[00:00.000 --> 00:10.020]  I really have hope, and I hope that one day, and even today, that I hear there is peace, that I can be convinced that there is enough peace, I can go back.
[00:10.940 --> 00:16.920]  Reporting for Free Speech Radio News, this is Joshua Sharimpa in Nyakivar Kam in western Uganda.
[00:27.070 --> 00:37.770]  Free Speech Radio News is produced at Pacifica Station's WBAI in New York, KPFA in Berkeley, and KPFK in Los Angeles, and community radio station WMNF in Tampa, Florida.
[00:38.450 --> 00:41.590]  Producers are Kata Mesta, Simba Russo, and Monica Lopez.
[00:42.170 --> 00:45.110]  Our Headlines Editors are Nell Abram and Randy Zimmerman.
[00:45.670 --> 00:47.470]  Our DC Editor is Mitch Jesserich.
[00:48.150 --> 00:49.330]  Technical Producers are...
[00:49.330 --> 00:53.230]  Okay, there's a lot of people involved in this program, but it's two minutes late, so we're just going to have to imagine their names.
[00:53.610 --> 00:55.910]  It's 7.02 time for Off the Hook.
[01:01.230 --> 01:05.610]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[01:06.650 --> 01:11.050]  I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call.
[01:11.790 --> 01:13.910]  We couldn't get much worse.
[01:14.610 --> 01:16.430]  But if they could, they would.
[01:16.710 --> 01:19.370]  Von Diddley Bum, for the best, expect, or worst.
[01:20.050 --> 01:21.830]  I hope that's understood.
[01:22.030 --> 01:22.910]  Von Diddley Bum!
[02:03.090 --> 02:05.310]  And getting to everybody, the program is Off the Hook.
[02:05.390 --> 02:08.770]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you for the next two hours tonight.
[02:08.770 --> 02:12.230]  That's right, you heard correctly, this is a special extended program.
[02:12.910 --> 02:17.610]  Because the personal computer people will not be here tonight at 8 o'clock, sorry to say.
[02:18.310 --> 02:25.810]  If you're tuning in for a special on Freedom in Haiti, that's going to be broadcast at a future date on tape, I believe.
[02:26.630 --> 02:28.150]  We're here for a couple of hours tonight.
[02:28.210 --> 02:29.390]  We have a special program for you.
[02:29.550 --> 02:31.010]  And we have a full house as well.
[02:31.150 --> 02:32.010]  Boy, everyone's here tonight.
[02:32.010 --> 02:35.070]  All right, let's see if I get everybody right.
[02:35.490 --> 02:38.230]  Well, Red Hack is over there in the corner because he got here late and there's no chairs.
[02:38.510 --> 02:38.770]  Right.
[02:39.050 --> 02:39.250]  Okay.
[02:40.070 --> 02:41.870]  And Jeff, you're in your appointed seat.
[02:42.090 --> 02:42.790]  I'm on time.
[02:43.010 --> 02:43.910]  Mike, you're here.
[02:44.110 --> 02:44.310]  Yeah.
[02:44.490 --> 02:44.910]  And Jim?
[02:45.090 --> 02:46.970]  I got here early but got bumped over.
[02:47.130 --> 02:50.570]  All right, and Jim, and Lynn is here.
[02:50.890 --> 02:51.970]  Jim and Lynn is here.
[02:52.130 --> 02:52.470]  How are you doing?
[02:52.770 --> 02:52.930]  Good.
[02:53.350 --> 03:00.810]  And we have a special guest tonight, Adrian Lamo, who is being sentenced tomorrow in federal court, right?
[03:00.810 --> 03:01.630]  Good, in New York City.
[03:01.870 --> 03:02.150]  Indeed.
[03:02.590 --> 03:10.710]  We're going to talk about that, and of course we'll have an opportunity for listeners to call in and talk to us all about that particular case and what's going on.
[03:11.830 --> 03:12.530]  It's off the hook.
[03:16.900 --> 03:19.020]  Oh, and of course I forgot, Bernie, yes, down there in Philadelphia.
[03:19.720 --> 03:20.640]  Yes, I'm here too.
[03:20.840 --> 03:21.180]  How are you doing?
[03:21.660 --> 03:22.220]  Great, great.
[03:22.320 --> 03:23.520]  It should be a good show, two hours long.
[03:23.720 --> 03:24.420]  Two hours long.
[03:24.520 --> 03:27.800]  I hope you're Sprint PCS Funkin' can handle all that bandwidth.
[03:27.920 --> 03:29.720]  I have an extended battery in, so...
[03:29.720 --> 03:30.460]  All right, good for you.
[03:31.500 --> 03:37.920]  Bernie, we've had some interesting developments in the last week concerning the ACLU and that terrorist profiling list.
[03:37.980 --> 03:38.660]  What do you know about that?
[03:39.320 --> 03:51.260]  Well, this is really the first lawsuit filed against the Transportation Security Administration for the unconstitutional nature of this do not fly list.
[03:51.260 --> 04:13.840]  As people, our listeners are probably aware, all kinds of people have been prevented from flying or delayed from flying, so they missed their flight, just because they have a name that's identical to or similar to someone on a secret list of suspicious people who could have something to do with terrorism.
[04:13.840 --> 04:21.500]  So even if you have a common name, if someone else is on the list that's a suspected terrorist that also has that name, you get stopped.
[04:21.740 --> 04:31.400]  It doesn't matter if you have all kinds of documentation with you, your passport, your letters from the Attorney General, it doesn't matter what documentation you have.
[04:31.400 --> 04:36.260]  You're going to get delayed, you're going to miss your flight at best, and worse, just not allowed to fly.
[04:36.260 --> 04:43.060]  And this is really unconstitutional, because the Constitution says people have a right to travel, in so many words.
[04:43.700 --> 04:49.440]  Yeah, you know, I understand that, the right to travel and all that kind of thing, but does the Constitution say you have the right to travel via airlines?
[04:49.700 --> 04:50.600]  That's a good question.
[04:51.260 --> 04:52.300]  And it hasn't been settled.
[04:52.460 --> 04:56.860]  It's kind of like the Second Amendment, the right to bear arms.
[04:57.020 --> 04:58.360]  Does it mean you're allowed to have a...
[04:58.360 --> 04:59.820]  Yeah, let's get into that discussion.
[05:00.020 --> 05:00.900]  I don't want to go into that.
[05:01.000 --> 05:04.900]  I'm just saying, you know, there's a lot of ambiguity in the law.
[05:04.900 --> 05:08.200]  And a lot of people tend to think the law is black and white, it says this or that.
[05:08.360 --> 05:09.300]  It's not that way.
[05:09.420 --> 05:10.500]  It's open to interpretation.
[05:10.840 --> 05:17.820]  There's all kinds of... lots of laws... legal decisions are based on case law, previous legal decisions.
[05:18.000 --> 05:23.900]  And there are no... there is no case law for this transportation, this do not fly list thing.
[05:23.980 --> 05:30.540]  So this is the first case, and whatever happens in this case is going to be very significant, because it will affect all cases that come after it.
[05:31.520 --> 05:31.920]  Fascinating.
[05:32.120 --> 05:33.520]  And, of course, we'll be watching this.
[05:33.520 --> 05:35.180]  This was filed... was it yesterday?
[05:35.960 --> 05:36.400]  Yes.
[05:37.400 --> 05:37.840]  Okay.
[05:38.020 --> 05:39.900]  Well, we'll certainly be following that.
[05:40.580 --> 05:42.580]  Yeah, the air travel system is a mess.
[05:43.000 --> 05:44.400]  All kinds of horror stories.
[05:44.500 --> 05:46.200]  In fact, I'm trying to track one down right now.
[05:46.280 --> 05:49.180]  Someone sent us to the radio station.
[05:49.280 --> 05:56.360]  Of course, you're welcome to send us your experiences, your mail, your life story, whatever you feel is needed.
[05:56.360 --> 06:16.060]  If listeners are interested in this case, and it's a really significant one, if you go to the ACLU.org website, there's a lot of information about the Do Not Fly list, a program called CAPS, and CAPS 2, which is the government wants to roll out instead of what they have now,
[06:16.140 --> 06:18.760]  which is going to be even worse, according to the ACLU.
[06:18.820 --> 06:21.080]  There's a lot of good information on ACLU.org.
[06:23.000 --> 06:23.400]  Absolutely.
[06:24.500 --> 06:30.060]  This listener wrote in to us about what's entitled Atlanta Immigration Fiasco.
[06:31.160 --> 06:32.820]  And have you ever been through immigration?
[06:33.460 --> 06:36.860]  You know, we've been through it ourselves, Bernie, myself, a bunch of other people.
[06:37.660 --> 06:41.800]  But we're American citizens, so, you know, we don't have to really worry too much.
[06:42.140 --> 06:42.800]  We're used to it.
[06:42.880 --> 06:45.400]  We're used to it, and we know eventually they have to let us into the damn country.
[06:45.400 --> 06:49.180]  So, it's not that, you know, you can almost have fun with it.
[06:49.260 --> 06:51.600]  You can almost just, you know, watch how bad it gets.
[06:51.600 --> 06:55.780]  But for people that can be sent back to a different country, it's not so much fun.
[06:56.580 --> 07:00.900]  And, of course, that's something to keep in mind for those people coming to the conference in July.
[07:01.600 --> 07:06.440]  Obviously, there's a lot of, you know, anxiety attached to any kind of trip to this country.
[07:06.580 --> 07:12.340]  But hopefully people will get over that and, you know, try it anyway.
[07:12.460 --> 07:15.260]  Maybe tell their story when they get to the conference, because I'm sure we'll have a lot of good ones.
[07:15.400 --> 07:19.160]  This story here, just writing to inform about my recent trip to Atlanta.
[07:19.540 --> 07:24.200]  It took me no less than five hours from getting off the plane to leaving the airport.
[07:24.620 --> 07:27.440]  And that's not including the time taken to retrieve my luggage.
[07:27.680 --> 07:29.000]  And I was one of the lucky ones.
[07:29.080 --> 07:31.500]  The immigration police were downright nasty people.
[07:31.640 --> 07:34.620]  And they were sending people from visa waiver countries.
[07:34.900 --> 07:37.840]  Those are the countries where you don't have to show a visa to get into this country.
[07:38.020 --> 07:40.900]  I guess Western Europe and Japan and places like that, right?
[07:41.260 --> 07:41.660]  Canada.
[07:42.600 --> 07:44.020]  Canada's its own category.
[07:44.020 --> 07:45.900]  Yeah, Canada's its own category, because they're right next door.
[07:47.560 --> 07:51.600]  But they were sending people from visa waiver countries to the back of a very long line.
[07:51.740 --> 07:52.280]  Do you know why?
[07:52.680 --> 07:56.640]  Because they filled in their forms in blue ink instead of black ink.
[07:57.480 --> 07:57.760]  Yeah.
[07:57.920 --> 08:00.900]  Even though, on the papers, it doesn't even say it has to be filled out in black ink.
[08:01.000 --> 08:02.220]  They were sending them to the back of the line.
[08:02.220 --> 08:05.220]  I've seen immigration officers behave like that.
[08:05.360 --> 08:08.000]  And really, you know, treat people in a very disrespectful manner.
[08:08.340 --> 08:08.880]  I have too.
[08:09.560 --> 08:12.600]  And also sending them to the back of the line for writing too small.
[08:13.420 --> 08:14.360]  Things like that.
[08:14.720 --> 08:16.620]  Any excuse to be nasty to someone, it seemed.
[08:16.680 --> 08:20.200]  I was standing in line for five hours and treated worse than cattle would be.
[08:20.420 --> 08:27.020]  I was threatened by no less than two immigration police that they would send me back home on the next flight if I did not stand still in line.
[08:27.880 --> 08:32.060]  I just sat on my ass for nine hours and they expect me to stand still.
[08:33.600 --> 08:36.300]  After an eight to nine hour flight, no one should be treated this way.
[08:36.440 --> 08:38.640]  I almost told them to send me home on the next flight.
[08:38.900 --> 08:42.260]  I have a flight booked for the summer and I'm flying via Philadelphia this time.
[08:42.700 --> 08:47.540]  I hope it isn't this bad in Philadelphia or I will tell them to send me home and tell them I'll spend my money in another country instead.
[08:47.700 --> 08:50.820]  Well, if you're coming to the conference, please, you know, tell them something.
[08:51.020 --> 08:54.340]  But come to the conference and, you know, your voice will be stronger that way.
[08:54.340 --> 08:58.160]  Unfortunately, my experiences in Philadelphia have not been that much better.
[08:58.600 --> 09:02.720]  Although, unfortunately, I'm not a U.S.
[09:02.840 --> 09:06.040]  from another country, so I didn't have to deal with what this gentleman had to deal with.
[09:06.120 --> 09:12.960]  But I witnessed some pretty abusive tactics by these customs people here in Philadelphia.
[09:13.060 --> 09:19.440]  But if he flies into Philly, he can just take a train up to New York and that's one option.
[09:20.360 --> 09:22.320]  Bernie, have you ever been treated like this in another country?
[09:24.380 --> 09:27.500]  In Morocco during the first Gulf War.
[09:27.740 --> 09:39.360]  I was not fighting in that war, but I had planned to be in Morocco before, you know, the saber rattling and George Bush I decided to take action.
[09:39.760 --> 09:44.700]  And so I went anyway and there were almost no tourists in Morocco.
[09:45.280 --> 09:49.060]  The 747 I flew on was almost empty on Royal Air, Morocco.
[09:49.700 --> 09:59.840]  But a couple days after I got there, my host there, Ali, who lived in Morocco, he said, The police need to speak with you.
[10:00.000 --> 10:03.660]  Apparently, the police called his house and said they wanted him to take me over there.
[10:03.840 --> 10:06.160]  And the police, it was this bizarre thing.
[10:06.240 --> 10:08.100]  The police interrogated me in Arabic.
[10:09.500 --> 10:13.600]  And my friend Ali had to translate everything.
[10:13.600 --> 10:18.320]  And he told me in the end, he said, really, they were really concerned, really, about my safety.
[10:18.320 --> 10:19.860]  They want to know what I was doing there.
[10:19.860 --> 10:25.200]  Why was an American coming to this rural town in Morocco called Ben-Malaw?
[10:25.440 --> 10:34.000]  And they were really upset about the international implications of my being harmed because there's a lot of anti-American sentiment in Morocco because the U.S.
[10:34.060 --> 10:37.200]  had dragged Morocco into that war, like the U.S.
[10:37.220 --> 10:38.920]  has dragged some other countries into this war.
[10:40.260 --> 10:42.400]  But I got out of there unscathed.
[10:42.480 --> 10:48.620]  And my friend who's Moroccan said, really, they were not trying to give me a hard time, although it seemed that way.
[10:48.700 --> 10:51.980]  And it's kind of weird being interrogated in the language you don't understand.
[10:53.220 --> 10:58.700]  Yeah, well, you know, I feel that way whenever I get interrogated here because I just don't understand what they were talking about half the time.
[10:58.840 --> 11:01.380]  But you got out of that okay, right?
[11:01.380 --> 11:02.840]  Yeah, it was fine.
[11:03.000 --> 11:04.280]  And they shook my hand.
[11:04.400 --> 11:09.700]  And my friend at least said, just tell them you're a student and you're here to learn.
[11:09.860 --> 11:11.600]  You know, so that's what we did.
[11:12.140 --> 11:15.920]  And then you came back here and you were promptly thrown in jail when you got back to this country.
[11:15.940 --> 11:18.420]  Yeah, it wasn't that much longer before my freedom was lost in this country.
[11:18.640 --> 11:24.640]  So, you know, and unfortunately, your esteemed guest tonight may be facing the same fate tomorrow.
[11:24.720 --> 11:25.240]  Let's hope not.
[11:25.360 --> 11:25.980]  Let's hope not.
[11:26.120 --> 11:26.620]  Let's hope not.
[11:31.380 --> 11:42.140]  You have this story concerning travelers from Western European nations and Japan who will be added in September to the list of foreign visitors who will be fingerprinted and photographed upon arrival in the U.S.
[11:42.160 --> 11:42.600]  That's right.
[11:42.780 --> 11:47.680]  According to the State Department, they're no longer going to be immune from that.
[11:48.000 --> 11:54.120]  Where, you know, certain countries, you have to have your fingerprint taken and you're photographed upon entering the country.
[11:54.800 --> 11:57.500]  Apparently, that's going to be expanded to Western Europeans as well.
[11:57.580 --> 12:00.380]  But not until September, so you can still come to the conference and not have to worry about that.
[12:00.380 --> 12:03.800]  So, it's a good time to come because you can just kind of sneak in under the wire.
[12:03.880 --> 12:08.800]  This may be the last opportunity you have to come into this country without having your vital statistics taken.
[12:08.920 --> 12:09.320]  Yes, RedHack.
[12:09.420 --> 12:09.700]  That's right.
[12:09.940 --> 12:10.440]  Come on over.
[12:10.480 --> 12:16.660]  As I understood it, they all have to comply with some new passport standard before they would be able to come in without being fingerprinted again?
[12:16.900 --> 12:20.180]  Well, they're making RFID passports everywhere.
[12:21.080 --> 12:26.080]  But this was until they come up with a new passport, right, that we can somehow...
[12:26.080 --> 12:26.700]  Well, let's see.
[12:27.340 --> 12:27.960]  The rule...
[12:27.960 --> 12:28.140]  Yes.
[12:28.420 --> 12:28.880]  Yeah, okay.
[12:28.880 --> 12:30.640]  The extension is...
[12:30.640 --> 12:31.140]  Extension?
[12:32.620 --> 12:33.020]  Okay.
[12:33.280 --> 12:35.400]  The extension to those countries as being...
[12:35.400 --> 12:35.840]  Oh, I see.
[12:35.920 --> 12:36.060]  I see.
[12:36.160 --> 12:36.260]  Okay.
[12:36.320 --> 12:39.800]  The extension to those countries is designed to address security concerns stemming from a U.S.
[12:39.840 --> 12:47.520]  agreement last month to delay for two years a new passport requirement for visitors from 27 countries, mostly in Europe, who are allowed to enter the U.S.
[12:47.560 --> 12:48.140]  without visas.
[12:48.140 --> 13:01.620]  That rule is being delayed until December 2006, and it requires visitors from those 27 visa-waiver countries to carry new passports that contain a machine-readable barcode and other information such as digital fingerprint identifying the holder.
[13:04.980 --> 13:08.840]  So, yeah, the new rule requiring fingerprint and photographs of U.S.
[13:09.080 --> 13:13.160]  visitors from the 27 visa-waiver countries will take effect September 30th.
[13:13.280 --> 13:17.620]  The only countries whose visitors will not be subject to these requirements are Canada and Mexico.
[13:18.480 --> 13:19.460]  Digital fingerprint.
[13:19.460 --> 13:20.440]  That sounds redundant.
[13:20.840 --> 13:21.480]  Yeah.
[13:21.700 --> 13:22.320]  Yeah, maybe it is.
[13:23.040 --> 13:34.860]  The Travel Industry Association of America, which last month praised the two-year passport extension, has warned that the fingerprint rule could diminish business and leisure travel by alienating European and Japanese visitors.
[13:35.180 --> 13:49.820]  While we appreciate the rationale for the federal government's action, TIA is nonetheless greatly disappointed and very concerned about potential negative reactions in key inbound tourism markets in Western Europe, Japan, and other important visa-waiver countries.
[13:49.860 --> 13:50.880]  You know, no one's going to want to come here.
[13:51.560 --> 13:55.300]  No one's going to want to come to this country when these rules are implemented.
[13:56.020 --> 14:01.900]  I predict there's going to be some serious impact on our tourism industry and the airlines.
[14:02.300 --> 14:07.220]  They're going to be screaming bloody murder after this goes into effect because they're not going to have as much money from customers.
[14:07.500 --> 14:08.840]  Do the State Department cares?
[14:09.800 --> 14:10.280]  I don't know.
[14:10.500 --> 14:17.040]  Well, honestly, what I learned from my case of the Secret Service is the government really does care about bringing money in.
[14:17.200 --> 14:20.340]  That is an important goal, like one of the most important goals.
[14:20.780 --> 14:26.540]  And they really care about, you know, industries that have influence with powerful political people.
[14:26.700 --> 14:29.640]  And the travel industry has lobbyists and powerful connections.
[14:31.140 --> 14:32.960]  Inbound overseas travel to the U.S.
[14:32.980 --> 14:37.020]  has declined by 27% since the September 11th attacks.
[14:37.600 --> 14:40.940]  And this isn't going to help that any, I don't think.
[14:40.940 --> 14:47.540]  And I predict that once this goes into effect, it won't be very long before they implement this on American citizens as well.
[14:47.620 --> 14:50.360]  When you travel into this country, you will have to give your fingerprint.
[14:51.060 --> 14:53.820]  And I just wonder, you know, will we get used to this kind of thing?
[14:53.900 --> 14:55.800]  Because we tend to get used to things.
[14:56.020 --> 15:04.120]  Well, you've already have to give your Social Security number on your passport so they can help trace the flow of money offshore.
[15:04.120 --> 15:04.220]  Sure.
[15:04.960 --> 15:05.440]  Yeah.
[15:05.520 --> 15:09.400]  I'm waiting for them to start taking swabs of people coming into our country.
[15:09.400 --> 15:13.640]  Because, you know, you know that these men are coming from overseas to take our women.
[15:15.060 --> 15:15.680]  Yeah.
[15:15.940 --> 15:26.100]  The Transportation Security Administration, TSA, is examining the use of RFID-tagged airline boarding passes that could allow passenger tracking within airports.
[15:26.820 --> 15:31.860]  That's a proposal some privacy advocates call potentially outrageous violation of civil liberties.
[15:32.620 --> 15:41.640]  Under the Registered Traveler Program, frequent flyers would provide the TSA with detailed personal information that would be correlated by a background check.
[15:42.560 --> 15:48.880]  Privacy advocates said they believe the RFID boarding pass would then serve as an automatic link to the Registered Traveler Database.
[15:49.880 --> 15:56.100]  Details on how exactly this is going to work haven't been released yet, but you can only imagine how this kind of a system could be abused.
[15:56.180 --> 15:59.900]  Bernie, any ideas on ways that this system could be abused?
[15:59.900 --> 16:03.040]  Well, the point you brought up earlier concerns me most.
[16:03.200 --> 16:05.600]  It's not going to stop at digital fingerprint scans.
[16:05.820 --> 16:17.920]  It's going to become more and more intrusive, literally bodily intrusive, biometric identifiers are going to have to be incorporated into identification systems.
[16:18.080 --> 16:20.820]  And, you know, it's all leading towards DNA.
[16:21.580 --> 16:23.880]  Everybody's, you know, government's going to have everybody's DNA eventually.
[16:23.880 --> 16:31.620]  And I, you know, it's going to happen in a few years because this stuff, this mission creep that we have with these types of systems just doesn't stop.
[16:31.800 --> 16:34.200]  You know, it keeps getting more intrusive over time.
[16:34.540 --> 16:38.920]  And it's sugar-coated for reasons like, oh, we have to do this to keep you safer or whatever.
[16:39.200 --> 16:40.960]  But, you know, these things don't stop.
[16:41.100 --> 16:41.780]  It's like a juggernaut.
[16:41.880 --> 16:42.840]  It's in the interest of safety.
[16:43.000 --> 16:45.300]  I mean, wouldn't you give up for safety?
[16:45.520 --> 16:46.900]  I don't feel safer in the slightest.
[16:47.160 --> 16:47.900]  You don't feel safer?
[16:48.080 --> 16:48.340]  No.
[16:48.440 --> 16:49.520]  That doesn't sound very patriotic.
[16:49.520 --> 16:52.140]  Well, that's one of my many problems.
[16:52.320 --> 16:57.880]  RFID tagging, though, in airports, what exactly could they do with this?
[16:57.980 --> 16:59.880]  They would know where you are at all times?
[16:59.880 --> 17:03.800]  How much of a detection system can they actually have?
[17:04.160 --> 17:21.000]  Well, if you have an RFID passport or anything else that's RFID tagged on your person, if there's an RFID detection unit or scanner that's within, you know, walking distance, maybe 10, 20 feet away from you, maybe longer, depending on how they build it,
[17:21.900 --> 17:28.920]  you can basically ping your transponder and your passport and tell that you were there at that point in time.
[17:29.340 --> 17:32.440]  And there's no saying where these things are going to be put.
[17:32.600 --> 17:51.920]  No matter where you carry your passport or if future driver's license has RFID in it or whatever, a wrist bracelet in some people's cases or on house arrest or ankle bracelets, wherever you go, if some detection unit is placed at some place, these can be hidden.
[17:52.020 --> 17:52.760]  You don't know where they are.
[17:52.980 --> 17:55.220]  They can tell where you are at any given time.
[17:55.340 --> 17:56.060]  It's kind of like E-ZPass.
[17:56.220 --> 17:58.880]  That's the best analogy that most people are familiar with.
[17:59.060 --> 18:05.660]  But E-ZPass isn't a system where the government can send out a signal right now and know where my car is.
[18:06.260 --> 18:07.520]  If, oh, it's not true.
[18:07.820 --> 18:08.420]  That's not true.
[18:08.620 --> 18:11.980]  While they can't tell where you are, you know, RFID is the same way.
[18:11.980 --> 18:14.020]  They can't tell from a satellite that you're here or there.
[18:14.160 --> 18:20.500]  But if they have a detection unit that's, say, 20 feet away from where you passed, you could tell where you are.
[18:20.700 --> 18:20.940]  Right.
[18:20.940 --> 18:22.900]  But my car right now is in a hidden place.
[18:23.060 --> 18:29.860]  They would not know that unless there happened to be a detector nearby that could say just that.
[18:30.020 --> 18:41.540]  There's no reason that E-ZPass detection units couldn't be put at intersections, strategic intersections in New York City, for instance, and be able to tell that you went from here to here to here to here.
[18:41.980 --> 18:43.180]  We don't know where they are.
[18:43.360 --> 18:47.360]  As far as we know, they're only in a toll booth.
[18:47.520 --> 18:50.000]  But I would bet that there are other places as well.
[18:50.180 --> 18:52.340]  And there's just no way of knowing because they're easily hidden.
[18:52.540 --> 18:58.220]  Well, I mean, isn't there something we could build that would light up when these things are nearby?
[18:59.020 --> 18:59.400]  Yes.
[18:59.560 --> 19:00.180]  It could be done.
[19:00.640 --> 19:01.580]  Well, why don't we do it then?
[19:02.660 --> 19:04.760]  Well, nobody has suggested it yet.
[19:04.760 --> 19:05.760]  I'm suggesting it now.
[19:05.900 --> 19:15.360]  I think that's a good project so that people know when the E-ZPass system is being invoked, some kind of a device that beeps or lights up when you're near a sensor.
[19:15.540 --> 19:21.620]  And then the same thing with RFID tags, so that you know if you're being monitored or traced in some way.
[19:21.760 --> 19:28.480]  But my point was, in the airport, would they have the ability to say, where is passenger X, and immediately have an answer?
[19:28.500 --> 19:33.880]  Or would they just be able to say, passenger X was here at this particular point in time, and he could be any other place now?
[19:34.320 --> 19:38.140]  If they put sensors all around the airport, they could tell where everybody is at any given point in time.
[19:38.380 --> 19:45.900]  Yeah, if they wanted to spend the money, enough sensors could track you throughout the concourse to your baggage to the plane.
[19:46.900 --> 19:49.300]  Perhaps if you're a terrorist out on the tarmac.
[19:49.560 --> 19:53.900]  However, a smart terrorist will ditch his passport before getting anywhere near that.
[19:54.000 --> 19:55.300]  Or wrap it in tinfoil.
[19:55.840 --> 19:56.980]  Yeah, you could do that too.
[19:57.060 --> 19:59.200]  Tinfoil seems to be the answer to all these problems right now.
[19:59.600 --> 20:03.620]  So, but, wow, it's hard to imagine that this is what we're looking at.
[20:03.720 --> 20:05.460]  And it's kind of like the camera system in Las Vegas.
[20:05.560 --> 20:10.500]  If you ever go to Las Vegas in a casino, you will always, always have a camera on you, no matter where you go.
[20:10.620 --> 20:15.920]  And as soon as you get out of sight of one camera, you'll notice another one is creeping around the corner and is getting you.
[20:16.000 --> 20:17.580]  So you're always on camera somewhere.
[20:17.940 --> 20:19.620]  But, but let me tell you about that.
[20:20.560 --> 20:32.980]  Being, being a long-time poker player, and things happen at the poker table, and you want to have a camera to go back and determine, you know, who stole your chips or, or, you know, what happened before the table was tipped over or whatever.
[20:33.180 --> 20:33.800]  You did it, Jim, didn't you?
[20:34.000 --> 20:34.740]  Yeah, usually I do.
[20:35.480 --> 20:40.080]  But anyway, what happens is, is information overload.
[20:40.440 --> 20:42.140]  There are only so many cameras.
[20:42.340 --> 20:43.600]  Not all of them are taped.
[20:44.060 --> 20:45.540]  Not all of them are watched.
[20:45.740 --> 20:54.160]  Lots of times I've been in a casino, something has happened, and nothing can be done because it wasn't taped or no one was watching it.
[20:54.200 --> 21:00.260]  It's the Czescu syndrome where, you know, Nicolai Czescu in Romania taped everything, every phone call.
[21:00.800 --> 21:05.220]  And they had so many, so many tapes of people talking, they did not have the staff to go through it all.
[21:05.300 --> 21:11.700]  The control is not so much in the security office, although, of course, for the cashier's cage, they've got all that taped and the control is up there.
[21:11.820 --> 21:15.860]  But the control is within the minds of the people who know that there are cameras everywhere.
[21:16.540 --> 21:16.980]  Amazing.
[21:16.980 --> 21:22.980]  The big difference between the video monitoring and the telephone call recording and RFID.
[21:23.200 --> 21:25.780]  With RFID, it's a purely digital signal.
[21:25.980 --> 21:37.580]  It doesn't have to recognize someone's face, which is not a perfect technology, or recognize spoken words, which is not perfect technology, and both are very computer, time-consuming, resource-consuming tasks.
[21:37.780 --> 21:47.520]  But RFID, they can just log all this data and any time in the future play it back and say, you know, just do a search for Emanuel Goldstein and see where he was at any given time, and it's right there.
[21:47.520 --> 21:50.880]  It's not like they have to cull through tons of tapes.
[21:51.260 --> 21:54.700]  It's just instantaneous, digitally accessed data from a database.
[21:55.180 --> 21:55.540]  Amazing.
[21:55.860 --> 21:59.360]  Now, this is going to seem out of left field now because I've been waiting to say this for a couple minutes.
[21:59.480 --> 22:00.800]  But back to the E-ZPass thing.
[22:01.920 --> 22:14.980]  Now, this might not have been true, but I heard someone told me that they received a ticket because they had been a detector on one side of, like, a bridge or the other side, and it had measured, you know, well, they passed by this detector at this time,
[22:15.160 --> 22:17.760]  they passed by the other one at this time, distance over time.
[22:17.940 --> 22:18.740]  That's how fast they were going.
[22:18.780 --> 22:20.000]  They got a speeding ticket based on...
[22:20.000 --> 22:23.460]  You know, I've heard that they were going to do something like that, but you have actually...
[22:23.460 --> 22:24.660]  Jeff, you're shaking your head viciously.
[22:24.660 --> 22:25.340]  No, I wasn't sure.
[22:25.740 --> 22:26.380]  It actually happened.
[22:26.440 --> 22:27.260]  It's a rumor, isn't it?
[22:27.440 --> 22:28.980]  Well, I believe it was...
[22:28.980 --> 22:33.360]  No, it was supposedly tested, and this may be part of the legend, but it didn't stick.
[22:34.040 --> 22:34.460]  It didn't...
[22:34.460 --> 22:36.680]  What, the ticket didn't stick, or the technology didn't stick?
[22:36.980 --> 22:40.300]  The technology sticks, but the ticket didn't.
[22:40.360 --> 22:48.280]  Well, there's only one way to test this, and that's to get on the New Jersey Turnpike after the show, so speed on down to Philadelphia at about 85, get off again, see if you get a ticket in the mail.
[22:48.640 --> 22:51.940]  I predict that bicycling's going to become a lot more popular.
[22:52.360 --> 22:52.500]  Maybe.
[22:52.840 --> 22:54.100]  And Bernie, one quick question.
[22:54.520 --> 22:54.700]  Yeah?
[22:55.080 --> 22:58.240]  Doesn't the Scout pick up the EasyPass signal?
[22:58.760 --> 23:08.280]  It may, and I was going to say that next time I go through a toll booth, I'm going to turn on my OptoElectronic Scout, which is a frequency counter we talked about on a previous show, to see if it picks that up.
[23:08.340 --> 23:12.620]  My guess is, though, that it's a digital signal that we may need a digital Scout, which I don't own.
[23:12.620 --> 23:14.380]  It's a rather expensive piece of equipment.
[23:14.560 --> 23:18.840]  But that would almost certainly work for detecting the EasyPass signal.
[23:19.100 --> 23:19.720]  Digital Scout.
[23:19.880 --> 23:20.080]  Wow.
[23:20.240 --> 23:20.480]  Okay.
[23:20.680 --> 23:21.280]  That's interesting.
[23:23.500 --> 23:28.480]  Well, so RFID detectors everywhere you go in the airport, and boy.
[23:29.320 --> 23:38.900]  But, you know, if you're in the airport and your passport has this, it's your passport or your boarding pass, you just hand it to somebody else, it seems like a very simple way to not be tracked, or, you know, you throw it in the trash or something.
[23:39.040 --> 23:41.940]  If you're a terrorist, I imagine things like that won't be that hard to do.
[23:43.000 --> 23:43.360]  Tinfoil.
[23:43.880 --> 23:44.300]  Yeah, but...
[23:44.300 --> 23:44.940]  And tinfoil, of course.
[23:45.060 --> 23:48.900]  It will be nice to see Reynolds advertising that it's RFID grade.
[23:49.840 --> 24:01.000]  You know, though, if someone just dropped off the map or stopped moving altogether, that would kind of be an indication that, you know, they did ditch their ticket or they did, you know, whatever, try and mask it.
[24:01.100 --> 24:03.580]  It might be an indication that they're up to no good, so...
[24:03.580 --> 24:03.820]  Right.
[24:03.820 --> 24:05.300]  You want to hide your RFID tag.
[24:05.300 --> 24:16.380]  If you're on the lam, obviously you want to stick it under the bumper of a random car or a bus or something so that, you know, people go on a wild goose chase to get after you in the wrong direction.
[24:17.380 --> 24:17.680]  Interesting.
[24:17.980 --> 24:19.940]  Len, you have something important to announce.
[24:20.240 --> 24:22.180]  Well, just wanted to...
[24:22.180 --> 24:22.720]  We were...
[24:22.720 --> 24:26.140]  The segue from the cameras was pretty good because, um...
[24:26.140 --> 24:28.480]  Actually, tonight, for the first time, you said?
[24:28.920 --> 24:29.880]  Uh, I think so.
[24:29.920 --> 24:32.420]  If what you're going to say is what we said before, yes, it probably is the first time.
[24:32.420 --> 24:35.020]  I think we're going to have some, uh, visuals from the show.
[24:35.160 --> 24:40.420]  So, if you want to go to J-A-W-G-A dot com if you have internet access...
[24:40.420 --> 24:40.660]  We do.
[24:40.780 --> 24:40.880]  Here.
[24:40.980 --> 24:41.440]  Let's go there.
[24:42.880 --> 24:43.680]  Then, uh...
[24:43.680 --> 24:44.300]  Then, uh...
[24:44.300 --> 24:44.880]  This ought to be fun.
[24:44.940 --> 24:46.200]  We'll take some, some images.
[24:46.360 --> 24:48.720]  You'll have to refresh, um...
[24:48.720 --> 24:49.480]  And, uh...
[24:49.480 --> 24:50.260]  What's that URL again?
[24:50.320 --> 24:51.040]  Something that's like that.
[24:51.180 --> 24:54.460]  J-A-W-G-A dot com.
[24:54.660 --> 24:58.660]  You know what we can do later on is we move the camera close to that terminal.
[24:58.940 --> 25:00.840]  It'll be like looking in your own eye.
[25:03.120 --> 25:04.020]  Very exciting.
[25:04.380 --> 25:05.660]  Okay, we're trying to get that website up.
[25:05.780 --> 25:10.880]  So, those are live pictures of the radio show here as we're, as we're, uh, speaking.
[25:11.260 --> 25:12.320]  How are they getting there, Lynn?
[25:12.920 --> 25:13.860]  Yeah, how are they getting there?
[25:14.520 --> 25:15.680]  How are they getting there?
[25:15.840 --> 25:19.580]  Um, they're getting there via a laptop with a Verizon Air card.
[25:21.700 --> 25:23.680]  And then they're getting FTP'd to the website.
[25:23.940 --> 25:26.780]  J-A-W-G-A dot com.
[25:27.380 --> 25:30.160]  And then I'll, I'll, I'll snap some and archive some of them.
[25:30.160 --> 25:30.520]  That's me.
[25:30.640 --> 25:31.080]  Look at that.
[25:31.140 --> 25:31.400]  Wow.
[25:31.740 --> 25:33.020]  How about, that's exciting.
[25:35.180 --> 25:36.740]  It doesn't take much to excite me.
[25:37.800 --> 25:38.960]  We're such simple people.
[25:39.780 --> 25:51.980]  Um, this person writes into our show, uh, Dear Off the Hook, replying to the show on March 31st, when I visited Switzerland around two years ago, I saw a tank driving on the street right by the airport in the area where you rent cars.
[25:52.280 --> 25:58.520]  That's in response to, uh, to Bernie's, uh, Bernie's remarks last week about the tank that greeted his airplane.
[25:59.860 --> 26:00.580]  Very weird.
[26:00.780 --> 26:01.600]  It's, um, yeah.
[26:01.980 --> 26:03.780]  Switzerland has some tanks roaming around.
[26:03.780 --> 26:09.920]  Swiss are very, Swiss are very big on national security in a real sense, not in a fake sense like our government is.
[26:10.460 --> 26:13.980]  Um, and, uh, they just don't, you know, they're politically neutral.
[26:14.220 --> 26:15.380]  They don't mess with anybody else.
[26:15.480 --> 26:16.440]  They don't want to be messed with.
[26:16.580 --> 26:24.680]  And, uh, maybe that was just an intentional intimidation tactic to make sure that anybody landing in the plane who had thoughts of messing with them thought twice.
[26:24.920 --> 26:26.060]  I certainly thought twice.
[26:26.160 --> 26:27.360]  You're already there.
[26:27.560 --> 26:29.060]  You know, you've already landed.
[26:29.260 --> 26:33.200]  I don't understand what the message is that they're, that they're sending to, uh...
[26:33.200 --> 26:34.100]  Well, I got the message.
[26:35.120 --> 26:37.400]  Did it, did it affect what you did later on?
[26:37.540 --> 26:38.100]  I mean...
[26:38.100 --> 26:40.180]  No, well, it just affected how I felt.
[26:40.300 --> 26:44.120]  It's like, wow, these people are really serious about their own security.
[26:44.400 --> 26:47.560]  And, and I felt, you know, I felt safe in a way.
[26:47.660 --> 26:52.720]  In other ways, I felt like, boy, if I were a terrorist, I would certainly think twice about bullying anything in this country.
[26:52.900 --> 26:55.940]  It's not like the tank is going to be following you around everywhere you go in Switzerland, though.
[26:55.980 --> 26:57.500]  Well, the Swiss are, I mean...
[26:57.500 --> 26:58.240]  The Swiss are very...
[26:58.240 --> 27:02.540]  There's a lot of other things that Swiss do to keep themselves safe, and they've managed to do that for a long time.
[27:03.320 --> 27:04.560]  Like staying neutral, for one.
[27:04.980 --> 27:05.340]  Exactly.
[27:05.720 --> 27:06.220]  That definitely helps.
[27:06.680 --> 27:11.620]  Okay, uh, talking about things not being safe, mobile phones are in the hands of millions of people around the world.
[27:11.720 --> 27:12.580]  We all know that's not safe.
[27:12.820 --> 27:17.080]  But increasingly, it seems that they're also getting into the hands of terrorists.
[27:17.820 --> 27:18.400]  That's right.
[27:18.540 --> 27:21.700]  Somehow the terrorists are also getting their hands on their hands How did they do that?
[27:21.940 --> 27:22.600]  I don't know.
[27:22.740 --> 27:23.000]  I don't know.
[27:23.040 --> 27:23.560]  They're very clever.
[27:24.000 --> 27:32.920]  But anyway, the bombers who targeted commuter trains on March 11th used the built-in alarm clock on a mobile phone to set off the explosives.
[27:33.600 --> 27:37.240]  Now, I've never used that feature on any of my phones, but apparently it's there.
[27:37.440 --> 27:38.140]  I've used it.
[27:38.240 --> 27:45.580]  In Jerusalem, it's believed that a call to a cell phone in a rucksack set off a bomb at Hebrew University in 2002.
[27:46.100 --> 27:52.680]  One of the Bali bombs in October 2002 had a cell phone attached, as did a car bomb which killed 12 people.
[27:53.400 --> 27:57.580]  Mobile phones, according to the Risk Advisory Group, are relatively cheap.
[27:57.580 --> 27:59.580]  You can acquire them in relatively large numbers.
[27:59.580 --> 28:03.500]  You can build a whole stack of them at one time and place them and set them off at your leisure.
[28:03.660 --> 28:10.520]  It means you can step away from some considerable distance the other side of the world in order to initiate the explosive device.
[28:10.520 --> 28:13.040]  And there's some late-breaking news, Emmanuel.
[28:13.220 --> 28:26.200]  Today, in the Atlanta International Airport, allegedly a bomb was discovered in a backpack with a grenade basically connected to a triggering device connected to a cell phone.
[28:26.560 --> 28:31.080]  And that was found in an Atlanta bathroom in an international airport today.
[28:31.460 --> 28:31.640]  Really?
[28:31.640 --> 28:42.880]  And a few years ago, I think it was probably around 93 or 94, the Israeli Intelligence Service and Assad used a cell phone to blow up That's right.
[28:43.040 --> 28:44.540]  A Palestinian
[28:47.900 --> 28:54.160]  military activist or whatever actually hid the explosives in the battery pack of the cell phone.
[28:54.280 --> 28:55.300]  It looked like a regular cell phone.
[28:55.940 --> 29:06.660]  And actually, they just modified the battery pack and they got somebody to switch the battery pack on this PLO guy's phone and they basically called him and said goodbye and blew him up.
[29:06.880 --> 29:08.140]  They actually said goodbye?
[29:08.480 --> 29:11.840]  Well, they probably said something cute before they blew him up.
[29:12.380 --> 29:14.580]  I mean, it's just too good an opportunity to resist.
[29:14.780 --> 29:18.500]  Well, I mean, was the action of picking up the phone is that what made the explosive go off?
[29:18.660 --> 29:25.120]  No, I imagine they could send some signal, a tone or something, you know, like a red box tone or something and they could go boom.
[29:25.220 --> 29:29.360]  So in addition to cell phones being used to trigger bombs, cell phones themselves could be bombs.
[29:30.040 --> 29:30.480]  Sure.
[29:30.480 --> 29:38.940]  If an explosive device is hidden inside the battery pack and there's a little bit less battery is used, it wouldn't have to be just...
[29:39.640 --> 29:42.140]  It could be just a cell phone as far as you're concerned.
[29:42.340 --> 29:45.760]  I mean, there's enough explosives that are powerful enough now, some of them, that you could...
[29:45.760 --> 29:47.280]  It would just look like a cell phone.
[29:47.420 --> 29:50.540]  So, you know, you could go through airport security and nobody would even know this.
[29:51.860 --> 29:57.300]  Well, I mean, it just seems to me that, you know, triggering devices can be almost anything that has a clock in them.
[29:57.620 --> 29:58.280]  A pager.
[29:58.540 --> 30:05.340]  Yeah, a pager certainly and I just think this might be used to limit people's right to use phones.
[30:05.380 --> 30:19.500]  For instance, at the convention later this year, I am certain, and this is my prediction, that they are going to jam all cell phones around Madison Square Garden throughout the convention, meaning that you won't be able to communicate with anybody if you happen to be there.
[30:19.600 --> 30:22.000]  Unless, of course, you're with the authorities.
[30:22.220 --> 30:26.420]  The reporters would kill the people who did that, so I don't know.
[30:26.800 --> 30:30.840]  Well, maybe they'd have to work something out with the government to be allowed to communicate.
[30:31.160 --> 30:31.840]  I don't know.
[30:32.000 --> 30:34.540]  But they're talking about using cell phone jammers.
[30:35.380 --> 30:39.020]  Now, cell phone jammers are illegal to have in this country.
[30:40.420 --> 30:41.800]  Basically, they're the size of a phone.
[30:41.960 --> 30:44.440]  They can block cell phone signals in a 20-foot radius.
[30:45.020 --> 30:47.600]  Larger devices can block signals reaching an entire building.
[30:48.940 --> 30:51.260]  They demonstrated one at the H2K2.
[30:51.400 --> 30:55.240]  Well, it was illegal then because you're not allowed to have them in this country and you're not allowed to have them in England.
[30:56.540 --> 30:59.040]  They say the right to make a call reigns supreme.
[30:59.300 --> 31:08.280]  Although, it's my dream to drive down Wall Street if I could still do that and just watch people saying, hello, hello, and not being able to reach the other side.
[31:08.320 --> 31:08.940]  But it wouldn't be right.
[31:09.040 --> 31:09.620]  It would be wrong.
[31:09.700 --> 31:10.240]  But it would be funny.
[31:11.000 --> 31:19.680]  Anyway, Michael Minaj of Global Gadget said in the UK as in most other nations they are illegal because you are interfering with somebody else's right to use a mobile telephone.
[31:20.260 --> 31:24.500]  Through these aerials you are broadcasting a signal on a wavelength for which you do not have a license.
[31:24.920 --> 31:27.080]  But governments are using similar technology.
[31:27.800 --> 31:36.940]  It's widely reported a radio jammer inside the car of Pakistani President Pravaz Musharraf stopped an attempt to assassinate him last December.
[31:37.240 --> 31:43.980]  A bunch of us heard about that and yeah, they jammed the signal that apparently was going to be triggered by a cell phone.
[31:44.480 --> 31:48.020]  It's expected more high profile people will use the technology in the future.
[31:49.540 --> 31:55.100]  I guess every time the President is in town maybe they'll jam all cell phone calls around where he is.
[31:55.280 --> 32:01.520]  There actually is a security measure the Secret Service and the White House Communications Agency does.
[32:01.700 --> 32:02.440]  There's a van.
[32:02.580 --> 32:04.300]  Have you ever seen the President's motorcade?
[32:04.560 --> 32:07.920]  If you look behind his limousine and there's always two.
[32:08.060 --> 32:10.040]  There's one that's the real one and one's the fake one.
[32:10.280 --> 32:11.840]  You can't tell which one is which.
[32:12.020 --> 32:16.360]  But if you look behind one of them there's a van or like a big SUV.
[32:16.360 --> 32:18.880]  It's really a van with tons of antennas on it.
[32:19.440 --> 32:22.620]  And it's really run by the White House Communications Agency.
[32:22.820 --> 32:31.640]  And there's jamming equipment on that van to monitor all the radio signals around and to jam them.
[32:31.900 --> 32:35.320]  There's a good book called Inside the White House.
[32:35.700 --> 32:37.980]  I think it's Inside the Secret Service or Inside the White House.
[32:38.020 --> 32:40.340]  I think it's Inside the White House by Ronald Kessler.
[32:40.520 --> 32:41.540]  K-E-S-S-L-E-R.
[32:41.660 --> 32:50.220]  It describes the White House Communications Agency's van and it's radio signal jamming tactics that it uses wherever the president goes in the world.
[32:51.880 --> 32:52.480]  Wow.
[32:52.780 --> 32:56.920]  So even in a different country with totally different frequencies that van would follow him.
[32:57.080 --> 32:59.280]  They're always listening and always jamming.
[32:59.440 --> 33:04.980]  And I took a GPS unit to a President Clinton rally here in Philadelphia back in 97.
[33:05.420 --> 33:10.940]  And my GPS unit failed to receive the signal when the president was speaking.
[33:11.580 --> 33:14.600]  And after he left a few hours later it worked fine.
[33:14.840 --> 33:17.100]  It worked fine before and it worked fine when he left.
[33:17.360 --> 33:27.640]  So I can only conclude that GPS signals were being jammed because I guess you could put one on a missile or a model airplane with an explosive on it and use GPS to guide...
[33:27.640 --> 33:33.580]  The day a missile comes out of the sky and hits the president that's when I'll say okay, yeah, you know what?
[33:33.700 --> 33:38.300]  We are living in dangerous times and maybe we should have increased security but...
[33:38.300 --> 33:39.040]  Plan for everything.
[33:39.480 --> 33:39.920]  Yeah.
[33:40.040 --> 33:44.420]  Now you say there's two limousines there's a fake limousine and a real limousine every time the president travels?
[33:44.800 --> 33:45.200]  Typically.
[33:45.900 --> 33:47.540]  Couldn't you just get twice as many attackers?
[33:48.060 --> 33:48.300]  Yep.
[33:49.040 --> 33:50.940]  Is there a fake president in that limousine too?
[33:51.140 --> 33:52.480]  I think there's a fake president now.
[33:52.680 --> 33:54.040]  Yeah, well, let's go to that same.
[33:54.080 --> 33:56.080]  It's just cloth upholstery instead of the leather.
[33:56.380 --> 33:56.540]  Uh-huh.
[33:57.920 --> 34:08.320]  But Bernie mentioned a moment ago about the fact that a cell phone with explosives might go through the airline detection and I thought they had sniffers going on on all this new equipment as well.
[34:08.400 --> 34:10.080]  Only if you're chosen to be sniffed.
[34:10.500 --> 34:12.380]  I've been sniffed just once or twice.
[34:12.480 --> 34:13.700]  I watched it one time I remember.
[34:13.820 --> 34:15.700]  Yeah, you were there watching me being sniffed.
[34:15.700 --> 34:36.360]  And, you know, they take your stuff and they put it through they actually take this wand with a cloth swab on the end of it and they dab it all around the inside and the outside of your bags and take the cloth out of the swab and they put it in the they put it in the special detection equipment that electronically sniffs for you know,
[34:36.440 --> 34:37.720]  explosive molecules.
[34:38.560 --> 34:42.700]  And, uh, fortunately it came up zilch with me.
[34:43.120 --> 34:47.120]  The other thing I'm wondering is, is what is the ratio of battery to explosive for a cell phone?
[34:47.280 --> 34:47.340]  Anyway.
[34:47.740 --> 34:48.180]  Three to one.
[34:48.500 --> 34:48.980]  It is three to one.
[34:49.120 --> 34:50.160]  You have to ask them aside.
[34:50.340 --> 34:51.380]  They're experts in that department.
[34:51.760 --> 34:55.160]  Well, just to finish up on, uh, on this story, apparently the U.S.
[34:55.440 --> 34:57.040]  Department of Defense is also in on this.
[34:57.260 --> 35:06.460]  Uh, they have a, um, a program called Wolfpack uh, that basically denies the enemy the use of all radio communications including mobile phones on the battlefield.
[35:06.560 --> 35:11.400]  So I'm sure you'll be seeing that used a lot in Iraq in, uh, in weeks to come.
[35:11.940 --> 35:16.360]  Um, but, uh, it's something to keep an eye on here as well to see when, when signals are being jammed.
[35:16.420 --> 35:20.980]  I'd like to know more about that if, uh, when the president is around that GPS signals are blocked.
[35:21.320 --> 35:23.220]  So, uh, let's definitely keep an eye on that.
[35:23.920 --> 35:27.320]  Um, let me read this letter and then we'll, uh, we'll get to, uh, some more material here.
[35:27.420 --> 35:30.560]  Again, we are on for two hours tonight off the hook of a special expanded edition.
[35:31.460 --> 35:37.800]  Um, this person writes in there's a law that's going for the first reading in the Canadian Senate called the Canadian Public Security Act.
[35:37.960 --> 35:39.320]  It's dreadfully similar to the U.S.
[35:39.440 --> 35:40.000]  Patriot Act.
[35:40.540 --> 35:45.640]  Our Prime Minister, uh, Paul Martin, who, uh, above all else wants to be George W.
[35:45.720 --> 35:46.260]  Bush's friend.
[35:46.420 --> 35:47.120]  He even said that.
[35:47.440 --> 35:51.180]  Uh, and our Heritage Minister, we don't have a Heritage Minister, do we?
[35:51.900 --> 35:52.480]  No, I guess not.
[35:52.940 --> 35:59.040]  Uh, has stated that they plan to fix the hole in Canadian copyright law that allows sharing of files, reported on this last week.
[35:59.400 --> 36:07.520]  Uh, I'm finding it somewhat difficult and extremely time-consuming to find information on events like this happening in Canada compared to the relative ease of finding information in the U.S.
[36:07.760 --> 36:10.720]  Uh, my website is now posting any information I can find on the issue.
[36:10.840 --> 36:27.900]  The URL is http colon slash slash www.act6 A-C-T number 6 dot org slash O-Z-Z and my email is listed there for people to send information, so please post information and, uh, Sean, thanks for, uh, taking the interest and let us know what happens up there.
[36:27.960 --> 36:32.580]  I know it's easy for things to get past when people don't know anything about them, so it's important to be educated.
[36:33.820 --> 36:38.500]  All right, um, with that, I'd like to get to our special guest, uh, this week who's been waiting patiently, Adrian Lamo.
[36:38.500 --> 36:39.460]  Welcome to New York.
[36:40.140 --> 36:40.980]  Thanks for having me.
[36:41.280 --> 36:43.960]  Um, uh, sorry it has to be on these circumstances that you're here.
[36:44.080 --> 36:52.000]  You're being, uh, sentenced in federal court tomorrow, uh, for, uh, crimes involving the New York Times, which we talked about on this program a few months ago.
[36:52.000 --> 36:55.720]  Um, can you tell us, uh, what exactly they involved?
[36:56.920 --> 37:03.600]  I'm being sentenced for my unauthorized access to the New York Times internal network to which I pled guilty in early January.
[37:04.100 --> 37:12.780]  Um, I gained access to their network, their information, resources, and accounts of theirs, which I accessed without authorization and in some instances misused.
[37:13.380 --> 37:23.520]  Um, I contacted the Times by way of a reporter shortly after that intrusion and notified them of their vulnerabilities and they elected to press charges as is their right.
[37:23.980 --> 37:24.260]  Mm-hmm.
[37:24.380 --> 37:27.740]  And my sentencing is coming up on those matters tomorrow.
[37:28.240 --> 37:32.280]  So, now, this access allowed you to see what exactly?
[37:33.520 --> 37:49.780]  As described in the complaint, the access included information regarding some of their contributors to their op-ed page, which is generally a pretty diverse list, including former presidents, uh, people tied to the UN, um, actors who are relatively well-known.
[37:49.860 --> 37:52.620]  I certainly don't want to drag their names out again because they've probably had enough of it.
[37:53.000 --> 38:00.120]  So, basically, they had a database online through their website that had these people's private information just there.
[38:00.480 --> 38:05.060]  In many places, including social security numbers and home telephone numbers and such.
[38:05.600 --> 38:06.860]  And how were you able to find this?
[38:08.680 --> 38:11.200]  All of the access in question took place through a web browser.
[38:11.640 --> 38:11.860]  Uh-huh.
[38:12.100 --> 38:15.040]  And did you have to crack some kind of a code to, uh, to figure out how to get in?
[38:16.680 --> 38:22.800]  Well, I, I, I don't want to get, get into it too much since it's really all in the past and what I'm trying to do is move forward.
[38:22.980 --> 38:26.160]  But essentially, it all happened through a web browser and the use of an open proxy.
[38:26.300 --> 38:27.500]  It was nothing terribly sophisticated.
[38:27.960 --> 38:37.500]  Um, in, in retrospect, I, I probably wasn't such a hot idea, but, um, there was nothing that was complicated by the access.
[38:37.640 --> 38:39.640]  There, there was no exceptional security going on.
[38:39.860 --> 38:42.540]  They, they had a lot of problems and, for that matter, may still.
[38:49.780 --> 39:01.460]  And, uh, moving on, that they would, uh, want to drag this out and, you know, put somebody through torture like they're putting you through, having to come all the way to New York, uh, to, to face trial and then to face sentencing and all that kind of a thing.
[39:02.280 --> 39:05.900]  Um, I mean, you've been, you've been involved in security for quite some time.
[39:06.040 --> 39:09.340]  You've, you've alerted lots of companies to security holes.
[39:09.600 --> 39:11.800]  And I imagine quite a few of them have been very happy you've done that.
[39:13.160 --> 39:14.940]  I imagine that it seems reasonable to them.
[39:15.240 --> 39:17.400]  It's easy to be angry about intrusion.
[39:17.640 --> 39:18.760]  And really, I can't blame them.
[39:18.900 --> 39:22.260]  To them, I'm just another anonymous name, another intruder.
[39:23.540 --> 39:25.140]  They don't tie a face to it.
[39:25.220 --> 39:30.700]  They don't, they have no reason to know or care that I have a family or how this affects them or anything like that.
[39:30.760 --> 39:34.320]  It's, it's just a person and it's just an intrusion to be dealt with.
[39:34.680 --> 39:44.440]  Um, and on that level, I think I'm guilty of roughly the same thing in that it's easy to disregard the time that administrators have to put in to fix these sorts of things.
[39:44.900 --> 39:49.620]  Um, mind you, they probably could have fixed them earlier on and that this would have ever happened.
[39:49.760 --> 39:49.880]  Right.
[39:50.020 --> 39:54.100]  And they could have been there in the first place so that, uh, you know, people wouldn't be able to get in.
[39:54.160 --> 39:59.180]  I mean, I just find it amazing that through the web, you can access this information that's, that's sitting there.
[39:59.300 --> 39:59.880]  It's private information.
[39:59.920 --> 40:01.120]  It shouldn't be on the internet at all.
[40:01.220 --> 40:02.280]  I don't see any reason for it to be.
[40:03.240 --> 40:12.880]  And, um, you know, they, you know, obviously, you don't want to say this kind of a thing, but I, I want to say that I think they should be held accountable for this.
[40:13.360 --> 40:20.160]  They're the ones that, uh, violated these people's privacy because they had that information out there where people could find it.
[40:20.900 --> 40:25.360]  You know, unfortunately, they're blaming the messenger for the message, and I just think that's, that's sad.
[40:25.740 --> 40:33.920]  Well, I, I do think that there are some lines that I stepped over in my access, and that, that's why I pled, and that's why I'm stepping up to take whatever sentences handed down.
[40:34.020 --> 40:35.400]  I'm obviously hoping for the best, but...
[40:35.400 --> 40:38.720]  Yeah, hopefully it'll be reasonable, not like, uh, you know, the case of, uh, Bernie or the case of Kevin.
[40:38.860 --> 40:54.320]  I mean, you know, in Kevin's case in particular, he admitted he did, he did something wrong, you know, and, uh, that's an important admission to make, but certainly the sentence that he received as a result of what he did wrong, five years in prison, and all this time on probation,
[40:54.660 --> 41:05.720]  and, uh, not to even mention the time when he was, you know, trying to escape it all, um, for what actually happened just strikes me as absurd and, and, and completely out of proportion with reality.
[41:06.100 --> 41:19.480]  I, I think that computer crime law, computer crime prosecutions, and really internet culture as a whole are, and are evolving entities, and I think that situations like Kevin's, um, and those like him really contribute to the evolution of it.
[41:19.740 --> 41:31.280]  Um, I think that there's room for people to, to learn from mistakes of the past, and I think that in some ways, um, you know, although there are many parts of it that I wish hadn't happened, and it's certainly been a traumatic experience for me and those around me,
[41:31.380 --> 41:47.080]  I, I think that they've taken some of the lessons from those cases and learned that there's some things that, you know, they should take into account that they shouldn't do, and I like to hope that the circumstances of this case will similarly contribute to the evolution of the process in the future.
[41:47.340 --> 41:50.700]  What were the actual charges that, uh, that they filed against you?
[41:51.800 --> 41:55.580]  I was originally charged with multiple counts, um, at the plea.
[41:56.040 --> 42:10.240]  The charges were reduced to one count of unauthorized access to the New York Times network, which encompassed, um, my access to the Times network, to informational services to which the Times subscribed, and one section of what's called relevant conduct,
[42:10.540 --> 42:19.400]  um, which involved access to a Microsoft customer database containing information on everybody who had ever bought a product directly from Microsoft.
[42:21.420 --> 42:34.740]  And for those, the amalgamated damages were approximately $65,000, which is something that, um, I will have to pay back most likely, and I'd like to think that this will be an educational experience of sorts.
[42:34.840 --> 42:36.980]  I'm looking at it as sort of an extended student loan.
[42:37.160 --> 42:41.120]  I, I think that really all parties involved can come away better from this.
[42:41.260 --> 42:45.840]  I have to say you have an amazingly positive outlook on these kinds of... I'd be very bitter myself.
[42:46.760 --> 42:50.320]  Um, I, I think that really everybody involved is doing what they, what they feel is right.
[42:50.500 --> 42:53.320]  The, the Times felt that they had assets to defend, and that's their right.
[42:53.440 --> 42:56.540]  The agent felt that she had law to uphold, and that's certainly her duty.
[42:57.760 --> 43:06.100]  And I, for my part, at this point in time, have lessons that I think I've learned, and a future to look to, and I really want to put this behind me to the degree possible.
[43:06.400 --> 43:10.560]  And, which isn't to say that I support criminalizing curiosity, not in the least.
[43:10.660 --> 43:24.160]  And that's really why I'm going into journalism, because I believe that that's a venue where curiosity can make a difference, where I can do things involving curiosity, involving seeing things differently, involving wanting to know more about the world around me,
[43:24.260 --> 43:29.060]  and do them positively in a way that's legitimate, in a way that allows me to make a meaningful change.
[43:29.600 --> 43:30.000]  Adrian?
[43:30.800 --> 43:31.160]  Go ahead.
[43:31.620 --> 43:32.560]  I have a question for you.
[43:32.620 --> 43:33.660]  This is Bernie in Philadelphia.
[43:34.520 --> 43:38.540]  I understand you were charged under both the U.S.
[43:38.620 --> 43:42.000]  criminal code, which is Title 18, Section 1029 and 1030.
[43:42.000 --> 43:42.540]  Is that correct?
[43:42.700 --> 43:43.220]  That is correct.
[43:43.800 --> 43:59.000]  I was also charged under Section 1029 for possession of hardware or software that could be used for the unauthorized, used for modifying a piece of telecommunications equipment for the unauthorized access to telecommunications services.
[43:59.500 --> 44:03.660]  What part of Section 1029 specifically were you charged with violating?
[44:04.900 --> 44:19.580]  Well, I'm not a lawyer, but I'm under the impression that it had to do with unauthorized possession of access devices, in this case, passwords for a informational service, Lexis Nexus, to which the New York Times subscribed.
[44:20.360 --> 44:25.000]  So you were charged with possessing passwords that you shouldn't have had?
[44:25.560 --> 44:26.180]  That's correct.
[44:26.680 --> 44:26.880]  Okay.
[44:27.080 --> 44:28.140]  That's what I was trying to find out.
[44:28.340 --> 44:30.620]  What part of 1029 were you charged with?
[44:31.100 --> 44:38.340]  And so just the possession of a password, not necessarily the use of it, is a criminal offense, right?
[44:39.220 --> 44:42.420]  Again, I'm not a lawyer, and I'm not sure exactly how that was charged.
[44:42.620 --> 44:48.740]  In this case, I did make use of the passwords, and I confessed to that in my plea allocution.
[44:49.220 --> 44:49.840]  Were these...
[44:49.840 --> 45:00.700]  I have another question about the LexisNexis account that you allegedly used to look up legal information and news information.
[45:02.020 --> 45:05.600]  Was that a flat-rate account that New York Times had that you were charged with using?
[45:06.540 --> 45:07.780]  You know, I don't know.
[45:08.180 --> 45:10.360]  I don't have any formal information in that regard.
[45:12.100 --> 45:22.340]  I have reason to believe that it was flat-rate, but again, it's not something that I intend to nitpick about, I want to take responsibility for this, and I want to put it behind me.
[45:22.520 --> 45:22.700]  Right.
[45:22.780 --> 45:25.580]  I appreciate you can't be completely frank at all, you...
[45:25.580 --> 45:32.860]  I have to say you are being frank, and I appreciate the fact you're getting sentenced tomorrow, and you have to choose your words very carefully, because it's being...
[45:32.860 --> 45:36.600]  I'm sure every word you were saying tonight is being scrutinized, and it takes a lot of courage to...
[45:36.600 --> 45:40.840]  I like to think that I'd say the same things that I'm saying now, if this were happening two days later.
[45:41.580 --> 45:45.140]  I'm not one to put on different faces for different circumstances.
[45:45.500 --> 45:45.920]  I'm sure.
[45:47.600 --> 46:04.100]  Well, I mean, I'd like to say just to Bernie that, you know, along those lines, if something is an unlimited account, obviously, obviously, it didn't cost anything if somebody made use of it, if it wasn't charged, you know, per usage or whatever.
[46:04.220 --> 46:06.000]  But we don't know for sure if that was the case.
[46:06.440 --> 46:10.340]  But one has to suspect that a company like the New York Times would have some kind of arrangement like that.
[46:10.340 --> 46:16.440]  I think what Bernie's getting at is kind of curious how they computed this $65,000 figure.
[46:16.740 --> 46:21.400]  There's certainly been a history of companies just kind of inventing figures.
[46:21.520 --> 46:26.200]  You know, we caused $3 million worth of damage because whatever reason.
[46:26.620 --> 46:34.760]  And a lot of times the government will not take a case if, you know, someone only caused $50 worth of damage or no monetary damage at all.
[46:34.880 --> 46:36.900]  So they invent these large numbers.
[46:36.900 --> 46:41.520]  And I'm wondering if you have any idea how they came up with this number.
[46:42.100 --> 46:52.140]  Well, I know that it's the sum of the various parts of the allegations to which I confessed in that part of it comes from LexisNexis, part of it comes from the New York Times, and part of it comes from Microsoft.
[46:52.680 --> 46:56.020]  As to the precise calculations, I don't know.
[46:56.200 --> 47:07.900]  And I sort of made a decision early on that this was something that I could nitpick about or it's something that, you know, once they got it down to a reasonable figure, because the original figure just didn't strike me as reasonable.
[47:07.900 --> 47:11.640]  It was in the neighborhood of $300,000, just for the LexisNexis searches.
[47:12.540 --> 47:15.580]  And, you know, I just didn't believe that was true.
[47:15.760 --> 47:21.940]  But in the numbers that we've stipulated, too, I think that's reasonable, and I'm not going to nitpick at it.
[47:22.380 --> 47:23.620]  I appreciate that.
[47:23.640 --> 47:36.480]  I just think it's important to point out, for the sake of listeners who hear something like that, that somebody caused, you know, $100,000 of damage, just what exactly they're talking about when they say that and how that could be interpreted or misinterpreted.
[47:37.440 --> 47:52.000]  It could be analogized to someone borrowing your cell phone when you had unlimited nights and weekends for long distance, and they made a bunch of long-distance calls, and they gave it back to you, and you didn't give them permission to make long-distance calls,
[47:52.040 --> 47:56.460]  even though it didn't cost you a dime or even a penny for them to make those calls.
[47:58.800 --> 48:01.080]  That might be a similar analogy.
[48:01.700 --> 48:04.560]  Apparently, the New York Times didn't give Adrian permission.
[48:05.200 --> 48:16.200]  There's a very good chance that they had a flat... I mean, of all news entities, you would think the New York Times would have a flat-rate account for Alexis Nexus access, and it seemed astounding to me that they wouldn't.
[48:16.500 --> 48:26.360]  And how they came up with this dollar figure is really intriguing, because it makes... it reminds me of cases like Kevin Mitnick's case, where these numbers were just picked out of a hat.
[48:26.860 --> 48:29.000]  They remember the old 911...
[48:29.000 --> 48:30.000]  911 document?
[48:30.280 --> 48:31.280]  What did they say that was worth?
[48:32.340 --> 48:34.660]  75,000... you know, tens of thousands of dollars.
[48:34.760 --> 48:35.960]  It seemed like a large amount at the time.
[48:36.080 --> 48:37.500]  Now, of course, they're going crazy.
[48:37.660 --> 48:38.980]  Oh, $100 million now.
[48:39.460 --> 48:48.040]  And we saw them... we caught them at this with the Kevin Mitnick case, where they were saying things were worth a lot of money that they were giving away for free.
[48:48.560 --> 48:54.300]  You know, and it was obvious that the feds were simply trying to get them to come up with the largest number possible so that the case would stick.
[48:54.680 --> 48:57.980]  And in the end, in the Kevin Mitnick case, what was he finally ordered to pay?
[48:58.080 --> 49:00.700]  I think $3,000 was the total amount.
[49:01.560 --> 49:06.860]  And I think everybody came away from that realizing that it was really nonsense, that there was no harm caused.
[49:07.240 --> 49:07.620]  That, yeah...
[49:07.620 --> 49:08.900]  It literally was in the millions, remember?
[49:09.040 --> 49:10.460]  It was in the hundreds of millions, I believe.
[49:10.600 --> 49:11.180]  Yeah, it was.
[49:12.000 --> 49:17.120]  And, you know, obviously, to have somebody intrude on your computer system without permission is wrong.
[49:17.300 --> 49:19.300]  And Adrian certainly understands that.
[49:19.380 --> 49:20.260]  Kevin understands that.
[49:20.260 --> 49:31.360]  But what I don't understand, and I think a lot of other people don't understand, is how you can go after somebody and make their lives so miserable just to prove this point that has already been understood.
[49:32.020 --> 49:40.380]  The ironic thing in all this is because these, Section 1029, that Adrian is being charged at violating, falls under the federal fraud statutes.
[49:40.660 --> 49:56.300]  And what I find ritually ironic about all this is that the dollar estimates that are being thrown around for the damage that he allegedly caused, I think, are because they seem to be lacking in factual basis, are fraudulent in and of themselves.
[49:57.260 --> 50:02.140]  But, I mean, it's just ironic, and we may never be able to prove that, but it seems to be what's happening.
[50:03.760 --> 50:13.160]  Yeah, Bernie, in your case, were such things done very often as far as exaggerating the amount of something or just...
[50:13.160 --> 50:25.920]  No, my case was rather unique in that there was never even any allegation or charge that I had accessed anything or caused, you know, one dime's worth of damage or...
[50:26.580 --> 50:28.180]  No dollar figures were mentioned.
[50:28.180 --> 50:42.260]  In fact, in the pre-sentence investigation report, which will be read at Adrian's sentencing tomorrow, in my case, the pre-sentence investigation report stated, and I'm quoting from it here, there were no victims in the offense, end quote.
[50:43.860 --> 50:52.180]  Yet, I was charged with just the mere possession of hardware software that could have been misused, landed me with a conviction.
[50:52.200 --> 50:53.860]  Now, we all know it wasn't really about that.
[50:54.020 --> 50:55.180]  There's a long story behind it.
[50:55.300 --> 51:10.380]  But the bottom line is, they didn't actually stoop to coming up with fictitious dollar amounts, although it was insinuated that if I didn't plead guilty, that when it went to trial, they would... and if I were found guilty, which I certainly would have,
[51:10.420 --> 51:22.580]  because I never contested the fact that I possessed this hardware and software, the hardware you buy any Radio Shack and the software was being freely given away by me, that if you...
[51:22.580 --> 51:24.200]  I forget what my point was.
[51:24.440 --> 51:25.700]  If you, uh...
[51:25.700 --> 51:27.480]  I... sorry, I lost my track.
[51:27.660 --> 51:28.120]  Train of thought.
[51:29.020 --> 51:29.440]  Well, okay.
[51:29.440 --> 51:30.460]  What was your question again?
[51:31.100 --> 51:31.880]  Uh, well...
[51:31.880 --> 51:32.820]  Oh, the dollar... the dollar amount.
[51:32.900 --> 51:33.840]  Yeah, they were exaggerated.
[51:34.240 --> 51:52.800]  Yeah, well, what they said is, if I was found guilty, then at the sentencing stage, which is not an evidentiary proceeding, at the sentencing stage, they could estimate that the numbers of pieces, the software that I gave out, and the parts that I distributed,
[51:53.000 --> 52:03.660]  and you could buy at any Radio Shack store, could have been misused to commit this much, this many dollars amount in fraud, which would have significantly increased the number of years that I was spent behind bars.
[52:04.040 --> 52:13.560]  And they made that very clear, that if I didn't plead guilty, at the sentencing stage, where they don't have to prove a thing, they would come up with these estimates, which they're allowed to do.
[52:14.600 --> 52:18.900]  So, I saw the writing on the wall and realized that this wasn't going to go my way.
[52:19.220 --> 52:36.200]  So, in Adrian's case, I'm sure there is similar insinuations that they don't have... at the sentencing stage, if you go to trial in a federal case, and you're found guilty, they throw everything at you afterwards and don't have to prove anything.
[52:36.420 --> 52:44.800]  So, the dollar amounts, which you can come up with later, can be really fictitious, and they don't have to show any basis in fact to these dollar amounts.
[52:44.940 --> 52:47.900]  And the sentencing is based on the dollar amount.
[52:48.540 --> 52:53.820]  So, it's really not set up fairly, in my opinion.
[52:54.060 --> 52:56.660]  Well, they have all the resources, as you mentioned in Freedom Downtime.
[52:56.780 --> 52:59.640]  They have everything, and they're going to use all these resources.
[52:59.880 --> 53:02.180]  You don't have very much at all.
[53:02.320 --> 53:04.240]  So, obviously, it's, you know...
[53:04.240 --> 53:11.280]  Adrian was actually somewhat fortunate, although everybody thinks, you know, he's going through hell, and I sympathize with him.
[53:11.540 --> 53:23.400]  At least he had the benefit of being out to, you know, in a free state, not behind bars, to work on his own defense, which is very difficult to do when you're locked up.
[53:23.540 --> 53:31.480]  And when he is sentenced tomorrow, I'm certainly hoping he's not going to be incarcerated, but regardless of his sentence, he will have a date to look forward to.
[53:32.240 --> 53:50.000]  In Kevin's case, and in mine's case, neither of us knew, we were both locked up from the get-go, had no time to plan a defense, or no way to plan or strategize a defense outside of prison walls.
[53:50.120 --> 53:51.740]  And it's very difficult to do when you're locked up.
[53:51.780 --> 54:00.580]  You don't have access to the phone in a normal way, you don't have access to internet, you don't have access to people, you don't have access to books that you would normally on the outside.
[54:00.860 --> 54:17.200]  But one thing you do have is a lot of time, and I notice a lot of people behind bars turn into real legal experts, knowing, you know, every law that applies to them, and how it's not exactly true how they're being prosecuted, and I'm quite impressed sometimes reading some of the briefs that are filed by these people.
[54:17.380 --> 54:18.100]  It's astounding.
[54:18.220 --> 54:35.760]  But if you have access to Lexis, which is the big legal, the Mead Data Central legal database, which the feds have, that's a huge, you know, in a war of attrition, that's a huge advantage, being able to access, you know, all case law ever written at your fingertips with just a keystroke,
[54:35.760 --> 54:39.360]  as opposed to a bunch of musty volumes on a shelf.
[54:39.580 --> 54:43.320]  Unless you're using the New York Times account, in which case it's not an advantage at all.
[54:44.460 --> 54:45.620]  Kind of ironic there.
[54:45.700 --> 54:53.520]  Another thing that I think is ironic is that Adrian is interested in pursuing journalism, which, you know, I've often said that any good journalist is also a good hacker.
[54:54.560 --> 54:58.580]  And it's too bad that the Times didn't realize that.
[54:58.840 --> 55:03.260]  At least, you know, the legal arm of the Times, I guess, is not really the same as the reporter part of the Times.
[55:03.560 --> 55:07.400]  Well, the Times has remarkably few good journalists, but we'll talk about that another day.
[55:08.100 --> 55:08.800]  Okay, you're on.
[55:09.700 --> 55:13.440]  We're talking with Adrian Lamo, who's live in our studio on the eve of his sentencing.
[55:13.620 --> 55:17.820]  And in case you're worried that you won't be able to make a phone call, fret not, because we're on for an extra hour tonight.
[55:18.060 --> 55:21.120]  And our phone number is 212-209-2900.
[55:22.180 --> 55:26.560]  So if you want to ask any questions, but feel free to, you know, ask whatever you want.
[55:26.680 --> 55:29.000]  But I imagine there are some things, Adrian, that you can't talk about.
[55:29.160 --> 55:30.700]  And please respect that.
[55:30.700 --> 55:46.940]  Is it a stretch, Emmanuel, do you think, to suspect that journalists that work for the New York Times have at one time or another, somewhere down the road, done something that might not have been unethical to get information to research a case?
[55:47.060 --> 55:48.440]  Oh, I've witnessed it firsthand.
[55:48.980 --> 55:52.840]  I'm not going to name names, but yeah, journalists do that kind of thing all the time.
[55:52.960 --> 55:56.480]  Okay, so is this a case of the pot calling a kettle black, or what?
[55:56.480 --> 56:00.220]  Well, again, you know, it's not the journalists that are taking Adrian to court.
[56:00.340 --> 56:04.320]  I imagine most journalists would understand what it is that...
[56:04.320 --> 56:05.540]  Yes, but the Times, the Times is.
[56:05.920 --> 56:17.240]  The Times is a corporation out to make money and protect their shareholders, you know, and I think that's, you know, the fact that they publish a newspaper really is incidental, you know.
[56:18.300 --> 56:18.980]  I don't know.
[56:19.040 --> 56:21.940]  That's just my view of the way things are.
[56:23.060 --> 56:24.440]  I've got a quick question.
[56:25.460 --> 56:32.100]  When this first broke, I deal with high school kids all day long, and I was sharing the story, and they used a moniker for you.
[56:32.200 --> 56:33.120]  What do you call yourself?
[56:33.240 --> 56:36.000]  How do you look at... how would you describe yourself?
[56:36.760 --> 56:38.460]  I tend to not really describe myself.
[56:39.320 --> 56:50.260]  There are a lot of labels and a lot of terms that have been thrown out around there, but I don't really adopt any of them in that I don't necessarily feel that what I do is easily categorizable.
[56:50.520 --> 56:52.320]  For me, it's not strictly about technology.
[56:52.600 --> 57:02.040]  It's more about a way of looking at the world and looking at life, and as I've said before, it's ultimately closer to being about religion for me than it is about technology.
[57:02.820 --> 57:03.380]  Okay, good.
[57:03.580 --> 57:03.860]  Thanks.
[57:04.220 --> 57:04.520]  Okay.
[57:05.200 --> 57:07.220]  Again, you're listening to WBAI in New York.
[57:07.480 --> 57:12.040]  If you're tuning in for the personal computer show, actually, you'll be turning in in two minutes, but I'll make this announcement again.
[57:12.240 --> 57:13.740]  They are not on tonight, unfortunately.
[57:14.360 --> 57:17.400]  They will be back next week, and we're on for an extra hour.
[57:17.740 --> 57:28.960]  Again, our phone number is 212-209-2900, and we're with Adrian Lama, who is here from California, and hopefully you'll get to use that return plane ticket that you have.
[57:29.400 --> 57:34.020]  If not, you might be a guest of some institution for a while.
[57:35.140 --> 57:36.040]  It must be hard.
[57:36.320 --> 57:41.240]  I mean, how does it feel being in a foreign city, not knowing if you're going to be going back?
[57:42.280 --> 57:52.760]  It's nerve-wracking, and it's been a nerve-wracking process, but in a sense, I'm looking forward to tomorrow, and that it'll take a weight of uncertainty off my shoulders.
[57:54.000 --> 58:00.160]  I've spent the better part of the last six months not having any idea of what the future would hold for me.
[58:00.640 --> 58:08.080]  And after tomorrow, it will all be over, except for doing my time in whatever form it takes.
[58:08.660 --> 58:10.500]  And that's a relief.
[58:10.820 --> 58:14.760]  I won't have to worry about how it's going to play out that it'll be done with.
[58:15.160 --> 58:21.120]  And for me, I think that'll be a positive thing, as much as something positive can come out of this experience.
[58:21.260 --> 58:22.900]  I look forward to moving on.
[58:24.960 --> 58:26.120]  Okay, let's take some phone calls.
[58:26.240 --> 58:28.200]  212-209-2900.
[58:28.920 --> 58:29.760]  And good evening.
[58:29.860 --> 58:30.300]  You're on the air.
[58:30.880 --> 58:31.720]  Hey, Emmanuel.
[58:31.760 --> 58:32.220]  How's it going?
[58:32.360 --> 58:32.660]  How you doing?
[58:32.720 --> 58:33.120]  Where are you calling from?
[58:33.780 --> 58:34.140]  California.
[58:34.420 --> 58:34.720]  California.
[58:34.880 --> 58:35.500]  Okay, what's on your mind?
[58:36.060 --> 58:36.800]  I was curious.
[58:36.900 --> 58:39.360]  A few questions, especially one for Bernie.
[58:39.580 --> 58:42.980]  What's about... you guys actually brought up before about the cell phone blockers.
[58:43.640 --> 58:44.480]  I was curious.
[58:44.580 --> 58:52.080]  Is there anything for the wireless range, either 2.4 or 5.4, I believe it is, that does the same thing?
[58:52.280 --> 58:56.280]  That's going to stop people from using wireless internet in a certain area?
[58:56.780 --> 58:57.120]  Yeah.
[58:57.440 --> 58:58.980]  It's actually commonly available.
[58:58.980 --> 59:00.540]  It's called a microwave oven.
[59:01.840 --> 59:03.760]  Is there anything handheld that would do that?
[59:05.660 --> 59:10.500]  Because I know both microwaves and fluorescent lighting can stop 2.4.
[59:10.500 --> 59:25.360]  Well, you can... I mean, there are applications... there's malicious software out there, written that's out there, that just attacks wireless networks and uses up, like, uses up all the DHCP addresses, for instance, gobbles them all up.
[59:25.440 --> 59:33.000]  So if you're a DHCP Wi-Fi site, they're all gobbled up and you don't have any to use.
[59:33.140 --> 59:34.060]  So that's one thing.
[59:34.140 --> 59:51.040]  But just from an RF standpoint, which is what you asked, a simple $50 microwave oven, if the door is taken off and it's turned on and you jumper the interlock switch, that can knock out all the 2.4 gigahertz cordless phones and wireless networks within,
[59:51.040 --> 59:56.240]  like, you know, probably a mile, depending on which direction it's pointed.
[59:56.960 --> 59:57.280]  Oh, really?
[59:57.760 --> 59:57.920]  Yeah.
[59:58.060 --> 01:00:02.860]  Is there anything that would be handheld that you could create that wouldn't, say, generate white noise or something to that effect?
[01:00:02.960 --> 01:00:03.260]  Would that work?
[01:00:03.760 --> 01:00:04.980]  It could be done.
[01:00:05.240 --> 01:00:06.340]  There's no reason that couldn't.
[01:00:06.780 --> 01:00:11.280]  RF is funny how it behaves, the radio signals, how they bounce around and so forth.
[01:00:11.700 --> 01:00:14.360]  I wouldn't want to be near a microwave oven with this door open, though.
[01:00:14.540 --> 01:00:17.480]  I was going to say, Bernie, doesn't that also effectively work for birth control?
[01:00:19.660 --> 01:00:25.340]  Well, if you point it up at the sky, you could actually hit a duck with it and it would be cooked before it lands.
[01:00:26.940 --> 01:00:38.240]  The other, Bernie, this, Lynn, the other thing that's interesting is that those frequencies that are used for 802.11 are primary, well, secondarily allocated to ham radio, as you know.
[01:00:38.620 --> 01:00:52.600]  And there was a group in Texas who essentially shut down Wi-Fi within about a three-mile radius because it was interfering with their TV transmitter that they had had on the air for about ten years.
[01:00:53.340 --> 01:00:57.440]  And there was no legal problem with them doing that either because they were licensed.
[01:00:57.640 --> 01:00:58.440]  Their primary.
[01:00:58.980 --> 01:01:04.640]  Their primary and 802.11 is part 15, which means that it has to accept any harmful interference.
[01:01:04.960 --> 01:01:10.160]  The only people, the, the, um, actually I say primary, their secondary, of course the U.S.
[01:01:10.500 --> 01:01:13.200]  government is primary on, on, uh, 2.4.
[01:01:13.780 --> 01:01:15.580]  Okay, thanks, uh, thanks for that question.
[01:01:16.280 --> 01:01:17.460]  Uh, Lynn, also, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh,
[01:01:17.460 --> 01:01:18.120]  uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh
[00:00.000 --> 00:00.860]  They're primary.
[00:01.220 --> 00:07.000]  They're primary, and 802.11 is Part 15, which means that it has to accept any harmful interference.
[00:07.420 --> 00:10.620]  The only people... actually, I say primary.
[00:10.800 --> 00:11.420]  They're secondary.
[00:11.860 --> 00:12.520]  Of course, the U.S.
[00:12.620 --> 00:15.560]  government is primary on 2.4.
[00:16.300 --> 00:17.960]  Okay, thanks for that question.
[00:18.560 --> 00:22.600]  Lynn, also, let's announce the camera thing again, which I noticed that you're only pointing at me.
[00:22.840 --> 00:24.180]  Well, I moved it around some.
[00:24.180 --> 00:30.080]  Move it around a little bit more, because every time I look at the screen, I see my face, and, you know, I don't think that people need to see that that much.
[00:31.020 --> 00:35.580]  But we're broadcasting the show live over the Internet in many ways.
[00:35.740 --> 00:36.160]  Look what you've done.
[00:36.220 --> 00:38.040]  We've got, like, dueling cameras in the studio.
[00:38.040 --> 00:39.360]  Now, Jeff has his camera out.
[00:39.420 --> 00:39.580]  Okay.
[00:40.460 --> 00:41.680]  Give us the URL again.
[00:41.940 --> 00:46.160]  Yeah, it's jawga.com.
[00:46.540 --> 00:51.360]  Okay, and if you go there, you'll see pictures of this program, and now Adrian has his camera out, too.
[00:53.180 --> 00:54.440]  Boy, this is really something.
[00:55.260 --> 01:00.240]  And you'll see pictures of us doing the radio program here live on WBAI in New York.
[01:00.400 --> 01:05.780]  Again, if you're tuning in for the Personal Computer Show, regretfully, those fine folks are not here tonight.
[01:05.940 --> 01:10.160]  They will be back next week, so feel free to tune in.
[01:10.160 --> 01:14.020]  The Haitian Freedom Specialist is postponed until it comes back.
[01:14.380 --> 01:20.540]  Yeah, if you somehow read the Daily News today and saw an announcement for that, well, that's being taped.
[01:20.780 --> 01:22.180]  So that will be broadcast at a later date.
[01:22.220 --> 01:23.940]  I'm sure we'll have all kinds of announcements about that.
[01:25.020 --> 01:29.920]  Okay, again, we have Adrian Lamo here with us in the studio on the eve of his sentencing in federal court tomorrow.
[01:30.820 --> 01:36.960]  And if you have any questions, comments, remarks, that kind of a thing, please give us a call, 212-209-2900.
[01:37.360 --> 01:39.100]  And let's take this listener phone call.
[01:39.200 --> 01:40.240]  Good evening, you're on the air.
[01:40.400 --> 01:41.940]  Oh, that person lost their patience.
[01:41.960 --> 01:44.220]  Let's go over to this line.
[01:45.280 --> 01:46.540]  And good evening, you're on the air.
[01:46.940 --> 01:47.300]  Hello?
[01:47.480 --> 01:48.000]  Yes, go ahead.
[01:48.000 --> 02:00.840]  Yeah, I have a question about Wi-Fi, but first I have a comment for the gentleman that's going to be sentenced tomorrow and about that dollar amount that the feds use, because I had a case with the feds also, and I think I was charged with illegal use of access into the license.
[02:00.880 --> 02:04.800]  I actually had a couple of cases before them in the Eastern District of New York.
[02:05.120 --> 02:10.120]  And actually, the feds don't have jurisdiction unless it's over $5,000.
[02:10.200 --> 02:16.840]  So they will add to that or find ways to build up the dollar amount.
[02:16.840 --> 02:23.540]  And in my case, they actually levy the fine against us for me and my brother for, I think, $300,000 each.
[02:23.700 --> 02:36.620]  And the only reason that we haven't had to pay that is because after we got out of prison, because we went to trial, we went into the court transcripts and brought out the fact that the so-called victims in the case testified that the insurance paid for anything,
[02:36.900 --> 02:38.680]  everything, so they didn't take a loss.
[02:39.000 --> 02:40.700]  So that restitution...
[02:43.360 --> 02:48.020]  They've been trying to contact me for, like, two years after that, trying to collect that $300,000.
[02:48.360 --> 02:50.640]  Well, there's really... I've got to interject here.
[02:50.720 --> 02:55.920]  There is no $5,000 threshold that kicks in federal jurisdiction.
[02:56.720 --> 03:05.740]  The feds can take... the Secret Service, FBI, any other federal law enforcement agency can take action, criminal action against anyone in a fraud case, even if there was no dollar amount alleged.
[03:05.780 --> 03:10.600]  In my case, and I'm quoting from my sentencing report, it says there were no victims in the offense.
[03:10.860 --> 03:12.360]  That means zero dollar amount.
[03:12.360 --> 03:13.860]  It affects interstate commerce.
[03:14.160 --> 03:15.760]  It affects interstate commerce.
[03:15.760 --> 03:17.780]  Everything affects interstate commerce.
[03:17.960 --> 03:17.980]  Right.
[03:17.980 --> 03:22.660]  If you look and see how they stretch the interstate commerce clause, I mean, their masters is stretching that.
[03:22.760 --> 03:24.960]  So everything is affected under interstate commerce.
[03:25.060 --> 03:25.900]  That's not even an issue.
[03:26.040 --> 03:28.340]  I do have one piece of advice for the gentleman, though.
[03:29.000 --> 03:37.760]  Before he... no one in the federal court even pays attention to this, but the PSI, the pre-sentencing report, if there's anything that's incorrect in that, challenge it.
[03:37.760 --> 03:47.820]  A lot of people don't like to do that because it has to do... it doesn't affect the sentence or anything, but it will affect you once you get in, in terms of where you allocate it and your status and stuff like that.
[03:47.940 --> 03:51.240]  So if there's anything incorrect in the PSI, challenge it ahead of time.
[03:51.440 --> 04:03.740]  And the question I have about Wi-Fi is, I have 802.11b built into a handheld computer that I have, and I'm pulling a signal from... actually, I don't know where it's coming from.
[04:03.740 --> 04:04.900]  This is how I go online.
[04:05.080 --> 04:06.920]  Everywhere I go, I pull a signal from everywhere.
[04:07.080 --> 04:11.280]  But when I'm at home, I'm pulling it from, I believe, an industrial park next to me.
[04:11.640 --> 04:22.400]  How can... is it possible for me to buy a repeater and boost their signal so that I can get it... make the signal stronger and put it all throughout my home?
[04:23.020 --> 04:23.380]  Yes.
[04:23.760 --> 04:24.620]  How would I do that?
[04:24.740 --> 04:26.560]  Because when I go on, it says Linksys.
[04:26.660 --> 04:27.240]  There's two of them.
[04:27.320 --> 04:30.400]  One of them says Linksys, and the other one says Warehouse.
[04:30.920 --> 04:31.740]  So how do I help?
[04:31.740 --> 04:35.000]  Well, let's assume you have permission to access their network first.
[04:36.260 --> 04:37.280]  That's a good assumption.
[04:38.180 --> 04:45.100]  Assuming you had their permission, you could set up a couple of wireless access points with a bridge between them.
[04:45.340 --> 04:45.540]  Right.
[04:45.640 --> 04:49.880]  And it would effectively be... you could configure it to basically be a repeater.
[04:50.420 --> 04:50.520]  Okay.
[04:50.820 --> 04:52.860]  And Lynn could probably go into that in more detail, couldn't you, Lynn?
[04:53.080 --> 04:58.720]  Yeah, I would say the Linksys product might not be the best way to go.
[04:58.720 --> 05:00.240]  So it's going to be the easiest one to repeat.
[05:00.600 --> 05:06.700]  But there's a product out called a DWL900+.
[05:07.380 --> 05:13.700]  And I know for sure it has a repeater mode, and it repeats anything from anybody.
[05:13.700 --> 05:15.340]  You just bind to the MAC address.
[05:16.200 --> 05:16.740]  Lynn product?
[05:17.080 --> 05:18.080]  Sorry, repeat that?
[05:18.240 --> 05:18.960]  Who's the product?
[05:19.140 --> 05:20.160]  Who's the manufacturer?
[05:20.360 --> 05:21.160]  I think it's D-Link.
[05:21.340 --> 05:21.920]  D-Link, right?
[05:21.920 --> 05:22.460]  Yeah.
[05:22.640 --> 05:28.860]  And so I wouldn't actually have to be able to have access to their system to code it or any type of thing like that.
[05:28.980 --> 05:30.260]  It just looks for the MAC.
[05:30.440 --> 05:31.240]  You just have...
[05:31.240 --> 05:36.900]  It scans the area, and it says, which of these networks do you want to repeat?
[05:37.120 --> 05:40.280]  And you click on the MAC address of the one you want to repeat.
[05:40.480 --> 05:43.940]  And from there on out, that one just repeats everything that one hears.
[05:44.200 --> 05:44.740]  Oh, great.
[05:46.460 --> 05:49.320]  With a really good antenna, you can repeat that quite a distance.
[05:49.620 --> 05:51.340]  Assuming you have...
[05:51.340 --> 05:52.020]  Permission.
[05:52.400 --> 05:52.760]  Permission.
[05:52.980 --> 05:53.260]  Of course.
[05:53.480 --> 05:55.580]  Well, he wouldn't want to do it without permission, I'm sure.
[05:55.600 --> 05:56.620]  We're always going to make that assumption.
[05:56.800 --> 05:58.480]  But thanks very much for that phone call.
[05:59.260 --> 06:02.360]  And again, 212-209-2900 is our phone number.
[06:02.400 --> 06:02.920]  This is off the hook.
[06:03.060 --> 06:04.420]  We're on until 9 o'clock tonight.
[06:05.080 --> 06:06.520]  In the studio is Adrian Lamo.
[06:07.100 --> 06:07.940]  Mike, you have something to say?
[06:07.960 --> 06:11.280]  He could also, I think, just buy a better antenna for his wireless card.
[06:11.620 --> 06:11.880]  Yeah.
[06:12.200 --> 06:14.600]  A lot of times, that makes all the difference in the world.
[06:14.720 --> 06:16.260]  It's a low-tech solution.
[06:16.460 --> 06:18.560]  But he is trying to repeat it around the house, he said.
[06:19.160 --> 06:19.820]  Okay, fine.
[06:20.900 --> 06:22.220]  And good evening, you're on the air.
[06:23.400 --> 06:23.760]  Okay.
[06:24.220 --> 06:25.600]  Another person, losing patience there.
[06:25.620 --> 06:26.760]  Good evening, you're on the air.
[06:27.760 --> 06:29.000]  Holy God, did I make it on?
[06:29.080 --> 06:30.260]  You're on the air, yes.
[06:30.520 --> 06:30.760]  Wow.
[06:31.260 --> 06:34.600]  I have a few things to say, and I actually wrote them down so I wouldn't forget.
[06:34.800 --> 06:35.040]  Good.
[06:35.220 --> 06:36.280]  Where are you calling from, first of all?
[06:36.840 --> 06:37.580]  Upstate New York.
[06:37.700 --> 06:38.240]  Upstate New York.
[06:38.360 --> 06:39.000]  Okay, what's on your mind?
[06:40.160 --> 06:44.300]  First of all, I've never gotten to meet Rebel, and I don't think I want to.
[06:45.100 --> 06:46.380]  Let's not talk about that.
[06:46.380 --> 06:49.300]  That guy needs to stop calling, because I can never get through.
[06:49.760 --> 06:52.020]  Okay, well, you got through tonight, so let's not talk about him.
[06:52.180 --> 06:52.960]  Let's continue.
[06:53.500 --> 06:59.280]  And also, like a month ago, I sent him an email, because I want to be a speaker at the Fifth Hope.
[06:59.820 --> 07:01.380]  Okay, and you haven't heard anything yet?
[07:01.460 --> 07:02.140]  No, I've never heard anything.
[07:02.140 --> 07:06.660]  Yes, well, we probably have it on file, and we just started processing them last night, in fact.
[07:07.060 --> 07:09.560]  So you will be hearing something soon, guaranteed.
[07:09.800 --> 07:15.980]  And those people who are interested in being speakers, email 5h-speakers at 2600.com.
[07:16.220 --> 07:19.480]  Again, the Fifth Hope is taking place July 9th through 11th here in New York City.
[07:19.660 --> 07:27.620]  And if you're interested in volunteering in whatever capacity you feel you can volunteer, email 5h-volunteers at 2600.com.
[07:27.620 --> 07:31.200]  And for more information on the conference, www.hope.net.
[07:31.560 --> 07:35.980]  And I can't tell you how many religious zealots want that domain, but we're holding on to it.
[07:36.020 --> 07:36.960]  Hope.net is ours.
[07:37.400 --> 07:39.060]  Okay, what else is on your mind?
[07:39.260 --> 07:51.780]  Well, a while back, you spoke about how the FBI is getting, like, more permissions, or they're trying to get more permissions with ISPs to, like, tap and kind of sniff exactly what people are doing.
[07:53.100 --> 08:02.920]  And I think we need to really worry about that a lot more, because even with encryption, I mean, when you're someone's default gateway, you know, it really doesn't matter what they do.
[08:03.100 --> 08:05.400]  You can almost always get, see what they're doing.
[08:07.040 --> 08:15.780]  You know, I think a good proven method with that is SSH, because you can actually perform a man-in-the-middle attack with that.
[08:17.100 --> 08:25.680]  And if you're not watching carefully, it will tell you that, you know, your remote host fingerprint has changed.
[08:25.960 --> 08:28.180]  But you can just hit, you know, yeah, I do want to continue.
[08:29.340 --> 08:33.100]  And not notice, yeah, just do it too fast and not pay attention to these messages.
[08:33.380 --> 08:40.520]  So I think, one, we need to be careful with that and not let the Fed get too much access rights.
[08:40.520 --> 08:52.740]  And, two, what happens when a social engineer contacts the ISP and tricks them into thinking that they're with the government and they can see exactly what you're doing, so...
[08:52.740 --> 08:56.400]  Oh, of course, you know, things like that are theoretically possible.
[08:56.680 --> 08:56.800]  Yeah.
[08:57.160 --> 08:59.640]  And, you know, if it happens, I'd certainly like to know about it.
[08:59.880 --> 09:00.020]  Mm-hmm.
[09:00.240 --> 09:00.820]  Anything else?
[09:01.040 --> 09:01.960]  No, I think that's it.
[09:02.080 --> 09:02.900]  Okay, thanks for your call.
[09:03.180 --> 09:03.620]  Yep, thank you.
[09:04.300 --> 09:06.240]  All right, 212-209-2900.
[09:06.540 --> 09:07.220]  Let's take this call.
[09:07.260 --> 09:07.540]  Good evening.
[09:07.660 --> 09:08.140]  You're on the air.
[09:08.700 --> 09:10.880]  Hi, yes, just a moment, let me...
[09:11.360 --> 09:19.260]  Yeah, I'm thinking about the situation in the airports with the tracking devices, the tracking system they have.
[09:19.360 --> 09:19.580]  Mm-hmm.
[09:20.400 --> 09:23.800]  It seems to me that it would be very easy to thwart these things.
[09:26.080 --> 09:38.880]  Just make a noise generator with a diode and a triple-A cell and then feed this to a tune circuit and an amplifier transistor.
[09:39.180 --> 09:49.180]  It would take two transistors, one triple-A cell and a tune circuit, and you could drop these things all over the place and drive them absolutely crazy.
[09:49.320 --> 09:52.000]  And what do you say to the TSA when I ask just, what the hell are you doing?
[09:54.500 --> 10:01.100]  You just load up your pockets, you drop them on, you know, in the washroom and trash baskets and so forth.
[10:01.100 --> 10:07.060]  But can you imagine the questioning if you got stopped by the TSA with a bunch of these things in your pocket?
[10:07.160 --> 10:14.060]  I'm just, you know, your intentions are pure, I give you that, but it could definitely land you on the news.
[10:14.060 --> 10:18.500]  You can't just take Radio Shack parts and just carry them around and put them places.
[10:18.640 --> 10:20.280]  You're liable to get locked up in federal prison.
[10:20.680 --> 10:20.900]  Yeah.
[10:21.200 --> 10:21.980]  Bernie knows that.
[10:22.080 --> 10:23.160]  He knows that first sentence.
[10:23.480 --> 10:24.280]  We all know.
[10:24.420 --> 10:24.620]  Jim?
[10:24.800 --> 10:39.980]  The problem with this is if you have something that's going to be giving out an RFID signal when it gets pinged, is all of a sudden they're going to have all these unusual signals all in one group moving throughout the airport and stopping at every garbage can site.
[10:40.760 --> 10:43.680]  Don't you think you'd get picked up before you get too far in?
[10:44.440 --> 10:45.520]  No, they'll have a switch.
[10:45.940 --> 10:48.280]  Well, you could simply have a switch, yeah, exactly.
[10:48.440 --> 10:49.300]  Connect him to a cell phone.
[10:49.340 --> 10:49.900]  Don't help him.
[10:50.920 --> 10:51.340]  That's right.
[10:51.480 --> 10:52.080]  That's conspiracy.
[10:53.300 --> 10:55.540]  All right, thanks for that call and for those ideas.
[10:55.780 --> 10:56.980]  We certainly have a lot to mull over now.
[10:58.240 --> 11:04.740]  Okay, again, I want to stress that Adrian Lamo is here, too, and, you know, if you have anything to ask him or advice to give him.
[11:04.880 --> 11:06.420]  Bernie, you've already given some advice.
[11:06.540 --> 11:10.700]  Any other words of advice for somebody on the eve of their sentencing?
[11:10.760 --> 11:13.820]  I know, you know, it makes all the difference in the world that he's out and not in.
[11:13.820 --> 11:22.300]  And like you were, I remember seeing you when you were being, you know, held in court and the horrible shape you were in because of the conditions that you were held in.
[11:22.760 --> 11:29.000]  I think it really, as you said, makes all the difference when you're able to, you know, think rationally in the free world before this happens.
[11:29.000 --> 11:33.460]  Yeah, but it's really not much easier, I don't think, in Adrian's case.
[11:33.660 --> 11:45.460]  The best advice I've heard from many attorneys who were former federal prosecutors themselves, my best attorney was, he said you have to be as contrite as you can possibly be.
[11:45.760 --> 11:53.700]  Just, you know, and I think Adrian is sincerely contrite about what he did, what he pleaded to doing.
[11:53.700 --> 11:57.620]  And he just has to show that he's sorry to the judge.
[11:57.720 --> 11:58.800]  The judge warns to hear.
[11:58.940 --> 12:01.620]  It's really an experience of a beratement.
[12:01.940 --> 12:02.080]  Right.
[12:02.320 --> 12:05.160]  The prosecution will berate you.
[12:05.600 --> 12:16.360]  The judge will read a bunch of charges, and you may not feel that you're guilty of some of them, but you still have to say, yes, I did this, yes, I apologize, I was the worst person in the world, whatever.
[12:16.980 --> 12:25.940]  You've got to convince the judge that you really are sincere, and I believe Adrian is sincerely believing that he stepped over the line.
[12:25.940 --> 12:27.040]  I truly believe that.
[12:27.200 --> 12:35.940]  But he's got to convince the judge of that, and the prosecutor's going to paint him as the devil incarnate, and the judge is going to want to hear contrition.
[12:35.940 --> 12:39.680]  Bernie, in all fairness, I've been talking to Adrian for a while now, before the show.
[12:39.860 --> 12:44.420]  I don't think he's going to cop to anything that he doesn't feel responsible for.
[12:44.800 --> 12:48.180]  If he is called the devil incarnate, I don't think he's going to say, yes, I am.
[12:48.640 --> 12:54.260]  It's a question of being honest, and I think they can tell when you're being honest and when you're just saying what they want to hear.
[12:54.580 --> 12:58.220]  And in Adrian's case, I think this is how he really feels.
[12:58.520 --> 12:58.980]  So do I.
[12:59.600 --> 13:02.360]  Reading like Milton and things, the devil doesn't seem all that bad.
[13:03.460 --> 13:07.960]  All right, you're going to have to answer to that in front of some court someplace, I'm sure, but not on this show.
[13:08.180 --> 13:18.780]  But the caller who called in and said you should try to contest some inaccuracies in the pre-sentence investigation report, I imagine, Adrian, you've already seen your PSI report?
[13:20.740 --> 13:21.760]  Yeah, to an extent.
[13:22.100 --> 13:22.320]  Okay.
[13:22.700 --> 13:25.300]  Do you agree with absolutely everything that it says?
[13:26.820 --> 13:28.500]  It's pretty much sticking to the facts.
[13:28.500 --> 13:33.220]  There's nothing in there that's untrue, and there's certainly not anything in there worth contesting it.
[13:33.520 --> 13:35.900]  It effectively describes my course of conduct and...
[13:35.900 --> 13:39.860]  Well, that's good, because unfortunately, if there was something in there that wasn't true...
[13:39.860 --> 13:41.280]  You'd be a little bit late to worry about it.
[13:41.280 --> 13:43.740]  If you know that you can't really...
[13:43.740 --> 13:45.220]  You really have to bring it up at the sentencing hearing.
[13:45.360 --> 13:47.880]  That's when you have to bring it up at your last chance.
[13:48.420 --> 13:58.720]  If there was anything in there that wasn't accurate or wasn't true, if you challenge these things, it makes you appear as you're not as contrite.
[13:59.040 --> 14:00.900]  And, you know, what are you going to do?
[14:01.080 --> 14:08.960]  So I'm glad that yours seems fairly accurate, and that's a good thing, and you don't even have to quibble about anything that's in there.
[14:09.040 --> 14:10.400]  That's a good thing in your side.
[14:11.060 --> 14:16.160]  And, you know, it's something of a cliche, but at least in this context, I like to think that actions will speak louder than words.
[14:16.380 --> 14:32.440]  I mean, it's only been six or seven months since my arrest, but I like to think that during that period of time, I've demonstrated as well as I can that I'm not just waiting for an opportunity to go back into a life of crime.
[14:32.960 --> 14:33.320]  Absolutely.
[14:33.520 --> 14:34.560]  I'm in school full-time.
[14:34.720 --> 14:35.940]  I've been writing for my school paper.
[14:36.100 --> 14:41.520]  I've been freelancing for a number of publications, and I'm really happy doing these things.
[14:41.560 --> 14:46.620]  I don't feel like, you know, there's anything for my life.
[14:46.820 --> 14:47.980]  Yeah, this is not your life.
[14:48.060 --> 14:51.020]  This is not something that encompasses everything you do.
[14:51.200 --> 14:52.720]  This is merely one chapter.
[14:52.940 --> 15:05.020]  But I'm curious, do you have any idea why, as opposed to cases like Bernie, cases like Kevin, you weren't treated like enemy of the state and held in solitary confinement and treated horribly?
[15:05.020 --> 15:06.940]  Do you think they're being fairer with you?
[15:08.160 --> 15:23.680]  I like to think that it's really part of, you know, I alluded to the fact that security prosecutions and Internet culture are evolving processes, and I like to think that this case is, to an extent, the sum of what's come before it in a lot of ways, that,
[15:23.700 --> 15:26.460]  you know, the government has no reason to want to repeat mistakes.
[15:26.880 --> 15:32.720]  You know, they know what works, what doesn't, and what's reasonably, well, reasonable.
[15:32.960 --> 15:36.740]  And I think that they're treading around that.
[15:37.120 --> 15:50.160]  And also, I like to think that the fact that I accepted responsibility early and that I really didn't make any effort to avoid that.
[15:50.160 --> 15:55.840]  Well, you accepted responsibility early than almost anybody because you did it before you were even charged.
[15:55.840 --> 16:08.000]  And, I mean, one thing in your career is you've always been up front about what exactly you did in the hopes that, obviously, they would take that seriously and fix the problem, you know?
[16:08.060 --> 16:16.460]  And it's just unfortunate that in this case they took their time fixing the problem and then they went after you as if you had caused the problem when, in fact, you had just discovered it.
[16:16.620 --> 16:22.260]  I think at one point, a long time ago, I joked that if one is going to be a federal criminal, one might as well be an honest one.
[16:23.720 --> 16:31.700]  And I'm through being a federal criminal, but I like to think that I'll be able to carry over the latter part into journalism because there's, I think, too little of that around these days.
[16:32.180 --> 16:32.820]  All right, let's hope so.
[16:33.280 --> 16:35.200]  Again, Adrian Lamo here in the studio with us.
[16:35.480 --> 16:36.740]  He's being sentenced tomorrow.
[16:36.940 --> 16:40.280]  Do you know what the range that you can get is?
[16:41.380 --> 16:47.200]  The plea agreement stipulates a sentence of between 6 to 12 months.
[16:47.200 --> 16:52.420]  And because of the nature of the offense, there are various ways that that sentence can be served.
[16:52.560 --> 16:53.700]  It can be served as house arrest.
[16:53.860 --> 16:55.740]  It can be served as community confinement.
[16:55.760 --> 16:57.720]  I can go to jail on weekends.
[16:58.800 --> 17:00.640]  Or I can go to federal prison.
[17:00.960 --> 17:06.680]  And it's my hope that they'll take into account a lot of the factors that are existing in this case.
[17:07.440 --> 17:08.900]  The fact that my family needs me.
[17:08.980 --> 17:13.260]  The fact that being around my family I think has been helpful to everybody involved.
[17:13.260 --> 17:17.300]  It's given me a bit of a new outlook on a lot of things.
[17:19.500 --> 17:20.780]  And it's also...
[17:20.780 --> 17:23.620]  The case itself has propelled me to things that I probably wouldn't have done otherwise.
[17:23.880 --> 17:25.740]  I wouldn't have gotten around to enrolling in school.
[17:25.880 --> 17:27.860]  But now that I've had to, I'm enjoying it.
[17:29.340 --> 17:34.180]  Working on my school newspaper staff, I push the envelope in terms of coverage.
[17:34.180 --> 17:38.120]  I like to try and get them to cover things that college newspapers generally don't.
[17:38.220 --> 17:43.120]  But it's one of those rare occasions in life where I genuinely feel like I'm part of a community.
[17:43.980 --> 17:48.360]  Like, I have a vested interest in the future of the paper of where it goes.
[17:48.620 --> 17:53.880]  I want it to be someplace that people consider for news about Sacramento.
[17:54.180 --> 17:56.920]  I want it to not be limited by the fact that it's a college paper.
[17:57.080 --> 17:57.600]  What's the paper?
[17:57.820 --> 17:58.900]  The American River Current.
[17:59.080 --> 17:59.420]  Uh-huh.
[17:59.680 --> 18:01.660]  The finest source of news in Northern California.
[18:02.800 --> 18:03.200]  Great.
[18:03.440 --> 18:05.460]  Well, it's good to see you involved in that.
[18:05.600 --> 18:07.100]  And I hope that works out, too.
[18:08.120 --> 18:11.200]  212-209-2900 is our phone number if you have any questions or comments.
[18:11.200 --> 18:14.380]  Let's go over here and take this phone call.
[18:15.160 --> 18:15.760]  Good evening.
[18:15.860 --> 18:16.320]  You're on the air.
[18:17.560 --> 18:18.140]  Go ahead.
[18:18.620 --> 18:19.080]  How you doing?
[18:19.520 --> 18:19.960]  How you doing?
[18:20.000 --> 18:20.480]  What's on your mind?
[18:20.680 --> 18:21.180]  Not much.
[18:21.300 --> 18:23.220]  Just so you guys know about that D-Link.
[18:23.980 --> 18:26.400]  It's the D-W-L-900-AP.
[18:27.760 --> 18:28.000]  Okay.
[18:28.380 --> 18:28.980]  Yes, thank you.
[18:29.080 --> 18:30.080]  I've got another thing to mention.
[18:30.240 --> 18:30.600]  Yes, go ahead.
[18:31.660 --> 18:33.560]  I don't know if you guys ever heard of the Pringle can.
[18:34.040 --> 18:35.260]  Oh, we've heard of the Pringle can.
[18:35.380 --> 18:36.020]  The Pringle can.
[18:36.120 --> 18:36.280]  Yeah.
[18:36.300 --> 18:40.780]  If you just go around in the city with that, you can pick up so much wireless activity, especially even going through the tunnel.
[18:40.960 --> 18:41.320]  Uh-huh.
[18:41.820 --> 18:43.000]  Which is pretty amazing.
[18:43.140 --> 18:43.560]  That's true.
[18:43.700 --> 18:44.080]  That's true.
[18:44.220 --> 18:53.320]  It actually works better if you use a coffee can because that silver stuff on the inside of the Pringles can really isn't that great for directing the signal.
[18:53.600 --> 18:55.020]  Isn't it the same as the coffee can?
[18:55.320 --> 18:55.640]  Uh-uh.
[18:56.580 --> 19:01.120]  That aluminum-looking stuff on the inside of the can really doesn't work that great.
[19:02.360 --> 19:05.480]  Don't you think it would be a little bit easier to hide a Pringles can than a coffee can?
[19:06.960 --> 19:09.540]  Well, it depends on what are you trying to hide from.
[19:10.640 --> 19:11.700]  Just picking up wireless.
[19:11.780 --> 19:14.480]  Say you're just driving in the city just trying to pick up signal.
[19:14.880 --> 19:18.480]  Oh, I have a hole-mount antenna on the roof of the car.
[19:18.600 --> 19:20.640]  That works much better than any of the above items.
[19:20.940 --> 19:21.260]  Really?
[19:21.520 --> 19:21.760]  Yes.
[19:22.220 --> 19:22.560]  Really.
[19:22.880 --> 19:23.160]  Okay.
[19:23.420 --> 19:24.700]  Hey, thanks for your call.
[19:24.760 --> 19:25.420]  Thanks for that advice.
[19:25.640 --> 19:26.720]  And good luck with the Pringles can.
[19:27.780 --> 19:28.380]  Good evening.
[19:28.500 --> 19:28.880]  You're on the air.
[19:29.620 --> 19:33.240]  Yeah, I guess you're going to be the life of the party in the shower room there.
[19:33.820 --> 19:34.300]  All right.
[19:34.300 --> 19:34.920]  That's enough of that.
[19:35.360 --> 19:35.920]  Good evening.
[19:36.020 --> 19:36.500]  You're on the air.
[19:36.700 --> 19:40.900]  When I told the phone company about my...
[19:40.900 --> 19:42.160]  Rebel, you have 30 seconds.
[19:42.260 --> 19:42.380]  All right.
[19:42.760 --> 19:51.900]  When I told the phone company about what's wrong with it, for example, you can call a certain exchange collect, like cellular phone exchange collect.
[19:52.200 --> 19:58.780]  I social engineered my way to the people who are in charge of, I guess, fraud or investigations or whatever.
[19:59.000 --> 19:59.440]  Ten seconds.
[19:59.440 --> 20:00.440]  They didn't arrest me.
[20:00.440 --> 20:01.240]  They didn't arrest me.
[20:02.520 --> 20:04.460]  They just, you know, they took my...
[20:04.460 --> 20:05.340]  And they fixed it.
[20:05.440 --> 20:07.500]  Well, they didn't fix it yet, but they're about to fix it.
[20:07.960 --> 20:08.240]  All right.
[20:08.340 --> 20:08.600]  Thank you.
[20:09.180 --> 20:11.720]  As that proves, there's no justice in the world.
[20:11.880 --> 20:12.480]  Rebel for us there.
[20:12.520 --> 20:12.940]  Good evening.
[20:13.080 --> 20:13.760]  You're on the air.
[20:14.740 --> 20:15.220]  Go ahead.
[20:15.220 --> 20:16.080]  Hi.
[20:16.320 --> 20:19.120]  I wanted to bring a correction about last week's broadcast.
[20:19.520 --> 20:25.420]  Somebody had mentioned that regarding the Pennsylvania license, your Social Security figured on it.
[20:25.980 --> 20:26.380]  Yes.
[20:26.380 --> 20:28.120]  Actually, I apologize.
[20:28.580 --> 20:29.700]  That has changed.
[20:29.860 --> 20:35.340]  It used to be the Social Security number was on Pennsylvania driver's licenses, and they have taken it off since.
[20:35.620 --> 20:36.100]  Yes.
[20:36.820 --> 20:37.920]  It's a while, man.
[20:38.460 --> 20:44.960]  And it's fair to say that they have the best motor vehicle across the nation, and that is compared to New York.
[20:46.240 --> 20:47.140]  You're saying that...
[20:47.140 --> 20:50.000]  They have the best service when it comes to the Department of Motors.
[20:50.000 --> 20:50.500]  Oh, the service.
[20:50.720 --> 20:51.020]  Okay.
[20:51.200 --> 20:51.500]  Well, yeah.
[20:51.620 --> 20:53.160]  I shouldn't have been getting any argument with me about that.
[20:54.080 --> 20:54.580]  All righty.
[20:54.740 --> 20:55.000]  All right.
[20:55.040 --> 20:55.640]  Great show, guys.
[20:55.800 --> 20:56.000]  Thanks.
[20:56.160 --> 20:57.080]  Thank you for pointing that out.
[20:57.200 --> 20:57.360]  Yeah.
[20:57.480 --> 21:00.180]  So, what states still do use Social Security numbers on their licenses?
[21:00.340 --> 21:00.800]  Anybody know?
[21:01.560 --> 21:02.240]  Massachusetts, Mike?
[21:02.760 --> 21:02.880]  No.
[21:03.080 --> 21:03.300]  They don't have...
[21:03.300 --> 21:04.840]  Well, Massachusetts is an option.
[21:05.000 --> 21:07.880]  You check a box on the form, and you get a state random number instead.
[21:07.920 --> 21:10.140]  So, if you don't check the box, you get your Social Security number on your license.
[21:10.140 --> 21:11.640]  I don't know what the default is.
[21:12.140 --> 21:12.500]  Georgia.
[21:12.840 --> 21:13.180]  Georgia.
[21:13.600 --> 21:21.780]  You have the option, but you don't have the option not to have your fingerprint put in a 2D barcode on the back of your driver's license.
[21:22.020 --> 21:22.240]  Fingerprints.
[21:22.400 --> 21:22.840]  That's...
[21:22.840 --> 21:24.620]  Everything is going to be fingerprints in the future.
[21:24.760 --> 21:25.420]  Jeff, how about Jersey?
[21:26.620 --> 21:27.540]  SSNs on licenses?
[21:27.840 --> 21:29.540]  No, there's no Social Security on it.
[21:29.760 --> 21:29.920]  Okay.
[21:30.020 --> 21:30.620]  California, Adrian?
[21:31.580 --> 21:32.020]  Nope.
[21:32.180 --> 21:34.780]  Just a California identification number.
[21:35.560 --> 21:35.820]  Okay.
[21:36.440 --> 21:37.100]  Fantasyland, Jim?
[21:38.460 --> 21:39.180]  Well, I'm sorry.
[21:39.240 --> 21:40.620]  I used all the states up, so...
[21:40.620 --> 21:41.760]  I'm from New York.
[21:41.980 --> 21:42.260]  Okay.
[21:42.540 --> 21:43.260]  Well, yeah.
[21:43.260 --> 21:44.300]  We know New York doesn't have it.
[21:45.020 --> 21:45.280]  All right.
[21:45.920 --> 21:47.260]  212-209-2900.
[21:47.700 --> 21:48.480]  Let's take a phone call.
[21:48.560 --> 21:48.820]  Good evening.
[21:48.920 --> 21:49.300]  You're on the air.
[21:50.500 --> 21:51.200]  Go ahead, please.
[21:52.140 --> 21:52.860]  Hi, guys.
[21:53.120 --> 21:53.700]  I'm sorry.
[21:54.500 --> 21:55.220]  Great show.
[21:55.400 --> 22:00.340]  As usual, I'm, like, really confused because I didn't expect you guys, like, to answer that fast.
[22:00.580 --> 22:01.060]  Oh, we did.
[22:01.900 --> 22:02.460]  Okay.
[22:02.460 --> 22:02.560]  Okay.
[22:02.820 --> 22:03.140]  Okay.
[22:03.140 --> 22:04.080]  I have, like, three questions.
[22:04.240 --> 22:12.120]  The first one is, like, somebody's been calling me three times now and only three or four numbers shows in my phone.
[22:12.360 --> 22:12.860]  I don't...
[22:12.860 --> 22:14.880]  Anybody see something like this before?
[22:15.260 --> 22:17.700]  Are they calling your cell phone, your home phone?
[22:17.780 --> 22:18.600]  My cell phone.
[22:18.760 --> 22:23.540]  And only the area code and two, sometimes two, sometimes three numbers.
[22:24.240 --> 22:25.560]  Yes, I've seen that.
[22:25.860 --> 22:33.720]  I got a call the other day from somebody from a quasi-telemarketer and it only read 662.
[22:34.440 --> 22:40.460]  Yeah, they can basically send any number down, caller ID or A&I, if they have the right equipment.
[22:40.580 --> 22:41.100]  They can do that.
[22:41.520 --> 22:42.800]  If you have the right type of phone line.
[22:43.000 --> 22:44.900]  Did you pick up and did you find out who was on the other end?
[22:44.920 --> 22:46.060]  No, nobody answered.
[22:46.320 --> 22:46.960]  Like, I don't know.
[22:47.240 --> 22:50.680]  Like, it was weird, but, like, it happened, like, four or five times today.
[22:51.000 --> 22:51.360]  Uh-huh.
[22:51.360 --> 22:52.280]  What service do you use?
[22:52.700 --> 22:53.880]  Uh, T-Mobile.
[22:54.020 --> 22:54.580]  T-Mobile.
[22:55.700 --> 22:58.640]  Um, it's, you know, it could be anything.
[22:58.760 --> 22:59.060]  It really could.
[22:59.080 --> 22:59.920]  You need more information.
[22:59.920 --> 23:03.640]  You need to, uh, actually see who's calling and what kind of system they're using.
[23:03.840 --> 23:10.400]  Okay, the other thing is, like, uh, I'm originally from Egypt and we used to, like, send, like, email in Arabic all the time.
[23:10.880 --> 23:17.740]  Right now, like, there is no email, like, you cannot read any documents on the, in the web in Arabic.
[23:17.960 --> 23:20.180]  I'm talking about, like, me and a lot of my friends.
[23:21.100 --> 23:25.920]  Especially with, uh, the, the, the, the Microsoft, like, that browser.
[23:26.160 --> 23:26.600]  Uh-huh.
[23:26.660 --> 23:31.360]  I don't know if this, like, because September 11th, or what, or any information about this.
[23:31.520 --> 23:32.880]  I have no idea.
[23:33.320 --> 23:40.500]  Every time you read Arabic, it's like some kind of, like, hieroglyphic, you know, like, some, I, I, I swear, weird, like, font.
[23:40.900 --> 23:46.700]  Yeah, um, you have to install, uh, Arabic support, uh, basically.
[23:46.980 --> 23:51.680]  And if you're using a computer, you know, in Egypt, obviously every computer in Egypt is going to have the support.
[23:52.040 --> 23:56.680]  Uh, but someone here who, who operates a public computer might not have done that.
[23:57.100 --> 24:02.060]  Similarly, if you want to read, you know, Chinese, Japanese, whatever, doesn't use the kind of English alphabet.
[24:02.600 --> 24:03.260]  All right.
[24:03.520 --> 24:04.480]  Thank you so much.
[24:04.680 --> 24:05.040]  Good luck.
[24:05.780 --> 24:06.560]  And good evening.
[24:06.680 --> 24:07.560]  You're on the air.
[24:07.820 --> 24:08.260]  Yes.
[24:08.780 --> 24:09.120]  No.
[24:10.320 --> 24:10.980]  Good evening.
[24:11.140 --> 24:11.820]  You're on the air.
[24:12.660 --> 24:13.280]  Go ahead.
[24:13.900 --> 24:14.240]  Hi.
[24:14.440 --> 24:14.820]  How you doing?
[24:15.100 --> 24:15.300]  Good.
[24:15.340 --> 24:15.660]  How are you?
[24:16.040 --> 24:16.720]  What's on your mind?
[24:17.080 --> 24:20.620]  Um, actually, I was just, uh, calling in and talking about all this fingerprinting.
[24:20.720 --> 24:28.520]  I just thought I'd share a quick story that I took a, recently took a position with network security at a bank part-time.
[24:29.560 --> 24:32.160]  And I was unable to be fingerprinted.
[24:32.740 --> 24:34.500]  What do you mean you were unable to be fingerprinted?
[24:34.660 --> 24:41.340]  Well, I suffer from a, like a mild hypertension where I get a, like, sweaty fingers, sweaty palms.
[24:41.660 --> 24:42.020]  Okay.
[24:42.340 --> 24:44.780]  And I have to, of course, do a background check with the FBI.
[24:45.580 --> 24:49.540]  And I was totally unable to be fingerprinted.
[24:49.540 --> 24:51.480]  They actually had to dismiss me because of it.
[24:51.780 --> 24:57.080]  You're saying that because of your sweaty palms you can't get an accurate reading on your fingerprinting?
[24:57.200 --> 24:57.380]  Yes.
[24:57.460 --> 25:02.380]  Actually, the guy went through about 25 different cards to try to get me fingerprinted.
[25:03.100 --> 25:04.220]  And you lost the job.
[25:04.240 --> 25:05.700]  You lost the job because of this.
[25:05.940 --> 25:06.800]  I lost the job because of it.
[25:06.820 --> 25:10.400]  Isn't that some kind of handicap that you could, you know, appeal that way?
[25:10.540 --> 25:11.400]  Well, two things.
[25:11.620 --> 25:15.280]  First of all is they used an inkless pad in all probability, correct?
[25:16.380 --> 25:18.020]  Well, no, they used an ink pad.
[25:18.160 --> 25:18.740]  Oh, okay.
[25:18.960 --> 25:21.340]  And they said that was the only technique that they could use.
[25:21.500 --> 25:28.000]  Yeah, I was going to say, inkless pads definitely are not to be used when you have some sort of strange fingerprint fingerprint problem.
[25:28.180 --> 25:30.380]  I know that through my own interesting experiences.
[25:30.620 --> 25:34.700]  And the other thing is I would think that this would be covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act.
[25:34.760 --> 25:36.380]  You should find a good disability lawyer.
[25:36.600 --> 25:39.240]  No, sweaty palms actually qualifies as a disability, though.
[25:39.460 --> 25:40.280]  Well, I don't know...
[25:40.280 --> 25:45.120]  He lost the job because of a medical condition that has no bearing on his job.
[25:45.120 --> 25:45.600]  No, I agree.
[25:45.680 --> 25:46.020]  It should be.
[25:46.120 --> 25:47.660]  I just don't think it is as of now.
[25:47.840 --> 25:49.280]  Please sue their you-know-whats.
[25:49.520 --> 25:49.540]  Yeah.
[25:49.760 --> 25:51.740]  Tell us what bank this is so we can boycott them.
[25:51.980 --> 25:52.400]  Yeah, tell us.
[25:52.500 --> 25:53.320]  This is MBNA.
[25:53.520 --> 25:54.580]  It's actually a credit card.
[25:54.720 --> 25:55.720]  The credit card company.
[25:55.800 --> 25:56.820]  I never liked them anyway.
[25:57.100 --> 25:57.340]  All right.
[25:57.440 --> 26:01.680]  Well, now we know that if you have sweaty palms and you go there you're going to have a battle on your hands.
[26:01.720 --> 26:07.420]  I thought it was interesting that maybe I was just like a natural-born criminal that couldn't leave fingerprints.
[26:07.600 --> 26:09.300]  What happens if you get arrested?
[26:09.540 --> 26:11.640]  Do they have to let you go if they can't take your fingerprints?
[26:11.820 --> 26:12.360]  I don't know
[26:15.540 --> 26:22.340]  fingerprints was like an ex-police officer and he had you know, he said in 30 years it's the first time he's ever come across this.
[26:22.660 --> 26:23.980]  Oh, I find that hard to believe.
[26:24.280 --> 26:25.160]  I really do.
[26:25.300 --> 26:26.460]  It happened to me, Emmanuel.
[26:26.840 --> 26:27.860]  You have sweaty palms too?
[26:27.940 --> 26:28.520]  I never knew that.
[26:28.720 --> 26:29.040]  Well, yeah.
[26:29.220 --> 26:38.940]  At one point I was in a secret service office here in Philadelphia and Special Agent Tom Varney literally tried to fingerprint me dozens of times.
[26:39.140 --> 26:43.880]  It was like 20 or 30 times and he was screaming obscenities at me that I was doing this on purpose.
[26:44.060 --> 26:45.280]  I think his work weren't coming out.
[26:45.580 --> 26:46.620]  What were you doing on purpose?
[26:47.460 --> 26:56.980]  I was, maybe I was a little bit nervous and my palms were sweating but he was, he was irate because these prints were not coming out and he was just disgusted that he couldn't get good prints from me.
[26:57.160 --> 26:59.700]  Oh, that, that, that was the exact case with this guy.
[27:00.100 --> 27:06.440]  You know, he was like well, you know, when I was a cop when I was a cop we'd break their arms if we couldn't do this and stuff like that.
[27:06.620 --> 27:08.040]  So, that's, uh that's nice to know.
[27:08.260 --> 27:14.640]  It's, it's very important that you do not commit a crime because even though they can't get your fingerprint it sounds like they're going to get your DNA.
[27:15.080 --> 27:15.840]  Yeah, probably.
[27:16.280 --> 27:16.780]  You know, that's...
[27:16.780 --> 27:24.700]  It is possible to intentionally you know, mess up with fingerprinting by smudging it but, uh, it doesn't sound like the guy in the phone wanted to do that.
[27:24.720 --> 27:24.920]  Smudging is one thing.
[27:25.080 --> 27:27.740]  It means there's movement of your finger you can do things like that.
[27:27.840 --> 27:34.760]  Yeah, it definitely wasn't smudging because he would he couldn't even get past my, uh, my thumb on one hand because...
[27:34.760 --> 27:49.980]  The newer systems the newer systems they use in more advanced booking departments in federal and state and some local jurisdictions it's a glass plate that you put your hand on and there's no ink involved and that should read your prints fine if you're sweaty or not.
[27:50.240 --> 27:52.240]  Yeah, I have seen that and that just goes by the oils on your skin.
[27:52.240 --> 27:58.640]  Bernie, the system that they're using for people coming into the country would that be messed up by this kind of sweaty palm syndrome?
[27:58.900 --> 28:13.720]  I haven't been subjected to it but I assume it's the glass plate thing where it's very much like a computer scanner that you, you know it's a glass plate you lay the document on it except you put your fingers on it and it does your whole hand in one shot all of your prints at once.
[28:13.900 --> 28:15.780]  So sweaty palm isn't going to affect that?
[28:15.940 --> 28:22.260]  If anything it might make it better I don't know but unless you were like dripping and the water the sweat would probably still work fine.
[28:22.460 --> 28:23.260]  Great imagery there.
[28:23.320 --> 28:23.660]  Yes, Jim.
[28:24.620 --> 28:42.060]  The NYPD uses a computer system which uses the glass screen and number one it has a lot of internal computer glitches number two although you do take a full palm print at one shot you do take the individual fingers one by one on the glass screen.
[28:42.740 --> 28:43.380]  Okay, Adrian.
[28:44.220 --> 28:49.100]  This may be a sign that times are changing in terms of their tolerance of difficulties fingerprinting people.
[28:49.360 --> 29:08.400]  The feds here in New York had to I'd lost count of the number of times they had to redo my fingerprinting and they were doing it on the glass screen oddly enough and for some reason it just wasn't working out but apart from a few points where my fingers were bending a little bit oddly as they tried to fit them into place they were pretty nice about it and in fact on a tangentially related note the
[29:08.400 --> 29:08.560]  U.S.
[29:08.680 --> 29:11.520]  marshal has actually let me retake my mugshot until I thought it looked pretty.
[29:11.820 --> 29:12.280]  You're kidding.
[29:12.520 --> 29:12.860]  Really?
[29:12.980 --> 29:14.120]  I didn't know you could get to do that.
[29:14.120 --> 29:21.360]  So you know it may be that we're coming into a time of kinder gentler processes or maybe they're just having a slow day Are you allowed to smile?
[29:22.700 --> 29:23.100]  Yeah.
[29:23.420 --> 29:24.560]  You can smile in the mugshot?
[29:24.700 --> 29:27.040]  They let me I mean they like Kevin Paulson why wouldn't they let me?
[29:27.400 --> 29:30.880]  I guess Jeff Are we going to see it on the smoking gun?
[29:32.040 --> 29:34.200]  Somebody has to get on the ball and file that FOIA request.
[29:34.580 --> 29:34.980]  Alright.
[29:36.080 --> 29:37.920]  Or hack into their system I guess.
[29:38.180 --> 29:39.180]  I can't condone that.
[29:39.980 --> 29:41.100]  Thanks for that phone call.
[29:41.240 --> 29:41.420]  Alright.
[29:41.520 --> 29:41.860]  Thanks a lot.
[29:42.000 --> 29:42.540]  Great show guys.
[29:42.700 --> 29:42.980]  Thank you.
[29:44.040 --> 29:47.880]  212-209-2900 here with Adrian Lama for the next half hour or so.
[29:48.160 --> 29:50.240]  Is the mugshot a digital process now?
[29:51.160 --> 29:51.520]  Yeah.
[29:51.660 --> 29:54.040]  It was done entirely on computer when I was at the U.S.
[29:54.140 --> 30:00.120]  Marshal's office and mind you I had to be processed a total of three times until I decided I was good and surrendered.
[30:00.640 --> 30:02.780]  It sort of took on some irony after a while.
[30:02.900 --> 30:07.220]  I had to do it once with the Marshals in Sacramento once with the FBI in New York and then the Marshals in New York.
[30:07.860 --> 30:17.040]  And you'll do it once again well let's hope you don't have to do it once again but if you are admitted into a Bureau of Prisons facility you'll be processed once again with photographs and fingerprints.
[30:17.760 --> 30:19.040]  I guess their time isn't the charm.
[30:19.560 --> 30:19.660]  Yeah.
[30:20.040 --> 30:21.060]  Let's hope that doesn't happen.
[30:21.280 --> 30:21.540]  All right.
[30:21.680 --> 30:25.080]  Even if even if he's put on parole he'll have to do it again.
[30:27.640 --> 30:28.080]  All right.
[30:28.160 --> 30:30.460]  212-209-2900 good evening.
[30:30.600 --> 30:31.000]  You're on the air.
[30:31.460 --> 30:31.580]  Yeah.
[30:31.700 --> 30:32.100]  Oh wow.
[30:32.340 --> 30:32.860]  Good evening.
[30:33.020 --> 30:33.800]  Thank you very much.
[30:33.960 --> 30:34.380]  No problem.
[30:35.100 --> 30:41.120]  Mr. Lama I commend you for this and I think you are definitely the person that can help answer this.
[30:41.220 --> 30:42.340]  I'm going to turn this noise down here.
[30:42.520 --> 30:42.640]  Hold on.
[30:42.980 --> 30:43.380]  Sorry.
[30:43.820 --> 30:50.200]  I guess I'm not trying to be funny but I'm going to ask I guess an ethical question with I'm no computer guy at all.
[30:50.400 --> 31:16.000]  This scares me to death and I'm really surprised to even be calling in but this is so interesting because it delves into to me to me I'm wondering would you characterize this as the guerrilla war because I commend you let me preface it that I just walked in late so I heard that you said hey I did it wrong before anybody said hey somebody did something wrong that's boss okay and I heard Mr.
[31:16.100 --> 31:39.100]  Emmanuel say that's boss too okay well not in those words but yeah okay well yeah okay okay alright but you understand where I'm trying to go with this is that where do you feel now with where you are I'm not even going to deal with where they're going to think they're putting you I'm talking about where your soul and your spirit is and what you've what I've heard you say is you are no joke you
[31:39.100 --> 31:49.780]  weren't joking when you did it I want to talk about people who are honest like you and people who you're probably sitting in a room with who aren't quite as honest Well, let's say, quite as rapidly.
[31:50.500 --> 31:51.400]  You know what I'm saying?
[31:51.560 --> 31:53.240]  I'm trying to do political correctness.
[31:53.580 --> 31:55.620]  Stuff don't work for me.
[31:56.140 --> 31:58.920]  What I'm asking, I'm trying to make it simple because it's bugging me out.
[31:59.440 --> 32:17.340]  How are we, and I don't own a computer, my daughter does, how are we as people in this country to approach this from the fact that, because I have a couple of clients who have been in prison for this years ago, years ago.
[32:18.480 --> 32:20.020]  And they're still doing it.
[32:20.100 --> 32:21.280]  And I'm noticing your sentences.
[32:21.320 --> 32:22.880]  I have a friend that did seven years.
[32:25.360 --> 32:26.500]  You're doing six months.
[32:26.600 --> 32:28.080]  You'll probably get probation, whatever.
[32:28.840 --> 32:31.060]  I'm wondering, and please bear with me.
[32:31.140 --> 32:35.400]  I apologize for being, you know, spacey about this, but this is really querying me.
[32:36.140 --> 32:46.780]  I sense and feel your commitment, but I wonder if other people that are into this, because I'm not, I don't know internet, but people who are, because I listen to your show every once in a while.
[32:46.780 --> 32:48.520]  I'm really here in the city on Wednesday.
[32:48.640 --> 32:50.000]  That's why it was a treat coming home.
[32:50.180 --> 32:51.420]  And I honestly mean that.
[32:51.500 --> 32:52.660]  I never thought I'd talk to you.
[32:53.080 --> 32:59.660]  But I'm wondering, you guys that give out this information, I'm not saying you're flippant, but are you aware?
[33:00.220 --> 33:10.600]  And I know you are, because if the guy is calling in, who's on part of your show, who knows about those vertical, poor, decorating, feng shui attitude they have in prisons, right?
[33:10.600 --> 33:11.240]  You know.
[33:12.040 --> 33:28.400]  Where are you as far as your brothers in the room and on the phone and in the world that are listening to this program, who are, I hope, know that in my mind, as stupid as I am, that this is not the beginning.
[33:28.640 --> 33:30.400]  You are an evolutionary point.
[33:30.520 --> 33:31.580]  That's why I commend you.
[33:31.580 --> 33:37.120]  But do you have the backing of the so-called, well, you know, what are we going to do tonight?
[33:37.280 --> 33:38.420]  Well, let's break into NASA.
[33:40.400 --> 33:41.660]  Have you reached the end of the question?
[33:42.320 --> 33:43.320]  I'm very sorry.
[33:43.500 --> 33:44.040]  No, I'm...
[33:44.040 --> 33:48.540]  Because I find a lot of people, highly intelligent people, play games with it.
[33:48.780 --> 33:53.060]  And there are highly intelligent people that play games that make sense and money.
[33:53.220 --> 33:55.320]  And then there are people that they call criminals.
[33:55.480 --> 33:58.160]  I've always found the system creates the criminality.
[33:59.160 --> 34:00.860]  The criminal don't create the system.
[34:01.180 --> 34:04.320]  That's not a cop-out for anybody, but if it comes in handy, you can use it.
[34:04.980 --> 34:05.920]  I'm going to leave now.
[34:06.080 --> 34:07.420]  And if you can't address it, fine.
[34:07.560 --> 34:08.640]  Otherwise, God bless you.
[34:09.240 --> 34:11.220]  And I think that you're going to stay powerful.
[34:11.620 --> 34:12.420]  All right, well...
[34:12.420 --> 34:13.140]  Don't let them break you down.
[34:13.360 --> 34:13.620]  Thank you.
[34:13.660 --> 34:13.860]  Thanks.
[34:13.920 --> 34:14.560]  Thanks for those words.
[34:16.340 --> 34:16.940]  I don't know.
[34:17.020 --> 34:19.200]  He seemed to say it pretty well, whatever it was.
[34:19.320 --> 34:20.440]  But do you have anything to add?
[34:21.880 --> 34:27.480]  I'm not sure I entirely parsed what exactly the focus of the question was.
[34:27.480 --> 34:28.140]  We have a cassette.
[34:28.240 --> 34:28.860]  We can study it later.
[34:30.260 --> 34:31.560]  He did have a lot to say.
[34:31.780 --> 34:36.140]  And I'm not sure exactly how to respond on that one.
[34:36.260 --> 34:38.220]  But I'll percolate on that.
[34:38.280 --> 34:39.780]  I think your integrity got through.
[34:40.020 --> 34:40.260]  All right?
[34:40.320 --> 34:42.260]  I think that's something he addressed.
[34:42.420 --> 34:47.980]  You know, that you're honest and forthright about what it is that you've done.
[34:49.440 --> 34:50.760]  And that's got to count for something.
[34:51.520 --> 34:53.300]  That's about a 50th of what he said.
[34:53.400 --> 34:56.820]  But, you know, I think that was the gist of it.
[34:57.480 --> 34:58.260]  Bernie, any comments?
[35:00.400 --> 35:00.840]  No.
[35:01.040 --> 35:06.280]  I mean, it was difficult for me to understand through my cell phone connection everything the guy was saying.
[35:06.500 --> 35:15.140]  But really, I think it's what I was trying to find out from Adrian is where he is mentally right now.
[35:15.460 --> 35:16.420]  That's a good question.
[35:16.820 --> 35:17.660]  That's a good question.
[35:17.760 --> 35:19.180]  I think he's answered it to a degree.
[35:19.180 --> 35:20.900]  But I'd like to hear specifically that.
[35:22.840 --> 35:24.900]  I very much feel like...
[35:25.440 --> 35:28.000]  I think, in general, people's lives are divided into chapters.
[35:28.280 --> 35:31.940]  And I think that really I'm at the turning point in a chapter in my life right now.
[35:32.200 --> 35:35.780]  And I don't have any idea of what the future is going to hold.
[35:35.780 --> 35:39.320]  And I'm not sure that I necessarily want to.
[35:39.740 --> 35:45.100]  Tomorrow will provide a certain amount of stability in that I will know what and how...
[35:45.100 --> 35:47.420]  Well, in what way I'll have to answer for my actions.
[35:47.720 --> 35:50.240]  And from there, I can go about answering for them.
[35:51.740 --> 35:54.780]  And after that, it's largely up to me.
[35:56.000 --> 36:01.080]  One thing I want to do is try to minimize my role as a source for media.
[36:01.340 --> 36:03.680]  I've let enough reporters tell my story.
[36:04.180 --> 36:15.540]  And if there's one thing that I've learned from it, it's that many people come into events with a pre-existing idea of what the story is and make the events fit their idea of what that is.
[36:16.040 --> 36:19.220]  And that's one of the things that motivated me to go into journalism.
[36:19.220 --> 36:38.520]  I have seen enough mistakes, enough cutting of corners, enough overall sloppiness and ethical apathy that I want to be in a position where I can prevent that from happening to others, where I can provide a voice, where I can apply that sort of experience,
[36:38.680 --> 36:42.240]  where I can take something positive from the events that led up to this.
[36:43.060 --> 36:53.640]  Do you have any advice to people who might be in a similar situation as you were in the past where they are exploring, looking for vulnerabilities, finding them?
[36:55.380 --> 36:58.400]  I think it's ultimately up to everyone what they want to do with their lives.
[36:58.560 --> 37:00.980]  I don't have standing to tell anybody how to live.
[37:01.460 --> 37:10.520]  The only thing I would say to them is that, although I know that some people do, hopefully not many, but I don't think that anybody should look to me as a role model in anything.
[37:10.820 --> 37:18.820]  If there's anything that's important for what we do in this life, it's to bring new and novel ideas into the world, new experiences, new paths.
[37:19.520 --> 37:21.360]  And what I've done has been done.
[37:21.480 --> 37:22.720]  There's no point in repeating it.
[37:23.680 --> 37:29.800]  If anybody wanted to know how I would advise them to live their lives, it would be to find their own way to go about it.
[37:30.700 --> 37:34.600]  I don't advocate what I've done for anybody else.
[37:34.800 --> 37:37.660]  It hasn't even worked out all that hot for me, but I still have hope for the future.
[37:37.800 --> 37:38.980]  You certainly haven't become rich from it.
[37:39.340 --> 37:44.460]  I mean, one of the things that guy said was there are people who, uh, make money doing this kind of thing.
[37:44.960 --> 37:49.220]  And, um, I mean, I think he was talking about, you know, internet pages or businesses.
[37:49.400 --> 37:51.840]  I don't think he was referring to illegal acts.
[37:52.080 --> 37:52.800]  Right, right.
[37:53.200 --> 37:58.460]  Well, I even, even leading to, uh, legitimate business, you know, consulting, things like that.
[37:59.040 --> 38:04.660]  Um, have you been able to make any kind of business out of, out of this kind of, uh, security detection?
[38:05.840 --> 38:15.560]  I've been offered jobs in that area and they've come from a variety of sources from the private sector, from the military, from entities within the military that I'd never heard of until they contacted me.
[38:15.940 --> 38:22.240]  Um, and ultimately, uh, I'm as disinterested in the private sector and security as I am in the military.
[38:22.720 --> 38:25.000]  Um, I have moral qualms with both.
[38:25.220 --> 38:28.680]  I don't think that today's security industry is an honest industry.
[38:28.880 --> 38:32.140]  I think that it feeds significantly off of fear and deception.
[38:32.980 --> 38:43.240]  Um, I don't want to be part of the vulnerability of the day where there's a cottage industry and churning out problems that will never affect a real human being but have to be answered and generate more revenue.
[38:43.780 --> 38:47.960]  Um, you're not going to accomplish anything really meaningful that way for the most part.
[38:48.200 --> 38:57.620]  And I don't want whatever course of action comes after this in my life to just be an empty churning out of money.
[38:58.120 --> 39:07.240]  Um, I, although I, I've been bad math journalist a few times during the course of this segment, by no means have all of the ones that I've met been bad.
[39:07.360 --> 39:15.420]  I've met some very noble people and probably a greater variety and a greater concentration than I have in many other fields than really in any other field.
[39:16.320 --> 39:22.660]  And while simultaneously acting as a terrible warning, it's also been an inspiration.
[39:22.880 --> 39:27.200]  Has there been, uh, decent coverage in your opinion of, of the story?
[39:27.480 --> 39:29.340]  Have they gotten the facts right for the most part?
[39:29.800 --> 39:30.580]  Sometimes they do.
[39:30.700 --> 39:31.500]  Sometimes they don't.
[39:31.880 --> 39:36.940]  Um, actually a lot of times they don't, but I'm of the opinion that the truth tends to itself.
[39:37.180 --> 39:50.120]  I think that the people that want to know what's going on are able to read between the lines to see the truth that comes through the slant for the opinion, the various ways that acts and facts can be distorted.
[39:50.340 --> 39:53.240]  What do you find that journalists tend to miss with regards to your story?
[39:54.560 --> 39:58.700]  It's not so much missing things as it is inappropriate focus.
[39:59.140 --> 40:02.300]  Um, and in a lot of ways, I can't blame them.
[40:02.600 --> 40:07.000]  There's an impulse to want to make something as appealing to a reader as possible.
[40:07.320 --> 40:18.960]  So it's much more interesting for them to focus in on the so-called mythos of the alleged homeless hacker than it is to focus on all of the other parts of my life.
[40:19.720 --> 40:20.120]  And...
[40:20.120 --> 40:20.820]  Mm-hmm.
[40:20.900 --> 40:22.700]  And they sensationalize the story?
[40:23.780 --> 40:25.120]  Yeah, it's sensationalized.
[40:25.240 --> 40:32.520]  On occasion, things are either fabricated out of whole cloth or, um, um, creatively embellished.
[40:32.700 --> 40:35.240]  And there was a time when that sort of thing bothered me.
[40:35.420 --> 40:46.900]  But if there's one thing that... Well, actually, if there's one out of a lot of things that I've come away from this whole process with is that I do believe that nobody ever really gets away with anything.
[40:46.980 --> 40:49.880]  It always comes full circle, and that applies to both sides of the spectrum.
[40:49.880 --> 40:51.660]  You can't lie and not have the truth come out.
[40:52.080 --> 40:52.300]  Interesting.
[40:53.240 --> 41:02.300]  Yeah, it... I'm just curious when you're talking about, uh, having job offers from the military and so on, would you entertain or would you have a problem if they said, look, this is going to be your sentence.
[41:02.540 --> 41:10.440]  We're going to have you work, you know, in an approbation sense, sense, where, uh, you're going to work for the government for a period of time?
[41:11.700 --> 41:13.020]  You know, I have no idea.
[41:13.880 --> 41:22.000]  It's always easy to engage in armchair moralization about various scenarios and things that we will come to in our lives.
[41:22.060 --> 41:25.800]  But it's ultimately hard to find yourself faced with a decision and actually have to make it.
[41:26.240 --> 41:32.480]  We always know what we would like to do in a specific situation, what we think would be right or appropriate of us.
[41:32.600 --> 41:39.400]  But when it actually comes to making the choice, the reality is usually different than what we expected.
[41:39.860 --> 41:42.020]  And sitting here today, I just have no idea.
[41:44.160 --> 41:44.560]  Okay.
[41:44.560 --> 41:51.540]  Well, in, uh, less than 24 hours, you will, uh, know what your fate is as far as, uh, what the sentence, uh, handed down will be.
[41:51.700 --> 41:53.500]  And we, uh, we all hope that works out.
[41:53.820 --> 41:58.120]  Uh, we have a few more minutes to take phone calls, 212-209-2900.
[41:58.400 --> 42:09.280]  We're with, uh, we're here with Adrian Lamo from, uh, California who was being sentenced tomorrow for, um, various, um, uh, hacking crimes, I guess is the best way to describe them, right?
[42:09.400 --> 42:17.840]  I mean, uh, that's a very general term, but, uh, involves the New York Times and, uh, we've told the story before and I'm sure, uh, we can get into it again in the future too.
[42:18.380 --> 42:19.420]  Let's take some phone calls though.
[42:19.520 --> 42:20.800]  212-209-2900.
[42:21.300 --> 42:21.620]  Okay.
[42:21.660 --> 42:23.460]  I just have a story for Bernie and you.
[42:23.760 --> 42:25.160]  Um, let me get it.
[42:25.640 --> 42:25.960]  Okay.
[42:26.000 --> 42:27.260]  While you're getting it, we're going to get another call.
[42:27.340 --> 42:27.600]  Good evening.
[42:27.680 --> 42:28.100]  You're on the air.
[42:29.420 --> 42:29.920]  Go ahead.
[42:30.360 --> 42:30.660]  Oh, hi.
[42:30.780 --> 42:31.660]  Thanks for taking my call.
[42:31.780 --> 42:32.320]  Oh, it was a pleasure.
[42:32.420 --> 42:32.700]  Believe me.
[42:32.980 --> 42:33.840]  Uh, a couple of things.
[42:34.280 --> 42:35.300]  Uh, your show is great.
[42:35.460 --> 42:36.600]  I enjoy listening to it.
[42:36.840 --> 42:37.240]  Thank you.
[42:37.640 --> 42:42.560]  Uh, uh, I wanted to say to Adrian, I wish him the best of luck tomorrow when he goes for his sentencing.
[42:42.940 --> 42:45.360]  He sounds very sincere in what he's saying.
[42:45.520 --> 42:49.860]  And then that's the kind of results the penal system is supposed to bring about.
[42:50.740 --> 43:02.800]  Um, I admire him for it, uh, about the analogy that Bernie made earlier about your cell phone, somebody taking your cell phone and using it at night when you're not charged for calls.
[43:03.000 --> 43:06.760]  I don't think it's quite accurate if, oh, I'm sorry.
[43:06.940 --> 43:13.120]  He's, he used the analogy of you giving your cell phone to somebody and then I'm going to say that somebody took it and then returned it.
[43:13.240 --> 43:14.560]  I don't recall exactly what I said.
[43:14.640 --> 43:14.880]  Okay.
[43:15.480 --> 43:27.540]  Um, but surely if you didn't know about it, you would want to find out who was using your cell phone so that you would prevent them from perhaps using it when it would cost you money.
[43:27.700 --> 43:40.420]  And I think when, when a system gets hacked, part of the expense that the company goes to, to find out who it is that's responsible ends up being included in the calculation of the cost.
[43:40.840 --> 43:43.040]  I'm not sure about that, but I would just guess that.
[43:43.220 --> 43:52.540]  There's another, uh, another thing too that I just thought of that, uh, if you did lend somebody your cell phone and even though it didn't cost money, you still have to worry about what the person might've done with the cell phone in your name.
[43:52.740 --> 44:03.900]  For instance, making prank calls to the White House with your caller ID, you know, the worry, the worry of, of what could have happened is very much a part of, uh, of, of computer security people when they detect an intrusion.
[44:04.140 --> 44:05.840]  Uh, it may not have caused any damage.
[44:05.960 --> 44:09.680]  It may not have, uh, actually adversely affected something, but what could it have done?
[44:09.780 --> 44:10.800]  What might've been planted?
[44:11.080 --> 44:16.340]  You know, the sleepless nights trying to figure out exactly what it was that, that actually happened when you don't really know.
[44:16.660 --> 44:19.320]  And yeah, you can't really put a, a price on that, I suppose.
[44:19.580 --> 44:24.340]  But, um, I can sort of understand what, uh, you know, what they're saying.
[44:24.340 --> 44:37.820]  Well, for example, if you were, uh, in charge of security on a system and there were signs of a break-in and you had to spend a hundred hours trying to track that down, that's part of the cost, I would think.
[44:38.460 --> 44:40.120]  If you don't mind, I'd like to jump in.
[44:40.320 --> 44:42.300]  And that is true.
[44:42.760 --> 44:54.760]  But one thing, and I know I keep saying, you know, one thing that I've gotten out of this, there are a lot of one things that I've gotten out of this, but one that always sticks out when I hear people talking about it, is that it's very difficult to make valid analogies.
[44:55.040 --> 44:59.840]  And certainly, the people that run systems would be concerned, just like the owner of the cell phones would be concerned.
[45:00.040 --> 45:02.840]  And I don't deny that that's an aspect of damage.
[45:02.980 --> 45:05.320]  But your computer is not your car.
[45:05.440 --> 45:06.300]  It's not your cell phone.
[45:06.400 --> 45:07.080]  It's not your garage.
[45:07.140 --> 45:08.560]  It's not somebody going through your bedroom.
[45:08.720 --> 45:10.460]  It's not somebody climbing in your bathroom window.
[45:10.620 --> 45:13.560]  It's not somebody hot-wiring your car and taking it for a test drive.
[45:13.820 --> 45:15.120]  It's a unique scenario.
[45:15.340 --> 45:15.760]  It's a computer.
[45:16.080 --> 45:20.940]  It's unlike really any other analogizable scenario in human history.
[45:21.340 --> 45:25.420]  And to make analogies for it really is only to distort the process.
[45:26.620 --> 45:29.600]  It's easy to make analogies because it helps people understand things better.
[45:29.860 --> 45:32.520]  But ultimately, it always takes away from the process of reason.
[45:33.520 --> 45:34.540]  That's just my two cents.
[45:34.680 --> 45:38.300]  I've always had... I've had something sort of a vendetta against analogies for a while now.
[45:38.500 --> 45:38.760]  Yeah.
[45:38.940 --> 45:48.960]  The other thing I hear in a lot of the statements you're making, it provides a contrast to a lot of the people that appear on the show that have been in similar situations.
[45:49.440 --> 45:51.600]  You're not blaming the law.
[45:51.800 --> 45:54.580]  You're not blaming the people who are prosecuting you.
[45:54.800 --> 45:57.420]  You're taking full responsibility for what you're doing.
[45:57.620 --> 45:58.740]  And that's admirable.
[45:59.640 --> 46:02.500]  They're all doing what they feel they should do, and that's their right.
[46:02.560 --> 46:03.560]  And in fact, that's their duty.
[46:03.900 --> 46:10.560]  And where I sit now, my right and my duty is to take responsibility for my actions.
[46:12.040 --> 46:13.780]  Ultimately, things tend to themselves like that.
[46:14.080 --> 46:14.180]  Yeah.
[46:14.380 --> 46:15.440]  Again, I commend you for it.
[46:15.480 --> 46:17.620]  And I wish you, again, the best of luck in your sentencing.
[46:17.940 --> 46:18.620]  Thank you very much.
[46:18.760 --> 46:19.020]  Thank you.
[46:19.160 --> 46:19.680]  Thanks for your call.
[46:19.960 --> 46:20.260]  Thank you.
[46:20.940 --> 46:22.600]  And see if we can squeeze in a couple more.
[46:22.700 --> 46:24.280]  212-209-2900.
[46:24.500 --> 46:24.820]  Good evening.
[46:24.920 --> 46:25.360]  You're on the air.
[46:27.000 --> 46:27.480]  Go ahead.
[46:28.200 --> 46:28.520]  Hello?
[46:28.700 --> 46:29.180]  Yes, go ahead.
[46:29.240 --> 46:29.540]  You're on the air.
[46:29.600 --> 46:30.320]  Oh, oh, fantastic.
[46:30.900 --> 46:32.400]  I've got so many business signals on the side.
[46:33.860 --> 46:35.620]  Yeah, I had a couple of quick questions.
[46:36.360 --> 46:41.140]  First question is, is there a good place to read on the web, a little more details?
[46:41.340 --> 46:54.780]  Because, you know, just on the show, it's a little unclear, and obviously this isn't a good time to review everything, but is there a website that would tell us a little more about Adrian's case and how we could, you know, support him and whatever, or even just to get the details and...
[46:54.780 --> 46:55.620]  Get the details, yeah.
[46:55.840 --> 46:56.040]  Adrian.
[46:56.620 --> 46:58.220]  That website would be Google, really.
[46:58.780 --> 47:02.280]  I try not to point anybody at any one source of information.
[47:02.400 --> 47:02.840]  All right, that's fine.
[47:02.940 --> 47:04.220]  And how do you spell your last name?
[47:04.740 --> 47:08.560]  Lamo, L-A-M-O, and Adrian is A-D-R-I-A-N.
[47:08.560 --> 47:18.920]  And if you want to see the, um, sort of the loyal opposition to the government, if you will, you can go to freelamo.com and freelamo.org.
[47:19.380 --> 47:27.760]  And conversely, there's a copy of the complaint against me, um, somewhere on findlaw.com, and I believe it's linked to from freelamo.com.
[47:28.060 --> 47:28.860]  Oh, thank you.
[47:29.000 --> 47:41.060]  And, uh, another question that's sort of RF related, uh, the water company in my neighborhood has decided to place RF transmitters on the meters.
[47:41.380 --> 47:46.800]  And it's transmitting at 910 to 920 megahertz spread spectrum.
[47:47.120 --> 47:48.860]  Did you write, did you write into the show?
[47:49.060 --> 47:49.800]  I did.
[47:49.800 --> 48:04.380]  And I hadn't received back, but I was just wondering, uh, if, if you had any comment on this, is there any danger, or is this interfering that I don't know about, uh, uh, they're gonna, and the thing, it, it, uh, I'm reading the specs right now.
[48:04.560 --> 48:06.600]  It's from the Neptune, uh, water.
[48:06.680 --> 48:08.160]  Yeah, we actually, uh, we did reply to you.
[48:08.400 --> 48:09.500]  Um, I don't know why you didn't get it.
[48:09.500 --> 48:11.480]  Well, maybe, uh, maybe I just haven't, haven't seen it yet.
[48:12.140 --> 48:19.140]  Uh, but in any case, I was just wondering, because it, it's transmitting every 7 to 10 seconds continuously.
[48:19.140 --> 48:21.480]  We actually replied to you in great detail.
[48:21.600 --> 48:24.400]  So check your email, and, and, and, and just for the listeners.
[48:24.500 --> 48:25.120]  Yeah, for the listeners.
[48:25.320 --> 48:36.420]  It didn't, it didn't seem like, uh, you really had anything to worry about, unless the water company also connected this device to your phone line as a backup communications channel, which I would freak out about.
[48:36.540 --> 48:38.200]  Right, no, they didn't do anything like that.
[48:38.200 --> 48:42.220]  I can vouch for their, uh, their, their purity on that level.
[48:42.660 --> 48:43.060]  Okay.
[48:43.440 --> 48:44.200]  They came in today.
[48:45.160 --> 48:55.660]  It's really, it's a spread spectrum device, so it's, it's very unlikely to interfere with other spread spectrum devices, which by their nature are designed to, uh, uh, not interfere with each other.
[48:55.920 --> 48:59.260]  Um, like your, your, a cordless phone that operates in that same range.
[48:59.520 --> 49:10.940]  The 902 to 928 range is an unlicensed Part 15 FCC allocation for frequencies that many cordless phones and other cordless devices use, including these, uh, water company meters.
[49:11.220 --> 49:14.060]  So, um, it's, it's really, it's very low power.
[49:14.200 --> 49:14.840]  It's really not good.
[49:14.900 --> 49:16.540]  It just runs off a couple of batteries, probably.
[49:17.340 --> 49:23.580]  It's really no implication to your, to your privacy, unless it's connected to your phone line or had a microphone in it, then I would worry.
[49:24.180 --> 49:24.540]  Right.
[49:24.680 --> 49:26.660]  No, I don't imagine it has anything like that.
[49:26.760 --> 49:38.220]  The only thing I would imagine is that, uh, I, I guess I was concerned since it's now a public, uh, you know, a public radio broadcast coming from my house and, you know, continually broadcasting.
[49:38.220 --> 49:44.160]  And, you know, so, uh, uh, and by the way, for some reason, I did not get your reply, which is bizarre.
[49:44.400 --> 49:46.660]  So, well, if you write us again, I'll send it to you again.
[49:47.340 --> 49:47.660]  Okay.
[49:48.140 --> 49:49.040]  Uh, that'd be great.
[49:49.180 --> 49:52.020]  But in any case, uh, yeah, it's just kind of amazing.
[49:52.120 --> 50:03.860]  I mean, I mean, then, you know, the technology and now here we are, uh, you know, so they're just going to drive by and they're just going to click a little gun and they'll catch my, uh, water meter from that, which is, I guess, if you're worried about the privacy of your water consumption figures,
[50:04.160 --> 50:06.500]  then you, you would have reason to worry.
[50:06.700 --> 50:07.560]  Frankly, I don't really care.
[50:08.460 --> 50:14.160]  Of course, the water company tends to know that anyway, but now I guess anybody else who knows how that device works might, might have access to that information.
[50:14.460 --> 50:20.380]  Similarly, anyone sufficiently interested could go up to a conventional type meter and look at it just the same as the water company does.
[50:20.680 --> 50:20.740]  That's true.
[50:20.740 --> 50:26.460]  I understand the concern with having little devices, uh, transmitting information, but as Bernie says, this is nothing to be worried about.
[50:27.180 --> 50:27.800]  Um, okay.
[50:27.880 --> 50:28.240]  We'll see.
[50:28.380 --> 50:28.700]  We'll see.
[50:28.860 --> 50:29.840]  Thanks, uh, for that call.
[50:30.340 --> 50:31.120]  Uh, Jim, you had something?
[50:31.360 --> 50:37.320]  I was just going to say that, uh, it's possible that the police could look at these figures and find out he's illegally growing fish in the basement.
[50:38.340 --> 50:42.200]  Well, wasn't there a case in California where, where a family... I was watching cops last night.
[50:42.340 --> 50:42.600]  Uh-huh.
[50:42.800 --> 50:58.160]  Uh, they raided somebody because the power company told the police, Multnomah County, uh, Oregon, I believe, uh, told the police that the guy was using way over the electricity for the one family house and they figured, aha, marijuana growing.
[50:58.360 --> 51:01.300]  They went in, son of a gun, and the guy is growing marijuana under girl lights.
[51:01.600 --> 51:04.860]  You see, on, on that program, cops, they always show the people who are guilty.
[51:05.080 --> 51:09.400]  They don't show the people that have their doors kicked in who are innocent, like happened in New York last week.
[51:09.400 --> 51:10.020]  There's no excitement to that.
[51:10.140 --> 51:12.000]  No, there's also a lot of legal problems with that.
[51:12.140 --> 51:16.320]  But, uh, they always show the cops acting as gods, you know, and they're never incorrect.
[51:16.920 --> 51:19.340]  Uh, here's a story out of, out of, uh, California, I believe.
[51:19.840 --> 51:20.400]  Uh, Carlsbad.
[51:20.560 --> 51:30.900]  When, when people noticed, uh, Dina Daigie's family was spending $250 to $300 a month on electricity, they suspected a marijuana farm was flourishing under high-intensity lights inside their home.
[51:31.160 --> 51:43.520]  What they found when they showed up with a drug-sniffing dog and a search warrant was a wife and mother who does several loads of laundry a day, keeps a dishwashing machine going, has three electricity guzzling computers, and, uh, three kids who cannot remember to turn the lights out when they leave a room.
[51:43.900 --> 51:44.940]  See what can happen, kids?
[51:45.020 --> 51:47.520]  If you don't turn the lights out, you might have the cops kicking in your door.
[51:47.840 --> 51:51.920]  It's hard to believe a high-utility bill would be enough to issue a state warrant, she said.
[51:52.100 --> 51:54.360]  Uh, she's demanding the police department issue a written apology.
[51:54.360 --> 51:56.220]  So far, they have not done so.
[51:56.500 --> 52:01.560]  Uh, but, uh, these systems, you know, $250, that's not even a high bill around here.
[52:02.280 --> 52:04.080]  It's, I mean, in Long Island, certainly it's not.
[52:04.440 --> 52:07.160]  I mean, the, the cost of power varies greatly.
[52:07.200 --> 52:07.980]  It does, it does.
[52:08.100 --> 52:16.440]  But to, you know, to just have that information, uh, and, and use that as, as, as the basis for a warrant is, uh, it's really kind of shocking.
[52:16.760 --> 52:19.820]  Sounds like she should take some steps to conserve energy, though.
[52:20.000 --> 52:28.560]  Yeah, I mean, you know, if, if those are the, the conservation dogs going into your house, sniffing around, telling you that you could be saving power here, okay, granted, that's legitimate.
[52:28.780 --> 52:31.880]  But, uh, you know, don't accuse somebody of marijuana growing when it's not happening.
[52:32.840 --> 52:33.200]  Okay.
[52:33.360 --> 52:37.880]  In that scenario, did you say, um, that the power company itself was the one that contacted the police?
[52:38.260 --> 52:39.800]  Uh, I believe it was the power company.
[52:40.060 --> 52:44.860]  These, um, authorities, okay, authorities, you know what, they don't say how they found out.
[52:44.920 --> 52:57.240]  They say when authorities noticed how high the bill for the daggy home was, they sent the police dog to the suburban, they sent the police dog on his own to go, to go and investigate in the suburban San Diego neighborhood.
[52:57.420 --> 52:59.940]  And it reacted as though it had smelled drugs.
[53:00.500 --> 53:02.600]  Well, check that dog out before you check anyone out.
[53:02.700 --> 53:07.120]  I hope the power company told the police, because the alternative is that the police are reading your bill directly.
[53:07.360 --> 53:08.940]  Well, this is an Associated Press story.
[53:09.040 --> 53:16.360]  There is nothing in this story that I see that indicates the power company is the one that told... they say when authorities noticed how high the bill was, so...
[53:16.360 --> 53:17.680]  I'm not sure which alternative is worse, though.
[53:17.760 --> 53:21.440]  I'm not sure I want my power company acting as an agent of the state.
[53:21.680 --> 53:25.400]  And it would really raise questions of whether it's an illegal search if they're acting as an agent of the state.
[53:25.680 --> 53:25.880]  Yeah.
[53:26.260 --> 53:28.000]  Especially since you're paying them money anyway.
[53:28.200 --> 53:32.040]  The other piece of evidence they found was that she, like, throws out her garbage or something.
[53:32.040 --> 53:33.520]  This was deemed to be suspicious.
[53:34.260 --> 53:34.460]  Yeah.
[53:34.780 --> 53:34.900]  Yeah.
[53:35.280 --> 53:35.520]  That's, uh, very suspicious.
[53:35.520 --> 53:44.060]  I remember that actually, specifically, they said she threw out her garbage shortly before pick up a tactic allegedly frequently used by people with something to hide to keep the cops from digging through their trash.
[53:44.120 --> 53:44.260]  Yeah.
[53:44.440 --> 53:44.680]  Of course.
[53:44.800 --> 53:45.800]  You have something to hide if you do that.
[53:47.000 --> 53:47.320]  Okay.
[53:47.420 --> 53:49.820]  This, uh, brings us to the end of our special two-hour program.
[53:49.960 --> 53:53.560]  Again, if you've been tuning in, hoping to hear the personal computer show, well, obviously you didn't.
[53:53.800 --> 53:55.800]  Uh, it will be back again next week at nine o'clock.
[53:56.160 --> 53:57.360]  Uh, I'm sorry, at eight o'clock.
[53:57.480 --> 54:01.360]  And we'll be back again next week at seven o'clock, uh, with another edition of Off the Hook.
[54:02.080 --> 54:07.040]  Uh, we've been here with Adrian Lamont for the last couple of hours, who's being sentenced tomorrow in federal court here in New York.
[54:07.240 --> 54:12.860]  And hopefully, Adrian, you'll get to go back to California soon, uh, unless you want to spend more time in New York sightseeing and that kind of thing.
[54:13.340 --> 54:18.020]  Uh, I want to thank you for, uh, for coming down and talking to us on the eve of, uh, this momentous event.
[54:18.160 --> 54:21.840]  And I hope this latest chapter in your life, uh, is, is a productive one.
[54:22.580 --> 54:23.600]  Well, thanks for having me.
[54:23.800 --> 54:27.420]  And all I can do is wonder whether the judge is out there somewhere in Radioland.
[54:28.740 --> 54:30.080]  Everyone's out there in Radioland somewhere.
[54:30.360 --> 54:32.740]  So, um, good luck.
[54:33.040 --> 54:33.560]  Best of luck.
[54:33.680 --> 54:36.820]  And, uh, well, of course, next week we'll, uh, we'll report on what happened.
[54:37.680 --> 54:38.140]  All right.
[54:38.300 --> 54:39.320]  Manuel Galsin for Off The Hook.
[54:39.620 --> 54:40.580]  See you next week.
[58:28.940 --> 58:35.400]  I had never before seen an African chained to a post in their yard.
[58:35.600 --> 58:36.960]  They kept a black slave.
[58:37.380 --> 58:38.920]  Just a boy like me.
[58:39.160 --> 58:42.020]  He didn't even have whiskers on his face.
[58:43.740 --> 58:44.900]  Slave driver.
[58:45.420 --> 58:47.080]  John Brown, Trumpeter of Freedom.
[58:47.280 --> 58:49.020]  The one man play has been extended.
[58:49.360 --> 58:53.380]  The play is at St. Mark's and the Bower is 2nd Avenue and 10th Street.
[58:53.820 --> 59:00.220]  Performances will be on April 4th, 11th, 18th, May the 2nd, and 16th at 4.30 p.m.
[59:00.540 --> 59:06.100]  The reservation number is 718-784-0905.
[59:06.420 --> 59:10.820]  That's 718-784-0905.
[59:10.820 --> 59:18.740]  Or, visit our website at www.wbworks.com slash johnbrown.
[59:18.840 --> 59:22.700]  That's wbworks.com slash johnbrown.
[59:22.700 --> 59:25.640]  How they put the lies of their souls.
[59:26.820 --> 59:29.580]  Today they say that we are free.
[59:30.140 --> 59:31.760]  Only to be changed.
[59:32.000 --> 59:37.780]  You're listening to WBAI Radio in New York, 99.5 FM.