[00:02.880 --> 00:06.700]  about corruption is vastly different from then to now.
[00:07.160 --> 00:12.120]  And most of these cases now, you know, where they say, you know, corruption is rampant.
[00:12.260 --> 00:15.060]  Well, that sells newspapers maybe.
[00:15.260 --> 00:24.160]  But the fact is, when you have a, you know, police force, you know, the men's size that this one is, bigger than a lot of standing armies, the amount of corruption is incredibly small.
[00:24.160 --> 00:24.580]  Yes.
[00:24.860 --> 00:39.740]  You know, I would love to see them open the doors on an agency like Central Intelligence, you know, where we're now sitting with a 23-ton cocaine case of drugs that hit the streets of the United States by CIA assets, and we can't even find out.
[00:47.080 --> 00:51.160]  I'm Michael Moore, the director of Canadian Bacon and the producer-host of TV Nation.
[00:51.500 --> 00:53.620]  But we all know this is a radio nation.
[00:53.620 --> 00:57.700]  So listen to 99.5 FM, WBAI, New York.
[01:07.700 --> 01:13.160]  And it is exactly 8 o'clock.
[01:13.160 --> 01:15.260]  You're listening to radio station WBAI in New York.
[01:15.260 --> 01:16.220]  It's Tuesday night.
[01:16.220 --> 01:18.920]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[01:23.480 --> 01:45.240]  The telephone keeps ringing So I ripped it off the wall I cut myself while shaving Now I can't make a cough It couldn't get much worse But if they could, they would Bum-diddly-bump But the best, expect the worst I hope that's understood Bum-diddly-bump
[03:01.510 --> 03:23.470]  And a very good evening to you We're here to communicate Over the airwaves Off the Hook On a Tuesday night The program that talks about high technology, computer hackers, privacy issues Y2K issues, all kinds of things like that And we have some very interesting things tonight Some things to share with all of us Isaac's here.
[03:23.530 --> 03:26.870]  Good evening, Isaac Yeah, we have a lot of issues We have some...
[03:26.870 --> 03:27.990]  You wanted to start with the issues right away?
[03:28.050 --> 03:31.450]  No, no, that's quite all right You want to continue the conversation we're having in the hallway?
[03:31.810 --> 03:33.270]  Well, no Because I'll do it on the air.
[03:33.350 --> 03:46.730]  I don't care That's okay I've just been told by many people I have many issues No problem with continuing this issue on the air We could continue it after the show Well, we should probably do that Completely up to you I will choose to do that off the air We'll stick to the technology First wise move you've made today Hey,
[03:46.890 --> 04:05.350]  thanks All right Well, we have some news items And some surprises and things like that And we have some special guests Patrice is here from Holland Hello, Patrice Hi Actually, you're from Holland, but you're also from France Well, vaguely, but I'm living in Holland So we keep it Dutch Okay,
[04:05.490 --> 04:11.090]  we'll keep it Dutch tonight And Patrice is here on a special visit to New York Having fun?
[04:11.470 --> 04:40.010]  Yes, a lot Yeah All right And some news items Let's get right to the news And then we'll get into some features We'll take some listener phone calls Later on in the show A computer hacker was sentenced to three years in prison And fined $1,200 for breaking into a computer system And manipulating prices on Shanghai's stock exchange According to the state-run news agency In the first case of its
[04:40.010 --> 05:05.190]  kind in China's financial capital Zhao Zhe broke into a trust investment firm's computer system And changed five transaction records His act caused the turnover of two stocks to increase dramatically And caused about $356,000 in losses He was sentenced recently in Shanghai What do you think about that,
[05:05.210 --> 05:05.370]  Isaac?
[05:06.510 --> 05:13.650]  Uh, are you trying to incite my libertarian conservative capitalist economic policy?
[05:13.730 --> 05:16.170]  This is about China What does libertarian capitalism have to do with that?
[05:16.230 --> 05:24.170]  I'm talking about a computer hacker being sentenced to prison in China He basically played around with something he really shouldn't have Wasn't really hacking Huh?
[05:24.310 --> 05:29.630]  Wasn't really hacking I mean, he stole money It's a criminal activity Well, I don't know Did he actually steal money?
[05:29.730 --> 05:37.290]  He, uh, his act caused the turnover of two stocks to increase dramatically He manipulated a system in his own favor And...
[05:37.290 --> 05:51.410]  Using some technical ability which he possessed Right But it's, it goes beyond hacking into the realm of criminality I agree, I agree And, uh, yeah, he's in jail They say it caused about $356,000 in losses But again, they don't go into details to exactly how those losses came about Well,
[05:51.450 --> 06:02.750]  we've already dealt with companies claiming losses But here's the thing, this is China This is where they sentence people to death for, you know, staring the wrong way Or crossing against the light And send your family a bill for the bullet They send you a bill for the bullet Uh,
[06:02.890 --> 06:17.310]  all kinds of horrible things like that And here is a guy who definitely stole money Or, or did something that was financially damaging I'm surprised he only got three years Three years Now, Kevin has been in prison almost five years Yeah, but he didn't have a trial Until the last,
[06:17.510 --> 06:18.950]  how many months?
[06:19.470 --> 06:35.130]  Well, I think, I think this guy got a trial a lot faster Or got sentenced a lot faster Or, or whatever The point is, though According to the sentencing Even if he had gotten a trial on day one He would have gotten this amount of time And that's just the way the system supposedly works But once again,
[06:35.230 --> 06:38.450]  Liberation Day is coming up That's January 21st, 19...
[06:38.450 --> 06:40.830]  Ooh, I have a Y2K bug of my own, don't I?
[06:41.590 --> 06:57.810]  January 21st, 2000 Yeah, and, um We're planning all kinds of celebrations Assuming, of course, society manages to get through that Assuming we make it through Y2K There's no reason to not assume we don't make it through Y2K Because we don't make it, we don't make it And we won't know we didn't make it But,
[06:57.810 --> 07:18.170]  assuming we do January 21st, 2000 International Hacker Day of Liberation I don't know what that's going to mean But that's what people are saying on the street What are you going to do for the International Hacker Day of Liberation Or International Day of the Hacker Whatever you want to call it All kinds of fun things will be happening We'll be out in California And we'll be there to greet him and
[07:18.170 --> 07:20.110]  talk to him in person.
[07:21.050 --> 07:22.570]  Do all kinds of fun things like that.
[07:25.430 --> 07:27.290]  Okay, let's see what else we have here.
[07:27.990 --> 07:29.310]  There was a... yeah, give me that.
[07:31.530 --> 07:33.750]  Seraph has some news for us on this.
[07:34.270 --> 07:35.550]  The White House and encryption.
[07:35.730 --> 07:44.470]  The Clinton administration hopes this week to issue a draft proposal for lifting its controversial restrictions on the export of encryption technology.
[07:45.110 --> 07:49.490]  A document that could upset the administration's fragile two-month truce with Congress.
[07:50.250 --> 07:52.170]  Okay, Seraph, fill us in here.
[07:52.290 --> 08:01.790]  Now, you know, we keep hearing all these things about, you know, encryption restrictions and regulations being lifted and McIntosh is not being able to be exported.
[08:02.310 --> 08:03.910]  Where does the White House really stand on this?
[08:03.990 --> 08:04.870]  Where are we going?
[08:06.070 --> 08:06.670]  Go ahead.
[08:07.130 --> 08:08.690]  It hasn't been entirely clear.
[08:08.910 --> 08:15.870]  They've sent a mixed message over the past eight years or so that the Clinton administration has been in power.
[08:16.810 --> 08:21.490]  Clinton and Gore were two of the great proponents of Clipper when that whole fiasco was going on.
[08:21.850 --> 08:23.570]  Now, they seem to be going back on it a little bit.
[08:23.570 --> 08:24.570]  And it's a little hard to...
[08:24.570 --> 08:26.010]  It's a little hard to tell what they're doing.
[08:26.210 --> 08:27.710]  It's a little hard to tell where they stand.
[08:27.990 --> 08:29.050]  You must have a theory.
[08:29.650 --> 08:33.850]  Well, what they're promising to do is this week to release...
[08:33.850 --> 08:37.270]  and they've been kind of building up to it for, what is it, about a month now?
[08:37.390 --> 08:38.010]  Something like that.
[08:38.190 --> 08:45.830]  They've been building up saying that they're going to reduce restrictions on export of encryption or get rid of them altogether, but everybody's a little bit suspicious about it.
[08:46.090 --> 09:02.610]  And everybody seems to agree that what's going to come out is going to sound at first read like something really promising, but that once you read all of the things that they've redefined, like what exactly encryption means and what exactly a technical review for whether or not it's exportable means,
[09:02.770 --> 09:07.370]  that it will really mean not as much as it should.
[09:07.510 --> 09:11.730]  It will let through the things that don't scare the NSA.
[09:12.070 --> 09:18.450]  It will let through the things that will make business happy, that will make e-commerce companies happy, but as far as enforcing people's privacy.
[09:18.630 --> 09:23.510]  So we're talking basically about protecting transactions, financial transactions, not speech so much.
[09:24.650 --> 09:35.530]  Well, the whole government is driven by lobbyists, and there's got to be some reason that they're coming out with this now, and I'm sure it's pressure from companies that are saying, well, people are nervous about putting their credit cards or personal information on the internet.
[09:35.790 --> 09:37.230]  We need encryption to protect this.
[09:37.730 --> 09:44.270]  And while it may have side effects for people's personal liberties, it's definitely not the driving force behind it.
[09:44.450 --> 09:46.210]  Okay, so what do we have to look forward to in the next couple of weeks?
[09:46.290 --> 09:47.090]  What's going to happen with this?
[09:47.310 --> 09:53.110]  Well, we're going to see some kind of document come out from them stating what they plan to do, and I think it's just going to be a draft of some kind.
[09:53.110 --> 10:02.210]  It's not going to be a law or even a bill, but there will be some kind of statement of intent for the first time from the Clinton administration.
[10:02.210 --> 10:03.330]  What do they plan to do?
[10:03.610 --> 10:05.890]  What do they plan for the future of encryption?
[10:06.730 --> 10:08.610]  Do you think there's going to be a big fight in Congress about this?
[10:08.830 --> 10:09.490]  I think so.
[10:10.730 --> 10:13.710]  Okay, time to turn on C-SPAN and watch the fun.
[10:14.130 --> 10:14.990]  I'm making popcorn.
[10:15.830 --> 10:16.470]  Yeah, yeah.
[10:16.850 --> 10:17.330]  There you go.
[10:17.550 --> 10:18.290]  Okay, here's...
[10:18.290 --> 10:18.970]  Thanks, Seraph.
[10:18.970 --> 10:22.690]  Here's some fun out of Canada that Isaac brought in.
[10:23.290 --> 10:29.230]  Red faces all around at Canada's spy organization after top-secret documents were stolen from the backseat of an Asian's car.
[10:30.130 --> 10:38.650]  And what is being described as the most serious security breach in 20 years, documents outlining the future plans of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
[10:38.850 --> 10:39.630]  The CSIS?
[10:40.510 --> 10:41.310]  Have you ever heard of them?
[10:41.470 --> 10:42.090]  I've heard of them.
[10:42.170 --> 10:42.830]  Have you followed them?
[10:42.950 --> 10:43.470]  Do you know about them?
[10:43.570 --> 10:45.550]  I know people from Canada who have never heard of them.
[10:45.550 --> 10:46.310]  What's their web page?
[10:46.530 --> 10:47.430]  I have no idea.
[10:47.810 --> 10:49.230]  All right, I'm sure somebody can call in and tell us.
[10:49.290 --> 10:50.990]  One of our Canadian listeners, please call us.
[10:51.230 --> 10:53.470]  I bet you it ends in .ca, though.
[10:53.670 --> 10:55.130]  Well, you figured that out yourself, huh?
[10:55.310 --> 10:55.710]  .ca.
[10:55.830 --> 10:56.950]  Boy, that's great.
[10:57.830 --> 11:11.170]  Okay, so the future plans of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, including the controversial plans about taking over several states in this country, were stolen last month by drug addicts while the agent was watching an ice hockey game in Toronto.
[11:11.810 --> 11:13.050]  It's just so Canadian.
[11:13.350 --> 11:15.370]  I mean, talk about stereotypes there.
[11:16.670 --> 11:18.770]  And he was drinking beer and saying A, right?
[11:18.950 --> 11:20.690]  That's what they're going to say in the next paragraph.
[11:20.950 --> 11:22.130]  It was just all a booty.
[11:23.690 --> 11:30.910]  A police investigation has concluded that the sensitive documents were later tossed into a rubbish bin and ended up in a landfill site.
[11:31.330 --> 11:35.910]  The CSIS, which was formed in 1984, they're kind of late in the intelligence business, weren't they?
[11:36.730 --> 11:38.850]  We're right on time if you're an Orwellian fan.
[11:39.050 --> 11:39.810]  Yeah, 1984, that's true.
[11:40.390 --> 11:44.150]  The CSIS is responsible for counterintelligence, they certainly proved it here, didn't they?
[11:44.530 --> 11:50.690]  And counterterrorism efforts in Canada, the agency which is charged with guarding the government's deepest secrets.
[11:50.870 --> 11:52.750]  Yeah, like, what kind of secret does Canada have?
[11:52.950 --> 11:54.250]  The Northwest Passage?
[11:54.370 --> 11:54.810]  I don't know.
[11:56.910 --> 11:58.730]  They're extremely embarrassed by the lapse.
[11:59.430 --> 12:06.630]  CSIS officials were trying to play down the importance of the documents, saying they contain no details of intelligence sources or specifics of operations.
[12:06.990 --> 12:08.230]  Yeah, they say that now.
[12:09.030 --> 12:09.270]  You know?
[12:09.890 --> 12:10.550]  What are they going to say?
[12:10.610 --> 12:10.850]  What would it surprise me?
[12:10.910 --> 12:12.250]  Say, oh, no, we gave up everything.
[12:12.410 --> 12:13.430]  It's all out there now.
[12:13.550 --> 12:14.550]  We have no privacy anymore.
[12:16.670 --> 12:23.170]  An agency official was forced to conclude, we consider the loss of the documents to be a serious matter of national security.
[12:23.610 --> 12:26.310]  It is not the first time the CSIS has slipped up.
[12:26.750 --> 12:34.970]  Earlier this autumn, there were reports that one of its spooks had posted on the internet the names and pictures of Canadian fighter pilots who served in the Balkans War.
[12:35.630 --> 12:36.690]  Why would that be a secret?
[12:37.690 --> 12:38.390]  I don't know.
[12:38.510 --> 12:40.650]  I mean, they're not still serving over there, so...
[12:40.650 --> 12:42.630]  Well, there's always the possibility of vengeance.
[12:42.630 --> 12:48.190]  Yeah, the people in the Balkans are going to click on the website, say a picture, and say, okay, we're going to find you anywhere in the world now.
[12:48.410 --> 12:49.010]  I don't know.
[12:49.130 --> 12:50.230]  Hey, you never know.
[12:50.330 --> 12:51.390]  Yeah, that's true, I suppose.
[12:53.650 --> 12:54.590]  I'm sorry, Petrice?
[12:54.830 --> 12:58.930]  They were saying that about Dutch pilots too, but it proved more or less a hoax.
[12:59.290 --> 13:01.370]  And Holland is a lot closer to Balkan.
[13:01.630 --> 13:03.030]  That's true, they could get there on a train.
[13:03.190 --> 13:03.290]  Yeah.
[13:04.270 --> 13:11.350]  In another incident, a computer disk containing the names of targets of CSIS intelligence pros was found by a member of the public.
[13:13.090 --> 13:13.990]  Hey, I'm on here.
[13:14.450 --> 13:14.770]  Interesting.
[13:14.890 --> 13:16.190]  You know, they spell disk differently in Canada.
[13:16.290 --> 13:17.170]  They spell it D-I-S-C.
[13:17.410 --> 13:18.150]  That's how I spell it.
[13:18.430 --> 13:19.510]  Oh, you're spelling it wrong.
[13:19.650 --> 13:20.910]  It's D-I-S-K is how you spell it.
[13:20.910 --> 13:22.570]  Well, it's a D-I-S-C inside.
[13:23.050 --> 13:24.270]  D-I-S-K is diskette.
[13:24.690 --> 13:24.830]  Right.
[13:25.450 --> 13:27.010]  It discuss kind of derivative.
[13:27.010 --> 13:30.550]  Okay, well, I'm just saying, the equivalent news story in this country, you'd never see that spelling.
[13:30.890 --> 13:31.270]  It's real.
[13:31.970 --> 13:32.730]  I'll grant you that.
[13:32.730 --> 13:38.690]  Even as cartoonists and satirists feasted on the story, there were warnings that Canada's spy agency was now seriously compromised.
[13:38.690 --> 13:47.170]  The country is not a specific target for terrorists, but its proximity to the United States and its open access to banking and telecommunications make it attractive to terrorists.
[13:47.170 --> 13:52.470]  Not to mention a lot of the military info and a lot of the intelligence info we exchange with them on a regular basis.
[13:52.630 --> 13:58.330]  For instance, NORAD is a jointly operated facility between the United States and Canada.
[13:59.550 --> 14:04.870]  And if, you know, something like that were to get out, we would be in just as bad straits as they are.
[14:05.330 --> 14:06.570]  Our secrets are their secrets.
[14:06.750 --> 14:06.910]  Yeah.
[14:07.050 --> 14:09.450]  Well, not all of them, but there's a good portion of them.
[14:11.430 --> 14:11.790]  Wow.
[14:12.550 --> 14:15.230]  Well, that's interesting news from our neighbors to the north.
[14:15.230 --> 14:17.670]  If we get bombed or something, blame Canada.
[14:18.390 --> 14:19.670]  Don't we always blame Canada?
[14:19.890 --> 14:21.470]  Isn't that like the thing to do these days?
[14:21.630 --> 14:22.110]  Blame Canada?
[14:22.310 --> 14:23.750]  Well, there was a song written about it.
[14:23.950 --> 14:24.170]  Yeah.
[14:24.170 --> 14:24.510]  But I haven't...
[14:24.510 --> 14:24.690]  Yeah.
[14:24.830 --> 14:25.830]  I haven't seen that movie.
[14:25.930 --> 14:26.490]  I've heard that song.
[14:26.550 --> 14:27.230]  I still haven't seen it.
[14:27.710 --> 14:29.330]  I don't think you'll have much of a chance now.
[14:29.430 --> 14:29.730]  I know.
[14:29.850 --> 14:35.130]  Here's a letter from one of our listeners, and you can be one of our listeners too, that mails us OTH at 2600.com.
[14:36.030 --> 14:38.470]  Hey, do you hack pages because you have a reason?
[14:38.670 --> 14:42.010]  As in the people behind the pages and what they say or do piss you off?
[14:42.050 --> 14:43.530]  Or just because you want to hack a page?
[14:43.950 --> 14:44.570]  I don't.
[14:45.330 --> 14:46.470]  I'm not trying to criticize you.
[14:46.470 --> 14:46.990]  I was just wondering.
[14:47.110 --> 14:48.870]  All this hacking stuff is quite intriguing.
[14:49.450 --> 14:49.750]  Ooh.
[14:50.210 --> 14:55.430]  Well, first of all, let me point out, as we've pointed out many times, we don't hack those pages.
[14:55.670 --> 15:05.610]  We post the pages on the website, www.2600.com, and you'll see all kinds of hacked pages over the years, ever since it first began.
[15:06.410 --> 15:07.690]  And some of them are cool.
[15:07.810 --> 15:08.770]  Some of them are kind of stupid.
[15:09.170 --> 15:10.310]  You know, some of them are sloppy.
[15:10.430 --> 15:11.410]  Some of them look really nice.
[15:13.210 --> 15:14.250]  And it's historical.
[15:14.670 --> 15:15.770]  It's a form of expression.
[15:15.770 --> 15:18.510]  Whether or not you agree it's a valid form of expression or not really isn't the point.
[15:18.630 --> 15:24.110]  The point is it's happening, and it's up there, and we are archiving it for posterity's sake.
[15:24.150 --> 15:27.050]  It's really interesting to go back and look at some of the things that happened in the past.
[15:27.050 --> 15:35.810]  In fact, I've been doing that over the past couple of weeks, looking at old issues, looking at listening to old shows, looking at old web hacks.
[15:35.990 --> 15:37.290]  Taking a trip down memory lane.
[15:37.330 --> 15:38.370]  Taking a trip down memory lane.
[15:38.490 --> 15:42.610]  Well, I had to do some archiving, and I just happened to be doing a lot of this at once.
[15:42.730 --> 15:44.090]  And it just hits you.
[15:44.230 --> 15:47.450]  How much history has been going by in the hacker world over the past 10 years?
[15:47.550 --> 15:52.150]  And what better way to listen than listen off the hook and hear the things actually happening?
[15:52.330 --> 15:53.570]  All of our shows are up online.
[15:53.570 --> 15:56.070]  You can click on them at any time and just listen away.
[15:56.070 --> 15:58.630]  Especially in this industry, things move very quickly.
[15:58.910 --> 16:01.210]  I mean, 10 years worth of off the hook is...
[16:01.210 --> 16:04.630]  Well, I was just listening to some of the phone-ins, some of the phone calls.
[16:04.730 --> 16:08.530]  Apart from Rebel calling in back then, too, the phones just sounded different.
[16:08.750 --> 16:10.270]  The noises they made were different.
[16:10.490 --> 16:12.150]  The recordings you got were different.
[16:12.350 --> 16:16.630]  So things are changing incredibly fast, and it's good to be able to document them in some way.
[16:17.010 --> 16:18.170]  It's a fun time we live in.
[16:18.350 --> 16:20.450]  Speaking of things changing, guess what I got today?
[16:21.070 --> 16:21.550]  A quarter?
[16:21.850 --> 16:22.250]  DSL.
[16:22.750 --> 16:24.350]  DSL finally came to 2600.
[16:24.350 --> 16:28.550]  This is after, I think, about eight months of Bell Atlantic trying to prevent it from coming to us.
[16:28.630 --> 16:28.970]  Which kind?
[16:29.590 --> 16:31.050]  Well, it's supposed to be SDSL.
[16:31.170 --> 16:33.710]  It's going to be put on our main site.
[16:33.850 --> 16:34.530]  But here's the thing.
[16:34.610 --> 16:35.330]  Of course, there's a catch.
[16:35.390 --> 16:35.870]  You realize that?
[16:36.010 --> 16:36.550]  There's always a catch.
[16:36.970 --> 16:41.610]  Bell Atlantic apparently didn't connect the loop to the office to anything.
[16:42.110 --> 16:44.630]  So you've got a really long piece of copper that goes nowhere?
[16:44.750 --> 16:47.630]  I've got this new pipeline sitting in the office now.
[16:47.750 --> 16:47.970]  Okay.
[16:48.310 --> 16:51.390]  This regular pipeline, which is what our site is running on now, an ISDM line.
[16:51.490 --> 16:51.670]  The ISDM.
[16:51.910 --> 16:52.610]  Not the website.
[16:53.550 --> 16:54.930]  The mail site, I guess you'd call it.
[16:54.970 --> 16:57.330]  Speaking of which, are you still going to need that after you move to ADS?
[16:57.930 --> 16:58.410]  Never mind.
[16:58.550 --> 16:59.450]  We'll talk about that later.
[16:59.450 --> 16:59.770]  We'll talk about that later, yeah.
[17:01.870 --> 17:05.910]  So, right now we have a pipeline operating at 112, data over voice.
[17:06.570 --> 17:07.810]  And now there's a new pipeline.
[17:08.570 --> 17:10.070]  It's called a Pipeline DSL.
[17:10.690 --> 17:11.750]  Now, here's the thing.
[17:11.970 --> 17:13.850]  It looks exactly the same, same size.
[17:14.110 --> 17:15.270]  And it's all hooked up.
[17:15.430 --> 17:18.090]  It seems to be working, except for the fact that Bell Atlantic hasn't connected to anything.
[17:18.190 --> 17:19.910]  And we don't know what the speed of it's going to be yet.
[17:20.290 --> 17:23.130]  Because it depends on how far you are from the central office.
[17:23.770 --> 17:25.550]  And we're not exactly next door to them.
[17:26.350 --> 17:27.870]  So, we don't know how fast it's going to be.
[17:27.870 --> 17:31.390]  But the other weird thing is that this pipeline is sitting there.
[17:31.950 --> 17:35.250]  And I figured I'd be able to, you know, change things.
[17:35.430 --> 17:36.470]  To check things out.
[17:36.570 --> 17:36.950]  I can't.
[17:37.010 --> 17:37.990]  I can't access the pipeline.
[17:38.190 --> 17:39.550]  I'm not allowed to access the pipeline.
[17:39.710 --> 17:40.590]  What do you mean you're not allowed to access it?
[17:40.590 --> 17:42.050]  The pipeline belongs to this company.
[17:43.030 --> 17:45.190]  This company called, I think it's NAS?
[17:45.570 --> 17:46.570]  You can't log into the thing?
[17:46.810 --> 17:47.670]  No, I can't log into it.
[17:47.690 --> 17:50.070]  Not only that, but my provider cannot log into it.
[17:50.230 --> 17:51.530]  They're not allowed to log into it either.
[17:51.850 --> 17:52.810]  Only the big company.
[17:53.070 --> 17:54.290]  Are you allowed to buy your own?
[17:54.430 --> 17:55.050]  I don't know.
[17:55.250 --> 17:56.210]  See, I didn't realize.
[17:56.530 --> 17:57.810]  I didn't ask enough questions.
[17:57.870 --> 17:59.530]  So I don't have the answer to this.
[18:00.070 --> 18:01.330]  I don't know if I can buy my own.
[18:01.410 --> 18:02.070]  I hope I can.
[18:02.210 --> 18:02.650]  You ought to.
[18:02.810 --> 18:05.170]  If I can't, imagine what we're getting into here.
[18:05.290 --> 18:12.750]  We're getting into a situation where machines are put inside your house or in your office, and you no longer have the ability to access them.
[18:12.890 --> 18:16.430]  They're accessed by some big company someplace, but you're not allowed to touch them.
[18:16.550 --> 18:26.590]  And I wonder what modifications they would have done to the pipeline software, which allows them to forward completely, I imagine, random packets to places.
[18:26.590 --> 18:29.590]  Well, needless to say, this is not sitting very well with me right now.
[18:29.670 --> 18:32.950]  This only happened a couple of hours ago, so I'm kind of like, you know, still in shock.
[18:33.110 --> 18:35.750]  Well, it is on the local network, and it is just a telnet, so we can...
[18:35.750 --> 18:40.930]  Well, I have every intention of getting into that thing one way or another, and, you know, that's just the way I think.
[18:41.010 --> 18:52.230]  Now, maybe it's not in keeping with the way society is supposed to think these days, but if something is sitting in my office or in my house, I'm going to try to get into it, whether it's a cable box, a satellite receiver, or a router.
[18:52.550 --> 18:53.470]  I mean, come on.
[18:54.290 --> 18:56.790]  We're going to be taught that, no, you're not allowed to do this.
[18:56.810 --> 18:57.790]  It belongs to somebody else.
[18:57.810 --> 18:58.470]  It's not yours.
[18:59.010 --> 18:59.610]  It's hacking.
[18:59.750 --> 19:00.510]  You can't get into it.
[19:01.030 --> 19:04.370]  But I think that's nonsense, and I think we have to challenge those things.
[19:04.490 --> 19:07.590]  But, you know, I'm not saying they're up to something nefarious.
[19:07.770 --> 19:09.610]  I'm saying, you know, I just want to see what's going on.
[19:09.630 --> 19:13.210]  I want to see what's going on on the wires that are coming into my facility.
[19:13.210 --> 19:14.790]  I want to be able to look at that.
[19:14.890 --> 19:17.490]  I find it odd that your provider can't even access it.
[19:17.590 --> 19:18.230]  That's what I was told.
[19:18.230 --> 19:20.230]  So what happens when, like, the line goes down?
[19:20.290 --> 19:21.850]  You need to call three or four different people?
[19:22.050 --> 19:22.670]  I don't know.
[19:22.950 --> 19:25.610]  I mean, maybe the upside to this is that there's 24-hour support.
[19:26.670 --> 19:27.730]  Yeah, right, yeah.
[19:28.490 --> 19:32.430]  Of course, that just means blaming Bell Atlantic whenever something goes wrong.
[19:32.490 --> 19:32.670]  We can do that anyway.
[19:33.410 --> 19:37.450]  I suppose that means that they can log in 24 hours a day from their little office.
[19:37.670 --> 19:38.690]  Yeah, they could log in.
[19:38.770 --> 19:39.910]  They could monitor what's going over.
[19:40.390 --> 19:41.470]  It's kind of unsettling.
[19:41.590 --> 19:42.490]  But it's interesting, too.
[19:42.570 --> 19:44.410]  I'm going to, you know, study this for a while.
[19:44.410 --> 20:01.150]  I don't know what the tradition here is in the United States, but your story reminds me when I was a little kid, I was looking at the telephone at my father's place, and you were absolutely forbidden to do anything with the telephone, with the telephone equipment,
[20:01.430 --> 20:08.030]  with the lines, with anything in your house, which was all property of the state telephone utility.
[20:08.790 --> 20:15.850]  There were criminal penalties to tampering with your own phone.
[20:15.970 --> 20:20.330]  Well, that used to be the case in this country back in the early 70s, actually.
[20:21.430 --> 20:22.510]  You rented your phone.
[20:22.650 --> 20:23.870]  You leased your phone from the phone company.
[20:23.950 --> 20:25.150]  There was only one phone company.
[20:25.290 --> 20:26.490]  It was your local company.
[20:26.610 --> 20:27.510]  It was your long-distance company.
[20:27.590 --> 20:28.510]  They owned the central office.
[20:28.590 --> 20:29.290]  They owned the phone.
[20:29.450 --> 20:30.250]  They owned the wire.
[20:30.390 --> 20:31.030]  They owned everything.
[20:31.530 --> 20:32.710]  You were not allowed to touch that.
[20:32.750 --> 20:37.770]  You were not allowed to put an extension in another part of your house unless you paid them for the right to do that.
[20:38.590 --> 20:42.970]  And, you know, God help those people that snuck around plugging in phones where they weren't supposed to.
[20:43.050 --> 20:45.690]  And, of course, you know, playing with the network, that was forbidden as well.
[20:45.730 --> 20:46.650]  But people did it anyway.
[20:47.470 --> 20:52.370]  And I like to think that kind of led to freer and opener times.
[20:53.490 --> 20:56.410]  We have to continue challenging oppressive rules.
[20:57.630 --> 21:02.350]  All right, speaking of oppression, something really fun and oppressive is just around the corner.
[21:02.610 --> 21:02.850]  Uh-oh.
[21:03.030 --> 21:07.510]  In fact, you might even say it's coming at us like a freight train.
[21:08.190 --> 21:13.970]  Of course, we're referring to the thing we've been looking forward to now for...
[21:13.970 --> 21:15.570]  When's the first time we mentioned it?
[21:15.970 --> 21:17.010]  A couple of years ago?
[21:17.610 --> 21:18.530]  Very long time ago.
[21:18.530 --> 21:18.730]  Yeah.
[21:19.330 --> 21:21.310]  Well before anyone else realized what was going to happen.
[21:22.930 --> 21:23.370]  Y2K.
[21:23.750 --> 21:24.610]  Countdown to Doom.
[22:15.310 --> 22:17.190]  And with under...
[22:17.190 --> 22:17.750]  What is it?
[22:17.770 --> 22:19.570]  Eight weeks to go now until...
[22:19.570 --> 22:20.530]  Forty-something days.
[22:20.610 --> 22:21.330]  The year 2000?
[22:21.610 --> 22:24.230]  Yeah, it's really coming up fast.
[22:24.550 --> 22:26.390]  I'm sick of these morons on TV.
[22:26.390 --> 22:29.370]  Let's say, oh, this is the last World Series of the century.
[22:29.590 --> 22:31.610]  You know, this is not the end of the century.
[22:31.890 --> 22:32.310]  No, it's not.
[22:32.450 --> 22:33.630]  Next year is the end of the century.
[22:34.390 --> 22:37.050]  That's, you know, the years did not begin with the year zero.
[22:37.170 --> 22:37.930]  They began with the year one.
[22:38.130 --> 22:38.230]  Right.
[22:38.370 --> 22:40.130]  So 2000 is part of the 20th century.
[22:40.830 --> 22:43.190]  So next World Series will be the last World Series of the century.
[22:43.250 --> 22:45.690]  And I keep hearing, this is the last time we'll be doing this this century.
[22:45.790 --> 22:47.370]  It's the last tree in Rockefeller Center this century.
[22:47.470 --> 22:49.330]  Well, unless you have plans not to live next century.
[22:49.510 --> 22:49.630]  Next century.
[22:49.750 --> 22:50.610]  I mean, next year, rather.
[22:50.610 --> 22:52.510]  Well, we may not survive, so...
[22:52.510 --> 22:56.530]  We may not survive, so that's the only way they can possibly redeem themselves.
[22:56.570 --> 23:01.270]  I get much more upset with people claiming that January 1st, 2000 is the next millennium.
[23:01.730 --> 23:02.390]  Well, it's the same thing.
[23:02.470 --> 23:03.290]  It's the same stupidity.
[23:03.390 --> 23:04.090]  I just foam at the mouth.
[23:04.230 --> 23:05.730]  But it's the exact same mistake they're making.
[23:05.990 --> 23:08.930]  It really is, because the millennium begins on January 1st, 2001.
[23:09.990 --> 23:11.130]  So, that's the situation.
[23:11.250 --> 23:14.650]  Anyway, you wanted to announce that everything is okay, and everything's going to be alright?
[23:14.930 --> 23:17.130]  Well, no, actually, President Clinton did that.
[23:17.270 --> 23:17.890]  Did I misunderstand?
[23:18.110 --> 23:18.290]  Okay.
[23:18.570 --> 23:18.750]  Yeah.
[23:18.890 --> 23:20.470]  You're not saying everything is going to be okay.
[23:20.470 --> 23:22.650]  I'm not saying everything's going to be okay by a long shot.
[23:22.790 --> 23:24.570]  I think we're going to have some problems.
[23:25.550 --> 23:30.490]  But President Clinton did recently decide to tell us that it's all going to be alright.
[23:30.830 --> 23:33.190]  Everything's going to be safe, and there's not going to be any problems.
[23:33.730 --> 23:38.610]  Have you noticed, though, that there aren't as many stories about Y2K as there were, say, six months ago?
[23:38.930 --> 23:39.250]  Yes.
[23:39.570 --> 23:39.970]  Why is that?
[23:40.170 --> 23:41.330]  Well, I have no idea.
[23:41.850 --> 23:42.550]  Why do you think?
[23:42.650 --> 23:46.450]  I think people are finally getting fed up with it and realizing that, hey, this is not going to be a big deal after all.
[23:46.610 --> 23:47.170]  That's what I think.
[23:48.450 --> 23:49.990]  You think there's a darker conspiracy?
[23:49.990 --> 23:50.790]  I hope you're right.
[23:51.170 --> 23:53.190]  Well, what's your dark conspiracy theory here?
[23:53.550 --> 23:55.050]  Well, we won't go into my dark conspiracy theories.
[23:55.050 --> 23:55.490]  Why not?
[23:55.790 --> 23:57.090]  But let's put it this way.
[23:57.170 --> 23:58.170]  You're afraid you'll be proven wrong.
[23:58.170 --> 23:58.510]  That's why.
[23:58.510 --> 24:13.530]  The president's own Y2K Advisory Council recently put out a paper talking about how 9-1-1 systems may not be fully operational, how a lot of these different infrastructure, little pieces of infrastructure may or may not be completely ready.
[24:14.390 --> 24:19.170]  They're estimating, like, 50% of medium-sized businesses and, like, 20% of large...
[24:19.170 --> 24:24.950]  They have all these interesting little numbers, which you can go on, like, look at, thomas.lock.gov.
[24:25.010 --> 24:28.150]  If you have never been to thomas.lock.gov, go there.
[24:28.710 --> 24:33.690]  I demand it of you, just for your own, you know, education and so on and so forth.
[24:33.870 --> 24:34.410]  But anyway...
[24:34.410 --> 24:35.930]  So there's all kinds of facts and figures up there.
[24:36.030 --> 24:46.670]  Yeah, there's all kinds of facts and figures up there, but it's somewhat interesting that the president basically has this report in his hands and ignores it and says, you know, everything's going to be okay, everybody's going to be safe and secure, and we don't got to worry.
[24:47.210 --> 24:47.970]  It's all solved.
[24:48.710 --> 24:51.350]  But meanwhile, there are a lot of other things around the world that could potentially affect us.
[24:51.350 --> 24:52.550]  Well, tell us what's wrong.
[24:52.790 --> 24:53.250]  What's wrong?
[24:53.250 --> 24:54.410]  Yeah, what's not working?
[24:54.930 --> 24:55.570]  I don't know.
[24:55.830 --> 24:57.310]  It's not after 2000 yet.
[24:57.990 --> 24:59.830]  So you have no idea what's going to happen?
[25:00.270 --> 25:05.810]  I have no idea what's going to happen, and anybody who claims that they know what's going to happen is probably kidding themselves.
[25:06.010 --> 25:08.590]  Well, I know people are going to panic and act crazy.
[25:08.690 --> 25:10.630]  Well, all right, yes, in general, people are going to...
[25:10.630 --> 25:16.110]  There's going to be some social unrest, as there is, you know, all the time, some kind of silly thing is impending doom.
[25:16.350 --> 25:21.030]  There'll be occasional airliners plunging into the Atlantic because people want to get away from it all.
[25:21.150 --> 25:22.470]  I really don't think that's going to happen.
[25:22.470 --> 25:28.610]  But, I mean, you know, you can reasonably say there... you can outline certain problem spots.
[25:28.890 --> 25:33.550]  For instance, people have been going nuts about microcontrollers and things like that.
[25:33.930 --> 25:36.410]  You know, embedded systems.
[25:36.410 --> 25:38.230]  What are your plans?
[25:38.370 --> 25:38.970]  What are my plans?
[25:39.270 --> 25:41.330]  Just for the record, so we know for the archives.
[25:41.790 --> 25:46.170]  Well, I was originally planning a vacation in December in the great American Southwest.
[25:46.650 --> 25:47.090]  And what happened?
[25:47.150 --> 25:47.590]  That fell through?
[25:47.590 --> 25:48.470]  No, it didn't fall through.
[25:48.550 --> 25:55.930]  I decided to move it back a bit and, like, maybe spend, you know, New Year's out in the desert, which may or may not be the greatest idea.
[25:55.950 --> 25:59.770]  But I have a feeling my mother is going to guilt trip me into spending the holidays at home.
[25:59.930 --> 26:00.630]  So, you know.
[26:00.790 --> 26:04.310]  Well, I'll be right there in Times Square where it's going to hit the fan.
[26:04.430 --> 26:04.950]  Ha ha.
[26:05.570 --> 26:07.190]  Well, they say that's where terrorists will strike.
[26:07.290 --> 26:08.830]  But, you know, terrorists can strike anywhere.
[26:09.050 --> 26:10.870]  Why would they pick the biggest place?
[26:10.870 --> 26:16.310]  Why would they pick the capital of the world on the most important date when everybody in the world is watching?
[26:16.310 --> 26:21.050]  I think Trenton, New Jersey would be a much better target because no one's going to be guarding anything there, you know?
[26:21.630 --> 26:23.730]  The point is to incite terror.
[26:24.050 --> 26:26.270]  And there's really no better time to incite terror.
[26:26.290 --> 26:29.530]  You see, the terror is incited by us talking about it like there's going to be terror.
[26:30.050 --> 26:35.870]  You know, I'm watching these TV newscasts where they're saying someone could stand up on a roof and start shooting everybody.
[26:36.290 --> 26:40.090]  Of course, it scares everybody to death, but, you know, that could happen at any time.
[26:40.090 --> 26:40.410]  Yeah.
[26:40.570 --> 26:42.630]  Why wait until, you know, a particular date?
[26:42.850 --> 26:43.650]  That's casual by surprise.
[26:43.850 --> 26:47.610]  Because the professional terrorist is trying to make a point above and beyond killing people.
[26:47.690 --> 26:48.730]  They're trying to get attention.
[26:48.970 --> 26:49.850]  And the place...
[26:49.850 --> 26:52.490]  But you see, they're getting the attention just by making people worry about it.
[26:52.630 --> 26:53.650]  Well, if you have...
[26:53.650 --> 26:59.510]  The more cameras that you have pointed at one thing at one time is the ultimate scenario that they could dream for.
[27:00.090 --> 27:06.510]  If you have, like, 14 angles on one incident, and it can be talked about for months and years on end, all of a sudden...
[27:06.510 --> 27:09.290]  But look at your history of terrorism.
[27:09.290 --> 27:11.130]  How many times has it happened that way?
[27:11.270 --> 27:13.150]  It usually happens where you least expect it.
[27:13.390 --> 27:15.570]  It doesn't happen in the place where all the cameras are focused.
[27:16.270 --> 27:19.030]  You think it's going to happen there, but it doesn't actually happen there.
[27:19.150 --> 27:23.570]  It's the paranoia that makes us feel the terror more.
[27:23.870 --> 27:24.070]  Oh, okay.
[27:24.610 --> 27:24.750]  Yeah.
[27:24.870 --> 27:25.410]  Sir, if you had something.
[27:25.710 --> 27:25.910]  Yes.
[27:25.970 --> 27:34.570]  Well, you have to strike a compromise between the cameras that will give you news attention and the cameras that will have your face on the FBI wanted posters.
[27:34.570 --> 27:36.350]  Yeah, that could generally be bad.
[27:36.510 --> 27:38.090]  So you have to choose your cameras carefully.
[27:38.550 --> 27:54.230]  But what I was going to say, because Isaac brought up the topic of microcontrollers and embedded systems and things like that, what scares me more than anything are all of the embedded ships that control little municipal functions that are handled by little towns that really just don't think much about Y2K.
[27:54.350 --> 27:54.690]  Oh, yes.
[27:55.190 --> 27:58.390]  The water mains, the gas mains, electricity, things like that.
[27:58.390 --> 28:09.690]  It would be a lot of fun if, for instance, the Department of Water and Sewage here in the beautiful city of New York were to, oh, say, have their PDP-11s, which are controlling the sewage gates.
[28:09.850 --> 28:10.750]  They have PDP-11s?
[28:10.750 --> 28:12.730]  They have PDP-11s still controlling the sewage gates.
[28:12.770 --> 28:12.970]  Oh, cool.
[28:13.050 --> 28:14.330]  You think they'll be throwing them out anytime soon?
[28:14.850 --> 28:18.890]  Well, after 2000, they may very well do that, after somebody, like, kicks them over.
[28:19.370 --> 28:20.210]  That's going to be cool.
[28:20.490 --> 28:23.110]  But, for instance, they're supposed to...
[28:23.550 --> 28:27.370]  They open gates in relation to lunar cycles.
[28:28.670 --> 28:30.010]  So, think about that for a second.
[28:30.750 --> 28:38.350]  You have to release sewage into the river in regards to the tides, because if you release it while the tide is coming back in, you have this very nasty stench going up the East River.
[28:38.510 --> 28:38.670]  True.
[28:38.990 --> 28:39.350]  Nasty.
[28:39.650 --> 28:41.870]  I think there must be a clock involved in that, isn't there?
[28:41.890 --> 28:42.890]  Yeah, I think there would be.
[28:42.990 --> 28:43.530]  Oh, what do you know?
[28:43.690 --> 28:58.110]  And imagine what would happen if, for instance, the computer were to suddenly think it was the year 1900, which I have no idea where that would be in the lunar cycle compared to the January 1st of 2000, and they were to open, say, the sewage gates at the wrong time.
[28:58.210 --> 29:01.370]  All right, so you get some raw sewage dumped out into land.
[29:01.510 --> 29:02.670]  How about onto the streets?
[29:02.790 --> 29:04.390]  Onto the streets, but it only lasts a day.
[29:04.530 --> 29:05.830]  We clean it up, and then we move on.
[29:06.010 --> 29:07.090]  It's not the end of civilization.
[29:07.110 --> 29:07.950]  It's a serious health.
[29:07.970 --> 29:09.190]  It's just a bad day, you know?
[29:09.330 --> 29:10.190]  It's going to be a bad...
[29:10.190 --> 29:11.850]  I'm not saying it's going to be the end of civilization.
[29:11.890 --> 29:13.110]  I think people are overreacting.
[29:13.190 --> 29:14.570]  This already happened once in California.
[29:14.790 --> 29:15.730]  See, it's already happening.
[29:15.830 --> 29:16.150]  We lived.
[29:16.330 --> 29:16.370]  Yeah.
[29:16.930 --> 29:19.170]  All right, Patrice, what's going on in Europe as far as Y2K?
[29:19.250 --> 29:19.510]  Panic?
[29:19.750 --> 29:20.210]  Well, no.
[29:20.210 --> 29:22.950]  No, no, but it's quite funny, in fact.
[29:24.870 --> 29:27.770]  For a long time, the Americans were talking about Y2K.
[29:27.850 --> 29:29.270]  Nobody was talking about that in Europe.
[29:29.550 --> 29:33.990]  And then suddenly it came up, and then there was some kind of panic.
[29:34.530 --> 29:38.110]  And there was a lot of interest, and it became kind of hype.
[29:38.430 --> 29:43.570]  And all kind of Y2K experts sprang out of nothingness.
[29:43.650 --> 29:45.030]  Right, because they can make so much money.
[29:45.030 --> 29:48.150]  They can make so much money scaring people and selling their products.
[29:48.150 --> 29:48.950]  Well, that happens all the time.
[29:49.210 --> 29:50.550]  I was one of them for some time.
[29:50.690 --> 29:51.450]  I didn't make any money.
[29:52.410 --> 30:01.730]  But anyway, then the government, at least in Holland, came into the act and did a two-pronged approach.
[30:01.970 --> 30:05.090]  It was something like Y2K, something you really should care for.
[30:05.770 --> 30:10.250]  Do something about it before it does something about us, was the slogan.
[30:10.730 --> 30:17.150]  And at the same time, was tranquilizing everybody that it would be taken care of in due time.
[30:17.750 --> 30:21.770]  The result was that it was quite some campaign.
[30:21.990 --> 30:23.190]  And then the whole thing died off.
[30:23.330 --> 30:26.290]  And nowadays, nobody talks about it.
[30:26.710 --> 30:27.590]  It's completely dead.
[30:27.590 --> 30:27.810]  Yeah, same thing here.
[30:27.950 --> 30:28.770]  It's dead as a dodo.
[30:28.910 --> 30:29.910]  He's just not talking about it anymore.
[30:30.230 --> 30:30.930]  It's amazing.
[30:31.110 --> 30:31.650]  It's a dead issue.
[30:31.750 --> 30:38.550]  Well, I've got a surprise for people that has to do with Y2K, things that you will start seeing very, very soon.
[30:38.690 --> 30:40.130]  And Isaac, this one is for you.
[30:40.230 --> 30:40.970]  This one's for me.
[30:41.370 --> 30:41.730]  Hey!
[30:42.830 --> 30:44.730]  It's a box of Tootsie Rolls that are Y2K.
[30:44.730 --> 30:46.450]  Hey, it's a Y2K-compliant Tootsie Roll.
[30:46.610 --> 30:47.830]  Y2K-compliant Tootsie Rolls.
[30:47.950 --> 30:47.990]  Cool.
[30:48.010 --> 30:50.470]  They started selling them in a supermarket near me.
[30:50.670 --> 30:51.750]  It comes in a big tube.
[30:51.950 --> 30:53.950]  This bank is filled with delicious Tootsie Rolls.
[30:54.070 --> 30:54.430]  Well, I think...
[30:54.430 --> 30:56.650]  Maybe reused for emergency Y2K funds.
[30:56.810 --> 30:57.010]  Yeah.
[30:57.250 --> 30:57.890]  Now, that's just...
[30:57.890 --> 30:59.390]  It's like a little piggy bank in addition.
[30:59.570 --> 31:00.730]  But here's the crazy thing.
[31:00.850 --> 31:02.630]  These things just suddenly appeared in a store.
[31:02.930 --> 31:04.190]  And I said, hey, this is cool.
[31:04.270 --> 31:05.270]  I'll bring it into the radio show.
[31:05.910 --> 31:07.450]  And I walk up to the cash register.
[31:08.190 --> 31:09.750]  And it made the computer crash.
[31:10.290 --> 31:10.610]  Really?
[31:10.930 --> 31:13.150]  It was so new, it wasn't registered anywhere.
[31:13.370 --> 31:13.890]  So it just...
[31:13.890 --> 31:15.630]  It showed up as something that didn't exist.
[31:15.850 --> 31:18.830]  And they had a hell of a time trying to figure out, you know, how to get the machine...
[31:18.830 --> 31:19.930]  You know, the cash register to reboot.
[31:20.530 --> 31:21.530]  So they wouldn't sell it to me.
[31:21.610 --> 31:22.530]  They said, we can't sell this to you.
[31:22.590 --> 31:24.710]  Even though they're all over the store, you know.
[31:24.850 --> 31:25.430]  That's really funny.
[31:25.590 --> 31:26.890]  It displays all over the place.
[31:27.030 --> 31:29.970]  So I had to come back the day after, after they fixed everything and buy it then.
[31:30.150 --> 31:31.350]  And you did all that for me?
[31:31.570 --> 31:32.670]  No, actually, I want it back.
[31:32.990 --> 31:33.510]  Oh, okay.
[31:33.930 --> 31:34.970]  We'll share it after the show.
[31:35.410 --> 31:37.270]  Yeah, it's pretty heavy there.
[31:37.530 --> 31:39.110]  Okay, so that's the deal with Y2K.
[31:39.170 --> 31:42.110]  We're going to take phone calls at 212-209-2900.
[31:42.230 --> 31:45.810]  But we have a bit of a breaking news item as well.
[31:45.890 --> 31:50.170]  It seems that the takedown film, which we've been talking about...
[31:50.170 --> 31:52.450]  Oh, that little Miramax thing with the garbage can lid?
[31:52.670 --> 31:53.030]  Miramax.
[31:53.110 --> 31:54.570]  Well, the garbage can lid scene isn't in there anymore.
[31:54.750 --> 31:57.450]  But there are other scenes in there that are just as bad, if not worse.
[31:58.550 --> 32:01.770]  Apparently, that film is steadily making its way towards the public.
[32:01.770 --> 32:09.430]  Two nights ago, one of our correspondents, who sent us mail, says they saw an advanced screening of takedown.
[32:09.530 --> 32:13.250]  It was presented at the 8th Annual Independent Filmmakers Conference in Chicago.
[32:14.330 --> 32:19.750]  Now, we'll give you a synopsis of the film and then this person's opinions about it.
[32:20.610 --> 32:24.370]  The movie is based on the book by Satomo Shimomura, with the same title.
[32:24.890 --> 32:30.830]  In the very beginning, we see Kevin and his friend Alex in a strip club meeting with a hacker named Icebreaker.
[32:31.170 --> 32:37.250]  He mentions a system called SAS, although Alex tells him that we don't hack anymore.
[32:38.130 --> 32:40.770]  They, Kevin and Alex, don't seem to trust Icebreaker.
[32:40.970 --> 32:43.070]  Icebreaker, of course, represents Agent Steel.
[32:44.150 --> 32:48.610]  He has a laptop computer and has to leave for a minute, leaving them with a laptop.
[32:49.530 --> 32:53.150]  Alex writes recorder on a piece of paper showing it to Kevin.
[32:53.630 --> 32:58.570]  They then start saying things like, he is a nice guy, and he's the real stuff, etc.
[32:59.590 --> 33:06.690]  We see Kevin and Alex in the same strip club again, which seems to be a hangout place for them, although they don't seem to be interested in the women there.
[33:07.950 --> 33:12.410]  SAS seems to be a phone monitoring system, which Kevin becomes obsessed with stealing.
[33:13.070 --> 33:21.230]  In a conversation, he tells Alex that his probation will be over in three days, although he fears that the FBI will come after him with something else.
[33:21.510 --> 33:25.350]  Alex replies that they'll come after him in three days minus three seconds.
[33:25.830 --> 33:28.650]  Alex advises Kevin not to go for it, meaning SAS.
[33:29.550 --> 33:32.950]  Kevin is portrayed as being obsessed with the SAS system.
[33:33.370 --> 33:37.570]  He puts on a scam that involves social engineering to get a copy of that system.
[33:38.070 --> 33:39.410]  Kevin lives with a girlfriend.
[33:39.410 --> 33:41.290]  We see him and Alex in the sitting room.
[33:41.290 --> 33:47.770]  She comes home, but Kevin doesn't even acknowledge her presence, not even when she comes over to kiss him.
[33:47.890 --> 33:48.750]  They're really trying to push...
[33:48.750 --> 33:49.330]  I'm sorry.
[33:49.490 --> 33:52.570]  They're really trying to push this whole, like, not interested in women thing, aren't they?
[33:52.570 --> 33:52.770]  Yeah.
[33:52.970 --> 33:54.370]  Well, you know, that's what hackers...
[33:54.370 --> 33:59.310]  Hackers are geeks that get, you know, caught up in computers and forget about life going on around them.
[33:59.630 --> 33:59.810]  Life?
[34:00.950 --> 34:11.490]  We will later see Icebreaker on the phone with an FBI agent who's pissed off that Icebreaker mentioned the system, as Kevin is probably monitoring the very conversation, which happens to be true.
[34:11.710 --> 34:12.850]  That's actually one of the funnier parts.
[34:14.070 --> 34:18.870]  We first see Shimomura in the San Diego Supercomputing Center on his rollerblades.
[34:19.730 --> 34:27.590]  We later see Shimomura in a congressional hearing where he demonstrates the use of a mobile phone being programmed by scanner.
[34:28.190 --> 34:30.310]  Uh, the hearing is broadcast on TV.
[34:31.010 --> 34:38.330]  Uh, we also see Kevin and Alex, uh, in what turns out to be Alex's house, where Alex is now the one living with that same girl that we saw before.
[34:38.970 --> 34:45.970]  Uh, Kevin still seems totally uninterested in her, and he does not acknowledge her presence when she walks into the room and says hello to him.
[34:46.150 --> 34:49.790]  We see Kevin and Alex watching Shimomura on the TV.
[34:50.490 --> 34:54.710]  Kevin makes fun of him by asking, is he even an American, or something to that extent.
[34:55.550 --> 34:59.850]  Uh, Kevin is with Alex in an outside, on an outside public phone.
[35:00.050 --> 35:05.830]  Kevin calls Shimomura, trying to put on a social engineering scam to get some information, portraying himself as a son employee.
[35:06.650 --> 35:11.050]  Uh, Shimomura runs a program, something like Finger, that confirms the name on the phone.
[35:11.170 --> 35:14.270]  When the name does not match, he calls Kevin a lamer.
[35:15.050 --> 35:20.410]  Kevin gets very angry, and we see him becoming ballistic on the phone, yelling, he called me a lamer.
[35:21.190 --> 35:23.830]  That's going to be one of the all-time Hollywood quotes.
[35:24.110 --> 35:24.530]  A lamer?
[35:24.710 --> 35:25.750]  He called me a lamer.
[35:26.050 --> 35:27.930]  Isn't that one of those small rodent things that, like...
[35:27.930 --> 35:28.690]  That's a lamer.
[35:28.850 --> 35:29.250]  Oh, sorry.
[35:29.350 --> 35:29.490]  Yeah.
[35:30.270 --> 35:32.990]  Uh, we later see Shimomura with a girlfriend named Julia.
[35:33.550 --> 35:36.930]  Uh, Kevin hacks into Shimomura's computer and gives him a call.
[35:37.070 --> 35:43.690]  He mentions Julia and another male name, and says that this male person is a friend, and that's disgusting.
[35:44.990 --> 35:51.670]  Kevin goes on to say, uh, does she call out his name when you XX her?
[35:51.670 --> 35:54.270]  Uh, Shimomura becomes very upset.
[35:54.510 --> 36:00.930]  Uh, he then logs into his home computer and finds out about the hack, drives over to his office, only to confirm that his data is lost.
[36:02.010 --> 36:05.170]  Uh, it's not clear in the movie who Shimomura works for.
[36:05.170 --> 36:14.150]  Uh, during his introduction to the congressional hearing, we hear the president of the committee saying that Shimomura works for Fortune 500 companies and the San Diego Supercomputing Center.
[36:14.890 --> 36:20.650]  Uh, Shimomura explains to Julia that one of the stolen programs is something that he has developed, which is more like a virus.
[36:21.070 --> 36:24.290]  And it is capable of bringing a whole country to its knees.
[36:25.390 --> 36:27.870]  Uh, the FBI is after Kevin, who is now on the run.
[36:28.030 --> 36:30.470]  He goes to stay over at Alex's house for a couple of weeks.
[36:30.710 --> 36:36.230]  When the FBI walks in on them, walks, uh, knocks on the door, rather, Kevin is gone, leaving them a note on the wall.
[36:36.830 --> 36:38.870]  That pisses off the leading investigator.
[36:39.450 --> 36:45.070]  Uh, we also see Kevin shutting off the FBI investigators' electricity, gas, and water utilities.
[36:46.270 --> 36:49.450]  Gosh darn it all, hackers do that kind of thing all the time, don't they?
[36:49.610 --> 36:51.350]  I guess it's kind of interesting, too, but okay.
[36:51.690 --> 36:51.810]  Yeah.
[36:53.230 --> 36:56.830]  Shimomura goes to a conference to give a presentation where he talks about the hack.
[36:57.350 --> 37:01.010]  Alex is attending the conference and tries to piss Shimomura off during his talk.
[37:01.010 --> 37:05.590]  When people ask what exactly was stolen, Shimomura replies, it's confidential.
[37:05.910 --> 37:07.830]  And Alex shouts, not anymore.
[37:08.990 --> 37:11.710]  Shimomura then asks Alex, do you know something we don't?
[37:11.790 --> 37:13.630]  And Alex replies, it's confidential.
[37:15.230 --> 37:21.030]  After Shimomura's talk, we see him conversing with the FBI agent, and he says, I am a hacker.
[37:21.330 --> 37:22.990]  Kevin is a cracker.
[37:24.130 --> 37:24.910]  Here we go.
[37:25.730 --> 37:30.870]  In Seattle, Kevin is at a coffee shop reading a newspaper about cyberterrorism.
[37:31.710 --> 37:34.910]  The waitress seems to be interested in Kevin and tries to start a conversation.
[37:35.070 --> 37:42.890]  Initially, Kevin does not seem interested, but he will, he then says, in the interest of free and open society, I think we should continue this conversation.
[37:43.630 --> 37:48.650]  We see Kevin being late for the date, and when they go for a walk, he talks about Big Brother.
[37:49.810 --> 37:52.130]  Nowhere in their conversation do we hear anything personal.
[37:53.150 --> 37:55.750]  Later on, we see them both sitting on a couch at her place.
[37:55.950 --> 38:05.130]  She will try to kiss him, and he initially responds, but then, he suddenly stops and asks her if she has a scanner in order to demonstrate something to her.
[38:05.670 --> 38:07.150]  I think we talked about this once.
[38:07.650 --> 38:09.030]  I vaguely recall.
[38:10.990 --> 38:15.030]  He gets a scanner and goes on demonstrating some phone conversation monitoring.
[38:16.870 --> 38:23.150]  She seems obviously pissed off, and she tells him that she has to get up early, and she would rather crash.
[38:23.850 --> 38:27.270]  Now, here's the part that they added that I find unbelievable.
[38:28.090 --> 38:29.710]  This is something we just learned about.
[38:29.710 --> 38:35.690]  So, Kevin gets up and says, you know, my mother is a waitress, and she's a bitch, too.
[38:36.330 --> 38:37.470]  And then he leaves the house.
[38:37.610 --> 38:43.930]  Now, how can you put that in a film about somebody that he says that about his mother, something he has never said?
[38:44.410 --> 38:46.810]  I mean, what kind of reaction do you think that's going to get?
[38:46.810 --> 38:48.690]  It's going to make Kevin look bad, first of all.
[38:48.870 --> 38:55.130]  It's going to really hurt the feelings of his family members, who I hope know that he wouldn't say something like that.
[38:55.130 --> 38:56.830]  But it's completely undocumented.
[38:56.830 --> 38:57.830]  They just threw that in.
[38:58.230 --> 38:58.950]  I don't know.
[38:59.050 --> 38:59.890]  I don't know why they did that.
[39:01.790 --> 39:02.290]  Okay.
[39:02.370 --> 39:06.550]  While walking to his apartment, Kevin sees police cars outside his building.
[39:06.550 --> 39:07.290]  It's raining.
[39:07.550 --> 39:12.890]  We see Shimomura standing outside, holding a wanted leaflet with Kevin's picture on it.
[39:13.150 --> 39:13.890]  Kevin walks by.
[39:14.070 --> 39:16.450]  Shimomura eventually recognizes him and runs after him.
[39:16.850 --> 39:18.270]  Now, this...
[39:18.270 --> 39:22.650]  Yeah, this is the part where the scene we had the initial problem with.
[39:22.690 --> 39:23.190]  So, what is it now?
[39:23.190 --> 39:23.670]  A bottle?
[39:23.670 --> 39:32.990]  No, initially, just to refresh people's memory, initially, Kevin bonks Shimomura on the head with a garbage can lid and knocks him out or something like that and gets away that way.
[39:33.190 --> 39:34.130]  They change the scene.
[39:34.190 --> 39:35.850]  I'll show you how they changed it here.
[39:36.710 --> 39:39.890]  After running for a few blocks, Shimomura finally catches up to him.
[39:39.990 --> 39:41.750]  Kevin suddenly stops and shouts, what?
[39:41.870 --> 39:42.790]  What do you want?
[39:43.810 --> 39:45.650]  Shimomura replies, you stole from me.
[39:46.870 --> 39:49.670]  Kevin then starts shouting, this guy stole my wallet.
[39:49.670 --> 39:55.370]  And a couple of guys come out from an establishment, hear Kevin shouting that this Japanese guy stole his wallet.
[39:55.830 --> 39:57.650]  And then they start beating up Shimomura.
[39:57.730 --> 39:58.510]  And that's how he gets hurt.
[39:59.230 --> 40:00.270]  Bunch of rednecks in the bar.
[40:00.370 --> 40:00.990]  Well, that's kind of clever.
[40:01.250 --> 40:02.350]  It's a little clever, yeah.
[40:02.450 --> 40:03.970]  But it's better than the garbage can lid.
[40:04.090 --> 40:04.730]  Well, it's...
[40:04.730 --> 40:05.570]  Except it never happened.
[40:05.770 --> 40:05.890]  Yeah, exactly.
[40:06.330 --> 40:07.370]  There's that little aspect to it.
[40:07.370 --> 40:09.610]  And they haven't exactly met before the trial.
[40:09.610 --> 40:12.150]  Yeah, they never met, except after he got arrested.
[40:12.850 --> 40:15.830]  Through his Netcom logins, by the way, they do keep the name Netcom.
[40:15.910 --> 40:19.110]  I think all other references to every other computer system has been deleted.
[40:19.410 --> 40:21.170]  Remember, the well got changed to the ball.
[40:21.590 --> 40:26.730]  Instead of Whole Earth Electronic Link, it became the Bay Area Electronic Link.
[40:26.870 --> 40:28.670]  It became the ball, but it's out altogether now.
[40:28.970 --> 40:33.030]  And this is from what Kevin tells me, because Kevin also happened to see the film in the last couple of days.
[40:33.030 --> 40:34.870]  They actually arranged for him to see it.
[40:35.210 --> 40:37.650]  And he's rather upset by some of the things that happened.
[40:37.770 --> 40:38.250]  I would imagine.
[40:39.030 --> 40:43.770]  Through his Netcom logins, they managed to locate him and arrest him in his North Carolina apartment.
[40:45.390 --> 40:48.590]  Six months after his arrest, Shimomura visits Kevin in prison.
[40:48.710 --> 40:49.790]  This is the other part they changed.
[40:50.150 --> 40:52.450]  Kevin asks, how come I'm in here and you're not?
[40:52.670 --> 40:58.630]  Kevin then gets pissed off and starts shouting, calling him an MF, among other things, and getting really hysterical.
[40:58.630 --> 41:01.450]  You've got to get the rating going from PG to PG-13.
[41:01.550 --> 41:01.910]  I guess.
[41:02.250 --> 41:03.130]  Something like that.
[41:03.290 --> 41:06.590]  So Kevin went ballistic inside prison, which is something that was not in the initial scripts.
[41:06.590 --> 41:08.730]  Now, here's the ending, which I think we've talked about, too.
[41:08.990 --> 41:11.970]  The last scene, we see Shimomura and Julia trying to get money from an ATM.
[41:12.250 --> 41:16.090]  The machine, Aesop Shimomura's card, displays a message, free Kevin.
[41:16.470 --> 41:20.910]  So basically, they take what we've been saying and use it for their message.
[41:21.130 --> 41:28.170]  To basically say that all hackers are hacking into ATMs and stealing things and doing horrible stuff and winding up in prison.
[41:29.170 --> 41:30.810]  Not what the free Kevin movement is all about.
[41:32.270 --> 41:35.290]  This person who sent us this email has a couple of observations.
[41:36.130 --> 41:40.470]  He says, there are so many issues I found disturbing in the movie that I don't know where to start, but I'll take a shot.
[41:41.090 --> 41:47.010]  The last scene, free Kevin, was probably the best scene in the whole movie, which I found to be very offensive towards Kevin.
[41:47.230 --> 41:52.150]  First of all, where exactly have they got evidence that Kevin ever cursed his own mother, calling her a bitch?
[41:52.570 --> 41:55.090]  I'd really like to know where exactly they got that from.
[41:55.910 --> 42:00.890]  What seems to me is that this was an attempt to portray him as a psychologically unstable person.
[42:01.330 --> 42:08.830]  The movie is very careful to portray Kevin as a totally antisocial and shy character who is not interested in any kind of relationship, not even with his own girlfriend.
[42:09.130 --> 42:12.830]  He even seems totally indifferent when his girlfriend leaves him to live with Alex.
[42:13.210 --> 42:17.570]  In the strip club where he and Alex seem to hang out, they always have their backs to the girls who are dancing in the background.
[42:18.350 --> 42:21.730]  Kevin is also portrayed as obsessed with obtaining the SAS system.
[42:22.350 --> 42:28.150]  He gets very angry when Shimomura calls Malamer over the phone to the degree that he is portrayed as behaving childish.
[42:28.930 --> 42:37.230]  Second, the movie was very careful not to mention John Markoff anywhere, as if he never took part in any of the events prior and following Kevin's arrest.
[42:37.710 --> 42:41.110]  On the other hand, Shimomura is portrayed more or less as a Superman.
[42:41.490 --> 42:48.830]  When we first see him rolling along the corridors in his office, the camera flies along with his moves, just like Superman or Spider-Man movies.
[42:49.770 --> 42:50.250]  Interesting.
[42:50.630 --> 42:51.690]  Or Hackers, the movie.
[42:52.330 --> 42:53.490]  Like the roller skating.
[42:53.690 --> 42:54.170]  Yeah, maybe like that.
[42:54.290 --> 42:56.950]  I'd have to see if the film technique is the same.
[42:57.090 --> 42:58.030]  They did tracking shots.
[42:58.230 --> 42:58.350]  Yeah.
[42:59.070 --> 43:06.050]  An interesting point during a meeting at Shimomura's workplace is when he's wondering who would do such a thing, stealing his data, that is.
[43:07.010 --> 43:11.010]  Julia says something to the effect of, well, somebody who was really pissed off at you.
[43:11.010 --> 43:15.350]  And a colleague of Shimomura then says, well, that would be pretty much everybody, Julia.
[43:19.110 --> 43:22.110]  After the show, there's a question and answer session.
[43:22.190 --> 43:23.330]  That's a good thing about these film festivals.
[43:23.450 --> 43:26.190]  You have a question and answer session with the people involved in making it.
[43:26.190 --> 43:27.630]  And director Joe Chappelle was there.
[43:28.050 --> 43:31.830]  And this reader asked the following question.
[43:31.950 --> 43:39.230]  Other than Shimomura's book, and Marco's book, obviously, where else did you get an account on Kevin's character?
[43:39.230 --> 43:45.790]  The answer was that they had Kevin's friends as consultants.
[43:46.590 --> 43:49.450]  I know one friend of Kevin's was a consultant.
[43:51.230 --> 43:53.430]  And that's... I think it was only one person.
[43:54.130 --> 43:59.330]  Chappelle also said that both Shimomura and Kevin got compensated for the movie, although Shimomura got much more.
[44:01.030 --> 44:07.490]  Chappelle said that they didn't want to portray a negative image of Kevin and did their best to be as objective as possible.
[44:08.470 --> 44:10.370]  This is why they had Kevin's friends around.
[44:10.690 --> 44:11.670]  Again, it's...
[44:11.670 --> 44:12.290]  Uh-huh.
[44:12.310 --> 44:13.810]  It's not really the way it was.
[44:14.450 --> 44:15.630]  Another question from the audience.
[44:16.070 --> 44:18.110]  How many hackers are there?
[44:18.650 --> 44:20.770]  And how serious is this whole hacking deal?
[44:21.050 --> 44:21.590]  Oh, God.
[44:22.750 --> 44:23.470]  Chappelle replied...
[44:23.470 --> 44:24.530]  I found this very interesting.
[44:24.710 --> 44:27.890]  90% of the hackers are cool, but some of them would do things...
[44:27.890 --> 44:30.650]  Would do things like go to a McDonald's, hijack the drive-in intercom system.
[44:31.030 --> 44:35.330]  And if an African-American family would come over to place an order, they'd say something like, We don't serve blacks.
[44:35.330 --> 44:38.210]  I personally found this to be the lamest explanation of what hacking is about.
[44:40.330 --> 44:40.770]  Interesting.
[44:41.630 --> 44:46.150]  Because I heard that exact same story from Kevin's friend, who was a consultant for the film.
[44:46.290 --> 44:48.350]  So that's where that little story came from.
[44:48.790 --> 44:49.810]  Well, the 90%...
[44:49.810 --> 44:50.410]  Well, never mind.
[44:50.630 --> 44:52.330]  I'm not even going to bother analyzing it.
[44:53.250 --> 44:54.830]  The film will be out at some point.
[44:54.830 --> 45:00.870]  No word as to when, how, where, in what form of the video or in the theaters.
[45:01.130 --> 45:02.830]  But we'll keep you updated as far as that goes.
[45:02.830 --> 45:04.910]  Just keep checking the, the website.
[45:06.730 --> 45:08.210]  And, uh, we'll let people know.
[45:09.690 --> 45:10.150]  Okay.
[45:10.590 --> 45:12.730]  Uh, 212-209-2900 is our phone number.
[45:13.310 --> 45:16.410]  We have some phone calls coming in, so I guess we should get right to it.
[45:17.470 --> 45:18.090]  Good evening.
[45:18.170 --> 45:18.650]  You're on the air.
[45:19.610 --> 45:20.210]  Yeah, hi.
[45:20.370 --> 45:20.790]  Question.
[45:21.070 --> 45:28.670]  Now, as far as I remember, Kevin had a definition of character lawsuit pending against this film.
[45:29.210 --> 45:30.410]  Whatever happened with that?
[45:30.550 --> 45:35.190]  I believe it was a libel suit, and I think that's what they were referring to when they said he got compensated.
[45:35.410 --> 45:40.610]  He, he, he must have, uh, settled for some minimal amount so that they could go ahead.
[45:40.850 --> 45:43.470]  I think had he not done that, they would have gone ahead anyway.
[45:44.090 --> 45:50.530]  Uh, but, um, he certainly did not get anything near the amount that, uh, some of the other people got for this.
[45:51.230 --> 45:55.810]  And I'm, I'm curious to know if, if Markoff actually got compensated.
[45:55.990 --> 45:56.530]  Oh, yes.
[45:57.310 --> 45:57.790]  Yeah, big time.
[45:57.910 --> 45:58.830]  No, he was never mentioned.
[45:59.270 --> 46:06.350]  Does anybody know if he was mentioned, you know, like in the opening credits based on a book by John Markoff and Jim Amora?
[46:06.490 --> 46:09.930]  Well, I would imagine that, uh, if they, if they credit the book, they have to list his name.
[46:10.030 --> 46:14.770]  There wasn't a mention of that in this account, but I, I'm, I would imagine that, uh, they, they will list both names.
[46:14.770 --> 46:23.410]  I do know when the option for the film was initially purchased back when the book came out, it was, it was a large amount of money, and I imagine more will come out of it now.
[46:23.530 --> 46:28.070]  I mean, we're talking, you know, an excess of a million dollars has been made on, on this story by these people.
[46:28.670 --> 46:30.090]  It's, it's really unbelievable.
[46:30.470 --> 46:39.490]  And Skeet Ulrich is still, I mean, the, the filming's already been done, they're already past post-production, so now it's just a question of whether or not it's got to be released.
[46:39.490 --> 46:47.710]  Yeah, Skeet Ulrich plays Kevin Mitnick, and, uh, and, uh, I forget who plays Jim Amora, but it doesn't matter.
[46:48.030 --> 46:48.210]  Okay.
[46:48.350 --> 46:50.790]  Point is, uh, it's, it, it'll be out before you know it.
[46:52.210 --> 46:52.510]  All right.
[46:52.830 --> 46:57.910]  He was, uh, he played the, the, the killer in Scream, among other things.
[46:58.590 --> 46:59.170]  All right.
[46:59.690 --> 47:00.730]  Good evening, you're on the air.
[47:02.330 --> 47:08.230]  Yeah, um, about the Y2K thing, I saw an interesting article.
[47:08.890 --> 47:09.570]  Uh-huh.
[47:10.390 --> 47:11.750]  Um, excuse me.
[47:13.970 --> 47:17.230]  It was, it was about the 9-1-1 problem.
[47:17.510 --> 47:17.770]  Okay.
[47:18.370 --> 47:27.690]  And, uh, towards the end of the article, it said that it was going off about the warheads possibly not being safe.
[47:28.470 --> 47:34.950]  And it, it was saying that military commanders from Russia and the U.S.
[47:35.010 --> 47:37.990]  were going to be celebrating the new year.
[47:38.330 --> 47:40.290]  They were at a military base in Colorado.
[47:40.650 --> 47:48.270]  Yeah, they're all going to hang around NORAD and, uh, basically have this, uh, what they're going to do is they want to share as much data as possible.
[47:48.590 --> 47:53.350]  So if there is some kind of a launch, you've got a Russian there to, like, strangle, or you have a U.S.
[47:53.410 --> 47:55.330]  guy there to, like, strangle and say, what are you doing?
[47:55.330 --> 48:00.290]  And, uh, so, you know, we don't launch, you know, full strikes at each other and make things very bad.
[48:00.290 --> 48:03.170]  These guys are going to stay sober, I hope, while they're doing this.
[48:03.370 --> 48:04.770]  I mean, you know, New Year's Day, you know.
[48:04.950 --> 48:10.490]  But basically they have this, like, two-story building set up and they've got pipelines from NORAD going to it and all this other stuff.
[48:11.130 --> 48:19.170]  Uh, so, so far as 9-1-1, um, basically, uh, the only things that are supposed to go down are the advanced features.
[48:19.170 --> 48:21.410]  I mean, you're not going to see 9-1-1 just fail.
[48:22.170 --> 48:23.010]  There are so many contingencies.
[48:23.010 --> 48:23.730]  Well, we see that now.
[48:23.890 --> 48:25.010]  We see 9-1-1 fail over a couple of weeks.
[48:25.010 --> 48:28.310]  Yeah, but there are so many contingencies involved in that system that, I mean, so what?
[48:28.310 --> 48:30.010]  You don't get past caller ID info.
[48:30.010 --> 48:30.390]  I'm sorry.
[48:30.390 --> 48:30.930]  No, no, no, no, no.
[48:31.050 --> 48:33.810]  We're talking about people dialing 9-1-1 and not getting any response.
[48:34.310 --> 48:35.230]  Silence for two minutes.
[48:35.330 --> 48:36.170]  That's happened already.
[48:36.270 --> 48:36.490]  It's happened.
[48:49.290 --> 48:51.070]  If people panic, everything will fail.
[48:51.230 --> 48:58.050]  If everybody picks up their phone at once, you know something like only 20% of, of, uh, of the people will ever get a dial tone if everybody picked up the phone.
[48:58.170 --> 48:59.030]  Well, maybe it's even less than that.
[48:59.110 --> 48:59.430]  I don't know.
[48:59.750 --> 49:03.570]  The central offices are not, uh, able to handle that kind of traffic.
[49:03.730 --> 49:04.670]  They're not designed to.
[49:04.970 --> 49:11.690]  So, if people panic, if people start, you know, taking all their money out of the stock market, then things are going to, uh, you know, totally fall apart.
[49:11.710 --> 49:21.270]  So, if you were in control of trying to maintain a, uh, you know, continuity of, uh, the status quo, uh, you would want people not to panic, correct?
[49:22.110 --> 49:23.030]  Well, generally, yeah.
[49:23.030 --> 49:27.010]  Or you, you would try to reduce the amount of panic as much as possible before the event?
[49:27.590 --> 49:32.770]  I think you answered your own question as to why you're not seeing a lot of these news stories about Y2K recently.
[49:32.990 --> 49:33.750]  Okay, but how?
[49:33.890 --> 49:34.550]  How do they do it?
[49:34.590 --> 49:36.490]  How do they keep people from talking about things?
[49:36.490 --> 49:40.690]  How can you turn on ABC, NBC, and CBS and get the same viewpoint on the same story?
[49:41.990 --> 49:42.670]  Tell us.
[49:43.250 --> 49:43.990]  Conspiracy here?
[49:46.030 --> 49:46.750]  There's the answer.
[49:48.550 --> 49:50.190]  I don't believe so, in fact.
[49:50.410 --> 49:59.990]  I think in, uh, uh, what they did is that people have calmed down quite a lot and it's, it's, it's not living as much as it, it's not living as much as it did.
[50:00.690 --> 50:13.090]  And the big, the big thing, the big issue at the moment, it's, uh, it's happening, or say on the level of the telephone system, on the level of some transportation things, it's happening on, especially on the financial side of things.
[50:13.090 --> 50:18.890]  They take measures, like, uh, for instance, there's a story that the Swiss National Bank, I'm talking from Europe, huh?
[50:19.190 --> 50:24.970]  The Swiss National Bank has now, in its vote, three times as many banknotes as are in circulation.
[50:25.470 --> 50:28.630]  So, if people rush to the banks and want cash, they will get it.
[50:28.870 --> 50:28.890]  Yeah.
[50:29.990 --> 50:33.010]  Uh, publicizing this, uh, it's largely publicized.
[50:33.170 --> 50:34.210]  The paper is there.
[50:34.210 --> 50:34.890]  It's not a lie.
[50:35.050 --> 50:37.970]  I mean, it costs not that much to print, uh, banknotes.
[50:38.110 --> 50:39.170]  So, everything is there.
[50:39.350 --> 50:45.630]  And people, people down, uh, uh, how you say it, they, they play their panic, they, they play their panic down.
[50:45.810 --> 50:58.230]  What you were saying about these emergency numbers, there was a funny precedent at some stage when in, in a couple of provinces in the Netherlands, it was made known that the emergency service phone was not responding.
[50:58.870 --> 51:02.670]  But, uh, in fact, then a lot of people tried just for...
[51:02.670 --> 51:03.950]  Oh, just to see if it was worth it.
[51:04.170 --> 51:05.690]  And then it really came down.
[51:07.430 --> 51:07.750]  Interesting.
[51:07.870 --> 51:14.850]  But, you know, a lot of people told me last year, and I think, I think, sir, if you were one of them, that you're going to pull all your money out of the stock market and come June.
[51:14.990 --> 51:16.030]  And you haven't done it, have you?
[51:16.210 --> 51:17.390]  You know, I was thinking about it.
[51:17.510 --> 51:18.150]  Now, why didn't you?
[51:18.490 --> 51:20.570]  Are you planning on doing it before December 31st?
[51:20.610 --> 51:20.830]  Well, you know what?
[51:20.990 --> 51:24.610]  I wasn't planning on doing it because I was afraid of what might happen with those companies.
[51:24.610 --> 51:29.710]  I was planning on doing it because I was afraid of, um, other people pulling their money out of the stock market.
[51:29.870 --> 51:32.590]  And because things have cooled down, I'm not, I'm just not worried about it now.
[51:33.250 --> 51:34.890]  So, see, nobody's telling him to do this.
[51:35.010 --> 51:36.330]  It's, it's, it's, it's a choice.
[51:36.470 --> 51:37.770]  And people aren't pulling their money out.
[51:37.970 --> 51:38.670]  What's going on?
[51:38.710 --> 51:39.290]  Where's the panic?
[51:39.490 --> 51:41.010]  It's people generally cooling down about it.
[51:41.110 --> 51:45.230]  And, and I, I agree that there's not a conspiracy to keep things quiet.
[51:45.330 --> 51:55.150]  But I do know that the Securities and Exchange Commission did ask the various national news agencies to stop talking about Y2K in relation to, um, finance and things like that.
[51:55.310 --> 52:01.410]  Because, um, in America, as opposed to certain other countries where their, uh, their paper money actually relates to some kind of value.
[52:01.590 --> 52:01.770]  Yeah.
[52:01.930 --> 52:10.170]  If everybody in this country pulled their money out of the bank, it would cause all kinds of havoc because, um, Fort Knox and the, the piles of gold that are there are no longer really related to the paper.
[52:10.870 --> 52:12.110]  I was, I was wondering about that.
[52:12.110 --> 52:13.130]  I don't get into a whole Fort Knox.
[52:13.570 --> 52:16.410]  I don't get into a whole big economic thing, but I was, I was wondering about this.
[52:16.410 --> 52:18.550]  You know, we have so much money these days.
[52:18.750 --> 52:22.570]  Do we have the same amount of money circulating in the street as we did say 20 years ago?
[52:22.710 --> 52:23.610]  Do they just print more money?
[52:23.730 --> 52:26.550]  You know, if they added it all up, how much money is out there?
[52:26.650 --> 52:27.650]  You see, I'm not an economist.
[52:27.890 --> 52:28.630]  Are you an economist?
[52:29.150 --> 52:29.650]  Not really.
[52:29.770 --> 52:30.130]  Okay.
[52:30.550 --> 52:31.070]  The U.S.
[52:31.130 --> 52:32.530]  went off the gold standard under Nixon.
[52:32.810 --> 52:39.230]  So there is no relationship whatsoever between the paper money and, and the gold that's allegedly there.
[52:39.970 --> 52:40.730]  Um, but the U.S.
[52:40.770 --> 52:41.450]  Treasury, the U.S.
[52:41.530 --> 52:48.910]  Treasury has increased the monetary supply, at least not released, but they've printed it, um, by about 30%.
[52:49.370 --> 52:52.370]  And the normal fluctuation is closer to 2 or 3%.
[52:52.370 --> 52:55.130]  And the Swiss National Bank by 300%.
[52:55.130 --> 52:57.050]  Not released, of course, but it's there.
[52:57.090 --> 52:58.870]  It's there as a contingency.
[52:59.250 --> 52:59.710]  All right.
[52:59.790 --> 53:00.270]  Back to the phones.
[53:00.410 --> 53:01.590]  212-209-2900.
[53:01.710 --> 53:01.990]  Good evening.
[53:02.130 --> 53:02.810]  You're on the air.
[53:03.550 --> 53:04.190]  Good evening.
[53:04.850 --> 53:05.430]  How are you doing?
[53:05.730 --> 53:07.470]  Uh, I have three things.
[53:07.650 --> 53:15.650]  So, number one, I work for EMS, and I, and, and I can tell you that 9-1-1 systems are, in New York City, are already up to snuff.
[53:15.650 --> 53:16.090]  Excellent.
[53:16.410 --> 53:27.530]  Even though they, even though they, uh, uh, they did go down once, uh, recently, but I, I believe that as they, uh, uh, they're making long-term changes in the system, that's probably what happens.
[53:27.930 --> 53:28.330]  Okay.
[53:28.770 --> 53:29.750]  That's the first thing.
[53:29.870 --> 53:39.290]  Number two, uh, I read the, I read the, the, the book Takedown on, uh, on Kevin McNich, and I came away, and I, uh, I'll, I want to preface something.
[53:39.290 --> 53:40.990]  I'm not a computer user.
[53:41.310 --> 53:47.070]  I, uh, other than at work, I have a, uh, a computer system that we use for dispatching ambulances.
[53:47.570 --> 53:50.310]  But, other, other than that, I don't have one in my home.
[53:50.630 --> 54:07.890]  It seemed to me that, uh, they went after, uh, Kevin McNich with something, uh, akin to, uh, him being public enemy, and they're treating him like public enemy number one, when in actuality, it, it, it, that, that whole book read to me like Shin Amor did,
[54:08.270 --> 54:15.210]  did, did, did, took his own data, and stuck his own conclusions into that, into that, uh, that, that business.
[54:15.530 --> 54:15.690]  Why?
[54:15.810 --> 54:16.230]  I don't know.
[54:16.350 --> 54:17.670]  Maybe it was self-aggrandizement.
[54:17.850 --> 54:18.290]  I don't know.
[54:18.410 --> 54:22.230]  The interesting thing is that perception comes out even when you read Shin Amor's own words.
[54:22.470 --> 54:25.990]  Well, when you read Shin Amor's own words, it's very difficult to maintain consciousness.
[54:26.850 --> 54:31.130]  I, I never got past the first, I never got first, past the first chapter.
[54:31.270 --> 54:33.530]  So I'm on my way going to ski.
[54:33.530 --> 54:43.370]  Yeah, anyway, I went to total, and we did the, anyway, so I'm on my way to ski, and I was out Los Alamos, which has nothing to do with me skiing, but, oh, God.
[54:43.610 --> 54:44.610]  Point number three, yes.
[54:44.850 --> 54:49.810]  Point number three, I'll be working, uh, uh, oh, actually, one more point after that.
[54:49.990 --> 54:51.730]  I'll be working New Year's Eve in Times Square.
[54:51.730 --> 54:53.990]  I don't think that there's going to be any big terrorist threat.
[54:54.150 --> 54:56.790]  I think that, uh, uh, that's been overblown.
[54:56.870 --> 55:02.070]  I think if there's going to be a terrorist threat, it'll, I think, as you said, it's going to be somewhere other than, than Times Square.
[55:02.070 --> 55:03.610]  Like maybe the middle of the desert.
[55:04.230 --> 55:09.150]  It would just be somewhere where people aren't as prepared as New York City is.
[55:09.490 --> 55:10.990]  Because New York City is prepared.
[55:11.010 --> 55:12.430]  Yeah, that's the issue.
[55:12.510 --> 55:14.810]  I'll see you in Times Square.
[55:15.250 --> 55:16.210]  Yeah, wave to me.
[55:16.330 --> 55:18.150]  I'll be the guy in the big red and white box.
[55:18.550 --> 55:23.110]  And is there a 2600 group in Rockland County in New York?
[55:23.630 --> 55:25.510]  Is there a 2600 group in Rockland County?
[55:25.530 --> 55:27.910]  Well, we don't have an official meeting there as far as I know.
[55:27.910 --> 55:34.090]  But the way we have it set up, if you're near a mall and you can't get to a meeting, just have your own meeting in the food court.
[55:34.510 --> 55:36.790]  But the official meeting takes place here in New York.
[55:36.890 --> 55:38.750]  I think there's the nearest one.
[55:39.250 --> 55:40.250]  Is there one in Connecticut still?
[55:40.270 --> 55:42.350]  I don't think there's anything in Rockland County or anything near there.
[55:43.870 --> 55:51.790]  I mean, not that I'm a hacker, but as I said before, but I definitely enjoy you guys.
[55:51.950 --> 55:58.790]  I definitely think that freedom is something that is too precious to let other people monkey around with.
[55:59.030 --> 56:02.730]  And, you know, I'd like to see 4600 go on.
[56:02.950 --> 56:03.210]  Okay.
[56:03.390 --> 56:04.370]  Well, thanks for your support.
[56:04.570 --> 56:04.790]  All right.
[56:04.850 --> 56:05.230]  Have a good night.
[56:05.450 --> 56:05.750]  Take care.
[56:06.190 --> 56:06.650]  Nice fellow.
[56:06.930 --> 56:07.130]  Yeah.
[56:07.250 --> 56:11.830]  I feel comfortable having people like that, you know, protecting us on New Year's Eve.
[56:11.850 --> 56:15.870]  I mean, I can have a heart attack now on New Year's Eve and feel confident that I can dial 911 and get through.
[56:15.990 --> 56:20.310]  Well, so long as you're not, like, in a line with 20 other heart attack victims.
[56:20.450 --> 56:21.670]  Well, we'll just have to see about that.
[56:21.710 --> 56:25.270]  As far as other New York meetings, we have meetings in Rochester and Buffalo.
[56:25.270 --> 56:25.930]  I knew about Buffalo.
[56:26.210 --> 56:27.270]  I wasn't sure about Rochester.
[56:27.410 --> 56:28.370]  I haven't heard anything from them recently.
[56:28.870 --> 56:30.230]  So, if you're anywhere near there...
[56:30.230 --> 56:31.990]  I know that's not Rockland County, but it's something.
[56:32.530 --> 56:33.370]  Let's take another phone call.
[56:33.450 --> 56:33.690]  Good evening.
[56:33.770 --> 56:34.290]  You're on the air.
[56:35.110 --> 56:35.330]  Yes.
[56:35.490 --> 56:36.070]  Hi, Manuel.
[56:36.290 --> 56:36.510]  Hey.
[56:36.650 --> 56:37.090]  How are you doing?
[56:37.270 --> 56:40.650]  I want to give out my new email address, which is my permanent email address.
[56:41.110 --> 56:44.810]  So, by saying this is your permanent email address, you will never do this again?
[56:45.090 --> 56:48.870]  I will never change the email because it's my permanent email address.
[56:49.070 --> 56:50.470]  I will hold you to this.
[56:50.550 --> 56:51.490]  I just want you to know that.
[56:51.650 --> 56:53.050]  You can never change your email address.
[56:53.170 --> 56:53.970]  This is your permanent address.
[56:53.970 --> 56:56.530]  This is as permanent as my 700 and 500 numbers were.
[56:57.190 --> 56:57.710]  Go ahead.
[56:57.850 --> 56:58.170]  What is it?
[56:58.250 --> 56:58.550]  Let's hear it.
[56:58.910 --> 57:03.030]  As far as I know, it's rebel at metconnect.com.
[57:03.210 --> 57:06.910]  That's metconnect as in metropolitanconnect.com.
[57:06.990 --> 57:12.290]  That's all one word, M-E-T-C-O-N-N-E-C-T.com.
[57:12.470 --> 57:12.950]  All right.
[57:13.050 --> 57:13.370]  All right.
[57:13.450 --> 57:15.290]  Well, I'm glad we got that information out.
[57:15.390 --> 57:17.030]  I was worried that it wouldn't come in in time.
[57:17.030 --> 57:21.030]  I can just hear the people typing right now, putting them on every single spam list from here and to here.
[57:21.150 --> 57:21.650]  All right.
[57:21.870 --> 57:22.150]  Good evening.
[57:22.230 --> 57:22.670]  You're on the air.
[57:25.010 --> 57:25.650]  All right.
[57:26.350 --> 57:32.450]  I'm calling about my story with the incident on the recent Cabbage Night with the police in my town.
[57:32.710 --> 57:34.230]  Cabbage Night with police in your town.
[57:34.390 --> 57:34.550]  Okay.
[57:34.710 --> 57:35.890]  Yeah, Mischief Night, as it is.
[57:36.010 --> 57:39.510]  Sounds like a story that's been duplicated many times over in this country, but make it fast.
[57:39.790 --> 57:39.970]  Okay.
[57:40.090 --> 57:45.990]  Well, last year, they basically, if they saw you just walking down the street, even if you had camouflage on, they just kind of drove by.
[57:46.230 --> 57:47.770]  Even if you had camouflage on?
[57:47.810 --> 57:49.890]  Even if you were like, if they saw you...
[57:49.890 --> 57:52.270]  I would think they would get their attention if you had camouflage on.
[57:52.270 --> 57:53.170]  No, they just took it lightly.
[57:53.310 --> 57:54.650]  They took it lightly last year.
[57:54.710 --> 57:55.330]  They didn't really mind.
[57:55.450 --> 57:59.630]  But this year, a cop drove by on the next road that we saw.
[57:59.730 --> 58:00.610]  We saw him drive by.
[58:00.870 --> 58:05.230]  And then about three seconds later, he came back at about 90 miles an hour and almost hit one of us.
[58:05.230 --> 58:05.730]  Uh-huh.
[58:05.730 --> 58:07.210]  We all had to dive out of the way of the car.
[58:07.670 --> 58:13.070]  And he immediately jumped out of his car, grabbed off our bags, and just immediately went through our backpack searching for things.
[58:13.370 --> 58:16.010]  Oh, you're the one... you're the person with the recording of someone...
[58:16.110 --> 58:17.250]  Do you have that recording with you now?
[58:17.330 --> 58:22.450]  Yeah, I have it on my computer right now, but I don't know if it'll come out clearly over the air, but can I try?
[58:22.690 --> 58:24.750]  Give it a try, but we only have two minutes left.
[58:24.870 --> 58:25.150]  All right, here we go.
[58:25.150 --> 58:25.890]  Actually, we have less than that.
[58:26.470 --> 58:29.110]  This is a cop allegedly confiscating a $2,600.
[58:29.450 --> 58:30.750]  Yeah, he found a $2,600 in my backpack.
[58:30.930 --> 58:31.170]  Here we go.
[58:31.270 --> 58:31.910]  Let's hear this.
[58:45.590 --> 58:48.910]  Let's hear this.
[59:01.230 --> 59:02.210]  Oh, that was great.
[59:02.710 --> 59:04.290]  That came out very well.
[59:04.370 --> 59:06.690]  They sounded really amused by that.
[59:06.990 --> 59:13.650]  Yeah, actually, they made us write down our name, address, phone number, and date of birth.
[59:13.750 --> 59:15.150]  Actually, that's what he told us.
[59:15.230 --> 59:19.630]  And then when everyone started writing it down, no one put their date of birth...
[59:19.630 --> 59:21.790]  Or no, no one put their telephone number.
[59:21.930 --> 59:23.790]  And he just seemed to ignore this fact.
[59:23.790 --> 59:25.630]  And that just shows how...
[59:25.630 --> 59:29.010]  It's intimidation tactics, which a lot of cops use against kids.
[59:29.430 --> 59:30.530]  Most of the time, it works.
[59:30.690 --> 59:35.890]  But, you know, you've got to keep an eye out for when it's abused and when your rights are really being violated.
[59:36.010 --> 59:38.930]  We can talk more about this in weeks ahead, but we really don't have any time right now.
[59:39.030 --> 59:40.030]  But glad you survived.
[59:40.150 --> 59:41.030]  Glad the magazine survived.
[59:41.030 --> 59:41.590]  Hopefully it did.
[59:42.490 --> 59:44.270]  And we're going to survive until next week.
[59:44.630 --> 59:47.310]  We'll be back again talking about all kinds of other issues.
[59:48.230 --> 59:51.170]  Until then, it's Emanuel for Isaac and everybody else.
[59:51.570 --> 59:52.470]  Have yourselves a good night.
[59:52.470 --> 59:53.430]  Bye.