[00:00.920 --> 00:05.380]  This is the Expert Witness Radio Show with Michael Levine.
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[00:31.760 --> 00:36.840]  Community residents once again took to the streets today to protest the latest police killing.
[00:37.080 --> 00:40.760]  This time, the shooting death of African immigrant Amadugialo.
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[01:17.500 --> 01:22.380]  ...to warrant an indictment, the officer walked away a free man.
[01:24.020 --> 01:27.280]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI in New York.
[01:27.460 --> 01:28.540]  The time is 8 o'clock.
[01:28.640 --> 01:30.100]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[01:36.960 --> 01:45.700]  The telephone keeps ringing So I ripped it off the wall I cut myself while shaving Now
[01:52.510 --> 01:59.290]  we're from Diddly Bump But the best expect from worst I hope that's understood From Diddly Bump
[03:50.310 --> 03:52.530]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[03:52.530 --> 03:54.650]  The part of the program is Off the Hook.
[03:54.910 --> 03:58.430]  We come your way every Tuesday night at this time.
[03:59.110 --> 04:02.110]  Manuel Wellstein here with you, along with Isaac over the other side of the room.
[04:02.210 --> 04:02.710]  How you doing, sir?
[04:03.390 --> 04:04.970]  And Bernie, yes, down there in Philadelphia.
[04:05.130 --> 04:05.690]  Bernie, how you doing?
[04:06.130 --> 04:06.710]  I'm here.
[04:06.850 --> 04:10.370]  I'm kind of sick, so pardon me if I cough in your radio.
[04:11.470 --> 04:13.050]  Yeah, I heard about this.
[04:13.510 --> 04:15.330]  You're really miserable down there, huh?
[04:15.770 --> 04:16.770]  Well, I'm not miserable.
[04:16.770 --> 04:18.210]  I just have a bad cough.
[04:18.210 --> 04:18.770]  Yeah.
[04:20.330 --> 04:23.430]  Well, we'll try not to make the show too stressful tonight.
[04:24.610 --> 04:29.090]  But we're going to deal with matters of injustice and frustration, as we always do.
[04:30.650 --> 04:32.390]  And, of course, our listeners are welcome to call in.
[04:32.550 --> 04:35.190]  We were supposed to have Kevin Mitnick on the air this evening.
[04:35.210 --> 04:38.990]  That's not going to happen because Kevin had a scheduling conflict with a conference out there.
[04:40.670 --> 04:42.990]  And he's going to have to do this next week.
[04:42.990 --> 04:49.050]  He promises he'll definitely move hell and high water or whatever to be here next week.
[04:49.190 --> 04:54.910]  Not be here in the studio, but be on the phone and have an interactive type of a show where we talk back and forth.
[04:55.090 --> 04:56.510]  So that will be next week.
[04:56.510 --> 05:00.510]  So all you people who planned around it, you can resume a normal life for one more week.
[05:01.530 --> 05:08.790]  But we have lots of other things that have been going on over this past period of time, including a brand-new website.
[05:09.050 --> 05:11.250]  Isaac, I think you're very excited by this.
[05:11.250 --> 05:11.850]  Oh, yeah.
[05:12.130 --> 05:14.510]  The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property section.
[05:14.950 --> 05:15.350]  Cybercrime.
[05:15.790 --> 05:16.190]  Cybercrime.
[05:16.190 --> 05:17.030]  Cybercrime.gov.
[05:17.670 --> 05:22.250]  I can't believe cybercrime is a word that falls under .gov now, but it does.
[05:22.370 --> 05:23.230]  That's the times we live in.
[05:23.650 --> 05:28.030]  The word cybercrime was just introduced into the Oxford English Dictionary, by the way, too.
[05:28.250 --> 05:28.450]  Really?
[05:28.470 --> 05:30.070]  How do you introduce a word into a dictionary?
[05:30.190 --> 05:31.510]  Because I've got a few I'd like to introduce.
[05:31.810 --> 05:34.050]  Well, the OED is now online.
[05:34.590 --> 05:35.670]  It's a fee-based service.
[05:35.710 --> 05:37.270]  I think it's like $5 a month or something.
[05:37.270 --> 05:43.970]  But it beats buying, like, 20 volumes of, you know, this huge compendium of the human language.
[05:44.710 --> 05:45.550]  It's a giant.
[05:45.690 --> 05:46.790]  It looks like a huge encyclopedia.
[05:47.030 --> 05:51.990]  Anyway, they just added cybercrime to that, and they update the OED quarterly now online.
[05:52.350 --> 05:52.790]  Wow.
[05:52.930 --> 05:53.530]  $5 a month?
[05:53.690 --> 05:55.130]  But how do you introduce a word?
[05:55.210 --> 05:55.830]  That's what I want to know.
[05:56.750 --> 05:58.670]  Well, I guess they have these...
[05:58.670 --> 06:01.090]  They've got about 100 people on their staff.
[06:01.090 --> 06:05.330]  And what they do is they go out, and they're, like, etymologists.
[06:05.610 --> 06:07.130]  They listen on the streets, huh?
[06:07.470 --> 06:08.450]  Well, they're etymologists.
[06:08.630 --> 06:18.050]  They study the English language, and I have some official way of determining whether a word is actually in common usage.
[06:18.210 --> 06:24.610]  I guess they do surveys and do searches to see if it appears in print, media, that sort of thing.
[06:24.970 --> 06:25.170]  Hmm.
[06:26.210 --> 06:26.630]  Interesting.
[06:27.430 --> 06:28.270]  Interesting, indeed.
[06:28.270 --> 06:33.230]  Well, in any event, cybercrime is, I guess, a word, but it's also a website.
[06:33.870 --> 06:34.210]  U.S.
[06:34.530 --> 06:45.850]  Department of Justice has launched a one-stop shopping site for information on computer crimes that officials hope will make it easier for victims to report cyberattacks and help law enforcement catch, investigate, and prosecute the criminals.
[06:46.050 --> 06:48.030]  That site is going to be so owned.
[06:48.110 --> 06:48.470]  You know that.
[06:49.110 --> 06:49.550]  Somebody...
[06:49.550 --> 06:49.990]  Very quickly.
[06:49.990 --> 06:53.510]  Somebody is going to hack that site, and they're going to be merciless.
[06:53.670 --> 06:57.250]  And I'm just going to laugh, because it's just funny.
[06:57.350 --> 06:57.990]  You've got to read the site.
[06:57.990 --> 06:59.890]  You've got to, like, wander around just to see what people say.
[07:00.090 --> 07:01.690]  Well, they've got a good idea at the top.
[07:01.790 --> 07:04.410]  The text-only version is the first link on the top of the page.
[07:04.470 --> 07:12.430]  It shows that somebody who is at least conscious of text-only browsers is kind of working with them on the matter, which I think is a positive aspect.
[07:12.650 --> 07:24.910]  The FBI estimated recently that electronic crimes cost $10 billion a year, but it's believed only 17% of the corporate victims report the crimes because of worries about copycats and possible effect on shareholder and consumer confidence.
[07:25.030 --> 07:27.470]  So basically, they have no idea what they're talking about.
[07:27.470 --> 07:30.450]  Well, that's a nice way of saying that.
[07:31.590 --> 07:32.570]  But, you know...
[07:32.570 --> 07:38.770]  In the words of Ted Koppel, don't, I guess, read the news.
[07:40.530 --> 07:41.430]  He said that, huh?
[07:41.670 --> 07:42.550]  Yeah, a couple years ago.
[07:42.550 --> 07:47.170]  There was something the ABC News reported that was false.
[07:47.490 --> 07:48.550]  You sure that was Ted Koppel?
[07:48.610 --> 07:49.690]  Because he doesn't read the news.
[07:50.150 --> 07:51.990]  He's supposed to do, like, an interview type of show.
[07:51.990 --> 07:53.430]  Oh, no, on the...
[07:53.430 --> 07:53.950]  He was an anchor.
[07:54.470 --> 07:58.630]  He was an anchor a couple years ago on, at least some nights on the ABC Evening News.
[07:59.290 --> 08:02.610]  And he said, hey, basically, don't blame us.
[08:02.670 --> 08:03.390]  I just read the news.
[08:03.610 --> 08:03.750]  Uh-huh.
[08:04.050 --> 08:04.630]  Don't blame me.
[08:04.710 --> 08:05.370]  I just read the news.
[08:05.710 --> 08:07.550]  I forget what the story was.
[08:07.970 --> 08:10.730]  Yeah, well, we don't just read the news here at BAI.
[08:10.730 --> 08:11.730]  We investigate the news.
[08:11.850 --> 08:15.750]  I wish they'd do that more in, you know, in the real world.
[08:16.130 --> 08:21.050]  Not that we're not the real world, but it's just, you know, you see things on the net.
[08:21.610 --> 08:26.250]  You see things on commercial TV, and it's all the same, and they don't investigate it.
[08:26.430 --> 08:30.170]  And I think, Isaac, you've got a really good example of how they did that on this website.
[08:30.330 --> 08:31.270]  This is fairly amusing.
[08:31.870 --> 08:33.210]  Bobcat actually sent this my way.
[08:33.210 --> 08:42.750]  Anyway, if you go to cybercrime.gov, at the very bottom, they have a link on the page for their privacy and security notice.
[08:43.430 --> 08:50.970]  Well, you know, they have a nice little page, and it's got this GIF 89A with a blinking eagle on the top, which is the Department of Justice logo.
[08:51.510 --> 08:59.030]  And the second paragraph here, the fact that I'd read it, Our website does not require you to disclose any personal identifying information.
[08:59.030 --> 09:09.330]  If, however, you choose to contact us via email, please keep in mind that your email address, any other information your email headers show about you, such as your name, organization, will be revealed in the email.
[09:09.550 --> 09:16.290]  We pledge, however, that when you communicate with email, we will use your email information only for the specific purpose of responding to you.
[09:17.790 --> 09:24.750]  Your email address will not be sold, nor will it be shared with others outside the bank, unless we are compelled to do so by law.
[09:24.750 --> 09:28.950]  Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, stop, back up, PPP.
[09:31.230 --> 09:32.110]  What bank?
[09:32.370 --> 09:36.050]  Your email address will not be sold, nor will it be shared with others outside the bank.
[09:36.830 --> 09:39.070]  You're reading something from cybercrime.gov.
[09:39.090 --> 09:39.690]  Who's the bank?
[09:40.010 --> 09:44.030]  Well, you know, the Department of Justice is obviously very confused about what kind of business they're in.
[09:44.550 --> 09:49.210]  So, with a little bit of investigation... Bernie, you're laughing.
[09:49.290 --> 09:49.970]  You think this is funny.
[09:50.510 --> 09:51.070]  It's hilarious.
[09:51.350 --> 09:53.410]  Well, here's the actual source.
[09:53.410 --> 09:55.350]  There's a bank somewhere up there I don't get.
[09:55.510 --> 09:58.570]  Well, here's the source for that particular section of the privacy statement.
[09:58.570 --> 10:06.390]  If you go to www.firstmid.com, that's the First Mid Illinois Bank and Trust.
[10:06.730 --> 10:13.730]  And the second paragraph of their privacy policy is... Our website does not require you to disclose any personally identifying information.
[10:13.910 --> 10:15.190]  If, however, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.
[10:15.390 --> 10:15.970]  Word for word?
[10:16.090 --> 10:21.070]  Your email address will not be sold, nor will it be shared with others outside the bank, unless we are compelled to do so by law.
[10:21.310 --> 10:22.710]  It's the same thing.
[10:22.710 --> 10:22.970]  Well, okay.
[10:23.110 --> 10:26.890]  So, to me, this sounds like some kind of, like, little thing that they cut and pasted from...
[10:26.890 --> 10:27.030]  Right.
[10:27.530 --> 10:28.810]  Well, there's actually...
[10:28.810 --> 10:32.670]  I'll bet you go to any bank on the web and see that same privacy notice, but...
[10:32.670 --> 10:34.750]  Well, this is the one place it was located.
[10:35.230 --> 10:39.430]  The only difference that I can see is in the first line.
[10:39.610 --> 10:49.670]  They say, disclose any personal identifying information for the DOJ version, and our website does not require you to disclose any personally identifying information on the...
[10:49.670 --> 10:50.530]  Who says personally?
[10:50.610 --> 10:51.210]  Who says personal?
[10:51.390 --> 10:52.810]  Personal is the DOJ.
[10:52.990 --> 10:56.090]  Personally is the First Mid-Illinois Bank and Trust.
[10:56.410 --> 10:58.070]  I think personal is grammatically correct.
[10:58.170 --> 10:59.090]  Maybe they made a correction.
[10:59.530 --> 11:02.310]  Well, it's identifying information.
[11:03.210 --> 11:06.690]  Personally is the adverb which modifies the adjective identifying.
[11:06.870 --> 11:07.850]  Which you don't need to do.
[11:08.670 --> 11:10.070]  It's completely unnecessary.
[11:10.930 --> 11:12.610]  Modifying something that doesn't need to be modified.
[11:12.610 --> 11:13.270]  It's a waste.
[11:14.230 --> 11:14.710]  Well...
[11:14.710 --> 11:16.630]  So many people go around modifying things.
[11:16.630 --> 11:17.570]  They're not supposed to be modifying.
[11:17.570 --> 11:20.710]  And you know how much time is wasted because of that, and how many words and letters?
[11:20.850 --> 11:24.110]  Well, it's identifying information, and then there's personally identifying information.
[11:24.290 --> 11:26.530]  I applaud the Justice Department for de-adverbing that.
[11:27.450 --> 11:27.770]  Well...
[11:27.770 --> 11:30.570]  But that's the only thing I applaud them for, because the rest of it is just pure...
[11:31.710 --> 11:32.370]  What's the word?
[11:33.730 --> 11:36.110]  You know, what the guy from Senator from Delaware did.
[11:36.250 --> 11:39.290]  You know, he stole words and, you know, said they were his.
[11:39.530 --> 11:40.610]  Copy something...
[11:40.610 --> 11:41.370]  Yeah, plagiarism.
[11:41.530 --> 11:41.730]  That's it.
[11:41.750 --> 11:42.310]  Right, that's the one.
[11:42.590 --> 11:43.090]  Well, I hope the banks...
[11:43.090 --> 11:51.090]  Do you think, Emanuel, do you think the Justice Department will prosecute itself for stealing the intellectual property of the bank whose words they stole?
[11:51.230 --> 11:52.490]  Only if we demand it.
[11:52.750 --> 11:53.630]  And I think we should.
[11:54.130 --> 11:55.390]  All right, what else is on this site?
[11:55.510 --> 11:56.450]  This, uh...
[11:56.450 --> 11:56.870]  This, uh...
[11:56.870 --> 11:58.210]  It's a fun site to wander around.
[11:58.270 --> 11:59.750]  What does CCIPS do?
[12:00.050 --> 12:05.190]  CCIPS, of course, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, and, uh...
[12:05.190 --> 12:06.070]  Section of what, though?
[12:06.070 --> 12:06.590]  I don't know.
[12:06.690 --> 12:11.490]  The Computer Crime Intellectual Property Section attorney staff consists of about two dozen lawyers...
[12:11.490 --> 12:12.230]  Oh, God.
[12:13.490 --> 12:22.570]  Two dozen lawyers that are going to figure out ways to prosecute people for all kinds of new things, who focus exclusively on the issues raised by computer and intellectual property crime.
[12:22.950 --> 12:35.090]  Section attorneys advise federal prosecutors and law enforcement agents comment upon and propose legislation, coordinate international efforts to combat computer crime, litigate cases, and train all law enforcement groups.
[12:35.090 --> 12:36.110]  That's kind of interesting.
[12:36.290 --> 12:37.730]  They're international in scope?
[12:38.230 --> 12:40.030]  Everything's international in scope these days.
[12:40.210 --> 12:44.810]  We've got little teams of feds going everywhere in the world trying to influence policy.
[12:44.910 --> 12:46.690]  I thought that was the responsibility of the Department of State.
[12:47.050 --> 12:47.370]  Silly me.
[12:48.430 --> 13:02.210]  Other areas of expertise possessed by CCIPS attorneys include encryption, electronic privacy laws, search and seizure of computers, e-commerce, hacker investigations, and intellectual property crimes.
[13:03.790 --> 13:05.670]  So, yes, CCIPS...
[13:05.670 --> 13:06.970]  There's got to be a better way to say that.
[13:07.450 --> 13:07.770]  CCIPS.
[13:08.110 --> 13:09.630]  Do they want us to pronounce that somehow?
[13:09.810 --> 13:10.150]  I don't know.
[13:10.650 --> 13:12.170]  It's one of those, like, odd acronyms.
[13:12.270 --> 13:18.470]  Well, we're going to be hearing from them in the future, that's for sure, because every time somebody gets prosecuted for something, I'm sure they have something to say.
[13:19.350 --> 13:22.650]  Here's a word on the international aspect of this.
[13:22.650 --> 13:29.050]  The borderless nature of computer crime requires a large role for CCIPS in international negotiations.
[13:29.410 --> 13:40.870]  CCIPS chairs the G8 subgroup on high-tech crime, which has established a 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week point of contact with 15 countries for mutual assistance in computer crime.
[13:41.270 --> 13:42.590]  I don't have the number, do you?
[13:42.590 --> 13:43.430]  Nor do I.
[13:43.810 --> 13:51.690]  All right, if anybody out there has the number for 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week point of contact with those 15 countries in CCIPS, we'll print it on our website, you know?
[13:51.870 --> 13:52.390]  I'd be interested.
[13:52.390 --> 13:53.510]  Trying to help out here.
[13:54.210 --> 14:01.930]  CCIPS also plays a leadership role in the Council of Europe Experts Committee on Cybercrime, C-E-E-C-C.
[14:02.990 --> 14:04.950]  That's a rip on CCC.
[14:05.210 --> 14:05.710]  I don't care.
[14:06.710 --> 14:08.870]  Chaos Computer Club is going to have a thing to say about that.
[14:08.970 --> 14:10.150]  Well, we'll wait for it.
[14:10.610 --> 14:14.690]  And also a new cybercrime project at the Organization of American States.
[14:17.590 --> 14:18.610]  I've never heard of them.
[14:20.870 --> 14:21.510]  All right.
[14:21.770 --> 14:23.130]  That's pretty crazy.
[14:23.230 --> 14:24.590]  But here's another fun thing here.
[14:28.210 --> 14:29.790]  It's kind of a chart.
[14:30.330 --> 14:32.870]  Where you go to report your particular crime.
[14:36.570 --> 14:37.930]  Computer intrusion, i.e.
[14:37.990 --> 14:38.290]  hacking.
[14:38.410 --> 14:39.030]  Who would you go to?
[14:39.030 --> 14:44.090]  What particular group, what particular federal agency would you go to?
[14:44.250 --> 14:45.150]  I would...
[14:45.150 --> 14:46.450]  I'll go for CERT.
[14:47.210 --> 14:47.670]  No, no, no.
[14:47.730 --> 14:48.850]  It's got to be enforcement.
[14:48.970 --> 14:49.150]  Bernie?
[14:49.490 --> 14:51.670]  I would say the United States Secret Service.
[14:51.830 --> 14:52.330]  That's very good.
[14:52.410 --> 14:52.650]  U.S.
[14:52.710 --> 14:53.870]  Secret Service local office.
[14:54.390 --> 15:00.070]  But there is also FBI local office and NIPC.
[15:00.250 --> 15:00.530]  That's who it is.
[15:00.650 --> 15:00.730]  My pick.
[15:00.950 --> 15:03.170]  The National Infrastructure Protection Committee.
[15:03.390 --> 15:03.890]  No, never mind.
[15:04.090 --> 15:04.250]  Center.
[15:04.250 --> 15:06.190]  If anybody knows what NIPC stands for.
[15:06.290 --> 15:07.590]  National Infrastructure Protection Center.
[15:07.690 --> 15:07.970]  Thank you.
[15:07.970 --> 15:14.170]  Apparently, there's some overlap in the charters of both the FBI and the Secret Service.
[15:14.450 --> 15:34.230]  If you read up on their charters and their missions and their responsibilities, you'll see that the Secret Service is responsible for protecting the president, counterfeiting, credit card fraud, and telecommunications and computer fraud-related crimes.
[15:34.230 --> 15:39.610]  But apparently, the FBI also has anything to do with fraud.
[15:39.870 --> 15:40.750]  They're responsible, too.
[15:40.830 --> 15:45.890]  So I guess, in some cases, they probably sort of flip a coin or fight with each other as to who gets the case.
[15:46.810 --> 15:48.830]  Well, at least we've narrowed it down to two organizations.
[15:49.050 --> 15:54.670]  Previously, you'd have to, like, ask the Air Force and NASA had their own little thing going on and the DOE had their own deal.
[15:55.030 --> 15:59.350]  And at least now we've got it down to, like, two investigative agencies who can pass the buck back and forth.
[15:59.490 --> 16:00.250]  NIPC is there, too.
[16:00.270 --> 16:00.990]  Well, NIPC is.
[16:00.990 --> 16:03.410]  And also the same organizations with password trafficking.
[16:03.410 --> 16:04.390]  You would contact them.
[16:04.390 --> 16:06.090]  But here's a different one.
[16:06.250 --> 16:08.670]  Copyright, software, movie, sound recording, piracy.
[16:09.930 --> 16:12.730]  Actually, copyright, piracy, which includes software, movie, and sound recording.
[16:12.950 --> 16:13.170]  Oh, okay.
[16:13.250 --> 16:14.170]  That's got to be FBI.
[16:14.590 --> 16:15.650]  FBI, local office.
[16:16.090 --> 16:18.070]  But if imported, U.S.
[16:18.270 --> 16:18.990]  Customs Service.
[16:19.290 --> 16:20.010]  Oh, that's interesting.
[16:20.170 --> 16:22.330]  You can contact them at 1-800-B-ALERT.
[16:23.410 --> 16:24.450]  B-E-A-L-E-R-T?
[16:24.630 --> 16:24.870]  Yeah.
[16:25.030 --> 16:26.190]  The world needs more alerts.
[16:26.550 --> 16:26.750]  Yes.
[16:27.010 --> 16:28.150]  Bernie, theft or trade secrets?
[16:28.210 --> 16:28.650]  Who would you go to?
[16:30.410 --> 16:31.090]  Trade secrets.
[16:31.210 --> 16:32.150]  I guess that's FBI also.
[16:32.210 --> 16:32.950]  FBI, local office.
[16:33.030 --> 16:33.310]  Very good.
[16:34.390 --> 16:35.510]  This one, trademark counterfeiting.
[16:36.310 --> 16:36.950]  Trademark counterfeiting?
[16:37.250 --> 16:38.550]  That would probably be U.S.
[16:38.630 --> 16:39.410]  Patent and Trademark Office.
[16:40.210 --> 16:41.190]  No, they don't mention that.
[16:41.230 --> 16:41.850]  They're not law enforcement.
[16:41.930 --> 16:42.330]  No, they're not law enforcement.
[16:42.330 --> 16:42.890]  It's not law enforcement?
[16:42.990 --> 16:43.110]  Uh-uh.
[16:43.270 --> 16:43.730]  Oh, I'm sorry.
[16:43.870 --> 16:45.990]  I'm in, like, a whole different state of mind with this.
[16:46.130 --> 16:46.910]  Law enforcement...
[16:46.910 --> 16:48.670]  It's got to be Secret Service, because it's counterfeiting.
[16:49.310 --> 16:51.150]  Well, actually, it says FBI...
[16:51.150 --> 16:51.790]  No, no, it's got to be...
[16:51.790 --> 16:52.510]  I bet it is FBI.
[16:52.650 --> 16:56.530]  If software is being counterfeited, the FBI investigates that.
[16:56.610 --> 16:57.370]  FBI, local office.
[16:57.470 --> 16:58.650]  But if imported, U.S.
[16:58.770 --> 17:00.990]  Customs Service, located at 1-800-B-ALERT.
[17:02.890 --> 17:05.710]  Oh, yes, I've got to give them a call later, make sure they're alert.
[17:06.910 --> 17:07.770]  Counterfeiting of currency?
[17:07.990 --> 17:08.470]  Oh, this is a giveaway.
[17:08.750 --> 17:09.190]  Well, that...
[17:09.190 --> 17:10.130]  Come on, that's Secret Service.
[17:10.410 --> 17:10.670]  U.S.
[17:10.730 --> 17:11.070]  Secret Service.
[17:11.150 --> 17:12.770]  But also, they say FBI, local office, as well.
[17:12.890 --> 17:14.630]  Maybe they can give you the number for the Secret Service.
[17:14.990 --> 17:15.770]  That's what they're for.
[17:16.390 --> 17:18.250]  All right, child pornography or exploitation?
[17:18.910 --> 17:19.230]  FBI.
[17:19.430 --> 17:19.690]  FBI.
[17:20.190 --> 17:21.430]  Or, if imported, U.S.
[17:21.510 --> 17:22.090]  Customs Service.
[17:22.350 --> 17:23.170]  1-800-B-ALERT.
[17:24.610 --> 17:27.550]  The only reason I'm reading that number so many times is because they only give that number.
[17:27.590 --> 17:29.570]  They don't give the FBI or the Secret Service number.
[17:29.850 --> 17:30.970]  All right, Internet...
[17:31.910 --> 17:33.110]  What is Internet fraud?
[17:33.910 --> 17:35.250]  You're going to get all philosophical on me.
[17:35.350 --> 17:37.550]  You're not going to get a law enforcement agency interested.
[17:37.710 --> 17:41.570]  Are you like a mock ISP that says, I will give you access to the Internet, but you don't?
[17:41.690 --> 17:44.830]  Maybe it's somebody saying, this is the Internet when it's not.
[17:45.090 --> 17:45.470]  Like AOL.
[17:45.470 --> 17:47.750]  I think it's if somebody steals the entire Internet.
[17:48.030 --> 17:49.130]  Oh, okay, that's not bad.
[17:49.610 --> 17:51.430]  The Internet has been stolen, yes.
[17:52.030 --> 17:52.810]  I don't know.
[17:52.890 --> 17:55.770]  I guess selling something on the net, you're not really selling.
[17:55.850 --> 17:58.930]  Like eBaying the moon or something and not delivering it.
[17:58.930 --> 18:01.070]  So fraud perpetrated on the Internet?
[18:01.710 --> 18:02.750]  Yeah, that sounds good to me.
[18:02.750 --> 18:04.650]  Or using the Internet as a medium for...
[18:04.650 --> 18:04.990]  Okay, fine.
[18:05.230 --> 18:06.710]  Who would we contact for that?
[18:06.890 --> 18:09.230]  Do you want what the penalty is for delaying a radio show?
[18:09.290 --> 18:09.690]  I'm sorry.
[18:09.950 --> 18:10.290]  So people die?
[18:10.470 --> 18:10.630]  Okay.
[18:11.210 --> 18:15.710]  Internet fraud is FBI local office or the Federal Trade Commission.
[18:16.570 --> 18:21.530]  If security is fraud, alcohol, tobacco, and firearms.
[18:21.730 --> 18:24.230]  No, security is an exchange commission, of course.
[18:25.150 --> 18:25.630]  Internet harassment.
[18:25.630 --> 18:34.610]  By the way, on the SEC announced the first Internet-related insider trading prosecution today, or at least indictment.
[18:35.030 --> 18:35.930]  Yeah, there was a...
[18:35.930 --> 18:55.910]  I don't have all the details on it, but apparently some guy working at a consulting firm, one of the big, like one of the big five consultants, like Arthur, it wasn't Arthur Ams, but one of those ilk, a temporary employee who was doing word processing for them found out about all these mergers and acquisitions ahead of time by preparing documents,
[18:55.930 --> 19:02.990]  and tipped his friends off in a chat room about these things.
[19:02.990 --> 19:09.070]  And apparently about $8.5 million was gained through this insider trading information.
[19:09.350 --> 19:13.810]  And they've, so far, they've indicted something like 20 people on this.
[19:13.870 --> 19:19.790]  But it's the first, they're touting this as the first insider trading indictment that involved the Internet.
[19:19.930 --> 19:20.970]  Because they use a chat room.
[19:21.050 --> 19:22.090]  They're chatting on the chat room, yes.
[19:22.210 --> 19:23.870]  So it was like a cyber crime.
[19:23.930 --> 19:27.510]  Yes, as opposed to picking up a telephone and saying, Hey, Jerry, I got a line for you.
[19:27.630 --> 19:28.130]  Oh, boy.
[19:28.550 --> 19:29.870]  Okay, very quickly now.
[19:30.150 --> 19:32.330]  Internet harassment, you would go to the FBI local office.
[19:32.330 --> 19:34.050]  Internet bomb threats, FBI local office.
[19:34.050 --> 19:37.010]  They actually say local office, because traditionally it's been known as the field office.
[19:37.130 --> 19:38.070]  Well, they say local office here.
[19:38.070 --> 19:40.050]  Maybe they ripped that off somebody else.
[19:40.330 --> 19:43.670]  Internet bomb threats, FBI local office, or ATF local office.
[19:43.790 --> 19:48.170]  And finally, trafficking in explosive or incendiary devices or firearms over the Internet.
[19:48.350 --> 19:48.830]  ATF.
[19:48.990 --> 19:50.830]  And FBI local office as well.
[19:51.190 --> 19:57.150]  So that's the news from the Computer Crime Intellectual Property Section, www.cybercrime.gov.
[19:57.490 --> 20:01.170]  Now, how about if it's an anonymous email that contains a bomb threat?
[20:01.690 --> 20:06.790]  Well, you see, that's not going to be a problem anymore, because the latest thing is to make anonymity illegal.
[20:07.270 --> 20:07.710]  Exactly.
[20:07.850 --> 20:08.510]  That's why I brought that up.
[20:08.650 --> 20:23.150]  Apparently, last week, a high-level working group, chaired by Attorney General Janet Reno, announced that police, and I quote, police should be able to determine the source of hacker attacks or anonymous emails that contain bomb threats.
[20:24.250 --> 20:28.790]  Now, how are they going to determine the source of an anonymous email?
[20:28.790 --> 20:30.370]  Are they going to require...
[20:30.370 --> 20:48.830]  Are they going to require to throw out all our computers and get machines that have some sort of unspoofable authentication token and then have some huge database that tracks who has possession of which tokens?
[20:48.830 --> 20:53.250]  And, like, if somebody dies, they've got to revoke the token.
[20:53.710 --> 20:54.950]  How are they going to do this?
[20:55.470 --> 21:08.870]  Well, way back when, the law enforcement agencies were actually considering trying to make the IETF, the Internet Engineering Task Force, implement this entire thing over the new generation of the IP protocol, IPv6.
[21:09.490 --> 21:09.850]  And now...
[21:09.850 --> 21:11.410]  Originally, they got turned down on that deal.
[21:11.430 --> 21:11.790]  Exactly.
[21:11.910 --> 21:13.590]  IETF just said, uh, no.
[21:14.390 --> 21:18.110]  Even if they said yes, how could that possibly ever be implemented?
[21:18.250 --> 21:18.510]  It can't.
[21:18.670 --> 21:21.190]  Well, more importantly, how could it be implemented securely?
[21:21.750 --> 21:23.370]  The thing is, it's a wish list.
[21:23.370 --> 21:26.770]  It's something that the people have no conception of how the technology works.
[21:26.790 --> 21:32.730]  If they understood how the Internet worked, they wouldn't even put this on their wish list because it's completely impossible.
[21:32.730 --> 21:38.730]  It's like wishing for a Star Trek transporter to take you to other solar systems in two seconds.
[21:38.910 --> 21:40.630]  You know, it's just, like, get real.
[21:41.250 --> 21:41.690]  Absolutely.
[21:41.690 --> 21:44.030]  Yeah, because the transporter doesn't go between solar systems.
[21:44.090 --> 21:45.270]  It just goes from the ship to the plant.
[21:45.450 --> 21:45.630]  Never mind.
[21:45.770 --> 21:46.010]  Exactly.
[21:46.570 --> 21:48.210]  A couple other news items here.
[21:48.390 --> 22:03.290]  Online, speaking of the brokerages, online brokerage National Discount Brokers on Thursday gave new definition to hacker phobia by blaming recent outages at its online trading site on hacker-like attacks by an unnamed web software maker.
[22:03.710 --> 22:13.750]  In a statement, the Jersey City-based online share dealer said periodic disruptions since last Thursday to its site were the result of software incompatibility with products of the outside company.
[22:14.130 --> 22:21.030]  The explanation appeared to step back from comments by a company executive when the disruptions began at the NDB.com site last week.
[22:21.170 --> 22:25.510]  At that time, Chairman Dennis Marino said the site outages had the earmarks of a hacker attack.
[22:25.510 --> 22:35.110]  As a result of what it now said were software conflicts, the company said its NDB.com site had been subjected to several instances of hacker-like denial of services.
[22:35.490 --> 22:35.930]  Oh, I see.
[22:36.230 --> 22:39.190]  Which precluded some of the company's customers from reaching the website.
[22:39.370 --> 22:40.550]  Basically, they screwed up.
[22:40.550 --> 22:43.350]  And they didn't install something properly.
[22:43.590 --> 22:46.730]  And that, whenever something goes wrong now, it's a hacker-like attack.
[22:47.030 --> 22:49.250]  Or there's earmarks of a hacker attack.
[22:49.470 --> 22:54.550]  Like, I guess there's a mark on somebody's ear that looks like the earmarks of a hacker.
[22:54.750 --> 22:56.070]  Like, I recognize those marks.
[22:57.150 --> 22:59.070]  That looks like a hacker footprint to me.
[22:59.150 --> 22:59.810]  What do you think, Jake?
[22:59.970 --> 23:00.330]  That's unbelievable.
[23:00.330 --> 23:03.110]  Well, another example is the MIT thing that was fairly recently.
[23:03.290 --> 23:04.130]  Yeah, you heard about that?
[23:04.130 --> 23:05.090]  I heard something about that.
[23:05.090 --> 23:08.690]  Yeah, basically, there was a database.
[23:09.030 --> 23:17.530]  Somebody was using Excel or whatever the heck that Microsoft product is that does databases for this one instructor's class.
[23:17.730 --> 23:17.810]  Right.
[23:18.090 --> 23:23.430]  So what happened was, you know, two students magically got higher grades and 20 students got lesser grades.
[23:23.830 --> 23:26.290]  And the first thing they said was, hacker, hacker.
[23:26.550 --> 23:29.070]  And for a few days, they said just, hacker, hacker.
[23:29.070 --> 23:37.510]  And after which point, they realized, oh, I was the intern that was supposed to be, like, sorting Dr. Kemp's grades.
[23:37.750 --> 23:45.510]  And, well, I didn't click on the right row, so I sorted the names, but I didn't sort the grades at the same time that I sorted the names.
[23:45.770 --> 23:47.250]  So, you know, I'm sorry.
[23:47.830 --> 23:51.990]  And there's a whole press release on the MIT site stating that we were wrong.
[23:53.430 --> 23:53.870]  Unbelievable.
[23:53.990 --> 23:54.630]  MIT, too.
[23:54.710 --> 23:56.130]  You'd think they might have a clue.
[23:56.350 --> 23:56.930]  Well, no.
[23:57.530 --> 23:58.930]  Clues are hard to find these days.
[23:59.430 --> 24:03.590]  Speaking of clues, the latest thing with the whole denial of service thing.
[24:03.750 --> 24:05.190]  Are you even following this whole Coolio story?
[24:06.430 --> 24:06.790]  Coolio?
[24:06.950 --> 24:07.110]  Yeah.
[24:07.770 --> 24:08.350]  Here's the thing.
[24:08.490 --> 24:09.510]  Two people were named.
[24:09.690 --> 24:16.710]  I don't know why they were named, because somebody was in a chat room and they overheard that these two people were responsible for all the denial of service.
[24:16.830 --> 24:17.770]  Oh, Coolio and Nick.
[24:18.290 --> 24:20.770]  I thought you meant Coolio like the music artist.
[24:21.090 --> 24:21.410]  No.
[24:22.310 --> 24:23.810]  Why would I bring that up with you?
[24:23.830 --> 24:24.550]  I didn't realize it.
[24:24.850 --> 24:25.190]  All right.
[24:25.770 --> 24:26.950]  Coolio and Mafia Boy.
[24:27.170 --> 24:28.090]  Do you know who that is?
[24:28.090 --> 24:29.570]  I don't know who Mafia is.
[24:29.690 --> 24:29.850]  Okay.
[24:29.990 --> 24:32.410]  Well, those are two names that were brought up.
[24:32.410 --> 24:32.690]  Okay.
[24:32.730 --> 24:33.010]  I'm sorry.
[24:33.010 --> 24:33.310]  All right.
[24:33.450 --> 24:33.650]  All right.
[24:33.650 --> 24:36.950]  As implicated in the whole denial of service attack.
[24:37.870 --> 24:48.230]  So, naturally, all these people started hanging out in websites, yours truly included, with names similar or identical to that and seeing what happens.
[24:48.330 --> 24:49.650]  Coolio Boy and Mafia.
[24:50.010 --> 24:53.350]  Just seeing what kinds of messages that you would get.
[24:53.510 --> 24:55.910]  And, boy, let me tell you, people are gullible.
[24:55.910 --> 25:17.930]  And people in high standing, I go, I'm talking about people who actually went to CNN or on the news, talking as experts, were communicating, believing that they were talking to the actual perpetrator with absolutely nothing, nothing to indicate that except for the fact that the name on Internet Relay Chat was the same.
[25:18.070 --> 25:18.450]  That's it.
[25:18.450 --> 25:37.410]  That's all the evidence they needed, you know, so you're able to give them, like, drop little things as far as geography, as far as, you know, just basic little hints, and see it pop up on the news a few hours later as fact, just because somebody with a similar name said that.
[25:37.490 --> 25:39.490]  And that's what happened with this guy, Coolio.
[25:39.630 --> 25:42.690]  Coolio is, you know, how many Coolios do you think there are in the net?
[25:42.850 --> 25:43.330]  Well, two.
[25:43.510 --> 25:44.450]  Probably by two?
[25:45.410 --> 25:46.350]  The guy who's on that.
[25:48.610 --> 25:49.930]  Everybody's named Coolio these days.
[25:50.150 --> 25:50.310]  Sorry.
[25:50.590 --> 25:53.670]  It's really, it's not an uncommon name.
[25:53.750 --> 26:02.790]  But anyway, this person found himself with, you know, a kind of a funny situation because his name was Coolio, he's on IRC, and somebody was messaging him, so I said, yeah, sure, I did it.
[26:03.090 --> 26:08.630]  And because of that, because he got implicated in that way, all this attention was drawn on him.
[26:08.630 --> 26:10.390]  It's not very hard to find somebody in IRC.
[26:10.490 --> 26:11.030]  It really isn't.
[26:11.030 --> 26:13.090]  If you have any kind of skill, you can track somebody down.
[26:13.330 --> 26:17.670]  And so somebody tracked him down as this Concord, New Hampshire teenager.
[26:18.850 --> 26:23.410]  Now, he was not at all in any way guilty of denial of service attacks.
[26:23.690 --> 26:24.790]  Everybody agrees to that.
[26:24.970 --> 26:32.430]  But after he got tracked down, he admitted that he was the person responsible for hacking the D.A.R.E.
[26:32.570 --> 26:32.790]  site.
[26:33.330 --> 26:33.730]  The...
[26:33.730 --> 26:34.290]  Drug abuse.
[26:34.310 --> 26:34.770]  Drug abuse.
[26:35.550 --> 26:35.690]  Yeah.
[26:35.950 --> 26:36.190]  Oh.
[26:36.430 --> 26:38.310]  And I thought it was a pretty fun...
[26:38.310 --> 26:38.770]  I mean, look at that.
[26:38.850 --> 26:39.950]  You can't read it on the air.
[26:39.950 --> 26:40.970]  I can't see it.
[26:40.970 --> 26:41.610]  It's pretty...
[26:41.610 --> 26:42.710]  Okay, I'll give it to you.
[26:42.790 --> 26:42.990]  Oh, okay.
[26:42.990 --> 26:45.930]  Let's try to limit your shock to words you can say over the air.
[26:48.190 --> 26:52.210]  Now, imagine all these, like, you know, do-good anti-drug people coming to their site and seeing that.
[26:52.350 --> 26:52.730]  You're not immune?
[26:52.810 --> 26:53.610]  You don't think this is funny?
[26:53.630 --> 26:53.990]  I'm not immune.
[26:53.990 --> 26:54.890]  I think it's hilarious.
[26:55.410 --> 26:56.290]  It really is.
[26:56.450 --> 27:00.230]  But the thing is, regardless of whether it's funny or not, it's relatively harmless.
[27:00.270 --> 27:01.270]  It's just a prank.
[27:01.390 --> 27:03.310]  It's somebody sticking something on the website.
[27:03.310 --> 27:08.290]  Well, because of all this attention, now he's facing 15 years in jail.
[27:08.810 --> 27:09.330]  What?
[27:09.470 --> 27:13.810]  Yeah, because some moron out there said, oh, this person hacked a site.
[27:13.810 --> 27:17.730]  Well, now he's guilty of all kinds of horrible things.
[27:17.770 --> 27:20.870]  Let's see if I can find the exact charge.
[27:22.210 --> 27:28.770]  So released on a $5,000 personal reconnaissance bond, slated for arraignment on April 6th.
[27:29.170 --> 27:30.130]  Felony charges.
[27:30.250 --> 27:31.270]  These are felony charges.
[27:31.610 --> 27:32.350]  He hacked the site twice.
[27:32.350 --> 27:33.890]  His bail was only set at $5,000?
[27:34.030 --> 27:35.170]  Well, yeah, okay, I know.
[27:35.250 --> 27:36.450]  You didn't get any bail, Bernie, but...
[27:36.450 --> 27:38.850]  I don't know, and then, well, they dropped it down to a quarter of a million.
[27:38.930 --> 27:39.130]  Yeah.
[27:39.490 --> 27:40.370]  Like, that was cash bail.
[27:40.450 --> 27:42.250]  We're living in insanity, insanity.
[27:42.590 --> 27:43.930]  It's in total insane times.
[27:44.090 --> 27:45.650]  But anyway, this guy's being charged with felony.
[27:46.010 --> 27:50.110]  Each one carries 7 1⁄2 to 15 years in prison along with a $4,000 fine.
[27:50.590 --> 27:55.270]  This is for hacking a site, renaming a file, something that was fixed in two seconds.
[27:55.450 --> 27:58.230]  Actually, it's for gaining too much attention to himself.
[27:58.430 --> 27:58.570]  Yeah.
[27:58.950 --> 28:00.930]  Well, it's like, Bernie, it's like what happened to you.
[28:00.930 --> 28:03.190]  Basically, you embarrass certain people.
[28:03.710 --> 28:05.450]  And Kevin embarrassed certain people.
[28:05.530 --> 28:09.510]  And when you do that, that's when, you know, the weight of the system falls on you.
[28:09.530 --> 28:12.690]  It's far worse these days than actually victimizing anybody, apparently.
[28:13.590 --> 28:14.830]  Yeah, I mean, who was the victim here?
[28:14.910 --> 28:19.910]  A couple of, you know, confused people going to the site and seeing that picture, which I think is funny.
[28:19.910 --> 28:22.630]  Well, it's, all right, it's somewhat amusing.
[28:22.650 --> 28:24.650]  It's a teenage prank, for God's sake.
[28:24.790 --> 28:26.830]  I mean, we have to start waking up to reality.
[28:26.970 --> 28:27.870]  Teenagers do this kind of thing.
[28:27.870 --> 28:30.870]  But the DARE program is a fine example of...
[28:30.870 --> 28:33.890]  It's irrelevant if their program's a fine example of whatnot.
[28:34.090 --> 28:36.370]  It's basically anybody on the web.
[28:36.530 --> 28:44.290]  That is part of the rules you accept when you go onto the net, that there's a risk that you might have a gaping security hole that somebody will do something to.
[28:44.290 --> 28:50.710]  So you better keep backups, you better know what the security thing is, watch your site, fix it when it goes wrong.
[28:51.170 --> 28:55.930]  And, you know, don't go crying like Yahoo and Amazon when something bad happens.
[28:56.070 --> 28:57.230]  Fix it so it doesn't happen.
[28:57.430 --> 29:04.830]  I actually visited that DARE site, and it was extremely dry and lacked any humor whatsoever, so it probably needed a little bit of humor.
[29:04.830 --> 29:06.630]  So for a few minutes, it had humor.
[29:08.010 --> 29:12.030]  But now look at the cost that this poor kid has to pay for that.
[29:12.110 --> 29:12.570]  It's ridiculous.
[29:12.570 --> 29:14.870]  And that kind of thing is being repeated all over the place.
[29:14.970 --> 29:19.030]  We talk about Kevin, we talk about Bernie, yes, fiber optic, those cases, because they're the ones closest to us.
[29:19.110 --> 29:25.150]  But they're happening all over the place, and there are so many people that don't have, you know, a voice, that aren't being heard.
[29:25.390 --> 29:40.030]  I mean, the things that go on in schools, for instance, people who figure out a way to drop down to a DOS prompt or bypass the stupid restriction programs that are on their high school computer, treated like terrorists because they know too much, dragged down to the principal's office,
[29:40.030 --> 29:42.810]  is expelled sometimes because they gained access to something.
[29:43.010 --> 29:44.850]  This is not even doing something bad to it.
[29:44.950 --> 29:46.950]  It's just figuring out how to do it in the first place.
[29:47.170 --> 29:48.490]  Guess who's coming into schools now?
[29:49.090 --> 29:50.150]  Oh, yeah, yeah.
[29:50.270 --> 29:51.030]  Tell us about this, Bernie.
[29:51.090 --> 29:51.730]  I heard about this.
[29:51.730 --> 30:10.510]  The United States Secret Service, in the wake of the Columbine incident, Secret Service has been, apparently the Justice Department asked the Secret Service for their security expertise, because, you know, Secret Service is ostensibly responsible for protecting the president and other...
[30:10.510 --> 30:12.930]  They've done a real bang-up job on hackers, I'll say that.
[30:13.110 --> 30:14.990]  So, obviously, they're the experts.
[30:15.350 --> 30:16.210]  They bang me up pretty good.
[30:17.470 --> 30:18.290]  Okay, so what?
[30:18.370 --> 30:20.530]  Now they want to put the U.S.
[30:20.590 --> 30:21.950]  Secret Service inside schools.
[30:22.190 --> 30:29.850]  The Secret Service is going into high schools and, apparently, middle schools also, and maybe even elementary schools, but I don't know if they've gotten down that far yet.
[30:29.970 --> 30:33.330]  Or I don't think they're into kindergartens and nursery schools, but I'm sure that's coming.
[30:36.030 --> 30:39.010]  And basically looking for security threats.
[30:39.150 --> 30:44.630]  Now, obviously, they're going to probably have some sort of profiles as to who they think is going to bring the gun to school.
[30:46.230 --> 30:51.950]  And they're going to have some sort of strikes and taking out these particular students who've been profiled.
[30:52.070 --> 30:54.530]  Really, the first security risk is when you hear the gunshot.
[30:54.650 --> 30:55.770]  That's when it starts.
[30:56.070 --> 30:58.610]  You know, you can't really figure out who's going to do it.
[30:58.810 --> 31:00.450]  I believe tonight on...
[31:00.450 --> 31:19.570]  Not that 60 Minutes is any fine example of journalism, but at 9 o'clock tonight, Eastern Time, CBS 60 Minutes 2, it's like the spin-off of 60 Minutes at 9 o'clock tonight, is having a segment on why the United States Secret Service is coming into high schools now.
[31:19.750 --> 31:20.810]  Can someone tape that for me?
[31:21.750 --> 31:26.470]  Yeah, I found out about it after I left a place I could tape it from.
[31:26.570 --> 31:28.610]  So if somebody could make a tape for us, we'd sure like to see it.
[31:28.630 --> 31:28.990]  Yeah, we'd appreciate it.
[31:29.090 --> 31:30.110]  Because we need to laugh, too.
[31:30.290 --> 31:31.590]  You know, the world needs laughter.
[31:32.390 --> 31:35.090]  60 Minutes 2, they really burned the midnight oil on that name, didn't they?
[31:36.310 --> 31:37.110]  Oh, man.
[31:37.950 --> 31:38.390]  Oh, well.
[31:38.810 --> 31:42.290]  So that's some of what's going on out in our world.
[31:42.470 --> 31:43.350]  It's a scary world.
[31:43.530 --> 31:44.890]  We're going to take some phone calls.
[31:44.970 --> 31:47.250]  212-209-2900.
[31:47.730 --> 31:48.250]  Porkchop's here.
[31:48.490 --> 31:49.230]  Say hi, Porkchop.
[31:49.450 --> 31:49.930]  Hello, world.
[31:50.370 --> 31:51.090]  Hey, Porkchop.
[31:51.110 --> 31:52.930]  He sent it into the mic that doesn't work for some reason.
[31:55.110 --> 31:56.010]  Try that one.
[31:56.270 --> 31:56.470]  Hello?
[31:56.670 --> 31:57.070]  Yeah, that's it.
[31:57.070 --> 31:57.570]  There you go.
[31:57.970 --> 31:58.550]  Yeah, okay.
[31:58.630 --> 31:59.510]  I was looking at the wrong thing.
[32:00.450 --> 32:04.190]  Yeah, well, we've been working on the film last week or so.
[32:04.550 --> 32:06.290]  And, in fact, folks, when you see...
[32:06.290 --> 32:07.630]  We're getting a lot of complaints about this.
[32:07.750 --> 32:11.030]  There hasn't been an updated show in the past few weeks, and we know about that.
[32:11.190 --> 32:14.590]  It's because of, like, a conjunction of astronomical events.
[32:14.590 --> 32:16.850]  So we had to put out an issue and working on the film.
[32:16.950 --> 32:22.010]  So when you don't see a show pop up on the net right away, it's because we're, like, really, really busy doing other things.
[32:22.010 --> 32:24.350]  But we're going to do it probably this week, hopefully.
[32:24.470 --> 32:24.810]  It's coming along.
[32:25.030 --> 32:25.850]  Everything's coming along.
[32:26.490 --> 32:28.350]  And, of course, we're planning for H2K as well.
[32:28.470 --> 32:32.570]  So if you want to be part of that, H2K.net, www.h2k.net.
[32:32.850 --> 32:34.890]  Latest information will be posted there.
[32:35.250 --> 32:45.610]  And for those who don't know, it's a hacker conference of unheralded magnitude that will be taking place right here in New York City, Hotel Pennsylvania, July 14th through 16th.
[32:45.990 --> 32:47.090]  You can register online.
[32:47.090 --> 32:49.750]  You know, you've never been able to register online for a hacker conference before.
[32:50.350 --> 32:51.370]  It's kind of cool.
[32:51.790 --> 32:53.190]  Ought to be interesting results.
[32:53.730 --> 32:57.310]  On the registration, Emanuel, I registered months ago.
[32:57.570 --> 32:58.550]  You don't have to register.
[32:58.710 --> 33:00.190]  You're part of the staff.
[33:00.370 --> 33:02.450]  Well, I want to pay my fair share.
[33:02.630 --> 33:03.190]  That's how I am.
[33:03.270 --> 33:05.690]  But in any case, how do I confirm that I'm registered?
[33:05.810 --> 33:07.930]  Is there any way to confirm if you've been registered?
[33:08.150 --> 33:09.950]  You'll get a little thing in the mail.
[33:10.330 --> 33:13.610]  Because this was, like, two or three months ago I registered, and I've got nothing in the mail.
[33:13.890 --> 33:14.770]  How did you register?
[33:15.070 --> 33:18.690]  I sent in a money order for the payment and with my name and address.
[33:18.910 --> 33:19.650]  And you didn't get anything?
[33:19.750 --> 33:20.570]  I got nothing.
[33:20.770 --> 33:21.870]  Are you sure you sent it to us?
[33:22.150 --> 33:22.610]  I did.
[33:22.830 --> 33:24.010]  To the address on the website.
[33:24.130 --> 33:24.250]  All right.
[33:24.270 --> 33:26.590]  We'll talk after the show, because you definitely should have gotten something by now.
[33:26.590 --> 33:30.410]  Well, there may be other people that want to find out if they're, you know, confirmed as being registered.
[33:30.630 --> 33:30.950]  Yeah.
[33:31.550 --> 33:32.110]  Yeah, definitely.
[33:32.290 --> 33:40.170]  Well, you can mail me personally, Emanuel, at 2600.com, and I'll look into that, or mail the radio show, OTH, at 2600.com.
[33:40.530 --> 33:41.390]  I'm sure they got it.
[33:41.410 --> 33:42.250]  I just want to find out.
[33:42.310 --> 33:43.790]  Well, no, you should have gotten something in return.
[33:43.950 --> 33:48.810]  I mean, I know that we've been sending things out, so it seems kind of strange that we would treat you in this shabby fashion.
[33:48.810 --> 33:50.650]  I mean, others I could understand, but you?
[33:51.610 --> 33:51.970]  No.
[33:52.410 --> 33:54.010]  It doesn't make a whole lot of sense.
[33:54.030 --> 33:54.090]  It's okay.
[33:55.110 --> 33:55.470]  All right.
[33:55.670 --> 33:57.770]  Let's read a couple of letters, and we'll take phone calls.
[33:57.890 --> 34:00.070]  212-209-2900.
[34:01.350 --> 34:02.010]  Here's a letter.
[34:02.190 --> 34:02.670]  Hello, everyone.
[34:02.750 --> 34:04.350]  I got a question for all of you.
[34:04.970 --> 34:12.770]  I am constantly hearing clicking sounds on the phone system at work, almost like the signal is dropping in strength, and I've read somewhere that this might be a sign of tapping.
[34:13.130 --> 34:14.650]  I know you can get tap detectors.
[34:14.870 --> 34:15.990]  They're like 80 bucks.
[34:15.990 --> 34:24.550]  Is there a way I can hook up a standard voltmeter up to the phone line to test for a drop in current from someone picking up another extension or tapping into the line with a recording device?
[34:24.710 --> 34:31.570]  I know I could probably make one of these extension lights that I've seen schematics for, but I was wondering if there is something I can just use with a voltmeter.
[34:31.570 --> 34:35.870]  If so, how much should the drop be across a normal untapped line?
[34:35.970 --> 34:37.130]  How much would it change?
[34:37.790 --> 34:38.570]  Bernie, do you...
[34:38.570 --> 34:40.550]  That's a really good question he put in.
[34:41.370 --> 34:46.630]  Most, virtually all of those commercial tap detectors are complete wastes of money.
[34:46.950 --> 34:51.970]  There's nothing that can determine if there's a real law enforcement tap on your phone line.
[34:52.050 --> 34:56.910]  They don't, like, attach a tape recorder to your phone line with alligator clips anymore, like in the old days.
[34:57.010 --> 34:58.630]  It's actually done at the central office.
[34:58.630 --> 34:59.610]  That's not a tape recorder.
[34:59.770 --> 35:11.430]  In fact, they don't even have to, with this CALEA bill that was passed in 95, they can just do it from the FBI office and have direct access to your telephone company's central switch without the phone company even knowing about it.
[35:12.290 --> 35:13.350]  Just type it in.
[35:13.470 --> 35:17.150]  Now, of course, they're going to get a warrant before they'll type in your phone number, obviously.
[35:17.290 --> 35:17.730]  Sure.
[35:17.930 --> 35:28.310]  You wouldn't ever think the FBI or other federal law enforcement agency would ever, just out of curiosity, punch in a phone number just to see what's going on now that they can do that.
[35:28.630 --> 35:30.130]  But, of course, I trust them.
[35:30.770 --> 35:37.470]  In any case, this guy can take a voltmeter, just a simple, like, Radio Shack, even an analog.
[35:37.750 --> 35:45.650]  Actually, I would recommend an analog voltmeter as opposed to a digital one, because an analog voltmeter, you can actually see the needle swinging back and forth.
[35:45.730 --> 35:49.830]  A digital one, you can't see those voltage fluctuations that are subtle.
[35:50.750 --> 36:03.810]  When a normal phone line, like a POTS phone line, not a digital line that you might have on the PBX where you work, but if it's just a regular, plain old phone line, when the phone line is on hook, you should see about 48 volts.
[36:04.490 --> 36:13.390]  And that voltage is coming from a huge rack of batteries at the central office, which is supposed to keep the phone system working in case the power goes down.
[36:13.390 --> 36:18.350]  And you notice your phone still works because of all those batteries putting 48 volts down your phone line.
[36:18.570 --> 36:21.570]  Anyway, you should see 48 volts when the phone line is on hook.
[36:21.810 --> 36:31.470]  When you take it off hook, it should drop down to about 6 volts and fluctuate slightly as you talk into the phone or, like, dial digits.
[36:31.710 --> 36:45.670]  Now, if while you're on the phone, you see the voltage drop consistently to, you know, like 5 volts or 4 volts, at the same time you hear a click, that's a good sign that somebody else has picked up an extension.
[36:46.290 --> 36:57.050]  There are fairly inexpensive items on the market that will, that, you know, can sometimes light up an LED accurately if there's been an additional voltage drop, but they're not that reliable.
[36:57.190 --> 37:02.050]  Really, if you look at a DC voltmeter doing that, it's a clue.
[37:02.050 --> 37:12.290]  But if he's, it's a one in a million chance that if you, maybe not one in a million, but it's very unlikely if you hear any clicks in your line that somebody's actually wiretapping you.
[37:12.310 --> 37:16.170]  It could be some amateur out there hooking a butt set up, you know, a test phone up to your line.
[37:16.290 --> 37:17.770]  Could be a telco guy.
[37:17.950 --> 37:19.530]  You know, I catch them doing that all the time.
[37:19.990 --> 37:28.410]  You know, they have, most of the professional butt sets have a high impedance transformer in the thing, so you wouldn't even detect the voltage drop.
[37:28.570 --> 37:31.750]  They could monitor the phone line without you even hearing any clicks.
[37:31.750 --> 37:36.510]  So, unless it's somebody who's really amateurish, you're not going to hear any noise.
[37:36.510 --> 37:37.450]  It's not like Hollywood.
[37:37.610 --> 37:40.390]  You're not going to hear any clicks or telltale noises anymore.
[37:40.390 --> 37:43.370]  That's just an invention of the movie industry.
[37:43.550 --> 37:44.730]  It has nothing to do with reality.
[37:44.990 --> 37:49.670]  And, you know, it's something that people like to think, you know, their line is clean unless they hear something.
[37:49.970 --> 37:54.330]  You know, the fact is you could be monitored at any time and you won't know it.
[37:54.430 --> 37:56.890]  So, just assume that you're being monitored on your telephone.
[37:57.170 --> 37:58.690]  It's very simple to do.
[37:58.690 --> 38:09.010]  And the difference between law enforcement that will go around and just do this with or without a warrant and hackers, is that hackers, when they figure out how it works, will tell everybody and show everybody and, of course, be blamed for it.
[38:09.410 --> 38:15.510]  But, you know, I would like nothing better than to actually see this thing working and to be able to show people just how easy it is.
[38:15.510 --> 38:19.070]  Because that would make things, you know, that would wake people up.
[38:19.190 --> 38:20.990]  They say, wow, someone can just type this in.
[38:20.990 --> 38:24.610]  And if they can get beyond the fear of hackers thinking, oh, hackers can do this.
[38:24.770 --> 38:26.110]  No, anybody can do this.
[38:26.410 --> 38:26.770]  Anybody.
[38:26.770 --> 38:33.170]  The cop down the street who doesn't like you for some reason can spy on your conversations because he's got the access.
[38:33.730 --> 38:35.110]  You know, all kinds of people can abuse it.
[38:35.490 --> 38:47.770]  During my stay in federal prison, I got a chance to talk with some organized crime affiliates who had had mounds of electronic surveillance imposed on them by the FBI.
[38:48.130 --> 38:54.170]  And the vast majority of it did not involve actual wiretaps of phone lines.
[38:54.710 --> 39:03.890]  The majority of it was actual hidden radio transmitters or hardwired microphones installed into buildings.
[39:03.890 --> 39:16.570]  And in this particular organized crime family's case, the lawyer for the mob boss, the lawyer's office was actually bugged by the FBI.
[39:16.610 --> 39:21.070]  They installed all kinds of monitoring equipment in the actual lawyer's office.
[39:21.630 --> 39:28.910]  Most of the evidence against these guys was obtained not through phone line surveillance but on other means of surveillance.
[39:28.910 --> 39:32.730]  So be aware that just because you're not saying it on the phone doesn't mean you're not safe.
[39:32.730 --> 39:43.270]  If you're concerned about being under some sort of electronic surveillance, whether it's by law enforcement or who knows, the industry for electronic surveillance equipment is huge.
[39:43.550 --> 39:46.350]  Literally hundreds of millions of dollars of this stuff gets sold every year.
[39:46.470 --> 39:47.450]  Well, most of it is garbage.
[39:48.050 --> 39:48.450]  Exactly.
[39:48.610 --> 39:49.170]  Well, exactly.
[39:49.210 --> 39:50.650]  But that doesn't mean people aren't using it.
[39:50.850 --> 39:56.990]  The vast majority of this stuff is currently not being purchased by law enforcement.
[39:56.990 --> 40:01.570]  There's a huge commercial market, not a government market, for this stuff.
[40:01.570 --> 40:19.990]  And if you look at the sales statistics of all this electronic surveillance equipment being sold and compare it with the actual number of electronic surveillance warrants that are issued by federal courts, there's just a few thousand warrants that are issued every year compared to literally millions of dollars a year,
[40:20.050 --> 40:21.690]  this stuff that's purchased by the federal government.
[40:21.690 --> 40:28.590]  So they, you know, either they have tons and tons of this stuff sitting around not being used or they're using it illegally.
[40:29.030 --> 40:31.130]  So, you know, take your pick on what's happening.
[40:31.330 --> 40:32.370]  But you can probably have a clue.
[40:32.590 --> 40:33.690]  Well, you have to look out.
[40:33.870 --> 40:44.670]  If there are federal statutes, it's in the USC, which state that you're not supposed to possess, use, or generally possess a device for surreptitious bugging.
[40:45.210 --> 40:45.630]  Title III.
[40:47.390 --> 41:08.530]  And that term, the definition of Title III is becoming increasingly vague, as we've witnessed from the fine folks at Ramsey Electronics who were raided a few months ago for selling the most mundane, like, hobby-type radio transmitters that ham radio operators would play with.
[41:08.670 --> 41:11.870]  Boy Scout troops were buying these things as science projects.
[41:11.870 --> 41:15.090]  This is like Mr. Microphone-type toys.
[41:15.550 --> 41:17.630]  And they were raided by U.S.
[41:17.750 --> 41:18.210]  Customs.
[41:18.290 --> 41:22.710]  And Ramsey's had about $40,000 worth of this stuff confiscated from them.
[41:22.830 --> 41:30.670]  It's being sold at ham radio flea markets and ham radio and hobbyist magazines for decades openly.
[41:31.030 --> 41:37.570]  Like, this stuff is, you know, nobody who's really doing serious electronic surveillance would think to use this little stuff.
[41:37.570 --> 41:54.070]  But, so, apparently the government is trying to squelch anything that could possibly be used for anything that involves, anything that sort of infringes on their territory, which is surveillance.
[41:54.210 --> 41:59.010]  Right, so we don't, for one minute, think that they're doing it because they want to protect our privacy.
[41:59.610 --> 42:01.410]  I don't think it has anything to do with it.
[42:01.450 --> 42:01.590]  Okay, yeah.
[42:02.030 --> 42:02.410]  All right.
[42:02.610 --> 42:05.150]  Well, I just wanted to cut that off at the pass before they clean up.
[42:05.150 --> 42:05.950]  They don't like competition.
[42:05.950 --> 42:08.690]  Well, going back to Kalea, there's actually a U.S.
[42:08.770 --> 42:12.190]  company that's selling some German-developed software for Kalea.
[42:12.230 --> 42:17.550]  If you go to Cryptome.org, C-R-Y-P-T-O-M-E.org, you'll see a wonderful little article on that.
[42:17.610 --> 42:18.270]  Wow, it's a great site, by the way.
[42:18.450 --> 42:19.590]  It's an excellent site.
[42:19.650 --> 42:20.990]  I recommend everyone go there daily.
[42:21.150 --> 42:21.990]  He's got a list now.
[42:22.050 --> 42:23.870]  And speaking of which, because...
[42:23.870 --> 42:24.950]  Doesn't he have the DCSS?
[42:25.350 --> 42:31.890]  Yeah, well, now, they've been keeping a copy of the DCSS on that particular site as well.
[42:32.030 --> 42:35.730]  Now, Cryptome has not been charged, as we have been charged by the MPAA.
[42:35.950 --> 42:37.930]  In those lawsuits, which are still ongoing.
[42:38.270 --> 42:48.910]  But what the MPAA has been doing over the past couple of weeks is methodically going down our list of mirrors and contacting the owners of all of those sites and sending threatening letters to them.
[42:49.010 --> 42:58.070]  In many cases, that has gotten people kicked off systems, kicked out of classes and fired from jobs and things like that because it's intimidation.
[42:58.070 --> 43:00.650]  And they're going to, you know, the people that run sites.
[43:00.910 --> 43:07.050]  So, if you want to join us and have a mirror of DCSS, we welcome you.
[43:07.210 --> 43:08.070]  We'll add you to the list.
[43:08.210 --> 43:15.850]  But you should be aware that the MPAA is playing hardball and that they're going to resort to any tactic to try and silence you.
[43:16.570 --> 43:19.670]  So, go to our website, www.2600.com.
[43:19.790 --> 43:22.390]  We have a story up there now about everything that's been going on.
[43:22.690 --> 43:25.610]  And if you want to join us in the fight, hey, we welcome you.
[43:25.730 --> 43:26.730]  But know the risks.
[43:26.810 --> 43:27.670]  Know what's going on.
[43:27.750 --> 43:31.270]  Because these guys, they're, you know, they're playing for keeps.
[43:31.450 --> 43:31.950]  We are too.
[43:32.110 --> 43:36.190]  But they got, like, you know, real money behind them.
[43:36.270 --> 43:36.670]  Oh, boy.
[43:37.490 --> 43:38.090]  It's unbelievable.
[43:38.310 --> 43:38.430]  All right.
[43:38.450 --> 43:39.110]  Let's take some phone calls.
[43:39.110 --> 43:41.590]  212-209-2900.
[43:41.770 --> 43:42.350]  Good evening.
[43:42.490 --> 43:42.950]  You're on the air.
[43:43.870 --> 43:44.130]  Hey.
[43:44.470 --> 43:45.330]  My name's Aaron.
[43:45.790 --> 43:47.350]  I've been listening for a long time.
[43:48.150 --> 43:48.990]  You're the one.
[43:50.230 --> 43:51.970]  We knew we had a listener out there somewhere.
[43:53.110 --> 43:53.470]  Yeah.
[43:54.250 --> 43:58.070]  This whole FBI and school thing is really crazy.
[43:58.390 --> 43:59.030]  Secret Service.
[43:59.370 --> 43:59.650]  Oh, yeah.
[43:59.870 --> 44:00.430]  Secret Service.
[44:00.530 --> 44:00.830]  Excuse me.
[44:01.370 --> 44:11.930]  Well, the last year in my school, well, in the public school that I should be going to, um, uh, some, you're going to an unauthorized school now?
[44:12.130 --> 44:12.370]  What?
[44:13.010 --> 44:13.730]  No, I go to a...
[44:13.730 --> 44:14.710]  Are you going to an unauthorized...
[44:14.710 --> 44:15.250]  Oh, you're going to a...
[44:15.250 --> 44:16.430]  Let's let the guy talk.
[44:16.830 --> 44:17.610]  What's on your mind?
[44:17.990 --> 44:22.190]  Um, he made copies of, uh, dollar bills using the school's equipment.
[44:22.690 --> 44:23.010]  Uh-oh.
[44:23.770 --> 44:24.190]  Good idea.
[44:25.530 --> 44:32.950]  And then, uh, he, he got caught with them trying to use them in a snack machine, and by the end of the day, he was taken away.
[44:34.530 --> 44:35.170]  So, yeah.
[44:35.310 --> 44:37.290]  Well, you know, that's the kind of thing that I grew up with.
[44:37.290 --> 44:38.970]  I grew up expecting the Secret Service to do.
[44:39.130 --> 44:41.110]  If you copy money, they'll take an interest in you.
[44:41.290 --> 44:44.510]  You know, not if, if, if you're on a website or something like that.
[44:44.950 --> 44:54.090]  It's, it's, it's really incredibly dumb to try and counterfeit money and pass it off yourself, certainly, uh, especially in the place that you did it.
[44:54.310 --> 44:58.650]  But, you know, this is, this is, uh, you know, obviously a kid that needs to, uh, to learn something.
[44:58.790 --> 45:02.830]  And hopefully, hopefully they didn't, uh, you know, crucify him too badly.
[45:02.990 --> 45:04.570]  They just, uh, kind of scared him a little bit.
[45:04.570 --> 45:05.310]  Do you know what happened to him?
[45:05.750 --> 45:06.150]  Uh, yeah.
[45:06.310 --> 45:07.350]  They, they, they scared him.
[45:07.430 --> 45:10.330]  They charged him with some minor stuff and let him go.
[45:10.710 --> 45:10.850]  Yeah.
[45:10.890 --> 45:11.650]  You see, now that's the thing.
[45:11.790 --> 45:13.930]  That's a, that's clearly a financial crime.
[45:14.510 --> 45:15.050]  Counterfeiting money.
[45:15.210 --> 45:16.650]  You can't get much more financial than that.
[45:16.890 --> 45:18.310]  What they did was they scared him.
[45:18.410 --> 45:19.590]  He's probably never going to do it again.
[45:19.830 --> 45:22.430]  If this had involved computers, we'd be talking prison time.
[45:22.610 --> 45:24.730]  Do you think what he was trying to do was actually rip off the machine?
[45:24.730 --> 45:26.310]  Or do you think he was trying to figure out how it worked?
[45:26.530 --> 45:28.490]  Because how does a machine recognize a dollar bill?
[45:28.890 --> 45:29.910]  Does it recognize it by using?
[45:29.910 --> 45:30.570]  Well, he was ripping off the machine.
[45:31.230 --> 45:34.330]  He was trying to get money, get a, a candy out of the machine or something.
[45:34.550 --> 45:41.190]  But was he trying to figure out how the machine recognizes a dollar bill by seeing if a photocopy would work versus, uh, green paper, for example?
[45:41.330 --> 45:41.710]  I don't know.
[45:42.250 --> 45:44.510]  No, he knew it would work and it, it worked.
[45:44.530 --> 45:44.930]  Does it work?
[45:45.150 --> 45:45.430]  Yeah.
[45:45.670 --> 45:46.050]  Oh, wow.
[45:46.470 --> 45:49.730]  I would, you know, I would try to see if it worked once.
[45:49.730 --> 45:55.830]  But I wouldn't go around passing it out to people and say, oh, this is a way to get free stuff because that's stealing, obviously.
[45:56.010 --> 45:58.010]  But figuring out how it works, that's experimentation.
[45:58.010 --> 45:59.550]  A lot of people can't see the difference.
[45:59.990 --> 46:00.130]  Yeah.
[46:00.590 --> 46:01.950]  That's, that's what's scary these days.
[46:02.210 --> 46:02.570]  Exactly.
[46:03.030 --> 46:06.750]  I've, I've also had trouble with the, uh, with, uh, the Bell Atlantic DSL.
[46:07.750 --> 46:08.470]  Oh, boy.
[46:08.750 --> 46:09.090]  Oh, yeah.
[46:09.230 --> 46:09.270]  You too.
[46:10.370 --> 46:10.730]  Yeah.
[46:10.830 --> 46:12.370]  You and everybody else, I know.
[46:12.450 --> 46:13.910]  I've heard nothing but horror stories.
[46:14.030 --> 46:15.550]  Our DSL has managed to stay up.
[46:15.810 --> 46:17.410]  Uh, but, you know, I gotta tell you something.
[46:17.410 --> 46:22.450]  We've, we've gone from 112 to, uh, to 512 as far as our connection speed.
[46:22.710 --> 46:25.070]  And nobody notices any difference in speed.
[46:25.190 --> 46:26.050]  Now, explain that to me.
[46:26.130 --> 46:30.050]  Is that just because the net has gotten so much more lagged in the past few weeks or what?
[46:30.410 --> 46:32.450]  You'd think it'd be four times faster, but it's not.
[46:32.710 --> 46:42.790]  Yeah, I think, I, I think they're tricking you in, in some way because I, I get like great speed monitors, but it takes, it takes forever to download the same thing.
[46:43.010 --> 46:43.190]  Uh-huh.
[46:43.250 --> 46:53.350]  Well, one of the things that these companies are doing is they're selling so many, uh, DSL lines but on the other end of that DSL line is still maybe a T1, which you're sharing with like 40 other subscribers.
[46:53.970 --> 46:55.350]  That's, that's not good, yeah.
[46:55.350 --> 47:01.770]  So, the pipe between you and the ISP may be, you know, exceptionally high, unlike my 28.8 modem, which I'm still very happy with mine.
[47:02.330 --> 47:15.870]  Uh, but so far as the ISP connectivity to the rest of the known internet, uh, you're sharing just a limited amount of, uh, bandwidth and parceling it out over however fast your individual line happens to be.
[47:16.070 --> 47:16.350]  Yup.
[47:16.770 --> 47:20.110]  It's one of the unfortunate, uh, things that comes with, uh, especially cable modems.
[47:20.230 --> 47:21.150]  People are noticing that too.
[47:21.270 --> 47:21.630]  That's right.
[47:21.950 --> 47:22.330]  Yeah.
[47:22.330 --> 47:22.950]  Hey, thanks for the call.
[47:23.410 --> 47:24.550]  Yeah, down with the MPAA.
[47:24.790 --> 47:25.610]  Okay, take care.
[47:25.710 --> 47:25.930]  Absolutely.
[47:26.130 --> 47:27.550]  That's the attitude we need in our schools.
[47:27.750 --> 47:33.090]  But who will make the nifty green screen with the previews and the, the ratings and the...
[47:33.570 --> 47:36.270]  Well, we'll, we'll come up with a appropriate solution.
[47:36.370 --> 47:37.230]  It's not just the MPAA.
[47:37.350 --> 47:41.790]  It's all the, uh, all the movie, uh, houses too that are, that are, uh, after us.
[47:41.890 --> 47:42.010]  Yes.
[47:42.490 --> 47:42.910]  Oh, no.
[47:43.010 --> 47:44.990]  Just, just making a reference.
[47:45.890 --> 47:46.250]  Okay.
[47:46.550 --> 47:46.910]  Never mind.
[47:47.010 --> 47:47.310]  Go ahead.
[47:47.610 --> 47:49.030]  You, you, you have to understand this is radio.
[47:49.210 --> 47:50.210]  You can't make references.
[47:50.430 --> 47:52.470]  No, I was making a reference to you, not to the public at large.
[47:52.650 --> 47:52.870]  Uh-huh.
[47:53.230 --> 47:57.990]  Emmanuel, have you gotten the, uh, the caricature of, uh, Jack Valente, the head of the MPAA yet?
[47:58.450 --> 47:59.750]  Uh, we're working on it.
[47:59.910 --> 48:01.070]  We're working on, on his head.
[48:03.090 --> 48:04.090]  It's very funny.
[48:04.470 --> 48:04.610]  Uh-huh.
[48:05.830 --> 48:06.150]  Okay.
[48:06.730 --> 48:07.670]  Uh, well, interesting.
[48:08.670 --> 48:09.570]  Um, what else?
[48:09.910 --> 48:12.270]  Um, yeah, well, let's take another phone call.
[48:12.370 --> 48:12.450]  That's a good idea.
[48:12.450 --> 48:14.150]  2-0-9-2-900.
[48:14.770 --> 48:16.050]  Yeah, secret service in schools.
[48:16.190 --> 48:17.470]  That'll, that'll solve a lot of problems.
[48:17.790 --> 48:18.730]  Is that constitutional?
[48:19.010 --> 48:19.390]  I don't know.
[48:19.450 --> 48:19.750]  Good evening.
[48:19.790 --> 48:20.250]  You're on the air.
[48:20.350 --> 48:21.210]  Hey, how's it going, guys?
[48:21.370 --> 48:21.770]  How you doing?
[48:21.990 --> 48:26.190]  How many years did you say that kid's going to be facing for, uh, hacking into the, uh, DARE site?
[48:26.290 --> 48:29.210]  Seven and a half to fifteen for each offense, and he did it twice.
[48:29.330 --> 48:30.810]  What do you get for possession these days?
[48:30.990 --> 48:31.650]  I don't know.
[48:31.730 --> 48:32.150]  You know what I mean?
[48:32.170 --> 48:33.010]  Is there any irony there?
[48:33.090 --> 48:37.790]  I don't care at all with the folks at DARE that this guy's going to be in space more time than if he's been dealing drugs at the school or something?
[48:38.290 --> 48:38.610]  Absolutely.
[48:39.190 --> 48:44.330]  I, you know, but, but I think there's enough room in the prison system to accommodate everybody at the rate they're building prisons.
[48:44.570 --> 48:46.090]  We have, what, two million people there now?
[48:46.330 --> 48:50.190]  Pretty soon you'll be able to hack into the prison website that you're incarcerated in.
[48:50.270 --> 48:50.990]  That'll be kind of nice.
[48:51.410 --> 48:54.250]  Well, I don't think they're going to give, uh, net access to anybody anytime soon.
[48:54.890 --> 48:57.870]  Well, you could always sneak a computer in and, uh, tube of toothpaste or something.
[48:57.970 --> 48:59.110]  They're getting smaller and smaller.
[49:00.190 --> 49:01.930]  Bernie, I think you were accusing of your computer.
[49:02.510 --> 49:03.630]  Yeah, I had these two guards.
[49:03.630 --> 49:18.410]  I had these two guards storm into my cell at three o'clock one morning and, uh, they tossed my bed upside down, demanded to know where the computer was, uh, rifled through all my, uh, my personal papers and effects, then, uh, then dragged me, handcuffed me and took me to this,
[49:18.610 --> 49:22.410]  uh, this other, like, uh, hole type cell.
[49:22.830 --> 49:26.990]  Locked me up there for a few hours while they, uh, searched my, searched my cell for a computer.
[49:26.990 --> 49:37.170]  And, and, and as they were dragging me out, I saw one guard squeezing a tube of toothpaste on the, on the floor, like, like I had a really ultra miniature computer concealed inside the toothpaste tube.
[49:37.390 --> 49:39.950]  It was, it was all, it was all obviously a misunderstanding.
[49:40.030 --> 49:50.450]  I had dictated a, uh, a letter to a friend on the outside and asked her to fax it to, uh, to the prison.
[49:50.590 --> 49:54.810]  Long story, but in any case, that's, that's the common mentality we're dealing with.
[49:54.810 --> 49:56.010]  Anybody could make that mistake.
[49:56.310 --> 49:56.530]  Sure.
[49:56.710 --> 49:56.950]  Definitely.
[49:57.070 --> 49:58.350]  Did they allow you to have a fax machine in prison?
[49:59.090 --> 50:01.790]  No, but apparently they thought I was using a computer to fax.
[50:02.970 --> 50:03.930]  All right, thanks for the call.
[50:04.110 --> 50:04.310]  All right.
[50:05.250 --> 50:06.690]  212-209-2900.
[50:06.910 --> 50:07.550]  Let's go over here.
[50:07.770 --> 50:08.110]  Good evening.
[50:08.130 --> 50:08.650]  You're on the air.
[50:09.290 --> 50:10.150]  Hi, Bernie.
[50:10.230 --> 50:13.090]  I'd just like to ask you some, an opinion on something.
[50:13.450 --> 50:13.970]  One thing.
[50:14.090 --> 50:14.670]  Make it fast.
[50:14.790 --> 50:14.930]  Okay.
[50:15.690 --> 50:21.270]  Did, did you notice that when you call the Census Bureau, guess what the first question they ask you is?
[50:22.450 --> 50:23.590]  Your social security number.
[50:23.930 --> 50:24.330]  No.
[50:24.810 --> 50:26.910]  Whether you have buttons on your telephone.
[50:28.170 --> 50:30.050]  I mean, what else?
[50:30.210 --> 50:32.030]  I don't know if that's for the census, Rebel.
[50:32.210 --> 50:37.190]  I think that's for, to decide how you're going to continue with the call process.
[50:37.450 --> 50:40.290]  You know, I got, I got my census envelope in the mail recently.
[50:40.430 --> 50:40.570]  Really?
[50:40.730 --> 50:44.250]  And it says on the outside, you know, your response is required by law.
[50:44.430 --> 50:45.670]  I found that kind of interesting.
[50:45.670 --> 50:46.770]  So I looked up the law.
[50:47.490 --> 50:52.650]  Basically, you can opt out of the sentence, out of the sentence, no, the census.
[50:53.190 --> 50:53.490]  Yes.
[50:53.690 --> 50:54.350]  Opt out of the census.
[50:55.010 --> 50:56.190]  It's a hundred dollar fine.
[50:56.930 --> 51:02.270]  So, so, you know, if you're really up on privacy, you know, start opening your wallet, folks.
[51:02.470 --> 51:02.870]  Well, wait a minute.
[51:02.870 --> 51:04.630]  How do they fine you if they don't know who you are?
[51:04.890 --> 51:05.470]  Well, that's, that's the other thing.
[51:05.610 --> 51:10.630]  If they send you a certified letter and you refuse to reply, they can charge you the hundred dollar fine.
[51:10.650 --> 51:22.030]  If they just send you, like, the mass mailing that they've been doing forever, it's very difficult to prove that the census contacted you, rather, that the Department of Commerce contacted you for the census.
[51:22.030 --> 51:23.190]  I'm going to grab a dial tone.
[51:23.330 --> 51:24.490]  Let me just do that fast before we do it.
[51:24.490 --> 51:24.810]  Yeah, get that.
[51:25.250 --> 51:25.570]  Okay.
[51:26.410 --> 51:27.790]  Because all lines are taken up.
[51:28.590 --> 51:29.370]  Someone told me...
[51:29.370 --> 51:32.090]  One of these, one of these census guys actually threatened to arrest me for not...
[51:32.090 --> 51:34.210]  You see, you're defeating the whole purpose of what I'm trying to do here.
[51:34.630 --> 51:34.790]  Yes.
[51:34.950 --> 51:37.050]  I want to make a call before the dial tone goes away.
[51:38.170 --> 51:44.650]  Basically, this really has nothing to do with the census, but when Rebels said, you know, call up this thing, I thought of calling something.
[51:45.330 --> 51:51.670]  It seems there's, there's rumors of a new area code, and I want to verify if this area code actually exists.
[51:52.750 --> 51:54.830]  Bernie, maybe, maybe you might have heard of it.
[51:55.450 --> 51:56.610]  Can you hear me over the dial tone?
[51:56.990 --> 51:57.470]  I can hear you.
[51:57.610 --> 51:57.790]  Okay.
[51:59.130 --> 52:01.730]  Supposedly, there's an area code called 666.
[52:02.790 --> 52:03.430]  Oh, yes.
[52:03.950 --> 52:13.890]  Now, who, what, what, what part of the United States would be insane enough to actually go against the Bible Belt and have an area code like 666?
[52:14.110 --> 52:15.470]  I want to know who's got the guts to do that.
[52:15.810 --> 52:16.430]  Las Vegas.
[52:16.850 --> 52:17.850]  You think Las Vegas?
[52:18.150 --> 52:18.830]  Sure, same city.
[52:18.830 --> 52:18.970]  All right.
[52:19.190 --> 52:24.050]  Well, let's get an operator because, well, let me try calling 666 information, see if that works.
[52:28.880 --> 52:30.060]  Oh, dial tones don't time out.
[52:30.140 --> 52:30.680]  Isn't that kind of cool?
[52:31.460 --> 52:31.900]  Uh-oh.
[52:32.300 --> 52:35.320]  I think we can't call information from this phone line.
[52:35.340 --> 52:36.620]  I think that's, that's the problem there.
[52:37.100 --> 52:37.400]  All right.
[52:37.460 --> 52:41.760]  So, what we're going to do instead is get an operator.
[52:41.900 --> 52:42.660]  But you know what they're going to do?
[52:42.760 --> 52:45.660]  They're going to transfer us to the pay service when we ask where the area code is.
[52:45.780 --> 52:47.580]  You'll hear us getting ripped off, basically.
[52:48.060 --> 52:50.060]  Unless we get a nice operator like last time.
[52:50.540 --> 52:51.080]  She was nice.
[52:51.260 --> 52:51.840]  She was very nice.
[52:53.000 --> 52:53.440]  Stand by.
[52:57.030 --> 52:57.830]  AT&T.
[52:58.210 --> 53:00.890]  To place a call, please file the number that you are calling.
[53:01.110 --> 53:01.510]  Operator.
[53:02.590 --> 53:04.290]  Please hold for operator assistance.
[53:04.530 --> 53:05.310]  I never get to say operator.
[53:06.410 --> 53:08.050]  AT&T, how may I help you?
[53:08.170 --> 53:08.770]  Hi, operator.
[53:08.770 --> 53:10.330]  I've heard rumors of a new area code.
[53:10.410 --> 53:12.010]  I'm trying to find out where it is.
[53:12.170 --> 53:12.850]  Can you help me with that?
[53:13.750 --> 53:15.150]  Uh, hold on a moment.
[53:15.190 --> 53:16.650]  Let me transfer you to someone that can.
[53:16.870 --> 53:17.350]  Oh, okay.
[53:17.590 --> 53:18.210]  Oh, very helpful.
[53:20.630 --> 53:21.890]  There it goes, 75 cents.
[53:24.070 --> 53:24.390]  No?
[53:24.590 --> 53:26.150]  AT&T 00, Vanessa, how may I help you?
[53:26.250 --> 53:27.570]  Oh, how much does this call cost?
[53:28.390 --> 53:30.750]  Within state 99, out of state $1.49.
[53:31.250 --> 53:31.790]  Oh, really?
[53:31.910 --> 53:32.090]  Okay.
[53:32.190 --> 53:34.130]  See, I just want to find out where an area code is.
[53:34.290 --> 53:35.310]  Will that cost me money?
[53:36.210 --> 53:36.850]  Um, yes.
[53:37.090 --> 53:38.450]  And I don't think they...
[53:38.450 --> 53:41.110]  I don't know if they charge you the full 99 or half.
[53:41.110 --> 53:41.770]  I don't know.
[53:41.890 --> 53:43.350]  If I hang up now, do I get charged anything?
[53:43.750 --> 53:44.190]  Uh, no.
[53:44.370 --> 53:44.730]  Oh, I don't?
[53:44.790 --> 53:45.350]  Okay, that's good.
[53:45.410 --> 53:45.830]  That's good to know.
[53:45.890 --> 53:47.270]  Well, maybe you can help me with this, then.
[53:47.270 --> 53:51.930]  I'm looking to find out where area code 666 is, if there is such an area code.
[53:53.070 --> 53:54.510]  Okay, let me see one moment.
[53:54.670 --> 53:54.930]  Thank you.
[53:56.750 --> 53:58.930]  No area code listed under that number.
[53:59.130 --> 53:59.370]  Really?
[53:59.810 --> 54:00.170]  Really.
[54:00.170 --> 54:00.750]  Okay.
[54:01.430 --> 54:02.290]  All right, thanks anyway.
[54:02.430 --> 54:02.750]  You're welcome.
[54:02.830 --> 54:03.070]  Bye-bye.
[54:03.830 --> 54:04.770]  Well, I guess our...
[54:04.770 --> 54:05.090]  There's 99 cents.
[54:05.230 --> 54:06.130]  I guess our source...
[54:06.130 --> 54:07.630]  I don't know if I got charged for that.
[54:08.670 --> 54:09.630]  We'll ask the station later.
[54:10.370 --> 54:12.010]  I guess our sources were wrong.
[54:12.550 --> 54:13.010]  All right.
[54:13.110 --> 54:13.870]  Well, we'll look into this.
[54:13.990 --> 54:14.810]  We'll look into this a little further.
[54:14.930 --> 54:17.290]  I didn't think there'd be any place around here that would do that.
[54:17.490 --> 54:18.510]  But we'll just have to...
[54:18.510 --> 54:19.010]  We'll look further.
[54:19.770 --> 54:20.210]  All right.
[54:20.530 --> 54:21.750]  Sorry for wasting everyone's time.
[54:21.870 --> 54:23.410]  212-209-2900.
[54:23.570 --> 54:24.110]  Let's go over here.
[54:24.270 --> 54:24.610]  Good evening.
[54:24.670 --> 54:25.110]  You're on the air.
[54:27.070 --> 54:27.490]  All right.
[54:27.550 --> 54:28.170]  You were on the air.
[54:28.250 --> 54:29.130]  That was your moment of fame.
[54:29.130 --> 54:29.850]  Let's go over here.
[54:29.930 --> 54:30.170]  Good evening.
[54:30.270 --> 54:30.730]  You're on the air.
[54:31.110 --> 54:31.390]  Hi.
[54:31.590 --> 54:32.310]  This is Bertha.
[54:32.310 --> 54:33.010]  How are you?
[54:33.830 --> 54:34.190]  Okay.
[54:34.470 --> 54:35.050]  How are you?
[54:35.390 --> 54:35.750]  Hi.
[54:36.470 --> 54:37.130]  Two things.
[54:37.310 --> 54:37.430]  One.
[54:38.490 --> 54:39.210]  Hi, fiber.
[54:41.870 --> 54:42.230]  Okay.
[54:42.370 --> 54:43.090]  I didn't do that.
[54:43.230 --> 54:43.850]  I didn't do that.
[54:45.190 --> 54:46.330]  That person hung up.
[54:46.430 --> 54:47.090]  I didn't do it.
[54:47.270 --> 54:48.050]  And I can tell.
[54:48.150 --> 54:49.850]  The reorder proves that they hung up.
[54:50.190 --> 54:52.050]  You wouldn't get a reorder if I hung up.
[54:52.750 --> 54:53.270]  Good evening.
[54:53.330 --> 54:53.730]  You're on the air.
[54:54.210 --> 54:55.850]  Good evening, fellow revolutionaries.
[54:56.050 --> 54:56.570]  How are you doing?
[54:58.370 --> 54:59.370]  Very, very good.
[55:00.450 --> 55:07.410]  Listen, I'm not in the computer age yet, but this year I think I'm going to go out there and spring for a computer.
[55:07.590 --> 55:09.730]  Now, I'm not going to bore you with the computer questions.
[55:09.730 --> 55:11.690]  I'll wait for the computer program to do that.
[55:11.790 --> 55:12.150]  Very good.
[55:12.990 --> 55:15.130]  Not that you're going to bore them either, but I'm just saying.
[55:15.190 --> 55:17.770]  I wanted to ask you what you thought of, like, Linux.
[55:19.230 --> 55:20.390]  You mean Linux?
[55:20.630 --> 55:20.830]  Linux.
[55:21.490 --> 55:21.970]  Linux.
[55:22.390 --> 55:25.470]  Well, it's a good operating system.
[55:25.690 --> 55:27.110]  They've got the right attitude.
[55:27.370 --> 55:32.170]  And since they're kind of like co-defendants in our lawsuit, I have to say that they've got a lot of guts.
[55:32.390 --> 55:32.590]  Yeah.
[55:35.470 --> 55:46.270]  And how about if you put things, a mirror on your site, you're telling people that they're going down, each of the people that they're on the site.
[55:46.750 --> 55:52.450]  Yeah, they will contact the person who is listed as your administrative contact on that particular site.
[55:52.510 --> 55:55.550]  They may even go to your provider and try to intimidate them.
[55:55.670 --> 55:59.010]  So make sure that everybody knows the stakes when you go into it.
[55:59.730 --> 56:00.130]  Cool.
[56:00.370 --> 56:00.570]  All right?
[56:00.630 --> 56:04.590]  If you really believe in something and you're with people who do, it won't be a problem.
[56:04.750 --> 56:12.070]  I mean, yeah, you might find yourself in court with us, but, you know, sometimes you have to take a stand, and it always feels good when you do.
[56:12.450 --> 56:15.710]  Yeah, it always feels good when you do the right thing, doesn't it?
[56:15.710 --> 56:17.230]  That's been my experience.
[56:17.410 --> 56:17.550]  Yep.
[56:17.810 --> 56:18.450]  And mine too.
[56:18.690 --> 56:19.010]  All right.
[56:19.130 --> 56:19.730]  Have a good night, sir.
[56:19.730 --> 56:20.230]  Thanks for calling.
[56:20.650 --> 56:23.650]  I'm going to tactfully refrain from offering my comments on Linux.
[56:25.410 --> 56:25.770]  Okay.
[56:26.410 --> 56:27.870]  We'll refrain from listening, then.
[56:27.890 --> 56:31.190]  Those who know me are chuckling to themselves out in radio.
[56:31.290 --> 56:32.330]  Well, they always do that.
[56:32.450 --> 56:32.810]  Well, that's true.
[56:32.810 --> 56:33.450]  Because they know you.
[56:33.770 --> 56:34.570]  People who all know me chuckling.
[56:34.570 --> 56:34.810]  Good evening.
[56:34.970 --> 56:35.390]  You're on the air.
[56:35.910 --> 56:36.270]  Hello.
[56:36.570 --> 56:36.990]  How you doing?
[56:37.870 --> 56:44.350]  I'm doing fine, but I'm hearing you very hard because I'm listening to a computer calling from Scotland on the mobile phone.
[56:44.350 --> 56:46.770]  Do you have pay-as-you-go phones in the USA?
[56:47.310 --> 56:47.950]  I wanted to ask you.
[56:48.210 --> 56:48.250]  Yeah.
[56:48.430 --> 56:49.590]  You're calling from Scotland right now?
[56:49.870 --> 56:50.210]  Yeah.
[56:50.410 --> 56:50.850]  Oh, great.
[56:51.310 --> 56:52.090]  What part of Scotland?
[56:53.070 --> 56:53.470]  Sorry?
[56:53.690 --> 56:54.290]  What part of Scotland?
[56:54.950 --> 56:55.250]  Edinburgh.
[56:55.670 --> 56:55.890]  Ah.
[56:56.890 --> 56:57.630]  I've heard of it.
[56:57.850 --> 56:58.730]  Now, what's your question again?
[56:59.410 --> 57:01.350]  Do you have pay-as-you-go phones in the USA?
[57:01.650 --> 57:02.350]  What kind of phones?
[57:02.510 --> 57:03.110]  Pay-to-go?
[57:03.210 --> 57:03.790]  Pay-as-you-go.
[57:03.970 --> 57:04.870]  Pay-as-you-go phones.
[57:04.870 --> 57:13.410]  Yes, you dial a number on the phone, dial a number after that, and it adds up money to your phone, and you talk afterwards.
[57:13.670 --> 57:14.370]  Yes, we do.
[57:15.050 --> 57:15.650]  You do?
[57:15.910 --> 57:16.550]  We do.
[57:16.710 --> 57:18.770]  Sprint carries their calling...
[57:18.770 --> 57:19.610]  Not their calling card.
[57:19.670 --> 57:19.990]  What is it?
[57:20.090 --> 57:21.370]  The prepaid telephones?
[57:22.030 --> 57:22.210]  Yeah.
[57:22.210 --> 57:23.530]  Omnipoint has the same kind of thing.
[57:24.430 --> 57:27.750]  It's just as popular here as I would imagine across the pond.
[57:28.190 --> 57:28.990]  Yeah, exactly.
[57:29.190 --> 57:34.790]  And it's very popular here, the conversations like this with you now, which is now about if you know what I mean.
[57:35.050 --> 57:35.210]  Right.
[57:36.970 --> 57:38.190]  How are you calling us?
[57:38.230 --> 57:39.790]  Are you calling us through some weird way?
[57:39.890 --> 57:41.330]  Because you sound kind of...
[57:41.330 --> 57:42.210]  It's a mobile.
[57:42.470 --> 57:43.050]  It's a mobile phone.
[57:43.170 --> 57:43.330]  Okay.
[57:43.490 --> 57:43.690]  Yeah.
[57:43.930 --> 57:44.230]  All right.
[57:45.130 --> 57:48.270]  And I guess you'll probably hear my voice in a few minutes on the computer.
[57:49.090 --> 57:50.070]  A little bit of a delay.
[57:50.230 --> 57:52.610]  We're being broadcast on Real Audio, and there's always a little bit of delay.
[57:54.910 --> 57:55.310]  Yes.
[57:55.930 --> 57:56.210]  Okay.
[57:56.430 --> 57:57.370]  Five minutes remaining.
[57:57.750 --> 57:58.230]  Ah.
[57:58.350 --> 57:59.650]  Oh, that was a warning you got, huh?
[57:59.950 --> 58:00.150]  Okay.
[58:00.230 --> 58:00.550]  Yeah, yeah.
[58:00.770 --> 58:01.130]  Exactly.
[58:01.850 --> 58:09.610]  So, do you know, if you could check this site, freedom.bg.com or .net or .org.
[58:10.110 --> 58:14.850]  So, it's freedom.phreedom.org.
[58:16.090 --> 58:16.890]  That's not taken?
[58:17.650 --> 58:23.550]  That's a Bulgarian site for phone freaking and so on.
[58:23.730 --> 58:23.990]  Really?
[58:23.990 --> 58:24.230]  Hmm.
[58:24.570 --> 58:24.730]  Yeah.
[58:24.910 --> 58:25.070]  Yeah.
[58:25.070 --> 58:25.890]  Very interesting site.
[58:26.450 --> 58:28.070]  As I'm Bulgarian myself.
[58:28.430 --> 58:28.690]  Uh-huh.
[58:29.210 --> 58:30.850]  You're a Bulgarian living in Scotland.
[58:31.170 --> 58:31.910]  Yeah, exactly.
[58:32.150 --> 58:32.710]  Very interesting.
[58:32.910 --> 58:33.690]  So, yeah.
[58:33.890 --> 58:36.390]  So, I recommend you to see that when you get some time.
[58:36.570 --> 58:42.150]  And I'll write you a mail, and I'll explain you why it's so interesting, especially for you to see that.
[58:42.430 --> 58:42.810]  Okay.
[58:42.890 --> 58:43.450]  I look forward to it.
[58:43.510 --> 58:43.790]  Okay.
[58:43.790 --> 58:44.650]  Thanks for calling.
[58:44.970 --> 58:45.330]  Bye-bye.
[58:45.610 --> 58:45.970]  Take care.
[58:46.270 --> 58:46.450]  Wow.
[58:46.650 --> 58:47.790]  A Bulgarian from Scotland.
[58:48.090 --> 58:48.190]  Yeah.
[58:48.610 --> 58:49.950]  That's going on a car phone.
[58:50.130 --> 58:50.790]  Yeah, exactly.
[58:50.930 --> 58:51.010]  Yeah.
[58:51.190 --> 58:52.790]  I wanted to hear the sounds he made when he hung up.
[58:52.890 --> 58:54.730]  But, you know, these days you don't get any sounds anymore.
[58:54.810 --> 58:55.990]  You used to hear all kinds of neat sounds.
[58:56.030 --> 58:57.650]  There was a bit of a reorder there, I heard.
[58:57.770 --> 58:59.370]  That's the BAI phone system doing that.
[58:59.410 --> 58:59.750]  Oh, okay.
[58:59.810 --> 58:59.950]  Yeah.
[59:00.190 --> 59:00.950]  Hey, we're out of time.
[59:01.370 --> 59:02.010]  I'm sorry, everybody.
[59:02.070 --> 59:02.530]  We didn't get to.
[59:02.890 --> 59:04.250]  But next week, we'll have Kevin on.
[59:04.350 --> 59:07.210]  He'll be taking questions and calls and things like that.
[59:07.210 --> 59:11.570]  And we'll have all kinds of other updates on the various exciting things we're involved in.
[59:12.330 --> 59:13.970]  Bernie, any closing comments from you?
[59:14.670 --> 59:20.930]  I had a great time at the annual Winterfest gathering this past weekend of pirate radio operators and shortwave enthusiasts.
[59:20.930 --> 59:25.070]  So I want to say hi to all those listeners who are listening tonight.
[59:25.450 --> 59:30.870]  And I'll publicize it a little better next year so everybody who's listening can attend if they wish to.
[59:31.110 --> 59:31.490]  Okay.
[59:31.550 --> 59:39.290]  And we will try to get the shows up this week for all the dedicated listeners out there that like to hear the show twice or maybe aren't listening yet and haven't heard us say this yet.
[59:39.670 --> 59:42.090]  We'll try and get that updated as soon as possible.
[59:42.410 --> 59:43.950]  Isaac, Porsche, have any closing comments?
[59:44.250 --> 59:52.750]  Those of you who are actually interested in electronic countermeasures, bugs, and so forth, go to search engine and look for TSCM, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures.
[59:52.970 --> 59:53.570]  Great site.
[59:53.770 --> 59:54.210]  Great site.
[59:54.510 --> 59:55.010]  Yes, it is.
[59:55.330 --> 59:59.250]  Also, for Linux users, X11R6, X11R4.
[01:00:00.050 --> 01:00:00.690]  One of those.
[01:00:00.750 --> 01:00:01.590]  New X11 is out.
[01:00:01.970 --> 01:00:02.370]  Get it.
[01:00:02.530 --> 01:00:02.870]  Kind of cool.
[01:00:03.130 --> 01:00:03.370]  All right.
[01:00:03.810 --> 01:00:05.170]  Until next week, Emmanuel Galski.
[01:00:05.190 --> 01:00:05.610]  Have a good night.
[01:00:06.670 --> 01:00:08.610]  But if they could, they would.
[01:00:08.950 --> 01:00:09.730]  For me, they bombed.
[01:00:09.930 --> 01:00:11.610]  For the best, it's back from the worst.
[01:00:12.230 --> 01:00:14.150]  I hope that's understood.
[01:00:14.330 --> 01:00:15.350]  For me, they bombed.
[01:01:00.830 --> 01:01:07.130]  When the prosecution rested in the Abidugialo case, WBAI did not.
[01:01:12.650 --> 01:01:24.310]  From Albany and back to the Bronx, WBAI's news, interviews, arts, and investigative reports worked 24-7 to tell the truth, the authorities left unspoken.
[01:01:24.550 --> 01:01:29.410]  Community residents once again took to the streets today to protest the latest police killing.
[01:01:29.730 --> 01:01:33.930]  This time, the shooting death of African immigrant Amadugialo.
[01:01:34.730 --> 01:01:35.890]  WBAI's comprehensive.