[00:00.000 --> 00:05.020] In the meantime, both Juanita Young and her lawyer, Lynn Stewart, believe that her case will go to trial. [00:05.020 --> 00:12.140] But she believes that she has the authorities running scared and that ultimately she will claim justice for herself and for the memory of her son. [00:12.360 --> 00:16.740] Their angle now is to focus on my blindness. [00:17.360 --> 00:20.560] To me, that's showing that they know they're wrong. [00:20.860 --> 00:25.860] The fact that you have to go at another angle tells me I need to keep doing what I'm doing. [00:25.860 --> 00:31.500] For FSRN, I'm Amabwadi at Pacifica Station WBAI in New York City. [00:32.000 --> 00:39.640] For an archive of today's newscast or previous FSRN stories, go to www.fsrn.org. [00:39.780 --> 00:40.880] I'm Deepa Fernandes. [00:43.380 --> 00:48.380] And you're listening to Radio Station WBAI in New York where the time is just about 7 o'clock exactly. [00:48.660 --> 00:51.840] And that means it's time for Off the Hook. [00:59.800 --> 01:01.740] So I ripped it off the wall. [01:02.800 --> 01:04.720] I cut myself while shaving. [01:05.320 --> 01:07.220] Now I can't make a call. [01:08.000 --> 01:10.040] We couldn't get much worse. [01:10.780 --> 01:12.580] But if they could, they would. [01:12.860 --> 01:13.640] Bumbiddley Bump. [01:13.820 --> 01:15.500] But the best is back from worst. [01:16.180 --> 01:18.000] I hope that's understood. [01:18.300 --> 01:19.080] Bumbiddley Bump! [02:26.250 --> 02:27.330] And good evening to everybody. [02:27.390 --> 02:28.030] The program's Off the Hook. [02:28.110 --> 02:30.110] Emmanuel Goldstein here with you for the next hour or so. [02:30.250 --> 02:33.510] We are joined tonight by Jeff, Jim, Mike, and Leo. [02:33.890 --> 02:34.290] Good evening. [02:34.290 --> 02:34.750] How are you all doing? [02:35.010 --> 02:35.330] Hello. [02:35.570 --> 02:35.650] Good. [02:35.850 --> 02:38.770] I want to show you something really annoying before we get started tonight. [02:39.070 --> 02:41.110] Just playing around with my phone. [02:41.290 --> 02:46.090] And I found the ring that I think is probably the most annoying ring in the world. [02:46.270 --> 02:47.970] And I love using this wherever I go. [02:49.130 --> 02:49.630] Hang on. [02:49.790 --> 02:51.510] Let me just try and connect you. [02:51.590 --> 02:51.850] There we go. [02:54.250 --> 02:55.230] It doesn't stop. [02:55.390 --> 02:56.230] It just keeps going. [02:56.730 --> 02:57.410] Isn't that great? [02:57.590 --> 02:58.230] It never stops? [02:58.350 --> 03:00.690] Well, eventually when it goes to voicemail, it stops. [03:01.630 --> 03:07.950] But can you imagine being in a theater, you know, where you're trying to find this thing and it just will not stop until you, you know, usually there's a pause between rings. [03:08.030 --> 03:09.610] And this just keeps on going and going and going. [03:09.670 --> 03:11.430] Well, if it doesn't stop, it's easier to find. [03:11.650 --> 03:12.510] It is easier to find. [03:12.630 --> 03:15.070] It's also easier for them to find you, you know, as a culprit. [03:15.270 --> 03:16.990] Well, if you're in a theater, I hope they would. [03:17.150 --> 03:17.310] Yeah. [03:17.610 --> 03:19.350] And there it just went to voicemail. [03:19.350 --> 03:22.670] I'm all distressed with the Camptown Ladies Sing This Song ring. [03:22.950 --> 03:24.410] That one disturbs me. [03:24.410 --> 03:27.550] I'm not big into the music thing, you know, the whole music, play your favorite song. [03:27.550 --> 03:29.530] Yeah, yeah, well, they're out there and they're annoying. [03:29.650 --> 03:31.110] I don't understand the logic behind that. [03:31.190 --> 03:32.810] Why would you want your favorite song to play? [03:32.930 --> 03:33.870] Because you want to answer the phone. [03:33.990 --> 03:35.030] You don't want to hear your favorite song. [03:35.170 --> 03:38.130] Well, the idea is to have a different song play for different numbers that are coming in. [03:38.170 --> 03:41.910] So you can tell from the ring who it is as opposed to the looking at the screen. [03:41.970 --> 03:43.910] But if it's a song that you like, you're going to want to hear the rest of it. [03:44.030 --> 03:53.010] And if it's an important call from somebody who you assigned a song that you like, that call isn't going to get through because, you know, by the time you hear the part you like, it might be, you know, with the voicemail already. [03:54.410 --> 03:56.030] I'm that addicted to hearing music. [03:56.290 --> 04:01.490] Anyway, I'd like for somebody to volunteer here to turn my ringer off. [04:02.090 --> 04:03.090] Okay, can you do that? [04:03.110 --> 04:04.090] This phone has a flaw in it. [04:04.250 --> 04:04.590] I'll try. [04:04.770 --> 04:05.330] You want to try, Leo? [04:05.470 --> 04:05.730] All right. [04:06.410 --> 04:10.010] Don't do anything except turn the volume of the ring down. [04:10.350 --> 04:11.110] That's all I want to... [04:11.110 --> 04:14.750] And keep in mind, you're in a place where you cannot have that phone ring no matter what. [04:14.990 --> 04:16.770] All right, so right now you've got to turn the ringer down. [04:16.830 --> 04:17.990] For example, a radio station. [04:18.050 --> 04:19.470] A radio station, all right, so... [04:19.470 --> 04:20.990] I see a trick question here. [04:20.990 --> 04:22.490] You could turn it off, but you need to have the... [04:22.490 --> 04:22.910] Oh! [04:22.910 --> 04:23.030] Oh! [04:23.370 --> 04:23.950] You have failed? [04:24.010 --> 04:24.590] Give me the phone back. [04:25.030 --> 04:25.770] Give me the phone back. [04:25.930 --> 04:26.730] I'm going to pass it on. [04:27.410 --> 04:27.870] All right. [04:28.650 --> 04:29.430] Mike, it's your turn. [04:29.970 --> 04:31.210] Wait, I think this is a trick. [04:31.310 --> 04:36.370] You have to find the menu item and then turn the volume down on the ring. [04:38.190 --> 04:40.650] I presume you're calling it with your other phone. [04:40.670 --> 04:40.890] I did. [04:41.010 --> 04:41.210] No, I'm not. [04:41.310 --> 04:41.530] I'm not. [04:41.790 --> 04:42.490] What do I win? [04:42.590 --> 04:42.990] What did you do? [04:43.190 --> 04:43.930] I turned it down. [04:44.390 --> 04:44.910] How'd you do it? [04:46.330 --> 04:47.110] Well, you did it, yeah. [04:47.230 --> 04:47.770] How'd you do it? [04:47.790 --> 04:48.110] Tell us. [04:48.590 --> 04:50.290] There's buttons on the side for the volume. [04:50.430 --> 04:51.990] How do you know the buttons are on the side for the volume? [04:51.990 --> 04:53.650] Because I have similar buttons on my phone. [04:53.830 --> 04:56.750] So you're saying if I call this phone now, it won't ring? [04:56.930 --> 04:57.570] You're saying that. [04:57.910 --> 04:59.730] Are you sure you didn't turn the volume down for the earpiece? [04:59.950 --> 05:01.330] I turned some volume down. [05:01.350 --> 05:03.230] Okay, well maybe you didn't actually do what you think you did. [05:03.530 --> 05:04.650] It's entirely possible. [05:04.930 --> 05:06.310] Now I have to call it again. [05:06.890 --> 05:07.390] Hang on. [05:07.790 --> 05:09.930] Why don't you just turn the phone off or pop the battery? [05:09.930 --> 05:12.110] Because I told you, I'm in a place where I have to have the phone on. [05:13.010 --> 05:13.630] Theoretically, anyway. [05:14.170 --> 05:15.870] Alright, I'm calling the phone now. [05:16.430 --> 05:16.790] Hypothetically. [05:17.270 --> 05:17.470] Yeah. [05:18.050 --> 05:19.590] We'll see if it rings. [05:19.830 --> 05:21.690] Sprint is having trouble getting a signal in this room. [05:21.690 --> 05:22.730] even though it's five bars. [05:24.710 --> 05:26.490] Just waiting for sprint service is what we're doing. [05:26.870 --> 05:28.450] Okay, now the timer is going. [05:28.630 --> 05:29.670] We'll see if this phone starts to ring. [05:30.210 --> 05:31.150] Mike, you have failed too. [05:31.950 --> 05:32.170] Alright. [05:32.770 --> 05:33.710] No, no, no, no. [05:34.010 --> 05:34.770] You give up, Jim? [05:35.250 --> 05:36.230] I'm not supposed to do this. [05:36.370 --> 05:37.290] Jim Forfitts' turn. [05:37.470 --> 05:39.510] It's Jeff's turn to try and turn the ringer off. [05:39.510 --> 05:40.510] I passed my turn. [05:40.610 --> 05:41.130] There's a difference. [05:41.810 --> 05:47.290] And I'm still waiting on my Verizon for a message to come from 3.30 yesterday. [05:49.330 --> 05:51.150] Well, they don't show up till the weekend, I have thought. [05:52.650 --> 05:53.650] That's how I know this with Sprint. [05:53.650 --> 05:55.450] It's when you get the free nights and weekends. [05:55.650 --> 05:55.830] Yeah. [05:56.290 --> 05:58.370] I got a card from Sprint, actually. [05:59.130 --> 06:00.130] A thank you card. [06:00.610 --> 06:01.330] Oh, that's sweet. [06:01.450 --> 06:03.010] Your loyalty is appreciated. [06:03.170 --> 06:04.890] This may just change everything, actually. [06:05.870 --> 06:06.250] It's... [06:06.250 --> 06:07.090] Well, I mean, seriously. [06:07.210 --> 06:10.850] When you get a card like this, it makes you think about all the nasty things you've said. [06:11.970 --> 06:13.590] And, Jeff, you're hard at work there. [06:13.590 --> 06:14.770] You've got your glasses on and everything. [06:14.950 --> 06:16.050] Oh, I'm going to... [06:16.830 --> 06:17.970] You're determined to get this right. [06:18.110 --> 06:18.450] Why not? [06:18.550 --> 06:19.410] Because everybody else hasn't. [06:20.410 --> 06:20.770] All right. [06:21.170 --> 06:22.590] Your loyalty is appreciated. [06:23.070 --> 06:24.550] That's what Sprint PCS has told me. [06:24.810 --> 06:25.690] I want to thank... [06:25.690 --> 06:26.410] I want to thank you. [06:26.410 --> 06:28.110] This isn't, you know, some mindless corporation. [06:28.290 --> 06:29.370] This is a person writing to me. [06:29.370 --> 06:31.450] I want to thank you for choosing Sprint. [06:31.550 --> 06:37.250] It is our commitment to provide our valued customers with the best in wireless communication. [06:37.610 --> 06:38.290] They're in the plural already. [06:38.510 --> 06:40.210] Please don't interrupt the personal letter from Sprint. [06:42.390 --> 06:47.310] It is our commitment to provide our valued customers with the best in wireless communication. [06:47.310 --> 06:52.030] And I want to personally reaffirm that your satisfaction is our number one priority. [06:52.270 --> 06:55.330] Did you know that my satisfaction is Sprint's number one priority? [06:56.710 --> 06:57.650] I didn't know that. [06:57.750 --> 07:00.470] One worries about how the other priorities are failing. [07:00.470 --> 07:02.310] Well, maybe you worry about it, but I certainly don't. [07:03.070 --> 07:04.770] I think it's a bit selfish, don't you think? [07:04.970 --> 07:08.510] I'm just saying, this is how they do on priority number one. [07:08.670 --> 07:10.270] Can you imagine priority 3,000? [07:10.370 --> 07:11.330] Okay, Jeff, you failed. [07:11.430 --> 07:11.830] Give me the phone. [07:12.150 --> 07:12.430] All right. [07:13.230 --> 07:13.590] No, no, no. [07:13.590 --> 07:15.450] It's not intuitive at all, is it? [07:15.510 --> 07:16.110] It's not intuitive, no. [07:16.430 --> 07:17.350] Here's the thing. [07:17.430 --> 07:29.130] On this particular phone, which is a Motorola time port, the menu item to turn down the volume, turn down phone volume, you press an arrow to turn down the volume, but it rings the phone to tell you what the volume is as you're doing that. [07:29.470 --> 07:31.190] So if I was to go to that item... [07:31.190 --> 07:32.310] So you couldn't win in this game? [07:32.370 --> 07:32.990] You couldn't win, no. [07:33.150 --> 07:33.910] Oh, that's not fair. [07:34.650 --> 07:35.370] It was a trick. [07:35.550 --> 07:38.550] But basically, the thing is adjust ring volume. [07:38.770 --> 07:41.450] As soon as you hit okay to adjust ring volume, that happens. [07:41.850 --> 07:50.050] All right, there is one way you can do it, which is kind of a trick, and that's to go to the ring or vibrate menu and simply go to don't ring or vibrate. [07:50.590 --> 07:50.950] Ah. [07:51.070 --> 07:52.970] And I just selected that, and now it won't ring or vibrate. [07:52.970 --> 07:58.290] Well, what if you go to the ring or vibrate menu and go to change it to vibrate or whatever it says? [07:58.370 --> 07:59.150] Well, then it'll vibrate. [08:00.170 --> 08:01.970] But that still makes some bit of noise. [08:02.350 --> 08:02.750] Does it? [08:02.930 --> 08:03.070] Yeah. [08:03.810 --> 08:04.910] Yeah, mine does too. [08:05.650 --> 08:06.570] Turn the phones off. [08:06.610 --> 08:07.550] That's enough of the phones today. [08:08.070 --> 08:10.690] Let me get back to the Sprint note that I got here. [08:11.430 --> 08:12.210] It's a card. [08:12.550 --> 08:13.230] It's a card, yeah. [08:13.350 --> 08:14.350] It's like a holiday card. [08:14.530 --> 08:18.970] You'll see our commitment to your satisfaction and our ongoing dedication to expanding the Sprint nationwide PCS network. [08:18.970 --> 08:20.970] We've already invested over $17 billion. [08:21.710 --> 08:24.750] My God, that's like a country could survive on that, couldn't it? [08:25.110 --> 08:26.610] To build and expand our network. [08:26.610 --> 08:28.590] But we've taken your feedback seriously. [08:29.010 --> 08:30.030] They do listen. [08:30.330 --> 08:34.430] We've taken your feedback seriously, and we know that there is still room to improve. [08:35.770 --> 08:36.630] They've heard us. [08:36.910 --> 08:44.310] We are building 1,700 new cell towers this year, so you'll be able to connect wherever you like and experience improved coverage within homes and buildings. [08:45.010 --> 08:46.830] You'll also notice improvements in customer service. [08:46.970 --> 08:54.310] Now it's easier than ever before to get your questions answered the first time you contact us with faster access to a PCS customer solution specialist. [08:54.810 --> 08:56.190] We look forward to serving you. [08:56.370 --> 08:58.150] And again, I thank you for choosing Sprint. [08:59.090 --> 09:03.190] It's signed, Len Lauer, the President and Chief Operating Officer, President PCS Division. [09:03.630 --> 09:04.990] Sent me that personal note there. [09:05.170 --> 09:06.710] Does it say, Dear Emanuel? [09:08.590 --> 09:09.690] Or Valued Customer? [09:09.890 --> 09:12.670] No, you know, I didn't think he needed to be tacky by doing that. [09:12.770 --> 09:15.690] It's just that, you know, it's a card, but it's obviously he's speaking to me. [09:15.730 --> 09:20.330] It's got my name and address in the front, in the envelope, so I know they know who I am. [09:20.850 --> 09:24.390] But I also got this other card from DirecTV, and this one's written in script. [09:28.230 --> 09:33.890] The memories and stories of the holiday season are just a little nicer, just a little warmer when shared with someone special. [09:35.810 --> 09:40.490] And, uh, Dear Emanuel, thank you for allowing us into your home to share our favorite stories with you. [09:40.770 --> 09:43.430] Actually, this is from the Hallmark Channel and DirecTV. [09:44.170 --> 09:44.570] Please. [09:44.570 --> 09:46.890] It's a Hallmark card from the Hallmark Channel. [09:47.050 --> 09:48.410] I mean, this couldn't be more perfect. [09:48.430 --> 09:48.710] Well, that makes sense. [09:48.950 --> 09:49.510] I guess. [09:49.710 --> 09:50.330] They must have gotten a discount. [09:50.330 --> 09:54.650] They wouldn't have sent an American Greetings card, Why does the Hallmark Channel exist anyway? [09:54.690 --> 09:55.730] They make greeting cards. [09:55.890 --> 09:56.470] Well, also... [09:56.470 --> 09:58.630] We're going to get the, you know, Pillsbury Doughboy Channel next? [09:58.750 --> 09:58.810] No, no, no. [09:58.810 --> 10:02.070] For 30 years, they've sponsored the Hallmark Hall of Fame. [10:02.230 --> 10:05.570] You know, various, uh, dramatic pieces usually run... [10:05.570 --> 10:06.250] That was my next question. [10:06.250 --> 10:09.210] ...two hours, and there's a lot of them out there. [10:09.570 --> 10:11.710] Please tell me you get real Christmas cards, too. [10:12.290 --> 10:16.070] Well, I mean, you couldn't get much more real than, than Sprint PCS and the Hallmark Channel. [10:16.610 --> 10:18.290] Um, channel 312. [10:19.170 --> 10:21.710] So, I'll be sure to, uh, I don't think I've ever even turned that on. [10:22.150 --> 10:24.710] Your finger would get tired scrolling up there, wouldn't it? [10:24.830 --> 10:25.170] Yes. [10:25.470 --> 10:26.310] Ah, you'd punch it in. [10:26.310 --> 10:28.050] Well, we're joined tonight by The Mentor. [10:28.490 --> 10:29.410] Not The Mentor. [10:29.530 --> 10:30.110] The Condor. [10:30.210 --> 10:31.210] Is The Condor with us? [10:32.510 --> 10:32.910] No? [10:33.310 --> 10:33.710] Hello? [10:33.870 --> 10:34.550] Is anyone on the phone? [10:35.070 --> 10:35.510] Hey, Manuel. [10:35.730 --> 10:36.750] Yeah, it's Kevin Mitnick. [10:37.090 --> 10:37.630] How you doing? [10:37.670 --> 10:38.970] Previously known as The Condor, right? [10:39.610 --> 10:40.010] Previous. [10:40.290 --> 10:41.230] In the past life. [10:41.410 --> 10:42.210] Past life, yeah. [10:42.330 --> 10:55.610] You know, I didn't use that handle, you know, except back in the, uh, BBS days of the 1980s, and then, I guess, uh, when certain people wrote books and articles about me, they, they made it sound like I've always used that handle for many, many years. [10:55.610 --> 11:00.470] It was a trivia question, sort of, to throw people off so that they'd be surprised by the sound of your voice. [11:01.410 --> 11:02.370] I was thrown off. [11:02.470 --> 11:02.790] Yeah, see? [11:02.950 --> 11:03.510] You were thrown off? [11:03.570 --> 11:04.070] You didn't know, huh? [11:04.070 --> 11:06.610] Completely, completely, uh, out of it right now, so, uh... [11:06.610 --> 11:08.670] I was expecting Robert Redford in a spy movie. [11:08.790 --> 11:08.970] See? [11:09.550 --> 11:10.630] Three Days of the Condor. [11:10.630 --> 11:11.810] Yeah, is that what inspired it? [11:12.710 --> 11:14.490] No, uh, oh yeah, that, that handle? [11:14.650 --> 11:14.830] Yeah. [11:15.050 --> 11:15.210] Okay. [11:15.230 --> 11:28.050] Yeah, it was really, because, uh, if you remember, Redford in the movie called the CNA Bureau, you know, when he was trying to, uh, uh, evade, uh, and forces, and I thought it was, uh, pretty realistic. [11:28.050 --> 11:33.130] The only movie that I actually saw up until that time that actually, uh, demonstrated that. [11:33.290 --> 11:34.410] So, that's why I picked the handle. [11:34.550 --> 11:35.150] Do you remember that? [11:35.250 --> 11:35.990] Do you remember the scene? [11:36.110 --> 11:37.250] Yes, I remember that, that film. [11:37.330 --> 11:38.890] Have you ever seen a film called The Conversation? [11:39.310 --> 11:39.630] Yeah. [11:40.090 --> 11:42.170] Now, that's, I think that's a good, uh, hacker-type film. [11:43.710 --> 11:45.170] Yeah, I haven't seen it for a while. [11:45.270 --> 11:47.370] That was with, uh, it was in there, Hackman? [11:47.490 --> 11:48.050] Gene Hackman? [11:48.230 --> 11:48.490] Yeah, yeah. [11:48.710 --> 11:48.990] Yeah. [11:49.850 --> 11:52.610] Well, one of my favorite, other favorite movies is Enemy of the State. [11:52.790 --> 11:53.310] Enemy of the State? [11:53.430 --> 11:54.030] That's a good one, too. [11:54.590 --> 12:00.130] Yeah, I haven't seen any, uh, uh, films recently that, uh, of that hacker genre. [12:00.430 --> 12:00.970] What about sneakers? [12:01.190 --> 12:01.690] You like sneakers? [12:02.070 --> 12:03.310] Yeah, I thought sneakers as well. [12:03.310 --> 12:04.350] I thought the net was stupid. [12:04.750 --> 12:05.430] That was pretty stupid. [12:05.490 --> 12:07.810] Tonight on Off the Hook we'll be discussing films. [12:08.190 --> 12:08.810] Yeah, well, why not? [12:08.950 --> 12:10.290] You know, we haven't discussed this in a while. [12:10.950 --> 12:15.310] Yeah, what is this, like, Cisco and Ebert are two kinds of hacking movies? [12:16.550 --> 12:22.610] Well, one of them's, uh, Until the End of the World, which, uh, its main plot is not hacking, but it's a major subplot. [12:23.350 --> 12:23.670] Yeah. [12:23.670 --> 12:32.410] Hey, Eric, when you were talking about phones, I, uh, I was recently in Finland in Costa Rica and I picked up, uh, one of these Nokia Tri-Band phones. [12:32.510 --> 12:33.570] Finland and Costa Rica? [12:33.730 --> 12:34.050] With the color screens. [12:34.550 --> 12:34.770] What? [12:34.930 --> 12:36.330] They're right next door to each other, aren't they? [12:37.250 --> 12:37.590] Yeah. [12:37.590 --> 12:38.870] It was a package. [12:39.050 --> 12:39.170] Yes, they are. [12:39.250 --> 12:39.910] They're in Europe. [12:40.130 --> 12:40.390] Uh-huh. [12:40.490 --> 12:46.850] And I wanted to get a phone that actually worked in Europe and it's pretty cool because it, you know, it's kind of a water-resistant phone. [12:46.990 --> 12:49.090] It looks like, remember the sports Sony Walkmans? [12:49.330 --> 12:51.050] These are like the sports Nokia phones. [12:51.450 --> 12:51.750] Mm-hmm. [12:52.110 --> 12:59.150] But it has a weird, it has an awkward ring and they call it the Nokia Tune and it's like, it's kind of an annoying ring. [12:59.310 --> 12:59.530] Really? [12:59.530 --> 13:01.070] I have to, like, replace the ringtone, yeah. [13:01.190 --> 13:07.670] Well, I'm heading over to Europe for the, uh, Chaos Congress in December and I intend to get a new GSM phone because I'm sick of this time port thing. [13:07.790 --> 13:09.070] It's got too many problems with it. [13:09.490 --> 13:10.490] Yeah, get a Nokia. [13:11.170 --> 13:12.510] You know, one of my favorite companies. [13:12.510 --> 13:17.230] Yeah, they all seem to have Nokia over there and I guess I just have to get the right kind of Nokia that does all kinds of neat things. [13:17.450 --> 13:28.490] Except you pay out the, you know, you pay a lot of money over there because, first of all, it's euros, which is 20% higher than the American dollar and they don't, you know, so, like, I bought a phone and it cost me, like, 200 euros. [13:29.030 --> 13:33.210] They, if they sold it in the States, you'd probably get it, like, for a third of the price. [13:33.410 --> 13:35.170] If you, of course, if you sign up with the plan. [13:35.590 --> 13:36.650] Yeah, yeah, the plan. [13:37.270 --> 13:37.790] It's done. [13:38.030 --> 13:39.490] Yeah, so, Kevin, what's, uh, what's new with you? [13:39.550 --> 13:40.050] What have you been up to? [13:40.550 --> 14:05.390] Man, uh, just, uh, I've been, like, you know, kind of the worldwide jet setter going around to, uh, different countries and doing talks, like, and, uh, the real interesting news, or the good news is, as you know, last year, I co-authored a book called The Art of Deception and now Wiley has commissioned me to write a new book which we're gonna probably call The Art of Intrusion. [14:05.570 --> 14:09.730] I would have liked to call it The Art of Penetration but they probably won't let me use that title. [14:09.970 --> 14:10.650] Probably not. [14:11.110 --> 14:11.530] No. [14:11.930 --> 14:25.310] Uh, and what the, what I'm gonna have the book do is detail, this is gonna be the hardest part, is finding people out there that have, uh, hacked in the past that have done really clever and elegant type of hacks. [14:25.470 --> 14:33.630] I'm not just talking about social engineering, I'm talking technical, physical, you know, maybe getting a job at the company, you know, to compromise their network. [14:33.850 --> 14:46.170] And what I want to do is tell the story of what happened, then do an analysis of the story, then, and then have a section, well, you know, what do you have to do in your business to stop this from happening to you, type of thing. [14:46.170 --> 14:51.470] Well, I mean, there are lots of stories involving hackers, I'm sure, that we've heard quite a few in our time. [14:51.910 --> 15:00.150] Are you looking for stories about how companies can protect themselves from hackers, or stories about things that have happened to hackers that should never have happened, that kind of thing? [15:00.150 --> 15:01.210] No, no, no, no. [15:01.250 --> 15:03.470] What I'm looking for is stories of the actual hack. [15:03.750 --> 15:29.870] Like, if you broke into IBM and it was through exploiting a physical vulnerability or exploiting different attack vectors, and if it's an interesting story, because you have the run of the mill that isn't really all that interesting, and it's either because the target's interesting or the method that was used was interesting or that they never found out, [15:30.830 --> 15:47.070] what I want to do is tell maybe ten short stories of different hacks using different attack vectors, like social engineering, exploiting personnel security, physical security, network security, and not just... [15:47.610 --> 15:55.550] maybe coming up with an interesting way of exploiting a technical vulnerability or using a combination of those. [15:55.670 --> 16:04.130] It's kind of like the story of the hack rather than the story of what happened, like to the person if they were caught or, you know, that type of thing. [16:04.250 --> 16:05.110] So imagine... [16:05.110 --> 16:07.610] I'm not looking to tell anybody's life story, per se. [16:07.810 --> 16:09.910] It's just like the most interesting hack. [16:10.290 --> 16:10.470] Right. [16:10.730 --> 16:12.990] And putting them together, like... [16:12.990 --> 16:22.630] Like, for instance, if it was, like, discussing, like, phone-freaking with, like, you know, when John Draper, you know, on Captain Crunch, you know, when he and Woz called the Pope. [16:23.010 --> 16:26.550] You know, it's kind of interesting because it's unusual, you know, and... [16:26.550 --> 16:30.870] But I'm looking more along the lines of computer-related stories. [16:31.090 --> 16:33.950] And what I was kind of doing today is I was on... [16:33.950 --> 16:42.690] It's kind of funny that, you know, the Department of Justice, you know, since they've been so nice to me in past years, they actually are helping me now because they have this website, right? [16:43.330 --> 16:44.130] Cybercrime.gov. [16:44.130 --> 16:45.130] You've probably seen it. [16:45.230 --> 16:45.570] Oh, yes. [16:45.570 --> 16:50.530] And what they do is they detail everyone they bust and then they have the press release. [16:50.670 --> 16:54.630] So you can click on the case and it gives you the press release and it gives you a little synopsis of what happened. [16:55.370 --> 16:59.530] You know, but it's usually the DOJ, these lawyers, right, in such boring language. [16:59.750 --> 17:00.930] You know, it's kind of like reading a... [17:00.930 --> 17:03.230] You know, it's kind of reading like a technical manual. [17:03.470 --> 17:03.670] Right. [17:03.830 --> 17:14.590] So I was, like, scowling through there and I found, like, one group that looks interesting because they actually compromised NCIC, the National Crime Information Center, and they used... [17:14.590 --> 17:17.410] and they manipulated the phone networks to their advantage. [17:17.430 --> 17:18.830] There was a group called the Phone Masters. [17:18.950 --> 17:19.530] Do you remember them? [17:19.810 --> 17:20.790] I've heard of them, yes. [17:21.810 --> 17:22.530] Yeah, so... [17:22.530 --> 17:24.010] I don't know them personally. [17:24.230 --> 17:25.070] There's all kinds of... [17:25.070 --> 17:32.310] There's all kinds of groups and organizations out there, but I think you'll find the most interesting story from individuals, people who have, you know, played with the system. [17:32.450 --> 17:36.750] I wish Bernie was with us because I can't think of anybody who has more interesting stories to tell, you know. [17:36.830 --> 17:37.850] Oh, Bernie, yeah. [17:37.990 --> 17:39.910] Bernie would be around. [17:40.250 --> 17:40.450] Yeah. [17:41.750 --> 17:42.950] Well, maybe he snowed in. [17:43.090 --> 17:44.850] He must be snowed in somewhere in Philadelphia. [17:45.310 --> 17:46.630] It would be nice if he was with us tonight. [17:46.750 --> 17:47.090] It would be. [17:47.150 --> 17:49.830] It would be very nice to hear his voice, but, well, what are you going to do? [17:50.090 --> 17:50.470] Wait a minute. [17:50.670 --> 17:51.270] Bernie, is that you? [17:52.790 --> 17:53.690] How did you do that? [17:54.110 --> 17:54.830] Oh, my goodness. [17:55.090 --> 17:57.470] Wow, this phone system has mysteries even I don't know about. [17:57.990 --> 17:59.450] Well, Bernie, we're talking... [17:59.450 --> 17:59.830] I guess you know. [17:59.910 --> 18:01.230] We're talking to Kevin Mitnick on the phone. [18:01.370 --> 18:01.910] Hello, Kevin. [18:02.270 --> 18:02.990] Hello, Kevin. [18:03.850 --> 18:04.350] Wait, wait. [18:04.350 --> 18:05.750] Is it legal for you to talk to each other? [18:05.970 --> 18:06.850] You're sounding well. [18:07.010 --> 18:10.310] Yes, we can actually speak to each other without committing a felony now. [18:10.430 --> 18:11.210] Oh, but it wasn't before. [18:11.430 --> 18:13.530] Just for the act of communicating with each other. [18:13.710 --> 18:14.110] Okay. [18:14.370 --> 18:16.230] You guys weren't allowed to talk for a long time. [18:16.930 --> 18:17.530] That's true. [18:17.690 --> 18:19.390] I wasn't able to speak with... [18:20.450 --> 18:22.110] Fiber Optic wasn't able to speak with me. [18:22.190 --> 18:24.270] I wasn't able to speak with him a few years ago. [18:24.470 --> 18:24.950] It's a total... [18:24.950 --> 18:42.250] For people that don't know, anyone who's convicted of a felony in this country is typically prohibited from speaking to anyone else who's also been convicted of one for a period of several years after they're released from prison, after they've served their prison Yeah, [18:42.310 --> 18:45.170] unless they get permission from the probation department, which is unlikely. [18:46.670 --> 18:49.290] So, yeah, it's good to be able to hear from you. [18:49.730 --> 18:51.150] Yeah, good to hear from you. [18:51.230 --> 18:57.290] Hey, Manuel, do you want to tell a little story about when I was in New York when I was on probation or do we keep that off the record? [18:57.330 --> 18:57.750] I don't know. [18:57.910 --> 18:58.870] Maybe we... [18:58.870 --> 18:59.990] Well, let's just say... [18:59.990 --> 19:02.030] I mean, because I'm not at any jeopardy now. [19:02.110 --> 19:02.450] It's over. [19:02.910 --> 19:03.710] It's kind of funny. [19:03.990 --> 19:12.450] Yeah, well, okay, I guess, you know, all this will reveal is that sometimes, you know, we do bypass the system a little bit, which I guess won't be any big surprise to anybody. [19:12.650 --> 19:18.090] But, yeah, when you were in New York, you met some people that maybe you weren't supposed to meet, but you didn't know that you were meeting them at the time. [19:18.430 --> 19:18.990] Yeah, exactly. [19:19.370 --> 19:19.970] I mean, you never... [19:19.970 --> 19:21.850] I didn't recognize the person. [19:21.850 --> 19:24.350] I guess we all were out to dinner or something like that. [19:24.410 --> 19:29.330] But I think you told me like several months later like, hey, by the way, remember when we were out at dinner that night? [19:29.470 --> 19:31.310] You know, and... [19:31.670 --> 19:32.390] Was it Mark? [19:32.530 --> 19:33.610] It was Fiberoptic, yes. [19:33.710 --> 19:34.270] Yeah, yeah, Fiberoptic. [19:34.270 --> 19:37.550] We basically, we made like he was some Brazilian guy, I think. [19:37.710 --> 19:42.130] And since he's fluent in Portuguese, he social-engineered me. [19:42.210 --> 19:43.650] He social-engineered you pretty good, yeah. [19:43.930 --> 19:49.010] He even got your credit card numbers and your credit history and all that kind of thing, yeah. [19:49.490 --> 19:50.650] It was a lot of fun. [19:50.750 --> 19:51.790] I thought that was kind of funny. [19:51.950 --> 19:52.370] Yeah, but... [19:52.370 --> 19:56.210] The weird thing is you have no way of knowing who you're talking to and if they are a convicted felon. [19:56.330 --> 20:08.670] I mean, considering that, you know, millions of people in this country are convicted felons, how, you know, how could you possibly know if you were just having a conversation with a clerk or a professional? [20:08.910 --> 20:11.390] Or your local congressman, for instance, if you... [20:11.390 --> 20:11.590] Exactly! [20:12.810 --> 20:14.110] That could be a real problem. [20:14.970 --> 20:17.810] But the thing is, you know, there wasn't any devious planning or anything like that. [20:17.890 --> 20:20.650] Everybody was just in the same room, so that's just... [20:20.650 --> 20:21.070] No, no, no. [20:21.330 --> 20:22.010] I couldn't tell anybody to leave. [20:22.150 --> 20:23.690] I had no clue, but it was kind of funny. [20:23.770 --> 20:24.250] It was funny. [20:24.350 --> 20:24.690] It was. [20:25.270 --> 20:26.110] Well, when I come... [20:26.110 --> 20:31.590] You know, we'll go back to the book, but I guess I'll be in New York in the summertime. [20:31.890 --> 20:32.390] That's right. [20:32.470 --> 20:40.170] In fact, this is somewhat of a revelation here that Kevin will be doing one of the keynotes at the next HOPE conference July 9th through 11th. [20:40.630 --> 20:43.350] So we'll be looking forward to that. [20:43.470 --> 20:44.390] That's here in New York City. [20:44.710 --> 20:45.470] Yeah, I'm so excited. [20:45.610 --> 20:48.330] This is the first time I've been able to attend one of your conferences. [20:48.510 --> 20:49.030] Isn't that something? [20:49.130 --> 20:49.750] Our first conference [21:05.710 --> 21:07.150] can you believe the BOP? [21:07.930 --> 21:09.950] And 2000, 2002, the premiere... [21:09.950 --> 21:11.230] Actually, 2000 was the premiere of the film. [21:11.390 --> 21:14.090] 2002, you weren't allowed to come because... [21:14.090 --> 21:15.790] No, 2002 was the premiere, right? [21:16.090 --> 21:16.310] Yeah. [21:16.810 --> 21:17.350] I don't know. [21:17.470 --> 21:17.710] I don't remember. [21:17.810 --> 21:20.910] I wasn't allowed to come because I wasn't allowed to consort with these hackers. [21:21.450 --> 21:26.330] You know, they might cast a spell on me and control my behavior or something. [21:26.430 --> 21:31.670] So 2004 will be the first year that you will be able to come to a HOPE conference. [21:32.050 --> 21:33.230] Our fifth conference, in fact. [21:33.750 --> 21:37.650] You know what we've got to do and I should have talked to you about it online but I never... [21:38.330 --> 21:42.450] We've got to have some sort of get-together party like getting off probation party. [21:42.570 --> 21:43.090] I never had that. [21:43.190 --> 21:43.410] You know that? [21:43.470 --> 21:47.050] I was waiting for your conference to happen so maybe we'll schedule something around that time. [21:47.070 --> 21:47.790] We can do it then. [21:47.970 --> 21:48.090] Yeah. [21:48.490 --> 21:48.690] Absolutely. [21:48.690 --> 21:49.250] That would be awesome. [21:49.350 --> 21:53.810] There will be all kinds of celebrations and things like that but we'll have more information on that in weeks to come. [21:54.430 --> 21:58.210] So Bernie, I imagine you heard what Kevin was saying about the stories he's looking for. [21:58.530 --> 21:59.230] Any suggestions? [21:59.610 --> 22:00.470] I heard a bit. [22:00.970 --> 22:06.990] I'll have to get through my memory and come up with maybe an idea or two for that. [22:07.970 --> 22:29.090] I tend to agree with you, Emmanuel, that the stories of individuals and the thought processes they went through and the mental challenges they had in perpetrating a particular hack are more interesting than maybe than just some group or organization or underground organization that accomplished this or whatever. [22:29.190 --> 22:33.490] When you're talking about individuals it's just more of a real story that people can relate to. [22:34.270 --> 22:36.090] but there's stories out there like that. [22:36.330 --> 22:37.970] Yeah, the mindset, the strategy. [22:38.530 --> 22:38.870] Right, right. [22:39.050 --> 22:43.370] In fact, you know who would be great in any role who would probably have some really good stories? [22:43.550 --> 22:45.490] Well, let's not get them in trouble but okay, go ahead. [22:45.530 --> 22:45.850] Who are they? [22:46.130 --> 22:46.970] How about Bernie S? [22:49.330 --> 22:50.510] We're thinking about that, yeah. [22:51.290 --> 22:53.610] Bernie, do you want to participate? [22:54.630 --> 22:56.130] We'll talk privately about that. [22:56.370 --> 22:56.650] Okay. [22:57.090 --> 23:01.350] In any event, there are certainly a lot of people out there that we all know that have interesting stories to tell. [23:01.410 --> 23:02.190] And yes, I do agree. [23:02.190 --> 23:04.130] The individual, I think, is more compelling. [23:04.250 --> 23:07.290] When you have a group of faceless people, it sort of seems almost threatening. [23:07.730 --> 23:11.930] And that's how the media always portrays it as a group of hackers and organized coalition of some sort. [23:12.490 --> 23:15.970] And that's where you sort of lose the reality and gain the hysteria. [23:16.390 --> 23:24.170] So I think what we want to do is look at the individual person and how they're able to bypass things, figure things out, outsmart the system. [23:25.270 --> 23:29.230] And, I mean, you're going to be telling the story in a way that doesn't demonize that particular person. [23:29.410 --> 23:29.650] Oh, of course. [23:29.750 --> 23:30.070] Of course. [23:30.190 --> 23:32.750] Well, you know, remember, I'm of the same cloth. [23:32.890 --> 23:34.150] I used to do this type of stuff. [23:34.290 --> 23:35.630] Hey, you might have some stories. [23:35.950 --> 23:37.470] You might have some good stories, Kevin. [23:37.730 --> 23:38.750] Have you consulted with yourself? [23:39.150 --> 23:40.890] Yeah, the problem is is I can't tell my stories. [23:41.350 --> 23:42.790] That's a good point. [23:42.890 --> 23:56.390] The reason I can't discuss my true stories is because I had to sign an agreement with the government to get out of jail that I couldn't profit off telling my story for a period of time which doesn't expire, I think, to 2007. [23:57.090 --> 24:00.250] What if you trade with somebody, you tell their story, they tell your story? [24:00.270 --> 24:00.950] You know what I did? [24:01.630 --> 24:05.910] I'll even say this on the air because I figured a way to get around that agreement. [24:06.730 --> 24:07.050] Okay? [24:07.290 --> 24:07.450] Okay. [24:07.470 --> 24:08.830] And this would be classic, right? [24:08.970 --> 24:10.190] This is a hack too, but let's hear it. [24:10.290 --> 24:11.390] This is a hack. [24:11.510 --> 24:12.150] Okay, this is what I'm thinking. [24:12.390 --> 24:17.230] There's another individual, another former hacker, Kevin Poulsen, who has the same restriction. [24:17.390 --> 24:29.710] He can't write his book in profit, yet he has a very compelling story and I have a compelling story so I called Kevin one day and I said, listen, I figured a way that we can cash in and tell our story. [24:29.890 --> 24:30.810] And he goes, what? [24:31.050 --> 24:34.850] I go, I'll write the Kevin Poulsen book and you write the Kevin Mitnick book. [24:35.530 --> 24:36.810] A tale of two Kevins. [24:37.350 --> 24:38.170] Right, right, right. [24:38.310 --> 24:47.450] And it would work, right, because I could profit off in telling Kevin's story, right, if he would cooperate with me and he can do the same and then the government can come after either of us. [24:47.490 --> 24:50.590] I could just write the book about both of you and gain twice the profit. [24:50.950 --> 24:51.550] There you go. [24:52.190 --> 24:58.070] I think, Kevin, that you've got a little problem with the fact that in order for Kevin Poulsen to get your story, you have to tell him. [24:58.250 --> 24:59.650] Right, I can tell him for nothing. [25:00.570 --> 25:01.350] He's not getting... [25:01.350 --> 25:02.090] He can tell me for nothing, right? [25:02.090 --> 25:03.710] He would not be profiting by telling Kevin. [25:03.890 --> 25:05.370] No, you couldn't profit from telling Kevin. [25:05.770 --> 25:07.690] But Kevin can profit from telling your story. [25:07.690 --> 25:09.910] A dollar and I could pay him a dollar. [25:10.110 --> 25:12.650] So you could tell us your story here on the radio as well. [25:12.750 --> 25:13.350] It could go out. [25:13.550 --> 25:15.790] But as long as you're not getting money for it. [25:15.890 --> 25:19.750] But then we'd have 50,000 people profiting from the story by putting out their little books. [25:19.810 --> 25:20.190] And you know what? [25:20.330 --> 25:22.090] And what happens if John Markoff's listening? [25:22.310 --> 25:24.490] You know, I hear rumors sometimes that he does listen. [25:24.670 --> 25:25.790] So, hi, John. [25:25.870 --> 25:26.070] How you doing? [25:27.070 --> 25:32.950] Yeah, but the funny thing is, Kevin is a reporter for Security Focus and a number of other web publications. [25:33.350 --> 25:40.270] And I remember there was a time where he wanted to do a story about you except he wasn't allowed to talk to you either because he was a convicted felon too and made it very difficult. [25:41.030 --> 25:41.330] Right. [25:41.550 --> 25:44.810] Well, yeah, he was on supervised release when he was working for ZDNet. [25:45.310 --> 25:56.810] And he wasn't allowed to use a computer so he had to type all his stories on a typewriter and hand it to somebody who would then fax it over to a system that would computerize it and it was just pretty insane. [25:57.850 --> 25:58.450] Yeah, yeah. [25:58.890 --> 26:11.670] But anyway, getting back to the art of intrusion, what I really want to do is detail the different types of attacks from different perspectives by kind of looking for, like if you looked at, remember the art of deception even though they were fictional, [26:12.010 --> 26:20.310] they were kind of interesting stories, you know, that either based on the technique or based on how the attack worked or who was doing the attack. [26:20.530 --> 26:23.990] And that's what's really compelling because everybody likes to, you know, read good stories. [26:24.830 --> 26:32.850] And the problem is is probably the best ones, you know, people haven't been caught so they're certainly not going to come forward unless the statute of limitations expired. [26:33.030 --> 26:40.010] But then again, even if it had expired, they probably would take the, you know, probably take the high road and, you know, wouldn't say anything. [26:40.330 --> 26:40.570] Uh-huh. [26:40.730 --> 26:41.490] You know... [26:41.490 --> 26:42.330] I've got a question for you. [26:42.330 --> 26:42.710] Go ahead, Bernie. [26:43.850 --> 26:52.670] Kevin, I was having a conversation a couple weeks ago with somebody at work about what to look out for and what to, you know, just how to keep your wits about you sort of thing. [26:52.750 --> 27:02.530] And it becomes apparent sometimes that, and I'm sure you've run into this when you've done your consulting, that it's very difficult to train people to not be stupid. [27:04.790 --> 27:06.290] Train people not to be stupid? [27:06.550 --> 27:06.890] Yeah. [27:07.270 --> 27:15.170] I mean, I mean, they can read your book, they can be, go through so many seminars, but some people, they're just not going to get it. [27:15.390 --> 27:17.110] The stupidity instinct is hard to turn off. [27:17.190 --> 27:18.250] It's just really tough. [27:18.590 --> 27:18.810] Mm-hmm. [27:18.990 --> 27:19.190] Yeah. [27:19.190 --> 27:21.090] Because we have a fair road to communicate. [27:22.670 --> 27:23.910] For some, it's a gift. [27:24.250 --> 27:25.530] Yeah, that's certainly true. [27:25.630 --> 27:26.190] A fair road to communicate. [27:26.470 --> 27:27.310] Well, you know, you can try. [27:27.310 --> 27:29.730] You can try to educate people, obviously. [27:29.730 --> 27:30.650] You're not going to get to everybody. [27:31.150 --> 27:35.290] Well, like, with respect to social engineering, everybody's available to that regardless. [27:35.630 --> 27:37.710] It's not like it works because they're stupid. [27:38.110 --> 27:48.530] It works mostly because of the bugs in the human hardware that we have this implicit, we implicitly trust others, right? [27:48.710 --> 27:55.850] And there's certain types of influence techniques that are used in sales and marketing that also work if somebody's using social engineering too. [27:57.350 --> 27:58.990] social engineering is one of the best. [27:59.790 --> 28:07.270] You're going to want to attack the most vulnerable link in the security perimeter of a company, the human security perimeter. [28:07.650 --> 28:18.050] And, you know, you just keep trying until you find someone who's not as swift as someone else, somebody who's clueless or just doesn't get whatever security training they've received. [28:18.350 --> 28:20.450] And that's, you know, that's what someone's going to do. [28:20.490 --> 28:28.190] Yes, it's a greater challenge to try to social engineer as somebody who does get it and who's not clueless and who is well-trained. [28:28.310 --> 28:32.690] That's a much more fulfilling challenge for a hacker. [28:33.050 --> 28:42.750] But, a lot of times these things aren't done by hackers, they're being done by people who wish ill will towards the company or wish to gain from them in some dishonest method. [28:42.750 --> 28:50.450] And that's where you're going to run into the person who may not be too bright who can be taken advantage of. [28:50.510 --> 28:55.730] And all it takes is one person and an entire company like that to have the security violated. [28:55.730 --> 28:57.070] So that's a problem. [28:57.550 --> 28:58.790] As long as you have the human... [28:58.790 --> 29:14.290] That's a huge problem and that's what I try to do when I do my lectures and I don't know if you know this, Bernie and Manuel, is I developed a two-day seminar workshop on social engineering that goes through all the different... [29:14.290 --> 29:15.010] What is it? [29:15.030 --> 29:15.770] How does it work? [29:16.130 --> 29:21.770] What are the most common attack methods, targets, influence techniques and everything like that? [29:21.850 --> 29:34.390] And on the last day it's security mitigation techniques is what processes and what policies and what training needs to be implemented at the company to reduce the risk. [29:34.510 --> 29:36.590] But you can never reduce it to zero, unfortunately. [29:36.830 --> 29:38.170] No, I think as long as you have humans... [29:38.170 --> 29:43.950] As long as you have humans you'll never be able to reduce it to zero and there's something that's kind of reassuring about that. [29:44.270 --> 29:54.410] And don't forget the social engineer, the guy that's trying to con the target, all they're trying to do is get compliance with the request and getting up the person to circumvent security protocol. [29:55.190 --> 29:56.530] It's really, really simple. [29:57.130 --> 29:58.570] And so if people... [29:58.570 --> 30:06.830] First of all, I think according to PricewaterhouseCoopers, I mean, they did some sort of survey and I think only like 50% of the businesses out there actually have a written security policy, right? [30:06.830 --> 30:09.230] So then you have... [30:09.230 --> 30:17.910] So imagine 50% of the enterprises out there are vulnerable because not only do they not have a written security policy, nobody knows what the policy is because it doesn't exist. [30:18.430 --> 30:23.390] So then they're leaving compliance up to each and every person that's working there. [30:24.190 --> 30:31.110] Have you found any organization, any corporation, any government, institution that seems to do a pretty good job to protect themselves? [30:31.110 --> 30:32.030] Is anybody immune? [30:34.090 --> 30:41.130] Well, I think maybe military, you know, maybe companies under DOD that are really, they follow really strict protocol. [30:41.790 --> 30:43.590] I don't think they're immune. [30:43.590 --> 30:48.910] I think it's very, very difficult to be successful. [30:49.130 --> 30:50.390] Even if you're already in the military? [30:51.190 --> 30:54.010] I mean, once you've got your foot in the door, does that make things a lot easier? [30:54.390 --> 31:04.570] Well, usually not only do you have to verify identity of the requester, but if they have authorization, and I think the military allegedly is, you know, good at doing that. [31:04.630 --> 31:07.330] In fact, they don't call it social engineering, they call it OPSEC. [31:08.210 --> 31:09.410] Wait, wait, wait, what is this? [31:09.450 --> 31:09.830] Newspeak? [31:09.870 --> 31:10.430] What do they call it? [31:10.550 --> 31:13.730] They call it OPSEC, O-P-S-E-C, Operation Security. [31:14.090 --> 31:16.670] But they shorten it and they call it OPSEC. [31:16.850 --> 31:27.690] And that's the type of security where people manipulate the human element into some sort of action or to manipulate the target into revealing information or doing some sort of action item. [31:28.030 --> 31:30.350] I had OPSEC once, but it cleared up. [31:30.830 --> 31:31.550] it went away. [31:31.850 --> 31:32.450] Thank you, Jeff. [31:32.510 --> 31:33.470] And you used Oxy10. [31:34.550 --> 31:36.410] We're talking to Kevin Mitnick and Bernie S. [31:36.730 --> 31:39.230] And we'll be taking phone calls 212-209-2900. [31:39.410 --> 31:41.590] Kevin, if somebody has a story for you, how do they get it to you? [31:42.190 --> 31:43.270] They can email me. [31:43.830 --> 31:45.490] I have two e-mail addresses. [31:46.130 --> 31:58.950] It's kmitnick, M-I-T-N-I-C-K at defensivethinking.com or kevin, K-E-V-I-N at lab, L-A-B, mistress, M-I-S-T-R-E-S-S dot com. [31:59.630 --> 32:03.010] And soon enough, I'll have a 2600.com account. [32:03.110 --> 32:03.710] I won't tell you many more. [32:03.730 --> 32:04.130] That's right. [32:04.270 --> 32:10.850] In fact, we have technicians working on that right now and we're laboring around the clock to figure out I've only been waiting like two years. [32:10.970 --> 32:11.290] It's okay. [32:11.450 --> 32:16.410] Having Kevin Mitnick on your machine is something you don't take lightly and we're going to have an armed security guard. [32:16.490 --> 32:17.110] Security patches. [32:17.310 --> 32:17.730] Absolutely. [32:17.970 --> 32:18.190] Absolutely. [32:18.530 --> 32:20.170] So, yeah, that should be true. [32:20.170 --> 32:22.910] We've been upgrading over the weekend to prepare for the... [32:22.910 --> 32:23.110] Yeah. [32:23.410 --> 32:26.030] Well, you guys set up my own open BSD box, right? [32:26.430 --> 32:26.870] Yeah. [32:27.030 --> 32:31.390] Yeah, we did that and we disabled all incoming services like mail and things like that. [32:31.710 --> 32:34.510] No, we will have an e-mail account for you soon, though. [32:34.710 --> 32:49.770] We actually did have an e-mail account but what happened was it got so overtaken by spam that it became so useless because it was given out the whole time you were in prison and I think since I started talking about this you've probably gotten a hundred pieces of mail about the various ways you can enlarge parts of your body and, [32:49.810 --> 32:51.810] you know, making money fast and things like that. [32:52.170 --> 32:56.890] Well, yeah, in fact, they should use that like as a list, like a black hole list, you know, my mailbox. [32:57.370 --> 32:57.690] Probably. [32:58.250 --> 33:01.510] Yeah, so we're going to come up with something new as far as that goes. [33:01.630 --> 33:02.710] Hey, Manuel, I've got to tell you something. [33:02.850 --> 33:06.550] I don't know if you have to go to break but when I was in Costa Rica... [33:06.550 --> 33:07.310] We don't have a break here. [33:07.410 --> 33:07.930] We're non-commercial. [33:08.190 --> 33:08.470] Go ahead. [33:08.630 --> 33:08.830] Oh, okay. [33:08.930 --> 33:09.050] Yeah. [33:09.370 --> 33:09.590] Okay. [33:09.790 --> 33:11.290] I was looking at coming up to the half hour. [33:11.490 --> 33:12.810] I'm so used to commercial radio. [33:13.090 --> 33:20.890] But in any event, I did a talk in Costa Rica and the government actually runs the phone company out there. [33:20.950 --> 33:22.130] The phone company is called ECE. [33:22.370 --> 33:24.370] It's spelled I-C-E. [33:24.590 --> 33:24.890] Okay. [33:25.070 --> 33:34.510] And they liked my talk so much that they actually invited me to one of their central offices to take a tour and I have all these pictures of... [33:34.510 --> 33:36.410] It's a crossbar office, right? [33:36.550 --> 33:37.330] But it's still like... [33:37.330 --> 33:39.030] You know, I guess they still haven't... [33:39.030 --> 33:40.330] I guess in some... [33:40.330 --> 33:41.950] I don't know if you'd call it a third world country. [33:42.550 --> 33:47.750] But it was kind of interesting going on the tour and they even had a couple pen registers there so I'll have to send you the pictures. [33:48.370 --> 33:49.670] They let you take pictures of the pen registers? [33:50.350 --> 33:50.650] Yeah. [33:50.890 --> 33:51.550] Oh, that's nice. [33:51.850 --> 33:52.090] Wow. [33:52.210 --> 33:53.670] We can't even take pictures of the building here. [33:53.750 --> 33:54.710] Of the CO and everything. [33:54.890 --> 33:55.130] Uh-huh. [33:55.550 --> 33:57.010] It was hard though because I don't understand... [33:57.010 --> 33:57.630] I didn't understand... [33:57.630 --> 33:59.290] Well, I still don't understand Spanish [34:06.550 --> 34:06.930] and so forth. [34:07.410 --> 34:08.110] Man. [34:08.690 --> 34:18.790] Finland, you know, home of Nokia, Helsinki, London, Poland, Czech Republic, Spain, so what cities were those? [34:18.850 --> 34:27.110] Sevilla, Santiago, Lisbon, Portugal, Salvador, Brazil, Sao Paulo, Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile. [34:29.850 --> 34:30.850] That's all I can remove. [34:31.070 --> 34:32.370] I noticed you haven't been to Asia yet. [34:32.850 --> 34:33.610] No, not to Asia. [34:33.770 --> 34:35.390] Or Australia, Africa, or Antarctica. [34:35.550 --> 34:37.490] No, I really want to go to Australia or New Zealand. [34:37.610 --> 34:38.150] That would be cool. [34:38.270 --> 34:38.890] That would be cool. [34:39.030 --> 34:39.530] That would be cool. [34:39.710 --> 34:41.590] But I'll be going to Canada this year. [34:41.710 --> 34:42.850] I haven't been to Canada yet. [34:42.910 --> 34:44.110] That's a very mysterious place. [34:44.230 --> 34:44.470] Yes. [34:44.970 --> 34:46.430] Let us know what that's like when you get there. [34:46.710 --> 34:47.310] What part of Canada... [34:47.310 --> 34:49.070] You can find some crossbar switches in Cuba. [34:50.010 --> 34:50.570] Yeah, I bet. [34:50.710 --> 34:52.510] Well, I don't think I'll be going to Cuba anytime soon. [34:52.710 --> 34:53.750] Aren't we supposed to go to Cuba? [34:53.930 --> 34:55.070] A bunch of us are going to go to Cuba. [34:55.550 --> 34:55.770] Really? [34:55.770 --> 34:57.070] Yeah, we're going to try. [34:57.250 --> 34:57.870] We're going to work it out somehow. [34:57.870 --> 34:59.150] Bring back some Cuban cigars? [34:59.410 --> 35:01.110] Well, we'll smoke them there, of course. [35:01.290 --> 35:01.690] Of course. [35:01.810 --> 35:03.670] We'll bring them back and exhale them here. [35:04.330 --> 35:04.870] There you go. [35:05.470 --> 35:06.450] We'll smoke them in the plane. [35:06.610 --> 35:08.150] What part of... [35:08.150 --> 35:09.050] Yeah, that's legal. [35:09.150 --> 35:10.250] What part of Canada are you going to, Kevin? [35:10.630 --> 35:10.990] Toronto. [35:11.310 --> 35:11.490] Toronto. [35:11.690 --> 35:11.790] Okay. [35:12.030 --> 35:13.670] Well, that's... [35:13.670 --> 35:14.590] Do you know when? [35:15.050 --> 35:15.770] Yeah, in April. [35:16.010 --> 35:16.750] I'll be there in April. [35:17.050 --> 35:17.490] Okay, great. [35:17.970 --> 35:18.650] That'll be awesome. [35:18.750 --> 35:21.410] I'm going to Monterey, Mexico in February. [35:22.890 --> 35:23.610] But that's... [35:24.070 --> 35:28.090] Those are the only two international trips that I'll be making so far. [35:28.290 --> 35:28.730] You're lucky. [35:28.870 --> 35:31.450] You get to go to the Congress in Germany, right? [35:31.670 --> 35:32.190] Yeah, yeah. [35:32.510 --> 35:37.370] But you're coming to New York in July, so we'll see you then for the Hope Conference. [35:38.270 --> 35:40.370] Yeah, I hope a lot of people come out. [35:40.370 --> 35:41.890] I'm sure it will be a fantastic conference. [35:42.030 --> 35:42.850] Yeah, it's amazing, though. [35:42.850 --> 35:43.590] You're really jet-setting. [35:43.670 --> 35:46.990] You're making up for all the time spent confined and seeing the water. [35:46.990 --> 35:47.450] Well, you know what? [35:47.550 --> 35:48.530] I hate to fly, man. [35:48.670 --> 35:49.110] Oh, yeah. [35:49.330 --> 35:50.350] It stresses me out to no end. [35:50.490 --> 35:51.210] It's just... [35:51.210 --> 35:52.490] Well, they just make it so stressful. [35:52.670 --> 35:57.710] You know, all the making you take off your shoes and, you know, answer all the questions right and, you know, being... [35:57.710 --> 36:03.110] No, it's when these planes are built, you know, by manufacturers that, you know, are the lowest bidders. [36:04.030 --> 36:04.330] Yeah. [36:04.530 --> 36:07.130] And the plane has so many, you know, different parts to it. [36:07.190 --> 36:07.770] You know, you have to... [36:07.770 --> 36:13.210] Like, I remember in New York when that plane took off, or was it Flight 587 and it just, like, broke up in mid-air? [36:13.410 --> 36:13.590] Yeah. [36:13.590 --> 36:14.930] I kind of think about that. [36:15.330 --> 36:15.790] Over Rockaway. [36:15.870 --> 36:16.650] Yeah, that was horrible. [36:17.070 --> 36:17.490] Oh, yeah. [36:17.710 --> 36:19.030] Man, I couldn't imagine. [36:19.170 --> 36:21.410] I couldn't imagine being the people on the ground or in the air. [36:21.630 --> 36:21.870] Uh-huh. [36:22.770 --> 36:34.590] Well, you know, the problem with playing with technology and thinking about it a lot is sometimes you think about the failings of it and the easy ways that things can be completely messed up in various ways. [36:35.250 --> 36:38.750] So that makes a lot of people paranoid when they have to depend on technology. [36:38.930 --> 36:39.750] People like us, I guess. [36:40.190 --> 36:41.170] Anyway, let's take some phone calls. [36:41.230 --> 36:42.550] 212-209-2900. [36:42.730 --> 36:50.010] We're on the phone with both Kevin Mitnick and Bernie S., who have all kinds of stories to tell and things to talk about. [36:50.250 --> 36:51.430] Let's take this call here. [36:51.650 --> 36:52.050] Good evening. [36:52.110 --> 36:52.530] You're on the air. [36:53.470 --> 36:53.690] Oh, wow. [36:53.750 --> 36:54.070] Good heavens. [36:54.410 --> 36:54.770] How you doing? [36:55.430 --> 36:57.390] This is easier than getting through to Albania, huh? [36:57.790 --> 36:58.830] Well, not these days. [36:59.010 --> 37:01.410] Albania is a lot easier to call than it was, say, 10 years ago. [37:01.630 --> 37:02.990] It's just a blast from the past. [37:03.110 --> 37:03.910] A blast from the past. [37:03.970 --> 37:04.710] Well, we could always use those. [37:06.870 --> 37:07.950] Yeah, I have an observation. [37:08.190 --> 37:08.570] Go ahead. [37:08.570 --> 37:09.170] Go ahead. [37:10.130 --> 37:15.590] Now, on TV, they would not put on a show about hacking, for whatever reason. [37:16.230 --> 37:19.170] Nor would they probably put on a show about dating your daughters. [37:20.390 --> 37:22.830] But, look at me one. [37:23.350 --> 37:23.610] Hello? [37:23.950 --> 37:24.670] Yeah, go ahead. [37:25.030 --> 37:34.090] But, they will put on shows like Survivor and all these spin-offs where basically, you take people and divide them by having them all conspire against each other. [37:35.570 --> 37:38.130] Not just because it's cheap, but is this a trend or no? [37:39.130 --> 37:39.490] What? [37:40.290 --> 37:41.490] The stupidity factor? [37:41.870 --> 37:43.010] No, not the stupidity factor. [37:43.030 --> 37:48.590] The idea of what he called instead of any sort of solidarity, selling each other out in the hope of winning. [37:50.430 --> 37:52.370] Well, a feudal may or may not be. [37:53.850 --> 38:00.130] Much like everybody hoping to be a millionaire and, you know, supporting policies towards that end, but it may not always happen. [38:01.430 --> 38:05.130] Are you saying that programs are put on the air where people are encouraged to backstab each other and things like that? [38:05.530 --> 38:07.790] Well, I wouldn't know, but gee will like it. [38:08.310 --> 38:08.530] Uh-huh. [38:09.370 --> 38:10.430] Well, gee will like it, indeed. [38:10.650 --> 38:14.530] You know, I mean, nobody says like, gee guys, what's going on here? [38:14.670 --> 38:16.110] What would you like to see on the air? [38:17.170 --> 38:17.810] More Duckman. [38:19.010 --> 38:19.330] Okay. [38:19.990 --> 38:22.250] Well, we'll pass that along. [38:22.470 --> 38:25.590] And, of course, Strangers of Candy, I would like that I had to port back as a new series. [38:25.770 --> 38:27.110] That was a good show, too. [38:27.250 --> 38:27.410] Yes. [38:27.410 --> 38:31.910] I mean, not as a revamped series, but, I mean, as a, well, whatever continuation it might be. [38:31.990 --> 38:32.290] Okay. [38:32.650 --> 38:33.750] Hey, listen, good hearing your voice again. [38:33.970 --> 38:35.490] And, uh, thank you, uh, EC. [38:35.810 --> 38:36.470] All right, take care. [38:37.490 --> 38:39.350] Let's, uh, take another phone call over here. [38:39.470 --> 38:40.850] Hopefully my voice won't sound like that anymore. [38:41.010 --> 38:41.690] Okay, good evening. [38:41.830 --> 38:42.190] You're on the air. [38:42.830 --> 38:43.410] Go ahead. [38:44.150 --> 38:44.550] Hello? [38:44.730 --> 38:45.150] Yes, go ahead. [38:45.230 --> 38:45.550] You're on the air. [38:45.890 --> 38:46.470] Yeah, hi. [38:47.130 --> 38:49.690] Um, I, I like your show and everything. [38:49.810 --> 38:52.490] I'm interested in, your conversation. [38:53.370 --> 38:56.590] But, uh, the problem is I have no idea what you're talking about. [38:57.070 --> 39:14.390] Um, it seems like you guys are having a personal conversation using WBAI to, I probably can't afford to make a phone call, but if you're going to talk about stuff that, you know, uh, you know, people are listening to, at least explain what you're talking about. [39:14.570 --> 39:15.670] Well, ask us a question. [39:16.030 --> 39:17.250] What is social engineering? [39:17.430 --> 39:18.210] What is social engineering? [39:18.350 --> 39:19.210] Kevin, why don't you take that one? [39:19.810 --> 39:20.450] Okay, great. [39:20.630 --> 39:25.570] I, I, I should have defined it because sometimes when I'm on the telephone I forget that I'm actually on the air here. [39:25.570 --> 39:34.130] Well, social engineering is a technique, well, it's, it's a technique, uh, essentially it's, uh, similar to, you know, con games, pulling a con game. [39:34.230 --> 39:42.350] And social engineering is essentially using, uh, manipulation, deception, and influence to get a target to comply with the request. [39:42.350 --> 40:00.190] And usually that request is to release information or to do some action, action item that will let the attacker into the network or let the attacker gain access to information or trade secrets So social engineering, that's the name in the computer world. [40:00.650 --> 40:03.330] In the physical world, it would probably be called con games. [40:03.450 --> 40:06.570] In the private investigation world, it's called gagging or pretexting. [40:06.750 --> 40:09.090] So that's what social engineering is in a nutshell. [40:09.090 --> 40:09.710] Does that help? [40:10.270 --> 40:11.190] Oh, absolutely. [40:11.590 --> 40:15.290] I hope you guys do a little bit more explanation for stupid people like me. [40:15.490 --> 40:18.870] Because, you know, I like the conversation. [40:18.870 --> 40:21.250] It's just sometimes it gets too technical. [40:21.550 --> 40:31.210] And unless you want to talk to yourselves, among yourselves, other people are not going to follow what you say. [40:31.350 --> 40:32.590] Well, I think you bring up a very good point. [40:32.730 --> 40:35.370] And you see, a lot of people are on the other side of this and they miss this. [40:35.370 --> 40:36.830] They say we're not technical enough. [40:37.010 --> 40:42.850] But what we sometimes forget is that, you know, this is a radio station in the middle of New York City broadcasting to anybody who turns on the radio. [40:43.030 --> 40:46.890] And we need to be able to reach those people and have them understand what our perspective is. [40:47.010 --> 40:48.070] So you bring up a very good point. [40:48.170 --> 40:48.870] I'm glad you did. [40:48.910 --> 40:49.110] Oh, yeah. [40:49.430 --> 40:55.270] Maybe people out there will be interested in, you know, joining and learning more. [40:55.470 --> 40:56.430] And you lose them. [40:57.230 --> 40:57.550] Okay. [40:57.830 --> 40:58.490] Thank you very much. [40:58.530 --> 40:58.610] We'll keep an eye. [40:58.750 --> 40:59.710] Thanks for calling. [41:00.250 --> 41:02.710] So, yes, let's make that not happen again. [41:02.710 --> 41:03.210] Okay. [41:03.310 --> 41:10.310] Let's make a point of explaining our terms and, you know, for all those people that are listening for the first time because they always are tuning in. [41:10.590 --> 41:11.770] That's the thing people don't realize. [41:11.870 --> 41:16.370] On the Internet, of course, you listen to this show because you know it's on and you have listened to it before. [41:16.550 --> 41:20.090] But people are constantly turning in the radio and you never know who they are. [41:20.990 --> 41:21.350] Sorry? [41:21.550 --> 41:22.770] What do you mean by turning in? [41:23.030 --> 41:23.410] Tuning in? [41:23.530 --> 41:24.450] Tuning in on the radio. [41:24.670 --> 41:25.110] What does that mean? [41:25.210 --> 41:25.990] Tuning the dial. [41:26.510 --> 41:27.750] I've never heard that phrase before. [41:27.890 --> 41:28.310] I have. [41:28.470 --> 41:31.110] The point is, how far in the definitions do we go? [41:32.030 --> 41:32.830] I'm not following. [41:33.330 --> 41:34.490] Couldn't we also... [41:34.490 --> 41:35.890] Can you define the internet for me, please? [41:36.490 --> 41:36.810] See? [41:37.410 --> 41:39.530] Oh, you mean you don't understand what tuning in means. [41:39.670 --> 41:44.490] Well, you know, if you're operating a radio, I think, you know, you've gotten that concept down. [41:44.730 --> 41:46.610] Let's assume people know how to do that much, at least. [41:47.370 --> 41:52.390] Couldn't you also... I mean, would it be a commercial to say that there's a magazine out there that you publish? [41:53.110 --> 41:54.950] Depends what magazine... Oh, you mean that magazine. [41:55.030 --> 41:55.490] That magazine. [41:55.610 --> 41:55.770] Uh-huh. [41:56.110 --> 41:59.810] Well, 2600 tries to explain things, you know. [41:59.810 --> 42:03.990] But, again, that's more of a technical audience, so there's a lot assumed there. [42:04.070 --> 42:07.450] We can't redefine terms every time we put out an issue, just like we can't do the same thing here. [42:07.570 --> 42:12.790] I'm suggesting that maybe they go to the magazine to learn, so they could appreciate the radio. [42:12.810 --> 42:13.730] Go to the website, you mean. [42:13.910 --> 42:14.590] The website, as well. [42:14.590 --> 42:15.410] Or read the magazine. [42:15.490 --> 42:15.650] Sure. [42:15.770 --> 42:16.530] Or come to the meetings. [42:16.790 --> 42:17.130] There you go. [42:17.150 --> 42:17.730] Or the conferences. [42:17.890 --> 42:18.810] Yes, there's all kinds of things. [42:18.910 --> 42:19.570] Look at the films. [42:19.670 --> 42:21.210] You know, all kinds of things that we put out and do. [42:21.430 --> 42:23.190] We try to reach people and explain things. [42:23.310 --> 42:25.090] I recommend reading books. [42:25.390 --> 42:26.550] Written by John Markoff. [42:27.030 --> 42:28.010] Books written by John Markoff. [42:28.030 --> 42:29.710] I recommend that as a means to. [42:29.810 --> 42:30.690] And learn what's going on. [42:31.110 --> 42:34.130] Well, that's a way to learn what we get angry about, I guess. [42:34.290 --> 42:35.390] So that's part of it. [42:35.450 --> 42:38.970] If you want to read libelous and slanderous material, go ahead. [42:39.270 --> 42:40.830] Some people are into that, you know. [42:41.390 --> 42:42.250] Oh, speaking of... [42:43.670 --> 42:45.190] He's like a tabloid reporter. [42:45.590 --> 42:46.070] Bernie, yes. [42:46.370 --> 42:54.150] Speaking of slanderous and libelous material, I don't know how many of you there at the studio have seen the movie Broken Glass. [42:54.970 --> 42:56.450] You know, that's playing locally. [42:56.590 --> 42:57.970] That's about the New York Times. [42:59.810 --> 43:03.850] Who wrote the story, the libelous story about hackers that was completely made up. [43:03.910 --> 43:07.570] And a good part of the movie dwelled on that particular false story. [43:07.830 --> 43:10.310] So it's worth checking out to see what... [43:10.310 --> 43:10.850] Broken Glass? [43:11.490 --> 43:11.730] Yeah. [43:12.570 --> 43:12.830] Okay. [43:12.830 --> 43:16.210] I think that's playing at Angelico here in New York City, for those who are interested in going to that. [43:16.430 --> 43:17.970] And yes, I definitely want to see that as well. [43:17.970 --> 43:18.490] You saw it, Bernie? [43:18.890 --> 43:19.470] Yeah, I did. [43:20.130 --> 43:23.470] I was pretty incredulous about their depiction of what a hacker conference was. [43:23.630 --> 43:36.210] But then I had to realize that this was what an uninformed, deceptive reporter was perpetrating as a hacker conference. [43:36.210 --> 43:37.870] When it's been, in fact, never happened. [43:38.110 --> 43:45.130] So you actually got to see what his bogus impression of what a hacker conference might be. [43:45.170 --> 43:49.530] And it struck me as how radically different his depiction of it was. [43:49.530 --> 43:51.530] And it was recreated on screen and so forth. [43:51.850 --> 44:09.530] What an uninformed person's opinion of what a hacker conference might be compared to the hope series of conferences and the European hacker conferences that go on, which are just vastly different and intriguing gatherings of people who discuss a lot of really interesting topics. [44:09.690 --> 44:11.010] Well, Bernie, I'm curious about one thing, though. [44:11.230 --> 44:15.510] The story is about the guy, the reporter, who lies and writes false stories. [44:15.910 --> 44:21.870] So how do they portray this conference that he went to, which you're saying is also a lie? [44:21.930 --> 44:23.410] Or did they not portray that as a lie? [44:23.570 --> 44:24.970] He is describing it. [44:25.050 --> 44:25.870] Oh, he's describing it. [44:25.870 --> 44:32.550] And as he's describing it, you see what he is... you see the mental images that he's dredging up in his mind. [44:33.490 --> 44:37.070] Okay, and so it's clear to the audience that what he's describing is a lie? [44:37.350 --> 44:40.870] Yes, but you have to pay attention to realize that this isn't real stuff. [44:40.870 --> 44:42.410] This is all stuff that he's imagining. [44:42.630 --> 44:44.970] So you've got to pay attention, but it's pretty good. [44:45.410 --> 44:46.630] Okay, let's take another phone call. [44:46.870 --> 44:47.550] Where should we go? [44:47.610 --> 44:48.730] Let's go over here. [44:49.010 --> 44:50.210] And good evening, you're on the air. [44:51.070 --> 44:51.510] Hi. [44:51.830 --> 44:52.390] How are you doing? [44:52.650 --> 44:53.370] Hold on a second. [44:53.770 --> 44:53.990] Sure. [44:54.450 --> 44:55.390] Stuck in my earphones. [44:55.990 --> 44:58.150] And the movie is Shattered Glass, not Broken Glass. [44:58.330 --> 44:58.670] Thank you. [44:58.890 --> 44:59.210] Shattered Glass. [44:59.310 --> 44:59.590] Thank you. [44:59.830 --> 45:02.750] And it is an interesting story. [45:04.030 --> 45:06.650] I wanted to talk about something a little more serious, though. [45:07.590 --> 45:13.070] There's so much stuff going on in the news right now, and there's so much crap on the radio stations and the TV stations. [45:14.010 --> 45:28.570] And I've been thinking, as a person who declares himself a liberal Democrat, that what we never do on this station or any place, I mean, we're willing to protest after the fact. [45:28.690 --> 45:30.670] We're willing to say, ouch, it hurts. [45:30.670 --> 45:32.730] But we're not really doing any kind of planning. [45:33.010 --> 45:37.770] And I guess I'm calling you because your show focuses on computers and hacking. [45:38.070 --> 45:48.490] And what I am really dreading is that in the next election, with the new Diebold computers, they are just going to hack the system and have their president anyway. [45:48.490 --> 45:51.470] And once again, it will not matter who comes out and votes. [45:51.670 --> 45:56.390] And whether you're a Democrat or a Republican, I should say that's not the way you want to have your elections held. [45:56.690 --> 46:04.450] And I wondered if, beyond making suggestions, if you had any way of... [46:04.450 --> 46:07.750] I mean, what I want to do is to stop this before it starts. [46:08.090 --> 46:13.590] I mean, my personal feeling is if the Diebold computers are that easy to hack, then we should not use them. [46:13.630 --> 46:14.770] They're not ready for operation. [46:14.770 --> 46:21.330] We should stay with the old computer system, especially since they have such a bias to the Bush campaign with the huge contributions. [46:21.610 --> 46:30.970] But I was wondering if you have any suggestions of perhaps forming some kind of an organization to kind of head this off before it starts. [46:30.990 --> 46:32.950] So we don't have to just be a knee-jerk reaction. [46:32.950 --> 46:37.910] We can say we actually did something to prevent something awful from happening. [46:38.890 --> 46:44.130] The first point I want to make is that the Diebold computers, as horrible as they are, are really... [46:44.130 --> 46:45.570] In some sense, nothing new. [46:46.130 --> 46:55.390] The election laws have been structured in such a way as to prevent, you know, voices dissenting from the two-party system from even entering the races in a lot of cases. [46:55.590 --> 46:58.450] But that's old news, and, you know, a lot of people know it. [46:59.610 --> 47:16.290] With respect to the specific issue at hand of these computers, which don't count properly or are tampered with, I think one solution to the problem is to raise awareness, as you're doing, as we do on this show, to the problem. [47:16.290 --> 47:25.110] And I think a lot of people are starting to ask questions, you know, why are we using these computers that can't count votes properly, bringing the information out. [47:25.390 --> 47:35.910] And I hope that jurisdictions will start to look at this information that's being brought out and say, we don't want to use these computers here, and go from there. [47:36.070 --> 47:38.670] Well, just one last thing before I get off the phone with you. [47:38.710 --> 47:47.590] I just want to say that I'm frustrated with just getting the news out there, because as a person who listens to BAI and other news stations frequently, it doesn't seem to matter. [47:47.710 --> 47:54.850] I mean, one example of this is that the overtime laws have just been repealed as of November the 20th. [47:54.850 --> 47:58.750] And I'm sure that if you've been watching TV, you probably saw it maybe once. [47:59.310 --> 48:02.570] I'm so unhappy that WBA, I did not think it's important. [48:02.710 --> 48:03.830] So they haven't played the story. [48:03.990 --> 48:04.930] They played it once or twice. [48:05.030 --> 48:05.610] No big deal. [48:05.810 --> 48:07.550] It's a huge meat and potato story. [48:07.670 --> 48:08.730] It actually unites people. [48:09.670 --> 48:14.490] And once again, we're sitting at the edge saying, you know, we can't even get the news out there. [48:14.570 --> 48:18.310] But even when we do get the news out there, we don't have a game plan. [48:18.310 --> 48:37.650] And I'm concerned that we still have some time left before the election happens, that we form a group where somebody, you know, anybody can contact me at GWE2000 at AOL.com if you want to participate in some kind of program that could head this off at the start. [48:37.710 --> 48:43.450] I'm no computer with, but I see that this is going to be the biggest part of this election. [48:43.450 --> 48:54.510] And one thing I know for sure is that the Bush campaign, they are always well organized, they are thought out, they are not a knee-jerk reaction, and they think things out years ahead of time. [48:54.510 --> 48:55.690] And that's what we don't do. [48:55.750 --> 48:57.550] All we do is react with, ouch, that hurts. [48:57.690 --> 49:01.730] And, you know, it's really affecting our lives, and we really need to plan instead. [49:01.930 --> 49:03.130] So I'm putting that out there. [49:03.130 --> 49:05.530] And if you guys can think of anything, please put it on the air. [49:05.630 --> 49:07.870] And I hope you do keep talking about D-BOLD computers. [49:08.050 --> 49:09.510] Okay, thanks for your call. [49:09.650 --> 49:09.870] Bye-bye. [49:09.870 --> 49:13.470] Well, Emmanuel, maybe they should go away from D-BOLD computers to Windows. [49:14.590 --> 49:16.330] Well, that's a frightening comment there. [49:16.530 --> 49:18.870] D-BOLD computers are running, I think, Windows CE. [49:19.190 --> 49:20.270] So they got that covered. [49:20.310 --> 49:21.030] All right, you got your wish. [49:21.110 --> 49:21.250] Leo. [49:21.550 --> 49:35.770] Yeah, just wanted to point out that basically that during the 2000 election, it was admitted all over the news that election fraud happens each year and is so widespread that it will take so much time and money to investigate that the government just doesn't bother to investigate. [49:35.770 --> 49:41.230] And it's basically, D-BOLD computers is basically just something that adds on to the problem. [49:41.710 --> 49:51.010] So obviously it's bad, but the question is, if an organization is formed, what must it do to prevent it other than spreading the word out? [49:52.430 --> 50:06.210] I had an idea, which I wasn't going to bring up, but it now is on topic, which was one of the ways to sort of ensure that your vote is counted to some extent is to throw in a checksum, so to speak. [50:06.690 --> 50:09.230] Now, what the heck is a checksum when it comes to voting? [50:09.570 --> 50:13.610] Well, it's difficult, but it's possible to write in for an office. [50:13.610 --> 50:19.170] And I'm sure everybody who votes has one office that they don't give a flying damn about. [50:19.450 --> 50:34.170] So what I was thinking is that 2,600 could get a couple of dozen or hundred candidates for every state or whatever, who would be the sacrificial lamb, vote in Emanuel Goldstein for Fifth Circuit Judge or whatever. [50:34.330 --> 50:35.070] That works, sure. [50:35.190 --> 50:49.230] No, but the point is this, that when the results are finally tallied, all these people who have done this will have emailed some address and said, look, I voted for Emanuel for this, I voted for Emanuel for that, I voted for Joe Schmo for this. [50:50.050 --> 50:53.750] And we look at the official results and see how closely they... [50:53.750 --> 50:56.090] And you think everybody who emails us is going to be telling us the truth. [50:56.430 --> 51:00.950] No, but if 20 people that we trust email us and the vote is won... [51:01.590 --> 51:01.830] Uh-huh. [51:02.050 --> 51:04.410] Well, and I could kiss that judgeship goodbye, too, I guess. [51:04.810 --> 51:06.350] Which you know I was interested in. [51:06.350 --> 51:14.510] I can think of a number of reasons why that wouldn't work, the foremost among them being that write-ins aren't generally counted in New York. [51:15.110 --> 51:18.810] Well, that's something I'd like to know more about is the write-ins, like how many write-ins there actually are. [51:18.870 --> 51:19.870] I've always asked about that. [51:19.990 --> 51:20.890] I never can get a straight answer. [51:20.930 --> 51:25.250] You can get the number of write-ins fairly easily, but not who they're for. [51:25.530 --> 51:25.710] Uh-huh. [51:25.890 --> 51:29.990] I think, you know, but you nailed it there, thinking of ways that a particular system can't work. [51:30.150 --> 51:34.470] Every system is going to have ways that it can be compromised. [51:34.470 --> 51:40.070] And I think that's our responsibility is to think of ways like that, especially with the new electronic voting systems. [51:40.350 --> 51:48.350] There are plenty of ways to make those systems spew out faulty data or just become useless. [51:48.410 --> 51:51.010] And I think this is the time for us to be thinking of those ways. [51:51.150 --> 51:58.030] And, of course, companies like Diebold that try to keep it all secret, they have to be cast aside in all this. [51:58.050 --> 51:59.090] This should be all open source. [51:59.210 --> 52:00.650] It should be open to public scrutiny. [52:01.890 --> 52:12.250] And I don't think the voting machines are the only interesting way that computers are being used or could be used to change the political scene. [52:12.470 --> 52:13.590] There's a Supreme Court case. [52:13.710 --> 52:30.890] I think they heard today, the Supreme Court heard about redistricting here in the state of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, California, where computers were for the first time used, I think, in 94 to redistrict the state using all kinds of, you know, [52:31.010 --> 52:45.750] sophisticated algorithms to map out these arcane districts that are in the shapes of animals and so forth to shift the political power in another direction. [52:46.570 --> 52:51.370] And that's a really interesting application of technology that people don't really consider. [52:51.370 --> 52:52.370] Now, what are you going to do about it? [52:52.430 --> 52:52.790] I don't know. [52:52.890 --> 52:54.770] But perhaps it should be looked at. [52:55.450 --> 52:55.790] All right. [52:55.810 --> 52:57.050] Let's see if we can fit in on the phone call. [52:57.390 --> 52:58.030] And good evening. [52:58.110 --> 52:58.530] You're on the air. [52:59.110 --> 52:59.350] Yeah. [52:59.450 --> 52:59.670] Hello. [52:59.930 --> 53:00.190] How are you doing? [53:00.370 --> 53:01.370] Glad I got in. [53:01.570 --> 53:07.370] I'd like to respond to the gentleman who called previously, saying that he had a difficulty understanding. [53:07.370 --> 53:13.730] Now, let me preface by saying I have no computer or modern technology devices. [53:13.910 --> 53:16.030] And yet, I find the show very interesting. [53:16.030 --> 53:19.210] And I find it not too difficult to understand at all. [53:19.410 --> 53:25.910] If you just keep yourself well read and aware of the things going on in society, you can follow it with no problem. [53:26.450 --> 53:27.110] That's great. [53:27.190 --> 53:27.810] That's great to know. [53:27.930 --> 53:32.030] Because, you know, we get fan mail from grandmothers and queens and things like that. [53:32.030 --> 53:40.130] And that's great to see, that we're able to reach people who ordinarily would never be exposed to the hacker point of view and to high technology in various ways. [53:40.270 --> 53:44.930] So I'm glad we're able to reach people that aren't, quote-unquote, in the community. [53:45.110 --> 53:45.830] Yeah, absolutely. [53:46.010 --> 53:50.950] Because, like I said, I have no computer or fancy devices of that. [53:51.090 --> 53:52.290] But, like, I keep myself well read. [53:52.430 --> 53:59.610] Like, when he was talking about social engineering, I understand that it's called by various different names, so I knew exactly what he was talking about. [53:59.610 --> 54:04.950] Now, it's not too foreign to anyone who reads something besides the sport pages of the newspaper. [54:06.450 --> 54:06.810] Okay. [54:06.990 --> 54:07.550] Well, thanks for your calling. [54:07.690 --> 54:07.870] Okay. [54:08.030 --> 54:09.490] And then keep up the good work on the show. [54:09.610 --> 54:09.790] All right. [54:09.870 --> 54:10.150] Take care. [54:10.370 --> 54:10.710] All right. [54:11.850 --> 54:12.210] And... [54:12.210 --> 54:12.510] Good evening. [54:12.550 --> 54:13.070] You're on the air. [54:14.370 --> 54:14.910] Go ahead. [54:15.690 --> 54:16.050] Hello? [54:16.270 --> 54:16.910] Yes, you're on. [54:18.390 --> 54:18.970] Off the hook? [54:19.090 --> 54:19.910] Yes, you're on off the hook. [54:20.010 --> 54:20.250] Okay. [54:20.350 --> 54:20.530] Sorry. [54:20.530 --> 54:22.570] I'm on the streaming initiative behind. [54:22.770 --> 54:24.810] Ah, so, yes, about two minutes behind, so... [54:24.810 --> 54:25.110] I'm sorry. [54:25.470 --> 54:26.010] All right. [54:26.110 --> 54:27.490] Well, I'm calling from Canada. [54:27.770 --> 54:29.470] Ah, the mysterious country to our north. [54:29.610 --> 54:30.770] Yes, mysterious country. [54:31.030 --> 54:32.490] Oh, I'm an American at heart. [54:32.610 --> 54:33.530] I lived there for a few years. [54:33.650 --> 54:33.890] Okay. [54:34.850 --> 54:36.970] Well, the first thing I'd like to say is that, um... [54:37.750 --> 54:39.350] I'm a big fan of The Art of Deception. [54:39.350 --> 54:42.330] I read that within about two days of it coming out. [54:43.090 --> 54:43.790] Oh, thank you. [54:44.550 --> 54:44.790] Hmm? [54:45.170 --> 54:45.670] Thank you. [54:46.070 --> 54:49.630] Yes, it was a fantastic book, and I would love to read the new one, The Art of Intrusion. [54:50.190 --> 54:51.110] Do you have a story? [54:51.710 --> 54:52.030] Yeah. [54:52.030 --> 54:55.190] Any stories of your personal hacks that might make it into the book? [54:56.170 --> 54:57.430] I don't personally. [54:57.430 --> 55:02.010] I'm a high school student, and I haven't quite got that many behind my... [55:02.010 --> 55:03.030] Under your belt. [55:03.030 --> 55:03.490] Yeah. [55:04.530 --> 55:24.130] But anyway, my point in calling is to comment that there was a recent article, I think that's hit a number of news sources, that there was a report prepared for the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform that gives every government office a grade, [55:24.230 --> 55:26.130] so to speak, on the computer security. [55:27.390 --> 55:32.790] And I don't know if you guys are aware of this or not, but the Department of Homeland Security received an F. [55:33.710 --> 55:39.470] Along with a number of other bad grades. [55:39.670 --> 55:40.570] The overall U.S. [55:40.910 --> 55:41.950] government received a D. [55:43.450 --> 55:43.810] Wow. [55:44.090 --> 55:53.590] I've never heard of this committee personally, but I'm sure if you look at CNET News, which is what I'm reading right now, I'm sure if you do a couple of searches there, you'll find some stuff. [55:54.750 --> 55:55.010] Mm-hmm. [55:55.010 --> 55:56.530] That's where you read it, on CNET. [55:56.650 --> 55:57.630] Yeah, I read this on CNET. [55:57.730 --> 55:58.470] That was me. [55:58.550 --> 55:59.810] I was giving the grades that day. [56:01.430 --> 56:02.130] That's surprising. [56:02.850 --> 56:03.010] Yeah. [56:03.310 --> 56:05.790] And just another minor question that's pretty meaningless. [56:06.070 --> 56:07.050] Who is Rebel? [56:07.550 --> 56:07.910] Oh. [56:08.710 --> 56:11.270] We've gone the whole show without having to deal with that. [56:11.910 --> 56:13.490] Just one of our many callers. [56:13.650 --> 56:16.650] And I stress the word many, because thank God for many. [56:16.990 --> 56:19.390] Listen, we're out of time, but thanks for your call. [56:19.610 --> 56:24.450] And I want to thank both Kevin and Bernie for being part of the program tonight. [56:24.450 --> 56:28.650] Now, Kevin, one more time, how can people contact you to get their stories to you? [56:28.850 --> 56:28.970] Okay. [56:29.510 --> 56:32.010] Two email addresses until I get my 2600 account. [56:32.170 --> 56:32.350] Yes. [56:32.770 --> 56:39.150] Kevin, K-E-V-I-N, at lab, L-A-B, mistress, M-I-S-T-R-E-S-S.com. [56:40.270 --> 56:48.510] And Kevin, or K-Mitnick, M-I-T-N-I-C-K, at defensivethinkingaltogether.com. [56:48.590 --> 56:51.370] And I really appreciate you having me on the show again, Emmanuel. [56:51.590 --> 56:52.090] It's been fun. [56:52.250 --> 56:52.530] It is. [56:52.670 --> 56:52.990] Too short, though. [56:53.090 --> 56:55.590] And I look forward to when you're here in the city for the Hope Conference. [56:56.130 --> 56:57.810] We're going to have a blast then. [56:58.210 --> 57:00.750] And we'll be back again next week at this time. [57:00.970 --> 57:03.430] Well, actually, we'll be saying goodbye next week at this time. [57:03.830 --> 57:05.890] But for this week, we're out. [57:06.050 --> 57:07.950] We'll see you next week at 7 p.m. [57:08.510 --> 57:09.510] Emmanuel Goldstein for Off The Hook. [57:09.710 --> 57:10.330] Have yourselves a good night. [57:14.690 --> 57:17.250] Stinking weather, fat, shaky hands. [57:17.830 --> 57:20.010] Darkly morning, dark, grumpy night. [57:20.770 --> 57:23.350] Little wonder then, little wonder. [57:23.730 --> 57:26.250] You little wonder, little wonder you. [57:27.110 --> 57:29.770] It's green dolls, chips and explosions. [57:30.410 --> 57:32.750] Sleepy time, basketball with you. [57:33.390 --> 57:35.830] Little wonder then, little wonder. [57:41.760 --> 57:42.760] I'm getting it. [57:43.300 --> 57:43.940] It's [58:01.200 --> 58:04.460] calm, dine, meditation, tightly wide. [58:04.980 --> 58:07.540] Little wonder then, little wonder. [58:07.940 --> 58:10.640] You little wonder, little wonder you. [59:32.390 --> 59:35.930] Away, away, away, away, away, away, away. [59:38.430 --> 59:43.310] Hey, stay tuned for the award-winning Personal Computer Show coming up right after this message. [59:43.370 --> 59:44.050] Roy Ears. [59:44.150 --> 59:44.870] David Rovick. [59:44.870 --> 59:47.270] Camille Yarborough's Ancestors House. [59:47.370 --> 59:47.950] Coffin Dagger. [59:47.950 --> 59:48.730] Karen Taylor. [59:48.910 --> 59:49.810] Ashford and Simpson. [59:49.950 --> 59:50.530] Pete Seeger. [59:50.630 --> 59:51.070] Trends. [59:51.070 --> 59:51.730] Greg Tate. [59:51.790 --> 59:52.570] Callie Thorne. [59:55.390 --> 59:59.130] WBAI presents the first annual Holiday Radiothon. [59:59.290 --> 01:00:01.090] Tune in Friday at 7 p.m. [01:00:01.150 --> 01:00:07.830] And you'll hear some of the hippest and most progressive music, singing, rapping, slam poetry, and theater. [01:00:07.990 --> 01:00:11.210] And all this non-stop until midnight on Sunday. [01:00:11.850 --> 01:00:15.150] WBAI's Holiday Radiothon features Heritage O.P. [01:00:15.230 --> 01:00:15.990] The Clez Madden. [01:00:16.090 --> 01:00:16.550] Iggy Pop. [01:00:16.650 --> 01:00:17.410] Reverend Billy. [01:00:17.590 --> 01:00:18.330] Garland Jeffery. [01:00:18.430 --> 01:00:19.010] Jesse Mill. [01:00:19.090 --> 01:00:19.530] Lee Salone. [01:00:19.650 --> 01:00:20.190] Judy Gorman. [01:00:20.350 --> 01:00:21.110] Michael Frantes. [01:00:21.230 --> 01:00:23.210] And many, many more artists. [01:00:23.390 --> 01:00:27.130] So make sure this weekend, you and yours tune in to WBAI. [01:00:27.250 --> 01:00:30.090] 99.5 FM in New York City. [01:00:30.090 --> 01:00:32.970] I don't want to do a night like this. [01:00:33.130 --> 01:00:34.750] I need it sweet. [01:00:35.190 --> 01:00:36.570] I can't resist.