[00:02.330 --> 00:04.090]  This is Free Speech Radio News.
[00:04.350 --> 00:05.310]  I'm Deepa Fernandes.
[00:12.110 --> 00:13.270]  Is there still time?
[00:13.390 --> 00:15.290]  You have until November 21st.
[00:15.330 --> 00:16.170]  Then there is still time.
[00:16.250 --> 00:17.450]  There still is time.
[00:17.570 --> 00:18.790]  Till November 21st.
[00:18.790 --> 00:21.250]  Time for you to become a member of WBAI.
[00:21.330 --> 00:22.310]  And get to vote.
[00:22.410 --> 00:22.930]  That's right.
[00:23.090 --> 00:27.370]  For as little as $25, you get to vote for members of the local station board.
[00:27.510 --> 00:30.950]  You can give memberships to friends and relatives, and they will be able to vote.
[00:31.090 --> 00:33.250]  I can be a candidate, and they can vote for me.
[00:33.390 --> 00:35.410]  If you gave me a membership, I could vote for you.
[00:35.410 --> 00:36.690]  Or what about your twin sister?
[00:36.790 --> 00:38.590]  If I had one, you could buy her vote, too.
[00:38.750 --> 00:40.070]  This is a wonderful country.
[00:40.210 --> 00:41.770]  This is a wonderful radio station.
[00:42.030 --> 00:42.170]  Yeah.
[00:42.370 --> 00:43.610]  How do I get this accomplished?
[00:43.730 --> 00:44.950]  You make a phone call now.
[00:45.110 --> 00:45.910]  Well, I like the Internet.
[00:46.070 --> 00:47.810]  Go to WBAI.org.
[00:47.910 --> 00:48.790]  Or maybe I'll call.
[00:49.010 --> 00:51.830]  Telephone 212-209-2800.
[00:52.050 --> 00:53.230]  I love democracy.
[00:53.390 --> 00:53.630]  Good.
[00:53.630 --> 00:57.830]  And if you want to vote or run for the local station board, there's still time.
[00:58.010 --> 01:00.070]  Become a member of WBAI.
[01:05.580 --> 01:06.580]  Yes, that's right.
[01:06.720 --> 01:08.180]  And it's 7 o'clock.
[01:08.180 --> 01:10.240]  You're listening to WBAI New York.
[01:10.460 --> 01:14.200]  It's time, once again, for Off the Hook.
[01:17.680 --> 01:19.580]  The telephone keeps ringing.
[01:20.060 --> 01:22.100]  So I ripped it off the wall.
[01:23.120 --> 01:25.100]  I cut myself while shaving.
[01:25.700 --> 01:27.620]  Now I can't make a call.
[01:28.300 --> 01:30.420]  We couldn't get much worse.
[01:31.100 --> 01:33.000]  But if they could, they would.
[01:33.240 --> 01:35.900]  Bum, did we bump for the best, expect the worst.
[01:36.520 --> 01:38.400]  I hope that's understood.
[01:38.620 --> 01:39.440]  Bum, did we bump!
[03:10.600 --> 03:13.080]  And good hello and welcome back to everybody.
[03:13.660 --> 03:15.440]  Off the Hook is Back on the Air.
[03:15.600 --> 03:18.280]  After an absence of, what is it, two or three weeks.
[03:18.460 --> 03:19.260]  Interesting thing, too.
[03:19.320 --> 03:21.120]  I was late coming to the station.
[03:21.360 --> 03:23.340]  I was running down Wall Street as I normally do.
[03:23.960 --> 03:27.920]  And I hear, you know, I guess I underestimated what the show means to people.
[03:28.060 --> 03:31.380]  I just, all the, across the street I hear somebody yell, hey, Goldstein.
[03:31.560 --> 03:35.140]  And I'm like, I turn around and this guy in a suit and tie, a stockbroker.
[03:35.600 --> 03:36.860]  He just says, welcome back.
[03:37.460 --> 03:39.100]  I'm like, wow, that's pretty cool.
[03:39.180 --> 03:43.180]  And then from the other side of the street, I hear someone else say, off the hook, with a raised fist.
[03:43.520 --> 03:47.440]  And I was like, I could not believe how many people really cared about the program like this.
[03:47.460 --> 03:50.440]  I was running down the street and people were cheering and clapping me on the back.
[03:50.440 --> 03:53.220]  And I got to the radio station, got to 120 Wall Street.
[03:53.320 --> 03:55.740]  There's this cop there, standing in front of the door.
[03:55.940 --> 03:59.640]  He says, Emmanuel, I know you're late for the show, but I just want to show you one thing.
[04:00.100 --> 04:02.100]  And he takes me to the corner by the East River.
[04:02.800 --> 04:06.080]  And there's a big switch there and a whole bunch of people, suits and ties.
[04:06.320 --> 04:07.180]  Bloomberg is there.
[04:07.860 --> 04:09.280]  The switch gets thrown.
[04:09.840 --> 04:14.880]  And all the lights on all the bridges on the East River turn on for the first time in like eight months.
[04:15.460 --> 04:20.220]  And they say, let it be proclaimed that these lights shine as long as off the hook.
[04:20.440 --> 04:21.340]  It's back on the air.
[04:21.840 --> 04:23.160]  And I was just touched by that.
[04:23.260 --> 04:25.140]  You know, if you look outside the window, I'm not making this up.
[04:25.160 --> 04:28.580]  You look outside your window right now on the East River, all the bridges are lit up again.
[04:28.600 --> 04:29.700]  And it's because of us.
[04:30.200 --> 04:37.060]  And I'll just bet, I'll just bet because the media is all owned by the same people in this town, that you won't even hear that.
[04:37.380 --> 04:40.320]  You'll hear that the bridge lights came on, but you won't hear it's because of us.
[04:40.620 --> 04:41.620]  You know, that bothers me.
[04:41.680 --> 04:43.280]  I mean, I know it's because of us.
[04:44.160 --> 04:44.820]  That's what matters, right?
[04:44.860 --> 04:47.320]  It's true, you won't hear that on the mainstream media.
[04:47.660 --> 04:49.320]  Because they don't report the news.
[04:49.320 --> 04:51.280]  They don't report what's really going on.
[04:51.440 --> 04:53.100]  But, yeah, all the lights got turned back on tonight.
[04:55.320 --> 04:56.900]  I'm just very happy that we're back.
[04:57.080 --> 05:01.440]  But I'm also kind of sad because I found out that we're not going to be back in two weeks.
[05:01.760 --> 05:03.780]  We're being preempted for yet another fundraiser.
[05:04.020 --> 05:05.340]  This time a national fundraiser.
[05:05.360 --> 05:07.240]  I don't even know what a national fundraiser is all about.
[05:07.380 --> 05:10.340]  But apparently we'll be raising money, but we won't be here.
[05:12.000 --> 05:13.900]  Fundraiser after one other fundraiser.
[05:14.060 --> 05:16.760]  I don't know how we can possibly raise that many funds.
[05:18.380 --> 05:20.180]  But we're preempted again in two weeks.
[05:20.380 --> 05:24.800]  And it's really hard to keep presenting programming when we're almost never on the air.
[05:25.220 --> 05:27.120]  If you pledge, though, please pay your pledge.
[05:27.300 --> 05:30.680]  Yeah, don't say, well, because of this I'm not going to pledge money.
[05:30.780 --> 05:34.300]  That's kind of self-defeating and it'd probably make us ask for money all the more.
[05:34.560 --> 05:40.140]  And, you know, if someone out there just pledged $250,000 right now, we can probably put an end to all this nonsense.
[05:41.900 --> 05:43.920]  Yeah, I know there are people out there that can do that.
[05:45.060 --> 05:46.660]  Some of the dignitaries downstairs, in fact.
[05:46.760 --> 05:47.360]  We probably could do that.
[05:48.560 --> 05:49.640]  Well, welcome back, everybody.
[05:50.140 --> 05:50.960]  This is Off the Hook.
[05:51.960 --> 05:52.680]  And Bernie S.
[05:52.860 --> 05:53.500]  joins us from Philadelphia.
[05:54.380 --> 05:54.700]  Greetings.
[05:55.060 --> 05:55.440]  How are you doing?
[05:56.220 --> 05:56.800]  Not bad.
[05:56.940 --> 05:58.480]  I kind of miss hearing you on the air, Emmanuel.
[05:58.860 --> 06:03.640]  Well, we're on the air tonight, so cherish those moments while you can.
[06:04.160 --> 06:06.380]  They'll have to turn the bridge lights off in two weeks.
[06:06.700 --> 06:08.060]  I'm going to see if I can get that done.
[06:08.340 --> 06:09.800]  You've got to get the ones in Philly turned on.
[06:09.880 --> 06:11.160]  The Ben Franklin Bridge is dark.
[06:11.360 --> 06:11.620]  All right.
[06:11.720 --> 06:12.620]  One city at a time.
[06:13.040 --> 06:15.760]  Have you guys noticed the Empire State Building has been staying on all night?
[06:15.760 --> 06:16.260]  Yes.
[06:16.300 --> 06:17.260]  The lights have been staying on all night?
[06:17.500 --> 06:18.900]  I have a theory as to why that is.
[06:18.980 --> 06:19.840]  I think the guy...
[06:19.840 --> 06:22.200]  And they've all been white the whole time.
[06:22.280 --> 06:24.300]  They're not colored like they usually are, different colors.
[06:24.520 --> 06:28.720]  I think the guy who knows how to turn them on and off quit or died or something.
[06:28.880 --> 06:30.420]  And nobody knows where the keys are.
[06:30.420 --> 06:33.340]  So the lights are just always on and they're always the same color.
[06:34.060 --> 06:36.260]  It's a great rumor to start if it's not true.
[06:36.940 --> 06:43.480]  But if anybody knows why the Empire State Building is not turning off at midnight like it usually does and is staying white all the time, I'd sure like to know.
[06:43.720 --> 06:45.500]  Little city questions here.
[06:46.440 --> 06:48.160]  Bernie, what's new down by you?
[06:48.240 --> 06:52.280]  I understand there's been some new legislation passed or something?
[06:52.900 --> 06:56.280]  Well, not in Philadelphia, but nationwide.
[06:56.820 --> 07:05.080]  The FCC has just announced its new anti-piracy protections for digital TV.
[07:05.280 --> 07:12.340]  This is a mandate that really has sweeping implications for all of our listeners, both here and abroad.
[07:12.960 --> 07:16.100]  And we can talk about that maybe in a little more detail during the show.
[07:16.200 --> 07:19.200]  But there's probably, you know, the little things you'd like to talk about at the beginning of the show.
[07:19.280 --> 07:21.540]  This is going to take a few minutes to go over.
[07:21.540 --> 07:24.380]  Okay, but this is involving digital TV?
[07:24.600 --> 07:25.520]  Is that what it's involving?
[07:25.540 --> 07:34.060]  Yeah, well, as many of our listeners know, analog TV, this is about broadcast over-the-air terrestrial TV.
[07:34.480 --> 07:34.940]  Okay.
[07:35.520 --> 07:44.480]  Not cable, not satellite TV, but not cable TV, but over-the-air TV, analog TV, which is going away in a few years.
[07:44.640 --> 07:49.120]  According to the FCC, it's going to have to go away in 2007, analog TV.
[07:49.120 --> 07:53.800]  But you may wonder why the FCC is so adamant about getting rid of analog TV.
[07:53.900 --> 07:56.000]  This sort of explains it, I guess, because...
[07:56.000 --> 07:56.180]  It does.
[07:56.400 --> 07:57.800]  It exactly explains it.
[07:57.820 --> 07:59.540]  Everybody's wondering, you know, what's the hurry?
[07:59.640 --> 08:00.100]  What's the rush?
[08:00.200 --> 08:09.560]  Well, the rush is, what effectively is the DMCA-ization of over-the-air broadcast television.
[08:10.200 --> 08:23.760]  So it's going to effectively put the control over what you watch and how you use what you watch on over-the-air television in the hands of corporate America.
[08:23.760 --> 08:30.820]  Before, you know, you could record whatever you wanted off of over-the-air TV, which was deemed okay by the Supreme Court back in the early 80s.
[08:30.820 --> 08:34.600]  You remember the whole Betamax decision that permitted time-shifting.
[08:34.800 --> 08:39.840]  Well, this will prevent consumers from using their TiVo to record certain TV shifts.
[08:40.080 --> 09:03.920]  What really annoys me about the whole thing is that you remember a few years ago when this whole digital TV thing was being proposed, was that, you know, the broadcasters were saying, oh, the Europeans and the Japanese, they're getting ahead of us, and this is so Americans can have the best of technology and not have a digital divide and all that sort of nonsense.
[09:03.920 --> 09:10.480]  And what this comes down to is that Congress gave the U.S.
[09:10.580 --> 09:18.640]  broadcast community, TV stations, free radio spectrum, free TV channels to use for digital TV.
[09:19.420 --> 09:29.080]  And it turns out that now they can, they're going to, the broadcasters are going to turn around and use this for pay-per-view programming and prevent you from seeing over-the-air TV unless you pay.
[09:29.820 --> 09:33.840]  And I guess this would also prevent you from recording things for your own use over-the-air.
[09:33.920 --> 09:34.260]  Exactly.
[09:34.520 --> 09:46.120]  Not only will it control which channels you can watch and when, but what you can record, how you can record it, whether you can make a copy of it or not, that sort of thing.
[09:46.280 --> 09:52.660]  I mean, if this were Spectrum that they had a license for, that they paid money for, I wouldn't have so much of a problem with it.
[09:53.380 --> 10:02.200]  But free over-the-air TV has been sort of a birthright to anybody who's been born since the, probably the 30s, since TV came around.
[10:03.260 --> 10:11.100]  And now the corporate America is going to be able to control what you watch, when you watch it, and what you do with what you watch or record.
[10:11.340 --> 10:19.660]  Now, I know a lot of people who hate television, who don't have a TV, don't watch TV, and they're going to say, you know what, I don't care, it doesn't affect me at all.
[10:19.780 --> 10:21.720]  Now, why are they wrong, or are they wrong?
[10:21.720 --> 10:30.180]  Well, I actually think they have a point, because this is going to drive another nail into the coffin of over-the-air terrestrial TV broadcasts.
[10:31.680 --> 10:38.500]  Unfortunately, that's the only option available to some people who can't afford expensive cable TV or satellite TV, even though it's not that expensive.
[10:38.500 --> 10:41.800]  A lot of people, including, I'm sure many of our listeners, can't afford that.
[10:41.860 --> 10:46.440]  And if you want to watch, if you want to see what's going on in local news, for instance, it's really your only option.
[10:47.560 --> 10:57.460]  And these protections that the FCC is mandating don't restrict what local broadcasters can do as far as even news broadcasts.
[10:57.480 --> 11:05.040]  They can copy, protect, and control your use of, you know, the evening news broadcasts.
[11:05.040 --> 11:11.280]  Suppose you're a school teacher, and you want to record the evening news and show a story the next morning in your political science class.
[11:12.600 --> 11:22.440]  The local TV station could prevent you from doing that, just like they can with all this other DMCA stuff with movies and region coding and that sort of thing.
[11:22.840 --> 11:29.900]  It's very much like the whole DVD movie thing with DCSS.
[11:30.200 --> 11:37.420]  This is really putting much more control into corporations' hands with public resources.
[11:37.420 --> 11:44.700]  These are public airways that people are going to, that these companies are going to be able to actually make as a pay-per-view resource.
[11:44.820 --> 11:45.820]  And that's what really irks me.
[11:46.380 --> 11:52.480]  Let me introduce a couple of notes of justified paranoia as to why this is a more serious problem than you're getting at.
[11:53.980 --> 12:09.260]  Do you remember in the mid-late 90s, there was a number of big stinks about feeds of presidential candidates coming off at less than their best when they didn't know they were on the air, and they started scrambling various signals that you could pick up on satellite TV?
[12:10.040 --> 12:23.960]  Well, now, with this ability, anything that's shown on a live news feed, you know, our man in the street, whatever, can be put on, copy-protected, so to speak.
[12:23.960 --> 12:30.840]  And you may never see that again if it isn't to the ruling powers or station owners' liking.
[12:31.520 --> 12:35.720]  Bill Clinton comes out of the limo disheveled with Monica Lewinsky, perhaps.
[12:36.160 --> 12:39.140]  Or George Bush is seen picking his nose.
[12:39.400 --> 12:42.220]  You know, show your favorite politician doing whatever.
[12:42.500 --> 12:55.680]  Or, you know, a riot, an uprising, a protest, an impromptu speech by someone that just happens to go against the grain as the TV broadcasters would like it.
[12:56.140 --> 13:04.020]  Well, you know, it's interesting, but, I mean, not to be ridiculous here, but couldn't someone just simply set up a camera in front of a digital TV set and record everything that way?
[13:04.240 --> 13:04.520]  True.
[13:05.160 --> 13:10.240]  All right, so we always have that if it really gets bad, but it's kind of ridiculous that you'd have to actually do something like that.
[13:10.620 --> 13:13.400]  I mean, that's what they suggested during our trial with the ECSS.
[13:13.580 --> 13:24.660]  They said that, you know, the final outcome of the trial was if you want to make a copy, you can always simply record it off the TV set by focusing a camera on the digital content, and it's absolutely absurd.
[13:24.820 --> 13:32.920]  But it looks like the restrictions in place for DVD, as we've warned many times, will be transferred over to television as well.
[13:32.980 --> 13:34.460]  And maybe even other places, too.
[13:34.580 --> 13:36.100]  Maybe this will happen to radio as well.
[13:36.240 --> 13:51.960]  One of the especially interesting things about this particular initiative is that with the DVD, the DVD is encrypted, so it's actually hard to get the data off the DVD without, you know, in an unauthorized manner.
[13:51.960 --> 13:53.820]  Now people have figured out how to do it and what that...
[13:53.820 --> 13:56.300]  This new initiative is just a bit.
[13:56.540 --> 13:59.120]  It's one bit that says, do not copy this.
[13:59.800 --> 14:02.760]  So there's absolutely no technological protection at all.
[14:02.940 --> 14:11.740]  It's a totally legalistic thing, where, you know, they just mandate any receiver sold in the U.S.
[14:11.780 --> 14:12.900]  must honor this bit.
[14:12.900 --> 14:19.380]  But one also interesting note is that if you've already bought your digital TV receiver, it's not affected.
[14:19.520 --> 14:21.980]  You know, it doesn't know about this bit because it didn't exist yet.
[14:22.100 --> 14:24.660]  And they're not changing the standard in any other way.
[14:24.800 --> 14:28.420]  So if you already have a digital TV receiver, you'll be able to make copies.
[14:28.620 --> 14:31.440]  Now, here's my conspiracy theory here.
[14:31.740 --> 14:39.920]  Do you think this is simply something that they're leaking into the mainstream to spur some sales of digital TVs that don't have this setting?
[14:40.800 --> 14:41.900]  You know, it...
[14:41.900 --> 14:43.220]  You hadn't thought of that, did you?
[14:43.760 --> 14:44.760]  I wouldn't put it beyond them.
[14:44.840 --> 14:45.480]  Let's put it that way.
[14:45.760 --> 14:46.000]  Bernie?
[14:47.060 --> 14:58.840]  Well, if you buy a digital TV today, odds are, in a few years, it will not be able to interoperate with other equipment that will check to see if your TV is compliant with these rules.
[15:00.480 --> 15:02.700]  Is that a good thing for the consumer or a bad thing?
[15:02.840 --> 15:04.740]  It's a bad thing because it limits...
[15:04.740 --> 15:13.520]  You know, if you buy a piece of audio-video equipment today, you want to be able to use it in the future with, you know, to connect it to other equipment that you would normally be able to...
[15:13.520 --> 15:17.840]  Suppose you buy a TV now and you buy a recorder now.
[15:18.860 --> 15:24.940]  Suppose you buy a digital TV today and then in five years you buy...
[15:24.940 --> 15:28.440]  your recorder breaks or you want to buy a new one that has more capability.
[15:28.620 --> 15:36.800]  There's a good chance that the new recorder will not interoperate with your existing TV because it doesn't comply with these standards.
[15:37.240 --> 15:40.940]  So, you know, you are limiting yourself if you get one of these...
[15:40.940 --> 15:41.400]  Yeah, but...
[15:41.400 --> 15:42.900]  If you get a TV now or later, it limits yourself.
[15:43.080 --> 15:48.260]  But do you honestly think that someone's going to buy a digital TV set now and in five years it's not going to work?
[15:48.640 --> 15:52.400]  I mean, that just seems like people would be so outraged by that that it would never happen.
[15:52.720 --> 16:02.280]  Oh, you'd be able to see stuff over there but you may not be able to record anything from that TV because the new equipment, the new recording equipment will have to be compliant with this broadcast flag stuff.
[16:02.480 --> 16:10.360]  And if it doesn't get the signal from the TV saying, ah, this is okay for you to record, then you won't be able to record it.
[16:10.640 --> 16:11.780]  What if you have an old recorder?
[16:13.000 --> 16:13.780]  Maybe you can.
[16:13.980 --> 16:16.840]  If you've got a digital TV recorder, there aren't many like that.
[16:16.960 --> 16:21.460]  But what I say, the future recorders may not be able to record analog video output.
[16:21.780 --> 16:26.340]  So, they may be only looking for this bit which will require a digital connection.
[16:26.840 --> 16:27.840]  So, it's up to the...
[16:27.840 --> 16:36.960]  Really, it's up to what the manufacturers get kowtowed into doing from the more powerful people to control the broadcast.
[16:36.960 --> 16:40.600]  There's going to be such consumer backlash against this because people like to record things.
[16:40.700 --> 16:44.540]  I mean, they have their TiVos, they have their VCRs, they record things all the time.
[16:44.800 --> 16:52.400]  And if you start charging people or forbidding people from doing things like that, you're going to see so much, quote-unquote, piracy that it's going to put Napster to shame.
[16:52.400 --> 17:02.240]  I hope it turns out like the DivX thing where the DivX one-use-only or limited-use DVDs, remember how that fell on its face?
[17:02.240 --> 17:05.080]  Right, it was a spectacular failure and there was a reason for that.
[17:05.700 --> 17:13.820]  I'm hoping this falls on its face too, but people have a 10-day window of opportunity to express their displeasure to the FCC.
[17:15.500 --> 17:22.560]  If you go to FCC.gov, you can submit your comments about how this is going to be implemented.
[17:22.820 --> 17:25.020]  They're still asking for input on that.
[17:25.200 --> 17:27.680]  So, I encourage people to...
[17:28.620 --> 17:33.620]  It's called a further notice of proposed rulemaking, which is going to...
[17:33.620 --> 17:45.000]  They're looking for comments on a permanent objective process for the approval of digital recording and output content protection technologies that will foster innovation and marketplace competition.
[17:45.220 --> 17:49.020]  Well, you can translate that how you want and just tell them how much you like this.
[17:49.400 --> 17:52.160]  Yeah, I'm looking at the page right now and there's...
[17:52.160 --> 18:02.680]  Under headlines, FCC adopts anti-piracy protection for digital TV, news release, order, Powell Press statement, Abernathy statement, COPS statement, and Adelstein statement.
[18:02.900 --> 18:05.880]  I don't see here where you can submit your statement.
[18:06.780 --> 18:07.380]  Is...
[18:07.380 --> 18:08.860]  Do you know exactly how to get there?
[18:09.040 --> 18:09.900]  If you...
[18:09.900 --> 18:15.100]  Actually, they use the proprietary file format to look at certain notices.
[18:15.440 --> 18:22.340]  You need either Microsoft Word or Adobe Acrobat viewer to read the main summary of key issues.
[18:23.040 --> 18:29.480]  And if you read down on to page two of that, it mentions this further notice of proposed rulemaking.
[18:29.700 --> 18:35.600]  So all you people who run open source software only and refuse to let these other programs onto your system, you're out of luck.
[18:35.640 --> 18:36.520]  You can't even comment, right?
[18:36.720 --> 18:38.740]  You can read PDFs.
[18:38.740 --> 18:39.180]  Okay.
[18:39.580 --> 18:40.500]  With free software.
[18:40.780 --> 18:40.940]  Okay.
[18:41.160 --> 18:41.800]  And more files.
[18:42.020 --> 18:42.220]  Yeah.
[18:43.040 --> 18:43.560]  All right.
[18:43.620 --> 18:45.620]  Well, is there anything else we have to say on this subject?
[18:45.880 --> 18:46.860]  I think that's pretty much...
[18:46.860 --> 18:47.420]  This isn't just...
[18:48.020 --> 18:49.880]  People think this is just going to affect TV sets.
[18:49.980 --> 18:51.040]  No, this is going to affect...
[18:51.040 --> 19:03.160]  This basically gives the FCC the power to dictate to manufacturers of computers and chipsets and really anything that uses audio and video how this technology is going to be implicated.
[19:03.180 --> 19:04.180]  It's not going to stop at TVs.
[19:04.300 --> 19:10.900]  They've already said how this is going to have to apply also to computers.
[19:11.460 --> 19:16.940]  So if you connect your computer to your digital TV, you can't use your computer to record.
[19:17.220 --> 19:26.580]  So this is really imposing all kinds of technological restrictions on virtually any kind of audio, video, multimedia equipment, including computers.
[19:26.860 --> 19:32.080]  So this really has really broad sweeping implications that people aren't grasping at.
[19:32.280 --> 19:33.700]  But in a few years they're going to hit them.
[19:33.820 --> 19:40.760]  Especially if it's involved with computers, every other country in the world won't necessarily abide by these restrictions.
[19:41.040 --> 19:42.820]  So isn't that an easy way to get around it?
[19:43.040 --> 19:53.020]  Well, there's similar efforts right now that are being pushed at the WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization, and other international treaty processes.
[19:53.240 --> 19:58.960]  So this is getting pushed by MPAA and their ilk to other countries as well.
[19:59.040 --> 20:02.720]  As we saw, this region coding was accepted worldwide.
[20:02.720 --> 20:05.420]  worldwide, and this is very similar to that.
[20:05.720 --> 20:06.960]  Well, it was accepted worldwide.
[20:06.980 --> 20:08.760]  I don't think it's working out very well worldwide.
[20:08.760 --> 20:10.780]  Well, I hope this doesn't work out too well, too.
[20:11.080 --> 20:15.820]  Yeah, well, in Australia, New Zealand, practically every DVD player is region-free down there.
[20:15.960 --> 20:18.800]  And somehow I don't think that system's going to last very much longer.
[20:18.880 --> 20:23.380]  But yeah, it seems amazing to me that they would actually continue to plan things like that.
[20:24.240 --> 20:27.360]  But we'll certainly keep people updated on this in the future.
[20:28.540 --> 20:33.520]  Now, there's another story out there that that's causing quite a bit of consternation.
[20:33.640 --> 20:40.280]  And actually, it's similar in a way because it involves technology being quote-unquote improved.
[20:40.640 --> 20:43.200]  And I'm talking about the voting software.
[20:43.740 --> 20:49.660]  Now, there's been all kinds of controversy concerning this company.
[20:49.800 --> 20:50.360]  What was this, Mike?
[20:50.420 --> 20:51.700]  In California, this company is?
[20:52.060 --> 20:53.620]  Debold Election Systems.
[20:53.620 --> 20:54.200]  Debold Alike.
[20:54.280 --> 21:00.820]  Now, okay, there's this whole thing involving the Independent Media Center out there linking to some files.
[21:01.000 --> 21:01.820]  It sounds very familiar.
[21:02.820 --> 21:07.660]  I think they were just commentary files, people talking, engineers talking about the system.
[21:08.180 --> 21:09.760]  I have these files.
[21:10.240 --> 21:11.300]  You have these files?
[21:11.440 --> 21:12.420]  They're illegal to have, aren't they?
[21:13.700 --> 21:15.420]  We better not say it in public.
[21:16.260 --> 21:18.080]  Well, don't remind them.
[21:18.960 --> 21:23.480]  It's their mailing list, their internal mailing lists, the archives for that.
[21:23.620 --> 21:24.860]  How did they get out in the first place?
[21:25.040 --> 21:25.720]  That I don't know.
[21:25.940 --> 21:27.720]  That's something I've been asking a lot of people.
[21:27.780 --> 21:28.540]  No one seems to know that.
[21:29.080 --> 21:30.500]  If they get out, they're out.
[21:30.660 --> 21:33.020]  You can't prosecute people for having something that got out.
[21:34.140 --> 21:35.020]  Like DCSS.
[21:35.260 --> 21:35.720]  Well, yeah.
[21:36.180 --> 21:37.080]  Never mind that.
[21:37.640 --> 21:39.520]  Okay, so let's talk about Debold.
[21:39.840 --> 21:46.800]  So Debold sent these DMCA takedown notices to the ISP of the Independent Media Center.
[21:47.560 --> 21:54.300]  Now, the ISP of the Independent Media Center in San Francisco is something called the Online Policy Group.
[21:54.500 --> 22:04.080]  The Online Policy Group is a, let's say, a progressive ISP, which doesn't stand for this kind of nonsense, basically.
[22:04.540 --> 22:17.940]  And so now, what I understand is happening is the Online Policy Group, I think that's what it stands for, the OPG anyway, is suing Debold for sending, like, nonsense legal threats.
[22:18.960 --> 22:20.400]  So that's a countersuit of sorts.
[22:20.520 --> 22:21.760]  That's a countersuit of sorts.
[22:21.920 --> 22:23.560]  Okay, now, let's cut to the chase, though.
[22:23.680 --> 22:27.800]  What was in these little blurbs that people were linking to?
[22:29.040 --> 22:37.900]  Well, there's a lot of just kind of general, we need to sell it to this guy and this and that, but there's also, we're going to do a demo tomorrow, and our software doesn't actually work, how can we fake it?
[22:38.360 --> 22:47.320]  That sort of thing, which is, you know, something that software people do from time to time, but when they're running an election on this stuff, you want it to actually work.
[22:47.720 --> 22:50.820]  Is there an indication they did this during an election or just during a demonstration?
[22:51.980 --> 23:02.560]  You know, I haven't read the whole thing, and there's been, I don't know if they've been real elections or test cases where people have come up with negative numbers of votes.
[23:02.760 --> 23:03.300]  Oh, really?
[23:03.700 --> 23:13.000]  There's information on how to, apparently, they have these smart cards, there's two types of smart cards, there's the voter smart card and the administrator smart card.
[23:13.680 --> 23:20.000]  Well, at least once, they were just playing with random blank smart cards bought fresh from the smart card manufacturer.
[23:20.320 --> 23:23.940]  They'd put it in the machine, and it would say, oh, you've got an administrator card.
[23:24.400 --> 23:24.660]  Really?
[23:25.420 --> 23:25.780]  Wow.
[23:26.080 --> 23:27.000]  Just by default, huh?
[23:27.540 --> 23:28.000]  By default.
[23:28.020 --> 23:29.580]  I could have used one of them when I voted yesterday.
[23:30.180 --> 23:34.020]  Yeah, you know, and looking at the system, what kind of system do you have down there in Philadelphia where you voted?
[23:34.320 --> 23:40.120]  They now have a new digital electronic system where you, it's a, it's a, huge, big membrane.
[23:40.320 --> 23:50.540]  It's like three feet by three feet with a, with touch sensitive, well, you can feel like little calculator, like bubble switches behind the, a plastic sheet.
[23:50.960 --> 23:58.700]  And the text on this big sheet is so small, I had to spend almost half an hour in there to read all the, read everything.
[23:58.880 --> 24:00.020]  It was so tiny, the text.
[24:00.180 --> 24:05.660]  And you push the button, it's not really a button, you just put your finger on this piece sheet of plastic and an LED lights up.
[24:06.400 --> 24:09.160]  Fortunately, you can switch it again to, to unlight it up.
[24:09.260 --> 24:10.200]  But it's, it's crazy.
[24:10.340 --> 24:12.620]  I like the old mechanical lever system before, frankly.
[24:12.620 --> 24:15.680]  Well, that's what, that's what I still use is the mechanical, uh, lever system.
[24:16.280 --> 24:17.920]  Not without problems, by the way.
[24:18.100 --> 24:19.480]  What, mechanical lever system problems?
[24:19.740 --> 24:19.820]  Yeah.
[24:20.240 --> 24:21.300]  Did you, did you have a problem with that?
[24:21.540 --> 24:30.820]  Uh, it's, it worked for me when I voted yesterday, but, uh, the machines are, first of all, they're very old, and even when they weren't old, they don't work, they're mechanical.
[24:31.140 --> 24:32.260]  They break from time to time.
[24:32.360 --> 24:36.060]  Well, yeah, but you know when they break, as opposed to getting negative votes, you know?
[24:36.360 --> 24:38.980]  I don't think any of them have ever come with negative votes, no.
[24:38.980 --> 24:48.820]  The thing is, the thing is, we look at these old mechanical machines, and I'm, I'm not including the punch card system, because I just think that's a stupid system to start with, but, you know, the, the things we use up here in New York, where you just throw the lever,
[24:48.980 --> 24:55.120]  they're old, they're ancient, they're, you know, behind most world standards, but we understand the basic premise as to how they work.
[24:55.300 --> 24:56.080]  It's not a secret.
[24:56.440 --> 25:09.940]  You look at the software here, Diebold, and, uh, I don't know if there's any other company even doing anything, uh, involving voting software, and it's a big secret, you know, and, and you have lawsuits being threatened when someone even, uh, remotely refers to what the software does or doesn't do,
[25:09.980 --> 25:12.360]  and this should not be a secret.
[25:12.440 --> 25:18.160]  We should be able to see every single line of code, because what is the, it's a simple thing, you know, somebody pushes a button, it counts it.
[25:18.300 --> 25:20.580]  I don't even know what's so complicated about that, you know?
[25:20.760 --> 25:25.500]  Somebody pushes buttons, and it calculates, that's all it needs to do, it just needs to count, all right?
[25:25.500 --> 25:26.940]  So why is it a big secret?
[25:27.020 --> 25:32.880]  There's another story involving the actual software, uh, apparently by Diebold as well.
[25:32.980 --> 25:36.200]  It was made available at ftp.jaguar.net.
[25:36.360 --> 25:39.560]  Uh, it was stored on an FTP server owned by Jaguar Computer Systems.
[25:39.760 --> 25:41.900]  That's a firm that provides election support.
[25:42.340 --> 25:52.340]  Um, now the software was used for, uh, placing ballots on voting kiosks for storing and tabulating results, uh, for the Sequoia AVC Edge touchscreen system.
[25:52.760 --> 25:55.440]  Now this, um, it was just basically left unprotected.
[25:55.520 --> 25:56.680]  Anybody could log in and get it.
[25:56.860 --> 26:04.320]  Uh, and this security breach means that anyone with a minimal amount of technical knowledge could see how the code works and potentially exploit it.
[26:04.960 --> 26:06.660]  Now, okay, that raises some interesting questions.
[26:07.380 --> 26:08.400]  You can see the code.
[26:08.500 --> 26:09.380]  How do you exploit it?
[26:09.540 --> 26:14.180]  How do you go in there into the voting machine and change the code to make it do what you want to do?
[26:14.320 --> 26:15.400]  That's question number one.
[26:15.580 --> 26:18.720]  Or are we worried about the people who maybe run the elections exploiting it?
[26:19.060 --> 26:29.760]  Well, you can look at the code and you can see, if I press this button on the screen, which is on the screen when I go to vote, this is what will happen, and maybe that's not what's supposed to happen.
[26:30.760 --> 26:31.440]  Yes, right, Hack?
[26:31.720 --> 26:33.100]  It could also be...
[26:33.100 --> 26:41.600]  I mean, if you think about it, say there are certain backdoors in it for when maintenance is needed to be done, you know, looking at the code could reveal those.
[26:41.800 --> 26:54.300]  For example, I think with credit card swiping things in, like CVSs, there was a thing where if you press certain combinations of buttons, it would get into an administrator mode where you could change the phone number.
[26:54.300 --> 26:57.320]  Don't we have the obligation to tell people when something like that exists?
[26:57.560 --> 26:59.680]  I mean, I think that's a very basic part of all this.
[26:59.780 --> 27:07.020]  And it would be silly to actually implement some sort of backdoor that someone who just had access to the terminal itself would be able to do, but...
[27:07.020 --> 27:08.560]  I mean, why do you need a backdoor?
[27:08.560 --> 27:09.180]  People work like that.
[27:09.200 --> 27:10.860]  Why do you need a backdoor to get into a voting machine?
[27:11.060 --> 27:12.800]  Yeah, I mean, I'm an old-fashioned guy.
[27:12.980 --> 27:15.920]  I believe in small-D democracy and small-R republicanism.
[27:16.760 --> 27:19.440]  Why are there backdoors that would do anything?
[27:19.620 --> 27:28.840]  If you're designing a voting system, you don't want them to have a secret combination of buttons that says, let Candidate A get 10,000 more votes.
[27:30.480 --> 27:33.100]  Why is it there if it's there, number one?
[27:33.220 --> 27:51.500]  And number two, talking about the security on the Jaguar FTP site, obviously, if it was up there, it was up there to be downloaded into machines if, God forbid, you're out in the field and the machine fries, well, somebody could have uploaded a slightly altered version that has a backdoor that says,
[27:51.620 --> 27:53.560]  let Candidate A get 10,000 more votes.
[27:53.560 --> 28:07.580]  Which is why the source for these machines, I think, by every imaginable rule of decency should be released to the public where everybody can analyze for themselves and maybe one person out there who knows some obscure bit of programming can say, hey,
[28:07.660 --> 28:20.820]  look, if you do this, this person will suddenly get a million more votes and the whole thing could be or even something that's not deliberate, something that's accidental, something that, you know, when you have punch cards, when you have old mechanical systems,
[28:20.980 --> 28:23.900]  you have something physical that's there, you have the evidence, you can point to it.
[28:24.020 --> 28:28.440]  But when it's all software, you know, you don't know if somebody actually voted for someone else.
[28:28.560 --> 28:30.860]  You don't know that because it's all registered in a computer.
[28:30.860 --> 28:35.620]  I've had computers lie to me many times because they're only as smart as the people who program.
[28:35.620 --> 28:37.580]  I mean, lots of times it's very complicated.
[28:37.840 --> 28:38.520]  Think of it this way.
[28:39.000 --> 28:40.060]  Well, okay, go ahead.
[28:40.400 --> 28:41.240]  One quick line.
[28:41.660 --> 28:52.160]  If you're voting, the only way you know that things are screwed up is if you know you voted for candidate A and in your district, there are zero votes for candidate A.
[28:52.180 --> 28:52.860]  That's right, that's right.
[28:53.240 --> 28:56.760]  Now, think of how bad that is in general.
[28:57.520 --> 28:59.620]  You're the only person that wants candidate A.
[28:59.740 --> 29:06.660]  Now, of course, in a mechanical or a paper ballot or even a punch card system, people won't believe that.
[29:06.800 --> 29:09.760]  But in these electronic systems, ah.
[29:10.920 --> 29:11.280]  Yeah.
[29:11.640 --> 29:21.040]  Well, I mean, we think of the ridiculousness of what happened in Florida a few years ago where everybody was going through the punch cards and trying to analyze what the person was meaning to do.
[29:21.240 --> 29:21.940]  But you know what?
[29:22.000 --> 29:23.280]  At least you had the punch cards.
[29:23.460 --> 29:24.220]  At least you had something.
[29:24.380 --> 29:28.400]  When something like this happens with computers, all you have is what the computer tells you.
[29:28.700 --> 29:36.100]  And the computer is going to tell you it again or it's going to tell you something completely different and you won't know exactly what happened until you debug the entire thing.
[29:36.280 --> 29:39.520]  Now, why make it a big secret and wait for a crisis like that?
[29:39.820 --> 29:46.080]  Just to go back to what you said, in terms of having everyone be able to see the source code.
[29:46.240 --> 29:48.440]  I mean, say there is a problem with it.
[29:48.600 --> 29:55.180]  And say someone discovers it either by either obtaining the source somehow or by just figuring it out.
[29:55.240 --> 29:56.520]  I mean, that happens all the time.
[29:56.940 --> 30:00.560]  Windows exploits, there are people just figuring out parts that are broken.
[30:00.740 --> 30:03.460]  But like with the open source community, with Linux, everybody sees it.
[30:03.780 --> 30:10.560]  Yes, people notice exploits, people notice problems, but then there are also the other people who notice them and report them and say, this has to be fixed.
[30:10.700 --> 30:10.820]  Yeah.
[30:11.140 --> 30:13.940]  So, security through obscurity doesn't work.
[30:14.180 --> 30:15.360]  It's not a good...
[30:16.060 --> 30:18.840]  especially something as basic as voting, you know?
[30:19.480 --> 30:30.420]  Anyway, according to a computer programmer who discovered the unprotected server, the files also contain visual basic script and code for voting system databases that could allow someone to learn how to rig voting results.
[30:31.420 --> 30:32.460]  And that's...
[30:32.460 --> 30:42.860]  Worse than that, Emmanuel, on top of that, even if you have access to the source code, that doesn't... and if it looks fine, that in and of itself doesn't mean it's okay.
[30:43.400 --> 30:59.320]  Apparently, from what I've read anywhere, anyway, the development tool, the application development tool that was used to write some of the software is such that you could still write a Trojan, and it wouldn't really affect what the source code looks like,
[30:59.900 --> 31:03.920]  and there could still be a backdoor in it that would allow someone to play game, election game.
[31:04.140 --> 31:10.700]  So, the whole thing has to be open source, not just... it's not just the source code alone.
[31:10.960 --> 31:16.820]  There's... this is far to... frankly, I think this should be a... this shouldn't be a private operation.
[31:16.980 --> 31:28.640]  This should be something that should be paid for by the government so it's... the taxpayers and citizens and voters can have complete access to every aspect of this technology, because otherwise, you never know what's going to happen.
[31:28.820 --> 31:33.440]  Yeah, I don't know how it got awarded to these people and why it's suddenly a private enterprise thing.
[31:33.440 --> 31:35.900]  I know I never voted on that, but maybe I did.
[31:36.040 --> 31:36.580]  I don't know.
[31:38.040 --> 31:41.020]  It's... it's something that is very scary and frightening, I think.
[31:41.160 --> 31:44.440]  And I think we have an obligation to uncover what's really going on.
[31:44.660 --> 31:53.860]  And yeah, they're going to threaten with lawsuits and things like that, but if you have access to this information, I think it's your public responsibility to share it and to analyze and to scrutinize it.
[31:53.900 --> 31:54.220]  Yes, Leo?
[31:54.220 --> 31:58.860]  also in Florida, there was another problem that was discovered, which is, uh...
[31:58.860 --> 32:05.100]  remember reports of how somebody, once the results were put into a computer, uh, they got accidentally deleted.
[32:05.560 --> 32:19.360]  And there's a question of not only the voting machines being electronic, but writing down after all the votes were counted, putting that into a computer also causes a problem, because if that software has a problem, uh, it goes... it will go unnoticed.
[32:19.580 --> 32:25.520]  Well, how many people have lost something in a computer, like, really lost something, where it doesn't come back?
[32:26.020 --> 32:26.360]  You know?
[32:26.420 --> 32:31.120]  We're talking the same thing here if there aren't reasonable steps taken to protect the information.
[32:31.900 --> 32:37.380]  So, I'm very, uh, I'm very worried about what the future, uh, uh, holds for us.
[32:37.540 --> 32:51.380]  I think, you know, if there is a digital implementation, which, you know, everything is heading towards digital, but there should still be that person who, you know, who keeps check on it, you know, with checks the numbers every so often and so on and so forth,
[32:51.440 --> 32:52.080]  and not just people.
[32:52.080 --> 32:52.760]  Not just one person.
[32:53.040 --> 32:53.840]  Well, right, people.
[32:54.140 --> 33:00.780]  Someone who actually keeps a record of it and doesn't just let it run and assume the computer will do its job because that doesn't always happen.
[33:00.940 --> 33:01.100]  Yeah.
[33:01.240 --> 33:06.840]  If you assume a computer's going to, uh, do something properly, you're really... you're spelling out disaster for yourself.
[33:07.320 --> 33:07.460]  Okay.
[33:07.520 --> 33:12.940]  There's a... there's external events that could affect, uh, uh, voting, uh, election outcome with these machines, too.
[33:13.260 --> 33:21.020]  Um, suppose there was a big power surge, intentional or unintentional, uh, you know, these are electronic machines that have to run off of AC power.
[33:21.220 --> 33:28.460]  Suppose there's a big voltage spike, you know, which can basically reboot your computer and cause you to lose a file or whatever you're working on at that time.
[33:28.580 --> 33:30.400]  That could happen to one of these machines as well.
[33:30.520 --> 33:42.440]  Or someone could intentionally, um, insert, you know, power spikes into the power line or, or, you know, bring along one of these, uh, uh, uh, electromagnetic field generators near the voting machine or something.
[33:42.600 --> 33:43.880]  There's all kinds of things that could be done.
[33:43.960 --> 33:47.500]  Suppose the elections, it looks like the election's not going your way in this particular precinct.
[33:47.740 --> 33:52.920]  Somebody could come along and, uh, and sabotage it without anybody knowing other than the machine just sort of shut down.
[33:53.080 --> 33:54.260]  And then all those votes are lost.
[33:54.280 --> 33:55.400]  You can't call everybody back.
[33:55.520 --> 33:56.280]  It's like, oh, it didn't work.
[33:56.400 --> 33:57.420]  I've got to come back and vote again.
[33:57.520 --> 33:58.200]  That's not going to work.
[33:58.340 --> 33:58.880]  Right, right.
[33:58.960 --> 34:04.260]  And it can also be used to track votes as well, you know, link them to people in, in, in not so nice regimes.
[34:04.440 --> 34:05.740]  It's certainly possible.
[34:05.920 --> 34:10.020]  It's certainly a lot easier to hide when you have, uh, when you have technology like this.
[34:10.340 --> 34:20.840]  Of course, the, the, uh, the SIG file, the, the signature at the bottom of the email for one of the D-Bold employees apparently is, you know, if, uh, voting ever actually changed anything, they wouldn't let us do it anyway.
[34:21.080 --> 34:23.780]  Well, that's a great attitude to have for someone designing voter software.
[34:24.700 --> 34:26.960]  But, um, yeah, I, I guess, I guess.
[34:27.020 --> 34:32.400]  You know, in a way I sort of feel sorry for these people because they, they have so much responsibility on they're going to go nuts.
[34:32.660 --> 34:33.640]  They're going to go completely crazy.
[34:34.100 --> 34:36.120]  And, um, I don't know.
[34:36.300 --> 34:38.900]  Hopefully more people will get information on this and share it.
[34:39.000 --> 34:39.920]  That's, that's very important.
[34:40.060 --> 34:42.840]  Once it's out there, they can't, they can't take it back.
[34:42.900 --> 34:43.620]  It's out there.
[34:44.060 --> 34:44.640]  Uh, okay.
[34:44.720 --> 34:46.940]  We've gotten a lot of mail on the whole RFID thing.
[34:47.020 --> 34:50.860]  Those are the, uh, the little, uh, tags that, uh, everyone is, is very worried about.
[34:51.740 --> 34:55.200]  Um, speaking of which, I, just, uh, an aside here.
[34:55.300 --> 34:57.040]  I don't know if anybody caught Metropodon Diary yesterday.
[34:57.500 --> 35:02.540]  Uh, but somebody wrote in a story, um, saying that, um, they, they had moved to, I think, Tennessee or something like that.
[35:02.620 --> 35:04.280]  And they realized they didn't need their E-ZPass anymore.
[35:04.520 --> 35:06.740]  So they mailed it back to the E-ZPass people.
[35:07.120 --> 35:22.640]  And then when they checked their, their, um, their statement online, they noticed, much to their outrage, that there was a charge for somebody, uh, in, in, on the New Jersey Turnpike, uh, getting off, I think, at, uh, at, at, at Newark Airport and, uh,
[35:22.920 --> 35:23.840]  going on exit 18.
[35:24.440 --> 35:40.940]  Uh, and basically, basically, uh, what happened was, uh, according to the employee, that the person contacted, they said that, uh, oh, sir, uh, well, the, um, the, the, um, the tag is simply registering what the UPS truck that's carrying your E-ZPass tag is,
[35:40.940 --> 35:42.180]  is doing, where it's going.
[35:42.360 --> 35:45.200]  And it's every time that it, it goes through an exit, it's going to register.
[35:46.880 --> 36:02.580]  And I just found that to be incredible, that if that's really the way the system works, that a package in the back of a UPS truck, with an E-ZPass tag in it, it can actually, uh, register as they go through exits, why do you need to put it on your windshield then?
[36:03.160 --> 36:03.600]  You know?
[36:03.820 --> 36:05.060]  Why don't you just throw it in the trunk?
[36:06.020 --> 36:09.160]  It doesn't need to be in, in sight of the, of the transmitter or anything like that.
[36:10.020 --> 36:11.600]  I'd like to, uh, I'd like to experiment with that.
[36:11.940 --> 36:12.400]  I've actually...
[36:12.400 --> 36:13.260]  The truck was fiberglass.
[36:13.380 --> 36:16.320]  If you wrapped it in tinfoil with several layers, that probably wouldn't have happened.
[36:16.600 --> 36:16.820]  Uh-huh.
[36:17.260 --> 36:20.140]  Yeah, well, they, they give you an envelope, a special envelope to send them back.
[36:20.520 --> 36:22.220]  Uh, and, uh, supposedly that's what happens.
[36:22.320 --> 36:26.040]  But are you telling me if I don't put it in that envelope, uh, and, and just leave it?
[36:26.120 --> 36:28.700]  I've left it in my glove compartment and it hasn't, hasn't done anything.
[36:29.060 --> 36:31.120]  That's because your glove compartment is probably made of metal.
[36:31.220 --> 36:34.280]  Yeah, I've left it in my glove compartment and I, it's registered.
[36:34.820 --> 36:35.080]  Really?
[36:35.100 --> 36:38.500]  After going through the, the actual gate, I was like, wait.
[36:38.640 --> 36:39.900]  So then why, why put it on your window?
[36:40.060 --> 36:40.840]  I don't understand that.
[36:40.900 --> 36:47.700]  If it's that sensitive, if, if you can put it in the back of, uh, of a truck and it will still register through an envelope and everything, why do you have to put it on your windshield?
[36:47.860 --> 36:49.700]  It's probably more reliable to do it that way.
[36:50.040 --> 36:55.760]  Well, I'm gonna, I'm gonna, I'm gonna hide mine next time and see what I'll probably get in a lot of trouble from the crossing person.
[36:55.880 --> 37:00.380]  Anyway, to get back to RFID, we're getting a lot of mail on this technology.
[37:01.120 --> 37:04.340]  This person writes in, you probably already know about this, but if you don't, it might interest you.
[37:04.400 --> 37:11.560]  A public school director in Buffalo is using RFID chips to keep track of the children and plans to use it for a lot of other stuff.
[37:11.560 --> 37:18.240]  Of course, he says it is the safety of the children, and there's more information on Wired.com about this, apparently.
[37:19.080 --> 37:30.940]  This person lives in Fargo, North Dakota, where a new company, Alien Technology Corporation, what a great name, has been granting residence with North Dakota State University.
[37:31.100 --> 37:36.720]  They plan to build new labs here and work in conjunction with NDSU's microelectronics course.
[37:37.500 --> 37:42.440]  The local newspaper ran a story about the start of construction on this new building and about the new chips.
[37:42.680 --> 37:47.900]  A picture illustrating their size was of a dime under a scanning electron microscope.
[37:48.600 --> 37:52.460]  Ten of these fit inside the opening of the D.
[37:53.140 --> 37:55.360]  I'm not sure if it's the letter D or the dime itself.
[37:55.400 --> 37:56.580]  I'm not sure what this person means exactly.
[37:56.760 --> 37:57.960]  But basically, they're very tiny.
[37:58.140 --> 38:04.080]  It was mentioned the armed forces have these very same chips and are able to get them to respond up to three to four miles away.
[38:04.080 --> 38:09.820]  The practical applications that were stated were to dust probable enemy movement areas with the RFIDs.
[38:10.620 --> 38:14.620]  When a couple of hundred of these chips start moving, it's obvious that there is someone moving through the area.
[38:14.820 --> 38:18.440]  My concern is, what's to keep them from dusting our homeland?
[38:18.780 --> 38:20.700]  Just a question from Joe out of North Dakota.
[38:20.820 --> 38:24.580]  And it's a very good... it's a great image to think of, dusting the homeland.
[38:25.740 --> 38:28.340]  And tracking what people move around and where.
[38:28.600 --> 38:30.540]  And yeah, it's something to really be concerned about.
[38:30.540 --> 38:35.400]  The technology is moving at such a rate that such a thing is not completely impossible.
[38:35.620 --> 38:39.440]  Now, we also have this other letter that was actually mailed physically to us.
[38:39.540 --> 38:43.060]  And Bernie, I like your comments on this, actually, because this person raises some interesting points.
[38:43.580 --> 38:45.700]  In contrast to some of the things that we've been talking about.
[38:46.160 --> 38:56.500]  Regarding the topic of chips in products technology, you might want to consult the website, nocard.org, for more advanced info on the subject than you and your colleagues seem to be up on.
[38:56.500 --> 39:02.180]  You might search for a radio program that was aired on Coast to Coast AM in either September or August of this year.
[39:02.380 --> 39:10.600]  The female guest associated with NoCard, a consumer group that is rejecting the supermarket bonus card system, was quite knowledgeable regarding the technology.
[39:10.720 --> 39:17.940]  The storage tracking devices can carry microscopic batteries and antennas, and they can track the consumer to the home, etc.
[39:18.380 --> 39:22.260]  Each individual item has its own code, which can be read by satellite.
[39:22.580 --> 39:23.980]  Space technology is stunning.
[39:24.380 --> 39:29.100]  The day after this Coast program aired, Walmart announced that it would not be using the antenna device.
[39:29.320 --> 39:31.320]  This stuff is more dangerous than beneficial.
[39:31.560 --> 39:33.000]  It can be harmful to the body.
[39:33.180 --> 39:37.540]  The guest on the radio show stated that Target and Walmart already were using the devices.
[39:37.740 --> 39:39.800]  I don't recall the names of the other stores that are using them.
[39:40.180 --> 39:42.060]  Maybe this technology can be influencing pricing.
[39:42.300 --> 39:45.320]  The cost of supermarket items have been jumping more than ordinarily.
[39:46.000 --> 39:47.080]  I do not have a computer.
[39:47.340 --> 39:50.840]  Much of your show's fast talk is above my head, but I do enjoy what I can glean from the talk.
[39:50.940 --> 39:54.420]  I don't have a phone either, and I also don't sign letters like this.
[39:55.260 --> 39:56.680]  So this person is well protected.
[39:56.680 --> 40:01.700]  However, we did manage to dust your fingerprints off the envelope, and we will be contacting you shortly.
[40:01.980 --> 40:03.380]  Now, Bernie, do you have any comments on this?
[40:04.760 --> 40:05.940]  Actually, I don't believe it.
[40:06.140 --> 40:22.200]  It just doesn't seem feasible to install in consumer products that you're going to buy at a supermarket or a Walmart enough electronics and batteries and satellite transceiver equipment to make this practical on a wide scale.
[40:22.200 --> 40:31.220]  If they were going to target a specific individual, I guess, and knew he was going to pick up this particular box of soap or something, then maybe.
[40:31.500 --> 40:45.120]  But there's just no way that you could put a satellite transceiver and power supply and all that into, you know, in any kind of a cost-effective way into consumer, you know, just consumable products at Walmart.
[40:45.860 --> 40:50.420]  Well, now, here's a new story that just came over yesterday concerning Walmart.
[40:51.220 --> 41:02.880]  Walmart stores and its largest 100 merchandise suppliers plan to meet this week to plot the implementation of a new high-tech inventory tracking system project expected to send ripples across the retail industry.
[41:02.880 --> 41:10.380]  The meeting actually was scheduled for yesterday, so if anybody was at that meeting, please let us know, near Walmart's Bentonville, Arkansas headquarters.
[41:10.920 --> 41:17.120]  Follows the mega-retailer's announcement in June about its foray into a technology known as RFID, radio frequency identification.
[41:17.480 --> 41:28.580]  At the time, Walmart asked its top 100 suppliers to join the effort, and starting January 1st, 2005, attach RFID tracking tags to the millions of cases and containers they shipped to the company.
[41:29.400 --> 41:40.880]  So basically, RFID tags, which contain special microchips and antennas, are designed to automatically relay to computers precise information about the contents of product packages and containers.
[41:41.140 --> 41:55.810]  It's expected to reduce much of the manual labor and human error involved in tracking inventory via barcodes could save Walmart close to $8.4 million annually, but less clear are the benefits for their suppliers, many of whom already have highly accurate inventory systems.
[41:56.290 --> 42:02.610]  It's a critical question, given that large suppliers will spend an average of $13 million to $23 million to comply with Walmart's plans.
[42:03.130 --> 42:09.090]  Now, it doesn't really go into any detail here about consumer, the consumer end of all this.
[42:09.150 --> 42:12.150]  This is basically for tracking inventory within the Walmart systems.
[42:12.630 --> 42:19.310]  Each of 100 suppliers is going to spend $13 million, and they're going to save $8 million.
[42:19.650 --> 42:21.050]  This doesn't seem...
[42:21.050 --> 42:22.730]  Well, Walmart's going to save $8 million.
[42:22.750 --> 42:24.010]  Walmart's going to save $8 million.
[42:24.010 --> 42:27.870]  But the total savings are really negative.
[42:28.790 --> 42:29.970]  This is pretty common.
[42:30.070 --> 42:40.530]  I work for a company that has to comply with our customers' requirements, big customers' requirements, to barcode and label cases of things that are going out.
[42:41.010 --> 42:44.430]  And these big companies that buy this stuff, they pretty much hold this stuff over your head.
[42:44.510 --> 42:57.310]  Say, if you don't mark the packages or label them with certain barcodes or use RFID, which is probably coming very soon to us, then you have to pay fines to them.
[42:58.210 --> 43:00.770]  So, you know, the vendors are kind of stuck.
[43:00.890 --> 43:06.870]  If they want to do business with Walmart, they've got to put these things on the pallets and the cases that are going out.
[43:06.970 --> 43:07.770]  I don't think...
[43:07.770 --> 43:13.990]  But this proposal, as you just read, has anything to do with the individual consumer packages that you're going to take home with you.
[43:14.090 --> 43:18.950]  This has to do with putting things on, like a big, giant case of a product or something.
[43:19.150 --> 43:21.770]  And it really does help manage the supply chain.
[43:22.390 --> 43:26.370]  And I don't think there's really any privacy implications for this particular application.
[43:26.710 --> 43:28.870]  But, you know, once it starts applying...
[43:28.870 --> 43:34.530]  this stuff starts appearing in bars of soap and things like that, then we've got to look at it again.
[43:35.350 --> 43:36.010]  Very true.
[43:36.130 --> 43:36.550]  Very true.
[43:37.030 --> 43:39.150]  Now, a couple more things, and we'll take some phone calls.
[43:39.230 --> 43:40.870]  212-209-2900.
[43:41.590 --> 43:45.190]  Here's a letter about something that we discussed recently.
[43:45.870 --> 43:51.450]  You talk about a guy who held a shift key and defeated the copy protection on a CD.
[43:51.710 --> 43:52.930]  Remember that story?
[43:53.450 --> 43:54.570]  And was threatened with a lawsuit.
[43:54.690 --> 43:55.730]  This person writes in about this.
[43:55.890 --> 43:57.570]  It was not quite reported properly.
[43:57.770 --> 44:00.250]  The flaw does not reside in the software at all.
[44:00.610 --> 44:03.650]  Every Windows-based PC has this feature and always has.
[44:03.810 --> 44:12.430]  By holding the shift key down while inserting a CD-ROM, it disables the Autorun feature, which is found in Autorun.ini on the root of the CD.
[44:13.010 --> 44:16.930]  Furthermore, one can simply disable the CD Autorun feature in the control panel.
[44:17.150 --> 44:24.470]  This copy protection scheme is reliant on the CD's Autorun to initialize the Windows script host to transparently install the drivers.
[44:24.910 --> 44:31.490]  Any discussion of the DMCA being used against a guy is invalid since Microsoft's architecture is responsible for this feature, not the person who used it.
[44:31.750 --> 44:34.790]  And that's from Neil, who is a system administrator down there in Norfolk, Virginia.
[44:34.950 --> 44:36.610]  Thanks very much for writing that in.
[44:37.050 --> 44:53.150]  And, you know, I don't think it in any way affects the claim that the software is really bad because any software that relies on that assumption that Autorun.ini is going to run properly and everything is based on that, that's not very well designed, is it?
[44:53.630 --> 44:57.390]  No, but it still doesn't give you a loophole through the DMCA.
[44:57.650 --> 45:06.030]  The DMCA says if you circumvent a technological measure that's designed to protect or prevent whatever, then you're in violation.
[45:06.030 --> 45:15.050]  So, just because this was using the Windows operating system settings to circumvent, it doesn't mean you're off the hook with the DMCA.
[45:15.290 --> 45:24.030]  Well, now, even though you're using something that exists in Microsoft, that's a feature of Microsoft, you're not getting around a feature, you're using another feature.
[45:24.170 --> 45:25.810]  You're saying that DMCA still will apply?
[45:26.370 --> 45:44.830]  Sure, because if you read the term, the terms of art and the wording in the statute of the DMCA, it just says if you defeat a technological measure that's designed to prevent you from doing something they don't want you to do, I'm paraphrasing, obviously,
[45:45.590 --> 45:47.310]  then you're in violation of that.
[45:48.650 --> 45:53.410]  It's silly, it's illogical, but since when does the law have anything to do with logic or common sense?
[45:53.930 --> 46:06.110]  So if I were to insert the CD into my machine which runs Linux and then, say, make a backup, I would be in violation of the law because I put it into a machine that didn't use Windows.
[46:06.470 --> 46:13.810]  It's up to however the prosecutors want to describe that to the judge or the jury.
[46:13.910 --> 46:19.130]  But Bernie, where is it said that you must use Autorun or you're in violation?
[46:19.130 --> 46:21.150]  How would someone know that they're in violation?
[46:21.150 --> 46:21.950]  You don't.
[46:22.010 --> 46:22.470]  That's the thing.
[46:22.590 --> 46:24.830]  The law is not a black and white thing, unfortunately.
[46:24.910 --> 46:29.750]  If it were, we would know in advance when something is really illegal or not.
[46:29.810 --> 46:30.710]  But we don't always know.
[46:30.890 --> 46:32.010]  It's really up until...
[46:32.010 --> 46:32.650]  It's really...
[46:32.650 --> 46:37.850]  This stuff is left vague, so it's open to the interpretation of prosecutors and the courts and judges, that sort of thing.
[46:38.210 --> 46:47.170]  And you know how a prosecutor working for the MPAA or the RIAA is going to say this was how it was intended to...
[46:47.570 --> 46:48.930]  which is what it was intended to mean.
[46:48.930 --> 46:52.090]  So it doesn't get you off the hook, I don't think, legally.
[46:52.610 --> 46:54.150]  That's really comforting to know.
[46:54.950 --> 46:55.570]  All right.
[46:55.670 --> 47:05.510]  And finally, as part of this week's technology circumvention of our own here, we have this submission that was submitted by someone coincidentally named Bernie S.
[47:06.130 --> 47:09.050]  who's talking about Sprint phones, Sprint PCS phones.
[47:09.830 --> 47:15.490]  This hack works if you have Sprint PCS's unlimited PCS-to-PCS calling option in your plan.
[47:15.490 --> 47:21.250]  It effectively treats your calls to voicemail as unbillable PCS-to-PCS calls.
[47:21.450 --> 47:26.150]  So if I understand correctly, when you call voicemail, unless you have a particular kind of a plan, you get charged for that.
[47:26.210 --> 47:26.510]  Is that right?
[47:27.010 --> 47:27.350]  Yes.
[47:27.430 --> 47:33.170]  But you can pay an extra few bucks a month to get unlimited Sprint PCS-to-Sprint PCS calling.
[47:33.310 --> 47:33.550]  Okay.
[47:33.710 --> 47:34.070]  If you know someone else.
[47:34.230 --> 47:35.050]  But this Bernie S.
[47:35.070 --> 47:37.410]  who wrote in said that there's a way around that.
[47:37.410 --> 47:41.130]  You program the following number in one of the speed dial numbers on your phone.
[47:41.250 --> 47:42.210]  Everybody got their pencils out?
[47:42.810 --> 47:43.410]  All right.
[47:44.830 --> 47:45.530]  One, one.
[47:45.830 --> 47:53.290]  And then there's XXX-XX-XXXXXXXXX, which is any valid Sprint PCS number.
[47:53.690 --> 47:54.010]  Okay.
[47:54.530 --> 47:55.390]  Doesn't matter what it is.
[47:55.590 --> 47:56.570]  Doesn't matter what it is.
[47:56.650 --> 47:57.570]  Any valid Sprint...
[47:57.570 --> 47:59.350]  It has to be a Sprint PCS number, though?
[47:59.610 --> 47:59.910]  Yes.
[48:00.050 --> 48:00.170]  Okay.
[48:01.350 --> 48:01.950]  Star, star.
[48:02.170 --> 48:03.770]  I imagine those are the two stars on the keypad.
[48:04.810 --> 48:10.270]  Then T, which is a two-second pause that can be accessed from the options when entering a number.
[48:10.330 --> 48:11.270]  I'm a little confused by that.
[48:11.270 --> 48:11.910]  What does that mean exactly?
[48:12.090 --> 48:12.630]  Well, you scroll down.
[48:12.910 --> 48:13.430]  If you're...
[48:13.430 --> 48:17.090]  This is when you program a number into your handset for auto-dialing.
[48:17.150 --> 48:17.350]  Right.
[48:18.090 --> 48:19.110]  Oh, you can put a...
[48:19.110 --> 48:23.630]  You can program a fixed pause that requires you to press a button for it to continue.
[48:23.910 --> 48:24.170]  Okay.
[48:24.310 --> 48:26.570]  Like if you're waiting for a tone, or you can have a...
[48:26.570 --> 48:29.230]  You can put a T, which means for a two-second pause.
[48:29.530 --> 48:29.710]  Okay.
[48:29.710 --> 48:31.650]  It's very intuitive when you have the phone in your hand.
[48:31.950 --> 48:33.110]  And then the...
[48:33.110 --> 48:38.630]  Then follow that with the Sprint PCS phone number that you want to access voicemail, right?
[48:38.710 --> 48:39.990]  That would be your phone number, I would imagine.
[48:40.210 --> 48:40.430]  Right.
[48:41.350 --> 48:50.750]  So then you enter your phone number, your Sprint PCS number, followed by the pound sign, and then your four-digit password for voicemail, followed by the pound sign.
[48:51.090 --> 48:52.370]  And you save it in your phone.
[48:52.670 --> 48:53.730]  You save that in your phone.
[48:53.850 --> 48:57.770]  Again, to go over this one more time, 1-1, followed by any valid Sprint PCS number.
[48:57.850 --> 49:00.090]  Can it be the same number as the one you enter later?
[49:00.490 --> 49:01.790]  You know, I didn't try that.
[49:01.830 --> 49:02.530]  I just tried another one.
[49:02.530 --> 49:03.610]  Oh, you did this, Bernie.
[49:03.730 --> 49:05.230]  I used yours, actually.
[49:05.230 --> 49:06.950]  I just assumed this was another Bernie S.
[49:07.030 --> 49:08.470]  I didn't want to get you in trouble here.
[49:08.590 --> 49:10.410]  I actually used your Sprint PCS number, man.
[49:10.410 --> 49:11.130]  Oh, thanks a lot.
[49:11.390 --> 49:15.250]  Okay, so basically 1-1 followed by a Sprint PCS number, followed by a pause.
[49:15.370 --> 49:15.650]  Oh, you know what?
[49:15.670 --> 49:16.430]  I missed the pause here.
[49:17.350 --> 49:28.950]  The two-second pause, star-star, another two-second pause, then the phone number that you want to access voicemail with, then a pound sign, then the four-digit password to voicemail, then another pound sign.
[49:29.090 --> 49:36.050]  And doing all this, saving this as a speed dial number, will save you the cost of calling voicemail every time you call voicemail.
[49:36.170 --> 49:41.050]  That's right, which I don't have to charge you for anyway, because it's not taking you over the public switch telephone network.
[49:41.210 --> 49:41.930]  It all stays in there.
[49:42.690 --> 49:44.250]  Mike is trying this right now.
[49:44.330 --> 49:45.130]  Wait, this isn't legal.
[49:45.130 --> 49:46.110]  You're trying this in the studio.
[49:46.370 --> 49:49.610]  Will it charge the other person's number, or is it just...
[49:49.610 --> 49:51.890]  No, it just makes it...
[49:51.890 --> 49:56.970]  It makes... It fools Sprint into thinking that it's a Sprint PCS to Sprint PCS call.
[49:57.190 --> 49:58.090]  And frankly...
[49:58.090 --> 49:58.310]  Yeah.
[49:58.670 --> 50:04.190]  Frankly, any call to voicemail, I think, should be considered a Sprint PCS to Sprint PCS call.
[50:04.270 --> 50:04.690]  Oh, absolutely.
[50:04.890 --> 50:09.670]  But can't you just enter your own phone number, dial your own phone number, and you get connected to voicemail from that phone?
[50:10.870 --> 50:12.250]  It doesn't work that way.
[50:12.270 --> 50:13.750]  I've tried that, and it shows up on your bill.
[50:13.990 --> 50:14.470]  Oh, really?
[50:14.650 --> 50:14.850]  Okay.
[50:15.690 --> 50:20.490]  It has to be another person's Sprint PCS number, which is why I used yours.
[50:21.170 --> 50:21.910]  Yeah, thanks again.
[50:22.570 --> 50:23.510]  Mike, you just tried this.
[50:23.530 --> 50:23.790]  What happened?
[50:23.850 --> 50:28.430]  I tried it, and it told me that the number or code I entered was incorrect, and I should please try again.
[50:28.830 --> 50:31.310]  At what point did it tell you that, when you sped dialed it?
[50:31.990 --> 50:33.010]  After I dialed it, yeah.
[50:33.410 --> 50:35.150]  Well, you're supposed to save this, right, Bernie?
[50:35.730 --> 50:36.010]  Oh, yeah.
[50:36.070 --> 50:40.530]  You have to save this as a stored number in your phone.
[50:40.650 --> 50:41.670]  Why can't I just dial it?
[50:41.690 --> 50:42.670]  For testing purposes.
[50:42.930 --> 50:43.390]  Well, it just doesn't work.
[50:43.430 --> 50:43.890]  I've tried it.
[50:43.930 --> 50:44.530]  You've got to store it.
[50:44.670 --> 50:45.410]  Here are the instructions.
[50:45.670 --> 50:47.050]  Let's see if you can do this by the end of the show.
[50:48.030 --> 50:48.810]  I'll work on it.
[50:48.850 --> 50:51.090]  Of course, we don't know if you're not getting billed premium rates for doing this.
[50:51.750 --> 50:58.050]  Let's go to the phones, 212-209-2900, and let us know what your feedback is.
[50:58.610 --> 50:59.310]  And good evening.
[50:59.390 --> 50:59.830]  You're on the air.
[51:00.050 --> 51:05.350]  First, four days in Orlando and four days in Fort Lauderdale or Daytona Beach.
[51:05.730 --> 51:07.610]  You know, I don't think we need to hear that, whatever it is.
[51:07.690 --> 51:07.970]  Good evening.
[51:08.090 --> 51:08.630]  You're on the air.
[51:09.770 --> 51:12.010]  Well, that's an improvement, but it's not much of an improvement.
[51:12.850 --> 51:15.910]  Let's go over... now they're popping up.
[51:15.990 --> 51:16.210]  Good evening.
[51:16.270 --> 51:16.690]  You're on the air.
[51:17.970 --> 51:18.810]  Hey, what's up?
[51:19.150 --> 51:19.530]  Not much.
[51:19.530 --> 51:20.030]  What's on your mind?
[51:20.030 --> 51:23.910]  I just wanted to say that I have Sprint.
[51:24.050 --> 51:24.870]  This is peer-free.
[51:25.230 --> 51:26.130]  I haven't called in a long time.
[51:29.170 --> 51:35.930]  But Sprint... I go to college in Vermont, and people up here have so many insane problems with Sprint.
[51:36.910 --> 51:43.810]  And that being one of them, and I had heard about that, and my friend apparently was found out with that.
[51:45.330 --> 51:47.610]  Sprint gave him a nice little phone call.
[51:47.870 --> 51:48.930]  Was found out for what?
[51:50.030 --> 51:51.090]  The thing that Bernie S.
[51:51.210 --> 51:51.670]  was dispensary.
[51:51.850 --> 51:54.530]  Oh, so this is being... Bernie, do other people know about this?
[51:54.730 --> 51:55.210]  Oh, yes.
[51:55.870 --> 51:56.090]  Okay.
[51:56.290 --> 52:12.370]  Apparently, he found information about it on some posts online, and I don't really know where he found it, but he apparently used it, and it noticed it, and they weren't too happy about it.
[52:12.370 --> 52:13.150]  Interesting.
[52:13.310 --> 52:14.590]  So what did they threaten him with?
[52:15.430 --> 52:17.010]  No, they didn't threaten him with anything.
[52:17.010 --> 52:22.050]  They basically just said, you know, we just want you to know that this is not allowed.
[52:23.090 --> 52:24.270]  That's literally what they said.
[52:24.370 --> 52:24.990]  This is not allowed.
[52:25.010 --> 52:26.190]  Don't call these phone numbers.
[52:26.650 --> 52:29.310]  You can't store this in your speed dial and dial it.
[52:29.370 --> 52:29.810]  That's illegal.
[52:29.950 --> 52:30.310]  That's great.
[52:30.650 --> 52:32.690]  It's like saying, oh, you pay for phone service.
[52:32.690 --> 52:33.570]  You can't call your mother.
[52:35.150 --> 52:36.010]  It's a phone number.
[52:36.130 --> 52:37.090]  Can I call it?
[52:37.150 --> 52:41.830]  No, it's like using friends and family for MCI and calling someone who's not a friend or part of your family.
[52:42.130 --> 52:43.630]  What if you fall out with that person?
[52:43.770 --> 52:44.530]  They're not your friend anymore.
[52:45.130 --> 52:46.590]  No, it's in the agreement.
[52:46.590 --> 52:48.730]  You have to drop them if you're not friends with them anymore.
[52:49.690 --> 52:50.910]  Unless you marry them or something.
[52:51.190 --> 52:53.370]  He said that we're going to charge him any extra money.
[52:53.750 --> 52:55.130]  He wasn't supposed to do it.
[52:55.330 --> 52:55.570]  Uh-huh.
[52:56.210 --> 52:58.030]  That's their exact words.
[52:58.710 --> 52:59.030]  All right.
[53:00.430 --> 53:02.770]  But they weren't very threatening, really.
[53:02.870 --> 53:03.790]  They just kind of said it.
[53:04.650 --> 53:05.010]  Interesting.
[53:05.110 --> 53:06.350]  It might have been just a bored technician.
[53:06.370 --> 53:07.390]  Why not to scare somebody?
[53:07.770 --> 53:08.990]  I guess that's the way Sprint works.
[53:09.150 --> 53:09.970]  I mean, I have Verizon.
[53:10.150 --> 53:11.130]  I've been pretty happy with it.
[53:11.350 --> 53:13.230]  Sprint has very limited coverage here in Vermont.
[53:13.430 --> 53:13.670]  Yeah.
[53:13.850 --> 53:16.550]  Yeah, well, that coverage problem is definitely something that a lot of people complain about.
[53:16.910 --> 53:19.650]  Yeah, but I just figured I'd mention that for you.
[53:19.690 --> 53:19.690]  All right.
[53:19.690 --> 53:19.870]  Thanks.
[53:19.990 --> 53:20.490]  Thanks for your call.
[53:20.890 --> 53:20.950]  All right.
[53:20.950 --> 53:22.030]  Let's see if we can get on.
[53:22.390 --> 53:25.290]  It's only less than three weeks before number portability kicks in.
[53:25.350 --> 53:25.810]  That's right.
[53:25.970 --> 53:28.090]  And what date does number portability kick in?
[53:28.190 --> 53:28.470]  Do you know, Bert?
[53:28.470 --> 53:29.290]  November 24th.
[53:29.350 --> 53:29.790]  What day is that?
[53:29.930 --> 53:30.410]  Day of the week?
[53:30.650 --> 53:31.750]  Um, I don't know.
[53:32.030 --> 53:32.230]  All right.
[53:32.310 --> 53:33.010]  Well, somebody...
[53:33.010 --> 53:33.350]  I've got a computer there.
[53:33.350 --> 53:34.490]  Anybody have a calendar in their head?
[53:34.630 --> 53:35.190]  It's Monday.
[53:35.350 --> 53:35.790]  It's Monday?
[53:35.910 --> 53:36.650]  Leo says it's Monday.
[53:36.790 --> 53:37.930]  My birthday's on the 30th.
[53:38.030 --> 53:38.270]  That's right.
[53:38.350 --> 53:38.570]  Okay.
[53:38.610 --> 53:39.090]  That's why you know.
[53:39.170 --> 53:39.330]  Okay.
[53:39.390 --> 53:40.270]  I believe him this time.
[53:40.810 --> 53:45.470]  So that means that that show, which will be, I guess, what, November 25th?
[53:45.690 --> 53:45.970]  26.
[53:46.970 --> 53:47.250]  Really?
[53:47.370 --> 53:48.050]  If it's on a Monday.
[53:48.190 --> 53:48.990]  The 23rd is on a Monday.
[53:49.070 --> 53:50.330]  Won't our show be on the 25th?
[53:51.190 --> 53:51.950]  The 24th is on a Monday.
[53:51.950 --> 53:52.830]  The 24th is a Monday.
[53:52.970 --> 53:53.690]  Oh, the 24th is a Monday.
[53:53.810 --> 53:54.050]  I'm sorry.
[53:54.130 --> 53:54.510]  I got it wrong.
[53:54.670 --> 53:54.690]  Okay.
[53:54.750 --> 53:55.190]  So 26.
[53:55.370 --> 53:56.130]  November 26th.
[53:56.570 --> 53:58.230]  We will, I guess, be experimenting with portability.
[53:58.470 --> 54:01.230]  The thing is, with portability, a lot of people have to throw out their phones.
[54:01.750 --> 54:08.470]  And they're actually expecting a major problem in landfills, where people throw out all these phones, and they have all kinds of things in them that aren't good.
[54:09.370 --> 54:10.690]  But you can't just switch.
[54:10.850 --> 54:16.690]  It's not like GSM, where you can just switch to a different carrier, insert a different chip, or whatever, and use the same phone.
[54:16.750 --> 54:18.670]  You can't do that in this country, apparently.
[54:19.370 --> 54:21.130]  Now, okay, Mike, what results did you have?
[54:21.330 --> 54:21.950]  It worked.
[54:22.190 --> 54:22.830]  It worked?
[54:22.990 --> 54:23.170]  Yeah.
[54:23.370 --> 54:24.470]  I got my voicemail.
[54:24.530 --> 54:25.670]  You just committed a crime.
[54:25.750 --> 54:26.490]  You're going to get a national call for a sprint now.
[54:26.490 --> 54:28.150]  You just committed a crime on the air.
[54:28.310 --> 54:32.850]  The thing is, for me, I don't have this PCS-PCS feature, so I paid for the call anyway.
[54:33.010 --> 54:33.290]  Oh, right.
[54:34.090 --> 54:34.390]  So.
[54:34.550 --> 54:37.010]  Well, okay, so we verified that the actual speed dial thing works.
[54:37.010 --> 54:37.470]  It does work.
[54:37.550 --> 54:38.730]  We haven't verified any billing.
[54:39.330 --> 54:40.430]  Let's take another phone call.
[54:40.510 --> 54:40.830]  Good evening.
[54:40.990 --> 54:41.570]  You're on the air.
[54:43.030 --> 54:43.730]  You're on the air.
[54:44.290 --> 54:44.590]  Okay.
[54:44.730 --> 54:45.030]  You know what?
[54:45.030 --> 54:46.230]  It's a federal crime to do that.
[54:46.330 --> 54:47.110]  It really is.
[54:47.310 --> 54:47.730]  Look it up.
[54:47.790 --> 54:48.010]  Good evening.
[54:48.070 --> 54:48.470]  You're on the air.
[54:48.830 --> 54:49.590]  Good evening, Emmanuel.
[54:49.770 --> 54:50.290]  What's on your mind?
[54:50.290 --> 54:52.250]  I got a very interesting book.
[54:52.250 --> 54:53.530]  You may already know about it.
[54:53.690 --> 54:56.350]  The title of it is Dark Fiber by Geert Lovink.
[54:56.590 --> 54:57.330]  Yes, I've heard of that.
[54:57.490 --> 54:58.170]  This Dutch guy.
[54:58.370 --> 54:59.430]  You know this guy, right?
[54:59.490 --> 55:00.190]  I don't know the guy.
[55:00.410 --> 55:00.870]  Do I know the guy?
[55:00.910 --> 55:01.430]  I might know the guy.
[55:01.490 --> 55:03.130]  I don't think I do, but I've heard the title.
[55:03.430 --> 55:04.430]  Well, it's called Tracking.
[55:04.590 --> 55:06.850]  The subtitle is Tracking Critical Internet Culture.
[55:06.850 --> 55:22.570]  And it's a very good overview and sort of a history of the hacking in Holland and Germany and Italy, you know, and a good overlook of the whole scene and it shows how far ahead the people over there are in terms of the creative use of the whole net concept,
[55:22.730 --> 55:22.990]  you know.
[55:23.170 --> 55:23.370]  Yeah.
[55:23.850 --> 55:25.090]  But it's a very good book.
[55:25.190 --> 55:26.250]  I just want to recommend it.
[55:26.370 --> 55:29.730]  It's a Geert Lovink, MIT Press, Dark Fiber.
[55:29.930 --> 55:30.470]  Dark Fiber.
[55:30.790 --> 55:31.030]  All right.
[55:31.110 --> 55:31.430]  So noted.
[55:31.430 --> 55:32.690]  Thank you for that call.
[55:33.010 --> 55:34.090]  See if we can squeeze in one more.
[55:34.230 --> 55:34.490]  Good evening.
[55:34.610 --> 55:34.950]  You're on the air.
[55:35.410 --> 55:35.810]  Thank you.
[55:38.050 --> 55:42.510]  You know, the timbre of that voice just reminds me of somebody, and I'm just going to move on based on that alone.
[55:42.770 --> 55:43.050]  Good evening.
[55:43.130 --> 55:43.550]  You're on the air.
[55:43.730 --> 55:44.070]  Oh, I'm on.
[55:44.150 --> 55:44.370]  Okay.
[55:44.450 --> 55:44.570]  Hi.
[55:44.690 --> 55:45.730]  Welcome back, and thank you.
[55:45.910 --> 55:46.150]  Thank you.
[55:46.190 --> 55:46.590]  Thank you very much.
[55:46.710 --> 55:49.210]  I wanted to mention about the RFID thing.
[55:49.430 --> 55:49.590]  Yes.
[55:50.010 --> 55:50.330]  Yeah.
[55:50.570 --> 55:51.610]  I don't know if you guys heard.
[55:51.670 --> 55:54.810]  You probably already know all this, but something about Gillette products.
[55:55.350 --> 55:56.370]  Did you hear about that?
[55:56.950 --> 55:57.270]  No.
[55:57.410 --> 55:58.130]  But make it quick.
[55:58.410 --> 55:58.610]  Okay.
[55:59.050 --> 55:59.590]  Check out.
[55:59.690 --> 56:00.870]  Can I give you a website to check out?
[56:00.930 --> 56:01.090]  Sure.
[56:02.970 --> 56:04.390]  www.boycottgillette.com.
[56:04.550 --> 56:04.790]  Okay.
[56:04.790 --> 56:06.710]  They talk about the RFD on Gillette products.
[56:07.310 --> 56:09.390]  And www.rens.com is a good one, too.
[56:10.030 --> 56:10.930]  R-E-N-S-E.
[56:11.070 --> 56:14.110]  We'll make sure our listeners study that for next week.
[56:14.170 --> 56:15.010]  Check out those two websites.
[56:15.170 --> 56:15.270]  Okay.
[56:15.470 --> 56:15.850]  Thank you.
[56:16.030 --> 56:16.250]  Good luck.
[56:16.270 --> 56:18.830]  Thanks for your call, and thanks, everybody else, for trying to call.
[56:19.410 --> 56:22.150]  You can write to us, O-T-H at 2600.com.
[56:22.510 --> 56:28.550]  And, of course, we'll be back next week with another action-packed edition of Off the Hook.
[56:29.550 --> 56:32.330]  From what I understand, we won't be on the week after that, sadly enough.
[56:33.110 --> 56:35.430]  So, the meeting is this week.
[56:35.690 --> 56:37.150]  2600 meetings all around the world.
[56:38.150 --> 56:39.270]  First Friday of the month.
[56:40.130 --> 56:44.390]  Check www.2600.com slash meetings to see if there's one near you.
[56:44.810 --> 56:45.430]  This is Manuel Goldstein.
[56:45.530 --> 56:47.890]  For everybody else, have yourselves a good night.
[57:23.190 --> 57:24.400]  We'll be right back.
[57:30.920 --> 57:33.680]  You never have to know who you want.
[57:34.260 --> 57:38.000]  Made his life go live through dark.
[57:41.510 --> 57:44.870]  I told him that he shouldn't upset her.
[57:50.370 --> 57:52.310]  Involving somebody else.
[57:54.030 --> 57:57.330]  But I knew that he'd never forget her.
[57:58.430 --> 58:01.570]  While her memory worked and never...
[58:03.660 --> 58:04.760]  Keep her safe on yourself.
[59:52.160 --> 59:59.440]  Hey, you're listening to WBAI New York, 99.5 for all your cool cats.
[01:00:00.440 --> 01:00:10.180]  Stay tuned for, stay tuned for the award-winning personal computer show coming up right after this very, very extremely brief message.
[01:00:16.100 --> 01:00:19.120]  This is Joy Williams, election supervisor for WBAI.
[01:00:20.080 --> 01:00:24.460]  Candidates, are you having trouble finding WBAI members to sign your petitions?
[01:00:24.860 --> 01:00:31.420]  Members, do you want to meet potential candidates face-to-face and be in the company of other WBAI fanatics like yourself?
[01:00:31.640 --> 01:00:38.640]  Then come to the first petition signing event this Saturday, November 8th at WBAI from noon to 5 p.m.
[01:00:38.640 --> 01:00:55.500]  If you want to help plan the petition signing events in New Jersey, Nassau County, Suffolk County, Westchester and Queens, or host your own, give me a call at 718-453-1721 or email me at joywilliams at att.net.
[01:00:55.900 --> 01:00:58.800]  Remember, you must be a member of the station to be a candidate.
[01:00:59.060 --> 01:01:03.860]  A member must have contributed $25 or volunteered three hours within the past year.
[01:01:04.080 --> 01:01:06.500]  The nomination period ends December 5th.
[01:01:06.500 --> 01:01:15.980]  Once again, you can reach me at 718-453-1721 or email me at joywilliams at att.net.