followed the instructions because we said that it was only going to be up until midnight.
And we're still getting calls from people saying they're calling to test out the caller ID device, which is no longer connected to that line.
So it's kind of pointless.
So what we have are the area codes and exchanges that did go through in that particular time period.
And what I'll do is read those off.
Now, there were a bunch of private numbers.
So what I suspect is happening is that if the calls are coming from within New York and they're terminating in New York,
then the privacy restrictions seem to be respected.
In other words, if you have privacy on your line and you use 105.55 to make a phone call someplace within New York,
that privacy will be carried along on your phone call.
However, that does not necessarily work from out of state.
I talked to somebody from Washington State, all the way over in Washington State,
and they said specifically that they had selected call blocking for that particular call,
and they had used the WillTel carrier access code.
And their numbers showed up, and they were pretty surprised by that.
I've also seen a number come through from California, where I don't believe caller ID is even legal yet,
as far as the Public Utilities Commission out there.
So that's kind of an interesting point.
This is different from cable and wireless because this is something that anybody can use.
Cable and wireless has a carrier access code, too.
It's 10223.
However, you can't use it.
Only customers of cable and wireless are allowed to place calls over their network,
and if you're a customer, you have no reason to use 10223.
So it's kind of a pointless code.
You'll just get a recording if you try to use it.
However, 105.55 can be used by anybody.
And we're not sure yet what the percentage is of numbers that get passed along.
It seems to be everybody that's on the SS7 network,
everybody that has a capability of getting caller ID, of using call return,
and all those other neat features that the phone company is making a ton of money off of,
even though very few people are using it.
So here are the area codes and exchanges that we were able to pick up.
914-928, 201-947, 201-768, 212-627, 908-264, 908-530, and 718-599.
If you're a winner, good luck to you, and we'll see you next week, I guess.
I don't know.
It feels like a lottery.
Here's an interesting one, though.
A really weird one.
A 917-875.
Now, why am I getting caller ID for a 917 number?
Those are supposed to be just beepers and cellular phones.
Well, it came through.
Don't quite know how that happened, but it did.
And that's the story as far as that goes.
We'll be doing more experiments on caller ID being passed around the nation
without anybody knowing about it.
Okay, now, as for last week's program, we talked about this quite a bit over the past couple of months, really.
See, what happened was February 4th was kind of a day in history, a day to be remembered.
A day that hundreds of years from now, they'll probably say, this is when the fools could have stopped it and didn't.
That was the day the Clinton administration stood out in front of the White House, or maybe stood inside the White House.
I think it was kind of blustery that day, and said that they were going to go through with the clipper chip,
make it the, quote-unquote, voluntary standard.
Yeah, the voluntary standard.
And it's really kind of a frightening thing that's being sprung upon us,
because it's a standard that will allow law enforcement agencies to decrypt our conversations,
our encrypted conversations.
And, yeah, it's voluntary.
In fact, our guest last week said that it's voluntary for federal agencies.
Now, I don't really know how voluntary a federal agency can be,
but that's something that the Clinton administration is priding itself on,
the fact that it's voluntary, the fact that no one's being forced to use this.
But there was one very important point that was brought out last week
when we talked to Lynn McNulty of NIST.
We asked him what happens,
what happens if this voluntary system doesn't work, if people start using other things.
Well, listen to the question and listen to his response.
And tell me if you don't feel just a little quiver of fear.
If that is the case, then, and somebody develops another commercial program
that becomes very, very popular that the government does not have the key for,
will there be any reaction to that?
Well, I can't predict that.
I mean, certainly that would evoke,
and assuming it became very popular,
that would evoke some level of concern on the part of our law enforcement community,
and they might potentially ask for some sort of leveling of the playing field.
But at this point...
Yeah, leveling of the playing field.
That is something that scares me.
I mean, that's basically saying encryption will be made illegal
if certain things don't go right.
Now, what's it going to take for somebody out there to come up with a program
that nobody can crack except the people that are intended to use it?
It's going to take a bit of intelligence.
It's going to take a bit of persistence.
It's going to take a lot of courage.
But somebody's going to do it.
Will it catch on?
Well, that's up to us.
That's up to how much we value our privacy.
The average person.
Now, the average person, of course, is going to ask,
well, why does this affect me?
Why does it make a difference?
I have nothing to hide.
Well, that may be so.
We may have nothing to hide,
but that doesn't mean we have everything to display in front of everybody.
It doesn't mean that we want our every private detail
scrutinized by the government, by law enforcement, by other people.
There's all kinds of ways that there can be holes in any system.
I think we've seen that.
I think hackers have been proving that over and over again.
And the clipper system is not going to be an exception.
There's going to be holes.
There's going to be abuses.
Do we want to open this up and allow this to happen?
Or do we want to make use of technology to protect our privacy?
There were only about 1,000 wiretaps throughout the nation last year.
That's the number that's being quoted at us.
Now, for 1,000 wiretaps, do we really want to give away the potential
for every single telephone user in the country to be monitored?
Not just monitored in telephone calls, what telephone calls you make,
but monitored as far as where you are at a particular moment in time.
I mean, we're going to be using cordless phones a lot more.
We're going to be using cellular phones of different kinds.
They're going to come down in price.
Everyone's going to have one.
Your phone number will follow you around for life.
It'll be just like Star Trek.
You'll be carrying around a little communicator.
But with clipper chip technology, if we're using the same standard,
if we're using the same encryption standard that the government is able to crack into
whenever it feels the need to, well, if you happen to be on their list,
and with more and more powerful computers, the list can get bigger and bigger,
well, they can track you wherever you go.
They can look at who you call.
They can look at what buttons you press.
They can listen to your conversations.
And you won't even know it.
Now, the thing is, if there are a few people out there that decide that they don't like this system
and they design their own systems, are we going to make them criminals for trying?
Well, we're not too far away from doing that.
By implying that nobody has anything to hide who is an innocent person,
it makes it very dangerous, very scary.
And what's it going to mean for somebody that goes out there and develops an alternative?
Will they be arrested?
Will their product be outlawed?
Or will we enter into an age where our phone calls are as private
as any other private conversation we choose to have?
I mean, look at major crimes.
Look at the shooting on the Brooklyn Bridge.
Look at the World Trade Center bombing.
Those people were caught.
And they weren't caught because they were monitored,
because their phone lines were being tapped,
because their locations were being monitored constantly.
They were caught because law enforcement people knew what they were doing.
And they knew how to catch a criminal.
And if there are criminals out there, they're going to be caught.
You don't need this particular technology to catch criminals.
This particular technology, yeah, maybe you'll catch a whole lot more criminals.
Maybe even people that don't know they're criminals yet.
You can catch people before they really commit a crime.
Maybe they're thinking of committing a crime, or maybe they don't even know that yet.
You can probably do all kinds of traffic analysis and figure out certain patterns that criminals tend to take,
and then just simply put a net over the whole thing and get people before they do anything wrong.
There's all kinds of possibilities.
Something even scarier, though, just happened.
Even scarier than Clipper. Isn't that amazing?
I'm going to read you part of an Electronic Frontier Foundation press release.
And if this doesn't convince you that something ain't right,
well, I don't know.
You better go to another radio station or something.
Listen to some music, because that's probably all you'll be able to do.
The Clinton administration is backing a proposal by law enforcement agencies
that could make the entire communications infrastructure susceptible to surveillance.
And this is a lot easier than Clipper, by the way.
The digital telephony proposal, reintroduced this year after being successfully thwarted last year,
would require communications service providers to include backdoors in their software
through which wiretapping can be done.
In addition, the proposal would give law enforcement officers access to records about communications,
such as who you call and how long you talk.
Such traffic analysis can reveal vast amounts of information about you.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation is extremely concerned about this proposal
and has prepared the following summary to explain it and the harm it could do.
EFF has received a draft of the FBI's new proposed digital telephony bill.
After initial analysis, we strongly condemn the bill,
which would require all common carriers to construct their networks
to deliver to law enforcement agencies in real time, real time mind you,
both the contents of all communications on their networks
and the signaling or transactional information.
Basically, the potential for every single one of us to have a pen register on our lines,
a real-time pen register they can watch live,
any part of the country they choose to, what we are doing on our phones.
Continuing, in short, the bill lays the groundwork for turning the national information infrastructure
into a nationwide surveillance system to be used by law enforcement
with few technical or legal safeguards.
This image is not hyperbole, but a real assessment of the power of the technology
and inadequacy of current legal and technical privacy protections
for users of communications networks.
Although the FBI suggests that the bill is primarily designed
to maintain status quo wiretap capability in the face of technological changes,
in fact, it seeks vast new surveillance and monitoring tools.
Now, among the new powers given to law enforcement are the following.
Real-time access to transactional information.
It creates the ability to monitor individuals live.
And the bill would require common carrier networks, phone companies,
and anybody who plans on getting into the phone business.
I would include cable TV people as well.
It would require them to deliver in real-time call setup information.
In the simplest case, call setup information is a list of phone numbers
dialed by a given telephone currently under surveillance.
As we all come to use electronic communications for more and more purposes, however,
this simple call setup information could also reveal what movies we've ordered,
which online information services we've connected to,
which political bulletin boards we've dialed, all kinds of things.
And with increasing use of telecommunications,
this simple transactional information reveals almost as much about our private lives
as would be learned if someone literally followed us around on the street
watching our every move.
We are all especially vulnerable to this kind of surveillance
because unlike wiretapping the content of our communications,
it is quite easy for law enforcement to get permission to obtain this transactional information.
Whereas courts scrutinize wiretap requests very carefully,
authorizations for access to call setup information are routinely granted with no substantive review.
Not even a warrant.
Some federal agencies, such as the IRS,
even have the power to issue administrative subpoenas on their own
without appearing before a court.
And the real impact of the FBI proposal turns in part
on the fact that it is easy to obtain court approval for seizing transactional data.
All right, let's look at something else here.
Access to communication and signaling information for any mobile communication,
regardless of location,
allows tracking of an individual's movements.
The bill requires that carriers be able to deliver either the contents
or transactional information associated with any subscriber,
even if that person is moving around from place to place with a cellular or PCS phone.
It is conceivable that law enforcement could use the signaling information
to identify that location of the target,
whether that person is a subject of a wiretap order
or merely a subpoena for call setup information.
This is important because in the future,
our phone numbers will become more of our identity numbers.
In other words, you won't be tracking a phone number
so much as you'll be tracking a person.
And as we move into the wireless communications era,
every time you tap a phone or watch what a phone is doing,
you are in fact watching the person that belongs to it.
The other thing that this bill demands,
I guess there's no better way to say it,
expanded access to electronic communications services
such as the Internet, online information services, and BBSs.
The privacy of electronic communications services
such as electronic mail is also put at grave risk.
Today, a court order is required
under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
to obtain the contents of electronic mail.
Those ECPA provisions would still apply
for the contents of such messages,
but the FBI bill suggests that common carriers
might be responsible for delivering the addressing information
associated with electronic mail
and other electronic communications.
And finally,
finally, yes,
the bill proposes,
this is the crazy part,
or not so crazy,
depending on how you look at this,
the bill proposes that the Attorney General
have the power to shut down
any common carrier service
that fails to comply with all these requirements.
Put them right out of business.
This is scary.
This is something to be concerned with.
There are two different things.
Actually, three different things.
You've got Clipper,
you've got Capstone,
and you have this.
Clipper being the
wiretapping capabilities for phones,
Capstone being the
decrypting capability for data,
and the digital telephony bill,
the
potential to
watch all the transactional data
go flying by
and get almost as much information
as you can from a tap.
It's as easy as that.
That's what we're faced with,
and you know, it's interesting.
A lot of us are naive out there.
A lot of us think,
well, we've got a Democrat in the office now.
Things are going to be much nicer,
much fairer.
Well,
you know, I learned something.
I learned that it's not good
for government people
to know what they're doing
with technology.
It just isn't.
It was an advantage,
a tremendous advantage
to have Ronald Reagan
in the White House
who basically didn't know
how to answer a telephone.
That was good.
That was really no problem there
because he didn't need to.
For his job,
he didn't need to do
that kind of thing.
But now you have
political people meddling
in technology
that they don't understand.
I mean, imagine,
we all know that
the press,
the media,
the journalists,
quote unquote,
don't really know
what it is they're talking about
when they talk about
high technology.
They always get it wrong.
They always put something
in the story
that just doesn't belong.
Well, imagine those people
making the rules.
The same thing with politicians.
Politicians and people
on PM Magazine
are very similar sometimes.
They go for the sound bites.
They go for the shock value.
And now if you give them
access to all these things
without the kind of training,
without the kind of respect
that you get from using it,
from designing it,
we might just find ourselves
playing by their rules.
And that is going to be
a very depressing world
to live in.
So how do we stop it?
Well, we stop it
by communicating with people.
You see,
part of the problem is
a lot of the time
we spend preaching
to the converted.
I mean, a lot of people
on the net,
they know all this stuff.
They talk to people
on the net
who also know
all this stuff,
but they don't talk
to people that don't know.
They don't talk
to their parents.
They don't talk
to their relatives,
their friends
that aren't into all this.
They don't convince them
why this is important,
why this is something
that they should be objecting to.
Why should the average person
be upset by this?
That's the question
we need to answer.
That's the issue
we need to address.
And when we take phone calls,
it's one of the things
we're going to be asking
if anybody has any suggestions
as to what a good way
to bring this up
to somebody,
somebody that isn't
quite into all of this.
How would you explain it
to them in ways
that they would understand?
It's very complicated.
It's hard to get through
to a lot of people.
A lot of people
will just accept
whatever they're told.
They're very trusting,
and unfortunately
that doesn't always work out.
All right.
I've got good news
for me anyway.
I'm going to be
seeing fiber optic
this weekend.
I got approved actually
to visit.
And it's amazing
to get approved
to visit somebody.
But I'm actually
going to go over there
and see him
and bring back
whatever it is
he has to say
to people here.
He's very happy
that people are
sending him mail
and sending him magazines
and paperback books
because he's not allowed
to send hardcover books.
So please keep that mail
coming to him.
One thing that happened
over this past week,
this is the craziness
that he has to deal with
in prison.
He didn't fold his blanket
before leaving for work.
He didn't fold his blanket.
And because he didn't
fold his blanket,
they gave him 20 hours
of extra duty,
cleaning whatever the guards
say that he has to do
at a particular moment in time.
Forgot to fold his blanket.
I know in November
when he gets out,
hopefully November,
just hearing him talk
about this particular incident
I think will make us feel better
just hearing his voice.
Anyway, if you want to
write to him,
here's his address.
It's Mark Abene,
A-B-E-N-E,
and his number,
or really his name,
is 321-09-054,
and that's FPC,
Federal Prison Camp,
school kill,
spelled S-C-H-U-Y-L-K-I-L-L,
unit 1,
post office box 670,
and that's in Minersville,
M-I-N-E-R-S-V-I-L-L-E,
Pennsylvania.
Zip code is
17954-0670.
All right,
we're going to go to the phones.
212-279-3400
is our telephone number.
And we're talking about
privacy,
about the threat
in the future,
what we can do about it
in the present,
and anything else
that maybe
you have on your mind
that we haven't talked about
in the last few weeks.
Good evening,
you're on.
Well,
I guess he got on
and then he got off
really fast.
Let's try it again.
Good evening,
you're on.
Hello.
Yes, go ahead.
I was,
I just heard you
talking about the guy
who was in jail.
Yep, that was me.
I was wondering
what happened with that?
Okay, well basically,
fiber optic is somebody
that was on this show
many, many times.
He was a computer hacker,
still is a computer hacker,
it's not something
you can just wash
out of your system.
And basically,
he was,
he was raided,
I believe it was
four years ago,
if you can believe that.
Four years ago,
he got raided
and all this time,
he's been dealing
with that particular case.
And they always
could get him
on something,
whether it was
having possession
of phone codes,
having possession
of passwords,
accessing a computer
now and then.
But the one thing
they never had on him
and they never said
that he did
was do anything malicious,
alter anything in any way,
do something
that was considered bad.
Basically,
he was exploring
computer systems
a long, long time ago.
And they set out,
partly because of
things he said
on this radio station,
partly because of
things he said
in the media,
just the fact that
he never backed down
and said that
it was wrong for him
to do the things
that he did.
That's what got them angry,
that's what made
the judge sentence him
as a symbol,
in his words.
That's pretty wild.
That's why he got
a harsh sentence
of a year.
So he was in jail
for four years?
Oh, no,
he's in jail
for a year and a day.
Oh, a year.
Yeah, but what
started happening,
this has really been
going on for four years.
So it's pretty incredible.
And he's not the only one
either, by the way.
There's two other people
that are in jail
that were just as innocent
in my eyes as he was.
They didn't do anything
harmful or bad.
The thing is,
when people asked them
what they did
and how they did it,
they would tell them.
And this included
media people,
this included
government people,
this included
law enforcement people,
it included people
on the radio too.
So, unfortunately,
that kind of open
communication is not
welcomed.
Yeah.
Especially by large
corporations and by
federal agencies.
Definitely.
Well, also, I just
wanted to respond
to the clipper chip
discussion.
I heard the guy
speak last week.
And I thought the whole
discussion was very
interesting.
I think the clipper chip
has a lot to say.
But isn't it possible,
even though the law
may be passed,
that the Supreme Court
still could,
this law could still
be brought to the
Supreme Court as a
violation of free speech
or, you know,
whatever,
if such monitoring
is possible?
Well, yes,
it can be.
And I don't mean any
disrespect for the
Supreme Court,
but you have a bunch
of octogenarians there,
all right,
that don't really
understand what the
implications of this
technology are.
How can we get
through to them?
I don't think we will.
I don't think they
will understand that
this is not simply
an extension of law
enforcement's
wiretapping capabilities.
This is much,
much more than that.
This is the capability
to tap everybody
with a push of a button.
But doesn't it only
become that with the
two separate encryption
keys?
Yes, true.
Two separate keys
that are held by
two separate
governmental agencies.
Now, you know,
we brought up a few
good points last week.
Some of our callers
brought up some
excellent points.
One being,
what about where
the phone is
manufactured?
Obviously, they have
to have both keys
there.
That's a potential
source of the thing
getting out.
When the keys are
transmitted,
our guest last week
said they would be
transmitted over secure
phone lines.
But obviously,
that's not going
to hold true
for every single
governmental and
law enforcement agency
in the country.
He said they would
be transmitted using
another encryption
scheme.
Well, who has the
keys to that
encryption scheme?
The point is,
all anybody has to
do is somehow
capture that data
and they can have
it for all time.
There's all kinds
of ways.
And it's hard to
come up with
scenarios where
the technology can
be defeated when
the technology does
not yet exist.
Suffice to say,
it's going to
happen.
We don't know
exactly how,
but it will.
But also,
I mean,
the idea of
being able to
create these
encrypted programs
that are foolproof
to break into
is sort of a
fantasy,
it seems to me,
because I think
that's what people
thought about,
you know,
certain computer
systems that people
can hack into.
Exactly.
And you saw how
upset they got
when we hacked
into them.
Right.
And imagine what
they're going to do
when we hack into
this and show them
how anybody can get
in or how it can
be abused,
how it's not really
that strong a system.
Right.
And the implications
of hacking that
are so much more
than, you know,
recording a few
dial tones or,
you know,
whatever you do
on the phones now.
You see,
the other thing
that really scares
me about this
and what isn't
being,
I see articles
in the newspaper
all the time.
I saw one article,
I think it was Newsday
that got me really,
really angry,
because there was
a paragraph in there
where it said
that the government
has been having
trouble wiretapping
people because of
new digital technology.
And that is wrong.
That is not the case
at all.
That is what
the government
is saying,
but it has not
been proven.
However,
this particular
newspaper just spoke
it as gospel,
like the government
says it,
so that means it's true.
Right.
That was very,
very upsetting.
But what really
scares me is the fact
that the NSA
is involved in this.
National Security
Agency,
the organization
that is devoted
to monitoring
foreign outposts,
to spying on
various governments
and communications
and things like that,
well, now they're
turning their attention
to us.
We're no match
for these people.
These people are
scary.
We don't know
how many of them
there are,
but they're very,
very good at
what they do.
And if their
attention is being
focused towards
non-hostile people,
they're going to be
very, very successful
at what they do.
So this is something
that begs a lot
of analysis
and scrutiny.
And did they
think that they
were even going
to implement
these things
on wireless
and cellular
telephones?
Yeah, it's mostly
meant for that
kind of thing,
but as far as
Clipper goes,
it can be used
for any kind
of communication.
AT&T has a phone
out that uses
Clipper technology.
And of course,
the Capstone chip,
which we talked
about last week
too,
is the same
basic thing,
except this is
for data.
So if you send
an encrypted message
on the internet,
well, they can
decrypt that too.
Well, I heard
that they already
search outgoing
phone calls
from the United
States for,
you know,
certain key words.
Yeah, the old
key word of
bomb, terrorist,
kill, president,
and all that
kind of thing.
All my friends
overseas love
saying those words.
But I don't
really, you know,
I don't have
specifics as to
what kind of
technology that is.
But yeah,
imagine being able
to scan for
those kinds of
things using
the Clipper
technology.
If you marry
the two
technologies
together,
there's all
kinds of
potential for
abuse.
Well, I was
thinking about
how the
Clipper chip
might be avoided
or whatnot.
It seems to me
like that if
you send,
if you were
somehow able
to encrypt
something of
what you said
and then put it
through the
Clipper system
and have a
friendly person
on the other
line decrypt
your stuff,
wouldn't the
Clipper chip
only pick up
your encrypted
stuff?
That it
wouldn't be
able to
decipher?
It's hard to
say because I
haven't really
seen a working
model of any
of this.
I'm not sure
to be honest.
That's really
the best answer
I can give you.
I don't know.
I was just
wondering.
Yeah.
They're not
going to go
halfway on this.
They're going to
go all the way
on this.
It won't be a
half-assed system.
That's what's
scary about it.
Okay.
Thanks for
calling.
Thank you
very much.
Bye-bye.
Let's go to
another phone
call.
Good evening.
You're on.
Oh, great.
Hello, Emmanuel?
Yes, turn on
your radio, please.
Okay, it's off.
Two things.
One, there's a
need for a
constitutional
amendment on
privacy because
obviously the
founding fathers
totally missed
this as a
possible future.
it was inconceivable
to them that
any of this
stuff could
come to be.
An example of
why that's
necessary is if
you combine
voice recognition
technology with
supercomputers plus
artificial intelligence
plus the clipper
chip and the
various eavesdropping
techniques you
discussed, it
would be very
possible for
anybody who
has the access
to trace and
track every
conversation you
ever have on
the phone,
whatever phone
number you're
calling from,
wherever that is,
to whomever
it is.
In other
words, it'll
just identify
you as an
individual by
your voice
pattern and
then you could
get records of
you know, I
want every
conversation this
person's had on
Saturday nights for
the past five
years.
That is within
the realm of
reality at this
point and I
think that most
people, you
want to know how
to reach the
masses, most
people think of
themselves as
very mundane and
most of their
business dealings
and personal
dealings are very
mundane and they
don't see
themselves as a
threat to the
system, they're
not revolutionaries,
they're not
intellectually radical,
they're not
involved in
politics, so they
think that their
lives are sort of
meaningless and
therefore nobody
would care about
what they say or do
in private.
And in a sense, I
think that that may
even be true, but
what they need to
understand is that
if the government,
i.e.
Big Brother, gets
access to this kind
of technology for the
sake of controlling
criminals and
revolutionaries, the
next step for that
kind of information is
going to be for it to
go into private
enterprise, in other
words, they'll be able
to control the market
at a micro level, to
control the kinds of
taxes, the kinds of
things you buy, and
if somebody gets in
power, let's say the
moral majority right
wing fundamentalist
fanatics got to be in
power, they could use
that kind of
technology to see
what kind of
lifestyle you're
leading.
Maybe they might not
like the fact that
you cursed out the
local preacher for
being a hypocrite or
whatever.
The ramifications of
it are such that it
could enter into the
lives of everybody,
not just the hackers
and the revolutionaries
and the radicals.
And I don't think
that has been brought
home to the vast
numbers of the
American people, not
to mention the fact
that most people don't
want anybody else
snooping into their
business, no matter
how mundane it may be
anyway.
Okay, but you see,
this is the problem.
When you say they
don't want people
snooping around, the
way we've been
programmed right now,
the translation to
that is those evil
computer hackers that
are going around
snooping around
everybody's private
affairs, they don't
think of the bigger
picture where your
information is there
and people with real
power, real access
that won't get caught
have 24-hour-a-day
access to it and they
can do whatever they
want with it.
Well, Emmanuel, not
every computer hacker
is one who's fighting
for privacy and rights.
I think there's a
number of people who
do that kind of
stuff, who are
basically sort of
vandals of the highway
and they're basically
voyeurs or they're
trying to get credit
card numbers so they
can buy stuff.
Well, I'll tell you
what most of them are.
Most of them are
kids.
And you can't expect
kids to be out there
fighting for freedom
because they haven't
really experienced what
freedom is.
That's part of what the
joyride is.
But in the quest to try
to squash those few
idiotic kids doing that
kind of stuff, or maybe
even that some criminals
are doing it, the
government is using that
as an excuse to generate
a technology that could
really cost us our
democracy.
And that is frightening
and we need to be
concerned.
I think a constitutional
amendment is necessary.
Well, I agree with you
there.
I don't agree with you
that these are idiotic
kids, though.
I think they're the hope
that we have for the
future because if you
don't have somebody
showing you the
weaknesses in the
system and challenging
authority, we're just
going to be buried a lot
quicker.
Yeah, but do you want
to fight a cancer
with a virus?
I mean, you know, I'd
rather just have a
healthy system altogether.
I'd rather have a
country where people
don't play these kinds
of games and don't
want to or don't need
to.
Well, how is it a
virus, though, to be
looking at that
technology and playing
with it and exploring?
I mean, yeah, I agree
that people should not
be damaging things, but
I'm not talking about
that.
I'm not talking about
people that are out
there stealing and
doing credit card fraud
and damaging data.
Yeah, there's people
like that, but they're
not hackers.
Those are idiots.
Those are vandals.
And they're using what
hackers have learned.
Of course, how do you
avoid that?
Yeah, then we agree
100%.
It's just that we have
to be careful because
there are people who
would like to break into
that kind of a
government system so they
could snoop on their
ex-girlfriend or whatever,
that kind of thing.
Absolutely.
Anyway, I think you're
doing wonderful work and
you hang in there.
All right, thanks for
calling.
Bye.
It's something, something
we need to talk about,
you know, because it's
going to be upon us
before we know it.
Good evening, you're on.
Yeah, hi, Manuel.
Hi.
I have a question that
is an invasion of
privacy that is already
happening.
Maybe you can clarify or
maybe one of your
listeners knows what
happened.
Okay.
On my last three New
York telephone bills, I
got AT&T soliciting me
for like the $40 check if
I switched to them, along
with the calls that were
billed as if I dialed
through AT&T.
I have a different
carrier.
I wonder if you have
any idea what's going
on, how AT&T got my
number and billed my,
billed calls through.
I did make the calls,
but not through AT&T.
Not through AT&T?
Not use the dial, you
know, the access code.
I dialed directly through
a different carrier.
Okay.
From your home?
Excuse me?
You did this from your
home?
My home, yes.
How do you know you
didn't use AT&T, though?
Because I use a, I've
called many other times,
and I use a speed dial,
one-touch button, to
call people.
It was only one
particular call that,
it's the same number.
Every time I call this
particular number, it comes
up as an AT&T call.
Let me ask you a couple
of questions.
Can you tell me where,
what state is this number
in?
Okay, it's to Florida.
Now, I actually don't
complete the call.
I call, let it ring once,
and the person calls me
back.
Okay.
Okay, so the call's never
even completed, and yet it
shows up as a complete
AT&T call.
All right.
Direct dialed.
Now, what is the phone
company that you think
you're using?
Metromedia.
All right.
What it sounds like is
that for whatever reason,
when you were using,
thought you were using
Metromedia, somehow your
long-distance company got
switched back to AT&T?
Well, I checked, and all
the phone companies agree
that I'm a Metromedia
subscriber, including New
York Telephone.
They have a downer.
I'm a Metromedia customer.
I don't think it has
anything to do with your
speed dialing.
No.
What's odd, though, is the
fact that you're not
letting it pick up and it's
being billed.
How many of these calls
were there?
Well, I've actually called
several times a week, and I
get two a month that are
considered completed calls
by AT&T.
Uh-huh.
But I know I call many
other times, and the person
on the other end I've
spoken to, and they've
indicated to me that they've
never picked up the phone,
nor does their machine
pick up.
They set it for four rings,
so it's not possible for it
to be completed.
All right.
To make sure, since you are
using a speed dial, though,
I mean, I don't think this
has anything to do with it,
but just to be sure,
reprogram your speed dial to
have the carrier access code
of Metromedia, which is
10488.
Right.
And that way, there can be
no doubt, and if you just
use a speed dial, and it
still somehow gets routed
to AT&T when you're using
their carrier access code,
then you've got something
really weird going on.
Exactly.
But no one, any of these
phone companies, seems to
understand.
I've called, like, all three
of them, and they all say,
we don't know what's going
on.
Maybe all the circuits are
busy on Metromedia, and it's
swinging over to AT&T.
That's a possibility.
I've never heard of that
happening, but I guess that is
a possibility.
What AT&T is saying is it's
possible that, even though the
paperwork says Metromedia, that
the line actually is an AT&T line.
Uh-huh.
But New York Telephone claims
that's not true.
Well, you know the 700 number to
call to check that, right?
Uh, no, I don't know that
number.
Call 1-700-555-4141.
Okay.
And that will tell you what your
long-distance company is.
Okay.
Now, suppose after all this, I
find out it is a Metromedia
line.
How would I make sense of what's
going on here?
Uh, it probably is a Metromedia
line, and if it is, then, uh,
it's...
I don't really know the answer
to this.
This is something that I've
never heard of before.
Um...
I wonder if any of the
listeners have any...
Have that happened to them
also?
Yeah.
If they're interested in that, too.
Yeah.
It's something.
I mean, it's not a horrendous
problem in that you're not
really getting ripped off.
You're not being routed to one
of these, uh, crazy carriers
that'll charge you ten bucks.
No, but it looked like a way
for AT&T to, uh, get more
subscribers, because they,
and each one of these times
solicited me to switch over
for a $40 bribe.
If they're doing that, you
know, that's, uh, obviously
something that's, uh, that's
fraudulent.
Right.
But you've got to catch them
in the act.
No one can seem to prove it.
Yeah.
That's the problem.
How long has this been going
on for?
Uh, three months.
Three months.
After my third month, I
decided I wanted to do
something about it.
It's not the amount of money.
It's $0.14 a call.
It's not a big deal.
Well, look, look for any
similarities, like, uh, does
it happen on a particular
day?
Does it happen at a particular
time?
Uh, well, it always happens
around 7 o'clock in the
morning when I make this call
as a signal for the person
to call me back.
All right.
That's right when daytime
rates begin.
Maybe there's a rush or
something.
Maybe all their circuits got
busied out.
What you might want to do is
call Metro Media and say,
is it policy for you to, uh,
to switch your calls to
another carrier when, when you
become busied out?
They say they used to, but
not anymore.
Okay.
Well, tell them about this.
I think they should know.
They don't seem too
interested.
Well, who'd you talk to?
A customer service
representative?
Uh, supervisor of
customer service.
Uh-huh.
I haven't gotten any
further than that.
Uh, try going up the
executive ladder.
Okay.
Talk to some people like,
you know, the president's
office.
Uh-huh.
Say you think they deserve
to know this.
I would think so, but they
don't seem that interested.
I guess the, hopefully the
executive office is more
interested in customer
services.
Yeah.
Because it's rather
bizarre.
I don't know.
It feels like a sort of a
way of getting around
being slammed, if they
have a way to, uh...
That is.
No, it's a very good
point.
Yeah.
Um...
That's, uh...
I guess you'd give me a
good idea, though, to
call the executive...
Yeah, follow up on this
and let us know, because,
uh, this is something that
probably is happening to a
lot of people.
Yeah, that's why I'd be
interested if other
listeners have noticed the
same thing and thought
nothing of it, because it's
one call for not much
money.
Hey, it may have even
happened to me, and I
didn't notice.
Mm-hmm.
Okay.
Okay, well, thank you.
We'll get back to you,
Emanuel.
Okay, take care.
Bye-bye.
All right.
Let's, uh...
Let's go back to the
phones.
Go back to the phones.
Hello?
Good evening.
You're on.
Hello?
Yes.
Hi, um...
Turn down your radio,
please.
Yes, uh...
I was interested in
talking about, uh, the
new clipper chip, uh,
encryption and, uh, some,
uh, other alternatives to
it.
Okay.
Um...
Recently, uh, I read on
the internet, um, a, uh,
news brief, uh, from
Philip Zimmerman.
Uh, the creator of
PGP.
It's a widely distributed,
uh, free encryption
program, uh, which can
be used for various
different encryptions.
It's a two-key encryption
system.
It's, uh, based on the
RSA code, which so far
no one has cracked.
It's a variant of RSA.
Perfectly free, perfectly
legal, and I suggest you
get it if you can.
Um, Philip Zimmerman was,
uh, discussing his new
project, which, uh, I
kind of wanted to inform
the listeners about.
Um, his new project, uh,
is, uh, I'm not sure of
the name.
I think it was called, um,
PGP Talk, or some, uh,
variant thereof.
Um, um, and what this was,
according to Mr. Zimmerman,
was, uh, you could use your
personal desktop computer if
you had a sound card who has
speakers and a microphone,
which I happen to have, and, uh,
through your modem, he was
developing software which would
encrypt your phone calls.
Uh, no additional hardware was
necessary, wherein, uh, you
could call someone, and, uh, I
guess, uh, you know, if they
have their, uh, computer or
whatever hooked up in this
same method, uh, you could
talk hands-free with your
computer, and the, uh, the, uh,
conversation would be
encrypted using the RSA slash
PGP encryption method.
Um, now, I, I mean, I think
this is a very extremely
innovative thing, however, uh,
it doesn't do too much good
for cellular cordless
customers, and, uh,
unfortunately, it does require
you have a computer with a
sound blaster.
Um, as computers and sound
blasters are becoming more
and more standard, this seems
like it would apply to more
and more people, so, uh, I
think this is a very positive
step in, uh, an alternative
to Clipper, and I know the
government has been trying for
a very long time to, uh,
imprison, uh, and discredit and
destroy Mr. Zimmerman,
and his reputation, due to
this, uh, project PGP, which
they have, uh, been an uproar
about.
I don't know if they've been
trying to imprison him.
Not yet been, uh, cracked.
Um.
I mean, I think they, they
might want to imprison him,
but I don't think they've
been necessarily trying
outwardly.
Um, well, I mean, just, I
think there has been a lot
of things said, uh, to try
to discredit him, and, uh,
destroy his reputation in
the way of, uh, their
building back doors into a
system, and so on and so
forth.
Uh-huh.
Okay, well, thanks for the
information.
Um, but, uh, I mean, I
think this is a very
innovative idea, and it's
the first alternative I've
seen so far to Clipper.
Uh, so I'm very excited
about this.
All right, well, something
has got to catch on for,
for there to be any
alternative to Clipper.
So, uh, let's hope this is
it, or, or at least the
start of it.
Thanks for the call, and,
uh, let's go on to another
phone call.
Good evening, you're on.
Yes, hello.
Is this, uh, WBA?
Yes, and you're on the air.
All right.
Yes, you're on delay, too.
Uh, I went to the call about
the, uh, Clipper chip.
Uh-huh, go ahead.
Um, the following.
I've been taught, or I read
an article, uh, about two
months ago about a method of
how to bypass the Clipper
chip, and it, uh, used a
method similar to what the
caller just before described,
um, where you would take
your voice and, um, play it
in the noise of another
signal.
For instance, if I send, uh,
Mary had the little lamp
over, and, uh, I were to
take that signal and take out
the noise, and then take my
message and blend it into
the noise, then, um, then I
would send, I would take that
whole package and send it
over to you, and prior to
that, though, I would send you
over the Mary had the little
lamp in, in the original
form.
I'm a little nervous here.
Uh, don't worry.
Millions of people are
listening, but it's no big
deal.
So, but, the basic idea,
though, is that you get two
messages, one would be Mary
had the little lamp in its
original form, and one where
you would have Mary had the
little lamp and my message in
the noise, and all you have to
do is subtract the two
signals.
Yeah.
What you end up with is my
encrypted message.
Uh-huh.
And, uh, do you use this
method yourself?
Excuse me?
Have you used this method
yourself?
No.
You ever actually done it?
I think it sounds very
feasible, and the nice part
about it is that, um, no one
could really prove that you
actually send an encrypted
message, because it's in the
noise.
Well, that's true, but if you
make all this noise in the
phone, I don't know.
They might start looking at you
kind of funny.
But you always have noise in the
signal, and, and all you're
really doing is, uh, putting the
message in, in the, in the high
frequency parts of it.
Right.
But the question arises as to how
difficult is this to, uh, to set
up, you know?
I, I guess, like your previous
caller just said, I think it could
be done with the computer and, and,
uh, Sound Blaster card, um, or any,
any, uh, video or, uh, um, technology
that can process, uh, sound
information.
All you'd really need to do is, uh,
build a filter to initially take
out the, or generate a noise, uh,
signal, and then mix it with your,
uh, voice signal, and, and blend the
two back together.
And, and that's pretty easily done
with, uh, a lot of these software
packages now available.
Well, keep thinking, and keep trying
to come up with, uh, with innovative
ways of, of doing something like
this.
Okay.
Thanks for calling.
I'd mention that.
Okay, thanks for calling.
Okay, bye-bye.
We need people to think like that.
We need people to, uh, come up with
different ways of, uh, of encrypting
messages, because, criminal or not,
we're going to need that.
Good evening.
Hello.
Yes, go ahead.
Uh, yeah, um, and the, uh, uh,
well, a couple of topics.
One, on the telephone companies,
cutting people off, um, when they're,
uh, in queue with the phone ringing,
um, yeah, that stinks, I know.
Well, I, I was wondering if they have,
uh, legal authority to do that,
or if this is just, uh,
peremptory, uh, you know,
snatching of, uh...
Well, they, I don't know about
legal authority, but they have the
technological capability of doing
it, and people don't think that
there's something that can be
changed, you know.
It's, it's basically, well, that's
how it works.
That's, you know...
Could it be legally, uh,
challenged, let's say, uh, for the
public service commissioner?
It could, it could certainly be
legally challenged, but of course,
uh, you know, they're going to say,
well, what possible reason are you
going to have for staying on the
phone for more than 40 or 50
rings? It's costing us money.
Of course, the money it cost them
is so insignificant as to be
ridiculous, because this has been
going on for, for decades, and it
hasn't cost them much money.
Well, it's a specious argument,
too. Uh, I've been calling since
you opened up the phones. I got
cut off at least four times, and I
must have redialed at least three
dozen times.
Uh-huh.
So, uh, I think that must use more
telephone company resources than if
I just, uh, stood on the line.
Yeah, and you know, for, uh, I guess
for most calls, 40 rings or so is
sufficient, but when you, when you
calling a radio station or trying to
get through to something that
doesn't pick up immediately, uh,
there should be exceptions. There
should be a way of getting around
the system.
Yeah, well, okay, if there was any,
any, uh, complaint to be made, I'd
be interested in participating, but I
don't, I don't know if WBAI or your
organization might, uh, might be
interested in, um, filing some kind of
a protest, but that's not what I really
wanted to call about.
Okay.
On the Clipper and Capstone, uh, uh,
controversy, several points, uh, let
me just rattle through fast, um, and
then, uh, then, uh, I'll hang up and,
uh, um, you, you, uh, comment if you,
if you see fit.
Okay.
Uh, first, why assume that the
government doesn't know what it's
doing or talking about?
Um, they, um, they're pretty, uh,
pretty clever and astute about, about
this business.
They may want to make us think that
they don't know or that they're kind
of benevolent bumblers, um, but I
think it's, it's maybe more, uh,
plausible and prudent to think that
there's a purpose behind what they're
doing and that these guys are, uh,
quite, uh, competent in, in what
they're trying to do.
Well, you see, I, I, I'm trying to
believe that now, but in the past,
they certainly were bumbling.
I mean, they, they didn't know
anything about computers.
They didn't know anything about,
uh, technology.
Uh, they didn't have computers in the
White House.
They used typewriters.
Yeah.
Along, along with the evil, I guess
there's a lot of bumbling, too, and
practically, uh, any, any government
activity.
But then, next point, why assume
that the government means what it
says in support of the, uh,
friendliness of the proposal?
And, uh, and next thing, why assume
that the technology, uh, the chip
function and, and specs and security
is as specified as they're telling
us?
Who audits them?
Who, uh, who knows what
Microtronx is doing?
Uh, next point, what, what about
checking the track record of
government and previous control of
communication and, uh, prevention or
prohibition of, of encryption, for
example, and, uh, use of the radio
waves, amateur radio, uh, encoded,
uh, communication of any kind, I
think, is strictly, uh, prohibited,
uh, because they're able to do it.
They, they, uh, were able to establish
a precedent quickly, and now nobody's
really fighting them.
And, uh, then, uh, an analog of
their just, their, their nothing new
justification, where they say, they're
not really asking for anything they
didn't have already by force of law.
Um, it seems that the, uh, um, ability
that they were, they were given by
law was recognition of the exposures
of the communication network to
convenient, uh, interception.
So they were authorized to take
advantage of that.
Now they're turning around and saying
that authorizes them to cripple any
capabilities of the communication
network that, uh, doesn't make it
easy for them to do this.
And also to vastly extend their
power.
Now, an analog of this might be
saying the Fourth Amendment allows
them to go into your house to seize
your personal papers and, uh, read
them and, uh, do whatever they want
with them if they have a, a warrant.
Um, so it should be quite reasonable
for them, nothing new, to, uh, heavily
penalize use of any encryption
techniques that you might develop or
purchase and storing information on
your own computer media at home.
Uh, uh, without giving the
government independent access to
this, uh, whenever, uh, they
should, uh, whenever their
procedures, uh, let them, uh, come
into your house with the cops.
You see, there are occasions where
you do need to tap telephones.
I don't think anybody's denying that.
There are, there are instances where
you need to do that.
But I think it's very important to this
whole, whole balance of power thing
that when you need to, to tap a
telephone, that it'd be a real pain in
the ass to do it.
Otherwise, the temptation is there to
do it all the time.
And, and what we're, what we're almost
on the verge of doing right now is
making it so easy that they could do
it with a, with a flip of a button.
Well, like the, the CIA guys who just
got picked up, where they were caught
not through, uh, really high-tech,
uh, um, penetrations, but they were
careless.
They were talking, the guy was leaving
records in the garbage can in the
office.
They were talking on the phone.
It was very obvious, uh, old-fashioned
stuff, not, uh, they, they didn't,
they didn't really depend on, uh, on
this, uh, court-ordered interception
as far as I, I read in the papers.
Anyway, the last thing I wanted to
mention, I don't know if you saw this
or you might be interested, uh, in
Newsday, February 22nd, and I think
there are op-ed page viewpoints,
there's an article, uh, headline,
The Clipper Chip Will Block Crime.
This is by Dorothy Denning, uh,
Yes.
Chair of Computer Science at
Georgetown University.
Now, I don't understand, it just
seems really strange to me whenever
I read anything she writes on the
subject, but, uh, this seems to be a
pastiche of all the, uh, well, all
or most of the government, uh,
arguments, uh, and not even
arguments, but just hints that you're
supposed to subliminally, uh, uh,
accept there's, uh, justification for
this, on how, uh, it's, it's, uh,
totally reasonable, um, that the
government should be able to demand
this.
And, uh, uh, um, she's also saying
that, uh, uh, that this has been
essential, I'm reading, court-authorized
interception of communications has been
essential for preventing and solving
serious crimes, including terrorism,
drugs, kidnapping, and political
corruption.
The FBI alone has had many
spectacular successes that depended
on wiretaps.
And then she goes on.
Now, I've heard, uh, testimony
directly, uh, contrary to that.
Um, and, uh, I, you know, I, I suspect
that this is, uh, that what she's
saying is not, uh, not strictly
accurate and probably ought to be, uh,
replied to in the public press.
Anyway, uh, I don't want to, uh, go
on.
If, if you have any comment on this,
I'll, I'll hang up and, uh, uh,
Okay.
You have to say it.
All right.
Thank you.
Okay.
Bye.
Um, yeah, I happen to see that very
piece in the op-ed pages and, um,
it's disturbing.
I've seen, I've seen it before.
Um, I've talked to Dorothy Denning
about this, in fact, on a number of
occasions.
And it's, um, I don't know.
It's, it's basically the argument is
if you knew what we knew, you
wouldn't be arguing about this.
Well, I just can't buy that.
I just can't buy into an argument
where they won't even tell you the
facts.
They just say, trust us.
Sorry, I don't.
And I think we're fools if, if we
trust them.
And I think they're the ones that
need to start listening to what
they don't know, namely what
freedom, what privacy really means
to the individual and why it
should be protected.
One more quick call.
Good evening.
Hello.
How you doing?
Yes, sir.
How you doing?
Okay.
Um.
Yeah, I have about 30 seconds.
Okay, yes.
Well, um, I, I always hear you
giving away access codes and I, I
tuned into your program once
before and you had a book, uh,
you're telling me, uh, telling
listeners how they could get a
book on, uh, like, uh, people who
have phone numbers that are
unlisted and things like that.
And, uh, and different codes, uh,
access codes for the telephone.
You, you gave one away a little
while ago for a Metro Media.
Is there a book or something I can,
uh, write to or, or purchase?
Well, okay, let me just, uh,
clear one thing up, though.
These access codes, you understand
that they, they don't allow you to
make free phone calls or anything
like that.
They're just ways of using other
phone companies.
Right.
Okay.
Um.
But, um, isn't there a book also on,
um, unlisted, um, telephone
numbers that I can get?
Well, it's.
Or the addresses, it also just
prints out the address or whatever?
It's not, you can't really get
unlisted, you can get unlisted
numbers, but it's not that easy.
You have to go through all
different kinds of procedures.
There's a book called the
Calls Directory, which is, is a
reverse directory.
Is that what you're referring to?
Okay.
Is that, and does that also have,
um, um, access codes and things
like that?
Uh, no.
Well, access codes are actually
something you should be able to
get from your phone company.
Oh, I see.
They're called carrier access codes,
and there's one for every
long-distance company.
And unfortunately, we're out of
time.
Thanks for calling, and thanks
to everybody else that, uh,
that called tonight.
We'll be back again, uh, next
week with another program of,
uh, technology and wonder and
all that kind of thing.
This is Emmanuel Goldstein.
Have a good week.
We'll see you here again next
week.
Stay tuned for the evening
news.
This is WBAI, New York.
Good night.
Cut myself while shaving
Now I can't make a call
It could be yet much worse
But if they could, they would
One bigly bump
But the best expect the worst
I hope that I understood
One bigly bump
You're beber
You're welcome.
Bye.
Bye.
Bye.
Bye.
Bye.
Bye.
Bye.
Good evening.
In the news tonight, the plan for peace in Bosnia, does it really guarantee peace?
With the Brady Law in effect, gun control activists work for even tougher laws.
And in New York, police think they have the man who wounded four young Hasidic Jews
in yesterday's shooting on the Brooklyn Bridge.
With these and other stories, I'm José Santiago in New York with Verna Avery Brown in Washington.
And this is the news for Wednesday, March 2nd, 1994.
First to Washington for the Pacifica National News.
The Mexican government today agreed to a package of economic and political reforms
aimed at ending a two-month-old rebellion in the southern state of Chiapas.
The deal would improve social conditions and boost democracy for Mexico's indigenous peoples.
Leaders of the Zabatista National Liberation Army, who began their uprising on January 1st,
will now return to the jungle to consult with their supporters.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher today announced plans to hold talks in Washington
on Friday with PLO negotiator Nabil Shaaf in an effort to keep the Middle East peace talks on track.
Meanwhile, in Israel today, two more Palestinians were killed
as demonstrators continued to protest against last Friday's massacre.
Daoud Qutab reports from Jerusalem.
The sleepy town of Jericho, destined to be the temporary headquarters of the PLO
during the transitional periods, woke up today as the city witnessed
the most violent confrontation with the Israeli troops for years.
For the first time since the beginning of the Intifada,
Jericho had its own Shahid or martyr.
Twenty Palestinians, including peace negotiator Saabarakat, were injured.
A second Palestinian was killed in Hebron
as the Israeli army attempted to enforce a curfew throughout the occupied territories.
Four hundred Palestinian prisoners are expected to be released tomorrow.
International emissaries are trying to mediate between the PLO and Israel
in an attempt to get the peace talks back on track.
The PLO has indicated that it will not go back to the talks
unless the Jewish settlers are disarmed
and international protection is provided to Palestinians.
For Pacifica Network News, this is Daoud Qutab reporting from East Jerusalem.
Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist today rejected a request
by Senator Bob Packwood to stop the Senate Ethics Committee
from looking at his personal diaries and tapes.
In his ruling, Rehnquist says that Packwood has weakened his case
by disclosing that the diaries and tapes may have been altered.
The Senate Committee has requested the diaries and tapes
as part of an investigation into sexual misconduct charges.
Moves to end the war in Bosnia gathered momentum today
as diplomats responded to yesterday's agreement
between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims.
In Geneva, the UN Special Envoy Thorvald Stoltenberg
and European Envoy Lord Owen
resumed talks on the prospects of a peace deal.
But the Bosnian Serbs are still holding out.
Suzanne Nelson has this report from the Serbian capital, Belgrade.
Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic today cautiously welcomed
the peace accord between Croats and Bosnian Muslims,
saying any move toward peace is welcome
as long as it's not aimed against Serbs.
But speaking in Moscow, Karadzic warned that the United States
should not monopolize the peace process
and by doing so sideline the United Nations.
Karadzic's views were largely echoed
in the Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Montenegro,
where many Serbs are afraid a renewed alliance between Muslims and Croats
could lead to further loss of Bosnian Serb territory.
Serbs currently control about 70% of Bosnia.
But Serbian right-wing parties accused the United States
of selling out Serbs in order to expand the West's sphere of influence.
Yesterday's agreement between Bosnian Croats and Muslims
is expected to lead to further negotiations
over the opening of Tuzla Airport and control of Sarajevo.
For Pacifica Network News, this is Suzanne Nelson in Belgrade.
South Africa's parliament today approved measures
to extend regional powers in an effort to persuade the right wing
to take part in next month's elections.
But both the white and black members
of the right-wing Freedom Alliance said
the amendments did not go far enough.
Both the Zulu-based Nkata Freedom Party
and the white conservative party
are threatening to boycott the national elections in April
unless provisions for autonomous states are met.
The parties must register by this Friday
if they are to participate.
And those are the stories topping the news.
The question of the day for diplomats in the Balkans is
will the new agreement between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia work?
Washington and the leaders of the two groups say yes,
but the leader of the Serbs fighting in Bosnia says he doubts it.
Pacifica's Don Rush takes a look at the new deal
for the troubled Balkan state and its viability.
The new Muslim-Croatian deal is being hailed by diplomats
as a breakthrough in the long Balkan civil war.
After a year of battling each other in central Bosnia,
the leaders of the two sides tentatively reached agreement
to form a loose confederation.
The deal was hammered out here in Washington
during negotiations sponsored by the U.S.
Miles Raguze is a Croatian who participated in the talks.
There's genuine interest in combining the assets
of the both countries, of the both peoples,
and establishing a great future for both of them.
But the plan is quite Byzantine.
It envisions a federation between the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia.
It includes a presidency that rotates annually between the two groups,
a two-house legislature that represents population
and ethnic municipalities, and the merging of the two armies.
This new Bosnia will form a confederation with Croatia
to coordinate military and economic affairs.
This complex structure ensures two things,
the security of the Croatian minority within Bosnia,
and the security of the Muslims against the Serbs
through the confederation with Croatia.
Again, Miles Raguze, a Croatian participant in the talks.
The issue of a minority has always been the biggest problem for us
because we are the smallest group.
And one issue that we have been fighting all along
is the issue that we are constituent people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
And we have achieved that with this federative agreement.
But there is an irony here
because Croatia had not always been a friendly power to the Bosnian Muslims.
In fact, at one time it envisioned a separate Croatian state in Bosnia.
Catherine Kelleher with the Brookings Institution.
It's a little bit more than ironic
since Mr. Tuchman, the head of Croatia,
is of course one of those who has been the instigator of this entire war
and in fact has both in physical terms
and certainly rhetorically talked about
the great threat of a Muslim state in the heart of Europe.
The agreement specifies that the status of all territories
conquered by the Bosnian Serbs will be subject to negotiations.
Talks between the three Bosnian sides are to resume this month.
And this new confederation is seen as a way for Croatia and Bosnia
to present a united front against the Serbs.
But for the moment, the two sides are downplaying that part of the deal.
Again, Raghu's with the negotiations.
This federation agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina
does not exclude the Serbs.
Serbs will have the opportunity to join us
in forming a state along the lines
that we have agreed between the two delegations here.
So it does not exclude the Serbs.
But this offer is not being taken seriously.
Indeed, the Serbian response to the new deal has been outright hostile.
The Russians have been more low-key.
Special Envoy Vitaly Cherkin said
the deal did not infringe on the interests of the Bosnian Serbs
and could have a positive effect.
George Kinney quit the State Department
over the Balkan policy of the Bush administration.
He suggests there indeed could be a new twist
that the West does not anticipate.
It wouldn't surprise me at all if in the next few days or weeks
the Russians get the bright idea that
well, if the Muslims and Croats can form a union
that then joins with Croatia
why can't all the Serbs in these different areas
form some sort of a union and join with Serbia?
The Russians have been able to restrain the Serbs.
For instance, it was announced in Moscow
that the Serbs would allow the reopening
of the Tuzla airport in Bosnia.
And Russia played a key role in persuading the Serbs
to pull their artillery away from Sarajevo
before the NATO deadline.
All of this came amid some strong rhetorical support
from the Russian government for the Serbs.
Kelleher believes this rhetoric
keeps the Russian nationalists at bay
while keeping Moscow's commitments to a minimum.
On a rhetorical level,
if you talk about the Slav brothers,
you can get a group of pensioners and others.
But when it comes right down to it,
there's no popular support for Russian activity.
There's no, not even much popular support
even in the Duma, you know,
to send any money, let alone send troops.
Kelleher adds the Russians have far too many problems
to deal with in neighboring former Soviet republics
to make the Serbs a do-or-die commitment.
Don Rush, Pacific Network News, Washington.
More deaths in the occupied territories.
Israeli troops responded with gunfire
to stone-throwing Palestinian youths.
Two Palestinians were killed,
some 60 wounded in several incidents.
The deaths occurred when the army
temporarily lifted curfews that have been in effect
since the violence resulting from last weekend's massacre
in a Hebron mosque.
Peace talks also on hold since the massacre
may be on again, however.
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres
told reporters Israel is trying to persuade the PLO
to return to the talks.
And in Washington, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
told reporters he plans to meet with PLO negotiator
Nabil Sha'ath
in an effort to save the Middle East peace talks.
Christopher is taking a much more active role
in the negotiations,
but one thing is clear,
the U.S. and Israel are putting all their bets
on PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat,
as Mark Beavis reports.
PLO Chair Yasser Arafat has been gaining in popularity
in the U.S. administration.
Secretary Christopher has reportedly been on the phone
with Arafat several times since the massacre.
And yesterday, before a congressional committee,
Christopher praised Arafat as, quote,
the flag and the star-spangled banner
all wrapped up into one person, end quote.
All this for a man who one year ago
was not even allowed into the country
because the U.S. considered him a terrorist.
But Bishar Dumani, history professor
at the University of Pennsylvania,
agrees Arafat is indispensable,
indispensable for the U.S. and Israel.
First of all, he's a symbol of the Palestinian movement
for national liberation.
He's also a person who's managed to
pull all the strings of power into his own hands.
He seems to be the only one
that is able to keep the Palestinian movement together.
And he's proven himself
as someone who can survive and continue on working.
But back home in the occupied territories,
Arafat has lost a great deal of support.
And Dumani says it's only a matter of time
until the world sees what happens to Arafat's leadership.
The problem is that there's no clear alternative.
And worse than that, there is no clear structure
to continue within if he's out of the picture
all of a sudden for whatever reason.
Dr. Hanan Ashwari used to be Arafat's spokesperson.
She's now the Commissioner General
for the Palestine Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights.
Ashwari says this is Arafat's moment of truth.
People feel that his credibility
and that of the peace process are at stake.
There has been very open and vocal criticism.
And people are not saying, you know,
walk out of the peace process
and don't ever come back again.
But they're saying the way things stand,
this is not going to lead to any real peace
or any real justice.
So I think he can pull it off
provided that he's not put under so much pressure
as to demonstrate his credibility
to the Americans and to the Israelis
while losing his with his own people.
But Saeed Abarish believes Arafat
has already lost credibility with Palestinians.
Abarish is a Palestinian journalist
and author of several books,
including Cry Palestine.
He says that by pinning its hopes on Arafat,
the West has picked the wrong person.
I've just come back from the occupied territories.
And there is a very, very strong movement against him.
He has not been able to deliver in Palestinian terms.
It's as simple as that.
He signed a very, very porous agreement,
which is really not an agreement.
It's, you know, an indication,
an expression of intent.
And not only does Abarish believe Palestinians
are dissatisfied with the agreement,
he believes they're very disappointed
with Arafat's behavior.
He has no idea what it does to them
to walk out of a meeting holding hands with Perez.
He has no idea what it does to them
to sound like a cornball,
to keep repeating,
where there is a will, there is a way.
I wish nobody had taught him that expression.
He has no idea that they will not accept
his dictatorial ways.
They have not been consulted
on most of the things that are going on.
And I think that is most unsatisfactory.
And I do not myself believe that he's acceptable.
And that behavior has led to the resignations
of many people within the PLO,
although no one has yet risen to replace Arafat.
But if Arafat is losing credibility
in the occupied territories,
and if his legitimacy is being questioned,
why has the West embraced him?
Abarish thinks the answer is clear.
He is, at this moment in time,
he is just about the only one
who is willing to strike a deal
on the terms that exist.
And what's in it for Arafat?
Besides continued control,
Norman Finkelstein,
professor of New York University,
has his ideas.
He has one card left in his hand
in which he's invested everything,
namely Arafat is counting on the fact
that the fruits of Oslo
will include a large-scale infusion of money
which will buy you off the Palestinians.
That's his big card,
his ace in the hole.
And frankly,
I think there is reason
to believe that that's a plausible scenario.
Palestinians are desperate enough
that with large infusions of money,
they may be bought off in the short term.
The only problem, says Finkelstein,
is that if the violence like last weekend's continues,
money may no longer be able
to buy the Palestinians off.
So Yasser Arafat,
the Israeli government
and its Western allies
must act quickly.
And therefore,
the U.S. is planning to change
the advisory role it's played in the past
and become much more active
in future negotiations.
Mark Beavis,
Pacifica Network News, Washington.
If every gun in America
suddenly disappeared tomorrow,
what impact, if any,
would that have
on the nation's crime problem?
That's a hypothetical question.