[00:05.880 --> 00:12.700]  Check out the new issue of The Independent, the award-winning bi-weekly paper of the New York City Independent Media Center.
[00:12.920 --> 00:26.320]  This week's issue includes an article on a military-style training program for troubled youth in Bed-Stuy, charges of racism at Columbia University, Bush's new attack on federally subsidized low-income housing, and the latest from Iraq and Haiti.
[00:26.540 --> 00:30.200]  The Independent is distributed for free at dozens of sites throughout the city.
[00:30.360 --> 00:34.840]  To find out more, call 212-684-8112.
[00:34.840 --> 00:38.900]  That's 2-1-2-6-8-4-8-1-1-2.
[00:50.370 --> 00:53.630]  And at 7 o'clock exactly, you're listening to WBAI New York.
[00:53.790 --> 00:55.290]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[01:00.490 --> 01:04.970]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[01:05.930 --> 01:10.370]  I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call.
[01:11.090 --> 01:15.790]  We couldn't get much worse, but if they could, they would.
[01:15.790 --> 01:18.730]  But they live on for the best, expect the worst.
[01:19.470 --> 01:21.210]  I hope that's understood.
[01:21.530 --> 01:22.250]  But they live on!
[02:02.400 --> 02:04.260]  And a good interview by the program is Off the Hook.
[02:04.400 --> 02:10.200]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, along with Mike over there, and Jim over further.
[02:10.600 --> 02:10.840]  Yep.
[02:11.020 --> 02:11.300]  How you doing?
[02:12.120 --> 02:23.820]  And Bernie, we're trying to get Bernie on the phone, but unfortunately, we have new security codes here at the radio station, so what that means is that I can't dial out unless I hack the phone system, and that could take a little while.
[02:24.900 --> 02:32.740]  It's funny, because we had these new codes last week, and for some reason, the call went through without even asking for a code, so I forgot to bring the piece of paper in with the code.
[02:32.960 --> 02:33.600]  It's my fault.
[02:33.720 --> 02:34.260]  Totally my fault.
[02:34.340 --> 02:35.740]  Sorry, Bernie, if you're listening out there somewhere.
[02:36.180 --> 02:37.200]  We're trying to get to you.
[02:37.620 --> 02:39.300]  We have people working on this right now.
[02:41.020 --> 02:45.380]  This is Off the Hook, the program about technological challenges, and we certainly have found ourselves in one.
[02:46.980 --> 02:52.720]  Well, I was going to ask Bernie if he had anything new, but I guess I'll postpone that until just a little bit later.
[02:53.300 --> 02:54.460]  Oh, we have someone with a code.
[02:56.880 --> 02:57.600]  Can you...
[02:57.600 --> 02:58.720]  I'll dial the number.
[03:00.500 --> 03:04.920]  Actually, why don't I open up to you guys while I dial the phone.
[03:06.240 --> 03:08.380]  All my papers got soaked in the rain, though.
[03:08.460 --> 03:12.840]  Well, I have a couple of little things from old things that we've talked about.
[03:13.540 --> 03:23.400]  A couple months ago, we talked about how in Germany they have these affinity programs for supermarkets and such, much like they do in much of the United States.
[03:24.580 --> 03:30.080]  It turns out that our speculation on why don't we do something like that, well, we didn't.
[03:30.080 --> 03:32.220]  But we discovered somebody who does.
[03:32.460 --> 03:44.000]  If you go to the website cockeyed.com, that's C-O-C-K-E-Y-E-D.com, and look for the word Safeway towards the bottom of the page.
[03:44.000 --> 03:46.440]  There's a guy in California who's done this.
[03:46.440 --> 04:01.180]  He's cloned his barcode on his affinity card for Safeway supermarkets and has millions of people using the same thing, driving marketers and data miners crazy.
[04:04.660 --> 04:09.760]  First Amendment fans, I'd like to urge you to go to howardstern.com.
[04:10.040 --> 04:17.260]  There's not much salacious there until you start digging very, very deep, but there's a lot of First Amendment-related stuff early on.
[04:17.340 --> 04:24.240]  Even if you're not a fan of Howard Stern, I think you should go, because the First Amendment is for people that you don't agree with more than it is for people that you do agree with.
[04:24.240 --> 04:24.980]  Well, I agree with that.
[04:25.080 --> 04:28.160]  I didn't hear the rest of it because I was trying to dial this phone here, and it's not working.
[04:29.040 --> 04:31.840]  The code that we imported didn't work either.
[04:32.340 --> 04:34.820]  So what I'm going to have to... I'll be forced to do this.
[04:35.400 --> 04:36.000]  Can I get a dial tone?
[04:37.620 --> 04:38.420]  I'm not even getting a dial tone.
[04:38.500 --> 04:38.740]  There we are.
[04:38.860 --> 04:39.000]  Okay.
[04:40.040 --> 04:41.240]  Did you have a dial tone earlier?
[04:41.380 --> 04:42.460]  I had a dial tone earlier, yes.
[04:43.500 --> 04:44.660]  I wasn't born yesterday, you know.
[04:44.780 --> 04:45.320]  Okay, okay.
[04:45.340 --> 04:46.920]  And we get the special little tone.
[04:47.740 --> 04:49.320]  All right, I'm going to put in a very predictable code.
[04:52.360 --> 04:55.500]  Now, you see, every number we dial doesn't work.
[04:56.600 --> 04:57.620]  Do you have a five-digit code?
[04:58.180 --> 04:58.500]  No.
[04:58.800 --> 04:58.960]  Oh.
[04:59.100 --> 05:02.620]  Well, if anyone out there has a five-digit code, please let us know, because we know they're five digits now.
[05:03.520 --> 05:06.040]  And they gave me a piece of paper with...
[05:06.040 --> 05:07.640]  Hey, RedHack, do you have a five-digit code?
[05:09.180 --> 05:09.500]  No.
[05:09.680 --> 05:09.980]  Useless.
[05:10.040 --> 05:11.020]  Five-digit what code?
[05:11.220 --> 05:12.860]  Just any five-digit code?
[05:12.960 --> 05:13.700]  Is that what you're asking for?
[05:13.700 --> 05:15.220]  Leo, go out and find us a five-digit code.
[05:15.840 --> 05:16.780]  Don't return until you do.
[05:16.780 --> 05:18.240]  Five-one-one-one-one-one.
[05:18.900 --> 05:19.540]  All ones?
[05:19.800 --> 05:20.020]  Yeah.
[05:20.460 --> 05:22.180]  And five-for-three-two-one-backwards.
[05:22.900 --> 05:24.540]  We can sit here trying...
[05:24.540 --> 05:25.340]  Leo's the master hacker here.
[05:25.420 --> 05:25.920]  Okay, fine.
[05:26.020 --> 05:26.840]  We'll try that.
[05:27.380 --> 05:28.120]  Let's dial Bernie again.
[05:28.220 --> 05:29.660]  Of course, Bernie can always call us.
[05:30.500 --> 05:32.340]  Bernie, call us with a five-digit code.
[05:32.480 --> 05:35.940]  Yeah, but everybody else is going to call us, too, at the same time, so we have no way of knowing.
[05:36.200 --> 05:38.760]  Well, doesn't Bernie know the secret, double secret number?
[05:38.960 --> 05:39.480]  Five ones, was it?
[05:39.680 --> 05:40.760]  One-one-one-one-one.
[05:41.940 --> 05:43.040]  Oh, that didn't work.
[05:43.200 --> 05:44.180]  No, it seems too predictable.
[05:44.180 --> 05:44.200]  You know what?
[05:44.200 --> 05:44.840]  Nothing's going to work.
[05:44.960 --> 05:45.640]  Nothing's going to work.
[05:47.000 --> 05:49.860]  Well, Bernie, if you're out there, call us on the special line.
[05:50.700 --> 05:52.640]  Unfortunately, I never told them what the special line was.
[05:54.540 --> 05:54.940]  Yeah.
[05:56.420 --> 05:56.820]  Okay.
[05:58.680 --> 06:00.460]  Let's have some stories.
[06:00.600 --> 06:00.980]  What's this?
[06:01.220 --> 06:02.240]  Give me a calling card?
[06:02.400 --> 06:03.580]  I'm not using a calling card.
[06:04.140 --> 06:04.880]  That's ridiculous.
[06:08.230 --> 06:08.830]  All right, all right.
[06:08.830 --> 06:09.510]  Keep it as a backup.
[06:09.750 --> 06:10.710]  We'll use a calling card, then.
[06:13.090 --> 06:13.430]  Dalton?
[06:14.990 --> 06:17.070]  Of course, it's probably going to be expired or something.
[06:22.100 --> 06:25.420]  This just goes to show that hacking is usually very labor-intensive.
[06:25.840 --> 06:27.660]  Okay, now, I'm supposed to enter the...
[06:27.660 --> 06:29.220]  University's Institute for Survey Research.
[06:29.340 --> 06:29.960]  Keisha speaking.
[06:30.080 --> 06:30.780]  How may I help you?
[06:30.980 --> 06:31.720]  Uh, sorry.
[06:31.820 --> 06:32.800]  I must dial the wrong number.
[06:32.900 --> 06:34.880]  What kind of calling card is this when you get a human?
[06:36.500 --> 06:37.120]  I'm sorry.
[06:37.260 --> 06:37.580]  I'm not...
[06:37.580 --> 06:39.460]  You have to call the number on the back.
[06:40.100 --> 06:42.620]  Well, why the number on the back, not the number on the front?
[06:42.800 --> 06:44.120]  Because these people are insane.
[06:44.260 --> 06:44.380]  All right.
[06:44.380 --> 06:44.600]  You know what?
[06:44.680 --> 06:45.480]  You call the number.
[06:45.580 --> 06:46.240]  I'll call the number.
[06:48.380 --> 06:50.040]  I'll key in Bernie's number here.
[06:50.040 --> 06:50.620]  Wait, I hit this?
[06:51.620 --> 06:52.260]  And then...
[06:52.260 --> 06:53.880]  I hope the listeners are enjoying this.
[06:54.620 --> 06:56.100]  That's the bonus number there, so...
[06:56.100 --> 06:56.800]  That's a good way.
[06:56.800 --> 06:58.240]  How do I activate this thing?
[06:58.360 --> 07:00.320]  Okay, I'm not talking about this anymore in the air.
[07:00.360 --> 07:00.660]  I'm sorry.
[07:00.780 --> 07:02.600]  I'm sorry for all the craziness.
[07:02.600 --> 07:03.120]  I'll just do it on there.
[07:03.240 --> 07:03.760]  I'll just do it on there.
[07:03.780 --> 07:06.560]  This is what happens when you change codes in the middle of...
[07:07.440 --> 07:09.800]  Maybe this is a hint from BAI Management.
[07:10.000 --> 07:10.660]  Have you thought of that?
[07:10.840 --> 07:11.280]  I don't know.
[07:21.160 --> 07:21.800]  Go ahead and do the show, though.
[07:23.140 --> 07:29.400]  We have all kinds of news items, not the least of which, as long as we're talking about bumbling, we might as well talk about George W.
[07:29.560 --> 07:29.800]  Bush.
[07:30.440 --> 07:30.700]  He does.
[07:31.380 --> 07:33.300]  What, I'm not supposed to talk about a bumbling president?
[07:33.400 --> 07:34.900]  Is that somehow offensive to do that?
[07:35.260 --> 07:36.260]  I'm just waiting to...
[07:36.260 --> 07:39.020]  Listen, the guy is the most powerful man in the world, okay?
[07:39.100 --> 07:43.040]  He had better be as close to literate and intelligent as possible.
[07:43.040 --> 07:46.140]  Otherwise, he is going to be, you know, one big target.
[07:46.700 --> 07:49.120]  And last night, he drew a big bullseye on himself.
[07:49.280 --> 07:57.940]  Well, without telegraphing my politics, which everyone knows anyway, I think unless it has hacking or free speech-related content, it's not proper.
[07:58.480 --> 08:04.340]  Well, I think it has many things to do with free speech and many things to do with security.
[08:04.540 --> 08:05.640]  Well, then I'll reserve judgment.
[08:05.980 --> 08:06.300]  Yes.
[08:06.480 --> 08:07.380]  We have Bernie on the line?
[08:07.520 --> 08:08.080]  Bernie, are you there?
[08:08.380 --> 08:11.820]  I'm really impressed you went through such extraordinary efforts to call me, man.
[08:11.820 --> 08:16.760]  Well, we believe in leaving no man behind here at PAI, and we will thank you very much.
[08:16.840 --> 08:17.860]  I don't know how you did it, but you did it.
[08:17.940 --> 08:19.680]  Someone walked in with a new code.
[08:19.760 --> 08:20.440]  With a new code, okay.
[08:20.640 --> 08:20.780]  New code.
[08:21.560 --> 08:25.080]  Which we're not allowed to know, so we have to get him in every week.
[08:25.100 --> 08:25.980]  We have a code.
[08:26.100 --> 08:29.680]  I just left it someplace else because, well, I forgot, all right?
[08:29.780 --> 08:32.120]  Last week, I remembered, but we didn't need a code for some reason.
[08:32.440 --> 08:32.720]  Anyway.
[08:33.360 --> 08:35.640]  Okay, so we're about to critique George W.
[08:35.820 --> 08:37.800]  Bush over Jim's objections.
[08:39.280 --> 08:39.640]  Reservations.
[08:39.840 --> 08:40.200]  Reservations.
[08:40.380 --> 08:41.500]  Bernie, is it okay with you?
[08:41.960 --> 08:45.660]  Yeah, I actually caught much of the speech last night.
[08:45.780 --> 08:47.520]  It wasn't a press conference so much as a speech.
[08:47.720 --> 08:48.180]  Well, okay.
[08:48.720 --> 08:49.780]  This person writes in.
[08:49.840 --> 08:50.680]  One of our listeners writes in.
[08:50.720 --> 08:51.840]  I guess that makes it relevant, doesn't it?
[08:52.120 --> 08:52.300]  Maybe.
[08:52.580 --> 08:52.820]  Go on.
[08:52.920 --> 08:53.120]  All right.
[08:53.400 --> 08:54.620]  I was watching George W.
[08:54.760 --> 09:04.500]  Bush give his little speech Tuesday night, and when asked about being wrong in regards to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, he made the comment, a nation that hides things is a nation that is afraid of being caught.
[09:05.820 --> 09:08.420]  This is the first thing I have actually agreed with this man on.
[09:08.420 --> 09:13.620]  And I personally think it takes courage for him to admit that the United States government is really just afraid of being caught.
[09:14.500 --> 09:16.440]  And, uh, what?
[09:16.560 --> 09:17.900]  That's a good observation, I think.
[09:18.080 --> 09:19.020]  Well, I'm not objecting.
[09:19.100 --> 09:20.200]  That one I actually like.
[09:20.500 --> 09:22.200]  Now, this is a story from Reuters.
[09:22.700 --> 09:28.280]  Reuters news agency, which I, you know, part of our job here at this radio program is to analyze the media.
[09:28.520 --> 09:32.980]  And I think analyzing the way that this particular branch of the media presents a story is kind of interesting.
[09:32.980 --> 09:33.460]  Listen to this.
[09:33.800 --> 09:34.260]  U.S.
[09:34.360 --> 09:35.060]  President George W.
[09:35.160 --> 09:43.380]  Bush grimaced, sighed, rambled, and chuckled under his breath on Tuesday before saying he could not think of a single mistake he had made since the September 11th attacks.
[09:43.820 --> 09:59.020]  Before the glare of live television cameras at his first primetime news conference in more than a year, the Republican president responded to many of the questions from reporters by repeating stock phrases, fairly stock phrases about freedom in Iraq and the history-changing impact of the September 11th attacks.
[09:59.020 --> 10:04.420]  But one question for which Bush was evidently not prepared invited him to name his biggest mistake since 9-11.
[10:04.740 --> 10:10.400]  I wish you'd given me this written question ahead of time so I could plan for it, Bush joked before taking a long pause.
[10:11.000 --> 10:17.860]  I'm sure something will pop into my head here in the midst of this press conference with all the pressure of trying to come up with an answer, but it hadn't yet.
[10:18.200 --> 10:20.320]  And all those tense changes are not mine.
[10:20.900 --> 10:33.120]  Then came a meandering solidically that wandered from an affirmation of his decisions to invade Afghanistan and Iraq to his firm belief that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and the discovery of mustard gas on a turkey farm in Libya.
[10:33.700 --> 10:35.600]  I don't want to sound like I have made no mistakes.
[10:35.720 --> 10:36.600]  I'm confident I have.
[10:36.700 --> 10:37.380]  I just haven't.
[10:37.500 --> 10:42.420]  You just put me under the spot here, and maybe I'm not as quick on my feet as I should be in coming up with one, he concluded.
[10:43.180 --> 10:53.900]  His performance during the hour-long appearance in the ornate White House East Room, a venue reserved for large and formal occasions, featured the usual mix of misspoken words and grammatical conundrums for which the president is well known.
[10:53.900 --> 11:01.840]  This is a war against people who have no guilt in killing innocent people, he said, in describing the gravity of Washington's war on terrorism.
[11:02.320 --> 11:07.240]  By and large, the rare solo appearance before the White House press corps, can you guess why there's so few of them?
[11:07.860 --> 11:16.480]  Bush's 12th since taking office in early 2001 appeared to go better than his February interview on NBC's Meet the Press, which some conservatives criticized as unsure and bumbling.
[11:17.140 --> 11:26.620]  On Tuesday, Bush smoothly delivered a 17-minute prepared statement about Iraq before fielding well over a dozen questions from reporters, some of whom were called upon in a pre-set order.
[11:27.100 --> 11:32.080]  I've got some must-calls, Bush said, while inviting a question from a reporter named on his list.
[11:32.260 --> 11:37.420]  So, after all that, you know, he wasn't even calling on them in random order, some of the questions apparently were preparing.
[11:37.640 --> 11:40.580]  Back to the thing about what they mentioned about him using stock phrases.
[11:40.720 --> 11:47.000]  I found it amusing when the NPR representative asked him about that and he responded with more stock phrases.
[11:47.000 --> 11:50.500]  Let me find that in my notes, yes, proper response to this.
[11:50.620 --> 11:52.900]  But this is something that I really found to be amazing.
[11:52.900 --> 11:54.900]  I was looking at the transcript in the New York Times.
[11:55.460 --> 11:58.720]  NewYorkTimes.com, NYTimes.com always has transcripts of these things.
[11:59.060 --> 12:01.140]  And so I went over to the transcript.
[12:01.440 --> 12:08.300]  You don't have to get more than two sentences in to find something that is simply staggering.
[12:08.580 --> 12:08.940]  Okay?
[12:09.240 --> 12:10.580]  This is the prepared statement.
[12:10.940 --> 12:12.320]  And this might be a typo.
[12:12.420 --> 12:13.800]  If this is a typo, I'd like to know about it.
[12:13.800 --> 12:17.100]  Maybe somebody with a tape of this can play it back and tell me if he really said this.
[12:17.560 --> 12:17.680]  Okay.
[12:18.300 --> 12:20.080]  Listen to sentence number two.
[12:20.360 --> 12:24.420]  Before I take your questions, let me speak with the American people about the situation in Iraq.
[12:24.580 --> 12:26.080]  First sentence went smoothly, no problem.
[12:26.840 --> 12:29.200]  This has been tough weeks in that country.
[12:30.980 --> 12:33.560]  This has been tough weeks in that country.
[12:33.620 --> 12:34.500]  I mean, come on.
[12:34.720 --> 12:36.680]  Second grade, you can speak better than that.
[12:36.960 --> 12:39.600]  Now, again, is this a typo or did he really say that?
[12:39.680 --> 12:40.300]  Someone please tell me.
[12:40.400 --> 12:42.060]  It's in the New York Times, NYTimes.com.
[12:42.060 --> 12:43.680]  And I assume in the newspaper as well.
[12:43.680 --> 12:45.180]  Maybe he has foreign speechwriters.
[12:45.580 --> 12:46.840]  He's made similar...
[12:46.840 --> 12:49.620]  Last night, he made similar errors.
[12:50.820 --> 12:56.080]  Don't you think that kind of thing should be held up to some kind of standard during the election process?
[12:56.100 --> 12:58.000]  If somebody is illiterate, you're not in me.
[12:58.000 --> 12:59.200]  I don't believe it is illiterate.
[12:59.480 --> 13:00.140]  I have...
[13:00.140 --> 13:00.700]  You don't think talking like that is a lot?
[13:00.700 --> 13:01.280]  I'll tell you why.
[13:01.420 --> 13:02.740]  I have relatives...
[13:02.740 --> 13:03.020]  All right.
[13:03.140 --> 13:05.000]  My family all grew up in New York State.
[13:05.120 --> 13:06.580]  Your family doesn't have his button.
[13:06.840 --> 13:08.000]  It's his finger on the nuclear button.
[13:08.000 --> 13:08.800]  Let me go through...
[13:08.800 --> 13:10.520]  Give me a break and let me go through this.
[13:12.060 --> 13:12.580]  New York State.
[13:12.760 --> 13:13.260]  All right.
[13:13.620 --> 13:14.420]  College educated.
[13:15.180 --> 13:19.560]  My aunt has lived in Mobile, Alabama since the Second World War.
[13:19.800 --> 13:20.100]  Okay.
[13:20.320 --> 13:20.620]  All right.
[13:20.720 --> 13:22.240]  She's a well-educated woman.
[13:22.440 --> 13:26.340]  She got to the rank of commander during the Navy in the Second World War.
[13:26.480 --> 13:27.600]  She has to have some smarts.
[13:27.680 --> 13:29.180]  She talks like this.
[13:29.540 --> 13:29.800]  Okay.
[13:30.360 --> 13:35.040]  The point is, this is grammatical regional English.
[13:35.240 --> 13:35.540]  Okay?
[13:35.820 --> 13:37.100]  I don't know if that's grammatical.
[13:37.100 --> 13:38.180]  I believe it is.
[13:38.220 --> 13:38.520]  I'm sorry.
[13:38.520 --> 13:40.000]  It's not English at all, actually.
[13:40.280 --> 13:44.460]  If this were a Democrat doing this, Jim, you would be attacking it.
[13:44.700 --> 13:45.040]  No.
[13:45.220 --> 13:46.880]  We're going to find a Democrat that talks like this.
[13:47.040 --> 13:47.420]  Believe me.
[13:47.480 --> 13:48.100]  I think we can do it.
[13:48.180 --> 13:48.260]  No.
[13:48.400 --> 13:55.020]  I was quite lenient towards Strom Thurmond and Lyndon Johnson and, you know, you name the guy.
[13:55.120 --> 13:58.040]  I don't know of any speeches Lyndon Johnson name that sounded like this.
[13:58.160 --> 13:58.760]  I really don't.
[13:58.860 --> 13:59.440]  Well, maybe not.
[13:59.440 --> 14:02.360]  He had some colloquialisms and he had some racism, too.
[14:03.200 --> 14:04.260]  But, you know, as far as...
[14:04.260 --> 14:06.620]  And he had a thick Southern accent and all that sort of stuff.
[14:06.720 --> 14:09.880]  How do you go to Yale and pass English courses?
[14:10.100 --> 14:10.560]  Well, wait a minute.
[14:10.560 --> 14:11.920]  From what I hear, he didn't pass.
[14:12.080 --> 14:12.660]  Oh, he didn't pass.
[14:12.680 --> 14:12.960]  Okay.
[14:13.420 --> 14:13.680]  All right.
[14:13.760 --> 14:14.300]  Never mind then.
[14:14.440 --> 14:14.720]  I'm sorry.
[14:14.760 --> 14:19.180]  What you want is everyone to speak in a homogenized way in this country?
[14:19.220 --> 14:20.220]  Not a homogenized way.
[14:20.220 --> 14:21.140]  I think that's rather...
[14:21.140 --> 14:22.500]  Just a grammatically correct way.
[14:22.760 --> 14:23.420]  You know, this is...
[14:23.420 --> 14:24.480]  It's a simple sentence.
[14:24.640 --> 14:25.640]  It's a very simple sentence.
[14:25.660 --> 14:25.820]  It's a prepared speech.
[14:25.940 --> 14:26.760]  It's something he rehearses.
[14:26.760 --> 14:28.920]  And this was the prepared statement.
[14:29.120 --> 14:34.240]  If he had been speaking off the cuff, perhaps, but, I mean, it's something that was written ahead of time that he'd looked over...
[14:34.240 --> 14:35.160]  I'm sorry, Boyos.
[14:35.160 --> 14:35.480]  Who knows how many times?
[14:35.480 --> 14:37.040]  Most of it was regionalisms.
[14:37.160 --> 14:37.560]  I just...
[14:37.560 --> 14:38.360]  I have a personal...
[14:38.360 --> 14:38.600]  And those that weren't...
[14:38.600 --> 14:46.940]  I have a personal problem as an English major and somebody who edits a magazine with people who cannot put sentences together after college education.
[14:46.940 --> 14:49.260]  I mean, it's something I think everybody should be able to do.
[14:49.380 --> 14:53.100]  And I think we don't spend enough time focusing on that in this country.
[14:53.120 --> 14:55.560]  We don't spend enough time focusing on education in general in this country.
[14:55.560 --> 14:58.860]  And, unfortunately, the President of the United States represents that now.
[14:58.960 --> 15:00.520]  And that's something I think we need to address.
[15:00.760 --> 15:02.300]  His own wife was an English teacher.
[15:02.720 --> 15:03.840]  His wife is an English teacher?
[15:03.940 --> 15:05.700]  Shouldn't she be tutoring him or something, then?
[15:06.140 --> 15:07.020]  You would think so.
[15:08.960 --> 15:09.280]  Unbelievable.
[15:09.580 --> 15:10.960]  Okay, I don't want to spend the whole show on this.
[15:11.060 --> 15:13.660]  But I do think it's something that, you know, is worth...
[15:13.660 --> 15:15.160]  And, you know, I am a Bush-Cheney supporter.
[15:15.280 --> 15:17.080]  I can prove it with this letter I got in the mail.
[15:17.380 --> 15:19.560]  I told you not to contribute to the campaign.
[15:19.760 --> 15:20.380]  I don't know where...
[15:20.380 --> 15:21.200]  Did you get a nice photograph, Emmanuel?
[15:21.380 --> 15:24.760]  Did you get that really nice photograph of the President and his wife in the mail like I got?
[15:24.760 --> 15:26.120]  No, I got a credit card in the mail.
[15:26.300 --> 15:27.560]  Well, it looks like a credit card.
[15:27.560 --> 15:28.880]  Anyway, it's this nice, thick card.
[15:29.020 --> 15:31.240]  It says Bush-Cheney 04, Emmanuel Goldstein.
[15:31.340 --> 15:32.740]  And it's got my member number.
[15:34.200 --> 15:37.700]  And, basically, I'm a member since 2004, apparently.
[15:38.240 --> 15:39.360]  I have this letter.
[15:39.400 --> 15:41.720]  I have this letter that says, On behalf of President George W.
[15:41.860 --> 15:47.480]  Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, I am pleased to enclose your official Bush-Cheney 04 charter membership card.
[15:47.580 --> 15:48.280]  It's a fan club.
[15:48.520 --> 15:50.420]  Yeah, I don't know how I got on this list.
[15:50.500 --> 15:52.100]  It smells like rebel, if you ask me.
[15:52.100 --> 15:52.680]  Well, it sure does.
[15:53.120 --> 15:59.720]  This card honors you for your past support and recognizes the critical role you will play in the President's 2004 re-election campaign.
[15:59.820 --> 16:01.940]  A whole big, you know, nonsense letter goes...
[16:01.940 --> 16:03.200]  All the words, though, make sense.
[16:03.220 --> 16:03.640]  I'll say that.
[16:03.760 --> 16:04.860]  So, are you going campaigning?
[16:05.220 --> 16:05.740]  Well, no.
[16:05.880 --> 16:11.560]  But I did want to read the last part of this, because I think there's something very significant in the statement here.
[16:11.640 --> 16:12.360]  It's the P.S.
[16:12.360 --> 16:16.620]  The thing is signed by Mark Rassikot, or Rackikot, campaign chairman.
[16:17.240 --> 16:17.680]  P.S.
[16:17.740 --> 16:23.160]  Your Bush-Cheney 04 charter membership card is the most recognizable symbol of your status on President Bush's team.
[16:23.920 --> 16:24.680]  And listen to this.
[16:24.720 --> 16:25.360]  This is the sentence here.
[16:25.460 --> 16:30.520]  Only a few thousand votes out of millions cast will be the difference in the 2004 elections.
[16:31.060 --> 16:32.860]  I think that's a fascinating statement there.
[16:32.940 --> 16:40.420]  They're saying right away that either this is going to be an extremely close election, and they know that, or only a few thousand votes really matter out of millions cast.
[16:41.900 --> 16:43.960]  Or a couple of Supreme Court justices.
[16:44.040 --> 16:44.480]  No, no.
[16:44.620 --> 16:48.720]  They want you to believe that your vote is important.
[16:48.960 --> 16:49.660]  Very important to them.
[16:49.660 --> 16:52.040]  Yeah, but they're stating that only a few thousand votes are going to make.
[16:52.120 --> 16:52.280]  Right.
[16:52.380 --> 16:54.180]  And what do you think is a result of that?
[16:54.180 --> 16:56.140]  You think that your vote is very, very important.
[16:56.780 --> 17:07.820]  I mean, I'm amazed that the Bush campaign, the incumbent, is already certain that if they win, it's going to be by a very narrow margin.
[17:08.220 --> 17:09.120]  He's not certain.
[17:09.120 --> 17:10.580]  And it's a propaganda ploy.
[17:10.860 --> 17:11.200]  Well...
[17:11.200 --> 17:15.840]  And this explains the film crew following you around for that new movie, Win a Date with Condoleezza Rice.
[17:16.480 --> 17:19.000]  You know, the thing about Condoleezza Rice, she's intelligent.
[17:19.120 --> 17:19.720]  She's very smart.
[17:19.900 --> 17:20.780]  I will give her that.
[17:20.820 --> 17:21.460]  She scares me.
[17:21.560 --> 17:23.580]  But you know what scares me even more than her is her hair.
[17:24.140 --> 17:25.780]  That, I mean, it's like, it's got a life of its own.
[17:25.840 --> 17:26.600]  It doesn't move ever.
[17:26.880 --> 17:27.200]  You know?
[17:27.300 --> 17:30.320]  That thing could stand up to winds of 200 miles an hour and would not budge.
[17:30.520 --> 17:31.260]  How does she do it?
[17:31.540 --> 17:32.560]  No one's asked her that yet.
[17:33.460 --> 17:34.040]  Hairspray, maybe?
[17:35.260 --> 17:37.740]  That's, you know, concrete hairspray or something.
[17:37.740 --> 17:38.100]  I don't know.
[17:38.360 --> 17:39.660]  Let's fix her up with Donald Trump.
[17:39.900 --> 17:46.920]  Anyway, let's talk about electronic voting because this is something that we got a lot of mail about and there's apparently some new developments as far as that goes.
[17:47.520 --> 17:54.100]  Security concerns have led the Pentagon to scrap plans to test Internet voting among 100,000 military personnel living overseas.
[17:54.420 --> 18:04.240]  The $22 million plan first ran into trouble in January when a group of academics reported the Internet was too insecure and breaches could undermine the entire election.
[18:04.440 --> 18:07.020]  Now, the whole plan has been scrapped, according to the Washington Post.
[18:07.020 --> 18:11.120]  It's not that it's never going to go into test modes, said Pentagon spokesman Glenn Flood.
[18:11.320 --> 18:13.620]  It's that right now we're not going to do it.
[18:13.760 --> 18:17.700]  We have to step back and look at everything that we've done for two or three years in this thing.
[18:19.360 --> 18:20.240]  Adventure... I'm sorry.
[18:21.060 --> 18:22.940]  Accenture, e-democracy services.
[18:23.340 --> 18:28.140]  The firm running the system said the experiment could have been an important learning experience.
[18:28.400 --> 18:31.260]  The program had been set up to run in 50 counties in seven states.
[18:31.420 --> 18:36.720]  The cancellation came while the online system was being tested for certification with the federal voting standards.
[18:36.920 --> 18:39.400]  So, no certification decision was ever made.
[18:40.220 --> 18:43.380]  And on top of that, we have a U.S.
[18:43.520 --> 18:50.440]  company that makes software for electronic voting machines has taken the unprecedented step to make public all its proprietary computer code.
[18:50.500 --> 18:50.980]  What do you think, Mike?
[18:51.700 --> 18:52.520]  Good for them.
[18:52.740 --> 18:53.360]  Yeah, well...
[18:53.360 --> 18:54.640]  It's not unprecedented, though.
[18:54.720 --> 18:55.020]  It's not.
[18:55.360 --> 18:57.200]  This company is called Vote Here.
[18:57.380 --> 18:58.660]  They're based in Washington State.
[18:58.900 --> 19:04.140]  They've placed the software they use to control some e-voting machines on its website for free downloading.
[19:04.140 --> 19:05.640]  I guess votehere.com or something.
[19:05.920 --> 19:11.340]  A voting machine simulation is also included that lets programmers see precisely how the code would work in practice.
[19:12.060 --> 19:20.320]  You can actually program it to cheat and you can watch where the protocol detects where your ballot was changed, according to company founder Jim Adler.
[19:20.320 --> 19:24.480]  Now it's up to the world to take a look and dig in and give us their opinion.
[19:24.980 --> 19:30.980]  Now, prior to releasing their source code, Vote Here had it examined by an outside consultancy firm called Plus5.
[19:31.500 --> 19:39.400]  A statement from Plus5 founder Robert Baldwin describes the code as written in a professional and consistent style, making it easy to understand and review.
[19:40.060 --> 19:47.200]  Vote Here's software has yet to be used in any official elections and the company's code includes a list of improvements that it plans to make.
[19:47.600 --> 19:51.440]  But I think it's a good sign, at least, that they see the importance of releasing the code.
[19:52.960 --> 19:53.860]  It is good.
[19:54.020 --> 19:54.320]  It's good.
[19:54.400 --> 19:59.840]  I mean, if it's something that we're supposed to trust, it's good that people can look at it and find out if they want to trust.
[19:59.940 --> 20:00.100]  All right.
[20:00.180 --> 20:00.580]  Two points.
[20:01.440 --> 20:06.780]  The first point is my repeat point that none of these systems have any advantage whatsoever over pen and paper.
[20:07.440 --> 20:25.940]  And the second point is that there's a group called Open Voting, which has been making a fully open source, free software voting systems that I still trust more than anything created by a proprietary company, even if they do allow outsiders to look at the code after it's completed.
[20:26.220 --> 20:30.380]  This listener writes in, what cause do we have to have faith in current mechanical machines?
[20:30.700 --> 20:31.580]  Do we have this...
[20:32.440 --> 20:36.620]  It's either erroneous or enormous, because it's sort of a mixture of the two words.
[20:36.800 --> 20:41.500]  Faith in machines that are just as prone, if not even more prone, to error as are the computer-based machines.
[20:41.500 --> 20:45.040]  I find it interesting that you subscribe to the mechanical machine hysteria.
[20:45.360 --> 20:47.060]  Not that I subscribe to...
[20:47.060 --> 20:48.220]  What's the company's name?
[20:49.120 --> 20:49.480]  Diebold.
[20:49.660 --> 20:49.880]  Diebold?
[20:50.120 --> 20:50.820]  Or Diebold.
[20:50.900 --> 20:51.280]  Which is it?
[20:51.500 --> 20:52.640]  I think it's Diebold.
[20:52.760 --> 20:53.480]  I'm going to settle this.
[20:53.580 --> 20:54.500]  I'm going to settle this right now.
[20:54.720 --> 20:55.860]  I have their phone number.
[20:56.060 --> 20:58.400]  I looked it up before I came in here, because I knew this issue was going to come up.
[20:59.120 --> 20:59.640]  And, uh...
[20:59.640 --> 21:00.460]  Bernie, are you still there?
[21:00.900 --> 21:01.380]  I'm here.
[21:01.440 --> 21:03.160]  Okay, don't panic when you hear a dial tone.
[21:03.380 --> 21:03.680]  All right?
[21:04.000 --> 21:04.340]  All right.
[21:04.400 --> 21:05.240]  You said Diebold, too.
[21:05.300 --> 21:06.700]  I'm saying Diebold, because...
[21:07.380 --> 21:07.980]  I don't know.
[21:08.200 --> 21:09.040]  I took German.
[21:09.160 --> 21:13.560]  It's a German name, and usually the second vowel is the one that's pronounced.
[21:13.840 --> 21:16.240]  I have not called this number before, by the way, so...
[21:16.960 --> 21:18.800]  Whatever this person says...
[21:18.800 --> 21:19.960]  I'll bet a buck on Diebold.
[21:20.120 --> 21:20.920]  Let's agree.
[21:30.050 --> 21:34.630]  Hi, you've reached Diebold Incorporated at 1-800-993600.
[21:34.810 --> 21:38.530]  Our product application specialists are either on another line or away from their desk.
[21:38.830 --> 21:41.270]  Please leave your name and phone number with area code.
[21:42.330 --> 21:42.810]  Okay.
[21:43.150 --> 21:44.130]  Let's get Bernie back.
[21:44.250 --> 21:44.710]  Bernie, are you there?
[21:45.750 --> 21:46.510]  Bernie, are you there?
[21:46.510 --> 21:47.410]  I'm here.
[21:47.450 --> 21:47.890]  Okay, great.
[21:47.990 --> 21:48.590]  So it's Diebold.
[21:49.250 --> 21:49.810]  All right.
[21:50.170 --> 21:51.070]  We knew that anyway.
[21:51.290 --> 21:51.430]  Yeah.
[21:52.230 --> 21:52.670]  Okay.
[21:54.550 --> 21:55.070]  All right.
[21:55.090 --> 21:56.110]  What were we saying about Diebold?
[21:56.230 --> 21:56.450]  Oh, yes.
[21:56.510 --> 22:00.050]  Not that I subscribe to Diebold's crap that these machines are 100% bulletproof.
[22:00.050 --> 22:01.550]  I just don't understand the hysteria.
[22:01.710 --> 22:05.110]  I think we are for longing...
[22:05.110 --> 22:08.470]  We are longing for a time which is passing in machines that are slowly dying.
[22:08.730 --> 22:11.070]  The questions, I think, I think comes down to this.
[22:11.150 --> 22:15.910]  Does the error rate or even possible error rate of the computerized machines surpass the conventional machines?
[22:15.910 --> 22:21.890]  And also, do the computerized machines have in place the same protections for voting privacy and lack of proof of vote?
[22:22.090 --> 22:23.990]  So that you don't, for instance, sell your vote.
[22:24.490 --> 22:30.050]  If these three criteria are met, I don't personally believe I have a problem with the new machines and I really don't understand the controversy.
[22:30.590 --> 22:31.550]  How do you respond to that?
[22:32.050 --> 22:36.350]  First of all, I've said many, many times that the mechanical machines break fairly often.
[22:38.490 --> 22:43.570]  The potential for abuse with the electronic machines is greater.
[22:44.570 --> 22:56.590]  The potential to do really strange things like claim that the number of votes cast is ten times the number of people living in the district is something that I don't think a mechanical machine has ever been known to do.
[23:01.050 --> 23:02.550]  Spectacular errors like that.
[23:02.650 --> 23:03.930]  Spectacular random things.
[23:04.710 --> 23:08.910]  And tampering can be very hard to detect with computers.
[23:10.930 --> 23:19.070]  But, you know, like I've said a thousand times on this show, none of these systems provide any advantage over pen and paper.
[23:19.210 --> 23:22.190]  Pen and paper is something that pretty much everyone can understand.
[23:22.590 --> 23:27.730]  And we're just, like, using technology for the fun of it rather than for any appreciable purpose.
[23:27.910 --> 23:29.110]  But who uses pen and paper these days?
[23:29.330 --> 23:29.630]  Me.
[23:30.330 --> 23:30.950]  For voting?
[23:31.490 --> 23:32.450]  I've never voted once.
[23:32.590 --> 23:33.290]  Well, that's what I'm talking about.
[23:33.370 --> 23:35.190]  Who uses pen and paper to vote?
[23:35.290 --> 23:36.050]  The rest of the world.
[23:36.190 --> 23:37.070]  The rest of the world, but not here.
[23:37.210 --> 23:37.410]  No.
[23:37.730 --> 23:37.910]  Okay.
[23:39.010 --> 23:39.590]  Leo, yes?
[23:39.810 --> 23:40.850]  I just want to say...
[23:40.850 --> 23:41.110]  Wait a minute.
[23:41.210 --> 23:43.130]  You've got to get a microphone that works, first of all.
[23:43.310 --> 23:43.750]  Go ahead.
[23:43.890 --> 23:47.690]  Basically, mechanical machines leave a paper trail.
[23:48.410 --> 23:58.590]  Electronic machines, electronic voting machines do not, and unless they make them that leave a paper trail, they're not going to be any more secure than mechanical machines.
[23:59.330 --> 24:03.370]  The mechanical machines that they use here in the city at least do not create a paper trail.
[24:03.690 --> 24:05.570]  Well, interestingly enough, in the...
[24:05.570 --> 24:13.250]  I think it was right after the 96th election or just before the 96th election, a couple of people came out with a book that alleged that the...
[24:13.250 --> 24:21.410]  not only the mechanical machines were suspect, but also the vote reporting was suspect.
[24:21.730 --> 24:33.150]  There seems to be essentially just one entity that goes to the various sites and copies down the numbers and then reports them.
[24:33.170 --> 24:40.490]  And it's a private company that is contracted by various election commissions, election agencies, whatever you want to call them in your state.
[24:41.630 --> 24:45.170]  and they were very suspicious of this, but they had no proof.
[24:45.310 --> 24:47.870]  They had just a lot of allegations.
[24:49.030 --> 24:51.790]  Of course, that's what we have with electronic voting here, but...
[24:51.790 --> 24:53.990]  One more letter on this subject from the UK.
[24:55.790 --> 25:04.070]  This writer named Lou writes in to say there are no plans introducing electronic voting over here, but one thing I must object to is the removal of my freedom to mark the paper as I choose.
[25:04.290 --> 25:09.310]  I tend to spoil my ballot as a form of voting for none of the above due to the absence of such an option.
[25:10.070 --> 25:16.710]  The spoiled ballot shows that I turned out to vote, I made the effort, but had no intention of backing those I don't wish to govern.
[25:16.910 --> 25:26.110]  It seems to me that electronic voting removes any chance of spoiling the ballot, and thus my only option would be to stay away and risk being tarred as apathetic, which couldn't be further from the truth.
[25:27.550 --> 25:28.310]  That's a good point.
[25:28.430 --> 25:29.150]  Yeah, good point, I think.
[25:29.450 --> 25:30.770]  What about a negative vote?
[25:30.910 --> 25:32.410]  I've always liked the idea of being able...
[25:32.410 --> 25:36.810]  If you don't like any of the candidates, but you hate one more than all the others, you could vote negatively for them.
[25:37.110 --> 25:37.310]  Uh-huh.
[25:37.950 --> 25:41.610]  And it would counteract someone else's positive vote for that same candidates.
[25:41.610 --> 25:44.010]  So you wouldn't get a positive vote, you'd only get a negative vote?
[25:44.950 --> 25:45.950]  Well, I would...
[25:45.950 --> 25:52.050]  No, I could vote however I wanted, but I would like the option to do a vote against someone as opposed to...
[25:52.050 --> 25:54.090]  You know, not as opposed to, but...
[25:54.790 --> 25:57.450]  I can either vote for someone or against someone.
[25:57.870 --> 25:58.110]  Uh-huh.
[25:58.550 --> 26:01.470]  Okay, but could you vote for somebody else and vote against somebody?
[26:01.470 --> 26:03.230]  No, no, that would count as two votes.
[26:03.350 --> 26:04.130]  Exactly, that's my point.
[26:04.370 --> 26:09.410]  So, for instance, let's say I don't think Kerry is that great a candidate, but I really think Bush is an awful candidate.
[26:09.410 --> 26:11.370]  I would go in there and vote a minus one for Bush.
[26:11.650 --> 26:15.910]  Right, and I think that would give a more true reflection of people's wishes.
[26:16.130 --> 26:18.470]  I think you'd get a much greater turnout than they really do.
[26:18.610 --> 26:23.370]  I think the total, the vote totals would end up negative in a lot of elections.
[26:23.550 --> 26:26.650]  Yeah, you'd have some definite issues there.
[26:26.850 --> 26:27.970]  I've got another idea.
[26:28.110 --> 26:31.110]  Why don't you give everyone 100 votes per office?
[26:31.810 --> 26:43.570]  And if you don't like somebody, you vote like zero votes for anybody running for that office, or one vote, or three votes, or 20 votes, and you can just use them on another office that you feel strongly about.
[26:44.150 --> 26:45.530]  No, that's too complicated.
[26:45.630 --> 26:46.790]  Sounds like a card game now.
[26:47.110 --> 26:51.090]  But anyway, okay, that's it for electronic voting for this week.
[26:51.310 --> 27:00.990]  We had Adrian Lamo up here last week talking about his sentencing, which, well, I guess it sort of took place last Wednesday, but then it was postponed.
[27:00.990 --> 27:05.290]  We all went down to court, and it was an interesting experience, wasn't it, Mike?
[27:06.390 --> 27:08.750]  Well, we didn't really know what was happening.
[27:08.870 --> 27:10.710]  No, it was a big conference before the judge.
[27:10.810 --> 27:17.030]  They had a long conversation with the lawyers and the prosecutors and all that, and they decided to postpone it to June 16th.
[27:17.090 --> 27:19.850]  So basically, he's got to walk on eggshells until then as well.
[27:21.090 --> 27:23.610]  And, you know, I guess this kind of thing happens a lot.
[27:24.290 --> 27:29.730]  New things come up that the judge has to consider, and, you know, it's just... I don't know, Bernie, is this kind of thing typical?
[27:30.990 --> 27:39.050]  It certainly is emotionally trying when you prepare yourself mentally and psychologically for something like that.
[27:39.170 --> 27:42.450]  And then your judge ran and said, oh, it's not going to happen for a few months now.
[27:42.650 --> 27:46.870]  But I want to know, do we know who requested this continuance and why?
[27:48.230 --> 27:50.410]  I just know it was mutually agreed upon.
[27:50.410 --> 27:53.790]  I'm not sure who was really pushing for it.
[27:53.830 --> 27:56.230]  I just know that's what the judge wound up deciding to do.
[27:56.230 --> 28:01.470]  Apparently, some new evidence came to light of some sort, but I don't know what it was.
[28:01.870 --> 28:06.070]  And, you know, I guess we'll find out more in the months ahead.
[28:06.290 --> 28:09.570]  But we don't know who was trying to admit this evidence.
[28:12.330 --> 28:27.950]  The pretrial services, which are responsible for looking over people before their sentence, came up with some addendum to their report, which apparently made its way into the judge's hands, something like an hour before the sentencing hearing, while she was in the middle of another trial.
[28:28.150 --> 28:31.970]  Yeah, and it was really, you know, a last-minute thing, so she wasn't able to make a decision based on that.
[28:32.030 --> 28:33.310]  She had to look into it more, apparently.
[28:33.470 --> 28:42.330]  I will say that it is the consensus of those of us who watched the latter part of this trial, that the witness, who was not himself on trial, is certainly guilty of something.
[28:42.830 --> 28:44.710]  Well, let's not get into that.
[28:45.290 --> 28:47.250]  We're talking about a trial we don't even know anything about.
[28:47.550 --> 28:49.090]  But, yeah, you know, that's the interesting thing, though.
[28:49.150 --> 28:52.330]  You can go into these federal courthouses and just sit in on trials.
[28:52.570 --> 28:53.790]  It's really kind of cool, you know.
[28:53.830 --> 28:57.690]  You just walk in and pick your room, and you can just sit down and watch.
[28:57.790 --> 28:59.290]  And, you know, I think more people should do that.
[28:59.510 --> 29:03.010]  It's very educational and interesting and a fun way to spend the rainy day.
[29:04.110 --> 29:06.110]  Not that it was raining, but...
[29:06.530 --> 29:06.850]  Anyway...
[29:06.850 --> 29:13.930]  Well, basically, Adrian is going to be walking on thin ice, wondering about his fate for the next... how many months now?
[29:14.190 --> 29:15.330]  I guess another two months.
[29:15.930 --> 29:17.210]  Thin ice and eggshells.
[29:17.650 --> 29:20.310]  Why didn't they postpone it until just after the Fifth Hope?
[29:20.530 --> 29:21.590]  You know, I don't know.
[29:21.870 --> 29:25.270]  Probably... I'm sure he won't be able to make it to the Fifth Hope, you know, either way.
[29:25.410 --> 29:29.550]  I'm sure that's part of the conditions of whatever he winds up getting sentenced to.
[29:29.550 --> 29:34.310]  Well, I did manage to make it to Beyond Hope during my period of federal supervised release.
[29:34.590 --> 29:34.910]  Uh-huh.
[29:35.570 --> 29:38.110]  Yeah, that was good.
[29:38.390 --> 29:39.290]  It really was.
[29:40.130 --> 29:43.590]  And, of course, Kevin Mitnick will be at the next... the Fifth Hope.
[29:43.790 --> 29:47.950]  He has not been able to come to any of the hopes because in 1994, he was on the run.
[29:48.690 --> 29:49.950]  1997, he was in prison.
[29:51.070 --> 29:53.350]  2000, he was on...
[29:53.350 --> 29:53.610]  Wait a minute.
[29:53.690 --> 29:54.630]  I skipped one somewhere, didn't I?
[29:54.670 --> 29:55.050]  On ice.
[29:55.750 --> 29:56.270]  2000, yeah.
[29:56.330 --> 29:57.690]  2000, he was...
[29:58.470 --> 29:59.250]  Was he still on the run?
[30:00.070 --> 30:01.010]  Yeah, he was...
[30:01.010 --> 30:01.450]  Okay, yeah.
[30:01.510 --> 30:02.670]  He was on supervised release.
[30:03.430 --> 30:05.290]  And 2002, he was still on supervised release.
[30:06.310 --> 30:07.330]  So, this is 2004.
[30:07.330 --> 30:08.170]  He's free, so...
[30:08.170 --> 30:10.410]  So, you might say his life to this point has been hopeless.
[30:11.510 --> 30:11.910]  Good.
[30:11.990 --> 30:12.550]  Good one, yes.
[30:12.750 --> 30:13.390]  Should be in marketing.
[30:14.370 --> 30:19.970]  Anyway, this person wrote in about Adrian Lamo to comment on an article that appeared in this month's Wired.
[30:20.690 --> 30:22.110]  He wants to hear Adrian's reaction.
[30:22.190 --> 30:23.370]  Maybe Adrian will tell us his reaction.
[30:23.690 --> 30:32.450]  The article is well written up to page three, at which point the tone shifts and it becomes obvious that the writer needs to lay off the amateur psychological evaluations and take a course in journalistic objectivity.
[30:33.570 --> 30:35.830]  You can find it on Wired.com.
[30:36.070 --> 30:39.330]  Here's an excerpt regarding the whole Lexus Nexus business.
[30:40.090 --> 30:48.510]  Lamo, it turns out, spent several months playing on Lexus Nexus, mostly digging for personal information on other hackers and on journalists who had written critically about his work.
[30:48.510 --> 30:54.390]  At one point, he also attempted to find all the license plate numbers assigned to undercover vehicles registered with the FBI.
[30:54.870 --> 30:57.830]  All told, he conducted more than 3,000 searches.
[30:58.070 --> 31:06.030]  Although the Times doesn't pay retail for the service, the FBI calculated Lamo's damages using the full Lexus Nexus rate, which added up to a shocking $300,000.
[31:06.030 --> 31:08.290]  It was clearly a punitive figure.
[31:08.430 --> 31:15.250]  Had Lamo simply bought an unlimited three-month account with Lexus Nexus rather than piggybacking off the Times, it would have cost him just $1,500.
[31:16.570 --> 31:18.610]  So, that's from Wired.
[31:20.610 --> 31:22.530]  Interesting how these things transpire.
[31:23.510 --> 31:24.170]  What else?
[31:24.230 --> 31:25.730]  Anyone else have any interesting news items?
[31:27.290 --> 31:27.790]  Nobody.
[31:27.970 --> 31:28.810]  There's some wiretapping news.
[31:28.910 --> 31:29.470]  Wiretapping news.
[31:29.530 --> 31:29.910]  Tell us, Bernie.
[31:29.910 --> 31:39.910]  Well, it turns out the New York State Attorney General, Elliot Spitzer, who's known for his Organized Crime and Drug Task Force.
[31:40.990 --> 31:43.110]  His Organized Crime Task Force.
[31:43.370 --> 31:44.130]  What did I say?
[31:44.310 --> 31:47.210]  Well, you said his Organized Crime and his Something Else Task Force.
[31:47.630 --> 31:47.810]  That's true.
[31:47.810 --> 31:50.350]  I just want to make it clear what we're accusing him of and not accusing him of.
[31:50.350 --> 31:51.950]  Well, you can take it both ways, Emmanuel.
[31:52.250 --> 31:52.430]  Fine.
[31:53.710 --> 32:03.190]  He's very upset, and he's petitioning the Federal Communications Commission to basically change the rules for CALEA.
[32:03.330 --> 32:09.990]  CALEA, for our listeners who don't know, was the Communications Act for Law Enforcement Assistance, which was passed in late 1994.
[32:10.610 --> 32:17.390]  It basically required a vast right-wing conspiracy.
[32:17.490 --> 32:27.270]  No, a vast wiretapping infrastructure to be deployed across the nation to allow law enforcement agencies to more easily wiretap much larger numbers of people.
[32:27.450 --> 32:34.690]  That wasn't the reason it was sold, but that's the effective result of the system that's being put in place.
[32:34.690 --> 32:53.210]  Well, he's really upset because it turns out the phone companies are charging through the nose for all these high-tech wiretaps, which really, once the equipment and software is in place, doesn't require much more effort to put in place than, say, to request a call waiting on your phone line.
[32:53.390 --> 32:56.510]  It's just, you know, they just say, okay, this is going to be tapped, this number.
[32:57.350 --> 33:03.710]  So, but it turns out the phone companies are charging anywhere from $10,000 to $50,000 for a wiretap.
[33:03.850 --> 33:09.310]  And considering there were thousands of these done every year, this is an awful lot of money.
[33:09.810 --> 33:14.070]  So what Elliot Spitzer is really upset is he's going over budget with all these wiretaps.
[33:14.190 --> 33:24.390]  And, by the way, of the number of wiretaps that are done, I should say, authorized, court-warranted, court-approved wiretaps across the country, is about 1,500 of them a year.
[33:25.150 --> 33:29.290]  Congress has to get this number every year to know how many people are being wiretapped, basically.
[33:29.530 --> 33:30.750]  I think there's a lot more going on.
[33:30.830 --> 33:35.990]  But in any case, of the 1,500, what percentage of those do you think are just done in New York alone?
[33:37.930 --> 33:39.430]  We're talking about in New York State.
[33:39.650 --> 33:42.030]  This is the whole country.
[33:42.230 --> 33:42.730]  The whole country?
[33:43.170 --> 33:50.630]  There's about 1,500 court-ordered wiretaps per year, about 1,500 across the nation, local, state, and federal, all together.
[33:50.770 --> 33:51.390]  Jim, you have a guess?
[33:51.390 --> 33:53.650]  I'm going to take the high-pull side.
[33:53.990 --> 33:56.390]  Whatever anybody on the number says, I said it's got to be greater.
[33:56.570 --> 33:58.290]  If you want a specific number, I'll say 1,000.
[33:58.930 --> 34:00.250]  1,000 out of 1,500?
[34:00.730 --> 34:00.910]  Yeah.
[34:01.430 --> 34:02.150]  For the whole country?
[34:03.030 --> 34:04.190]  I'm going to say 750.
[34:05.290 --> 34:06.310]  It's about a third.
[34:07.270 --> 34:08.270]  Oh, we're both too high.
[34:08.490 --> 34:12.190]  Well, I thought you'd guess low, because I would have guessed lower than that.
[34:12.270 --> 34:19.990]  The entire country, of all the wiretaps done in the whole court-ordered wiretaps, about a third of them, 30%, are in New York alone.
[34:20.570 --> 34:20.950]  Wow.
[34:21.390 --> 34:22.050]  That's pretty amazing.
[34:22.250 --> 34:23.790]  Where are the other 30%, California?
[34:24.150 --> 34:28.430]  Oh, I didn't see the full breakdown, but I just saw the first, the biggest one.
[34:28.970 --> 34:36.990]  In any case, Ellis Pitcher is very upset that the phone companies are charging the New York Attorney General's office so much money for these wiretaps.
[34:36.990 --> 34:43.650]  So he's petitioning FCC to regulate what the phone companies charge for this.
[34:43.650 --> 34:45.830]  And there are some other interesting things in his report.
[34:46.370 --> 34:56.290]  It's a very long URL I have to look at this report, but if you just do a search for Elliott Spitzer, that's with a 1L, and CALEA, C-A-L-E-A.
[34:56.290 --> 34:58.690]  You can probably find this PDF file.
[34:58.690 --> 35:12.950]  And a couple of revelations I found in here was, first, you probably could have guessed, that in 93, when the World Trade Center bombing happened, that was the excuse used for the CALEA wiretapping infrastructure to be put in place.
[35:12.950 --> 35:18.230]  Which reminded me a lot of, well, how the Patriot Act was pushed through right after 9-1-1.
[35:19.150 --> 35:29.870]  Of course, it said that this report says that the phone companies are charging, quote, unreasonable fees that can be thousands of dollars a day and could be $10,000, $50,000 per wiretap.
[35:31.890 --> 35:42.730]  And over since CALEA was implemented in late 94, literally billions of taxpayers' dollars, billions, about $2 billion has been spent so far.
[35:42.730 --> 35:44.510]  For this CALEA compliance.
[35:44.690 --> 35:50.290]  So that's your money you're paying from your tax dollars for all these wiretaps.
[35:50.850 --> 36:02.890]  The most interesting thing was that Spitzer was complaining that some of these carriers charge so much that it's discouraging some law enforcement agencies from getting wiretaps through certain carriers.
[36:03.390 --> 36:11.970]  And it said that AT&T Wireless seemed to be the most expensive of all the carriers, both landline and wireless carriers.
[36:11.970 --> 36:25.590]  So if your local law enforcement agency is facing budgetary pressures, they might reconsider placing a wiretap order if their target carrier charges a particularly high wiretapping fee.
[36:25.710 --> 36:38.010]  So if you're using AT&T Wireless, there's a chance that you'll be less susceptible to a wiretap because it's just so expensive for the law enforcement agency to tap you.
[36:38.590 --> 36:40.070]  So I just thought that was really interesting.
[36:41.030 --> 36:41.170]  Okay.
[36:41.250 --> 36:45.610]  I'm sure all the organized criminal figures are taking notes as to which carrier would be best to use.
[36:46.010 --> 37:04.890]  And Elliot Spitzer's office set up his own, as an experiment, supposedly, set up a voice-over IP phone system in his own office, just to talk to another office, just to prove that criminals can set up untappable communications.
[37:05.210 --> 37:06.610]  How did they know it was untappable?
[37:06.690 --> 37:08.610]  They concluded it was untappable, but how did they know?
[37:08.730 --> 37:10.170]  Did they call every James Bond in the world?
[37:10.170 --> 37:12.510]  No, they asked law enforcement agencies, can you tap this?
[37:12.550 --> 37:15.790]  And they said, no, we can't tap that because it's not covered under CALEA.
[37:15.790 --> 37:37.190]  Because these non-telecommunication services, like Cable Modem or DSL, any system that's not primarily a telecommunication service, like Skype or something like that, and there's a variety of voice-over IP services that work over broadband, those aren't classified by the FCC as telecommunication services.
[37:37.470 --> 37:40.050]  That's why they're not subject to telecommunications taxes.
[37:40.050 --> 37:41.910]  But can they be tapped illegally?
[37:42.750 --> 37:43.170]  Absolutely.
[37:43.650 --> 37:55.890]  And I believe that is definitely happening, because if you look at the wiretapping industry, which is really hundreds of millions of dollars a year of wiretapping equipment and software and consulting services are sold every year.
[37:56.030 --> 38:01.430]  If you look at all that that's being sold, just for 1,500 wiretaps, it doesn't add up.
[38:01.530 --> 38:02.050]  No, it doesn't.
[38:02.170 --> 38:02.670]  It certainly doesn't.
[38:02.710 --> 38:04.870]  I think there's a lot more going on that we're not being told.
[38:04.970 --> 38:07.470]  I think there's 1,500 just on this block alone, but...
[38:07.470 --> 38:07.850]  Could be.
[38:08.190 --> 38:08.630]  Never mind that.
[38:08.630 --> 38:21.950]  Well, there's 1,500 through the regular court system, and there's also a very large number done through the FISA court, which stands for something, which is this kind of secret court that we're not supposed to talk about.
[38:22.330 --> 38:23.930]  Oh, well, then let's not talk about it.
[38:23.930 --> 38:24.590]  We don't get in trouble.
[38:24.730 --> 38:25.130]  It's the last thing we're going to do.
[38:25.130 --> 38:28.690]  But they do a lot of wiretaps, and they're not counted towards the total for some reason.
[38:28.690 --> 38:29.630]  All right.
[38:29.710 --> 38:33.390]  Well, speaking of getting into trouble, you can get into trouble if you have one of these devices.
[38:33.710 --> 38:39.390]  This comes from the Automobile Club of America newsletter known as Car and Travel.
[38:40.630 --> 38:47.050]  Imagine a commute home where the traffic signals are always green for you and red for motorists and the intersecting roads.
[38:47.210 --> 38:49.770]  Some people are acting on such selfish thoughts.
[38:50.470 --> 39:01.190]  Being peddled on Internet sites for as little as $350 are mobile infrared transmitters known as Mertz that can turn traffic lights green in many cities at a push of a button.
[39:01.370 --> 39:11.730]  They were developed by reputable manufacturers for use by drivers of fire trucks, ambulances, and other emergency vehicles on life-saving missions not to enable you to be home in time to watch the latest episode of ER.
[39:11.730 --> 39:16.110]  But, despite... you might be in a real-life episode of it, too, if you're not careful.
[39:16.450 --> 39:23.610]  Despite disclaimers for authorized use only, these transmitters are often sold as novelty items to the general public.
[39:23.750 --> 39:25.810]  They're also known as chrome boxes in the hacker world.
[39:26.350 --> 39:32.750]  The spread of Mertz is of concern to transportation officials from coast to coast, including New York, Suffolk, and Westchester counties.
[39:33.430 --> 39:40.530]  Besides compromising safety and traffic management efforts, the proliferation of these light changers could force municipalities to make expensive changes.
[39:40.530 --> 39:50.170]  New York City's computerized traffic signal system, which uses alternative non-infrared technology, is not vulnerable to such infrared tampering, according to city officials.
[39:50.230 --> 39:54.410]  Of course, what that means is that also they won't change the lights for ambulances and fire trucks.
[39:54.950 --> 39:58.170]  Some states have already enacted laws to ban the use of Mertz.
[39:58.290 --> 40:00.190]  New York State may need to join them in the future.
[40:00.390 --> 40:09.150]  In the meantime, red lights to those motorists who seek unfair advantage in avoiding them and to those marketers influenced by the color green rather than their civic responsibility.
[40:09.150 --> 40:10.790]  You've got the color green thing there.
[40:10.910 --> 40:11.710]  They're referring to money.
[40:12.410 --> 40:12.690]  Clever.
[40:12.810 --> 40:14.690]  Yeah, they're clever, these people, at the automobile club.
[40:15.110 --> 40:16.290]  So that's one of those things.
[40:16.330 --> 40:18.690]  If anyone has one of those boxes, I just want to see it work.
[40:18.830 --> 40:20.370]  You know, go to an abandoned intersection.
[40:20.450 --> 40:21.490]  I just want to see the light change.
[40:21.610 --> 40:22.610]  I just, you know, I'm curious.
[40:23.270 --> 40:23.910]  Not all.
[40:24.030 --> 40:25.910]  I mean, not all places use them, obviously.
[40:26.070 --> 40:26.330]  Obviously.
[40:26.330 --> 40:29.330]  And I remember I had a friend whose father was in the fire department.
[40:29.630 --> 40:33.750]  And the only light they could change, as far as I knew, was the one near their department.
[40:33.750 --> 40:37.550]  When they had to leave, they'd hit a button that would turn the light green for them.
[40:37.570 --> 40:40.910]  Probably changes a flashing yellow light to a red light for the motorists.
[40:40.970 --> 40:42.470]  I think a lot of fire departments have that.
[40:42.650 --> 40:43.590]  Something like that, yeah.
[40:44.090 --> 40:54.670]  If you look at a traffic light, and you look right next to it or above it, there's a little, like a tube, cut at an angle, maybe about the diameter of your thumb, that has a phototransistor in it.
[40:54.950 --> 40:59.030]  And if you look, you'll see the sensor that's pretty obvious on top of the traffic signal.
[40:59.230 --> 41:00.910]  And that's the kind that can be changed.
[41:01.030 --> 41:12.750]  The reason it costs so much money, they're complaining this is going to cost so much money for these agencies to retrofit systems, is because they bought into an inferior system that couldn't be reprogrammed for a different code.
[41:12.750 --> 41:15.730]  Basically, it's an infrared light that flashes at a certain pattern.
[41:16.050 --> 41:22.670]  Well, these companies sold these local government agencies systems that couldn't be programmed for a different code.
[41:23.030 --> 41:25.890]  You've got to replace the whole system, or like hardwired.
[41:26.050 --> 41:26.670]  It's very expensive.
[41:26.890 --> 41:28.490]  So they should have been able to...
[41:28.490 --> 41:29.650]  They should have got systems...
[41:29.650 --> 41:39.370]  Newer systems can be reprogrammed, so all you'd have to do is punch a new code into all the fire trucks and ambulances, and they'd be fine if the Mert use got out of hand until somebody passed out the new code, that is.
[41:39.370 --> 41:43.010]  Some of those systems, though, I know can be triggered with headlights flashing.
[41:43.770 --> 41:44.850]  You'd have to be pretty good.
[41:45.150 --> 41:45.690]  Yeah, yeah.
[41:45.850 --> 41:48.090]  But I've heard tales of that many times.
[41:48.650 --> 41:57.310]  Okay, we've talked about a website a number of times on this particular radio program that targets, in a form of speaking, New York City police officers.
[41:57.710 --> 41:58.870]  Jim, I think you remember this.
[41:59.010 --> 42:00.130]  Is this the undercover one?
[42:00.250 --> 42:01.050]  This is AJM?
[42:01.050 --> 42:01.630]  Or something else?
[42:01.830 --> 42:03.350]  It was AJM.cc?
[42:03.650 --> 42:04.250]  Yeah, yeah.
[42:04.370 --> 42:06.910]  We got a letter from the guy that actually runs the site.
[42:06.910 --> 42:07.450]  Oh, thank you, Alan J.
[42:07.570 --> 42:07.750]  Munn.
[42:07.750 --> 42:09.030]  Well, Alan Munn here, yeah.
[42:09.390 --> 42:11.090]  At least, you know, I assume that's him.
[42:11.570 --> 42:13.030]  You know, somebody wrote to us with that name.
[42:13.490 --> 42:15.890]  This message is for the Off the Hook radio show.
[42:16.090 --> 42:25.550]  The show twice discussed a website which provided publicly available information, for example, home addresses and telephone numbers of government officials, such as the CIA director and the attorney general.
[42:25.910 --> 42:33.130]  In the second show about the website, you discussed a New York Daily News article which contains an NYPD claim that the website might cause violence.
[42:33.450 --> 42:35.170]  No website has ever caused violence.
[42:35.170 --> 42:40.430]  Hence, the website in question, which provided information over the web for years, never caused violence.
[42:40.630 --> 42:42.410]  The news article had important mistakes.
[42:42.970 --> 42:51.690]  For example, the reporter wrote that Alan Munn had criminally advocated violence against an NYPD cop, as a result of which there was a court case which Munn lost.
[42:51.770 --> 42:53.430]  The truth is that everything he did was legal.
[42:53.510 --> 42:56.250]  The accusations against him were police lies, and he won the case.
[42:56.690 --> 42:58.030]  The government lost the case.
[42:58.170 --> 43:00.930]  I do not know who told the Daily News reporter that Munn lost the case.
[43:01.070 --> 43:03.150]  The article has many other serious mistakes.
[43:03.150 --> 43:06.990]  And by the way, the website is down now because of complaints about the website's contents.
[43:07.310 --> 43:12.430]  No company will provide dynamic DNS service to serve the web host frequently changing IP address.
[43:12.990 --> 43:13.950]  Now, it's interesting.
[43:14.190 --> 43:15.410]  I looked at the Daily News.
[43:15.490 --> 43:17.730]  I didn't see that mentioned in the Daily News.
[43:17.770 --> 43:24.310]  However, I did see it in a New York Post article, which is posted on a very interesting website in itself, officer.com.
[43:24.410 --> 43:27.610]  Apparently, this is a website for police officers.
[43:27.830 --> 43:31.930]  They have a special, like, internal section that you have to be a police officer in order to get into.
[43:31.930 --> 43:33.290]  I think this is a good site to infiltrate.
[43:33.770 --> 43:43.550]  And they reprinted this New York Post article that basically goes into all this detail about his previous history and his psychological problems and all kinds of things like that.
[43:43.830 --> 43:46.670]  It wasn't very objective, to say the least.
[43:46.670 --> 43:51.570]  It was a very attacking article, I guess, as the New York Post is well known for.
[43:51.630 --> 43:54.090]  As you know, only psychos would ever criticize the police.
[43:54.270 --> 43:55.010]  That's true.
[43:56.010 --> 43:57.510]  So, the site is not up.
[43:57.670 --> 43:58.690]  The site is down.
[43:58.950 --> 44:00.250]  Jim, you want the copy of the article there?
[44:01.790 --> 44:08.130]  Maybe we should give Mr. Munn a chance to host...
[44:08.130 --> 44:09.130]  We should host his site.
[44:09.590 --> 44:12.330]  Well, unfortunately, we're not internet providers, so...
[44:12.330 --> 44:12.810]  Well, no, but...
[44:12.810 --> 44:15.630]  ...whoever we get our service from, I'm sure, would bounce us right off if we had...
[44:15.630 --> 44:16.090]  All right.
[44:16.230 --> 44:17.170]  It was just a thought.
[44:17.250 --> 44:20.370]  ...hate mail coming in and whatever else a site like that generates.
[44:21.510 --> 44:25.470]  But, interesting that these stories can be interpreted in so many different ways.
[44:25.670 --> 44:31.470]  And, you know, I have to say, you know, just publishing names and addresses of cops, I don't see that as an issue.
[44:31.590 --> 44:35.350]  I think, you know, there's some politicians, you know their names, you know their addresses.
[44:35.770 --> 44:36.790]  There's public information.
[44:37.650 --> 44:43.590]  And police are in a unique situation, you know, a unique situation of, you know, trust.
[44:43.870 --> 44:50.050]  And if they behave in a bad manner, I think you need to know who is responsible.
[44:50.050 --> 44:51.530]  And how they can be reached.
[44:51.730 --> 44:57.530]  If anything, this story has proved media fallacies and biases exist.
[44:57.750 --> 45:03.770]  I mean, you know, the mistake that the Daily News made, I remember this first came up because Fox News was reporting about it.
[45:03.970 --> 45:11.110]  They had some angry report describing how this was revealing, what was it, they said undercover police officers, things like that.
[45:11.250 --> 45:11.370]  Yeah.
[45:11.370 --> 45:12.990]  All sorts of just, you know...
[45:12.990 --> 45:13.750]  No details given.
[45:13.890 --> 45:13.970]  Exactly.
[45:13.970 --> 45:14.770]  Just a lot of emotion.
[45:15.190 --> 45:18.310]  And, of course, that's something that you need to get to the facts and find out.
[45:18.310 --> 45:23.450]  We found the actual name of the website and, you know, people could judge for themselves.
[45:23.750 --> 45:23.890]  Yeah.
[45:24.210 --> 45:24.950]  That's what's important.
[45:25.390 --> 45:35.550]  Well, I personally have learned that undercover law enforcement officers take a dim view of having their information exposed to the public.
[45:35.930 --> 45:36.110]  Mm-hmm.
[45:36.390 --> 45:41.710]  Yeah, but the thing is, if the information is out there and you simply put it on a website, the information is already out there.
[45:41.710 --> 45:44.970]  It's kind of similar to revealing a security hole in the computer system.
[45:45.370 --> 45:47.530]  Your identity has already been compromised.
[45:47.530 --> 45:54.610]  If you're trying to be an undercover agent and people know about it and they post it on a website, it's not the posting on the website that has blown the cover.
[45:54.750 --> 45:55.750]  It was done before that.
[45:55.930 --> 45:56.710]  In fact, it might be...
[45:56.710 --> 45:57.110]  Blowing the messenger.
[45:57.310 --> 46:02.070]  It might be protecting you even more for everybody to know that you're not undercover anymore.
[46:04.150 --> 46:10.870]  Anyway, here's another website that someone sent in for us to publicize, www.xvid.org.
[46:10.870 --> 46:12.830]  That's X-V-I-D dot O-R-G.
[46:12.950 --> 46:16.830]  Just one of many sites in Europe that are protesting against new hard laws in Europe.
[46:16.950 --> 46:19.030]  That's from Bucket of Melbourne, Australia.
[46:19.250 --> 46:21.010]  Thank you very much for writing in with that.
[46:21.070 --> 46:28.190]  And I'm sure you'll find all kinds of European laws that should be protested against in some way.
[46:29.110 --> 46:33.490]  This is in response to last week's two-hour special, which was awesome, by the way.
[46:34.090 --> 46:41.570]  Specifically for the gentleman who called up and complained about why he was receiving phone calls constantly on his cell phone without the caller ID showing up properly.
[46:41.630 --> 46:45.890]  I believe he said the caller ID shows only three or four numbers on his cell phone's display.
[46:46.130 --> 47:04.710]  I do know that if I were to call up a cell phone from another cell phone on another provider, and in some cases a cell phone to a toll-free number being run by a competitor of the company you're calling from, the information being passed through won't get properly recorded by the cell site system that regenerates the A&I through a system called the Mobile Services Switching Center or the Home
[47:04.710 --> 47:06.570]  Location Register for GSM phones.
[47:06.730 --> 47:17.650]  If the gentleman sees only part of a phone number or a number that is not in service when he decides to call it back, the chances are he'll be reaching a non-terminating number that is automatically generated by the Mobile Switching Station, MSS.
[47:18.150 --> 47:23.930]  Why companies do this is beyond me, but I have theories it's probably due to non-compatible mobile switching equipment at the terminating end.
[47:23.930 --> 47:36.130]  My suggestion for taking further action against the individuals calling you is to record the times and the dates that you receive the calls, as well as the phone number, even if it's only part of a number, that reached you and anything that you heard when you answered the call.
[47:36.610 --> 47:45.430]  Good mobile companies should be able to do a trace for you to discover at least what carrier that person calling you is using, and then direct you to the appropriate department so you can take further action.
[47:45.950 --> 47:48.630]  If anyone is interested, I wrote an article about this a couple of years ago.
[47:48.750 --> 48:07.310]  You can read it at www.hackcanada.com slash Canadian slash freaking, that's spelled with a P-H slash cell dash A&I dash diversion dot TXT A couple of pseudo A&I numbers are listed there for reference and some info about how phone freaks, hackers, and just plain old criminals could potentially exploit this.
[48:07.410 --> 48:08.890]  That's from the clone up there in Canada.
[48:09.070 --> 48:10.490]  Thanks very much for writing in.
[48:11.870 --> 48:12.270]  Emmanuel?
[48:12.270 --> 48:12.670]  Yes.
[48:13.170 --> 48:16.850]  Last week you'd mentioned that it was easy for people to...
[48:16.850 --> 48:21.190]  Well, if you had the right equipment, you could spoof the caller ID data that shows up.
[48:21.390 --> 48:27.950]  We even had a panel discussion about that at the last conference as well, the software orange box technique.
[48:28.170 --> 48:39.630]  I discovered that if you call your Sprint PCS telephone number and your caller ID is the number of your Sprint PCS number...
[48:39.630 --> 48:39.970]  Oh, yes.
[48:39.990 --> 48:40.610]  I know what happens.
[48:40.610 --> 48:42.230]  It goes right into your voicemail.
[48:42.330 --> 48:49.390]  If you don't have the password selection, if you don't have that enabled where you have to enter the password when you call from your cell phone, that will happen.
[48:49.710 --> 48:50.070]  Yeah.
[48:50.170 --> 48:52.250]  So that's a very important message to people out there.
[48:52.370 --> 48:58.470]  If you have that feature on your phone, anybody who can spoof caller ID can get into your voicemail without a password.
[48:59.690 --> 49:00.910]  With Sprint PCS, anyway.
[49:01.210 --> 49:03.990]  With Sprint PCS, with any service that offers that.
[49:04.150 --> 49:04.910]  And a lot of them do.
[49:05.110 --> 49:05.510]  A lot of them do.
[49:05.510 --> 49:05.950]  Very scary.
[49:11.070 --> 49:13.670]  I just wanted to mention this one other thing from a story that just came out.
[49:14.270 --> 49:19.410]  Earthlink has developed a program to fight, and has anybody heard this word before, phishers?
[49:20.950 --> 49:21.670]  Password phishers?
[49:21.790 --> 49:21.890]  Yeah.
[49:21.890 --> 49:24.150]  Like people who try and steal passwords by...
[49:24.150 --> 49:25.230]  Well, they're...
[49:25.230 --> 49:25.890]  No, no, no.
[49:26.050 --> 49:26.590]  Fake websites?
[49:26.970 --> 49:27.670]  Phony websites.
[49:27.770 --> 49:28.050]  That's right.
[49:28.130 --> 49:28.870]  Now, how do you spell it?
[49:29.310 --> 49:30.370]  P-H-I-S.
[49:30.370 --> 49:30.650]  That's right.
[49:30.650 --> 49:31.690]  Just like the band.
[49:31.690 --> 49:32.670]  That's right, phishers.
[49:33.710 --> 49:40.730]  These websites are designed to deceive email users into providing personal information like passwords and credit card numbers, social security numbers.
[49:41.090 --> 49:45.510]  Phishers sites are called that because they phish for personal information that can be used in identity theft.
[49:45.670 --> 49:47.270]  I don't know why it's spelled that way, though.
[49:47.270 --> 50:00.810]  It used to, well, I mean, it used to be also people like when America Online was, well, it's still used by lots of people, but people would pose as America Online representatives and say, we have some problem with your account.
[50:01.030 --> 50:03.230]  We need certain information.
[50:04.230 --> 50:13.370]  And that's actually why, if you've ever noticed with, like, AOL Instant Messenger, it'll say at the bottom note, AOL representatives will never ask you for information or anything like that.
[50:13.370 --> 50:18.730]  But, um, so, I mean, this is something that's been around for a long time, or at least as far as I can remember.
[50:18.830 --> 50:20.190]  I just didn't know they were called phishers, though.
[50:20.290 --> 50:20.450]  Yeah.
[50:20.630 --> 50:20.830]  Yeah.
[50:21.210 --> 50:22.750]  Mike, you have an announcement for us.
[50:22.870 --> 50:23.710]  I have an announcement.
[50:24.150 --> 50:35.410]  Um, this Friday at the Citigroup Center is not a 2600 meeting, but a meeting for folks who are interested in volunteering for the Fifth Hope, which is the, uh, conference we'll be holding this summer.
[50:36.150 --> 50:47.150]  So, uh, if you're interested in volunteering in, in any of our specialized teams or just generally helping out with the conference, uh, come by if you're, if you're in the area.
[50:47.430 --> 50:47.850]  What time?
[50:48.150 --> 50:48.450]  What time?
[50:48.610 --> 50:49.170]  I don't know what time.
[50:49.170 --> 50:49.570]  What time?
[50:49.950 --> 50:50.630]  You tell me.
[50:51.030 --> 50:51.330]  Uh, 6 o'clock.
[50:51.330 --> 50:51.930]  We're all making an announcement.
[50:52.010 --> 50:52.370]  6 o'clock?
[50:52.490 --> 50:52.570]  Okay.
[50:52.790 --> 50:53.110]  6 o'clock.
[50:53.470 --> 50:53.650]  Great.
[50:53.890 --> 50:55.170]  You didn't just make that up, I hope.
[50:55.530 --> 50:55.850]  No.
[50:56.230 --> 50:57.730]  It's, uh, been set for ages.
[50:58.030 --> 50:58.190]  All right.
[50:58.230 --> 51:03.090]  Well, you can, you can, you can show up pretty much any time between 5 and 8, like the normal 2600 meetings, you know, just hang around.
[51:03.290 --> 51:04.730]  I think most people show up around 6 anyway.
[51:05.170 --> 51:08.830]  Uh, if you're not in the area, though, of course, we still could use your help.
[51:09.010 --> 51:19.050]  Uh, go to our website, uh, www.hope.net, and you'll see a section there for volunteers, and you can send us an email and, uh, say what it is you'd be interested in volunteering.
[51:19.210 --> 51:22.250]  We'll put you on the mailing list, and, uh, we'll coordinate everything that way.
[51:22.970 --> 51:23.330]  All right.
[51:23.370 --> 51:23.930]  Let's take some phone calls.
[51:24.010 --> 51:25.230]  212-209-2900.
[51:25.390 --> 51:26.150]  We'll have to, uh, hurry.
[51:26.470 --> 51:26.890]  Uh, good evening.
[51:26.950 --> 51:27.430]  You're on the air.
[51:29.850 --> 51:30.170]  Hello.
[51:35.410 --> 51:35.610]  Brooklyn.
[51:35.770 --> 51:37.770]  I saw a very interesting poster on the subway today.
[51:37.930 --> 51:38.210]  What's that?
[51:39.010 --> 51:44.610]  And it said, um, it said, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, don't, don't pay somebody to swipe you in.
[51:44.870 --> 51:45.130]  Mm-hmm.
[51:45.170 --> 51:46.710]  It's a, it's illegal to do that.
[51:46.990 --> 51:52.810]  Yeah, well, you know, someone could buy a day pass, an unlimited pass, and just simply charge, say, a dollar for every swipe.
[51:53.290 --> 51:55.370]  And people might take them up on that offer.
[51:55.650 --> 51:57.670]  So, yeah, I, I could see them being upset by that.
[51:58.230 --> 52:00.110]  Right, but is, is it, why would it be illegal?
[52:00.290 --> 52:06.730]  I mean, if I'm walking down the street with my friend, and he's got an unlimited pass, and I don't, and he's not getting on the train for a while.
[52:07.170 --> 52:07.630]  That's legal.
[52:07.810 --> 52:08.210]  That's different.
[52:08.330 --> 52:10.430]  No, I think they're talking about people that stand there.
[52:11.070 --> 52:13.170]  I know, but I understood, but if I give him a buck.
[52:13.590 --> 52:14.110]  That's legal.
[52:14.450 --> 52:16.690]  For him, for him to swipe me in.
[52:16.790 --> 52:17.770]  I don't know if that's legal, Jim.
[52:17.890 --> 52:18.530]  That might not be legal.
[52:18.630 --> 52:19.110]  Why does that become legal?
[52:19.630 --> 52:21.630]  What if I, if I do it up in the street, is it legal?
[52:21.630 --> 52:23.290]  If I do it by the turnstile, is it legal?
[52:23.390 --> 52:23.870]  Well, no, no.
[52:23.870 --> 52:29.590]  What they're trying to do is keep people from, from essentially defrauding them and keeping them from earning a lot of money.
[52:29.870 --> 52:32.710]  I know, but if I, if I do this once with my friend, am I breaking the law?
[52:32.890 --> 52:38.170]  Uh, possibly the letter of the law, but I don't think any reasonable judge will, will hang you.
[52:38.570 --> 52:46.670]  And, of course, if you now end up doing a week's time because of what I just said, I will, uh, you know, uh, take no responsibility.
[52:46.950 --> 52:48.650]  You don't take legal advice for many of us, actually.
[52:48.930 --> 52:49.850]  Uh, we're not experts on that.
[52:49.850 --> 52:50.430]  We're not lawyers.
[52:50.430 --> 52:56.290]  But, uh, you know, I'm not sure if this is illegal or just a violation of your contract with the MTA, you know, to buy a MetroCard.
[52:56.450 --> 52:59.170]  They rule that the rules are the force of law.
[52:59.490 --> 53:00.390]  They've gone through that.
[53:00.830 --> 53:02.810]  Does the card say it's not transferable?
[53:03.790 --> 53:05.870]  It's transferable if you keep it in your possession.
[53:05.890 --> 53:11.310]  If you work, say, the night shift and your spouse works the day shift, you can use the same unlimited MetroCard.
[53:11.310 --> 53:14.750]  My understanding is that while it's not being used by one person, it can be used by another.
[53:14.890 --> 53:19.390]  So if two people are in the system on the same card, that's bad if it's an unlimited card.
[53:19.750 --> 53:29.790]  So if you're roommates with two other people who work different shifts, it's like everybody works a third shift, you know, first, second, and third shift, you can conceivably use the same card for all three of you 24-7.
[53:29.790 --> 53:30.570]  Sure, why not?
[53:30.950 --> 53:32.550]  But the thing you can't do is sell it.
[53:33.510 --> 53:35.390]  You can't sell rides on your card.
[53:35.570 --> 53:35.810]  Right.
[53:36.210 --> 53:42.310]  And the other day, I saw somebody get on the bus, pop in their card, and then hand it to a friend who was not getting on the bus.
[53:43.030 --> 53:44.870]  I hand it back to a friend who was not getting on the bus.
[53:44.870 --> 53:46.310]  Well, how do you know it was an unlimited card anyway?
[53:46.390 --> 53:47.870]  It could have just been a card with a lot of money on it.
[53:48.630 --> 53:50.470]  You know, there's no way to tell one card for another.
[53:50.610 --> 53:51.030]  Yeah, that's true.
[53:51.270 --> 53:51.690]  That's true.
[53:51.810 --> 53:54.430]  You know, today, I walked many blocks to take the train.
[53:54.490 --> 53:55.570]  I usually take the bus down here.
[53:55.570 --> 54:02.390]  But the thing is, when you have a Metro card that doesn't have enough money on the bus, it's kind of an awkward situation where you either have to give them more money or you have to get off.
[54:02.970 --> 54:05.290]  And there's no way to refill the card at that point.
[54:05.510 --> 54:09.930]  So I walked all the way down to the subway station thinking I had to refill my card.
[54:10.010 --> 54:11.170]  It turned out I had 10 bucks on it.
[54:11.310 --> 54:13.830]  So, you know, if I had known that, I could have taken the bus.
[54:13.890 --> 54:17.310]  But there was no way to find out how much I had on my card without walking all the way down to the subway station.
[54:17.410 --> 54:21.530]  I just wish, you know, like in D.C., they print the number on the card of how much is there.
[54:21.650 --> 54:23.270]  There's no way to do that with this system.
[54:23.990 --> 54:29.250]  I usually keep extra $2 or $4 cars tucked away in my wallet, just for situations like that.
[54:29.330 --> 54:30.190]  That's a good idea.
[54:30.310 --> 54:31.130]  I wish I was that organized.
[54:31.410 --> 54:33.070]  Thanks for your call.
[54:33.510 --> 54:35.510]  All right, let's see if we can fit in a couple more.
[54:35.730 --> 54:36.990]  And good evening, you're on the air.
[54:38.330 --> 54:38.910]  Go ahead.
[54:39.290 --> 54:39.690]  Hello.
[54:39.850 --> 54:40.110]  Yes.
[54:40.290 --> 54:40.570]  Hi.
[54:41.490 --> 54:48.330]  I just wanted to make comments on your comments about the president's... well, I don't know what that actually was last night.
[54:49.330 --> 54:56.950]  And I had an interesting experience, because yesterday I went to the doctors, and she gave me the most potent decongestant I've ever had.
[54:57.110 --> 55:00.990]  I honestly... I don't do drugs, but I imagine that's what doing quaaludes is like.
[55:01.290 --> 55:13.650]  As I laid on the couch, phasing in and out, every time he would start to stammer again, I would just pick my head up and say, Oh, my God, this is what I would look like if I was doing your speech in this condition right now.
[55:13.970 --> 55:14.350]  Wow.
[55:14.510 --> 55:17.110]  You know, that might be a good idea for people to do in the future.
[55:17.110 --> 55:20.670]  I'm not advocating taking drugs, but I'm just saying, you probably enjoyed it so much more.
[55:20.930 --> 55:21.650]  Well, I did enjoy it.
[55:21.730 --> 55:27.950]  I mean, I got up... I mean, it upset me so much that I called my mother, you know, just absolutely going on.
[55:28.030 --> 55:35.390]  Because I have to tell you that it is not okay for anybody to say it's all right for the president to talk like that.
[55:35.450 --> 55:37.110]  It is simply not okay.
[55:37.310 --> 55:44.250]  And if the Republican Party has eroded themselves down to that level, then I suppose they deserve what they get.
[55:44.250 --> 55:45.850]  But I do not want this.
[55:45.990 --> 55:48.070]  I want somebody who's intelligent to be my president.
[55:48.270 --> 55:50.070]  And so far, I got a monkey up there.
[55:50.390 --> 55:56.590]  And last night, what really killed me is that the press, what a bunch of buffoons the press are.
[55:56.790 --> 55:57.630]  They get on.
[55:57.630 --> 56:01.770]  I couldn't even believe, even on PBS, we had this little...
[56:02.350 --> 56:02.950]  I don't know.
[56:03.050 --> 56:05.870]  He looked like, you know, Mr. Scholarly on there with...
[56:05.870 --> 56:07.230]  Well, you should have...
[56:07.230 --> 56:09.450]  It was on the McLear report.
[56:09.450 --> 56:12.730]  And when they shot McLear's face...
[56:12.730 --> 56:13.810]  Actually, you're merging the two names.
[56:13.930 --> 56:14.730]  It was McNeil-Lair.
[56:14.810 --> 56:15.690]  I think now it's just Lair.
[56:15.830 --> 56:16.090]  Sorry.
[56:17.010 --> 56:17.970]  I'm still doing drugs.
[56:18.770 --> 56:26.590]  Anyway, when they shot his face after this, you know, this press conference, you could see that, like, he was astounded and almost didn't know what to say.
[56:26.590 --> 56:30.150]  Like the rest of us, it was such a bad press conference.
[56:30.590 --> 56:31.050]  And what I...
[56:31.050 --> 56:31.710]  It depends on your perspective.
[56:31.870 --> 56:34.990]  I thought it was a fantastic press conference myself, but for different reasons.
[56:35.130 --> 56:47.990]  I mean, for this... for not one of these people in the press to take issue with the fact that he didn't answer any questions, he stood up there, he was a deer in the headlights, he stammered, he shook.
[56:48.210 --> 56:50.610]  I mean, this is just really kind of scary to me.
[56:50.690 --> 56:54.010]  You know, I think a lot of the press did get it as witness that Reuters report.
[56:54.210 --> 56:54.750]  But afterwards...
[56:54.750 --> 56:56.490]  The picture that was shown of him on CNN.
[56:56.590 --> 56:58.270]  And just, well, you know, that was the picture of him.
[56:58.430 --> 57:02.990]  Listen, I watched every single TV report that I could stay up for last night to see if anybody was going to take issue.
[57:03.110 --> 57:08.710]  And all I heard were a bunch of idiots on TV saying, what a good job he did.
[57:08.830 --> 57:12.350]  I'm like, excuse me, well, when do you want to question this guy?
[57:12.370 --> 57:15.310]  When we're all buried under, you know, atomic dust?
[57:15.450 --> 57:20.630]  It's interesting because, you know, in dictatorships, of course, everyone's afraid to question the leader and you don't do that.
[57:20.790 --> 57:24.250]  Here, we don't question the leader, but we say we're not afraid.
[57:24.250 --> 57:25.670]  And I'm wondering how true that is.
[57:25.670 --> 57:34.150]  Are these networks really, you know, going to challenge somebody who has power and, you know, FCC cracking down on people for all kinds of things?
[57:34.310 --> 57:40.470]  Well, they seemed like they were going to do it yesterday because I watched everybody talking about these hard, critical questions that were coming up.
[57:40.570 --> 57:42.950]  And that's why I was really geared up to listen to this thing.
[57:43.150 --> 57:46.350]  And then afterwards, they hardly had any commentary.
[57:46.530 --> 57:49.350]  If they had any at all, they were talking about the highlights.
[57:49.550 --> 57:50.590]  There weren't any highlights.
[57:50.810 --> 57:54.230]  Believe me, if you watch this thing, it was a very frightening thing.
[57:54.230 --> 57:58.290]  So, for your friend who thinks it's okay to talk like that when you're president, shame on you.
[57:58.410 --> 58:00.390]  Talk to your mom and your mom will tell you it's not okay.
[58:00.730 --> 58:01.090]  Okay?
[58:01.290 --> 58:01.870]  Good night, guys.
[58:01.950 --> 58:02.690]  Thanks for your call.
[58:02.790 --> 58:03.550]  Jim, you've got to make this quick.
[58:03.650 --> 58:03.950]  All right.
[58:04.690 --> 58:05.890]  One line, all right?
[58:05.970 --> 58:10.850]  I prefer to judge my politicians on substance rather than their grammar.
[58:11.210 --> 58:11.570]  Okay?
[58:11.770 --> 58:19.150]  If liberals say it's okay for us to protect white people in Kosovo, black people in Haiti, why can't we go protect brown people in Iraq?
[58:19.290 --> 58:20.590]  I don't think it's a race issue.
[58:20.730 --> 58:21.530]  It is a race issue.
[58:21.530 --> 58:22.970]  And there's not much in the way of substance either.
[58:23.070 --> 58:24.090]  It's a liberal issue.
[58:24.150 --> 58:25.510]  Well, let's talk about this next week.
[58:26.350 --> 58:27.430]  We're out of time this week.
[58:27.690 --> 58:31.210]  We'll talk to you again, I guess, in a week or so.
[58:31.310 --> 58:34.290]  Stay tuned for the personal computer show coming up next.
[58:34.830 --> 58:35.330]  Good night.
[58:35.330 --> 58:36.790]  Good night.
[58:39.400 --> 58:42.600]  Good night.
[58:53.400 --> 58:56.060]  Good night.
[58:56.060 --> 59:27.160]  Me dicen el clandestino por no llevar papel Pa' una ciudad del norte yo me fui a trabajar Mi vida la dejé entre Ceuta y Gibraltar Soy una raya en el mar Fantasman la ciudad Mi vida va prohibida, dice la autoridad Solo voy con mi pena