[00:02.320 --> 00:05.020]  Punky, like a gangster.
[00:05.720 --> 00:07.700]  Saw your grammar controls.
[00:09.640 --> 00:13.240]  Now you're almost out of batteries.
[00:13.980 --> 00:20.280]  You got a sweater much too small to be poking at your neighbor.
[00:22.220 --> 00:24.220]  Point your finger too.
[00:25.420 --> 00:31.400]  Do you say your lips don't even stick together when my lips never does come?
[00:31.400 --> 00:32.200]  Arms up.
[00:34.660 --> 00:36.540]  Throw across the plane.
[00:38.200 --> 00:41.380]  Pictures are falling in and out of the frame.
[00:41.920 --> 00:42.280]  Sing it.
[00:52.870 --> 00:53.990]  Good and evil.
[00:54.750 --> 01:05.230]  Let me also pay my respects to the coalition commanders that I just met and to the members of the armed forces that are here side by side with the United States.
[01:05.430 --> 01:14.910]  Armed forces from other countries, shoulder to shoulder, and we are very grateful that this is a multilateral, not simply a unilateral mission.
[01:15.350 --> 01:16.650]  Our U.S.
[01:16.790 --> 01:18.770]  presence, of course, is the dominant one.
[01:19.610 --> 01:20.090]  Weaponry.
[01:20.090 --> 01:26.470]  America's only international defense affairs, military hardware, and history talk show is heard every Tuesday night at 1.30 a.m.
[01:26.610 --> 01:36.670]  Tune in for in-depth, often scholarly, multifaceted analysis of the ongoing crises in Somalia, the Middle East, what used to be Yugoslavia, and some other places you haven't heard of yet except here.
[01:36.670 --> 01:50.930]  international security policy, electronic warfare, the next generation of Navy carrier fighters, DOD-wide force reductions, Vulcan's Watch with David Isby, documentaries, interviews, technical analysis, oral history, and more.
[01:50.930 --> 01:52.930]  Every Tuesday night at 1.30.
[01:53.210 --> 01:57.350]  Only on WBAI Pacifica Radio in New York.
[02:05.790 --> 02:10.610]  People think comic book is nothing, but comic book shoots right across young culture in America.
[02:10.850 --> 02:11.950]  It shoots right to the kids.
[02:12.250 --> 02:16.730]  It hits key kids who are decision makers in their groups.
[02:17.390 --> 02:19.550]  Comic books are read by people who read.
[02:19.950 --> 02:22.710]  Comic books are commented on by people who think.
[02:23.150 --> 02:28.510]  They're not for stupid people, and they're not for ignorant people, and they're not for non-leaders.
[02:28.650 --> 02:37.470]  They are for everybody, but from my experience, they go directly to people who have things to say, who will have things to say in the future.
[02:37.470 --> 02:46.910]  And the fact that they're being done the way they are, and the fact that they're being done by people who really care about what's going on in America is, I believe, is going to make a difference.
[02:47.770 --> 02:52.290]  And it's not a small thing that's happening there, and I'm very happy to see it happen.
[02:52.510 --> 02:56.090]  That was Neil Adams speaking on an early episode of Nuff Said.
[02:56.090 --> 03:02.890]  To hear thought-provoking and entertaining discussion on the subject of comics, tune in every Tuesday night at 10 p.m.
[03:03.210 --> 03:08.330]  for Nuff Said, here on WBAI New York, 99.5 FM.
[03:08.730 --> 03:13.110]  And visit our website, nuffsaid.net, for our upcoming schedule of guests.
[03:13.730 --> 03:14.590]  See you there.
[03:21.460 --> 03:24.380]  And it is 8.02 in the evening.
[03:24.720 --> 03:26.920]  That's time for Off the Hook.
[03:33.860 --> 03:35.840]  The telephone keeps ringing.
[03:36.160 --> 03:38.420]  So I ripped it off the wall.
[03:39.380 --> 03:41.420]  I cut myself while shaving.
[03:42.100 --> 03:43.980]  Now I can't make a call.
[03:44.840 --> 03:46.820]  It couldn't get much worse.
[03:47.500 --> 03:49.460]  But if they could, they would.
[03:49.720 --> 03:52.380]  Bum-dilly-bum for the best, expect the worst.
[03:53.000 --> 03:54.920]  I hope that's understood.
[03:55.180 --> 03:55.900]  Bum-dilly-bum!
[04:34.710 --> 04:35.350]  Hello.
[04:37.570 --> 04:40.050]  It is 8 o'clock, and it is time for Off the Hook.
[04:40.270 --> 04:44.090]  But, uh, I'm Isaac Falcon, and, uh, I'm kinda alone over here.
[04:44.250 --> 04:46.050]  I say for the two gentlemen who just walked in.
[04:46.230 --> 04:47.830]  I'm gonna try to get Emanuel on the line.
[05:54.900 --> 05:55.820]  What is that beep?
[05:58.060 --> 05:59.000]  It's kinda strange.
[05:59.540 --> 05:59.680]  Beep!
[06:00.740 --> 06:01.520]  There's another one.
[06:02.940 --> 06:03.340]  Hello?
[06:03.760 --> 06:04.400]  Hello, Emanuel?
[06:04.900 --> 06:05.300]  Yes.
[06:05.300 --> 06:06.080]  How are you doing?
[06:06.400 --> 06:06.660]  Yes.
[06:06.960 --> 06:08.560]  Oh, is it that time of week already?
[06:08.800 --> 06:12.180]  Yeah, well, you know, you've been chiding out over in Europe, but, uh, we found you.
[06:12.920 --> 06:13.900]  How time does fly?
[06:14.020 --> 06:15.980]  You know, it seems like only a week ago I was in hell.
[06:17.210 --> 06:18.460]  And, uh, now I'm here.
[06:18.680 --> 06:19.860]  But you've managed to escape hell.
[06:20.020 --> 06:23.380]  I left hell, uh, shortly after the program last week.
[06:23.560 --> 06:24.600]  Hell, Norway, that is.
[06:24.600 --> 06:37.080]  And, uh, now I find myself in, uh, Guttberg, Sweden, um, site of the riots of a few, uh, weeks ago, uh, the EU demonstrators and, uh, police and all that fun stuff.
[06:37.480 --> 06:41.320]  Uh, but yes, um, this is a very interesting time.
[06:41.720 --> 07:00.940]  Um, I don't know how this kind of thing happens, but, uh, uh, this very moment, right now, this very, well, second, a few seconds ago, uh, Greenwich Mean Time, uh, of, uh, zero hours, zero minutes, or midnight, as you might call it, uh, is, uh, when the code red worm is supposed to really start,
[07:00.940 --> 07:03.580]  uh, attacking computer systems all around the world.
[07:03.880 --> 07:05.360]  It's the top story here.
[07:05.560 --> 07:07.420]  I think it's the top story in the United States as well.
[07:07.710 --> 07:09.240]  And everybody's talking about it.
[07:09.760 --> 07:14.500]  And, uh, of course, it happens to fall in the very hour that off the hook begins.
[07:14.680 --> 07:16.360]  So you have to wonder about these things.
[07:17.570 --> 07:19.060]  But, uh, we're gonna be talking about that.
[07:19.160 --> 07:21.000]  We're gonna be talking about a bunch of other things as well.
[07:21.420 --> 07:23.140]  Uh, Isaac, I believe you're gonna be calling some people.
[07:23.140 --> 07:26.760]  Somebody else to bring them in on our, uh, on our, uh, conversation on air.
[07:26.900 --> 07:27.040]  Correct?
[07:27.260 --> 07:28.060]  He's already here.
[07:28.240 --> 07:28.660]  Oh, wow.
[07:28.740 --> 07:29.520]  You did that really smoothly.
[07:30.060 --> 07:30.580]  I'm pretty slick.
[07:30.680 --> 07:31.140]  How you doing, Mike?
[07:31.480 --> 07:31.760]  Hello.
[07:31.940 --> 07:32.240]  How are you?
[07:33.000 --> 07:35.380]  It's, uh, Mike from Columbia, except he's not in Columbia right now.
[07:35.380 --> 07:36.300]  He's in California.
[07:36.950 --> 07:41.540]  And, uh, he was at the, uh, the, uh, demonstration yesterday.
[07:41.600 --> 07:46.400]  The, uh, the further demonstrations yesterday, uh, for Dmitry, uh, Scholarov.
[07:46.960 --> 07:47.300]  Hello.
[07:47.880 --> 07:48.260]  Yeah.
[07:48.260 --> 07:55.520]  He is the, uh, here's the hacker who was arrested, uh, for violating the, uh, Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
[07:55.710 --> 07:57.780]  And, uh, perhaps, Mike, you could tell us something about that.
[07:58.580 --> 07:58.980]  Uh, sure.
[07:59.100 --> 08:08.210]  As, uh, I'm sure many of your listeners already know, uh, he was arrested, uh, two weeks ago after giving a speech at DEF CON about, uh, e-book encryption.
[08:09.020 --> 08:18.880]  And, um, um, he's since been in federal custody for violating, uh, the DMCA, a law familiar to, uh, many of, many of your listeners.
[08:19.800 --> 08:30.000]  Um, last week, uh, a, uh, group of us protested outside Adobe's, uh, offices in San Jose and around the country.
[08:30.820 --> 08:35.720]  And Adobe has now called for the charges to be dropped.
[08:36.000 --> 08:45.210]  However, the, uh, Department of Justice, which is, of course, prosecuting the case, uh, has not listened to them and is still pushing forward.
[08:45.380 --> 08:50.300]  There, there seem to be on some kind of, uh, get tough on cyber crime spree.
[08:50.300 --> 08:53.640]  Um, so, Demetri is still in jail.
[08:53.920 --> 08:55.020]  He's now in Oklahoma.
[08:56.000 --> 08:56.120]  Um.
[08:56.920 --> 08:59.100]  And he's getting a wonderful tour of the United States, huh?
[08:59.440 --> 09:00.520]  Something like that.
[09:00.640 --> 09:03.840]  Apparently, the federal prison system operates somewhat like FedEx.
[09:04.020 --> 09:08.500]  They route everybody to a central location in Oklahoma for their final destination.
[09:09.760 --> 09:11.740]  Wow, that's, uh, that's really something.
[09:11.960 --> 09:14.500]  He's learning a lot about the American, uh, justice system.
[09:15.220 --> 09:17.520]  Um, so, right now, we believe he's in Oklahoma.
[09:17.940 --> 09:18.400]  Right.
[09:18.400 --> 09:21.040]  As of, uh, yesterday morning, he was there.
[09:21.360 --> 09:23.600]  And there's been no information that he's been moved.
[09:23.940 --> 09:26.780]  Now, how many people came to the demonstration yesterday in, uh, in San Jose?
[09:27.100 --> 09:29.160]  In San Francisco, where we were yesterday.
[09:29.380 --> 09:29.980]  Was it San Francisco?
[09:30.120 --> 09:30.240]  Okay.
[09:30.600 --> 09:30.760]  Yeah.
[09:31.340 --> 09:32.940]  Uh, there were about 150 people.
[09:33.620 --> 09:35.180]  That's, that's really, uh, pretty good.
[09:35.240 --> 09:37.560]  And I understand there were people all throughout the, uh, the country.
[09:37.640 --> 09:38.560]  Do you have any figures on those?
[09:38.800 --> 09:40.660]  Uh, I don't have them on me.
[09:40.840 --> 09:42.180]  Uh, they're on the website.
[09:42.500 --> 09:46.240]  But there were about five or six other cities, um, yesterday.
[09:46.240 --> 09:50.740]  And there are other demonstrations in other cities in the United States.
[09:50.920 --> 09:52.580]  Uh, there's going to be one in Italy.
[09:52.880 --> 09:54.820]  Uh, I believe today, actually.
[09:55.140 --> 09:59.180]  And all around the world, uh, over the coming weeks.
[09:59.680 --> 10:00.210]  Mm-hmm.
[10:00.440 --> 10:00.780]  Mm-hmm.
[10:00.780 --> 10:09.260]  And we also have, uh, some interesting, uh, developments, uh, with, uh, the coming, uh, 2600 meetings on Friday, this being the first Friday of the month.
[10:09.260 --> 10:10.680]  We have meetings all around the world.
[10:11.040 --> 10:20.880]  And, uh, what we're doing this week is tying in, uh, this particular case in much the same way that we did with the, uh, Motion Picture Association of America, uh, a while back.
[10:20.880 --> 10:43.180]  Uh, if you go to the, uh, 2600 website, you will see, uh, various, uh, flyers in, uh, different formats, HTML, PostScript, PDF, Word format, uh, that you can download and start printing out and bring to the meeting on Friday, uh, and make as many copies as possible and just start handing them out to people so people become aware of,
[10:43.180 --> 10:48.860]  uh, just what this case is all about because this is a very important issue and something people need to know about.
[10:49.040 --> 10:57.940]  And I think in this particular case, and some guy is actually in prison right now or in jail, uh, it really starts to hit home that this is not right.
[10:58.100 --> 11:04.140]  This is not the way, uh, people should be treated for figuring things out or for, uh, writing computer code.
[11:04.540 --> 11:10.100]  And, uh, I'm, I'm quite, uh, elated actually that, uh, that people are actually finally getting it.
[11:10.160 --> 11:13.880]  I mean, with a civil case like what we went through, uh, last year...
[11:13.880 --> 11:14.260]  Well, wait a second.
[11:14.320 --> 11:15.520]  You're still going through it.
[11:15.620 --> 11:17.000]  Let's not say that it's all over.
[11:17.140 --> 11:17.140]  Yeah, that's true.
[11:17.180 --> 11:18.780]  Well, we went through the civil case last year.
[11:18.860 --> 11:20.800]  We're going through it again this year with the appeal.
[11:21.240 --> 11:29.460]  But, um, uh, people don't really see, um, uh, very much in that lots of times if they're not, uh, personally involved.
[11:29.460 --> 11:30.960]  They don't have some kind of a stake in it.
[11:31.180 --> 11:37.220]  But when someone actually is put in jail, when someone is actually imprisoned, uh, then they start to take an interest.
[11:37.360 --> 11:39.740]  And I think that's something that we have to not lose sight of.
[11:39.920 --> 11:42.820]  People have to realize that that's, uh, you know, that's a big difference.
[11:43.000 --> 11:44.440]  But it's a, it's a logical step.
[11:44.440 --> 11:46.480]  We knew it was going to reach that step.
[11:46.980 --> 11:53.120]  Uh, when, when this first started last year, uh, we knew that a criminal prosecution was, uh, was imminent.
[11:53.660 --> 12:00.540]  Uh, so again, if, um, if you go to the website, www.2600.com, uh, there should be a story up there.
[12:00.540 --> 12:07.500]  Uh, and we have the, um, uh, a link to the, uh, the various flyers in various formats.
[12:08.120 --> 12:11.240]  Uh, all you have to do is, uh, download those, figure out how to print them out.
[12:11.280 --> 12:12.280]  You're hackers, you can do that.
[12:12.840 --> 12:18.380]  Uh, and basically just make as many copies as you can, uh, bring them to the meeting.
[12:19.000 --> 12:22.320]  Uh, you guys are going to be, uh, Isaac King and me at the New York meeting, I assume.
[12:22.500 --> 12:23.240]  Of course.
[12:23.560 --> 12:25.060]  I've been to the New York meeting for years.
[12:25.220 --> 12:26.900]  And Mike, you'll be at the San Francisco meeting.
[12:27.260 --> 12:27.520]  Right.
[12:27.740 --> 12:29.320]  You'll never guess what meeting I'm going to be at.
[12:30.000 --> 12:31.420]  You're not going back to hell, are you?
[12:31.720 --> 12:32.880]  Uh, there is no hell meeting.
[12:33.140 --> 12:33.140]  No.
[12:33.480 --> 12:33.500]  Okay.
[12:33.600 --> 12:37.080]  I'm going to be at the, uh, Aarhus, Denmark meeting.
[12:37.640 --> 12:38.000]  Yeah.
[12:38.260 --> 12:39.040]  Aarhus, Denmark.
[12:39.340 --> 12:40.240]  It's not Copenhagen.
[12:40.360 --> 12:41.880]  I'm going to be in Copenhagen tomorrow.
[12:42.320 --> 12:44.540]  Uh, and I'll meet up with some people there on Thursday.
[12:45.120 --> 12:52.560]  Uh, and there is a Copenhagen meeting, but I figure, you know, if I'm going to be in Denmark, I might as well go to the other meeting too, which I understand draws quite a few, uh, people.
[12:52.700 --> 12:53.980]  So it's another town called Aarhus.
[12:54.440 --> 12:58.680]  Uh, and with the, uh, European train system, it's, uh, uh, a snap to get there.
[12:59.100 --> 13:02.980]  Uh, so, uh, it'll be nice to see another part of, uh, of, of the country as well.
[13:03.460 --> 13:04.620]  So, uh, that's it.
[13:04.740 --> 13:07.540]  There's quite a lot of activity as far as, uh, as far as that goes.
[13:08.040 --> 13:19.980]  Also, something else I should point out today, uh, right now is the last, uh, day that you can register for the Hackers at Large conference taking place on August 10th through 12th in Holland.
[13:20.600 --> 13:24.560]  Uh, again, if you go to our website, uh, there is, uh, a way you can register online.
[13:24.680 --> 13:25.480]  Now, you don't have to panic.
[13:25.660 --> 13:32.320]  If you can't register online or if you're not sure that you can make it yet, uh, you can always register on, uh, at, at the location itself.
[13:32.700 --> 13:41.320]  Uh, but for those people who want to register, uh, with a credit card and just, uh, have the peace of mind knowing that that's out of the way, uh, it basically expires tonight.
[13:41.680 --> 13:43.960]  Tonight at midnight is, uh, is when that runs out.
[13:44.100 --> 13:49.880]  So if you're, if you wanted to do it that way, uh, this is your fair warning that, uh, it, it won't work in a little while.
[13:50.120 --> 13:52.900]  And so, uh, so just don't say we didn't warn you.
[13:54.000 --> 13:58.520]  Um, also on the subject of, uh, DMCA, something very interesting happened today.
[13:59.180 --> 14:01.200]  Um, I don't know how these things come about.
[14:01.340 --> 14:08.700]  I don't know how we, uh, we, we wind up in the places that we're in, but I find myself in, uh, a city called, uh, Gutberg, uh, in Sweden.
[14:08.740 --> 14:16.440]  And as I mentioned, that's a city that, uh, had, uh, massive demonstrations, uh, a couple of months ago, I believe, uh, that, that really put it on the map.
[14:16.480 --> 14:20.400]  You might know the city as Guttenberg in the United States, but it's called, uh, Gutberg here.
[14:20.740 --> 14:38.100]  But also another thing happened in the city, uh, more recently, uh, and that concerned the, uh, the whole DVD controversy where a DVD shop was raided by Swedish police because they were selling DVDs that belong to region one.
[14:38.220 --> 14:41.020]  In other words, United States, uh, DVDs.
[14:41.140 --> 14:43.020]  They were selling those in Sweden.
[14:43.640 --> 14:44.200]  And, uh...
[14:44.200 --> 14:48.880]  You mean there were, there were, like, two bits on the actual CD that identified it as region one?
[14:49.240 --> 14:54.840]  Basically, that's, yeah, two bits, uh, yeah, that identified it as, as, as region one instead of, uh, the ones I identified...
[14:54.840 --> 14:56.820]  These were not pirated DVDs or anything like that?
[14:56.820 --> 14:57.540]  They were not pirated.
[14:57.740 --> 14:59.100]  In fact, uh, here's what happened.
[14:59.340 --> 15:03.880]  Uh, we went over to, uh, to the store, which, uh, actually, we're in a hotel right now.
[15:04.000 --> 15:08.020]  The store must be located about, uh, less than half a mile from here.
[15:08.320 --> 15:13.380]  We just walked around today and found the place and found the guy who was there at the time that all this happened.
[15:13.720 --> 15:17.720]  Uh, and what they did was, they imported these from Denmark.
[15:18.220 --> 15:30.380]  Now, Denmark, it's perfectly okay, and there's, there's never been a prosecution and no one ever raises any questions about it, uh, for, for them to sell region one DVDs there, uh, in a region two country.
[15:30.800 --> 15:35.260]  Uh, however, in Sweden, apparently it's not so, uh, it's not so clear.
[15:35.260 --> 15:42.920]  Now, it's also kind of weird because they're both members of the EU and, uh, well, one would think that the same rules would apply.
[15:42.920 --> 15:45.540]  How can you be prosecuted in one for, yeah, never mind.
[15:46.280 --> 15:48.340]  Apparently, uh, that it's, it's not so simple.
[15:48.660 --> 15:51.580]  Nobody really knows where it's going to, uh, where it's going to wind up.
[15:51.660 --> 16:00.220]  But it just was very interesting winding up here and actually meeting the person that, uh, that was a target of kind of the same thing that we're a target of.
[16:00.220 --> 16:09.400]  Uh, it wasn't the Motion Picture Association of America this time, it was the Swedish police, but it was basically acting on the same, uh, same behest of the same industry.
[16:10.060 --> 16:13.760]  Um, and, uh, we're both kind of wondering what's going to happen next.
[16:13.880 --> 16:17.720]  Right now, uh, this, the store is doing great, very crowded, lots of people going there.
[16:18.220 --> 16:24.740]  Um, but they, uh, they're unsure where this is going to, uh, where it's going to go next and how it's going to affect them.
[16:24.900 --> 16:26.280]  Well, where do you think it's going to go next?
[16:26.640 --> 16:27.700]  Uh, I don't know.
[16:27.700 --> 16:30.420]  You know, it, it, it keeps getting more and more bizarre by the week.
[16:31.080 --> 16:42.780]  Um, I mean, who would have thought a couple of years ago that we'd actually see a store get, uh, get raided for selling, uh, a product that was, um, imported from another country.
[16:43.320 --> 16:52.280]  Um, it's basically the industry just has this stranglehold on, um, on the technology that's really turning into something very unhealthy.
[16:53.020 --> 16:58.240]  And now you have people going to prison because they, uh, they reverse engineer and figure things out.
[16:58.460 --> 17:03.000]  Uh, you have massive lawsuits being filed against other people for basically the same reasons.
[17:03.480 --> 17:12.180]  You know, I, I think, I think the average consumer who's a lot more intelligent than the industry gives them credit for, uh, will start to figure out that this is a very bad thing.
[17:12.420 --> 17:16.530]  And, uh, hopefully we'll start to react and, uh, and, and make their feelings clearer.
[17:16.530 --> 17:26.160]  And I think, uh, one, one good way to get started with that is, uh, is this Friday to get involved with, uh, with handing out those flyers and also, uh, get involved in any future demonstrations.
[17:26.320 --> 17:28.220]  Now, Mike, are there future demonstrations planned?
[17:28.680 --> 17:30.340]  Um, they're being planned.
[17:30.600 --> 17:34.460]  Um, a lot of cities plan to have them, not this coming Monday, but the Monday after.
[17:34.460 --> 17:35.920]  A lot of people want to take a week off.
[17:36.220 --> 17:38.750]  But some cities are doing them on other days of the week.
[17:38.750 --> 17:47.420]  Uh, the best thing to do is to go to freesklylav.org, and they have a calendar on there with, uh, nationwide and worldwide events.
[17:47.680 --> 17:48.960]  Now, you know you're going to have to spell that.
[17:49.250 --> 17:49.960]  Uh, sure.
[17:50.140 --> 17:54.770]  It's F-R-E-E-S-K-L-Y-A-R-O-V.org.
[17:54.770 --> 17:57.880]  Or if you forget, we link to it at the 2600 site.
[17:59.510 --> 17:59.950]  Okay.
[17:59.950 --> 18:03.750]  Uh, well, now I guess we have to get into the subject that, uh...
[18:04.510 --> 18:06.250]  Uh, I really didn't want to get into this.
[18:06.270 --> 18:07.660]  I know I didn't want to get into this.
[18:07.660 --> 18:08.640]  No, certainly not.
[18:08.680 --> 18:13.790]  But, uh, we have to get into this, because it happens to be crashing down around us everywhere.
[18:14.510 --> 18:17.540]  Uh, just today, in fact, I got a call from, uh, CNN International.
[18:18.340 --> 18:19.940]  Now, CNN International, it's an interesting thing.
[18:20.580 --> 18:24.440]  I don't know if many of you watch CNN, uh, but, uh, occasionally they...
[18:24.440 --> 18:27.440]  you might see a little globe in the bottom right-hand corner.
[18:28.040 --> 18:28.880]  That means it's international.
[18:29.290 --> 18:32.180]  Yeah, CNN International, and that's got a little globe of the United States.
[18:32.270 --> 18:34.180]  But over here, the globe, uh, shows Europe.
[18:34.440 --> 18:35.880]  And it's totally different feed.
[18:35.880 --> 18:38.990]  Uh, the, the programming is just so much better than CNN.
[18:39.140 --> 18:40.380]  I can't even describe it.
[18:40.560 --> 18:43.840]  Uh, they, they just treat you with so much more, uh...
[18:43.840 --> 18:49.440]  Uh, well, they, they assume you have intelligence and, and, and interest in, and what's going on throughout the rest of the world.
[18:49.860 --> 18:53.840]  Uh, and there's also a network called BBC World, which I'm, I'm really hooked on right now.
[18:53.960 --> 18:56.750]  That, uh, every place I've been seems to be getting that.
[18:56.750 --> 18:59.720]  Uh, but anyway, we got a call from CNN International before.
[19:00.140 --> 19:04.720]  And I, uh, I, I agreed to talk to them, um, on the phone from, from, from Gutberg, Sweden.
[19:05.490 --> 19:11.750]  Um, and I told them, you know, just because you guys do a good job, because you're, you're CNN International, that's, uh, that's why we're talking to you.
[19:12.030 --> 19:15.620]  And that they're very happy that we thought they were better than CNN, uh, for, for the United States.
[19:16.040 --> 19:28.900]  Uh, but just a little while ago, a couple of hours ago, I did a piece for them, uh, talking about the code red, uh, warm that is spreading around and how, uh, how this is really, uh, kind of out of control and insane.
[19:29.080 --> 19:32.360]  It was really weird too, because they didn't have me on, on TV, obviously.
[19:32.530 --> 19:36.190]  They only had the map and it showed Sweden and, uh, you know, Gutberg.
[19:36.530 --> 19:40.230]  And they actually like drew out exactly where I was, but it didn't explain why I was here.
[19:40.340 --> 19:43.530]  It seemed kind of strange that I would be in a, in a, in a place so far away.
[19:43.530 --> 19:45.270]  Um, so who knows what they thought.
[19:45.970 --> 19:48.430]  Um, but, uh, actually, Porkchop is here too.
[19:48.430 --> 19:52.120]  In fact, um, uh, we're in a hotel room and there's two phones.
[19:52.290 --> 19:53.300]  There's one phone in the bathroom.
[19:53.580 --> 19:54.100]  Hang on a second.
[19:54.530 --> 19:55.860]  Do I pick up the phone in the bathroom?
[19:57.030 --> 19:57.360]  Hang on.
[19:57.850 --> 19:58.210]  Hello?
[19:58.540 --> 19:59.120]  Phone in the bathroom.
[19:59.840 --> 20:04.790]  Alright, Porkchop is, uh, joining us now from, from the bathroom of this room, uh, and, uh, the extension, uh, phone.
[20:05.230 --> 20:07.300]  Um, we're on the air now in New York.
[20:07.470 --> 20:07.690]  Can you hear?
[20:08.410 --> 20:09.490]  Um, whoops.
[20:10.230 --> 20:11.320]  Don't do that now.
[20:12.150 --> 20:12.510]  Sorry.
[20:14.390 --> 20:15.340]  Can you guys hear okay?
[20:15.580 --> 20:16.770]  Oh, we can hear fine.
[20:17.040 --> 20:17.120]  Okay.
[20:17.230 --> 20:18.140]  I'm sorry about that.
[20:18.540 --> 20:19.080]  Uh, two minutes.
[20:20.130 --> 20:21.580]  Uh, what was that?
[20:22.270 --> 20:22.990]  Something minutes.
[20:23.450 --> 20:24.190]  I heard, I heard it.
[20:24.380 --> 20:25.080]  The phone I'm on.
[20:25.140 --> 20:25.790]  The computerized voice.
[20:26.300 --> 20:27.430]  Could be the phone I'm on.
[20:27.950 --> 20:29.340]  What, did you hear what it said, Mike?
[20:29.970 --> 20:31.300]  It said two minutes, possibly.
[20:31.490 --> 20:35.080]  Okay, you might be getting a two minute warning, uh, from, even though it's an incoming call.
[20:35.230 --> 20:36.160]  I don't know why that would be.
[20:36.840 --> 20:38.860]  Um, okay, that's strange.
[20:39.300 --> 20:43.800]  Well, in any event, uh, if we do lose you, Mike, is there anything else that you need to, uh, tell us?
[20:44.660 --> 20:53.250]  Uh, just, just to go on the web and get information and pass out flyers this Friday and in your, attend other events in your local area.
[20:53.250 --> 20:55.040]  And keep, uh, checking the website.
[20:55.270 --> 20:58.690]  We'll have information posted as, um, as that, as that happens.
[20:59.300 --> 21:00.860]  Uh, we'll try to stick with you.
[21:00.860 --> 21:04.010]  But if the computer cuts us off, there's nothing we can do about that, obviously.
[21:04.640 --> 21:06.620]  Now, Porkchop is here, or, or there.
[21:07.080 --> 21:11.900]  Um, and, um, what's, what's your impression of this whole Code Red business?
[21:12.470 --> 21:16.640]  Well, it seems to be a little bit, uh, over, over-hyped.
[21:16.860 --> 21:33.010]  Um, I guess you have to over-hype these things after a while, since, uh, it's been pointed out earlier in the news that, uh, you don't, you generally under-hype all these viruses and so on and so forth, and, um, there's this very typical, um, buffer overflow exploit that Microsoft IIS,
[21:33.710 --> 21:50.030]  uh, the, uh, web server for, Microsoft web server, basically, has been vulnerable, uh, for, for over a month, um, since June 18th is when they, uh, um, released an alert, um, saying that, uh, people can break into this.
[21:50.030 --> 21:50.660]  30 seconds.
[21:51.740 --> 21:52.540]  How many seconds?
[21:53.210 --> 21:53.840]  30 seconds.
[21:53.980 --> 21:54.040]  30 seconds.
[21:54.080 --> 21:55.240]  I'm just gonna hang up on him.
[21:55.320 --> 21:55.820]  We're sorry, Mike.
[21:55.880 --> 21:56.960]  I think this is probably it for you.
[21:57.060 --> 21:58.000]  No, no, stay on.
[21:58.060 --> 21:58.780]  I insist you stay on.
[21:58.860 --> 21:59.960]  I wanna hear what she said at the end.
[22:00.190 --> 22:00.480]  Okay.
[22:02.220 --> 22:05.880]  Uh, for those who don't know, we're talking to Mike from Columbia out in, um, California.
[22:06.080 --> 22:09.430]  He's at, I guess, a cocot that we called, and it's very limiting.
[22:09.430 --> 22:10.520]  This is an MCI phone.
[22:11.140 --> 22:11.460]  I'm sorry?
[22:11.690 --> 22:13.020]  An MCI phone.
[22:13.460 --> 22:13.780]  MCI.
[22:13.950 --> 22:15.820]  Okay, so now we know that MCI cuts you off.
[22:16.390 --> 22:16.960]  Just like that?
[22:16.980 --> 22:17.360]  I guess that's it.
[22:17.600 --> 22:18.450]  No, I'm still here.
[22:18.450 --> 22:19.210]  Oh, you're still there.
[22:20.190 --> 22:21.690]  They're just gonna make funny noises now.
[22:22.950 --> 22:23.620]  What is this?
[22:24.820 --> 22:25.220]  Okay.
[22:25.950 --> 22:26.450]  Who knows?
[22:26.600 --> 22:33.600]  But anyway, we're talking about the Search Advisory 2001-13, which came out months ago, which is, uh, part of the Code Red Worm.
[22:34.690 --> 22:35.140]  Go ahead.
[22:35.140 --> 22:44.260]  What the Code Red Worm does is, is uses the, uh, the buffer overflow exploit, uh, in that alert that Isaac just named, um, to break into...
[22:45.020 --> 22:45.780]  Are we last mic?
[22:46.760 --> 22:51.980]  To break into, uh, a web server that's vulnerable, another Microsoft IIS server.
[22:52.690 --> 23:01.080]  Um, and basically, the idea behind a buffer overflow exploit is that, uh, it enters a certain number of bytes into the URL, well, in this case, the URL field.
[23:01.220 --> 23:05.210]  Where you type in, you know, in Netscape www.whatever.com.
[23:05.500 --> 23:17.430]  Um, in this case, after the whatever.com, it would, you know, put random digits for, uh, depends on the buffer overflow, but, um, random digits to a certain length.
[23:17.430 --> 23:25.080]  And after that point, the stuff that the computer receives after that point will be treated as normal instruction code.
[23:25.680 --> 23:33.210]  Um, in this case, the, uh, the Code Red Worm follows this, uh, in this, uh, normal instruction code.
[23:33.780 --> 23:44.880]  And, um, for, at least for, uh, NT4, 2000 XP, and some Cisco hardware even, which runs IIS, um, it will receive this worm, which is just saved in RAM.
[23:44.880 --> 23:47.060]  It's not actually written out to disk at any point.
[23:47.520 --> 24:02.620]  Um, and, um, between the 1st and the 19th of the month, whatever month you happen to be in, it will try and attack randomly generated IP addresses, um, to find out if, you know, to try to replicate itself.
[24:02.960 --> 24:12.820]  It will keep on doing this for 19 days, and, uh, then starting on the 20th and going until the 27th, it will start attacking whitehouse.gov with a denial of service type attack.
[24:13.080 --> 24:14.460]  You know, I heard something different.
[24:14.460 --> 24:18.320]  I heard that it would start attacking random sites on the 20th.
[24:18.540 --> 24:21.280]  Uh, it was originally supposed to attack just whitehouse.gov.
[24:21.460 --> 24:22.820]  We talked about this last week a little bit.
[24:23.260 --> 24:24.430]  Uh, they were clever.
[24:24.540 --> 24:27.950]  They changed their IP, and, uh, were able to avoid that.
[24:28.060 --> 24:36.690]  But, uh, now I heard it mutated so that not only whitehouse.gov is, is attacked with denial of service, but also random IPs, and that's what the real worry is.
[24:36.690 --> 24:42.740]  And if that's the case, that's, uh, the real time for people to worry, I guess, would be on the 20th of the month, not the first.
[24:43.450 --> 24:45.190]  I've been reading conflicting things.
[24:45.500 --> 24:54.620]  Um, the one thing that, uh, one of the items that I read, rather, um, was that it would select random IPs within the whitehouse.gov address space.
[24:55.440 --> 24:59.000]  Um, and, uh, I've, I've, that's what I've read most of the time.
[24:59.190 --> 25:03.400]  But, uh, um, unfortunately, I don't have access to bug track here.
[25:03.840 --> 25:08.210]  So, uh, I haven't been able to, uh, find out what they've been saying, and I'm sure they would know best.
[25:08.360 --> 25:14.060]  Regardless, it's, uh, it's just another instance of, um, a lot of hype, a lot of media hype.
[25:14.260 --> 25:16.540]  Uh, we saw it with, uh, Michelangelo.
[25:16.950 --> 25:19.520]  Uh, we saw it with Y2K, Isaac.
[25:20.220 --> 25:22.000]  And, uh, we've, uh...
[25:22.000 --> 25:22.840]  What was that?
[25:22.840 --> 25:30.060]  We've seen all kinds of, uh, of, of, you know, pandemonium and worry about, uh, something that may or may not happen.
[25:30.360 --> 25:43.900]  And, you know, of course, the fear right now, and, you know, maybe our listeners can help us with this, because according to some of the reports we've been seeing on television today, uh, the Internet will start to slow down to a crawl, starting at midnight Greenwich time,
[25:44.020 --> 25:45.260]  which is right now 8 p.m.
[25:45.430 --> 25:45.900]  Eastern time.
[25:46.400 --> 25:50.960]  Uh, and, uh, who knows, you might not even be able to reach your favorite website at all.
[25:50.960 --> 25:55.100]  Um, now, there's a lot of things that you have to take into account here.
[25:55.740 --> 26:00.720]  Uh, mainly, how much of an effect can this thing possibly have in the first place?
[26:01.000 --> 26:06.380]  Uh, simply by, uh, uh, by, by spreading its, its, its viral source or whatever.
[26:06.600 --> 26:10.860]  Well, as we've seen with the Morris worm, this can be a very dangerous sort of thing.
[26:10.860 --> 26:16.210]  It can be, uh, but in this particular case, we know what the, what the danger is.
[26:16.340 --> 26:20.120]  We know what time it was set to actually start doing something.
[26:20.480 --> 26:26.660]  And, unlike the Morris worm, this is something where a fix is very readily available.
[26:26.950 --> 26:37.020]  All you have to do, and all you ever should be doing if you're running a website, is keeping track of the various, uh, bugs and various fixes and patches that you need to install.
[26:37.020 --> 26:54.300]  Now, the only reason that this could ever be a problem is because a lot of morons out there, and I mean this with all due respect, morons out there, are, are, are running Microsoft products without even checking to see if these Microsoft products have any security holes and are just blithely letting them run and,
[26:54.300 --> 26:55.860]  and run themselves into the ground.
[26:56.280 --> 26:59.840]  Uh, while, uh, while all kinds of, of horrors are unleashed.
[26:59.980 --> 27:06.950]  Well, then isn't the hype helpful in order to let these people know that, hey, there is a serious problem that might motivate them to go out and actually check the patch sites?
[27:07.280 --> 27:14.280]  Well, you know, he, I, I think that what is more helpful is just an overall sense of, this is what you should do all the time.
[27:14.460 --> 27:21.280]  Because, yeah, someone might go out there and, and, and download the patch, but tomorrow there could be something yet again.
[27:21.480 --> 27:27.190]  You might think you're safe because you downloaded this patch, but if you stop paying attention again, you haven't learned anything.
[27:27.340 --> 27:30.210]  And it's just going to keep happening over and over and over again.
[27:30.380 --> 27:33.450]  Then you're advocating the licensing of systems administrators.
[27:33.840 --> 27:34.460]  I'm sorry?
[27:34.640 --> 27:37.100]  You're advocating the licensing of system administrators.
[27:37.460 --> 27:41.480]  You know, they have to pass a competency test for applying patches to various servers.
[27:41.720 --> 27:45.380]  I'm not sure how I was advocating, uh, you know, making another level of bureaucracy.
[27:45.540 --> 27:47.300]  Well, that's the extreme of your, your argument.
[27:47.300 --> 27:51.300]  Well, I'm advocating some common sense where people, uh, don't expect the internet to take care of them.
[27:51.430 --> 27:58.540]  You have to, you have to be monitoring the, the machines that you run, and not just expect everything to somehow magically work itself out.
[27:58.690 --> 28:00.190]  I mean, that's, that's how the net works.
[28:00.620 --> 28:09.980]  Now, what I should also point out about this particular, uh, uh, code red worm is that, uh, there isn't any particular damage that is done.
[28:10.140 --> 28:16.600]  Even in those cases where a special message is sent out and the webpage is replaced with some crazy messages that's hacked by the Chinese.
[28:16.600 --> 28:18.040]  And God knows where that came from.
[28:18.460 --> 28:24.300]  Uh, in all these cases, the, the, the web pages themselves are not affected that, except for that message.
[28:24.400 --> 28:25.720]  Of course, they're not, uh, damaged.
[28:25.950 --> 28:26.430]  They're not erased.
[28:26.780 --> 28:33.450]  Uh, but what we can consider this is just a giant wake up call that, Hey guys, this has been out since June.
[28:33.760 --> 28:37.140]  They, the, the, the patches for this have been out since June 18th.
[28:37.140 --> 28:41.800]  And if you haven't applied them now, boy, you really deserve to be made an idiot of.
[28:42.850 --> 28:45.540]  Well, wasn't the Melissa virus supposed to be a wake up call?
[28:45.690 --> 28:50.930]  What about these other viruses that were all supposed to be the, the final nail of incompetent administrators?
[28:51.160 --> 29:01.450]  Yeah, well, you know, I think that there's a lot of people out there, a lot of system administrators who are in a pretty deep sleep, who really can't seem to wake up and you have to start taking pulses pretty soon to see just what the, what, what the problem is.
[29:02.260 --> 29:07.340]  You know, there, there, there are two themes here that keep repeating themselves, clueless administrators and Microsoft products.
[29:07.820 --> 29:13.380]  I mean, all the viruses that we ever see via email are Microsoft Outlook Express type of viruses.
[29:13.380 --> 29:23.860]  And now we have this, which is basically web, web servers that run on NT 2000, Windows 2000 or NT 4.0.
[29:24.380 --> 29:27.280]  And it's, it's just the same things keep happening.
[29:27.400 --> 29:28.900]  Apache is not affected by this.
[29:29.220 --> 29:31.240]  You know, Macintoshes aren't affected by this.
[29:31.880 --> 29:35.760]  You have to really, you know, start wondering, what's going on here?
[29:36.100 --> 29:37.560]  Why is this happening so much?
[29:38.600 --> 29:40.840]  Well, you, you raised another point previously.
[29:41.710 --> 29:58.080]  Imagine if there were a self-correcting server, one that would actually go check for patches, patch itself, monitor its own output and see if it's within certain parameters or boundaries and actually stop itself ahead of time from participating in floods like this.
[29:58.580 --> 30:03.380]  Why don't we expect our servers to be intelligent enough to, to, to do this sort of thing?
[30:03.380 --> 30:11.430]  We definitely do need something that, that will, uh, will trigger, uh, when, when certain danger signs, um, show themselves.
[30:12.020 --> 30:16.300]  And, uh, yeah, this is certainly a, a, a good time to develop something like that.
[30:16.640 --> 30:34.460]  Until something is developed like that, though, it's, uh, it's extremely important that people who, who take the responsibility of running a website, uh, know the software that they're running, or, uh, at least keep in touch with the various, um, uh, mailing lists and websites that,
[30:34.520 --> 30:39.190]  that give information on the bugs and the problems that they cause.
[30:39.480 --> 30:42.580]  Because if you don't do that, you're just asking for all kinds of trouble.
[30:42.580 --> 30:54.320]  But now, to address the actual hype, uh, it's, it's really, I find it kind of comical that, um, there's all this concern and worry because, uh, because someone's website might slow down.
[30:54.560 --> 31:09.320]  And really, you know, I think the reason why we're seeing such, um, uh, such concern is because those sites, the ones that, that are going to be affected might be, uh, you know, the, the commercial sites that just aren't doing a good job keeping themselves secure.
[31:09.820 --> 31:14.760]  Um, it's very simple to, to fix this, to not be affected by this.
[31:14.880 --> 31:19.190]  So, if you apply the patch, it goes away.
[31:20.120 --> 31:21.620]  Now, that should be enough.
[31:22.660 --> 31:25.740]  Instead, we're, we're, we're seeing all this mass pandemonium and hysteria.
[31:25.740 --> 31:32.040]  And I think, I think a lot of that is, is, um, is designed to get some kind of a reaction.
[31:32.580 --> 31:36.380]  So people say, oh, these evil hackers, they must be stopped at all costs.
[31:36.560 --> 31:37.960]  And, uh, you know, they're the problem.
[31:38.080 --> 31:39.300]  It's not shoddy programming.
[31:39.540 --> 31:42.080]  It's not administrators who don't look at what's going on.
[31:42.450 --> 31:45.100]  You know, it's, uh, it, it's these individual people.
[31:45.220 --> 31:51.100]  And I've already heard calls for, you know, more legislation, you know, more, more criminal crackdowns on these people.
[31:51.300 --> 31:56.360]  I don't see how any of that is going to change, uh, some kind of a program from being written in the future.
[31:56.520 --> 32:00.820]  For one thing, it's, it's almost impossible to track down the source of something like this.
[32:01.320 --> 32:04.000]  So, you can write all the legislation you want.
[32:04.160 --> 32:07.000]  Some, some 13-year-old somewhere is going to figure out a way to do this.
[32:07.220 --> 32:07.660]  Well, what if...
[32:07.660 --> 32:09.450]  It's not really that hard to do, either.
[32:09.600 --> 32:12.280]  It's not really that, uh, complex a code that has to be written.
[32:12.620 --> 32:15.520]  But the point is, anybody in the world can do this.
[32:15.860 --> 32:18.560]  So, yeah, write all the legislation you want.
[32:18.740 --> 32:19.800]  It's not going to change anything.
[32:20.000 --> 32:24.660]  Well, what if you turn it around and make the administrators responsible for their servers acting up?
[32:25.760 --> 32:28.120]  Well, I mean, I think they are responsible for their servers.
[32:28.430 --> 32:30.800]  I mean, I don't know if you're saying to make them criminally responsible.
[32:31.120 --> 32:31.900]  I think that's a bit of a reason.
[32:31.900 --> 32:33.820]  Well, not necessarily criminally, but perhaps simply.
[32:34.800 --> 32:37.720]  It depends on what their web servers are, are, are attempting to do.
[32:37.820 --> 32:45.740]  For instance, uh, you, you have, uh, you have various, um, companies, industries that, uh, keep information on individuals on their websites.
[32:45.980 --> 32:46.560]  And I think, yes.
[32:46.740 --> 32:56.820]  If they allow, if they allow your credit card information, your private, uh, hospital records to go out to the public because they were running an insecure website, yeah, they're responsible for that.
[32:57.000 --> 32:58.080]  Absolutely, 100%.
[32:58.080 --> 33:09.260]  So, by the same token, I would say that, uh, if something of a confidential nature, um, was compromised in some way because the administrator wasn't doing their job, they should be liable for that.
[33:10.060 --> 33:10.640]  All right.
[33:11.140 --> 33:13.100]  Worth, uh, worth thinking about.
[33:13.480 --> 33:13.640]  Yeah.
[33:14.040 --> 33:19.280]  Anyway, uh, we, we, we should take phone calls on this and any other, uh, concerns that people might have.
[33:19.450 --> 33:22.580]  This is something certainly that, uh, you'll be reading about in the newspaper.
[33:22.820 --> 33:29.220]  My personal prediction, I'm not sure what your prediction is on this, Isaac, but my prediction is that, uh, this is going to be overblown yet again.
[33:29.540 --> 33:45.540]  Uh, this is going to be something that, yeah, a few people will be affected, a few, uh, you know, a few people who weren't doing, uh, a good job watching their systems, uh, and we'll all breathe a big sigh of relief and say, boy, what a good job we did stopping this catastrophe and,
[33:45.620 --> 33:50.240]  uh, the evil hackers, uh, you know, almost got us this time, but, uh, we, we're just too smart for them.
[33:50.460 --> 33:50.820]  Well, don't worry.
[33:50.900 --> 33:54.460]  We can, we can suffer the hype again with, uh, Michelangelo's birthday coming up.
[33:54.840 --> 33:56.120]  Oh, is that, is that coming up again?
[33:56.450 --> 33:56.900]  Isn't it?
[33:57.100 --> 33:58.280]  Sometime in October or November?
[33:58.400 --> 33:59.430]  No, I think that's in March, actually.
[33:59.430 --> 33:59.950]  That's in March?
[34:00.060 --> 34:00.640]  Okay, I'm sorry.
[34:00.640 --> 34:01.690]  Well, we got, we got some more time.
[34:01.690 --> 34:03.960]  One more question for people who are, um, going to be calling in.
[34:04.190 --> 34:15.540]  Uh, for those that are running a website of any sort, I mean, it doesn't need to be an IAS, uh, website or anything, but why don't you just take a look at your logs, live, like, live feed, like a tail dash F of your log files and see if you're getting any of these,
[34:15.540 --> 34:16.760]  uh, uh, requests.
[34:16.980 --> 34:19.220]  And if you call in, tell us how much you're getting.
[34:19.320 --> 34:24.340]  If you're getting, you know, one or two, you know, how many IP addresses you might, uh, be listening on for your web server.
[34:24.480 --> 34:28.100]  Give us a pretty good idea of how much, uh, how much is being attempted.
[34:28.100 --> 34:28.760]  Yeah.
[34:29.000 --> 34:39.540]  So tell us if the internet is slowing down or breaking right now as we speak, because that's, if you watch TV, you know, if you watch TV without thinking, you would believe that the internet would be breaking right about eight o'clock, uh, Eastern time.
[34:40.140 --> 34:42.880]  Uh, if you listen to us on the net, I guess that proves that it didn't.
[34:42.880 --> 34:50.640]  Uh, I know a lot of people are listening to us on the net, um, but, uh, people should be keeping an eye out for this kind of a thing and, and, and letting us know.
[34:50.820 --> 34:56.800]  Well, I'm, I'm going to gripe about the coverage so far as officially, uh, fairly quickly before I move on to two other topics.
[34:56.800 --> 35:01.120]  I'm, I'm, I'm here reading the, uh, the Nipsey website, uh, alert.
[35:01.800 --> 35:04.620]  Nipsey alert 01-016.
[35:05.180 --> 35:07.740]  A very real and present threat to the internet.
[35:07.960 --> 35:09.000]  July 31st.
[35:09.140 --> 35:10.100]  Deadline for action.
[35:10.680 --> 35:11.280]  You know, summary.
[35:11.680 --> 35:16.260]  The code red worm and mutations of the worm pose a continued and serious threat to internet users.
[35:16.600 --> 35:17.950]  Immediate action is required.
[35:17.950 --> 35:37.620]  I mean, you know, this, this isn't, uh, I wouldn't say it's that, uh, uh, pressing an issue, uh, but my favorite, uh, which is a pet peeve that's just made itself more and more, uh, apparent to me lately as I was trying to download the cert advisory, they stopped distributing standard text file cert advisories.
[35:37.840 --> 35:40.140]  The only way to get it is to be on their mailing list.
[35:40.340 --> 35:49.500]  And the only reason I can think of that they would force you to go to their website to download it is to grab a silly little graphic that they have of the infection rate of this code red worm.
[35:49.820 --> 36:03.820]  Now, if you, if you go to the cert website and you look up, uh, uh, uh, advisory 2001-23, uh, not 2001-23-P unless you speak Polish, uh, you'll see this silly little graphic.
[36:03.820 --> 36:06.450]  It's just a line that goes, uh, up and over.
[36:06.620 --> 36:15.560]  It's like a, uh, a sideways sine curve and it's just really silly to force people to do that and for them to deactivate their website.
[36:15.960 --> 36:30.140]  Uh, I think it's, I think it's really, really, really irresponsible for them not to, uh, give out the text files unless you, you, you know, sign over your email address and join up with their, with their, uh, you know, on their list and that kind of thing.
[36:30.220 --> 36:31.640]  This information should be public.
[36:32.000 --> 36:34.000]  Well, their list is admittedly low traffic.
[36:34.160 --> 36:39.060]  I mean, it's, they just give out the advisories and they don't subscribe to anything you don't want to be subscribed to.
[36:39.700 --> 36:41.560]  But, uh, let's move on a touch here.
[36:41.930 --> 36:47.660]  Um, I know you're in Europe and I'm not sure if you've heard the news, but, uh, did you hear about, uh, Wow Holland?
[36:48.500 --> 36:49.620]  Uh, no, I did not.
[36:49.910 --> 36:52.140]  Uh, this is, uh, from Wired News, Berlin.
[36:52.500 --> 36:59.870]  Friends of German hacking legend Wow Holland are planning a memorial tribute next Friday at the Hackers at Large 2001 gathering in the Netherlands.
[37:00.240 --> 37:03.890]  Holland, 49, died Sunday from complications of a stroke he suffered in May.
[37:03.890 --> 37:08.520]  A funeral service was, is planned for Holland's hometown of Marburg in two weeks.
[37:08.910 --> 37:17.080]  More than 1,000 people have posted remembrances of the Chaos Computer Club co-founder at his website expressing their regard for a person who never stopped challenging others to think creatively.
[37:17.410 --> 37:18.350]  That's, uh...
[37:18.350 --> 37:19.000]  That is a loss.
[37:19.350 --> 37:20.460]  Really, really shocking news.
[37:20.560 --> 37:21.370]  I had no idea.
[37:22.140 --> 37:30.370]  Uh, well, Holland was, was one of the first people I met from the Chaos Computer Club when I came over here in 1989, uh, at the Galactic Hacker Party.
[37:30.620 --> 37:37.870]  And, uh, he just, he struck me as someone who was just, uh, you know, filled with, uh, with a sense of fun, excitement, exploration.
[37:38.350 --> 37:43.140]  And, uh, I mean, this is, this is really stunning for me to hear this.
[37:43.680 --> 37:47.810]  And, uh, I'm really, really shocked to, uh, to hear something like this.
[37:47.890 --> 37:52.520]  And that's, he seems so young, vibrant, and, and, and, and into things.
[37:53.640 --> 37:59.080]  So, uh, well, we'll certainly, we'll certainly, uh, have a tribute to him at, at, at Howell in two weeks.
[37:59.330 --> 38:02.120]  Well, I'm sure you're all, uh, doing justice.
[38:02.430 --> 38:05.810]  But, uh, speaking of justice, that's a very poor segue.
[38:05.810 --> 38:08.760]  Uh, Nicodemo Escafaro.
[38:09.460 --> 38:11.620]  Uh, I'm sorry, Scarfo.
[38:11.870 --> 38:17.450]  Uh, the son of Philadelphia's former mob boss and alleged mastermind of a loan shark operation in New Jersey.
[38:17.640 --> 38:31.720]  This is the fellow who, at the end of last year, had the FBI put a, uh, keystroke logger on his computer system because they were so frustrated that he was keeping his files, uh, PGP encrypted.
[38:32.330 --> 38:36.720]  Uh, recently, uh, an action came to pass.
[38:36.830 --> 38:37.950]  In fact, it was this Monday.
[38:38.480 --> 38:38.980]  Uh, U.S.
[38:39.120 --> 38:39.850]  Judge, U.S.
[38:40.120 --> 38:44.040]  District Judge Nicholas Politan served his sharpest needling for assistant U.S.
[38:44.120 --> 38:51.760]  Attorney prosecuting the case, asking how a court could accept the government's earnest assurances that it's spy technology permitted by federal law and the Bill of Rights.
[38:52.620 --> 38:58.240]  Um, basically, the argument is that keystroke logging is a wiretap.
[38:58.240 --> 39:10.460]  And since the agents had a search warrant to enter the premises, they did not have a wiretap warrant and therefore the password that they gleaned from keystroke logging is, uh, uh, uh, inadmissible.
[39:10.980 --> 39:12.700]  Uh, interesting thing.
[39:12.810 --> 39:13.890]  I read the same story.
[39:14.100 --> 39:15.180]  Did you get that from the New York Times?
[39:15.640 --> 39:16.120]  Uh, no.
[39:16.200 --> 39:17.350]  This is actually Yahoo News.
[39:17.350 --> 39:18.080]  Okay.
[39:18.220 --> 39:20.890]  Do they actually give the password out in that story?
[39:22.320 --> 39:25.460]  Um, I didn't see it, if it is in here.
[39:25.680 --> 39:26.060]  Okay.
[39:26.140 --> 39:28.430]  I'm going to find it in the copy I have.
[39:28.540 --> 39:28.810]  Okay.
[39:29.220 --> 39:31.370]  Um, but continue with your point while I do that.
[39:31.500 --> 39:31.520]  Yes.
[39:31.580 --> 39:39.700]  Uh, basically, the, the reply to this from the Department of Justice is, well, it's not a wiretap because we didn't actually tap any wires.
[39:39.700 --> 39:43.810]  At which point the court says, well, let's figure out how you did this.
[39:43.950 --> 39:46.020]  You know, we want, we, this has to be evaluated.
[39:46.020 --> 39:54.260]  This is the purpose of the appeal to see if this is a, uh, a legitimate act on the, on the fact, on the part of, uh, law enforcement.
[39:55.360 --> 40:05.740]  And the FBI replied that the government key logger is a secretive law enforcement.
[40:05.740 --> 40:11.930]  Uh, yeah, the government calls the key logger a sensitive law enforcement that is privileged.
[40:12.520 --> 40:13.020]  Hmm.
[40:13.160 --> 40:21.040]  For their part, the feds believe so strongly in keeping this information secret that they've hinted that they may invoke the classified information procedures act if necessary.
[40:21.330 --> 40:29.660]  The 1980 law says that the government may say that evidence requires protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security.
[40:30.640 --> 40:34.540]  So keystroke logging is now a, uh, a matter of national security.
[40:34.540 --> 40:35.580]  That's wonderful.
[40:35.810 --> 40:36.450]  Isn't that wonderful?
[40:36.700 --> 40:43.830]  I tracked down the, uh, the password which was printed in the New York Times, um, which I remember reading here in the International Hero Tribune.
[40:44.350 --> 40:51.550]  Uh, the logger captured the password, get this, NDS09813-050.
[40:53.140 --> 40:59.500]  Now, I'm looking at this over and, um, it's, it's a very interesting password because, what was the guy's name again?
[41:00.220 --> 41:01.520]  Uh, let, let's see.
[41:01.660 --> 41:03.720]  Uh, his name was, uh, Nicholas S.
[41:04.740 --> 41:05.100]  Scarfo.
[41:06.220 --> 41:07.430]  I'm sorry, Nicodemo S.
[41:07.560 --> 41:07.830]  Scarfo.
[41:08.140 --> 41:09.370]  Oh, wait, you have a middle initial there?
[41:09.450 --> 41:09.720]  Are you sure?
[41:09.780 --> 41:10.910]  I have a middle initial here.
[41:11.000 --> 41:11.540]  It says S.
[41:11.850 --> 41:13.060]  Okay, I didn't get the middle initial.
[41:13.060 --> 41:18.180]  I assumed it was D because, uh, the first, uh, three letters were, were NDS.
[41:18.310 --> 41:23.810]  And then the number, which I thought was an interesting number, 09813-050.
[41:23.810 --> 41:27.390]  That, to me, uh, sounds like a federal prisoner ID.
[41:28.160 --> 41:30.000]  I was thinking that that's, uh...
[41:30.000 --> 41:30.370]  Amusing.
[41:30.780 --> 41:32.810]  Initials followed by their federal prisoner ID.
[41:32.870 --> 41:34.890]  Not a very good choice for a password, I have to point out.
[41:34.890 --> 41:35.390]  No, no.
[41:35.520 --> 41:43.390]  But you don't need to choose a good password because now you can simply have the, the bureau sniff the password from your keystrokes as you enter it anyway.
[41:43.620 --> 41:47.720]  So, you know, 46 keys long, uh, and it doesn't matter.
[41:48.310 --> 41:49.620]  Yeah, that's, uh, that's something.
[41:49.810 --> 41:52.870]  Let's open up the, uh, the phones, 212-209-2900.
[41:52.870 --> 41:54.000]  Good, uh, see you out there.
[41:54.160 --> 42:06.680]  If you want to follow this, by the way, you want to go to, uh, www.epic.org slash crypto slash scarfo.html, and they actually have all the documents from the, uh, the hearing going on.
[42:07.000 --> 42:14.620]  Yeah, it's a great group of people, Epic, and, uh, hopefully we can follow this story, too, because that's a, that's a very big threat to people's privacy and freedom.
[42:14.850 --> 42:18.500]  All right, I'm now wheeled over here by the phone, and we shall choose a line.
[42:19.450 --> 42:20.500]  Hello, you're on the air.
[42:20.500 --> 42:21.540]  Yeah.
[42:21.980 --> 42:27.720]  How do you know somebody hasn't invented artificial intelligence to stop hacking, or anything else like that?
[42:27.830 --> 42:28.830]  An excellent question.
[42:30.080 --> 42:30.600]  And we know it's capable.
[42:30.600 --> 42:32.120]  Artificial intelligence to stop hacking.
[42:33.380 --> 42:34.680]  Some genius out there.
[42:36.080 --> 42:37.200]  We know it's capable.
[42:37.830 --> 42:40.240]  How, well, how would you, how would you actually stop hacking?
[42:40.540 --> 42:42.560]  Hacking, hacking relies on...
[42:42.560 --> 42:50.220]  How would you say an entity that can think for itself that is capable of doing a hell of a lot more than what any hack or anybody else could do?
[42:50.430 --> 42:51.280]  Certainly, this is kind of what I was...
[42:51.280 --> 42:53.260]  And make your life a hell of a lot easier with it.
[42:53.260 --> 43:00.640]  This is what I was kind of describing, something that will actually look at inbound requests and its own outbound requests and say, is this normal?
[43:00.890 --> 43:02.480]  Is this what I'm supposed to be doing?
[43:02.930 --> 43:04.220]  You know, where is this coming from?
[43:04.330 --> 43:05.020]  Do I trust it?
[43:05.120 --> 43:06.560]  And can make those decisions on its own?
[43:06.560 --> 43:10.890]  I have to, you know, it would be interesting if something like that could be invented.
[43:11.700 --> 43:13.540]  But I think we're a long ways away from it.
[43:13.620 --> 43:21.540]  And I base this on my credit card companies that try to do the same thing, look for something that's, you know, not normal.
[43:21.830 --> 43:32.930]  And that's how I got my credit card turned off last week, because somebody saw a purchase at the Wiz that I always go to, but they thought it was a fraudulent purpose because of the way it was done, or something crazy like that.
[43:32.960 --> 43:34.960]  I could never get a better explanation.
[43:34.960 --> 43:36.640]  But their software flagged it.
[43:37.040 --> 43:50.940]  I can't tell you how many times something like this has happened to me, where some computer someplace decides that something isn't right, so they decide to inconvenience somebody because they're not certain if they should be allowing the transaction to take place.
[43:51.100 --> 43:56.560]  Frankly, I would prefer the secure inconvenience to an open-door problem.
[43:57.060 --> 44:05.520]  Well, you can have that in that particular case, but, you know, I prefer to, you know, to take my own chances as far as, you know, my own credit card goes.
[44:05.640 --> 44:06.980]  As far as this, I don't know.
[44:07.040 --> 44:09.440]  It depends on how good the software is.
[44:09.560 --> 44:15.780]  It needs to be developed in such a way that, you know, that obviously it's not going to cause more harm than good.
[44:16.260 --> 44:19.780]  Well, I think you're going to see something like that sooner than you think.
[44:20.160 --> 44:22.840]  I'll tell you what, you know, a hacker is going to be the one to write that.
[44:22.980 --> 44:23.520]  Oh, of course.
[44:23.860 --> 44:25.980]  So you won't stop hacking that way.
[44:26.120 --> 44:27.560]  Well, let's move on here.
[44:27.560 --> 44:28.940]  Hello, you're on the air.
[44:29.360 --> 44:29.760]  Hi.
[44:29.980 --> 44:30.400]  How you doing?
[44:30.560 --> 44:32.220]  Oh, let me just unplug this radio.
[44:32.480 --> 44:32.560]  Okay.
[44:32.980 --> 44:33.400]  Very good.
[44:33.600 --> 44:33.940]  What?
[44:35.580 --> 44:39.640]  Is there anything that'll read tone from a phone?
[44:39.940 --> 44:40.340]  Yes.
[44:40.480 --> 44:41.120]  By sound?
[44:41.500 --> 44:41.680]  Yes.
[44:41.880 --> 44:42.680]  Not caller ID?
[44:43.280 --> 44:44.080]  DTMF decoders.
[44:44.540 --> 44:47.600]  You can go out and find them, and they're certainly available.
[44:47.780 --> 44:49.380]  You can actually build them yourself if you're live.
[44:49.420 --> 44:50.060]  Is that what you're trying to do?
[44:50.180 --> 44:51.380]  You're trying to decode a touch tone?
[44:51.640 --> 44:51.960]  Right.
[44:52.700 --> 44:55.300]  Yeah, there's DTMF decoders that will do that.
[44:55.300 --> 45:00.000]  There used to be one that was sold by Radio Shack that the FBI got taken off the market.
[45:00.780 --> 45:04.160]  It was kind of like a pen register, like the kind they have.
[45:04.360 --> 45:04.660]  Right.
[45:04.780 --> 45:09.800]  That basically allows you to monitor the numbers that are dialed on your phone system.
[45:10.000 --> 45:13.600]  Apparently it worked too good, so they pressured Radio Shack to stop selling it.
[45:13.600 --> 45:20.720]  But there are numerous ways that you can record touch tones and translate them into numbers.
[45:21.280 --> 45:28.040]  There are computer-based programs that will do that, and there are other ways of doing it as well.
[45:28.340 --> 45:30.340]  Hey, Emmanuel, didn't your voice BBS do that?
[45:30.560 --> 45:36.660]  Yeah, the voice BBS is one way of doing that, our voice BBS, but that's only one way.
[45:36.660 --> 45:37.940]  There are many, many others.
[45:38.600 --> 45:39.780]  Well, where would I look?
[45:39.880 --> 45:40.860]  What is it?
[45:41.520 --> 45:43.420]  How would I identify it, or what is it?
[45:43.420 --> 45:55.120]  Well, you know, one old trick, and this is something that I used to do years ago, whenever I had a string of touch tones I needed to decode, I'd call my beeper and play it into my beeper number, and then my beeper would go off, and I'd see the numbers.
[45:55.740 --> 45:56.100]  Interesting.
[45:57.680 --> 45:58.720]  That's fantastic.
[45:59.060 --> 46:03.060]  Yeah, so there are many, anything that can read touch tones can repeat them back.
[46:03.160 --> 46:17.020]  For instance, let's say you call a voicemail system someplace that asks you to enter a password, and you enter a string of numbers, sometimes it will repeat the password back and say, the password, XXX, you know, is not valid.
[46:18.540 --> 46:23.420]  Any number of things that accept touch tone input will many times repeat back what you input.
[46:23.960 --> 46:27.760]  But to make one, or to look up the technology, to read about it...
[46:27.760 --> 46:32.060]  You want to go to a search engine, you want to look for DTMF decoder.
[46:32.380 --> 46:32.600]  Yep.
[46:33.240 --> 46:38.660]  And you'll no doubt find some part lists and some projects and schematics to build one for yourself.
[46:38.860 --> 46:41.000]  But all the search engines may be offline now, Isaac.
[46:41.220 --> 46:41.540]  I don't know.
[46:41.560 --> 46:42.140]  Well, you know...
[46:42.140 --> 46:43.740]  Any indication that the internet is still up?
[46:43.820 --> 46:44.620]  I can't quite tell.
[46:44.740 --> 46:46.140]  I'm not online today.
[46:46.320 --> 46:46.920]  I'm kind of busy.
[46:47.220 --> 46:51.060]  Okay, well, so far we've had two callers, and neither of them has proven that the internet still works.
[46:51.480 --> 46:51.640]  Hello.
[46:51.640 --> 46:53.240]  I'm getting a little worried here.
[46:53.600 --> 46:54.600]  The internet still works.
[46:54.980 --> 46:56.600]  Can you verify that, sir?
[46:56.960 --> 46:58.780]  Well, I see some traffic.
[46:59.340 --> 46:59.620]  We do.
[46:59.960 --> 47:01.320]  Code Red first struck...
[47:01.320 --> 47:11.460]  Fortunately, we run Unix and not Microsoft, but we first got a hit in the log on 16th of July at 2.46 a.m.
[47:11.720 --> 47:13.720]  Eastern time of Code Red.
[47:13.720 --> 47:20.640]  And then there's subsequent requests on the 17th, 18th, and then on the 19th, there were a whole bunch of them.
[47:20.660 --> 47:22.900]  I think a total of about 50 or 60 attempts.
[47:23.320 --> 47:32.920]  The way you can see this is if you grep through your logs, the string begins with slash default dot IDA question mark, and then a bunch of capital ends.
[47:33.520 --> 47:37.820]  So people out there who want to filter through their logs, that's how you can find it.
[47:37.820 --> 47:39.920]  Can I ask, what did you do about it?
[47:40.600 --> 47:40.820]  Nothing.
[47:40.820 --> 47:43.560]  I'm running Apache on Unix, so I just laughed.
[47:44.800 --> 47:57.600]  But, yeah, but apparently, you know, there were several attempts, and these are many different IP addresses coming in who were probing, you know, sending this attempted buffer overflow to our server.
[47:57.800 --> 47:59.640]  We just logged it, and that's the end of it.
[47:59.880 --> 48:02.100]  Has this caused you a lot of additional traffic?
[48:02.340 --> 48:03.260]  I didn't even notice it.
[48:04.120 --> 48:04.600]  Okay.
[48:04.600 --> 48:14.880]  I think between the 16th of July, there was one hit, 17th, one hit, 18th, like three, and then on the 19th, there were about 40, 47 times.
[48:14.880 --> 48:18.740]  Well, why don't you call us next week and tell us what happened, you know, since...
[48:19.120 --> 48:19.720]  Yeah, okay.
[48:19.920 --> 48:25.520]  Anyway, since we get about 50,000 hits an hour, I'd say 50 hits over two days, like, is meaningless.
[48:25.820 --> 48:26.920]  You wouldn't call that crippling.
[48:27.340 --> 48:37.760]  Not in terms of our network, but then again, we're not running IIS, and we don't know how many attempts those things would make if it fires up and starts probing, you know, out there in the universe.
[48:38.240 --> 48:38.640]  Right.
[48:38.700 --> 48:39.080]  It's hard to say.
[48:39.320 --> 48:39.480]  Right.
[48:39.700 --> 48:42.880]  By the way, this other virus thing out there, the CIRCAM.
[48:43.140 --> 48:43.380]  Right.
[48:43.540 --> 48:45.740]  I was about to mention, now that's a bandwidth killer.
[48:46.000 --> 48:48.860]  That's a bandwidth killer, and I don't know how many times...
[48:48.860 --> 48:52.140]  I must have got that about 300 times in the last couple of days.
[48:52.500 --> 48:52.640]  Yeah.
[48:52.760 --> 48:55.160]  Unfortunately, I don't get your advice or something like that, right?
[48:55.280 --> 48:55.480]  Right.
[48:55.820 --> 48:57.020]  But then...
[48:57.020 --> 48:57.600]  We've...
[48:57.600 --> 49:09.060]  Now, an interesting thing, because I'm traveling right now, and I thought it would be a good idea, stupid me, to forward my email to a Hotmail account, all right, just so I could check it without having to compromise security.
[49:09.640 --> 49:26.280]  Now, inside of maybe four hours, I reached the quota because of all the stupid emails I started getting of multiple megs that somehow this virus was generating from people who were running Microsoft Outlook or Outlook Express again.
[49:26.280 --> 49:26.620]  Yeah.
[49:27.080 --> 49:31.320]  So, and Isaac, we wound up forwarding it to one of your machines.
[49:31.340 --> 49:37.980]  Yeah, there's this user on one of my machines that seems to have like a multi-gigabyte mail spool at this point.
[49:37.980 --> 49:40.220]  Inside of two days, we had over 100 gigs of mail.
[49:40.440 --> 49:41.240]  100 megs of mail.
[49:41.340 --> 49:42.880]  Did you get any secret messages?
[49:43.020 --> 49:44.260]  Soon it'll be 100 gigs.
[49:44.260 --> 49:44.520]  Yeah.
[49:44.520 --> 49:44.660]  Yeah.
[49:44.780 --> 49:56.300]  Allegedly, the FBI had their computers infiltrated with this SIRCAM, and it allegedly, when it gets into your system, it scans your hard drive and picks files and mails them out.
[49:56.780 --> 49:57.060]  Yeah.
[49:57.200 --> 50:06.720]  Now, the thing is, we haven't been affected in that way because we don't run those programs, but we've been affected in the way that we're getting the mail from all the morons who do on that.
[50:06.720 --> 50:07.620]  Well, yeah, same here.
[50:07.800 --> 50:13.600]  I don't use Outlook or any pop clients, but I got hundreds of these men.
[50:13.800 --> 50:21.820]  Now, why is it that that is not getting any publicity on the mass media at all when that's a real bandwidth killer and that's something that's a real annoyance?
[50:21.940 --> 50:30.900]  That's something that can be destructive, too, because if you have any personal files or private files on your machine and it infests you, then it's going to potentially mail out.
[50:31.280 --> 50:32.580]  That's not all it does, either.
[50:32.760 --> 50:36.120]  This random document you talked about, it comes from the My Documents folder.
[50:36.820 --> 50:38.240]  It just picks up a random one.
[50:38.460 --> 50:46.640]  If you're using the European date format, that's day, slash month, slash year, you have a 1 in 20 chance of your hard drive being wiped on October 16th.
[50:46.920 --> 50:47.460]  That's right.
[50:47.840 --> 50:48.060]  That's the other funny detail.
[50:48.060 --> 50:53.380]  There are a couple of other things, a 1 in 33% chance of your hard drive being filled up on another date.
[50:53.580 --> 50:55.000]  Can you explain this?
[50:55.980 --> 50:58.080]  Well, just someone having fun, I think.
[50:58.600 --> 51:00.100]  Now, I'm wondering how it works.
[51:00.720 --> 51:02.820]  Oh, I didn't go that far deep.
[51:02.820 --> 51:08.480]  I went to CERT and to Security Focus.
[51:08.760 --> 51:10.180]  Yeah, the marvelous people at CERT.
[51:11.020 --> 51:29.180]  Yeah, well, this is very good because I think deserves a little bit more attention, because, you know, at least in my personal case, it was a real major pain to have to, like, not be able to get mail because things filled up so fast and to have to deal with bandwidth issues from all this massive amount of mail being bandied about.
[51:29.900 --> 51:32.680]  And also, it underlined my feelings towards spam.
[51:32.680 --> 51:43.100]  I mean, this isn't a spam, but we get so much spam in a typical user's mailbox that I think that's something that really needs to be looked at.
[51:43.140 --> 51:51.920]  Not for more legislation, not for more laws and people being prosecuted, but for a technical solution to prevent all this wasted time.
[51:51.920 --> 51:54.000]  And it really is a lot of wasted time.
[51:54.280 --> 51:55.300]  And storage space.
[51:56.480 --> 51:59.260]  And bandwidth and just having to go through it all.
[51:59.420 --> 52:04.860]  I'd say more than half the mail that I see is spam or something that I did not request.
[52:05.640 --> 52:08.400]  It would be nice if we could have scripts.
[52:08.400 --> 52:21.280]  Maybe that would work with SendMail or with Mutt or with one of the mailers that we use that will simply reject anything with this particular subject from this particular user with this particular amount of text in it.
[52:21.280 --> 52:23.340]  Sounds like proc mail scripts to me.
[52:23.380 --> 52:29.440]  Yeah, but something more sophisticated that will actually not waste your computer's time and not waste your computer's bandwidth.
[52:29.740 --> 52:32.300]  I think those are the real issues that we need to be focusing on.
[52:32.560 --> 52:32.720]  Hmm.
[52:33.380 --> 52:34.980]  Intelligent technical solutions.
[52:34.980 --> 52:36.240]  I like this idea.
[52:36.500 --> 52:37.480]  I like this thread for tonight.
[52:37.640 --> 52:39.820]  Yeah, and the intelligent technical solutions don't come through legislation.
[52:39.820 --> 52:42.160]  They come through technological innovation.
[52:42.420 --> 52:43.100]  I like it.
[52:43.460 --> 52:43.880]  All right.
[52:43.880 --> 52:44.940]  Let's take another call.
[52:45.200 --> 52:46.260]  Hello, you're on the air.
[52:46.480 --> 52:46.780]  Yes.
[52:46.900 --> 52:47.820]  Good evening, Walt.
[52:48.000 --> 52:48.460]  Good evening.
[52:48.620 --> 52:50.660]  I tried to get you in hell.
[52:50.660 --> 52:51.500]  This is a familiar voice.
[52:51.640 --> 52:52.300]  I know this voice.
[52:52.320 --> 52:52.340]  Yeah, Manuel.
[52:52.460 --> 52:52.940]  Hold on a second.
[52:52.980 --> 52:53.640]  Who could this be?
[52:54.100 --> 52:54.580]  It's Monroe.
[52:54.900 --> 52:55.160]  Listen.
[52:55.500 --> 52:55.740]  Monroe.
[52:56.080 --> 53:03.480]  Today Gary Knoll brought up the problem that he was faced with some invasion of his machinery.
[53:03.480 --> 53:13.760]  And also, apparently, anything from Gary Knoll should be, you know, be very carefully treated because there may be a virus in it.
[53:13.960 --> 53:15.340]  I'm hoping that he drew it.
[53:15.340 --> 53:17.800]  I haven't got anything up to Gary Knoll recently, but I'll certainly look at it if I did.
[53:17.800 --> 53:31.760]  No, but I think you guys should step in because I'm relying on you to determine who the hackers were, because he's sort of alleging that those culprits of the concerned friends sought are the ones who are guilty.
[53:32.280 --> 53:51.340]  Well, Monroe, we've talked about this before, but let me just say very quickly that any time somebody alleges that hackers did something, hackers got into a particular computer system and grabbed the one file that was necessary to prove a case or to do something that was of monumental importance,
[53:51.680 --> 53:55.400]  I think what we have to realize is that they've been watching a little too much TV.
[53:55.920 --> 53:56.940]  Yeah, yeah.
[53:57.100 --> 54:00.400]  That's what it's all about, because real life does not work that way.
[54:01.480 --> 54:02.280]  Wait a second.
[54:02.540 --> 54:04.140]  I like TV life.
[54:04.720 --> 54:05.060]  Yeah.
[54:05.320 --> 54:07.700]  Well, you know, you should check out TV here in Europe.
[54:07.700 --> 54:08.620]  It's so much better.
[54:08.840 --> 54:09.440]  It really is.
[54:09.440 --> 54:11.840]  They don't show commercials during television programs.
[54:11.960 --> 54:13.280]  They show full credits at the end.
[54:13.520 --> 54:16.400]  You feel like you're actually watching something that might be worth your attention.
[54:16.760 --> 54:18.700]  Well, that's also PBS here, but, you know.
[54:19.100 --> 54:21.920]  I kind of like explosions and good-looking women walking around.
[54:22.020 --> 54:22.820]  That's not a bad thing.
[54:23.280 --> 54:24.200]  Hello, you're on the air.
[54:24.680 --> 54:25.420]  No, you're not.
[54:25.780 --> 54:26.440]  Oh, my.
[54:26.680 --> 54:28.520]  I haven't heard the American dial tone in a while.
[54:28.820 --> 54:29.740]  Hello, you're on the air.
[54:30.420 --> 54:31.700]  Hey, hi, this is Quad.
[54:32.340 --> 54:33.240]  I had a question.
[54:33.460 --> 54:35.380]  It's not a virus, but it's just as irritating.
[54:35.720 --> 54:36.440]  Pop-up ads.
[54:37.060 --> 54:37.420]  Yes.
[54:37.420 --> 54:45.740]  Is there any software that can prevent you from having 15,000 pop-up ads come up every time I click on something?
[54:45.920 --> 54:46.660]  Turn off JavaScript.
[54:47.780 --> 54:48.260]  JavaScript?
[54:48.620 --> 54:48.960]  Mm-hmm.
[54:49.120 --> 54:49.960]  What about junkbusters?
[54:51.040 --> 54:51.800]  I'll write that.
[54:51.800 --> 54:52.080]  I don't know.
[54:52.920 --> 54:53.640]  Thank you.
[54:54.200 --> 54:57.700]  I'd actually considered writing a proxy at one point that...
[54:57.700 --> 54:58.800]  Oh, yeah, propaganda.
[54:58.920 --> 54:59.960]  That's a wonderful term.
[55:00.320 --> 55:03.500]  Writing a proxy at one point that would filter through those JavaScript...
[55:04.140 --> 55:04.640]  JavaScript...
[55:04.640 --> 55:05.140]  JavaScript.
[55:05.560 --> 55:06.060]  Very good.
[55:06.640 --> 55:08.200]  JavaScript pop-up requests.
[55:08.420 --> 55:10.220]  But I never quite got around to writing it.
[55:10.760 --> 55:11.900]  Hello, you're on the air.
[55:12.900 --> 55:13.400]  Hello?
[55:13.680 --> 55:13.920]  Hello.
[55:13.920 --> 55:14.440]  Yeah.
[55:14.620 --> 55:18.040]  I got a question for you guys on the BAI website.
[55:18.280 --> 55:18.520]  Yeah?
[55:18.920 --> 55:20.200]  I recently...
[55:20.200 --> 55:30.980]  Well, actually, back in the pledge drive, you said that she had seen a prototype of that, a beta, what have you, and that it was going to be opened up sometime soon, and it's been quite a while.
[55:31.160 --> 55:31.480]  I don't know if you...
[55:31.480 --> 55:32.820]  Which website are we talking about?
[55:32.820 --> 55:33.940]  The BAI.org.
[55:34.760 --> 55:36.760]  I know there's not much going on on that website.
[55:36.760 --> 55:43.660]  I've looked at it many, many times, and sometimes the counter number moves up, but other than that...
[55:43.660 --> 55:48.100]  And the link has been changed to reflect the fact that we're doing the webcasting.
[55:48.480 --> 55:51.160]  But I have not seen any content on that page.
[55:51.400 --> 55:51.780]  Right.
[55:51.800 --> 55:53.760]  I sure hope that changes sometime soon.
[55:54.260 --> 55:54.440]  Yeah.
[55:54.580 --> 55:54.780]  Okay.
[55:55.140 --> 55:55.360]  Thanks.
[55:55.360 --> 55:55.580]  All right.
[55:57.900 --> 55:58.820]  Moving right along.
[55:59.560 --> 56:00.600]  Hello, you're on the air.
[56:01.540 --> 56:02.080]  Yeah, hi.
[56:02.120 --> 56:02.560]  How are you doing?
[56:02.820 --> 56:03.060]  All right.
[56:04.160 --> 56:05.620]  I actually have, like, two questions.
[56:05.940 --> 56:09.180]  The first one is, what does this virus do to your computer?
[56:09.900 --> 56:11.440]  And what's the manual doing in Europe?
[56:12.100 --> 56:12.460]  Okay.
[56:12.600 --> 56:18.200]  Well, I'll take the second question first, and then maybe Porkshop or Isaac would like to tackle the second one.
[56:18.420 --> 56:24.060]  I'm in Europe because, well, first of all, I wanted to get away, and it keeps me sane to get away every now and then.
[56:24.240 --> 56:26.940]  I wanted to see parts of the world I have never seen before.
[56:27.200 --> 56:32.520]  Last week that was Norway, and it's an amazing place, a very inspirational country to be in.
[56:32.920 --> 56:42.080]  Probably the most serene place I've ever experienced in my life, and also a very healthy place for humanity to exist and learn things from each other.
[56:42.720 --> 56:44.760]  And right now I'm in Goodburg, Sweden.
[56:45.000 --> 56:47.940]  Sweden seems to be a different kind of an atmosphere.
[56:47.940 --> 56:52.440]  I don't really know that much about the country, so I'm not going to say that much about it just now.
[56:52.780 --> 57:04.120]  But mostly I'm in Europe because I'm preparing for the Hackers at Large Conference, which I'm meeting up with people in Holland in the next week or so.
[57:05.460 --> 57:08.400]  And basically that's my whole purpose of being here.
[57:09.240 --> 57:09.880]  Not bad.
[57:10.640 --> 57:15.480]  So far as what the virus does to your computer, it kind of makes you look like an idiot for catching it in the first place.
[57:17.220 --> 57:27.870]  And I'm not sure if there's any permanent damage, but I would recommend running some sort of a virus scanner to get rid of whatever shreds that the scanner companies know about that anyone else doesn't.
[57:28.480 --> 57:28.840]  All right.
[57:29.000 --> 57:31.420]  I don't think it actually does anything permanently to your computer.
[57:31.540 --> 57:34.200]  I don't believe it does either, but you never can tell.
[57:34.540 --> 57:35.040]  Hello.
[57:35.240 --> 57:35.640]  You're on the air.
[57:37.040 --> 57:44.100]  Hotmail and Yahoo, they have a pretty decent mail filter for people who are troubled by spam.
[57:44.100 --> 57:48.600]  I've found it to be relatively quite good.
[57:49.290 --> 58:03.300]  And they do have a tutorial, and there are different levels of filtering that you could get by just going through the wizard that they have, especially for the people who are complaining about being spammed with their Hotmail account.
[58:03.680 --> 58:04.980]  It's pretty decent.
[58:05.000 --> 58:08.000]  Both Yahoo and Hotmail's version is quite good.
[58:08.200 --> 58:15.960]  Now, can anyone explain to me, a little off the subject, first of all, the web is working because I was just on Google about five minutes ago.
[58:16.240 --> 58:16.540]  Oh, wonderful.
[58:16.740 --> 58:21.520]  Now, can anybody explain to me what frame relay is?
[58:22.480 --> 58:23.440]  Frame relay?
[58:23.800 --> 58:25.160]  I get this question every few months.
[58:25.660 --> 58:26.000]  Yeah.
[58:26.420 --> 58:28.400]  I'm getting... I can't figure it out.
[58:28.600 --> 58:30.980]  I've studied several tutorials.
[58:31.800 --> 58:33.720]  That's the only one that just gives me trouble.
[58:33.880 --> 58:38.700]  All the others I can pretty much grasp, but the concept of frame relay is just something I...
[58:38.700 --> 58:45.920]  Well, I think if you've read over this material and you haven't been able to grasp it, I don't think there's anything we can say in the remaining minutes of our show that will fix it.
[58:46.080 --> 58:48.780]  Your best bet is to go to a website called...
[58:48.780 --> 58:49.260]  Yeah, I did all that.
[58:49.440 --> 58:50.220]  I did it.
[58:50.220 --> 58:50.500]  Whatis .com?
[58:50.800 --> 58:51.400]  I did it, thanks.
[58:51.400 --> 58:51.680]  You did?
[58:52.280 --> 58:53.000]  Whatis.com?
[58:53.300 --> 58:54.340]  Yeah, whatis.com.
[58:54.500 --> 58:59.900]  It's a direct... rather a glossary of technical terms, and you can get a better example.
[59:00.260 --> 59:02.180]  You can get a fairly good explanation of what it is.
[59:02.800 --> 59:05.340]  Unfortunately, I don't have the time to go into it and...
[59:05.340 --> 59:08.660]  Well, type in whatis.com to whatis.com and see what happens.
[59:08.660 --> 59:09.060]  Right.
[59:09.160 --> 59:10.220]  You might break the net.
[59:11.240 --> 59:12.400]  It'll self-destruct.
[59:12.560 --> 59:14.900]  But I think we're running out of time here, Emmanuel.
[59:15.080 --> 59:15.840]  You want to sign off?
[59:16.360 --> 59:19.040]  Yeah, well, that's it for us.
[59:19.320 --> 59:27.860]  Me and Porkchop here in Gutberg, Sweden, this week, and Mike out there in California for updating us on the Dimitri demonstrations.
[59:27.860 --> 59:43.180]  Remember, check the website, www.twentystown.com, for information on the handouts, flyers that will be downloadable for the meetings this Friday, as well as information on registering for HAL 2001 in Holland.
[59:43.840 --> 59:46.320]  Next week will be our pre-HAL show.
[59:46.320 --> 59:51.200]  We'll be in Holland talking to some of the organizers and previewing what lies ahead.
[59:51.780 --> 59:52.680]  Not bad.
[59:53.100 --> 59:54.860]  All right, so we'll hear from you next week.
[59:55.140 --> 59:55.800]  Sounds good.
[59:55.800 --> 59:59.340]  All right, and this is Isaac Falcon for Off The Hook.
[59:59.400 --> 01:00:00.000]  You have a good night.