Tune in for a shortcut through 1994.
It was a nightmare.
Yeah, 94 was, yeah, it was a good sort of...
A horrifying nightmare.
11 p.m. New Year's Eve, right here on WBAI-FM.
All right, we're here.
Let's never speak of a shortcut again.
Just think how much you're going to be missed.
You don't have Nixon to kick around.
Talking about your entertainment.
And it's just about 10 o'clock.
Thank you, listening to WBAI in New York.
Once again, it's time for Off the Hook.
The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call.
It could be yet much worse, but if they could, they would.
I'll be the bomb for the best, expect the worst.
I hope the time is good, but make me go.
And a very good evening to everybody as we come together once again for another edition of Off the Hook,
the exciting program that takes you full speed ahead onto the information superhighway.
And making no stops along the way, I might point out.
It's been another fun week, another week full of activity and changes in the world of technology
and telephones and the internet and things like that.
We'll be taking your phone calls at 212-279-3400.
Yeah, this is the week the Pentium people finally gave in.
And they basically said, yeah, okay, all right, shut up already.
We'll give you what you want.
You want a new chip? We'll give you a new chip.
Just stop embarrassing us so much.
It's what we call, and this is a new phrase we're going to coin right here tonight.
It's called the Netcom Syndrome, okay?
And we're going to explain what that means in a little while.
But basically, Intel had a good dose of Netcom Syndrome, and they're trying to get out of it now.
They're trying to get out of it.
They put out a full-page ad.
Check out page B8 of today's New York Times.
To owners of Pentium processor-based computers and the PC community, we give up.
Leave us alone.
Well, okay, in their words, though, they said,
we at Intel wish to sincerely apologize for our handling of the recently publicized Pentium processor flaw.
The Intel inside symbol means that your computer has a microprocessor second to none in quality and performance.
Thousands of Intel employees work very hard to ensure that this is true,
but no microprocessor is ever perfect.
Bet you didn't know that.
Nope, microprocessor is ever perfect, particularly Intel microprocessors.
What Intel continues to believe is technically an extremely minor problem has taken on a life of its own.
Not unlike a computer virus.
That's right.
Although Intel firmly stands behind the quality of the current version of the Pentium processor,
we recognize that many users have concerns.
We want to resolve these concerns.
Intel will exchange the current version of the Pentium processor for an updated version
in which this floating point divide flaw is corrected for any owner who requests it free of charge
any time during the life of their computer.
And then they give an 800 number, which I'm going to call right now.
Let's just see what you get if you reach this number.
1-800-628-8686.
Let's see who answers.
Intel customer service and technical support is currently closed.
Oh.
We are sorry to have missed your call.
Please call back during normal business hours, Monday through Friday.
Well, let's see if we can hack their voicemail.
Calling Intel Corporation.
No, they're not...
Nothing.
I'm getting nothing here.
Not hackable.
So, forget that.
You won't get through.
All right.
We're not going to be able to solve our Pentium problems tonight, I'm afraid.
But that's what's happening in the world of Pentium.
Ah, how nice.
I don't know if anybody out there has taken up on this offer or intends to.
We'd like to hear from you if you are planning on doing so.
I don't know how they will know.
Anytime during the life of the computer, that means 25 years from now, if you decide to send
in your old Pentium chip, they'll have to honor it and replace it.
Not quite sure how they plan on doing that.
Or how they know if you're sending a new chip back.
You know, it could go on forever.
Okay.
We have some other things that are going on as well, including something that I think
is a bit startling.
Some information about...
Let's see.
Where should we begin here?
How about this?
You're walking through an office.
This comes from PC Week.
Some outrageous and not-so-outrageous predictions.
PC Audio's next push into the world of corporate computing will be dealt a major blow when a
disgruntled layoff victim at General Motors destroys hundreds of hours of work by running
through a floor of cubicles yelling,
File, close, no.
Now, by doing this, of course, that's activating certain voice commands, voice recognition on
certain computers.
And that will obliterate unsaved work on speech-enabled systems.
It'll close the files without saving.
File, close, no.
That little gem comes to us from John Markoff, PC Week magazine.
Piece entitled Oral Hacking.
Yeah.
Okay.
What else has been going on?
Well, we have...
Okay, we mentioned NetCon before.
And, of course, there is an ongoing problem on the net with NetCon, as many users may realize.
We've talked about this in the last couple of weeks concerning various use net postings
and mail bombings and things like that, you know, the Internet kind, not the explosion kind.
And a lot of this material seems to be coming from a computer system known as NetCon.
They're a very big system.
They have dial-ups in almost every city.
They have something close to 35,000 users, which is a phenomenal number.
And, basically, what has happened over the past few weeks is that people have gotten access to NetCon accounts
and been able to write all kinds of interesting programs that will post thousands, if not more, messages
to Usenet news groups and mail them to all kinds of interesting places.
We talked about last week, the Computer Emergency Response Team was the recipient of many of those messages.
And, well, it definitely caused quite a bit of conversation.
And, in fact, we refer to this as spamming on the net when something is sent to many, many different places repeatedly,
something like what Cantor and Siegel, the two famous lawyers, did when they sent out their mass mailing to thousands of computers on the net.
What happens sometimes is when someone does that, it elicits all kinds of responses,
and so the effect is kind of the same, where you keep quoting the message that you're talking about,
and it gets all the more out of hand.
So, something that sends out 1,000 copies elicits 750 responses where they quote the 1,000 copies that went out in the first place,
and then you have another 500 people responding to the 750 that responded,
and everybody's quoting the message, and it just gets everywhere.
It's incredible.
The next thing you know, it's in Time Magazine.
Well, what happened in this particular case was that time after time,
different accounts from NetCon were apparently being used.
And unlike a lot of other systems that we've come to know and love,
systems like The Well out in California, systems like Escape and Echo here in New York,
that when they have a security problem, they do something about it, they talk about it,
they communicate, let people know what's going on.
We got no such reply from NetCon.
We tried.
We sent mail.
We asked them to post something on the net.
Nothing.
They would say occasionally the problem has been dealt with,
but then the problem started all over again with another account.
Meanwhile, in the hacker community, it's fairly common knowledge that NetCon has security,
well, what's the opposite of second to none?
I don't know.
It was next to last or something like that, if not last itself.
And so, a lot of people got kind of angry.
In fact, I got angry.
All right, I got angry and I did something that some people didn't think was a good idea,
but I kind of thought needed to be done.
And I kind of like to know if people agree with me on this.
In fact, FiberOptic is here.
Welcome.
Hi.
How are you doing?
Okay.
You know about all this what I'm talking about, right?
Yeah, I do.
Okay.
What I did was I managed to go out there and get everybody's username on NetCon.
Every single one of them.
There's 35,000 usernames on NetCon.
I don't know if they really have 35,000 users, but there's 35,000 names out there.
And what I did was I distributed that list and I sent it to certain people and I said,
look, if you want to contact these people, since NetCon apparently has no interest in
sending mail to its users or posting something on its login banner saying, hey, we have a
problem.
Let's do something about it.
Change your password.
People are getting in, you know, et cetera, et cetera.
Since they're not doing it, someone has to.
So here are the people to contact, 35,000 names.
At the time, I don't know.
I don't think I really could think of anything better to do since there didn't seem to be
any other way to reach these people.
You know, sending out that many names, I guess, can be considered kind of spamming in itself.
But it was only something like 250,000 of names, which is a lot of names.
But when you consider that up to 500 megs of mail has been sent back and forth to various
places, that's really not that much.
I don't know.
As a system administrator, what do you think of that?
As far as overloading people with email?
Well, overloading people with email is obviously not very cool.
But as far as using that as sort of a net response to a problem, the users take it into their
own hands.
They send mail to the users, say, hey, by the way, you're on a system that is not secure.
I mean, is that, do you think that's responsible?
Do you think that's something to net?
Oh, definitely.
In fact, there was an incident a couple of years ago for the company that I work at.
Another popular company in the New York City area had a problem with packet sniffing, which
we've talked about in recent shows.
And people were using that other service to connect to ours sometimes.
So, not only was the person logging into the first service being compromised, but them
using their account on our service, and hence, unauthorized people gaining access to our service
was also occurring.
And, I mean, we really had a coordinated effort.
I mean, it wasn't anything major or massive.
It was just a simple task of changing the login banner to say, here's what happened, and
for further news, and to keep yourself updated, check this item in this conference on the service
that I work at, Echo.
So, people were really kept abreast of the situation as it happened, as it unfolded.
And the first company in question that the people were first logging in through to get
to us, I mean, they weren't really secretive about it or anything like that.
I mean, they were very cooperative.
And, eventually, the problem went away.
And, I mean, it was a coordinated effort, but on the other hand, it was very simple.
And, I mean, it's not so much that you have to worry about being able to reach 35,000 people.
It's, if those people are actively using their accounts that they're paying for on a place
like, say, Netcom, all it takes is a simple thing, is like putting up a message in the
login banner, in the message of the day.
Exactly.
So, they see it when they log in, change your password.
And, I might point out, there was another option that some of us had that we could actually
access the login banner and change it.
But, of course, that probably wouldn't last too long.
And, it could lead to a whole bunch of, you know, unfortunate questions being asked of
certain people.
So, yeah, this seemed like the legal way to do it.
The other thing that you could commonly do as a system administrator is force everyone
to change their password simply by declaring in the appropriate system files that everyone's
password is now expired.
Right.
So, upon them logging in, they would pick a new one.
Mm-hmm.
Provided that they know the old one.
Of course, that's not exactly fail-safe because you're counting on the fact that the person that's
going to be logging in is who they say they are.
Right.
So, obviously, the wrong person can choose a new password as well.
Yes, that is true.
But, then, it would be a matter of the person eventually logging in and their password not
working.
Mm-hmm.
So, they would contact Netcom or whoever it may be and say, something's wrong with my
account.
So, I mean, while there's no real fail-safe way to do it, there are things that you can
do as opposed to doing nothing.
Mm-hmm.
And, every one of those actions requires a bit of, I guess, embarrassment for the company
because they're admitting that they're vulnerable.
But, you know, this is the Internet.
Everybody is vulnerable.
And, that's the first thing we have to understand.
If you actually think that you can run a system that's a fortress and not have anybody get
in, you're just, you know, you're waiting for your appointment with Doom.
And, you know, people are actually going to cheer when you fall because that kind of,
you know, obstinance is unrealistic.
It really is.
Especially with a big company like that with so many users.
Obviously, they have problems.
They need to admit it.
They need to get some help, some professional help.
Hopefully, they will see this as a good-natured way of sort of prodding them into place and
hopefully preventing the kind of thing that has been occurring, you know, courtesy of them
throughout the net.
All right.
Again, we'll be open to suggestion on that.
I just want to read something from an announcement that they put out on, I believe this was the
December 8th, this went out.
Now, this was well before all the problems started.
And, this is referring to something within NetCom.
On Saturday, December 3rd, NetCom obtained evidence to indicate that a former user had,
quote, guessed, unquote, the passwords to a, just sitting around one day guessing words,
to approximately 1,100 NetCom customer accounts.
That is no small matter.
The majority of these passwords were accurate.
So, all accounts, I don't know what they mean by that.
The majority of these passwords were accurate.
If they guessed them, I would imagine they would be accurate.
So, all accounts involved were suspended pending an arrangement with our support department
to change their password.
The vast majority of these passwords were easily guessable through standard dictionary methods.
I find it hard to believe they actually used a system that would allow a dictionary to
guess the passwords.
We have no reason to believe that NetCom's own security was violated in this incident,
especially given the nature of the passwords guessed.
How do you interpret that sentence?
What does that mean?
They just admitted 1,100 passwords were guessed, yet there's no reason to indicate that security
was compromised.
Translate that for me, please.
I think, from what I understand of the problem, I mean, a lot of places don't really care so
much about the dictionary guessing method, because a lot of places simply have shadowed
password files and aren't readable by an average user.
So, it doesn't matter, because they need root to have access to it, and they wouldn't have
root in the first place, unless they found it through some other means.
And if they found it through some other means, they wouldn't need accounts.
They could just make as many as they want to.
Or they can change someone else's password, or whatever they want to do.
Certainly, if there's 35,000 people on the system, and you add one more, no one's going
to notice.
But, from what I could tell, anyway, from what I was reading, is it was possible that NetCom
was using, since they have so many machines at NetCom, and they like sharing files, like,
say, the password file, amongst the numerous machines at their site.
They're using something known as Yellow Pages, or has since the name has been changed to
Network Information Services, or NIS, or now NIS+, which is supposed to be secure, which
is basically something that originated at Sun Microsystems for Sun Workstations, and now
for lots of other machines, too, that allows someone to share important database files, like
the password file, and the group access file, and so on and so forth.
Now, if that isn't set up properly, you can have all the password shadowing in the world.
Someone can simply use a Yellow Pages command and list out the password file.
And I think that might have been happening to a certain extent, or it was also possible
from what I read, whether it was originally like this, or somebody did this on purpose,
that the password file was available in the clear at certain times of the day.
And if people are familiar with the way Yellow Pages works, basically the Yellow Pages server
pushes out the actual database files to the various different sites that share the same
database, such as the password file, at various times of the day when the file is
changed.
Say, all the people that change their password throughout the day, there's like, it's similar
to polling, only it's the reverse of polling, they push it.
The actual server pushes it out to all the sites that are considered slaves of the YP server,
so that the password file would be updated on all the machines in their domain, since all
the machines are used by all the subscribers, so instead of having a copy of the exact same
password file a dozen times over, you just have one, and all the machines share it.
That's the main purpose of Yellow Pages.
Obviously, if it's not set up right, there are going to be problems.
Well, continuing with what they said, and this is also kind of an interesting statement here,
which we have to sort of like do a Radio Moscow thing and read into what they're really trying
to say.
This is also an isolated incident and not related to any other password or server problems that
have occurred over the past week, nor do we have any indication that this incident is
related to the alleged break-in recently, quote, reported, unquote, in 2600 Magazine.
Now, what's this with the quotes around the reported?
I mean, we reported it, so obviously, you know, I don't know why it has quotes around it, but
apparently they don't believe what we said.
What we said was that there are indications that the entire credit file had been compromised,
and the indications were that a good chunk of it was posted on the Internet Relay Chat
and various other places, too, and just based on the reaction of certain people, it looked
like that had happened, that someone had actually gotten access to the credit card numbers of
people that had been paying for NetCom access.
For one thing, I don't understand why a system would have that online in the first place.
Yeah, that's really ridiculous.
There's absolutely no reason whatsoever to keep your entire subscriber base's personal
information and credit card numbers online.
There's simply no reason to do that.
I mean, it might have been just the new subscribers or something.
Is that possible?
You know, people that applied for accounts in the last 24 hours?
I mean, that's possible, but I mean, even so, why would it be accessible to the outside?
It doesn't need to be.
It could just be sent somewhere that's not reachable.
Anyway, that was part of the notice that appeared on some NetCom news groups, netcom.general.
This did not appear in the login banner.
I think it should have, but this appeared in early December, and it's gone now.
That's the interesting thing.
After all of this, nobody can find that particular message, and one person who posted on Alt-2600
said the following.
He said, it would seem to me that NetCom's shadow password file has been compromised.
Rumors were that it was located in slash VAR slash YP slash NetCom.
That's what he thinks the path is.
As an adjunct file that was world-readable once an hour like clockwork.
Right.
This is the Yellow Pages problem I was talking about.
Once an hour like clockwork, everybody would be able to read it for a few minutes, and
the protection mode was changed back.
So, if that's the case, figuring that there's a 10% hit rate, that's about 3,500 accounts
cracked right there.
So, I don't know.
You can basically interpret that however you wish.
A couple other things.
We have a list here of 500, a totally different subject here, 500 area code is something that
will be instituted next year.
That's the first step of personal communication services, where you have one phone number that
follows you around everywhere.
And, what that will do is enable you to use a cellular phone, a beeper, I suppose, everything.
You know, and you wouldn't have to, no matter where you moved in the country, you could keep
the same phone number.
Now, what we have here is a list of all different exchanges that apparently are being allocated.
Now, AT&T has had the 346, 367, 677, and I understand the 288 exchange allocated to them.
All these other exchanges are being allocated to different companies.
For instance, United Telephone Company of Missouri has the 320 exchange.
Central Telephone of Virginia has 882.
I don't understand why they're doing this.
This seems to be this kind of thing they're moving away from with 800 portability, where
an exchange does not belong to one particular company.
And, with this 500 business, now it looks like they're going right back to that.
It also prevents people from getting numbers of their choice.
So, we'll just have to see where that winds up taking us.
What do you think, Fiber?
Anything interesting in there?
Well, like you say, it's kind of ironic that after all the trouble they went through, after
with the advent of Signaling System 7 and the 800 service database that basically makes it
possible for you to have any 800 number you want to and choose the carrier of your choice,
it's kind of peculiar that they would revert back to a method where they're assigning exchanges
to specific companies.
I mean, I don't know that it would be something permanent.
You know, we could only hope that they're going to switch to 500 portability at some point
in the future.
Maybe they don't have the systems in place to handle it right now, so that to do it as
quickly as possible, they're simply assigning exchanges and maybe it'll change.
But, uh, it's hard to say for certain.
Take a look at the 464 exchange.
See if you can find that.
It's midway down the second column.
That exchange is assigned...
Edward A. Smith.
Edward A. Smith owns that exchange.
Now, I don't know who Edward A. Smith is.
All these other ones are telephone companies, but 464 belongs to Edward A. Smith.
What is going on here?
That's weird.
Is some rich eccentric guy out there, uh, buying up exchanges?
Well, that's a name to watch out for in the future, folks.
Edward A. Smith.
Don't know who he is, but we intend to find out.
Okay, a couple other things.
Um, call waiting and caller ID.
Supposedly, that's going to be, uh, a reality fairly soon.
Uh, maybe in the next year or so.
I know we mentioned this, uh, a couple of years ago, actually.
We got some sort of a Bell memorandum about that.
And what's your recollection on it?
I don't have it in front of me.
The recollection on it was, uh, the original drafting and the, uh, the Bellcourt Technical
Advisory made it sound completely unfeasible because in order for the data to be sent over
a call waiting, you would actually be disconnected from your party.
Basically, uh, by disconnected, I mean you wouldn't be able to hear each other.
Right.
And you'd be muted from each other.
For how long?
For a duration of a few seconds.
Mm-hmm.
As, as the, uh, caller ID info was sent.
Do you remember how many seconds?
About that one?
Specifically, I forget.
But there was all kinds of handshaking that was being done with actual touch tones.
Right.
And after all that was done, then it sent the data.
So it might have been something on the order of maybe four or five or even six seconds.
Yeah.
Now, that's a long time.
Yeah.
To, uh, you know, to be cut off from anybody.
And, uh, to give you an example.
Now, imagine being on the phone for that amount of time in the middle of an urgent phone conversation
when some other joker comes in and, and, and you get call waiting and you have to sit
through silence for that amount of time.
Or someone's calling you repeatedly.
Yeah.
You know?
So anyway, here's what we have on it right now.
The new service is called CIDCW, Caller ID on Call Waiting by Belcor.
It needs a new telephone set that responds to a new call waiting tone.
Instead of the usual beep to indicate call waiting, you get a special dual tone around, uh, 2650 and 2820 hertz.
Um, well, if we had our, our trusty, uh, demon dialer with us, we could produce that tone.
But, um, um, well, we'll, we'll try to produce that for future weeks.
So you'll, you'll know what that tone sounds like.
The new telephone recognizes the special tone and mutes the talking and listening paths in the telephone set.
Your talking doesn't mess up the Caller ID transmission and you don't get blasted in the ear with data.
Um, after the telephone has muted, it sends a tone back to the central office saying it's okay to send Caller ID.
Uh, and the tone that the, the telephone sends to the central office is a DTMF A.
All right.
So they'll be using that fourth row of, uh, touchstones, the A key, uh, from the fourth column.
Uh, that way people won't send it accidentally from a regular telephone set.
Ah, but hackers like us will send it on purpose.
All someone, all someone has to do is send this, uh, distinctive ringing call waiting tone initially and then send an A.
Yeah.
And send whatever they want to.
This, this ought to be interesting.
The return of silver boxing.
Um, this person's contributor, um, to, um, what news group is this?
Uh, this is Telecom Digest.
He says, I haven't seen any telephone sets that can do CIDCW yet, but I suspect Northern Telecom has a capability in one of their Vista telephones, uh, Beltronics.
Um, but no central offices have been, uh, announced yet.
Um, and I understand, uh, this is another contributor here.
If your, um, if your, um, if your, uh, phone replies with a DTMF-D, uh, that means it is caller ID call waiting compatible.
If it replies with DTMF-A, then it is, uh, both CIDCW and ADSI, uh, compatible.
What is ADSI?
That is, um, you know, it doesn't say what ADSI is.
Do you have any idea what that might be?
It doesn't ring a bell.
Nope.
There's no indication as to what that means.
All right.
We'll find out that too, but that's, uh, that's something coming in the next year.
Hmm.
And here's something someone, um, someone posted on Telecom Digest, uh, which a lot of our listeners have had questions about.
Uh, namely the differences between a DMS-100 and a number 5 ESS.
And I can sense people just, uh, just, uh, shivering in anticipation here as we go over some of these, uh, some of these differences.
Uh, some things that this particular, uh, subscriber, uh, finds.
Some things he noticed since he got cut over to a DMS-100.
Any line, uh, that is not, uh, not POTS, not plain old telephone service, can flash and get stuttered dial tone.
What this does is it parks the first connection and will ring you back if you hang up.
So in other words, if you're on the phone, you just hit flash, you hear a stuttered dial tone, you hang up, and it rings back.
5 ESS, apparently, you cannot do that.
Does that make sense?
I don't know if this is true or not.
I don't know anyone that doesn't have a POTS line in their home.
I don't know what they mean by that.
But, uh, I think, I think what this person meant was any line that is POTS.
No, I think, I would, I would say not.
Why?
If you're just, if you're just plain old telephone service and you're on a DMS-100 and you flash the switch hook, either nothing will happen or you'll hang the person up.
No, you see, I think that's what he's saying.
I think he's saying that any line will give you a stuttered dial tone no matter what the features are.
No, what he's saying is that if it's a non-POTS line.
Right.
And you flash the switch hook, you'll get a stuttered dial tone.
A stuttered dial tone is if you were on, uh, IntelliDial or Centrix.
Uh-huh.
Okay.
If there are no features provisioned onto that line that use the flash function, then dialing anything gets reorder.
Okay.
I found this because my first line has call forwarding and return call on it, but not three-way calling.
See, I think he means any line can get a stuttered dial tone.
I'm not sure.
Those of you with DMS-100, you know.
If he's saying that, it's simply not true.
Uh-huh.
He would have to mean, you don't get a stuttered dial tone if you flash the switch hook.
On a DMS-100?
No.
You're sure about this?
Absolutely.
Okay.
There would be people all over the city completely confused as to why they're getting a stuttering dial tone when they hang up.
Well, only if they flash.
Only if they flash the receiver.
Yeah, but people flash all the time just to hang up.
Sometimes they're hanging up and they're about to make another call, so they flash.
Well, you know, I've had several people ask me, why does the phone sometimes ring when I hang up?
Yeah.
And I think they might be flashing and then hanging up.
Yeah, if you have three-way, sometimes you're not really paying attention, but people with three-way might flash the switch hook.
Right.
And then hang up, and you're actually putting the person on hold, which is a feature of three-way.
Okay, again, if you have a DMS-100, you might want to experiment with that.
You can do it now because we're all phone lines tied up, so you won't get through to us.
I guarantee you it will not work.
Okay.
It does work.
Well, I mean, we have some phones in a DMS, but they're on IntelliDial.
Okay, but the thing is, when you flash and hang up there, you wind up transferring, so it's kind of hard for us to experiment with that particular feature.
But on IntelliDial, you'd get a dial tone anyway when you flash.
Yeah, yeah, so it's really not a good experiment there.
Number two, the Speed Dial Killer, when dialing a feature code before a call, like call forwarding or cancel call waiting,
you must pause for the stutter dial tone to stop after the code before dialing the number.
On the one ESS I was on, I could send 72-pound and then the phone number as one string.
On the DMS-100, I must send 72-pound pause then the number.
That means absolutely nothing.
It's completely dependent on the revision.
I have a 5 ESS in the neighborhood that I live in, and if I dial star 67 and a number right after that, I can't dial it in a constant string.
I have to pause.
So we're talking about, like, nuts and bolts kind of things that really are completely independent of what switch you're on.
I've noticed that star 67 tends to make you pause for a while.
And the other ones, like call waiting, call waiting, I don't know, I saw on a 5 ESS we could just dial it as one string,
and then on a DMS-100 you have to pause.
It could just be, you know, settings on one particular switch.
That or just a software revision.
I mean, all DMSs and 5 ESSs are not created equal.
There's various different generic software versions that are floating around.
Don't they tend to be the same, though, in the same area?
They can be drastically different now.
I mean, in the particular neighborhood that I lived in, for a long time, obviously, you're well aware of the fact,
we didn't have signaling system 7.
We couldn't do a caller ID or a call return or a repeat call or any of those features,
simply because we were on generic number 3.
We were on a 5 ESS switch in my neighborhood, but we were on generic 3.1, which is ancient.
Meanwhile, most of the rest of Queens and Brooklyn and elsewhere were already on generics 5 and above.
How do we find out what generic version we're on without actually accessing the switch?
Unfortunately, it's not really possible.
They're not liable to tell you that.
In fact, they probably won't even know what ESS means when you called them.
Usually not.
Yeah.
I mean, let's try it.
Let's try it right now.
See if the operator can tell us what kind of a switch we're on.
Now, I happen to know that we are on a, actually, I'm not sure if I know, we're on a 5 ESS here?
Where are we?
What office?
Right, gee, I don't even know.
What do you get when you do 9901?
Well, that's what we're going to try right now.
We're going to try, let's get a dial tone.
Okay.
279-01.
This should tell us what kind of a switch we're on.
Unless it's analog.
Well, not analog.
We cut over.
Sometimes it never answers at all, too.
Reach the verification number at West 36th Street, DS1, 5 ESS, area code 212.
That's a 5 ESS.
Yeah, that's what we are.
Okay, so now let's see if the operator can tell us that.
Okay, that's...
You don't think the operator's going to be able to tell us this for a moment, do you?
No, definitely not.
Okay, let's see if we can get her to understand anything that we're saying.
Because people are curious.
They want to know these things.
9S signs, may I help you?
Yes, hi, operator.
I was wondering if you could tell me what kind of a switch I'm on.
No, I don't.
I'm sorry?
I have no idea of telling you what kind of switch.
What do you mean by what kind of switch you're on?
The kind of switching system, whether it's a DMS-100, a 5 ESS, or what revision of it that generic is running.
No, we have no information on that, sir.
Uh, you're the operator, though, right?
Yeah.
You don't know that?
No, we weren't told that.
Oh.
Which we are.
Do you have any idea how I could find that out?
Let me give you to the repair department.
Hold on, sir.
Okay, thank you.
Now, there are people there that know.
When in doubt, go to repair.
All right, let's see if repair will tell us.
9X repair, Ms. Sedlitz speaking, can I have an air code and phone number you're reporting?
Well, actually, I'm just trying to find out what switch I am on.
I'm in the 279 exchange in the 212 area code.
You able to tell me that?
Uh, no, what switch you're on?
Yeah.
Oh, sorry, I don't have that information.
Who would I ask to find that out?
Uh, well, what it is, it seems like something that would be over at the central office.
Uh-huh.
I don't have a direct number to over there.
What you'd probably have to do is call here during business hours and have a foreman call you back from the central office.
Okay, so if I call repair service.
Right.
Could you transfer us to someone in mechanized loop testing?
Uh, no, I don't have a connection for that either, sir.
Okay, thank you.
Okay.
You got a kick out of asking that, didn't you?
What would have happened if he did?
Uh, if he did, then that person would have known the answer.
Are there people in mechanized loop testing at this hour of the night?
Uh, definitely.
Okay, that's somehow reassuring, even though I don't know what they're doing there.
Okay, we have a special guest with us.
Walter is here.
Hi, Walter.
You have some information for us on MetroCard.
Yeah, I, uh, I accidentally erased one of my MetroCards by, uh...
Accidentally?
Accidentally, by rubbing it repeatedly against a high-power permanent magnet.
I accidentally erased my, uh, MetroCard.
And, uh, Mr. Red Balaclava, uh, gave me one of these envelopes.
You could mail your MetroCard in, and they'll, uh, try to figure out what's wrong with it.
Um, I got, uh, a letter back from MetroCard Customer Service, and, uh, this is some of it.
Uh, you purchased your MetroCard on April 4th, 1994, for $10 and added value on one occasion.
It appears that your card was successfully used as 16 fares were correctly deducted each time you swiped the card at the turnstile.
Well, our thorough examination does not indicate damage or malfunction, but, um, they couldn't do anything for me.
They, they told me that, um, I used it, and, uh, it doesn't indicate damage or malfunction, and I never got a card back or anything.
So, they kept your card?
Yeah, they kept the card.
Well, what are they saying?
Are they saying that there was no value to it, or, or...
I'm not, I'm actually not sure if there was value on it.
Um...
Well, let's add up the numbers there.
You bought it for $10.
$10.
They say I added value once.
They don't tell you how much you added?
No.
But it was 16 fares.
Well, 16 times 125, that's, uh, 16, that's, that's what, uh, $20?
Yeah, that's another $10.
So, let's say you upgraded it once, does it sound like you would upgrade it at $10 or $5?
No, that's a possibility.
Okay, so according to them, you upgraded it once to...
$10.
Another $10, and that's, uh, that's $20.
Okay, so I guess they kept your card, because it had no value.
Well, they didn't say anything about that.
Uh, I would have appreciated it if they told me that the card had no value.
Mm-hmm.
Well, uh...
What's interesting, what I found interesting, is that they knew exactly when I bought it,
and exactly how many times I've used it.
Mm-hmm.
And where did that letter come from?
This came from, uh, MetroCard Customer Service, uh, Nancy Edwards, the supervisor.
And where are they located?
This is 10 Columbus Circle.
Columbus Circle, they're right there.
Yeah, I think they have a, uh, uh, something there that you can, they have a, the customer
service center there.
Mm-hmm.
You can probably go there and, uh, with your MetroCard and have a look at it.
And MetroCard Museum must be there, too.
Yeah.
The site of the future MetroCard Museum.
Okay, well, that's, uh, interesting.
The, um, so, so if someone has a problem, is there a phone number or anything there that
people can call?
Yeah, they have, uh, they have an 800 number for outside New York City, 1-800 MetroCard.
Uh-huh.
And within New York, it's, uh, 2-1-2-6-3-8-7-6-2-2.
They also have a fax.
I think, I think that spells MetroCard, if I'm not mistaken.
Well, I'm spelling it out now.
6-3-8-7-6-2-2?
Yeah.
Yeah.
That spells Metro, Metro, well, without the RD at the end.
So...
They also have a fax number, if you want to send a fax to them.
Okay.
What's that?
It's, uh, 2-1-2-2-4-6-3-4-2-1.
Okay.
Any other information?
Well, once, uh, there's, there's something interesting.
I, I, I was, uh, getting out of the 42nd Street exit, um, Times Square, and they actually
had one of these turnstiles open.
Uh, normally, I've seen other turnstiles open before, and they're basically empty.
This one turnstile they had open, uh, had a small computer inside, it looked like a
generic PC, and had some IBM token ring equipment in it.
And, uh, there was a technician there, I asked him a couple of questions, and, uh, he, he
verified the idea that my, you know, what I thought that there was a, it was actually
connected through a token ring network throughout the city, and that, in fact, he told me that,
uh, each station has one computer and one of the turnstiles, uh, that manages all the
other turnstiles.
So, uh, I've been, uh, thinking that they probably cache the MetroCard transactions locally in
that, in that particular station before sending them out to a central computer somewhere.
As a batch?
Yeah.
Yeah.
Something like that.
How often do you think they get sent down?
Oh, I really don't, I wouldn't know.
But, uh, it seems like it would be too difficult for each transaction to go to the computer,
uh, individually.
Right.
Yeah, that does make sense.
It does make sense.
Okay, well, that's a little bit more information on that.
And, of course, we'll be, uh, keeping people updated as we learn more.
212-279-3400 is our phone number.
Let's go to the phones.
Good evening.
You're on Off the Hook.
Good evening, sir.
Let me hang up the other line here.
Um, far too many questions to go into everything I would like to this evening.
Okay.
But, um, let me ask you this.
What was, where does that list come from with, uh, the, oh, by the way, you know about
portability and 500 service?
Uh-huh.
Well, I've talked to so many people about the 500 service now.
I'm not sure whether it was somebody at Belcourt or elsewhere, but somebody said that after
the first two or three years of the 500 service, they will do what they did with the 800 service
and, uh, introduce portability.
That it is, as, um, Mr. Goldberg, I guess it was, said at one point that you were speculating,
that is, uh, yes, it will only be for the initial period, first couple, two or three years,
that they will assign them, um, carrier by carrier, which is expected to be, that initial set of assignments
is expected to be completed by next May.
Okay, were you asking where we got the list?
Yes.
Okay, that's in Telecom Digest, Volume 14, Issue 459.
Well, uh, Volume 14, Number 459.
Right.
And the title is Telecom Digest.
Uh, yes, you can, you can read that on the internet, it's, uh, or Usenet, actually.
Comp.dcom.telecom is the actual Usenet news group.
Would you give me that one more time?
Yeah, uh, comp, C-O-M-P, uh, dot D-C-O-M, dot Telecom, T-E-L-E-C-O-M.
I'm assuming you have net access.
Well, I, I soon will, but just, C-O-M-P, dash, D-C-O-M, dot, I mean, comp, dot D-C-O-M, dot
T-E-L-E-C-O-M, dot, T-E-L-E-C-O-M, dot, T-E-L-E-C-O-M, dot, T-E-L-E-C-O-M.
Correct.
At?
No, that's it, that's, that's the, the name of the news group, you simply use your news
reader and read that particular news group.
A news group.
And, and, now, however, at the same time, is, does Telecom Digest come out in paper form as well?
Uh, if it does, I'm not aware of it coming out as such, but it is stored in various places,
so you can access a bulletin board somewhere or FTP site and get back issues.
It's stored, uh, as, as electronically on.
Right.
I, I don't know of it being printed.
There's, there's a lot of, a lot of material that comes out, like, uh, you know, a hundred
messages a day sometimes.
Oh, and this was a message that somebody who had the list put on there?
Basically, yeah.
That's, that's, that's what it is.
Okay.
By the way, they're, they're going to have, uh, you know, how some of us have discussed
what you can do with the AT&T Easy Reach Now, called True Connection Service, how you can
use it to avoid all calling card surcharges.
That's true.
For a flat, let's call it a flat rate of 25 cents per minute, uh, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. weekdays,
15 cents per minute, uh, other times within roughly 50 states, D.C.,
Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands.
Right.
The only problem is, every time you want to call a number, you have to go through this
elaborate reprogramming.
Well, with, with the 500 service, now this is from AT&T only.
Remember, there'll only be one carrier among dozens or scores or hundreds who will be offering
the 500 service, whereas they were the only company offering the 700, right?
Right.
They'll have a feature, uh, it'll be, there'll be five, uh, hold on, yeah, five versions of
their 500 service for, uh, you'll find this hard to believe, but, but, uh, I have a very
good authority.
The cheapest version, which will be a dollar per month.
And that will be the total monthly charge for it.
At that level, you will not have any four-digit charge reversing pins, and you will not even
be able to do forwarding, but you will have your lifetime, or let us call it, phone number.
The monthly charge is only a dollar a month.
Now, as the guy at AT&T pointed out to me, number one, it can increase their revenues,
um, for, for call charges, okay?
Number two, they have the local, uh, Bell and other large phone companies around the country
do their billing for them for this, and that's why they don't feel they have to have a minimum
of $5, or like the 700 service has been $7 per number per month.
Um, the second level, actually, the next two are both at the $3 level.
One is called Stay Close, um, $3 per number per month.
They will have, uh, four-digit charge reversing pins, besides, of course, the five-digit master
pins, same as you have on the 700, but no forwarding, and that's, let's call it Stay Close
One, though they don't have a one with it.
Now, Stay Close Two, and that, that's their term, Stay Close Two, though, as I say,
the other one is just Stay Close, it's not Stay Close One, okay, Stay Close Two, you will
have forwarding, but no charge reversing pins, that also, like, plain Stay Close, will be
$3 per month.
Next step you move up to is called the Traveler.
This is $5 per month, and it will give you both the four-digit charge reversing pins.
Can I ask you guys a question?
Yeah.
Are you by any chance Edward A. Smith?
No, I was, I, what I, uh, meant to say when you came on was to say, this is not Edward
A. Smith, but could you, anyway.
All right, I just wanted to know.
All right, thank you.
All right, uh, no.
You should have your own exchange, I think.
Uh, the, the Traveler, uh, gives you the charge reversing pins, it lets you do forwarding,
and it has a feature called Place a Call, Place a Call, and this, uh, gets rid of that
tedious forwarding and, and quickly un-forwarding, you see?
Mm-hmm.
And here, in fact, I just got the, the guy, uh, gave me the information today.
One second.
Here's, here is the, um, it's very simple and straightforward, uh, almost exactly like
a lot of calling card calls.
Let me give you the order, um, that you will do the dialing in.
Give me one second here.
Okay, we do have to move on to some more calls.
If you could send us a copy of that, that'd be great.
Uh, yeah, give me your fax number again there.
You can fax us at, uh, area code 516-474-2677.
2677.
And that's, uh, the 2600 fax machine.
You can, you know, feel free to load it up with all kinds of interesting things.
Right.
Long Island, 474-2677.
Yes.
Okay, now here, this is very simple and straightforward, just, but, it just tells you what order it
is in, give me one second, I've got it right, hold on.
Um, as you can see, I may sound like a reasonably competent person, but, I'm, I've got this powerful
new computer, and it's sitting there giving me guilt vibes, because I still have it, so
I'm still using paper records.
Okay, this is the order.
You will dial zero, and then 500, and then your own seven-digit, um, True Connections number,
because AT&T, their version, their name for it will be True Connections.
So, you dial your, uh, starting with zero, because some of them, the 700 service, everything
starts with zero.
On the 500 service, it's more like regular calls.
If, if it's, uh, sent paid, in other words, being charged to the number you're calling from,
it'll be one plus area code and number.
Mm-hmm.
Um, or, trying to think, no, you cannot make straight calls to foreign countries.
Okay, if it is, uh, charge reversing PIN, or, um, uh, calling card, then it'll be zero plus,
okay?
And also, you won't have to, as you, as you probably said, uh, in the last few weeks, you
will not have to use the 10XX code.
Right, okay.
You don't have to cross over to an AT&T line, or an MCI line, or a different line.
Right, you don't know by the, by the exchange, and eventually by the whole number.
All right, listen, thanks for all the information.
We're going to move on, okay?
Well, hello?
Yeah, thanks for the information, uh, keep us updated.
It's real quick, okay?
So, it'll be 0500 and your own seven-digit number.
Right.
Then you enter your own master PIN number of five digits, and then you take choice number
two, uh, which will be, place a call, and you simply dial, you've now put in an authorization
number, it amounts to, like a calling card number, you now dial the area code and number
you actually want to reach.
You'll be able to use pound to make a series of calls, and when you hang up, you don't
have to then do any elaborate undoing.
I see.
Okay, well, I look forward to the day when we can actually, uh, do this.
All right, thanks again for the call.
Okay, we're going to try and fit in a couple more calls today.
Um, let's first see what happens if we try dialing a 500 number.
I happen to know of one that's supposed to exist, but, uh, not quite sure when it's going
to be put into service.
We'll dial 1-500.
And then a number.
Let's see what happens.
Seems to be pausing for, for something.
We're sorry, your call cannot be completed as dialed.
Please check the number and dial again, or call your operator to help you.
1-3-2-A-2.
Okay, and that means what?
It's coming from where?
1-3-2.
It means it's coming from a tandem office nearby Manhattan.
Belonging to 9X.
This time I put a zero in front of it to see if that might make a difference.
Probably wind up with the same recording, but, uh, I'm not entirely sure.
Could even get an operator.
Same thing.
We're sorry.
Okay, let's go to another, uh, phone call here.
All right, now again, I'm calling your operator to help you.
That sounds like a blue box, uh.
Gee, gee whiz, yeah.
Who's on the line here?
Someone's playing with the blue box in this line, aren't they?
We're sorry.
Okay.
Hello, you're on the air.
You're talking about that attention signal for call waiting?
Yeah.
I have a computer thing set up, and this is the 2650 and 2820?
Yeah.
That's the noise you're going to hear?
Yeah.
It sounds, you know what it sounds like?
It sounds like a clear forward signal, like on some bastardized, uh, C5.
That's what it's, it sounds like something a blue box would do.
Let me just make sure we have the, the right frequency here, uh, because, uh, that's horribly harsh.
Yeah, extremely.
Of course, it all depends on how loud it is.
In this particular case, it was, it was very loud.
Um, okay, let's, uh, let's see what we have here.
Now, you had, uh, what was the frequency you were giving?
2650 and 2820.
Yeah, that's what we have here, 2650 and 2820 together.
Let's hear that one more time, a little less loud.
Wow, that's, that's the noise we're going to get.
Okay.
Extremely annoying.
Uh, concerning, uh, getting information about switches, when I had my service upgraded to
Incolera ID, um, I just dialed, you know, I live in the Bell Atlantic area, I just dialed
the 1-800-479-9977 business line.
And when I got that, you know, upgraded my service, I just asked, got a curiosity, what
this was, and they went back there, and sure enough, they said 1-A-E-S-S, and it's a chunk
test, and that's what it was.
Uh-huh.
Uh, pretty much is.
Okay, yeah, you're having a horrible dropout problem here on this line, so, uh.
What about now?
Oh, much better.
That's why, because I have the, uh, the computer on, you know.
Oh.
Yeah, that's certainly, certainly, uh, a difference there.
Uh, anything else you have to say?
Uh, no, it's good to, uh.
Good to speak with you.
Okay.
All I wanted to let you know is that tone.
Well, thanks, thanks for filling us in on that, and now we have something else to look
forward to.
Okay.
Take care.
I, I don't know, they should have consulted with, uh, the populace before they, they
decided with that particular frequency.
Good evening, you're on the radio.
Yes, yes, I love your show, by the way.
Well, thanks.
Um, I had a quick question for you.
One is that, uh, well, actually, a couple of quick questions.
One, does the 2600 line, uh, address, is there still a place where we can write to you to get
a copy of a subscription?
Uh, yeah, I'll give you the address.
Sure.
It's, uh, 2600 P.O. Box 752 in Middle Island, New York, Zubcud 11953.
Okay.
I have, um, some old issues of YIPL, Youth International Party Line.
Yipple, yeah, the predecessor to Tap Magazine.
Is that still around?
No, uh, that actually stopped publishing in 1983.
It's been a while.
Okay, but, um, are they worth anything?
I mean, these are from the 70s.
They gave some schematics.
Uh, people, people do sell back issues of that, uh, copies of back issues.
And, um, and, yeah, I mean, I, I see advertisers for it in, in 2600 as well.
People generally ask, like, a hundred bucks for the whole thing, I think.
Maybe even less.
Another question quick, also, did you have, um, when you get souped on a, uh, line where
it's always ringing, like I do when I call WBAI, and then that phone company automatically
hangs up on you after four minutes or five minutes or whatever, are you being charged
for that?
No.
Definitely not.
Okay, so it just, it just eliminates the line.
Right.
How long ago did they institute that?
Uh, when they cut over to the 5ESS, which was about, I'd say, what, a year, year and
a half ago?
Uh, that was just part of the package.
I don't know, are 1As capable of, uh, of timing out like that?
Yeah, I'm fairly certain that they are, to, uh, to time out after a certain amount
of time.
I don't think crossbars are.
Text against black boxes, or?
No, it has nothing to do with it.
No, it's basically greed, I think.
No, I mean, it, it's basically, uh, to free up the line, really.
I mean, uh, there's a finite number of connections that could be made at any one time, and, uh,
they just choose to boot people off if the phone is ringing for a really long period of
time.
Oh, I find it really annoying.
Yeah, it is.
And if you complain about it, maybe something will be done, because there are certain exchanges
where that does not happen.
Thank you for your time.
Okay, thanks for calling.
Now, this line here, it says, there's a little note on here that says this line is feeding
back, uh, so there's an unfortunate person here who probably will not get through, but
I figured we should just see what it sounds like anyway.
Good evening, you're on the radio.
Uh, hi, Emanuel, Fiber, Walter, it's Jeopardy!
Oh, I, I hear what, okay, this is, this is what they meant.
I hear my voice coming through several seconds later.
I hear feedback, too.
Do you hear that?
Uh, I'll make this quick, then.
Yeah, make it quick.
I've talked to, uh, Red Balaclava, who, because of, uh, unfortunate instances in lower Manhattan
today, can't phone.
Uh, the new thing with the MetroCard is they're switching the employee passes.
The current one allows passback.
The new one won't, so he's looking to attempt to copy his.
Right.
And, uh, you'll get email.
Okay.
Get off this line so we don't drive people crazy.
Yeah, you're driving me crazy here.
Thank you very much for calling.
It's, uh, kind of a cryptic message there.
In, in reverb.
Good evening, you're on the radio.
Hello.
Yes, go ahead.
Yeah, um, I have a question.
Uh, I work for the government.
Okay, which government would that be?
Uh, United States.
Okay, I've heard of it.
And they have a phone system called Autobahn.
The Automatic Voice Network.
Yes.
Uh, would you guys know anything about that?
Um, is that even still around?
Well, yes it is.
And it's really, really, really, really old.
But, uh, it is still used at, uh, military installations.
Yeah, they had an 800 number you could call into it.
Yeah.
And you were able to call back out.
Yeah.
Actually, if you ever had the pleasure of visiting the Secret Service at Six World Trade, they're
connected to both Autobahn and FTS2000, which are two government phone systems.
How, how would they work?
How would they make a phone call on that?
Uh, on Autobahn, the way that you, uh, normally make a call is, uh, obviously it's kind of
pointless without an Autobahn directory because it's a whole different way, uh, a whole different,
uh, directory of phone numbers that don't correspond to anything.
Seven digit, ten digit?
Oh, no, seven digit numbers.
So, there's like an eight, you dial eight, and then there's like a three digit prefix for
whatever that fight was that you want to dial into.
A three digit prefix and then four digit phone numbers?
Is that what you're saying?
Right, four digits are like the local extension.
Uh-huh.
And, uh, after which you could, uh, signal the priority of the call with, uh, A, B, C,
and D.
Right, the fourth column of, uh, touchdowns.
Did you have to use A, B, C, D?
I don't know if you necessarily had to or not.
Uh-huh.
I never actually used it myself.
I just know about the operation of it.
I thought they would let you do that over there.
Yeah.
What about the, uh, the other phone system?
FTS 2000, uh, I don't know too much about.
That's, that's a, uh, a newer phone system that was, uh, being set up by Sprint for the
government.
Sprint and AT&T, wasn't it?
I don't remember what the final word was on it.
They were kind of, uh, kind of battling each other for the contract.
Uh-huh.
But, uh, it's obviously newer than, than the, uh, Autovon network.
And what are the, I mean, how do they decide what phone network to use for what calls?
Only, only certain things are reachable on certain telephone networks.
It's, uh, my understanding that Autovon is mainly having to do with the military.
Uh-huh.
Uh, as, as opposed, there's also the, uh, uh, oh, what's it called?
I think it's called DSN, the defense.
Actually, that's part of it, too.
That's, DSN is part of Autovon?
Yeah.
Oh, okay.
Well, now, if, as the caller says, there's an 800 number to call to tap into Autovon, what's
the point of having different networks if they're reachable on the same network?
Well, I would assume for an emergency, if it's available from the outside.
Yeah, it's like you can, you dial a 800 number from any phone, and then you dial the, the
prefix, and then the, the, the, the code.
But what the thing is, you can dial anywhere in the country, or actually anywhere in the
world, on the Autovon, for free.
Uh-huh.
Well, who bills for these things?
Are there bills generated?
Uh, I guess internally.
Um, I know where I work, we don't get any, well, they, they do bill locally, because
some, they have different lines, they have like an A-line, a B-line.
But who is it that's billing you?
They bill themselves.
Wow.
In other words, um...
The Department of Defense bills itself.
Right.
In other words, like, if you have an A-line, A-line allows you to dial anywhere from your,
from your phone on the base.
You have like, there's like, there's like, there's like eight, there's Autovon, seven is,
um, seven is long distance, and nine is local.
Uh-huh.
So you can dial out, but you can, so you can dial anywhere in the world like that.
And then they, they, they, they, they, uh, count, they have counting for all that.
So they would, you know, a supervisor would look over there and say, hey, there's
guys dialing Hawaii.
What, what happens if you dial eight and then zero for operator?
What do you get?
The operator.
It's like Autovon operator.
The Autovon operator.
You can ask him.
You can say, well, um, I want the Autovon prefix for, uh, uh, uh, uh, or, um...
For Fort George, Mead, Maryland, let's say, yeah.
I went to Autovon prefix for Pearl Harbor military installation.
Uh-huh.
I gave you that prefix.
And this goes around the world, right?
Not just around the country.
Yeah, it goes all around the world.
Interesting.
Well, listen, I'd like to talk about this a lot more, but we're out of time.
But, uh, feel free to, uh, send us any information you have on this.
Sure.
Okay.
Thanks a lot.
Uh, anyone out there has access to Autovon, and we'd sure like to know more about it
because that's one topic that, uh, has been, uh, misrepresented, I think, more times
in the hacker world than almost any other.
That's our show for tonight, uh, FiberOptic.
Walter, thanks for stopping by, and, um, we'll see you again next week, same time.
And, uh, this is Emmanuel Goldstein saying goodnight.
Stay on your phone and, uh, learn things.
Stay tuned for the WBAI evening news coming up next here on WBAI New York.
Goodnight.
Good evening.
In the news tonight, an explosion rips through a New York City subway train, injuring more
than 30 people, some critically.
And it's official.
Parts of Harlem, Washington Heights, and the Bronx are to get millions of federal dollars
as empowerment zones.
And at a time when many states are building more prisons, a number of wardens say bigger
and better prisons are not the answer.
With these and other stories, I'm Jose Santiago in New York with Werner Avery Brown in Washington,
and this is the news for Wednesday, December 21, 1994.
And we'll be going to Werner Avery Brown in Washington in a few minutes, but first, our top story this
evening, the explosion in the New York City subway system.
Officials say an incendiary device blew up, possibly in the lap of a man riding the Brooklyn-bound
number four train this afternoon, moments after it pulled into the Fulton Street station,
not far from the World Trade Center.
Authorities say more than 30 people were injured, four of them critically, including the man believed
to have been carrying the incendiary device.
Witnesses describe a frightening scene with flames and smoke bursting through the subway car
and riders in some cases stampeding over each other to escape.
Police Commissioner William Bratton says investigators are waiting to interview one of the four injured
people who is now in the burn unit at the Cornell Medical Center.
He is described as a white male who Bratton says was picked up at a Brooklyn subway station
sometime after the explosion and who had suffered burns over much of his body.
That man appears to be the prime suspect as the person who might have been carrying the incendiary device.
Late this afternoon, a number of city officials, including the mayor, Commissioner Bratton,
and Chief of Transit Police Michael O'Connor held a news conference at City Hall
where they described the events surrounding today's subway explosion.
Here is a segment of that news conference beginning with Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.
At approximately 1.45 p.m., there was an explosion on the southbound number four train
at what would be described as the Fulton Street Station.
It appears that what has been called an IID, an improvised incendiary device, exploded.
The emergency response was immediate by both the police, EMS, fire.
The immediate response and the professionalism of it contained a potentially much more damaging situation
that could have led to even greater tragedy.
The Commissioner, Chief O'Connor, and I visited the scene a short while ago,
and there is no structural damage.
There was a good deal of damage, but no structural damage.
Tragically, 31 people were injured, at least, and that number may change as we continue to investigate the incident.
Four are critical and are at the Cornell Burn Center.
One woman and three men.
Transit Police Officer Otto, who is here with us, was on the train.
He is from District 30.
He happened to be going to his choir to sing tonight.
And he was very, very instrumental in assisting the people who were injured
and people who were burned and, in fact, were on fire.
And without him, again, it may have been a much more serious situation.
And he is to be commended for his immediate and brave response to this incident.
All of the packages and briefcases and other things that were left behind on the train,
which were the subject of some concern that they might contain another device, have now been searched.
There was no other device found.
So at least that aspect of it has been cleared at this point.
The case is under investigation.
I want to caution everyone, as we always do in a situation like this, that facts change,
because as more and more people are interviewed, numbers tend to change.
Some of the observations tend to change as you learn more about it.
And I want to emphasize that everyone in the city should remain very calm.
The emergency response here was close to miraculous in terms of being able to get there on time.
The investigation is very much under the control of the New York City Transit Police
and the New York City Police Department and the sense that there was any other device
or that it's connected to something else, at least at this point.
There's no cause for alarm.
And Alan Keeper and the Chief will describe to you the resumption of service on the train,
but I think that will happen pretty quickly.
So let me ask the commissioner to bring you up to date, and then Chief O'Connor.
Okay.
At this juncture, based on the preliminary investigation by our forensics and explosives people
at the train and on the platform,
it would appear that the device involved in this explosion is what is described
as an improvised incendiary device, IID, as opposed to an improvised explosive device.
The difference being the incendiary device would cause a flame
and an explosive device would be much more severe physical damage or explosion.
So we have a device that apparently was ignited for some reason on the train
after it had stopped in the station and the doors had opened.
The damage to the train is, as you would expect, from a flame, seared, smoke, charred.
There was not physical damage in the sense of blown-out windows or twisted metal,
a device that gives off flame.
It is, at this time, believed that the device may have consisted of what is described
as some type of glass jar filled with some type of flammable liquid with an external igniter.
And that is a very basic type of device.
That's information that we have at this juncture.
As the mayor has indicated, we have done a thorough search of that train, of that station.
There were many items left behind as people fled the scene in confusion.
We have checked all of those and have found no additional devices.
We will be working very closely with the transit police.
There is, fortunately, as of this juncture, been no deaths caused by this incident.
The primary jurisdiction for the investigation will rest with the transit police
with assistance from the New York City police and particularly our explosives people.
If a death had occurred or if one does occur, the city police will assume primary responsibility.
So the investigation is continuing.
We have a pretty good idea now what occurred.
A singular device, a singular event.
And with that, I'll ask Chief O'Connor to comment on their particulars
and then on to the issue of service resumption.
Mike?
I think all involved ought to be commended with the speed of the response
and the evacuation of the people who are injured as a result of this occurrence.
And I think one of the things that we see with this is that people help each other when the need is there.
In fact, the incident occurs about 1.45 in the afternoon.
It's on a southbound No. 4 train, as described, Officer Serato,
who was there within the same car when the explosion occurs,
managed to put out some of the clothing that was on fire, the people who were on fire at the time.
And EMS, Fire Department, Police Department personnel,
along with Transit Authority personnel, respond very quickly.
While there is the existing possibility of a secondary device being within the train,
people are evacuated and moved out very quickly.
The service on the A line and other lines was halted at that point,
and Alan Keeper is here to describe the remediation of the problems
as it relates to the service on the system.
Alan?
I'd like to add my thanks to all of the emergency services for their prompt response.
There was excellent cooperation.
Officer Serato is due special thanks for his prompt response.
He went to the token booth, got in the fire extinguisher, extinguished the flames,
and responded in an excellent fashion.
We're in the process of restoring service.
All service is now bypassing this station complex,
but we expect to have the station back in service fully in the early evening.
We first will have to get a release on the train involved from the police.
Once that's done, it will take us about two hours to get normal service restored.
There does not appear to be any damage to either the station or our facilities.
Thank you.
Thank you.