[00:02.120 --> 00:04.780]  In my position, July 2, 1947.
[00:05.680 --> 00:10.680]  The Army Air Force has announced that a flying disk has been found and is now in the possession of the Army.
[00:11.040 --> 00:18.960]  All the officers they've been told, found sometime last week, have been infected at Lauderdale, New Mexico, and sent to Wright Field, Ohio, for her infection.
[00:19.660 --> 00:26.300]  All that on the Army, at Lauderdale, for 40 years or more, they've threatened people and intimidated people.
[00:26.300 --> 00:32.280]  They've spied on UFO growth, infiltrated UFO growth, spinal researchers, compiled off the aid.
[00:32.800 --> 00:34.660]  Their response is bordered on paranormal.
[00:36.100 --> 00:44.840]  UFO Desk, a program about UFOs and the paranormal, can be heard this Sunday night, Monday morning, at 1 a.m.
[00:45.400 --> 00:49.160]  UFO Desk is on every two weeks, and this weekend is it.
[00:49.600 --> 00:55.580]  UFO Desk is produced for WBAI by veteran broadcaster Paul Williams.
[00:56.260 --> 01:08.020]  So, whether you really believe we're being visited, or see this whole thing as an odd and ongoing folk phenomena, tune in to UFO Desk this Sunday night, Monday morning, at 1 a.m.
[01:08.420 --> 01:09.460]  You never know.
[01:16.930 --> 01:21.030]  Yes, you can tune in to UFO Desk, but right now, it's time for Off the Hook.
[01:24.150 --> 01:29.390]  You'll notice that's not the theme, because we're missing a very important person.
[01:30.530 --> 01:31.650]  Emmanuel, are you on the line?
[01:33.770 --> 01:34.710]  Hello, Emmanuel.
[01:35.230 --> 01:35.870]  I'm here.
[01:35.970 --> 01:36.510]  Can you hear me?
[01:36.550 --> 01:37.390]  I can hear you.
[01:37.570 --> 01:37.930]  Okay.
[01:38.330 --> 01:38.890]  Where are you?
[01:39.070 --> 01:39.450]  There's a little thing there.
[01:40.790 --> 01:43.630]  Well, probably by the sound of my voice, you can tell I'm not in the studio.
[01:43.930 --> 01:44.390]  Of course.
[01:44.830 --> 01:45.050]  Yeah.
[01:46.170 --> 01:52.710]  And you'll probably be able to tell pretty soon just where exactly I am, because of all the noise around me.
[01:53.410 --> 01:55.410]  Let me just say, I've been on...
[01:56.690 --> 02:00.310]  This is the train ride from hell, I guess is one way to say it.
[02:01.350 --> 02:05.310]  I've been trying to get into the city from the island since about 3 o'clock this afternoon.
[02:06.370 --> 02:10.390]  And unfortunately, what happened was...
[02:10.390 --> 02:10.990]  Are you still there?
[02:11.230 --> 02:11.850]  No, I'm still there.
[02:11.930 --> 02:12.090]  Okay.
[02:12.210 --> 02:14.130]  Because I have no way of knowing if I drop you.
[02:17.410 --> 02:21.110]  I was basically snowed in, so I couldn't get my car out of my driveway.
[02:21.190 --> 02:22.310]  That guy just said Kew Gardens.
[02:22.670 --> 02:22.890]  Yeah.
[02:23.850 --> 02:24.970]  I'll get to that in a second.
[02:25.090 --> 02:25.290]  Okay.
[02:25.350 --> 02:28.610]  The fact that he's saying Kew Gardens really annoys me, and I'll get to that in a second.
[02:29.850 --> 02:37.190]  I was snowed in, so I figured, you know, the logical thing to do would be to listen to all the people on the radio and on the TV that say, Use mass transit.
[02:37.390 --> 02:38.230]  Use mass transit.
[02:38.330 --> 02:39.530]  The answer to all your problems.
[02:39.690 --> 02:41.930]  The answer to, you know, everything that could possibly go wrong.
[02:42.210 --> 02:43.110]  Don't use a car.
[02:43.370 --> 02:46.630]  Don't slide around on the ice and cause pollution and things like that.
[02:46.630 --> 02:47.450]  There's no reason for that.
[02:47.710 --> 02:49.550]  So I made it to the train station.
[02:49.610 --> 02:54.430]  I got on the train, and the train broke down right next to the Northport station.
[02:54.770 --> 02:55.330]  Oh, that's right.
[02:55.350 --> 02:56.250]  The train broke down.
[02:58.270 --> 03:04.050]  And the irony of that is that we were stuck for an hour and a half, and it had nothing to do with the snow.
[03:04.570 --> 03:09.010]  It had to do with an engine that wouldn't start.
[03:09.130 --> 03:10.710]  I heard it was a computer problem, actually.
[03:11.050 --> 03:13.350]  They were saying that they couldn't get the computer to start.
[03:13.610 --> 03:15.950]  And I heard someone yelling about firewalls.
[03:16.970 --> 03:21.030]  It's kind of a strange thing to see all these mechanics running around yelling about firewalls.
[03:21.610 --> 03:23.930]  So there we were by the Northport station.
[03:24.070 --> 03:25.550]  Nobody would let us off the train.
[03:26.130 --> 03:31.150]  If they would let us off the train, we could have gotten, say, a taxi and taken to the next station and taken the train there.
[03:31.150 --> 03:38.570]  Instead, they let us just sit on the train for an hour and a half, festering, making the same announcement every five minutes, saying, oh, the engine won't start.
[03:38.570 --> 03:41.490]  We're working on having it soon, and we'll get moving soon.
[03:41.850 --> 03:43.190]  Same announcement every five minutes.
[03:45.050 --> 03:50.890]  Eventually, they finally did what they should have done in the first ten minutes, and they got another engine to tow the train.
[03:51.070 --> 03:56.170]  Of course, they towed the train back to Northport instead of forward so that we could actually move ahead.
[03:56.970 --> 04:00.930]  Then they put us on buses and sent us to a place called Hicksville.
[04:01.810 --> 04:03.930]  Unfortunately, the bus driver didn't know how to get to Hicksville.
[04:03.990 --> 04:05.510]  All the passengers had to give them directions.
[04:06.570 --> 04:10.290]  We got to Hicksville one minute after a train left.
[04:10.750 --> 04:13.410]  So these people had absolutely no concern for their passengers.
[04:13.410 --> 04:15.170]  They don't care if they get any place.
[04:15.330 --> 04:16.450]  They wouldn't hold a train.
[04:16.670 --> 04:19.290]  Another train sped through and didn't even stop at the station.
[04:19.650 --> 04:21.610]  So now I'm on a train that's making local stops.
[04:21.610 --> 04:27.510]  There's no reason for it to be making local stops because nobody here was going to anywhere except New York.
[04:28.130 --> 04:33.150]  So, yeah, now we have to stop at Kew Gardens and Forest Hills and Woodside and all those other things.
[04:33.290 --> 04:40.230]  Eventually, I'll make it to Penn Station where I plan on getting a taxi and heading straight down to the radio station, hopefully in time to play the outro.
[04:41.730 --> 04:53.670]  So, basically, you're braving the storm of the century, which has been downgraded to the storm of 50 years, which in turn has been downgraded to the decade, to the year, to the week, and now I think it's just about the level of me with an ice cube and a cheese grater outside.
[04:53.910 --> 04:57.310]  Well, as I get closer to the city, I notice that there's less snow on the ground.
[04:57.370 --> 04:58.610]  But out on the island, there was quite a bit.
[04:58.690 --> 05:02.890]  There was at least a foot on the ground that I couldn't get through, which is why I decided to take the train.
[05:02.970 --> 05:09.490]  I tell you right now, I will never, ever, I don't care what's on the ground, I don't care if it's hot, burning coal, I will not get on that train again.
[05:09.490 --> 05:13.610]  There is just no way that a train is better than driving yourself into the city.
[05:13.790 --> 05:14.370]  Oh, I wouldn't agree.
[05:15.110 --> 05:17.170]  Well, you didn't go through what I just went through.
[05:17.330 --> 05:19.090]  And apparently this happens a lot.
[05:19.450 --> 05:21.990]  I mean, I'd like to see if there's any media coverage of this.
[05:22.070 --> 05:31.010]  People sitting in a train, inside a train for an hour and a half, not being told anything, not being allowed to get out, not being allowed to walk a few feet through a station to get a taxi or something.
[05:31.530 --> 05:32.170]  It's unbelievable.
[05:32.470 --> 05:38.630]  Right now the media is busy in Seabright, New Jersey, watching them disappear underwater like they do every four seconds.
[05:38.630 --> 05:39.570]  It's ridiculous.
[05:40.610 --> 05:42.690]  Do you recognize the music going on behind you, sir?
[05:42.870 --> 05:45.050]  I can barely hear you, so no, I can't hear the music.
[05:45.350 --> 05:47.870]  Well, that music is by Mr. Mark Snow.
[05:47.870 --> 05:50.930]  He's a very nice fellow who does music for the X-Files.
[05:51.090 --> 05:55.690]  And recently, this past Sunday, in fact, was the premiere of The Lone Gunman.
[05:55.910 --> 05:57.210]  Yeah, you know, I saw that.
[05:57.370 --> 05:57.910]  You saw that?
[05:57.930 --> 05:59.270]  I have a few comments on that as well.
[05:59.710 --> 06:14.570]  Well, The Lone Gunman is a show that's basically a spinoff of the X-Files involving a trio of basically hackers, the characters go by the name of Ringo Langley, Melvin Frohicke, and John Fitzgerald Byers.
[06:14.870 --> 06:19.890]  And they run around and they investigate conspiracies and put out a magazine called The Lone Gunman.
[06:20.470 --> 06:22.050]  And it's a lot of fun.
[06:22.170 --> 06:23.670]  And they actually have their own series now.
[06:25.250 --> 06:27.930]  Oh, the first four cars are getting off at Forest Hills, huh?
[06:28.030 --> 06:30.950]  Yeah, you know, they always tell you the first four cars will platform at Forest Hills.
[06:31.130 --> 06:32.470]  But how do you know what car you're in?
[06:33.370 --> 06:35.050]  That's what you figure out when you get on the train.
[06:35.990 --> 06:37.590]  Anyway, the show was a lot of fun.
[06:38.590 --> 06:39.410]  Well, I hope to see it.
[06:39.450 --> 06:41.630]  I happened to watch it this past Sunday.
[06:41.910 --> 06:42.110]  Okay.
[06:42.470 --> 06:43.750]  And, uh...
[06:45.310 --> 06:46.030]  Uh-oh.
[06:47.390 --> 06:48.530]  You're going robot voice.
[06:49.290 --> 06:50.410]  Oh, I'm talking to Genie's.
[06:50.470 --> 06:51.530]  I'm going robot voice now.
[06:54.730 --> 06:55.770]  And now you're gone.
[06:56.350 --> 06:56.870]  Oh, I'm not.
[06:57.030 --> 06:57.770]  No, you're not gone.
[06:57.850 --> 06:58.030]  Okay.
[06:58.350 --> 06:58.890]  How dare you.
[06:59.190 --> 06:59.490]  Okay.
[06:59.670 --> 07:00.370]  Well, you're still here.
[07:00.430 --> 07:01.910]  I'll call you when I'm gone, all right?
[07:02.950 --> 07:04.030]  What's the dial tone for?
[07:04.730 --> 07:05.830]  That wasn't my dial tone.
[07:06.710 --> 07:07.510]  Did you hear it?
[07:08.290 --> 07:08.730]  Hmm.
[07:09.230 --> 07:09.910]  Hang on a moment.
[07:16.600 --> 07:17.040]  Okay.
[07:17.220 --> 07:17.860]  Now I lost him.
[07:18.840 --> 07:20.860]  If you guys give me a second, I'll get him back.
[07:21.180 --> 07:22.020]  But, uh...
[07:22.020 --> 07:23.120]  For the moment, anyway.
[07:23.160 --> 07:24.640]  We're talking about, uh...
[07:24.640 --> 07:25.300]  The Lone Gunman.
[07:26.100 --> 07:26.540]  Uh...
[07:26.540 --> 07:27.240]  It was a lot of fun.
[07:27.320 --> 07:27.980]  They poked some...
[07:27.980 --> 07:30.180]  They poked fun at a bunch of hacker movies.
[07:30.320 --> 07:32.060]  I mean, the original, uh...
[07:32.060 --> 07:34.100]  Injuring sequence was, uh...
[07:34.100 --> 07:35.880]  A Mission Impossible spoof.
[07:36.500 --> 07:37.020]  Uh...
[07:37.020 --> 07:40.840]  They read reference to this, you know, fictional chip called the Optium 4.
[07:41.400 --> 07:41.920]  Uh...
[07:41.920 --> 07:43.160]  Which is supposed to have a...
[07:43.160 --> 07:44.460]  A, uh...
[07:44.460 --> 07:46.060]  Diabolical tracking system.
[07:46.280 --> 07:49.200]  Much like the much-touted Pentium 3 here in real life.
[07:49.660 --> 07:49.940]  Uh...
[07:49.940 --> 07:53.700]  And the new character to join the trio is, uh...
[07:53.700 --> 07:53.980]  A woman.
[07:54.540 --> 07:55.020]  Uh...
[07:55.020 --> 07:57.420]  Character name is Yviz Adelaide Harlow.
[07:57.740 --> 07:59.240]  Which is an anagram of, uh...
[07:59.240 --> 08:00.220]  Lee Harvey Oswald.
[08:00.380 --> 08:03.220]  Which is going to open up some very interesting doors, no doubt.
[08:04.560 --> 08:05.060]  Um...
[08:05.060 --> 08:06.080]  She, uh...
[08:06.080 --> 08:11.840]  Was just about doing everything that you would find Laura Croft, the computer game character, doing.
[08:12.280 --> 08:15.980]  Firing two Mac-10s and, you know, wearing skin-tight this, that, and the other thing.
[08:15.980 --> 08:22.780]  So they seem to have had a lot of fun, uh... trying to deal with the hacker culture and, uh...
[08:22.780 --> 08:24.940]  Poke a lot of, uh...
[08:24.940 --> 08:26.080]  You know, poke...
[08:26.080 --> 08:27.240]  Poke some fun at, uh...
[08:27.240 --> 08:29.580]  Some of the greater images that, uh...
[08:29.580 --> 08:30.320]  We seem to share.
[08:30.720 --> 08:32.540]  Who else we got in the studio, by the way?
[08:33.360 --> 08:33.680]  Uh...
[08:33.680 --> 08:34.060]  I'm here.
[08:34.220 --> 08:34.640]  You're here.
[08:34.800 --> 08:35.280]  Mike's here.
[08:35.440 --> 08:35.780]  And, uh...
[08:35.780 --> 08:36.480]  Yeah, I'm here.
[08:36.600 --> 08:37.140]  You're here, too?
[08:37.260 --> 08:37.640]  Am I here?
[08:37.760 --> 08:38.500]  Am I on?
[08:38.600 --> 08:39.060]  You're on.
[08:39.220 --> 08:39.400]  Okay.
[08:39.780 --> 08:40.240]  There you go.
[08:40.440 --> 08:43.760]  Well, you guys take it a second while I try to get Emmanuel back on the line here.
[08:43.840 --> 08:44.520]  Okay, we'll take it.
[08:44.520 --> 08:46.020]  I thought that, uh...
[08:46.020 --> 08:58.960]  The Lone Gunman was the pinnacle of mediocre media hype, and can't count the number of technical problems that I had with how they were hacking...
[08:58.960 --> 09:06.920]  Supposedly hacking into some government computer and actively being traced using IBM ThinkPad laptops.
[09:07.220 --> 09:07.520]  All of it.
[09:07.560 --> 09:09.500]  Everybody had the IBM ThinkPad laptops.
[09:09.980 --> 09:11.460]  I think that's a coincidence.
[09:11.740 --> 09:12.280]  Well, why did you...
[09:12.280 --> 09:13.560]  Why does that surprise you?
[09:13.560 --> 09:15.300]  It is a television show, after all.
[09:15.980 --> 09:16.140]  Right.
[09:16.620 --> 09:17.320]  And so...
[09:17.320 --> 09:17.840]  But it wasn't...
[09:17.840 --> 09:26.600]  These technical gaps were not at the level of, like, level nine, where you have these, you know, miserable people rolling around and pulling things out of thin air for no apparent reason.
[09:26.680 --> 09:27.820]  At least these people...
[09:27.820 --> 09:29.980]  At least they were actually, uh...
[09:29.980 --> 09:31.260]  Oh, Emmanuel's actually gone.
[09:31.360 --> 09:32.020]  I have his voicemail in.
[09:33.060 --> 09:34.220]  Yeah, the, uh...
[09:34.220 --> 09:37.980]  The I-10-DM-4 chip actually did use a ZipSocket chip.
[09:38.940 --> 09:39.120]  Hmm.
[09:39.380 --> 09:40.480]  Do they still make those anymore?
[09:40.640 --> 09:41.840]  I honestly don't know.
[09:41.840 --> 09:42.280]  Uh...
[09:42.280 --> 09:43.340]  But it was a lot of fun.
[09:43.680 --> 09:44.620]  And, uh...
[09:44.620 --> 09:46.220]  I-I-I think it was well done.
[09:46.340 --> 09:47.380]  Kudos to all those involved.
[09:47.640 --> 09:50.220]  I wish I'd known that I'd be here, uh...
[09:50.220 --> 09:50.420]  Uh...
[09:50.420 --> 09:50.520]  Uh...
[09:50.520 --> 09:52.260]  Trying to hold down the fork, because I probably...
[09:52.260 --> 09:52.780]  Well, we could...
[09:52.780 --> 09:53.960]  There's lots of things to talk about.
[09:54.040 --> 09:55.860]  Oh, we have plenty of things to talk about, but I could have had...
[09:55.860 --> 09:56.200]  Think about Hamster?
[09:57.000 --> 09:57.620]  We could...
[09:57.620 --> 09:59.240]  We could talk about a lot of things, including...
[09:59.240 --> 10:00.020]  Including, uh...
[10:00.020 --> 10:00.420]  Robert Hanson.
[10:00.580 --> 10:01.680]  We could talk about the other lone gunman.
[10:01.840 --> 10:02.620]  The other lone gunman?
[10:02.700 --> 10:03.700]  The grinning gunman.
[10:03.800 --> 10:04.560]  The grinning gunman.
[10:04.600 --> 10:05.260]  Who are the grinning gunmen?
[10:05.320 --> 10:06.060]  The grinning gunman.
[10:06.100 --> 10:07.360]  The guy who shot a bunch of people.
[10:07.420 --> 10:08.480]  Oh, I don't want to talk about that.
[10:08.560 --> 10:08.780]  That's...
[10:08.780 --> 10:09.300]  That's useless.
[10:09.600 --> 10:11.240]  But he was a quote-unquote nerd.
[10:12.260 --> 10:16.720]  No, he was a psychopath who shot his fellow students in a hallway.
[10:17.200 --> 10:18.180]  He's not a nerd.
[10:18.400 --> 10:18.620]  He's...
[10:18.620 --> 10:19.860]  He's psychotic, is his problem.
[10:19.860 --> 10:20.320]  Well, you did that?
[10:20.500 --> 10:21.260]  Well, all right.
[10:22.340 --> 10:22.780]  Regardless.
[10:23.480 --> 10:25.620]  I want to talk about Robert Hanson, the...
[10:25.620 --> 10:26.500]  Oh, let's talk about Robert.
[10:26.620 --> 10:28.240]  The FBI spy...
[10:28.240 --> 10:28.700]  Let's talk about B.
[10:28.980 --> 10:35.020]  The traitorous swine, Robert Hanson, who was selling our secrets to the Russians since the late 1980s.
[10:36.420 --> 10:37.300]  Mid-1980s.
[10:37.380 --> 10:37.960]  Mid-1980s, yeah.
[10:38.260 --> 10:39.080]  Mid-late, yeah.
[10:39.160 --> 10:39.400]  85.
[10:39.700 --> 10:42.940]  At least before that wall went down and the Iron Curtain got pulled away.
[10:43.200 --> 10:50.700]  I mean, this man is responsible for us losing some of the major intelligence sources that we have.
[10:51.380 --> 10:54.020]  Supposedly, he had access through his job...
[10:54.020 --> 10:54.540]  Through his work.
[10:54.640 --> 10:58.400]  He was the head of the counterintelligence unit at the FBI, by the way.
[10:58.500 --> 11:00.720]  So he's the one who's supposed to be looking for people like himself.
[11:01.560 --> 11:12.120]  Anyhow, in that capacity, he had access to a number of different bits of classified information, including the entire MASINT program.
[11:12.540 --> 11:15.340]  MASINT standing for Measurements and Signatures Intelligence.
[11:15.340 --> 11:28.280]  This is the kind of information that our intelligence agencies, the CIA, the NSA, glean from overhead passes from infrared, smelling for chemical traces in the air.
[11:28.660 --> 11:34.940]  For instance, if you're in a theater of war, you can tell what kind of chemical agents are being used, things like that.
[11:35.080 --> 11:40.300]  That's an entire program that evidently this man just gave the Russians on a silver platter.
[11:41.180 --> 11:43.280]  I think it was just in a plastic bag.
[11:43.340 --> 11:44.020]  Oh, that's right.
[11:44.100 --> 11:44.980]  In a plastic bag.
[11:45.040 --> 11:45.720]  Under a footbridge.
[11:45.820 --> 11:46.480]  Under a footbridge.
[11:46.820 --> 11:47.680]  He's a smart cookie.
[11:47.700 --> 11:59.480]  The PDF of the affidavit filed on behalf of one of the head FBI chief special agents on the case is a very informative piece of information.
[11:59.520 --> 12:00.420]  Oh, it's worth reading.
[12:00.620 --> 12:01.720]  Yeah, absolutely worth reading.
[12:01.860 --> 12:10.260]  Did they do the blacked out sections as they've done in the past with Acrobat Reader so that you can then open it up in the Acrobat Reader and just delete the blacking out?
[12:10.340 --> 12:12.200]  Well, that was the New York Times that screwed up that time.
[12:12.360 --> 12:19.640]  No, the redacted PDF that I saw on Kryptone.org was redacted before they PDFed it.
[12:19.740 --> 12:20.620]  How do you spell Kryptone?
[12:21.160 --> 12:24.340]  C-R-Y-P-T-O-M-E dot O-R-G.
[12:24.620 --> 12:25.040]  Excellent.
[12:25.260 --> 12:25.420]  Yeah.
[12:25.540 --> 12:27.160]  I think people should head over there and take a look.
[12:27.300 --> 12:27.540]  Definitely.
[12:28.420 --> 12:31.240]  He was also a technophile, if I recall.
[12:31.460 --> 12:32.520]  He was a Linux user.
[12:32.520 --> 12:37.960]  He was a Linux user, and he was trying to get his handlers to use PalmPilots to move information around.
[12:38.240 --> 12:40.840]  Now, I don't see how that's beneficial in any way.
[12:41.040 --> 12:44.740]  Even if you're using infrared to beam stuff around on a PalmPilot...
[12:44.740 --> 12:46.060]  Well, a product placement.
[12:46.260 --> 12:46.560]  There you go.
[12:48.460 --> 12:50.540]  3Com helps international traders.
[12:50.740 --> 12:51.140]  Oh, wonderful.
[12:52.580 --> 13:04.340]  Yeah, supposedly, what I imagine is his idea was to, say, sit in a park and just beam information between PalmPilots, like in that commercial where the one guy beams his telephone number to the woman on the train.
[13:04.480 --> 13:04.600]  Right.
[13:05.000 --> 13:06.500]  Where they're sitting right next to each other.
[13:06.600 --> 13:06.880]  Exactly.
[13:07.220 --> 13:15.360]  So, instead of using a dead drop, where two individuals are very far apart, physically and, more importantly, in a time sense.
[13:15.520 --> 13:20.380]  I mean, you drop a bag under that footbridge, it'll be 5 or 10 minutes before the next guy comes to pick it up.
[13:20.460 --> 13:22.940]  You never get close to this individual, who is your handler.
[13:23.420 --> 13:30.020]  Well, they said that one time they saw him come out and remove the pickup signal when they were late.
[13:30.180 --> 13:31.240]  Well, he's supposed to.
[13:31.660 --> 13:37.620]  But, to actually try and sit there on a park bench and beam stuff across between PalmPilot seems ludicrous.
[13:37.860 --> 13:43.800]  I mean, he seems to have been a technophile to the point where he's not actually using the technology in his tradecraft properly.
[13:46.710 --> 13:51.730]  Just proves, as has been suggested, that all Linux users are just closet commies.
[13:51.970 --> 13:52.850]  Oh, I agree.
[13:52.850 --> 14:02.770]  I certainly think that they all have something seriously wrong with them that allows them to have these difficulties with misapplying technologies where they don't belong.
[14:03.370 --> 14:06.770]  I saw an interesting thing, though, in relation to this, which kind of got me nervous.
[14:08.350 --> 14:14.130]  USA Today printed an article, just like every other media outlet who's been jumping all over this thing.
[14:14.330 --> 14:15.030]  Used Dodge for sale.
[14:15.290 --> 14:15.430]  Yeah.
[14:15.870 --> 14:21.650]  Well, besides the huge Dodge for sale, I have the whole article on the computer here, but I don't want to turn it on.
[14:21.650 --> 14:25.170]  Uh, the passage from this that got me a little nervous is the following.
[14:26.010 --> 14:37.990]  A law enforcement source familiar with the investigation says a key development occurred, key may be a little play on words, by the way, uh, when the FBI conducted secret entry into Hanson's house and obtained a copy of his computer hard drive.
[14:38.410 --> 14:41.490]  On it were letters Hanson allegedly wrote to his Russian handlers.
[14:41.810 --> 14:44.950]  The letters were encrypted, but the FBI cracked the code.
[14:44.950 --> 14:45.470]  Yeah.
[14:45.930 --> 14:47.150]  That gets me a little nervous.
[14:47.450 --> 14:51.170]  Well, I mean, if it was, I mean, did he, he had Linux on his laptop, right?
[14:51.170 --> 14:52.770]  Did he have Windows on his home?
[14:52.930 --> 14:54.570]  I mean, it depends on how they were encrypted.
[14:54.690 --> 14:55.750]  It depends on how they're encrypted.
[14:55.890 --> 14:58.190]  And the way I see it, there's a couple of possibilities.
[14:58.750 --> 15:05.190]  It's probably a Russian military intelligence code, a Russian military intelligence cipher that they gave him to use.
[15:05.510 --> 15:06.210]  Most likely.
[15:06.370 --> 15:07.770]  That would be what they'd want to use.
[15:07.770 --> 15:15.170]  So the FBI has, within its ability, to crack military and intelligence-grade ciphers internationally.
[15:15.510 --> 15:17.990]  What does that say about our domestic freeware stuff?
[15:18.510 --> 15:20.410]  That there may be a problem.
[15:20.750 --> 15:23.870]  Uh, on the other hand, they probably got help from the NSA on this.
[15:23.990 --> 15:24.350]  Absolutely.
[15:24.730 --> 15:30.330]  Yeah, I would think that, I mean, the FBI is enhancing their overseas presence.
[15:30.330 --> 15:42.990]  And certainly, uh, it's not that the, the much, uh, touted myth that there's, uh, you know, like a constant war between the armed forces and the intelligence agencies might have some truth to it.
[15:43.150 --> 15:51.870]  But it's certainly, uh, at the level of compartmentalized, top-secret information, there's information sharing going on between the levels of government.
[15:52.010 --> 15:52.410]  Oh, of course.
[15:52.530 --> 15:52.750]  Of course.
[15:52.970 --> 15:53.270]  Of course.
[15:53.750 --> 16:01.050]  Uh, CIA has been known to hand stuff to the KGB, and the KGB has been known to hand stuff to the CIA just for, well, their motive.
[16:01.050 --> 16:02.230]  No, I was talking about the same country.
[16:02.570 --> 16:03.630]  Oh, within the same country, yeah.
[16:03.910 --> 16:04.910]  In the same country.
[16:05.170 --> 16:05.310]  Yeah.
[16:05.310 --> 16:06.130]  Not just...
[16:06.130 --> 16:06.690]  Well...
[16:06.690 --> 16:12.810]  Yeah, it's, you know, the FBI, uh, they got that, uh, alleged mafia guy by bugging his keyboard.
[16:13.170 --> 16:14.190]  That's, that's the other...
[16:14.190 --> 16:15.590]  And sniffing his PGP password.
[16:15.790 --> 16:17.030]  Yeah, that's the other possibility here.
[16:17.070 --> 16:19.490]  But they couldn't track the PGP, but they sniffed his keyboard.
[16:19.630 --> 16:21.330]  They had his passcode, uh, the passphrase.
[16:21.510 --> 16:26.490]  Plus, they also, I mean, if they surreptitiously black-bagged his hard, of Hanson's hard drive...
[16:26.490 --> 16:27.890]  Well, that wouldn't help, though.
[16:28.250 --> 16:30.930]  Yeah, sure, then they would have had all the time in the world to...
[16:30.930 --> 16:32.570]  It's like, it's like safe-cracking.
[16:32.770 --> 16:39.770]  You could have 10 minutes to crack the safe while it's in the store, or you can get a truck and take a safe home, and then have all weekend to work on it.
[16:39.930 --> 16:52.450]  Well, to back up a couple of, of steps, um, the other possibility, besides the, the, you know, Russian military intelligence-grade ciphers, was that, as a big Linux user, he decided that he was going to use this freeware stuff that was lying around, like PGP.
[16:53.130 --> 16:55.850]  Now, uh, PGP is an asymmetric cipher system.
[16:55.850 --> 17:00.390]  For those of you out there who aren't, uh, gifted and talented within the cryptographic card...
[17:00.390 --> 17:03.610]  For those of you who know what an asymmetric cipher system is, but don't know what PGP is.
[17:03.650 --> 17:04.390]  Don't know what PGP is.
[17:04.670 --> 17:10.030]  Well, an asymmetric cipher, uh, is a cipher system which involves two keys.
[17:10.270 --> 17:11.810]  You have a public key and a private key.
[17:13.510 --> 17:25.350]  When you encrypt something to send to another person, for instance, I want to send something to, uh, my friend Mike over there, I'm going to look for his public key, I'm going to encrypt the message with his public key, and send it to him.
[17:25.890 --> 17:35.290]  Now, since he holds the private key, and he exclusively holds the private key, that message can only be read by Mike, as the sole, uh, user, or sole holder of the private key.
[17:36.430 --> 17:43.190]  Uh, there's a whole bunch of other stuff that you can do with RSA and, and these sorts of algorithms, uh, but we're not going to get into it, because it's not applicable.
[17:43.970 --> 17:54.250]  Regardless, uh, the, when you, um, send something, you actually wind up having to use your private key, which is sitting on your hard drive.
[17:54.610 --> 17:59.390]  Now, your, your private key is protected by the idea algorithm and a passphrase.
[18:02.250 --> 18:08.830]  Well, either Hanson was using a really bad passphrase, uh, for them to have cracked idea to get the key.
[18:09.610 --> 18:13.110]  Or, they had the keystroke logger on there, because the FBI has been known to do this.
[18:13.210 --> 18:23.450]  There was the report of the, uh, we'll just say, fine family man, who, uh, had this surreptitious entry and had the keystroke logger placed on his keyboard to, to capture the passphrase.
[18:23.450 --> 18:24.970]  Well, you're assuming, I mean, we're assuming a lot.
[18:25.110 --> 18:26.730]  We're assuming that we know his operating system.
[18:26.930 --> 18:32.550]  We're assuming that he had a, you know, some sort of, that he was using asymmetric public key encryption.
[18:33.270 --> 18:36.670]  Uh, we're also assuming that, I mean, let's look at the threat model.
[18:36.850 --> 18:53.170]  I mean, this guy was head of counterintelligence at FBI and he was, you know, certainly the FBI was going to, uh, not put any limits on the resources that they were going to expend in order to catch this guy.
[18:53.350 --> 18:59.630]  And he's not like some, you know, uh, he's that, he was definitely at the top of their list.
[18:59.770 --> 19:07.050]  I mean, he's not like some regular, ordinary private citizen who might have a bunch of MP3s encrypted on the hard drive.
[19:07.310 --> 19:07.350]  Right.
[19:07.350 --> 19:19.990]  Well, the other, the other thing there is that, um, uh, if, if we were to be able to recover his private key, it probably wouldn't do us any good because the messages he would send were encrypted with the other guy's public key.
[19:20.230 --> 19:20.350]  Right.
[19:20.970 --> 19:24.730]  So to sit there and try to play with this stuff is, is, um, not going to help them.
[19:24.790 --> 19:28.290]  What you, what I often do when I'm sending encrypted mails, I also encrypt it.
[19:28.290 --> 19:29.950]  You encrypt it to yourself and keep it on the drive.
[19:30.010 --> 19:30.790]  I can read it again.
[19:30.890 --> 19:32.810]  But this guy is supposed to know better than that.
[19:33.050 --> 19:40.850]  You don't keep the, you don't keep the things around, which goes back to, again, his, his technology love, which may have been his downfall.
[19:40.990 --> 19:41.010]  Right, exactly.
[19:41.070 --> 19:47.930]  That's the thing is that he, that his, these messages were on his hard drive at all in the first place, whether encrypted or not.
[19:48.030 --> 19:48.050]  Right.
[19:48.130 --> 19:48.370]  Why?
[19:48.530 --> 19:49.310]  Why are they on there?
[19:49.410 --> 19:49.790]  It's ridiculous.
[19:50.070 --> 19:58.090]  If you needed a computer, you can decrypt the stuff in RAM and display it somehow and, uh, never have it written to the hard drive.
[19:58.290 --> 20:00.650]  Which would make sense, but evidently he didn't take these precautions.
[20:00.990 --> 20:05.270]  The other thing that got him, uh, uh, he was going for 15 years, so he did take some.
[20:05.330 --> 20:05.870]  Well, he did.
[20:05.970 --> 20:07.530]  No, I'm, he's not a stupid man.
[20:07.530 --> 20:18.250]  I'm not trying to say that, but certainly, uh, you know, actually, if you read the affidavit, it describes, I mean, as you read it, you can see that he becomes bolder and less cautious over time.
[20:18.490 --> 20:25.550]  You can see that he sort of becomes comfortable and set in his ways in terms of the, they move around the dead drops and stuff like that, don't they?
[20:25.790 --> 20:25.790]  Right.
[20:25.990 --> 20:33.130]  But he certainly is, uh, you know, very comfortable and, you know, the, the head of the KGB starts sending him thank you notes, you know, after.
[20:33.250 --> 20:34.230]  You know, you're doing a good job.
[20:34.530 --> 20:34.530]  Right.
[20:34.610 --> 20:34.830]  Exactly.
[20:35.330 --> 20:45.410]  And so, uh, it's, you know, uh, even he says it in, in one of his notes to them, he's like everything, you know, this doesn't last forever.
[20:45.410 --> 20:45.870]  Yeah.
[20:46.130 --> 20:48.710]  And I'm going to keep it going until it... What was, what was the quote?
[20:48.850 --> 20:54.870]  We've, something has awoken the tiger and I'm no, I've, I am of no more use to you or something like that.
[20:55.130 --> 21:12.630]  Well, the other thing he was doing that was somewhat foolish was, um, actually interfacing with the FBI computer systems while he was at work and looking up the dead drops that he was using to see if someone had filed a report with the FBI on this bag full of a hundred thousand dollars sitting under a footbridge to see if they were onto him.
[21:12.790 --> 21:18.190]  The very fact that he was doing that left a log trip, uh, left an audit trail by which he could be captured later.
[21:18.790 --> 21:21.370]  It's, well, hey, that's, that's what got him.
[21:22.590 --> 21:25.250]  Of course, the response is, uh, interesting too.
[21:25.450 --> 21:33.370]  They, um, the FBI is, uh, obviously it's, it's a black eye for them and they're trying to figure out how to, uh, secure this.
[21:33.590 --> 21:42.990]  These, these are the folks that were making fun of the CIA back with the, the Ames case when they caught Ames and now it's, uh, unfortunately a bit of payback time for them on the CIA's part.
[21:43.810 --> 21:46.550]  Anyhow, a couple of other issues, then we'll get to the phones.
[21:46.710 --> 21:48.870]  212-209-2900.
[21:49.370 --> 22:04.610]  Uh, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, ASIS, and its counterpart, the ASIO, the Australian Secret Intelligence Organization, uh, the two organizations, uh, could be roughly, uh, equivalent to, uh, the CIA and the FBI here.
[22:04.850 --> 22:08.910]  Or roughly equivalent to MI6 and MI5.
[22:09.110 --> 22:09.570]  Same idea.
[22:10.250 --> 22:11.210]  Um, EGRU.
[22:12.170 --> 22:14.190]  Although not, that's not really, that's the question.
[22:14.890 --> 22:16.550]  FSB and NGRU.
[22:16.710 --> 22:22.770]  Uh, regardless, um, they're responding to a decree from their legislator to be more open.
[22:23.390 --> 22:30.110]  And in order to be more open, they're, they're openly soliciting international spies from the Australian people.
[22:30.470 --> 22:39.350]  They've got messages in, in newspapers and they're trying to get people on board and say, come work for us, head overseas and look over people's shoulders.
[22:39.610 --> 22:41.290]  The CIA has advertised.
[22:41.590 --> 22:43.170]  Yeah, the CIA does that now.
[22:43.250 --> 22:43.250]  The CIA does that now.
[22:43.310 --> 22:44.850]  And the Economist has for a while.
[22:44.850 --> 22:47.630]  Well, they do, they do little classified ads like, you know, they run full page ads.
[22:47.650 --> 22:48.630]  They roll full page ads now?
[22:48.870 --> 22:48.990]  Yeah.
[22:48.990 --> 22:52.310]  I've seen display ads in the campus paper, graduating, come work for us.
[22:52.310 --> 22:53.210]  Come work for the CIA, yeah.
[22:53.930 --> 22:56.170]  Um, another quick issue, OS Comet.
[22:56.570 --> 22:57.310]  Anyone familiar?
[22:57.850 --> 23:15.630]  Uh, a fella broke into Exigent software, Exigent manufactures an opera, uh, a system called OS Comet, which is used on the Navstar GPS satellite systems as, uh, the basis of, um, their operation.
[23:16.370 --> 23:25.050]  Um, supposedly, you know, the latest install of OS Comet sitting at the Colorado Springs monitoring station, uh, for the GPS system.
[23:25.210 --> 23:27.290]  And, uh, this fella broke in and got some source code.
[23:27.290 --> 23:29.430]  Why this is a problem, I couldn't tell you.
[23:29.830 --> 23:31.550]  First off, OS Comet is available commercially.
[23:31.550 --> 23:33.270]  You can actually go out and buy this thing.
[23:33.750 --> 23:36.530]  I don't know if you can buy the source, but you can go out and buy it if you want.
[23:36.890 --> 23:41.990]  Uh, despite the fact that it was done under, uh, like a Lockheed Martin subcontract by Exigent or whatever else.
[23:42.390 --> 23:47.190]  Uh, the second part is, just because he has the source code doesn't mean that GPS is vulnerable.
[23:47.670 --> 23:50.950]  Yes, by looking at the source, you have a better idea of what can be done.
[23:51.570 --> 23:54.370]  Uh, you know, the, the, the possible flaws that you can attack.
[23:54.370 --> 23:58.750]  But just having the source really isn't going to get you very far in and of itself.
[23:58.910 --> 23:59.270]  Of course not.
[23:59.270 --> 24:01.490]  The system is a global positioning sensor.
[24:01.650 --> 24:07.750]  So once you try to hack into it from somewhere on the globe, they're going to have your location.
[24:07.950 --> 24:08.730]  Well, possibly.
[24:09.030 --> 24:10.070]  No, almost definitely.
[24:10.390 --> 24:11.270]  If you're accessing...
[24:11.270 --> 24:11.270]  Why is that?
[24:11.270 --> 24:13.890]  Because you're accessing the GPS system.
[24:14.050 --> 24:16.690]  Well, you're just beaming up to the, the satellite as it goes overhead.
[24:16.690 --> 24:21.650]  And it's beaming down to confirm that you've, that it's done whatever, you know...
[24:21.650 --> 24:28.250]  This, this assumes that, this assumes that they're not only pointed to receive instructions from these specific locations on the Earth.
[24:28.450 --> 24:28.690]  Right, exactly.
[24:28.690 --> 24:32.270]  I mean, you'd have to be sitting in like a, a little phone company van in Colorado Springs.
[24:32.470 --> 24:35.570]  I mean, if it's commercially available, you can reverse engineer it and get the functionality out of it.
[24:35.690 --> 24:36.810]  And it's like, that's ridiculous.
[24:37.150 --> 24:39.210]  Well, but that's, that's the news media for you.
[24:39.250 --> 24:43.590]  And the last one is, uh, Congress seems to be waking up to the existence of web bugs.
[24:43.590 --> 24:44.730]  Are we familiar with web bugs?
[24:45.050 --> 24:57.010]  It's a very old technique, which got a lot of press, maybe six or eight months ago, where you load a one bit GIF or a one pixel image, uh, in order to track how a user moves around a site.
[24:57.330 --> 25:01.490]  It's, it's a standpoint by which you can, you know, easily review in logs what this person is doing.
[25:01.950 --> 25:09.370]  And, uh, I guess someone just like tapped their, you know, some aide tapped his congressman on the shoulder and said, Hey, you know, these web bugs are a problem with the privacy man.
[25:09.590 --> 25:12.210]  And the, uh, representative is now up in arms.
[25:12.210 --> 25:17.270]  I don't have their names and it seems ridiculous, but, uh, they're a little slow on the uptake, but they're, they're thinking about it.
[25:18.150 --> 25:20.870]  So anyway, anything else anyone want to add before we go to the phones?
[25:21.210 --> 25:25.690]  Uh, people may have seen in, in the, uh, in the comics this week, the comic strip Boondock.
[25:25.690 --> 25:26.370]  Oh yeah, that's right.
[25:26.370 --> 25:31.670]  It's been doing a, uh, a series on, uh, DCSS and Napster and other interesting topics.
[25:32.330 --> 25:37.130]  It's kind of scary, at least to me, when, when the comic strips are ahead of the editorial page.
[25:37.210 --> 25:37.710]  What are they doing?
[25:38.170 --> 25:50.950]  Um, they've been running a series where the, the main character of the strip has been talking about the DCSS algorithm, which, uh, should be familiar to listeners of this show is, uh, allows people to play DVDs.
[25:51.030 --> 25:51.650]  We have a copy.
[25:51.830 --> 25:52.970]  We have a copy of it right here.
[25:53.190 --> 25:54.150]  I'm looking at it.
[25:54.150 --> 26:01.250]  Uh, and you'll see at the end of the strip, uh, the, the, the character asks, you know, what's so big about the, about the program?
[26:01.950 --> 26:04.430]  And they black it out and say, censored.
[26:04.510 --> 26:08.070]  Yeah, this, this entire, uh, bar, you know how comics are written.
[26:08.210 --> 26:09.530]  They have the three frames next to each other.
[26:09.590 --> 26:14.750]  And if you don't, you can tune into the, uh, the comic show that's on, uh, tonight, in fact.
[26:15.010 --> 26:15.530]  10.30.
[26:15.850 --> 26:16.630]  Uh, 10 o'clock, 10.30.
[26:17.190 --> 26:20.450]  Uh, fine gentlemen, uh, Ed and, uh, anyway.
[26:20.450 --> 26:22.710]  Uh, they have this entire thing blacked out.
[26:22.830 --> 26:23.490]  It says, censored.
[26:23.810 --> 26:33.350]  This comic contains numerous references to the DCS, DCSS code used to bypass the content scrambling system of DVDs, which by order of Judge Lewis Kaplan is illegal to reproduce in any way.
[26:33.530 --> 26:38.590]  We apologize for the inconvenience, but speech that damages the profits of our corporate friends is not protected by the First Amendment.
[26:38.970 --> 26:39.410]  Thank you.
[26:39.990 --> 26:41.750]  It's, this is, this is kind of funny.
[26:42.070 --> 26:46.650]  So, people who haven't seen it can go to, uh, boondocks.net or ucomics.com.
[26:47.010 --> 26:49.030]  And you can, uh, and you can find it online.
[26:49.630 --> 26:53.270]  This ran, uh, I think Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, last week, something like that.
[26:53.310 --> 26:54.130]  Very cool stuff.
[26:54.690 --> 26:55.990]  Alright, let's go to the phones.
[26:56.950 --> 26:58.510]  Uh, pick a number.
[26:59.590 --> 27:00.150]  Uh, eight.
[27:00.470 --> 27:00.730]  Eight?
[27:04.720 --> 27:05.080]  Hmm.
[27:05.740 --> 27:07.300]  Let's see if I can't do this properly.
[27:08.940 --> 27:09.300]  Hello?
[27:09.540 --> 27:09.800]  Hello!
[27:10.080 --> 27:11.220]  No, you're not on the air.
[27:11.260 --> 27:11.780]  You hung up.
[27:11.900 --> 27:13.020]  Isaac hung up on you.
[27:13.160 --> 27:14.260]  I didn't hang up on you.
[27:14.340 --> 27:14.460]  Yeah.
[27:16.920 --> 27:17.280]  Alright.
[27:17.840 --> 27:18.020]  Hello.
[27:18.880 --> 27:20.140]  Give me a second here, alright?
[27:20.700 --> 27:22.320]  I don't use this system very often.
[27:24.340 --> 27:24.740]  Hmm.
[27:26.160 --> 27:28.560]  We'll listen to some music for a second while I figure this out.
[27:42.560 --> 27:43.780]  Do I have to turn the levels up?
[27:53.250 --> 27:53.650]  Hello?
[28:05.490 --> 28:06.610]  I figured it out.
[28:09.370 --> 28:10.470]  Hello, you're on the air.
[28:10.710 --> 28:11.610]  Isaac, how are you?
[28:11.730 --> 28:12.370]  There you are.
[28:12.610 --> 28:13.010]  Hey, hey.
[28:13.290 --> 28:13.790]  How are you doing?
[28:13.790 --> 28:21.910]  Hey, uh, the person to talk to, uh, is the head of the Senate Commerce Committee, Conrad Burns, Senator from Montana.
[28:22.250 --> 28:23.250]  What are we talking to him about?
[28:23.470 --> 28:24.530]  Uh, privacy issues.
[28:24.710 --> 28:25.090]  What about it?
[28:25.090 --> 28:25.310]  Yeah.
[28:25.310 --> 28:28.930]  And anything having to do with, uh, he's got a Tech 7 agenda.
[28:29.150 --> 28:34.150]  If you go to the, uh, uh, triple w dot, uh, senate dot gov. Yeah.
[28:34.150 --> 28:37.950]  And go to, uh, Conrad Burns' site, or to the, uh, Commerce Committee.
[28:38.390 --> 28:40.050]  Uh, there's more information about that.
[28:40.170 --> 28:42.270]  You should actually, um, they're open.
[28:42.270 --> 28:44.530]  You should talk to a guy named Mike Rawson.
[28:44.790 --> 28:45.290]  Mm-hmm.
[28:45.590 --> 28:50.770]  Uh, at, uh, 2-0-2-2-2-4-8-2-5-0.
[28:51.150 --> 28:53.270]  Um, I hope that was a published number.
[28:53.490 --> 28:57.110]  Yeah, yeah, no, that's, that's the, you know, hey, this is our public, uh, representatives.
[28:57.310 --> 28:58.470]  We pay them to answer the phone.
[28:58.770 --> 28:59.110]  Yeah, true.
[28:59.190 --> 28:59.870]  That's part of the thing.
[28:59.990 --> 29:01.690]  So, you know, they're open to stuff.
[29:01.770 --> 29:03.230]  And actually, he's a Republican.
[29:03.530 --> 29:05.490]  You might relate to that, uh, but...
[29:05.490 --> 29:06.350]  I like Republicans.
[29:06.350 --> 29:13.050]  He's got a lot of things, uh, in common with respect to privacy and especially over wireless communications and stuff.
[29:13.250 --> 29:15.870]  So, you know, it would be smart, because these guys don't know.
[29:16.310 --> 29:19.290]  And somebody like you, Isaac, you have a lot of experience and knowledge.
[29:19.450 --> 29:19.550]  Yeah.
[29:19.550 --> 29:22.510]  You should call them up and give them your, you know, consult these guys.
[29:22.770 --> 29:23.870]  That's a, that's a good idea.
[29:24.430 --> 29:24.750]  Well...
[29:24.750 --> 29:32.670]  The other thing, um, too, is, uh, you know, they, I don't know if you're aware, the, uh, House Commerce Committee and the Senate Commerce Committee both held hearings on ICANN.
[29:32.750 --> 29:34.210]  Nah, I don't want to hear about ICANN.
[29:34.330 --> 29:34.610]  I know.
[29:34.610 --> 29:36.110]  Well, nobody will hear about ICANN.
[29:36.350 --> 29:36.710]  ICANN is a nightmare.
[29:36.710 --> 29:41.470]  But, uh, you know, the point is, now, uh, did you hear about new .NET?
[29:41.730 --> 29:42.970]  Yeah, they're out of their minds.
[29:43.070 --> 29:45.310]  They want to throw a bunch of people off of .org, too.
[29:45.830 --> 29:46.190]  And, uh...
[29:46.190 --> 29:47.970]  Well, actually, that, that didn't come down.
[29:48.050 --> 29:51.370]  I spoke to Tierney at the Justice Department about that the other day.
[29:51.530 --> 29:51.610]  Yeah.
[29:51.610 --> 29:53.730]  And also, I saw some comments by ICANN.
[29:53.890 --> 29:55.890]  ICANN is basically testing the waters.
[29:56.030 --> 29:59.050]  They want to see how much they can get away with before everybody flames them to death.
[29:59.790 --> 30:04.330]  And, uh, actually, they took a lot of flack before the House Commerce Committee.
[30:04.650 --> 30:09.170]  Uh, somehow, the Congress is much more up to speed, actually, than the Senate on this issue.
[30:09.410 --> 30:09.570]  Uh-huh.
[30:09.570 --> 30:21.370]  And, uh, Congressman Tozen, Billy Tozen, who's the chair of the, uh, House Commerce Committee, was very concerned that ICANN was creating conflict, uh, with the biz, info, pro, and museum domains.
[30:21.650 --> 30:21.990]  They are.
[30:22.370 --> 30:22.810]  Yes.
[30:23.010 --> 30:38.570]  And, in fact, if we want to call Billy Tozen's office and, uh, show your support for the alternative routes that were not picked up by ICANN, including namespace, you can speak to, uh, Jessica Wallace at 202-225-2927.
[30:39.630 --> 30:45.190]  Uh, and then you can send emails, you know, jessica.wallis at, uh, mail.house.gov.
[30:45.370 --> 30:45.610]  All right.
[30:45.710 --> 30:48.170]  Well, you have a website people can go to real quick, and then we'll move on.
[30:48.390 --> 30:48.730]  Uh, yeah.
[30:48.870 --> 30:50.930]  Go to, uh, namespace.org.
[30:50.930 --> 30:51.830]  There's some links.
[30:51.970 --> 30:55.130]  There's written testimony, uh, from me to the, both committees.
[30:55.370 --> 31:00.530]  And also, keep checking reclaimthe.net, um, for more updates.
[31:00.710 --> 31:00.930]  All right.
[31:00.990 --> 31:01.330]  Thanks a lot.
[31:01.430 --> 31:01.950]  Hey, take care.
[31:02.170 --> 31:02.370]  Bye-bye.
[31:05.350 --> 31:09.700]  That something lives only as long as the last person who remembers it.
[31:11.220 --> 31:14.790]  My people have come to trust memory over history.
[31:17.040 --> 31:20.740]  Memory, like fire, is radiant and immutable.
[31:24.390 --> 31:30.290]  Those who would house the flame of memory in order to put out the dangerous fire of truth.
[31:32.090 --> 31:40.430]  Beware these men, for they are dangerous themselves, and unwise.
[31:41.950 --> 31:49.590]  Their false history is written in the blood of those who might remember, and of those who seek the truth.
[31:51.650 --> 31:52.450]  I like that.
[31:52.650 --> 31:53.190]  It's a good piece.
[31:53.230 --> 31:53.590]  What is this?
[31:53.670 --> 31:55.190]  As long as it's not Rambo's memory.
[31:55.530 --> 31:55.710]  Yeah.
[31:57.190 --> 32:01.770]  It's, uh, it's Mark's notes, uh, from an album called The Truth and the Light, the music of the X-Files.
[32:01.910 --> 32:02.490]  It's good stuff.
[32:02.690 --> 32:03.770]  Let's take another call.
[32:04.890 --> 32:05.810]  Hello, you're on the air.
[32:07.090 --> 32:07.490]  Hello.
[32:07.690 --> 32:09.450]  Yes, yes, I mean, Isaac.
[32:09.810 --> 32:11.010]  Ah, you're going away right now.
[32:12.790 --> 32:13.690]  Let's take this call.
[32:13.770 --> 32:14.430]  Hello, you're on the air.
[32:14.670 --> 32:15.310]  Yes, Isaac.
[32:15.330 --> 32:19.170]  I'd just like to mention about the things in life that are annoying.
[32:19.490 --> 32:31.330]  Did you know that when you, when you make a phone call, when you do, when you have a calling card, you know that, Bill, that Verizon's calling card, you can only, you know, you, the only way to use it is by dialing their 800 number?
[32:32.130 --> 32:32.810]  No, I didn't.
[32:33.810 --> 32:34.650]  Hello, you're on the air.
[32:35.690 --> 32:36.150]  No, you're not.
[32:37.210 --> 32:37.790]  Next one.
[32:38.530 --> 32:39.450]  Hello, you're on the air.
[32:40.850 --> 32:41.490]  Speak up.
[32:42.590 --> 32:43.770]  You just hung up, too.
[32:44.150 --> 32:45.530]  Wow, we are having no luck.
[32:45.850 --> 32:47.130]  Let's go try another one right here.
[32:48.010 --> 32:49.050]  Hello, you're on the air.
[32:49.710 --> 32:50.070]  Hello?
[32:50.330 --> 32:50.570]  Hello.
[32:51.110 --> 32:51.470]  Yeah, hi.
[32:51.870 --> 32:53.730]  You guys were talking about the lone gunman?
[32:53.910 --> 32:54.210]  Yes.
[32:54.670 --> 32:54.870]  Okay.
[32:55.470 --> 33:01.250]  There was this incredible X-Files on at 12 o'clock that night, and it was the story of the smoking man.
[33:01.570 --> 33:03.310]  Yes, using the cigarette smoking man.
[33:03.310 --> 33:15.190]  And the way it started out was that the smoking man was in this room, and he had this gun with a silencer, I guess, and a telescopic sight, and he was aiming it at the lone gunman publishing house.
[33:16.170 --> 33:28.170]  And it was the whole story of how he kind of went up through the ranks, and he ended up assassinating President Kennedy and Martin Luther King, and it was just really, it was kind of an entree into the lone gunman.
[33:28.170 --> 33:28.590]  Yeah.
[33:29.390 --> 33:30.650]  It was a good episode.
[33:31.010 --> 33:37.310]  There are actually two X-Files episodes that the gunman were in, three of a kind and triangle.
[33:37.610 --> 33:38.330]  The one that Gibson wrote, too.
[33:38.370 --> 33:42.930]  And the one that Gibson wrote they were in, where they had the other character, female lead, come in.
[33:43.570 --> 33:44.330]  It's a good program.
[33:44.470 --> 33:45.430]  I encourage everyone to check it out.
[33:45.590 --> 33:49.590]  They're on next week in the X-Files slot, Sunday at 9, and then they move to Fridays at 9.
[33:49.810 --> 33:50.890]  But what about the X-Files?
[33:52.910 --> 33:54.370]  I'm going to try to get a manual back.
[33:54.870 --> 33:56.350]  Why don't you guys take over for a second?
[33:58.690 --> 33:59.290]  Okay.
[33:59.290 --> 33:59.410]  Okay.
[34:00.430 --> 34:05.330]  Let's talk about Pig Latin encryption for MP3 files now that Napster is blocking.
[34:05.690 --> 34:06.290]  Right.
[34:06.570 --> 34:07.070]  Or not.
[34:07.230 --> 34:11.310]  There's this tool called Aimster, which apparently lets people...
[34:11.310 --> 34:12.070]  I haven't tried it myself.
[34:12.270 --> 34:17.030]  It apparently lets people trade MP3 files through AOL's Instant Messenger product.
[34:18.470 --> 34:27.070]  And some part of it uses Pig Latin encryption method, which is familiar to anyone who went through elementary school.
[34:28.310 --> 34:37.650]  And they're claiming that the Recording Industry Association is not allowed to, you know, look into their service and see who's trading copyrighted files.
[34:37.650 --> 34:46.050]  Yeah, because to do so would require them to break the Pig Latin encryption, which may be illegal under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
[34:46.050 --> 34:48.330]  And be bypassing their access controls.
[34:49.430 --> 34:54.630]  So it would be a nice trick to beat them with their own weapons.
[34:56.730 --> 34:58.130]  I think we have a manual back.
[34:58.910 --> 34:59.810]  Are you back, sir?
[35:00.350 --> 35:02.430]  I've been here for about 25 minutes, waiting for you to call.
[35:02.650 --> 35:03.330]  There you are.
[35:03.590 --> 35:05.970]  Well, the last two times I called, I got your voicemail.
[35:06.130 --> 35:10.070]  So rather than listen to your voicemail, I opted to continue with the program.
[35:10.550 --> 35:11.490]  How was your progress?
[35:12.050 --> 35:13.410]  Well, I'm practically there now.
[35:13.410 --> 35:14.230]  That's how long it's been.
[35:14.370 --> 35:15.190]  You're practically here now?
[35:15.390 --> 35:15.630]  Yeah.
[35:15.810 --> 35:16.570]  I'm an extra capital.
[35:17.090 --> 35:19.590]  We've got to get to Wall Street, so I'll be there pretty soon.
[35:19.830 --> 35:20.230]  Very good.
[35:20.230 --> 35:22.990]  But yeah, I had a lot of other things to tell you.
[35:23.130 --> 35:24.630]  But why don't you update me on what I missed?
[35:25.010 --> 35:26.610]  We were talking about the lone gunman.
[35:26.730 --> 35:28.290]  We were talking about the Hanson case.
[35:28.530 --> 35:35.990]  The cryptographic, the possibilities that the FBI can crack at least Russian military ciphers.
[35:36.470 --> 35:40.990]  And the possibility that the FBI may be able to crack domestic freeware ciphers.
[35:41.690 --> 35:42.670]  A West Comet.
[35:42.850 --> 35:46.930]  We spoke about the government waking up about bugs.
[35:46.990 --> 35:49.850]  We spoke about the Australians publicly soliciting spies.
[35:49.850 --> 35:51.750]  We went over a whole lot of stuff.
[35:52.350 --> 35:53.030]  I see.
[35:53.770 --> 35:54.630]  Did you go over boondocks?
[35:54.930 --> 35:55.150]  Yeah.
[35:55.230 --> 35:56.050]  We did boondocks, too.
[35:56.630 --> 35:58.170]  We covered a lot of territory.
[35:58.410 --> 36:00.230]  Okay, so you read the actual comic strips?
[36:00.350 --> 36:00.770]  Yes, I did.
[36:01.070 --> 36:01.250]  Okay, great.
[36:01.250 --> 36:02.130]  What was there?
[36:02.210 --> 36:03.890]  The big black mark that was there.
[36:04.390 --> 36:04.730]  Yeah.
[36:05.190 --> 36:13.750]  I thought that was pretty amazing that we've been trying for so long to get things printed in the editorial page, and instead in the print page they get it right.
[36:13.750 --> 36:20.110]  The editorial page they continue to get it wrong, referring to DCSS as a copy tool or something for piracy.
[36:20.490 --> 36:26.150]  And in boondocks it was stated very clearly that it was for decrypting DVDs and why is such a thing such a threat.
[36:26.830 --> 36:28.530]  And I think it was done really well.
[36:29.310 --> 36:30.890]  Well, I applaud the author.
[36:31.070 --> 36:33.170]  Does anyone know the fellow who writes it?
[36:33.570 --> 36:34.970]  It should probably be on the paper there.
[36:35.790 --> 36:36.210]  Aaron...
[36:36.210 --> 36:37.030]  Aaron McGruder.
[36:37.350 --> 36:38.110]  Aaron McGruder.
[36:38.410 --> 36:38.510]  Huh.
[36:39.210 --> 36:41.570]  Has he done stuff like this before or writing for UPS?
[36:41.610 --> 36:42.950]  He does very political strip.
[36:44.190 --> 36:48.650]  He has been able to hit it right on the mark many times.
[36:48.790 --> 36:51.850]  Of course, it's also very controversial because people don't like it when you do that.
[36:52.190 --> 36:55.390]  But I'd rather have somebody like that on our side than not on our side.
[36:55.810 --> 36:56.350]  All right.
[36:56.530 --> 36:59.250]  Well, we were actually taking phone calls while we got you back here.
[36:59.510 --> 36:59.770]  Okay.
[36:59.970 --> 37:02.250]  Talking about any of the topics or anything else you want to talk about.
[37:02.830 --> 37:03.210]  We could.
[37:03.330 --> 37:04.390]  With a few reasonable exceptions.
[37:04.610 --> 37:06.830]  And let's go back to another line here.
[37:06.890 --> 37:07.490]  Somebody pick a number.
[37:07.570 --> 37:15.170]  I should mention first that this DCSS has finally been actually integrated into a couple systems so that you can actually now watch a DVD.
[37:15.390 --> 37:16.510]  It's no longer merely...
[37:16.510 --> 37:20.010]  It's no longer a single product that's been integrated to a number of other things?
[37:20.010 --> 37:25.550]  It's no longer merely theoretical watching DVDs and alternate operating systems.
[37:25.690 --> 37:26.670]  Oh, you can do it now.
[37:26.790 --> 37:27.070]  You can do it.
[37:27.190 --> 37:27.350]  Yeah.
[37:28.210 --> 37:28.390]  All right.
[37:28.470 --> 37:29.070]  Pick a number somebody.
[37:29.830 --> 37:30.150]  Seven.
[37:30.430 --> 37:30.690]  Seven.
[37:31.750 --> 37:32.750]  Hello, you're on the air.
[37:33.090 --> 37:33.970]  I knew it would be me.
[37:34.190 --> 37:34.410]  Hey.
[37:34.570 --> 37:36.070]  I have a question and a comment.
[37:36.290 --> 37:44.110]  The question is a phone company once again has me on only being able to receive calls, yet I have a dial tone for emergencies.
[37:44.110 --> 37:45.010]  This is a home line?
[37:45.190 --> 37:45.670]  I'm sorry?
[37:45.830 --> 37:46.470]  This is a home line?
[37:46.570 --> 37:46.730]  Yeah.
[37:46.950 --> 37:48.690]  You know, if there's a...
[37:48.690 --> 37:58.270]  I thought one could legally, you know, call 101333 or something like that or use an 800 number or a phone card if there is a dial tone, but I can't do that at all.
[37:58.590 --> 38:01.250]  Do you have a normal residential line or is this an emergency line?
[38:01.310 --> 38:08.570]  Normal residential line, but because of a dispute that I had, they first cut me off and then I paid part of what they wanted and they turned it back on for incoming calls.
[38:09.150 --> 38:12.690]  But I have a dial tone, you know, and I can't make calls.
[38:13.130 --> 38:13.990]  Sounds like...
[38:13.990 --> 38:15.450]  Let me make a comment too.
[38:15.910 --> 38:21.010]  It sounds like they are specifically denying you that sort of access at the switch.
[38:21.010 --> 38:26.110]  They're just throwing away those touch tones and I guess you just pay them and you get your service back.
[38:26.250 --> 38:28.010]  I wonder if I can do a pulse that you mention that.
[38:28.570 --> 38:29.010]  Yeah.
[38:29.210 --> 38:38.630]  The comment also is that my mother works for Kmart and she was telling me that recently a kid was trying to purchase a CD with a credit card.
[38:38.630 --> 38:48.870]  You know, the credit card company is throwing cards at young kids and it was a parental consent lyrics CD and the register would not take the purchase.
[38:49.070 --> 38:51.750]  It kept coming up, purchase denied and said, please enter birthday.
[38:52.930 --> 39:01.510]  And it would, you know, report something back in the computer, the register would say something back to the credit card company and it would keep coming back.
[39:01.790 --> 39:02.590]  Purchase denied.
[39:02.990 --> 39:08.570]  And it would not let us get by the CD because of parental guidance and he wasn't old enough.
[39:08.710 --> 39:14.530]  So the two systems were integrated to the point where the credit card company informed Kmart that this person was underage.
[39:14.610 --> 39:14.790]  Right.
[39:14.790 --> 39:15.830]  That's pretty slick.
[39:17.250 --> 39:21.050]  Are we sure he hadn't just reached his spending limit or something like that?
[39:21.050 --> 39:21.330]  No.
[39:21.510 --> 39:22.550]  It was the birth date.
[39:23.210 --> 39:23.950]  Oh, there we go.
[39:24.090 --> 39:24.290]  Yep.
[39:24.470 --> 39:24.630]  Yeah.
[39:24.730 --> 39:27.010]  You see, the databases are starting to come together.
[39:27.150 --> 39:28.230]  There's a little bit of overlap.
[39:28.410 --> 39:28.570]  Right.
[39:29.630 --> 39:31.370]  Your electronic shadow was after you.
[39:31.730 --> 39:37.810]  And there's a real overlapping of databases, by the way, with the Genetic Privacy Act, the FBI and the NIH.
[39:38.290 --> 39:39.830]  More on that next week.
[39:40.070 --> 39:40.810]  Thanks for the call.
[39:41.070 --> 39:41.430]  All right.
[39:41.590 --> 39:41.910]  Thank you.
[39:41.910 --> 39:42.310]  Thank you.
[39:42.490 --> 39:42.590]  Bye.
[39:43.170 --> 39:43.770]  All right.
[39:43.850 --> 39:44.910]  Let's go to another line here.
[39:45.670 --> 39:46.110]  Hello.
[39:46.250 --> 39:46.630]  You're on the air.
[39:48.070 --> 39:48.510]  Hello.
[39:49.090 --> 39:49.450]  Hello.
[39:49.730 --> 39:50.030]  Hi.
[39:50.050 --> 39:50.430]  How are you doing?
[39:50.730 --> 39:51.110]  Good, good.
[39:51.690 --> 39:54.330]  I had a couple of comments on the Anson case.
[39:54.510 --> 39:55.050]  Yes, go ahead.
[39:55.310 --> 40:06.870]  I was going over the affidavit and it appears that the reason he was logging in from work is because the ACS database is actually an intranet.
[40:07.310 --> 40:07.670]  Well, yeah.
[40:07.710 --> 40:10.630]  You need to access it outside of probably the FBI headquarters, I imagine.
[40:10.630 --> 40:11.010]  Yeah.
[40:11.330 --> 40:17.350]  If they were to leave that kind of thing up to a dial-in network or anything like that, I personally would be very upset.
[40:18.870 --> 40:21.450]  It would compromise your security even more.
[40:21.450 --> 40:21.630]  Oh, of course.
[40:21.890 --> 40:22.250]  Even more.
[40:22.390 --> 40:23.670]  And then the other thing I wanted to...
[40:24.530 --> 40:25.310]  Hey, right back here, smart.
[40:26.190 --> 40:32.490]  I believe the reason he wanted to use the Palm 7s is because he actually wanted to send the files out over the internet.
[40:32.690 --> 40:34.610]  It's not that he wanted to transfer from Palm to Palm.
[40:34.830 --> 40:36.130]  Oh, he wanted to do it over the internet.
[40:36.590 --> 40:36.950]  Well...
[40:36.950 --> 40:38.050]  Well, then what would he need a Palm for?
[40:38.090 --> 40:39.030]  Why not use a full laptop?
[40:39.630 --> 40:42.150]  Yeah, see, I think the reason is he was wanting...
[40:42.150 --> 40:49.550]  If you read the entire affidavit, there's a couple of occasions where he spoke to employees and gathered information, just kind of rumor mill stuff.
[40:49.830 --> 40:50.030]  Right.
[40:50.110 --> 40:52.070]  And he was, I think, planning on using the Palm.
[40:52.070 --> 40:54.150]  I'm like, if he just heard something about...
[40:54.150 --> 40:55.130]  Oh, jot it down.
[40:55.290 --> 40:59.050]  If I'd be a compromise, he could sit there, yeah, go to the bathroom and get out immediately.
[40:59.390 --> 40:59.430]  Okay.
[40:59.430 --> 41:00.110]  Well, that's not bad.
[41:01.690 --> 41:04.950]  But I still think it's a misapplication of technology.
[41:05.150 --> 41:06.570]  I mean, for you to...
[41:06.570 --> 41:07.730]  That would be suicide.
[41:08.030 --> 41:13.810]  If you go into the bathroom, use a wireless method to transmit an email directly to KGB headquarters, you're nailed in an instant.
[41:13.970 --> 41:14.150]  Yeah.
[41:14.330 --> 41:15.290]  Is it going to be worth it?
[41:15.410 --> 41:17.470]  You know, it's just bad tradecraft.
[41:17.850 --> 41:21.410]  He's so in love with technology that he's trying to use it where it just doesn't belong.
[41:21.410 --> 41:23.570]  Yeah, I agree to a certain extent there.
[41:23.710 --> 41:23.970]  Yeah, definitely.
[41:24.470 --> 41:27.910]  I guess they could create some kind of a digital cyber drop.
[41:28.270 --> 41:29.030]  They could.
[41:29.330 --> 41:30.150]  There's been...
[41:30.150 --> 41:31.390]  But I mean, even that would be...
[41:31.390 --> 41:33.730]  Well, there's been speculation that...
[41:33.730 --> 41:48.030]  Actually, it's been a lot of snorting and FUD manufacture that Osama bin Laden has been leaving steganographically secured messages for his operatives in, like, Usenet chat rooms laced into pornographic pictures.
[41:48.350 --> 41:48.510]  Yeah, of course.
[41:48.510 --> 41:50.530]  Well, it's like an open channel that...
[41:50.530 --> 41:50.950]  Exactly.
[41:51.610 --> 41:54.170]  I heard the same thing with sports chat rooms, too.
[41:54.490 --> 41:54.670]  Right.
[41:55.010 --> 41:56.010]  Well, thank you very much.
[41:56.190 --> 41:56.850]  Oh, no, no problem.
[41:56.990 --> 41:57.150]  Thanks.
[41:57.710 --> 41:58.010]  Yeah.
[41:59.050 --> 42:01.510]  Supposedly, there's a big cry over steganography.
[42:02.430 --> 42:11.910]  Steganography, by the way, for those of you who still haven't managed to get your cryptographic license, is a technique by which you hide a signal within another signal.
[42:11.910 --> 42:18.710]  So, for instance, in the low bits of a GIF image or a JPEG or something like that, you can actually lace a message in there.
[42:19.050 --> 42:27.510]  And to the casual observer who doesn't know that it's in there, you're just going to get an image of Cindy Crawford in her birthday suit or something.
[42:27.570 --> 42:27.890]  Who knows?
[42:28.070 --> 42:31.850]  But the fact that this stuff exists should not be a surprise to anyone.
[42:31.850 --> 42:40.950]  And more importantly, it should not mean that all this cryptography goes out the window because Osama bin Laden is, you know, using it to go about his nefarious deeds.
[42:41.210 --> 42:47.690]  I mean, it's just another technique in the tool bag for legitimate and illegitimate use.
[42:47.770 --> 42:48.690]  And everybody does it.
[42:48.790 --> 42:49.650]  And everybody does it.
[42:49.750 --> 42:51.550]  There's steganography everywhere.
[42:52.050 --> 42:53.210]  All right, let's take another call.
[42:53.370 --> 42:53.590]  Everywhere that you see signals.
[42:53.690 --> 42:54.410]  I'm outside the door.
[42:54.530 --> 42:54.910]  I can't get in.
[42:54.910 --> 42:55.550]  You're outside the door.
[42:55.630 --> 42:56.110]  You can't get in.
[42:56.270 --> 42:56.610]  Yeah.
[42:56.610 --> 42:58.010]  Somebody let that man inside.
[42:59.670 --> 43:00.450]  Come on now.
[43:00.450 --> 43:01.390]  We have people running.
[43:01.650 --> 43:02.130]  We've got...
[43:02.130 --> 43:02.590]  All right.
[43:02.990 --> 43:04.250]  He's going to head out there.
[43:05.150 --> 43:05.590]  Just...
[43:05.590 --> 43:07.830]  You don't yet need a license of cryptography.
[43:07.850 --> 43:07.890]  We don't...
[43:07.890 --> 43:08.310]  Well, no.
[43:08.370 --> 43:08.970]  I'm joking.
[43:09.150 --> 43:11.170]  I also don't think that Linux users are communists.
[43:11.810 --> 43:13.870]  They have their problems, but...
[43:13.870 --> 43:16.730]  Both the communists send the Linux users, but they're different sets of problems.
[43:17.190 --> 43:17.610]  All right.
[43:18.110 --> 43:18.550]  So...
[43:18.550 --> 43:21.090]  Emmanuel is now walking in the station.
[43:21.330 --> 43:22.030]  Here he comes.
[43:22.310 --> 43:24.270]  We'll go to a little music link in the loop here.
[43:52.020 --> 43:52.460]  Okay.
[43:52.860 --> 43:53.900]  It's really a miracle.
[43:54.080 --> 43:55.360]  You didn't have to get up, Isaac.
[43:55.360 --> 43:55.960]  You could have...
[43:55.960 --> 43:56.720]  You could have stayed put.
[43:57.760 --> 43:59.660]  What is this crap you've got on?
[43:59.820 --> 44:00.660]  Turn that off.
[44:01.020 --> 44:01.760]  I'm on the red mic.
[44:02.720 --> 44:03.160]  Red one.
[44:03.580 --> 44:04.140]  There we go.
[44:04.220 --> 44:04.940]  I'm back on my red mic.
[44:05.000 --> 44:05.840]  Let me get a seat now.
[44:06.000 --> 44:07.260]  Leave you alone for a few minutes.
[44:07.600 --> 44:10.060]  First he's insulting communist, and now he's taking the red thing.
[44:10.060 --> 44:10.300]  All right.
[44:10.320 --> 44:11.060]  I don't know what I missed.
[44:11.140 --> 44:12.180]  I wasn't able to hear anything.
[44:13.220 --> 44:15.540]  By the way, Isaac, I had five bar signal all the way in.
[44:15.560 --> 44:16.840]  I don't know how you couldn't reach me.
[44:16.860 --> 44:17.980]  I called you about eight times.
[44:17.980 --> 44:21.200]  I got your voicemail twice, and my phone is off for the program.
[44:21.360 --> 44:22.800]  I mean, the ringer's off, and it's just on my belt.
[44:23.140 --> 44:23.620]  So, anyway.
[44:23.720 --> 44:24.280]  You're here now, though.
[44:24.540 --> 44:24.820]  Okay.
[44:25.000 --> 44:25.460]  Well, yeah.
[44:25.480 --> 44:25.920]  Here I am.
[44:26.060 --> 44:28.840]  So, let's try and get our act together.
[44:28.960 --> 44:29.360]  Hey, Claude.
[44:29.380 --> 44:29.880]  What are you doing here?
[44:30.120 --> 44:31.000]  Yeah, he's been here all the time.
[44:31.040 --> 44:31.880]  He's just quiet.
[44:32.220 --> 44:32.680]  What do you mean?
[44:32.680 --> 44:33.760]  For the last few months he's been here?
[44:34.220 --> 44:34.620]  Well, yeah.
[44:34.620 --> 44:36.280]  He just lives in the studio.
[44:36.540 --> 44:38.520]  We come in every once in a while, bring him some food and water.
[44:38.580 --> 44:40.000]  We haven't been here for a while.
[44:40.140 --> 44:40.620]  No, that's true.
[44:40.640 --> 44:41.540]  We haven't been here in a while.
[44:41.660 --> 44:42.340]  We weren't on last week.
[44:42.400 --> 44:43.500]  We didn't know that until we got here.
[44:43.720 --> 44:44.560]  Kind of went on last week.
[44:44.640 --> 44:45.360]  We're sorry about that.
[44:45.820 --> 44:46.800]  Hopefully that won't happen again.
[44:46.800 --> 44:50.680]  We weren't on the week before that because of all the expert witnesses that are parading through here for five hours.
[44:51.240 --> 44:51.880]  They were good ones, though.
[44:52.360 --> 44:54.680]  The week before that we were on, and we did very well at the fundraiser.
[44:54.780 --> 44:56.400]  I don't think it was ever said how well we did.
[44:56.940 --> 45:02.680]  But we did that little trick with the matching fund for the listener lawsuits, and the phones blew up.
[45:02.820 --> 45:03.400]  They exploded.
[45:03.680 --> 45:04.260]  Fifteen lines.
[45:04.360 --> 45:05.720]  We found out how many lines they have.
[45:05.960 --> 45:07.780]  Fifteen lines in the tally room.
[45:08.240 --> 45:12.700]  Unfortunately, we didn't have 15 volunteers in the tally room, so it was a bit of mayhem.
[45:12.780 --> 45:15.880]  But we wound up raising $9,060 in two hours.
[45:16.560 --> 45:22.220]  And, of course, now I've got to cough up that amount for the other fund that I pledged to match.
[45:22.400 --> 45:22.720]  Very good.
[45:23.200 --> 45:23.960]  Fair is fair.
[45:24.140 --> 45:27.320]  You have all those DVDs that you made with the CSS, right?
[45:27.460 --> 45:28.100]  Yeah, of course.
[45:28.280 --> 45:29.400]  Those millions of pirate DVDs.
[45:29.420 --> 45:31.180]  The piracy company that we run on the side.
[45:32.280 --> 45:35.740]  Okay, speaking of terrorists and things like that, I heard you mention something about Osama bin Laden.
[45:36.000 --> 45:36.280]  Yes.
[45:36.380 --> 45:41.500]  And that's a sore point with me because, well, I just read the story in the Associated Press.
[45:41.500 --> 45:41.780]  U.S.
[45:41.820 --> 45:49.200]  officials say Osama bin Laden is posting instructions for terrorist activities on sports chat rooms, pornographic bulletin boards, and other websites.
[45:49.500 --> 45:59.720]  Hidden in the X-rated pictures on several pornographic websites and the posted comments on sports chat rooms may lie the encrypted blueprints of the next terrorist attack against the United States or its allies.
[45:59.720 --> 46:02.180]  It sounds far-fetched, but U.S.
[46:02.580 --> 46:08.740]  officials and experts say it's the latest method of communication being used by Osama bin Laden and his associates to outfox law enforcement.
[46:08.880 --> 46:11.440]  Now, we take this kind of thing very seriously here at Off the Hook.
[46:11.560 --> 46:12.640]  You may not think we do, but we do.
[46:12.920 --> 46:16.300]  And we want people to help us track this kind of thing down.
[46:16.680 --> 46:30.820]  So, for the next few weeks, we'd like to cover every single pornographic picture out there and analyze it in close detail and, you know, everybody can get involved in this and find out where those terrorist plots are being hatched, specifically.
[46:31.220 --> 46:32.240]  They're in there somewhere.
[46:32.240 --> 46:32.760]  We know it.
[46:33.320 --> 46:36.160]  I'm sure I have a few in my browser cache.
[46:36.400 --> 46:36.900]  Oh, there you go.
[46:37.120 --> 46:37.920]  Oh, cached in the browser?
[46:38.820 --> 46:39.660]  And, uh...
[46:39.660 --> 46:42.480]  Did they say is being used or could potentially be used?
[46:43.220 --> 46:44.500]  It seems like...
[46:44.500 --> 46:44.960]  They say...
[46:44.960 --> 46:46.100]  It's just like a scarcity.
[46:46.400 --> 46:48.500]  ...is posting instructions, according to the Associated Press.
[46:48.760 --> 46:50.140]  So, someone has already found something.
[46:50.380 --> 46:52.500]  All these, you know, terrorist people...
[46:52.500 --> 46:53.200]  You may already be a winner.
[46:53.380 --> 47:01.000]  Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, and all the other, you know, little dictators that are a big threat to this nation, they're always doing things.
[47:01.060 --> 47:01.880]  We never see what they're doing.
[47:02.000 --> 47:04.480]  They're always just doing them, and they get all paranoid.
[47:04.620 --> 47:08.680]  Bottom line, they're taking advantage of one of the four horsemen of the techno-apocalypse.
[47:08.680 --> 47:14.600]  It's either going to be a child pornographer, an organized criminal, a drug dealer, or a terrorist, Osama bin Laden.
[47:14.700 --> 47:17.680]  So, expect to see the other three appear in at least the next couple of weeks.
[47:17.820 --> 47:21.120]  If they've taken all the pictures into kiddie porn...
[47:21.120 --> 47:22.840]  Oh, they could be two of the horsemen at once.
[47:22.840 --> 47:31.480]  ...and they've taken all the terrorist instructions into the kiddie porn, and then encrypt it on, like, Freedom Net, and then send it to the Cali Cartel.
[47:31.920 --> 47:33.040]  Then they could get all of them.
[47:33.040 --> 47:35.000]  They could be all four horsemen at once.
[47:35.980 --> 47:37.920]  Not that we're advocating anything like that, folks.
[47:37.920 --> 47:43.380]  I had a lot of other news stories, but we don't have time, because I just got here, thanks to the LIRR, which I condemn roundly.
[47:43.760 --> 47:44.220]  They have seen it.
[47:44.480 --> 47:45.260]  No, they're horrible.
[47:45.440 --> 47:46.060]  They are horrible.
[47:46.140 --> 47:47.460]  They do not care about their passengers.
[47:47.640 --> 47:49.960]  They leave people on trains for hours for no good reason.
[47:50.320 --> 47:52.840]  This whole... I would have been here on time if they had opened up the damn door.
[47:52.920 --> 47:57.480]  And, you know, had I been on an old-fashioned train, you know, the time they used to have, they built in the 1950s or something.
[47:57.580 --> 47:58.700]  They still run them out of poor Jeff.
[47:58.880 --> 47:59.480]  No, they don't.
[47:59.540 --> 47:59.820]  They don't anymore.
[47:59.820 --> 48:02.940]  They run the double-deckers with the automatic doors that won't open if the computer fails.
[48:02.940 --> 48:03.240]  Oh!
[48:03.440 --> 48:05.360]  Yeah, so we were all stuck there.
[48:05.500 --> 48:08.200]  And, you know, we were talking revolution in that train.
[48:08.320 --> 48:08.680]  We really were.
[48:08.820 --> 48:10.520]  What if the computer fails because of a fire?
[48:11.020 --> 48:11.940]  I don't know.
[48:12.200 --> 48:13.760]  Let's hope we don't find out.
[48:13.940 --> 48:14.960]  They didn't kick out one of the windows.
[48:15.060 --> 48:15.980]  Why didn't you kick out one of the windows?
[48:16.140 --> 48:22.720]  I think they had to take a train all the way from, you know, the yards here in Manhattan to get out there just to push our train three feet.
[48:22.920 --> 48:26.500]  Because they didn't have any other engines around, apparently.
[48:27.480 --> 48:27.840]  Ridiculous.
[48:28.200 --> 48:28.540]  Ridiculous.
[48:28.700 --> 48:29.480]  Okay, enough of that.
[48:29.660 --> 48:31.740]  We don't have time to complain too much.
[48:31.820 --> 48:33.320]  So let's take some phone calls.
[48:33.400 --> 48:34.820]  212-209-2900.
[48:35.080 --> 48:38.540]  Also, another thing I don't think we mentioned is the launching of the new 2600 news site.
[48:39.020 --> 48:40.140]  The 2600 news site?
[48:40.160 --> 48:40.440]  Yes.
[48:40.580 --> 48:40.940]  Where's that?
[48:41.360 --> 48:42.720]  On the 2600 site.
[48:42.780 --> 48:43.460]  Where have you been?
[48:43.660 --> 48:44.860]  This happened two weeks ago.
[48:45.020 --> 48:45.900]  It's a leading question.
[48:45.900 --> 48:48.740]  You say, www.2600.com slash news.
[48:48.880 --> 48:50.640]  Yeah, but you look perplexed.
[48:51.320 --> 48:52.400]  Like you really didn't know.
[48:54.360 --> 48:55.420]  Regardless, that's where it is.
[48:55.520 --> 48:55.940]  Take a phone call.
[48:56.500 --> 48:56.680]  You're on the air.
[48:58.320 --> 49:00.900]  Okay, you see, the way it works, you've got to speak, you know?
[49:01.020 --> 49:01.520]  That's how it works.
[49:01.560 --> 49:01.820]  Good evening.
[49:01.960 --> 49:02.320]  You're on the air.
[49:03.460 --> 49:04.040]  Oh, yes.
[49:05.960 --> 49:13.160]  Robert Hanson was a hero who put a dent in imperialism, which is the true terrorist.
[49:14.240 --> 49:16.440]  Not Ben Ledeen, not Robert Hanson.
[49:16.640 --> 49:18.040]  You're lucky I'm sitting on the other mic.
[49:18.040 --> 49:18.360]  Wait, wait, wait, wait.
[49:18.460 --> 49:19.000]  I'm lucky what?
[49:19.280 --> 49:19.620]  Wait, wait.
[49:19.700 --> 49:19.900]  Hold on.
[49:19.940 --> 49:20.200]  Hold on.
[49:20.460 --> 49:20.760]  Hold on.
[49:21.700 --> 49:22.200]  Hold on.
[49:22.200 --> 49:23.260]  WABC hate radio.
[49:23.400 --> 49:24.260]  Hold on, hold on.
[49:24.380 --> 49:26.700]  You say communism coming out on WABC hate radio.
[49:26.960 --> 49:28.800]  I'm not, I'm not, I'm not the conservative talking here.
[49:29.620 --> 49:30.640]  Will you please listen?
[49:31.360 --> 49:32.480]  Are the manuals on your side?
[49:32.480 --> 49:33.060]  Here's the thing.
[49:33.180 --> 49:35.420]  People have to stop talking sometimes and listen to the other side.
[49:35.500 --> 49:35.920]  Are you going to stop?
[49:35.960 --> 49:36.940]  No, you're not going to stop talking.
[49:37.000 --> 49:37.600]  I'm going to move on.
[49:37.600 --> 49:38.240]  Oh, jeez.
[49:38.320 --> 49:39.760]  I probably would agree with that guy, too.
[49:41.020 --> 49:41.620]  Good phone head.
[49:41.700 --> 49:41.940]  Good evening.
[49:42.000 --> 49:42.420]  You're on the air.
[49:42.600 --> 49:43.200]  Yes, Emanuel.
[49:43.480 --> 49:44.100]  No, no, no.
[49:44.100 --> 49:44.720]  I'm not talking to you.
[49:44.840 --> 49:45.660]  Can we let you speak a little more?
[49:45.660 --> 49:46.560]  Good evening, you're on the air.
[49:47.560 --> 49:48.420]  Hi, Emanuel.
[49:48.420 --> 49:49.160]  Yes, go ahead.
[49:49.320 --> 49:50.120]  Hi, listen.
[49:50.220 --> 49:51.880]  I just want to make this my dog.
[49:52.480 --> 49:53.240]  Sorry about that.
[49:53.320 --> 49:53.640]  It's okay.
[49:53.920 --> 50:01.520]  I just want, I really since last week when I, or whenever I pledged that money, right at the end of the program.
[50:01.640 --> 50:02.760]  Yes, which hopefully you'll pay.
[50:03.020 --> 50:03.680]  Which I will.
[50:03.680 --> 50:09.320]  Well, but now, now after I've heard what you said, I was starting to think, hmm, how's he going to do that?
[50:09.320 --> 50:10.160]  I don't know.
[50:10.540 --> 50:12.780]  Well, how are any of us going to meet a challenge?
[50:13.080 --> 50:13.760]  Whatever, you are going to do that.
[50:13.780 --> 50:15.640]  Yes, I said I would do it, and I will do it.
[50:15.780 --> 50:16.020]  Okay.
[50:16.020 --> 50:20.720]  So $9,060 goes to the listening lawsuits because people pledged to the radio station, so...
[50:20.720 --> 50:25.580]  All right, then I'll pitch, but I had to wonder how that was going to work.
[50:25.700 --> 50:27.180]  Well, we'll work it out, yes.
[50:27.340 --> 50:27.740]  Okay.
[50:27.920 --> 50:31.940]  The mere fact that this place exists is a miracle, so why not make more miracles?
[50:31.940 --> 50:35.340]  People do have to pay their pledges, though, or he doesn't have to pay.
[50:35.520 --> 50:35.640]  Yeah.
[50:36.060 --> 50:39.140]  Except there won't be a way for me to know that, but it's a trust issue.
[50:39.140 --> 50:46.020]  So I really hope people pledge and fulfill their pledge, because otherwise, you know, you're kind of not telling us the truth.
[50:46.540 --> 50:49.020]  And since we tell you the truth, we expect you to tell us the truth.
[50:49.540 --> 50:49.940]  All right.
[50:50.180 --> 50:51.340]  2-2, 2-0-9, 2-9-H00.
[50:51.460 --> 50:51.800]  Good evening.
[50:51.920 --> 50:52.240]  You're on the air.
[50:52.980 --> 50:53.300]  Hello.
[50:53.500 --> 50:53.900]  Yes, go ahead.
[50:55.280 --> 50:56.960]  I've got a small problem on my phone.
[50:57.220 --> 50:57.500]  Okay.
[51:02.960 --> 51:09.960]  And a guy offered me out in front a six-month subscription to a small leftist paper called a militant.
[51:10.120 --> 51:11.240]  I said, fine, for a buck.
[51:11.440 --> 51:13.500]  It's a demonstration for IBM or against IBM?
[51:13.580 --> 51:14.000]  Against IBM.
[51:14.000 --> 51:14.280]  Okay.
[51:14.360 --> 51:15.600]  For the South African spot.
[51:15.740 --> 51:16.000]  Got it.
[51:16.020 --> 51:16.780]  What did IBM do?
[51:19.260 --> 51:24.580]  And the same day I got the first issue, we started having problems with the telephone.
[51:24.580 --> 51:26.040]  I mean, serious problems.
[51:26.180 --> 51:27.020]  Beeps, squawks.
[51:27.120 --> 51:34.940]  And it continued for a year, year and a half, until my wife called up and screamed at some supervisor and they fixed it immediately.
[51:37.160 --> 51:42.500]  Now, over the last two years, I've been getting telephone rings.
[51:42.900 --> 51:50.680]  It'll ring a couple of times, you pick it up, there's a few seconds delay, and then a double click, click, click, and then nothing.
[51:50.680 --> 51:53.260]  If I hang on, it says there's a phone off the hook, et cetera.
[51:53.680 --> 51:53.860]  Right.
[51:54.680 --> 52:02.380]  I've heard that there are ways of dialing into a house so that when you hang up they can use it as a...
[52:02.380 --> 52:04.580]  Well, yes and no.
[52:04.840 --> 52:11.840]  Typically, that requires someone to modify the handset that's in your home in order to keep the microphone open.
[52:12.360 --> 52:16.440]  I've seen interesting documents that allow you to try and do it remotely.
[52:16.780 --> 52:20.920]  Most of them involve an actual modification to the physical unit.
[52:22.200 --> 52:27.900]  But yeah, if that's happening, that microphone picks up a lot of audio in your room.
[52:28.100 --> 52:28.760]  Yeah, I'm sure.
[52:29.060 --> 52:30.820]  And it could be a problem.
[52:31.180 --> 52:37.960]  Now, this non-answered call happens several times a week, sometimes several times a day.
[52:38.160 --> 52:38.340]  Right.
[52:38.820 --> 52:41.120]  And it's been going on for a couple of years now.
[52:41.120 --> 52:41.580]  Hmm.
[52:42.200 --> 52:46.360]  Well, I'd start chasing down the Public Service Commission and tell them what's going on.
[52:46.360 --> 52:50.960]  Honestly, I think that the subscription to the leftist newspaper is just a coincidence.
[52:52.540 --> 52:56.100]  These kind of things do happen, strange tones and beeps and squawks.
[52:56.140 --> 52:59.120]  I don't know any leftist that has it together enough to be able to tap a phone.
[52:59.240 --> 52:59.400]  Yeah.
[52:59.660 --> 53:00.980]  So, who knows?
[53:01.120 --> 53:02.680]  We've all we can do just to hook up a computer.
[53:03.800 --> 53:05.200]  212-209-2900.
[53:05.720 --> 53:06.620]  Best of luck with it.
[53:06.820 --> 53:07.160]  Yes.
[53:07.280 --> 53:07.660]  Good evening.
[53:07.660 --> 53:08.400]  You're on the air.
[53:08.960 --> 53:11.340]  I called before, but I just want to make a suggestion.
[53:11.520 --> 53:12.300]  Make it back, please.
[53:12.460 --> 53:14.980]  Can the modem keep it on hook with the echo off?
[53:15.040 --> 53:16.640]  Can you do that from the phone line?
[53:17.260 --> 53:20.320]  Can you dial a modem and leave the echo off?
[53:20.660 --> 53:21.200]  I don't know.
[53:21.420 --> 53:22.120]  Let's move on.
[53:22.120 --> 53:24.300]  We don't have enough time for all these repeat callers.
[53:24.340 --> 53:24.560]  Good evening.
[53:24.640 --> 53:25.000]  You're on the air.
[53:25.200 --> 53:25.400]  Hi.
[53:25.720 --> 53:34.320]  Doesn't lone gunman strike anybody as kind of a way for the powers that be to say conspiracy theorists and or hackers are ridiculous?
[53:34.640 --> 53:35.120]  Or nutjobs?
[53:35.120 --> 53:37.380]  Yeah, I think it's very obvious.
[53:37.620 --> 53:37.700]  Well, you've got...
[53:37.700 --> 53:39.140]  I never got to finish my comments.
[53:39.400 --> 53:51.120]  You know, I thought the whole thing was loaded with all kinds of, you know, stupid characterizations of hackers and, you know, little last-minute rescues and things like that.
[53:51.120 --> 53:51.860]  I expected better.
[53:52.020 --> 53:52.500]  I really did.
[53:52.660 --> 53:53.420]  I expected...
[53:53.420 --> 53:55.880]  I didn't expect better, but it was worse than I expected.
[53:56.060 --> 53:59.280]  I think it's the only representation of those two kinds of people on television.
[53:59.580 --> 54:02.480]  You know, if it was an ethnic group, we'd be mad, wouldn't we?
[54:02.480 --> 54:13.320]  I mean, it's saying if you think anything is bad in government, you're not only sort of ridiculous and you don't get girls mostly, but that you're in a fail every time because you're just... you're wrong.
[54:13.400 --> 54:25.280]  On the other hand, you have nine years' worth of the X-Files, which has done the exact opposite, which has portrayed these conspiracies as something very tangible and worthy of investigation that these two agents are fighting, you know, the evil forces that be.
[54:25.400 --> 54:27.360]  I love how they get product placement in there, too.
[54:27.480 --> 54:28.580]  Well, that's besides the point.
[54:28.580 --> 54:29.900]  No, I think that is the point.
[54:30.020 --> 54:31.120]  I think that's where they're coming from.
[54:31.140 --> 54:32.880]  You have to understand where the gunman came from, too.
[54:33.160 --> 54:44.160]  They were originally a plot device in the first season that were only to be used to introduce highly technical and arcane information, but the viewers so loved them and enjoyed the episodes that they were in, they decided to spin it off.
[54:44.440 --> 54:45.740]  And, you know, I liked the episode.
[54:45.960 --> 54:48.460]  Honestly, I think the only problem with it was they didn't have enough time.
[54:48.620 --> 54:52.520]  And the highly technical and arcane information was completely fabricated.
[54:52.540 --> 54:54.900]  No, they did a lot better than some other shows.
[54:54.900 --> 55:02.800]  They had a ship that somehow, what, made an airplane crash into the World Trade Center and they had five minutes to figure it out and they figured it out at the last possible minute and they missed the World Trade Center by about, what, an inch?
[55:02.800 --> 55:07.180]  They had 20 seconds to boot up the itanium chip and break into the...
[55:07.180 --> 55:11.020]  Well, I wanted to hear the bitchin' Betty scream, you know, ground...
[55:11.020 --> 55:15.100]  terrain, terrain, pull up, pull up, and, you know, have one of the powers make a slight comment.
[55:15.100 --> 55:16.160]  Good evening, you're on the air.
[55:16.420 --> 55:16.840]  Oh, good evening.
[55:17.340 --> 55:17.700]  Uh...
[55:18.300 --> 55:21.100]  One of the other folks here had mentioned about steganography, hiding stuff.
[55:21.240 --> 55:31.080]  Just as an FYI, our good friends at Privacy Digest were able to get somebody from Xerox to go on the record as saying that serial numbers do get put into the color copies.
[55:31.080 --> 55:31.480]  The color copies.
[55:31.940 --> 55:32.300]  Yes.
[55:32.420 --> 55:33.100]  I want to look into that.
[55:33.340 --> 55:35.100]  That way, if you copy money, people know...
[55:35.980 --> 55:37.100]  Before you hang up on him, did he...
[55:37.100 --> 55:37.380]  He's gone.
[55:37.600 --> 55:39.000]  Oh, he's gone.
[55:39.000 --> 55:39.340]  Oh, he's gone.
[55:39.520 --> 55:43.540]  Did he disclose the technique they use or did he just say, yes, it happens?
[55:43.900 --> 55:46.480]  Uh, he went into some detail on there.
[55:46.520 --> 55:47.640]  I can forward over to you.
[55:47.760 --> 55:50.320]  Or just pull up the Privacy Digest archive and you'll find it.
[55:50.460 --> 55:51.020]  All right, thanks a lot.
[55:51.200 --> 55:51.440]  Okay, take it.
[55:52.020 --> 55:54.000]  One more phone call while I look for the outro theme.
[55:54.420 --> 55:55.420]  Good evening, you're on the air.
[55:56.580 --> 55:56.940]  Yeah.
[55:57.380 --> 55:58.220]  That was Lancic.
[55:58.420 --> 55:58.740]  I mean...
[55:58.740 --> 55:59.020]  Hi.
[55:59.800 --> 56:00.800]  Good evening, you're on the air.
[56:01.280 --> 56:01.560]  Hello?
[56:01.800 --> 56:02.040]  Yes.
[56:02.460 --> 56:10.440]  Oh, I was wondering, uh, if you guys have heard lately, uh, Bill Lancic keeps making the offers that they have always on DSL.
[56:10.780 --> 56:11.060]  Right.
[56:11.060 --> 56:17.880]  When you get the in-home connection, you have to constantly, to get online when you turn on your computer, you have to connect and put in a username and password.
[56:18.460 --> 56:20.720]  Are they keeping their side of the deal on?
[56:20.820 --> 56:21.600]  I mean, is it legal?
[56:21.960 --> 56:24.020]  Well, is this something that your computer is doing?
[56:24.160 --> 56:25.160]  Is it a configuration thing?
[56:25.280 --> 56:28.740]  No, it's most computers that run on Bell Lancic or Verizon DSL.
[56:28.780 --> 56:29.240]  Yeah, it's me.
[56:29.240 --> 56:29.700]  It's P-O-E.
[56:30.200 --> 56:30.480]  Yeah, correct.
[56:30.480 --> 56:32.400]  With the username and password combination.
[56:32.780 --> 56:32.860]  It's P-O-E.
[56:33.380 --> 56:38.120]  Call technical support and get them to test your line and they'll give you a bunch of, uh...
[56:38.120 --> 56:38.600]  They won't.
[56:38.760 --> 56:39.520]  Yeah, but they'll...
[56:39.520 --> 56:42.160]  When I did it, they gave me a bunch of default passwords.
[56:43.180 --> 56:43.700]  Oh, yeah.
[56:44.100 --> 56:44.700]  Well, uh...
[56:44.700 --> 56:47.100]  They can use those if you're worried about them tracking you.
[56:47.100 --> 56:48.200]  See, also...
[56:48.200 --> 56:49.400]  I mean, uh...
[56:49.400 --> 56:51.320]  When I first signed up, they promised me...
[56:51.320 --> 56:52.320]  Not that anybody...
[56:52.320 --> 56:53.340]  Well, anyway, uh...
[56:53.340 --> 56:55.100]  They promised me, like, a static IP, right?
[56:55.200 --> 56:55.920]  Right, they didn't do it.
[56:56.060 --> 56:58.080]  Yeah, and they didn't go through with it because they said they're...
[56:58.080 --> 57:00.180]  The internet is lacking IPs now.
[57:00.480 --> 57:03.140]  You know, and these are the type of, uh...
[57:03.140 --> 57:03.460]  Uh...
[57:04.180 --> 57:06.300]  Troubles that I've had with them lately, so...
[57:06.300 --> 57:07.740]  Okay, well, that's, uh...
[57:07.740 --> 57:09.160]  That's all we're gonna hear about your troubles for today.
[57:09.580 --> 57:11.320]  Uh, well, this show really seemed to go by fast, didn't it?
[57:11.480 --> 57:12.540]  Well, for some of us.
[57:12.660 --> 57:12.800]  Yeah.
[57:13.640 --> 57:16.980]  All right, next time, I'm gonna try to get it here Monday night, so that I'll be here in time.
[57:16.980 --> 57:17.580]  It'll be good to do that, okay.
[57:17.900 --> 57:20.340]  Unless I can actually drive my car instead of take the train.
[57:20.500 --> 57:20.960]  Well, that'll be good.
[57:21.780 --> 57:22.700]  That's not getting home.
[57:22.980 --> 57:24.880]  Oh, my God, I didn't even think about that.
[57:26.320 --> 57:26.880]  I'm sorry.
[57:27.480 --> 57:27.840]  All right.
[57:28.040 --> 57:28.940]  This is a manual for everybody else.
[57:28.980 --> 57:31.780]  Thanks for, uh, for all the hard work getting the show on the air and getting it together.
[57:32.420 --> 57:32.680]  Thank you.
[57:32.680 --> 57:33.320]  We'll see you next week.
[57:33.480 --> 57:33.580]  Good night.
[58:22.440 --> 58:23.560]  Who may choose from?
[58:24.380 --> 58:25.020]  Ukulele Universe.
[58:25.320 --> 58:25.760]  What's that?
[58:25.940 --> 58:28.180]  A show for people who love ukuleles.
[58:28.180 --> 58:30.000]  People who collect ukuleles.
[58:30.180 --> 58:32.020]  Or are even in the ukulele business.
[58:32.420 --> 58:36.620]  And there are regular phone calls from people who have actually been to Hawaii.
[58:36.920 --> 58:39.380]  I guess I'll vote for Ukulele Universe, then.
[58:39.540 --> 58:41.240]  Without even knowing the other choice.
[58:41.400 --> 58:44.480]  I can't imagine a show I would like more than Ukulele Universe.
[58:49.180 --> 58:52.520]  You may laugh, but how about, say, on Central?
[58:52.740 --> 58:55.080]  The morning show where you commune with the dead.
[58:55.200 --> 58:56.780]  That stuff is fake, isn't it?
[58:56.780 --> 58:59.980]  All right, then that's a vote for Ukulele Universe.
[59:00.320 --> 59:01.780]  Thank you, Psychotica.
[59:34.920 --> 59:40.040]  Hi, this is Spike Lee, and you are listening to WBAI Community Radio in New York City.
[59:40.900 --> 59:43.260]  WBAI exists almost entirely on your support.
[59:43.520 --> 59:44.440]  Please be generous.
[59:44.920 --> 59:45.920]  Thank you very much.
[59:45.980 --> 59:46.080]  Because of these accesses.
[59:46.160 --> 59:46.320]  To Patty.
[59:46.320 --> 59:46.540]  Who talks so much more.
[59:46.540 --> 59:46.820]  Quite a leg with me,