[00:33.180 --> 00:36.280] Yeah, WBAI New York is the legal idea here. [00:36.460 --> 00:37.720] It's 7 o'clock. [00:37.900 --> 00:38.920] Time for Off the Hook. [00:44.080 --> 00:46.000] The telephone keeps ringing. [00:46.460 --> 00:48.540] So I ripped it off the wall. [00:49.500 --> 00:51.500] I cut myself while shaving. [00:52.100 --> 00:54.020] Now I can't make a call. [00:54.780 --> 00:56.840] We couldn't get much worse. [00:57.480 --> 00:59.400] But if they could, they would. [04:03.420 --> 04:06.180] Yes, we've been invisible over the past few weeks. [04:06.340 --> 04:07.220] But we're back now. [04:08.060 --> 04:09.580] Off the Hook is on the air. [04:09.780 --> 04:20.920] But I should warn people that while we've been preempted for the last three weeks in a row, we can stop the dancing now because we are, in fact, preempted next week. [04:22.480 --> 04:24.340] Yeah, we're preempted again. [04:24.480 --> 04:25.480] I know, I know. [04:25.900 --> 04:27.380] No need to stop the music, though. [04:27.740 --> 04:27.940] All right. [04:28.980 --> 04:30.380] Listen, it's for a good cause. [04:30.560 --> 04:32.120] Bloomsday is next week, all right? [04:32.200 --> 04:35.080] And that's like every June 16th. [04:35.280 --> 04:40.440] It's this whole big celebration of James Joyce where we read from Ulysses all day long. [04:40.880 --> 04:45.640] And, in fact, next week is June 16th, 2004. [04:45.760 --> 04:49.080] Do you know June 16th, 1904 was the first one? [04:49.100 --> 04:50.500] So it's the 100th anniversary, guys. [04:50.720 --> 04:51.860] You know, we have to... [04:52.760 --> 04:57.060] It would have been nice not to have been preempted the last three weeks in a row, though, knowing that bit of information. [04:58.780 --> 04:59.340] More importantly... [04:59.340 --> 04:59.880] Yes, Jim. [04:59.880 --> 05:01.220] More importantly, next... [05:01.220 --> 05:11.700] More importantly, next Tuesday is the 100th anniversary of the disaster of the General Slocum, the biggest disaster in New York City and possibly the civilized world, until the World Trade Center. [05:11.860 --> 05:22.140] 1,021 people or so died on a steamer, an excursion steamer in the East River, destroyed Little Germany, an enclave on the Lower East Side. [05:22.140 --> 05:23.020] We're a hacker show. [05:23.300 --> 05:25.600] Why are we focusing on... [05:25.600 --> 05:26.540] Hackers know a lot of things. [05:26.600 --> 05:27.940] Horrible disaster that happened. [05:28.300 --> 05:28.960] Okay, fine. [05:29.040 --> 05:30.260] Well, that is bad. [05:30.460 --> 05:32.100] I'm not sure how we're going to commemorate that. [05:32.600 --> 05:35.960] I'm just saying how we're going to commemorate James Joyce and Ulysses and all that kind of thing. [05:36.480 --> 05:39.780] Also, I have more good news in that we'll be doing... [05:39.780 --> 05:43.780] While you may not have heard much of us in the past few weeks, you're going to be hearing way too much of us in July. [05:44.480 --> 05:51.940] Not only won't we be preempted, I'm told, but on the Friday of the conference, which is July 9th, we'll be doing a two-hour special from the conference. [05:52.960 --> 05:55.680] Like what we did back in 1997 at Beyond Hope. [05:55.960 --> 05:57.360] So we're going to have a two-hour radio show. [05:57.420 --> 05:59.040] That's going to be beginning at 8 p.m. [05:59.280 --> 06:00.960] and running until 10 p.m. [06:01.340 --> 06:04.320] That will be live from the Hotel Pennsylvania. [06:05.040 --> 06:13.280] And using the magic of ISDN, we'll be able to actually patch into the studio here and you'll hear all kinds of things going on there. [06:13.440 --> 06:15.460] Hopefully you'll be in the audience too. [06:15.540 --> 06:22.540] We'll have a whole thing set up where hundreds, if not thousands of people can be witness to what's going on. [06:24.380 --> 06:25.360] So, yes, Jeff? [06:25.580 --> 06:28.900] Are we going to do it from a stage or is it going to be just in a room? [06:29.660 --> 06:33.900] We're going to be in one of the talk rooms, probably Area A, the big one. [06:34.080 --> 06:34.500] Okay, yeah. [06:34.640 --> 06:37.340] And we'll have, you know, all the luminaries, all the keynotes, they'll all be there. [06:38.120 --> 06:43.180] And we'll be speaking with them and having, you know, guests of various sorts come in as well. [06:44.740 --> 06:47.460] And, yeah, so here we all are. [06:47.680 --> 06:49.040] How have we been the last several weeks? [06:49.120 --> 06:50.520] We went to Dayton. [06:50.640 --> 06:51.680] Actually, Jeff, you didn't go to Dayton. [06:51.860 --> 06:52.780] Red Hacked, you went to Dayton. [06:52.880 --> 06:53.580] I did go to Dayton. [06:53.580 --> 06:55.700] And, Bernie, yes, out there in Philadelphia, you went to Dayton, right? [06:56.000 --> 06:57.700] Yes, we all caravanned out there. [06:57.760 --> 06:59.580] Well, we caravanned back there, actually. [06:59.740 --> 07:17.480] But I want to congratulate on the air the three 2,600 staffers, Shapeshifter and Red Hacked and Morgan, who all took their amateur radio, FCC license exams and all passed and are now licensed ham radio operators. [07:17.600 --> 07:19.040] Much to the chagrin of the federal government. [07:20.100 --> 07:21.560] Yeah, that is certainly true. [07:21.560 --> 07:26.280] And Red Hacked, in fact, you've got a scanner, which you've been glued to ever since you got back. [07:26.600 --> 07:42.100] Well, I've got a radio that can do wideband reception, so not only can I listen to and talk to other hams, but I can also listen to things like, you know, Columbia Security and stuff. [07:42.260 --> 07:42.480] Wow. [07:42.720 --> 07:46.080] You go to Columbia, so I guess that's very handy, knowing when they're on the way over. [07:46.700 --> 07:47.140] Cool. [07:47.540 --> 07:48.280] Well, um... [07:48.280 --> 07:50.660] For Red Hacked, more useful than for some other people. [07:50.660 --> 07:51.720] Why isn't your mic working? [07:51.820 --> 07:52.340] It's not lit. [07:52.460 --> 07:52.960] You didn't push the button. [07:53.020 --> 07:53.420] Oh, I didn't push the button. [07:53.560 --> 07:54.580] Say that clever comment again. [07:54.700 --> 07:58.780] I was going to say that this is more useful for Red Hacked than for the average, you know, student. [07:59.820 --> 08:00.080] Yes. [08:00.540 --> 08:04.980] Now, Bernie, you had a bit of a misfortune on the way back, actually on the way there as well with your car. [08:05.160 --> 08:06.000] Did that ever work out? [08:06.780 --> 08:12.480] Finally, enough people hacked my Volvo to come to the point where they found a faulty RPM sensor. [08:12.620 --> 08:20.940] It took about three weeks and three trips out to Western Pennsylvania and Wheeling, West Virginia to finally get the car back and working. [08:21.160 --> 08:32.700] But fortunately, we caravaned back following the 2600 van and in Wheeling, myself and a friend were able to ride steerage in the 2600 van. [08:32.940 --> 08:34.360] Yeah, that was quite something there. [08:34.440 --> 08:37.120] I don't think we could have fit another individual in there. [08:37.280 --> 08:39.040] It was packed to the rafters in the back. [08:39.740 --> 08:41.420] And the van held up. [08:41.520 --> 08:45.560] And the funny thing is that the van held up until I got back and that's when the headlights failed. [08:46.500 --> 08:46.760] Wow. [08:46.940 --> 08:48.440] Yeah, so the headlights didn't work at all. [08:48.640 --> 08:49.880] And in fact, they're being fixed right now. [08:51.660 --> 08:52.900] So we were very lucky. [08:53.140 --> 08:57.820] And the 2600 van came through once again and saved our collective asses. [08:58.500 --> 09:00.880] So, Bernie, you had to go out there three times to get it fixed? [09:01.060 --> 09:06.560] Yes, I went to Wheeling and then went to another town and that didn't work out and then a third town. [09:06.680 --> 09:07.440] So it was three weeks. [09:07.560 --> 09:08.620] Just got it back last weekend. [09:08.620 --> 09:09.220] Wow. [09:10.180 --> 09:11.500] It was a lot of towing. [09:12.240 --> 09:18.460] Yeah, because you originally broke down in Dayton and then you broke down again in Cincinnati and then you broke down in Wheeling, kind of a tour of the Midwest there. [09:18.480 --> 09:20.720] Yes, and then in Somerset, Pennsylvania. [09:21.020 --> 09:22.600] And it just got bad from whatever. [09:22.860 --> 09:26.400] But in any case, the story is not about car repairs. [09:26.580 --> 09:27.160] It's not car talk. [09:27.300 --> 09:27.880] No, it's not. [09:28.000 --> 09:28.780] But it certainly could be. [09:29.300 --> 09:32.300] And Bernie, you used to have some pretty reliable car service, didn't you? [09:33.060 --> 09:44.680] I had some excellent car service because I rode out to Dayton many times with Jeff in his ultra-reliable hacker van, which was highly recognizable to other hackers heading to Dayton. [09:44.860 --> 09:47.040] It had a blue box on the top. [09:47.040 --> 09:49.500] A big blue box with an H2K sticker. [09:49.740 --> 09:55.720] So many hackers would wave and shout just as they do with the 2600 van because they knew who we were and where we were headed. [09:55.960 --> 09:59.460] Yeah, we had some people waving and shouting and, you know, a lot of commotion inside the van. [09:59.580 --> 10:05.500] It was cool because we could play music with the iPods and people on the back, you were watching VCDs, I believe, of H2K2. [10:06.120 --> 10:08.240] You know, a big entertainment complex on the road there. [10:08.420 --> 10:09.180] So it was... [10:09.180 --> 10:11.360] Not bad for a van from the 70s. [10:11.420 --> 10:11.760] A lot of fun. [10:11.760 --> 10:14.240] And, of course, we saw all kinds of cool people out there in Dayton as well. [10:14.420 --> 10:15.100] And it was great. [10:15.200 --> 10:19.260] It was great seeing them hanging out there and just, you know, being in the Midwest. [10:20.120 --> 10:20.960] But we're back now. [10:21.100 --> 10:21.620] We're back on the East. [10:21.680 --> 10:23.360] Of course, that was, what, three weeks ago that we did that? [10:23.500 --> 10:26.180] It was just the first opportunity we've had to talk about it since then. [10:26.940 --> 10:28.260] And a lot's been going on. [10:28.360 --> 10:30.660] We're planning for the Fifth Hope, which is taking place next month. [10:30.820 --> 10:32.600] Boy, it's less than 30 days away now. [10:32.960 --> 10:33.220] Yes. [10:33.320 --> 10:33.420] Yeah. [10:33.640 --> 10:37.880] July 9th through the 11th, right here in New York City, Hotel Pennsylvania. [10:38.260 --> 10:41.340] Go to www.hope.net. [10:41.340 --> 10:42.680] We have three keynotes at the moment. [10:42.860 --> 10:46.500] We have Jello Biafra, we have Kevin Mitnick, and we have Steve Wozniak. [10:47.280 --> 10:51.180] Each will be giving a keynote address on each of the three days of the conference. [10:52.060 --> 10:54.960] And we also have all kinds of other speakers and panels lined up. [10:55.040 --> 10:56.220] One of them will be joining us. [10:56.260 --> 10:58.920] One of the speakers, not one of the panels, will be joining us today in the studio. [10:59.060 --> 11:00.280] Hopefully, he's on his way here now. [11:01.780 --> 11:03.860] And I guess we'll just surprise people when he gets here. [11:04.820 --> 11:06.420] Anyone have stories they'd like to... [11:07.100 --> 11:07.860] Mike has a story. [11:07.960 --> 11:08.080] Go ahead. [11:08.080 --> 11:13.420] Yes, you'll recall, if you can remember three weeks ago, that we were talking about Covance, Inc. [11:13.580 --> 11:16.480] Covance is a big multinational drug corporation. [11:16.680 --> 11:18.120] The ones that would like to sue you for putting out your pictures. [11:18.120 --> 11:18.260] Right, right. [11:18.260 --> 11:20.660] They abuse animals and censor-free speech. [11:21.100 --> 11:24.240] But they have cohorts in their battles to censor-free speech. [11:24.700 --> 11:25.200] Google... [11:25.200 --> 11:26.320] Covance has cohorts? [11:26.500 --> 11:27.760] They have cohorts. [11:28.100 --> 11:29.040] And Google... [11:29.040 --> 11:36.540] Google has a program where anyone can go in and place an ad on the right side of the search results for fairly cheap. [11:36.540 --> 11:37.100] I've seen them. [11:37.980 --> 11:40.240] Anyone who's typed Google has seen them. [11:40.460 --> 11:41.440] So I bought an ad. [11:43.000 --> 11:49.340] When anyone would search for Covance, my ad would come up saying, Covance abuses animals and... [11:49.340 --> 11:50.320] Google's our homepage here. [11:50.360 --> 11:50.740] Did you know that? [11:50.900 --> 11:51.620] I did not know that. [11:51.620 --> 11:53.360] I just fired up Explorer and Google came up immediately. [11:53.480 --> 11:54.800] I'm going to type in Covance and see what I did. [11:55.200 --> 11:56.960] C-O-V-A-N-C-E. [11:57.140 --> 11:57.480] Okay. [11:58.380 --> 11:59.420] And you'll see... [11:59.420 --> 12:02.480] There's one ad on the right-hand side and that's by Covance, Inc. [12:02.640 --> 12:03.720] You will not see my ad. [12:03.780 --> 12:04.440] I don't see your ad. [12:04.440 --> 12:04.680] No. [12:05.140 --> 12:11.360] Because Google's policy is apparently not to print ads that are critical of anything. [12:11.900 --> 12:14.300] They only print ads that will sell you things. [12:14.540 --> 12:16.700] They're only a commerce advertising. [12:16.840 --> 12:18.500] No negative advertising. [12:18.740 --> 12:18.920] No. [12:19.020 --> 12:19.620] So George W. [12:19.620 --> 12:22.960] Bush couldn't put on anything on here, negative campaign type things. [12:23.100 --> 12:23.800] I don't think so. [12:23.960 --> 12:24.140] Wow. [12:24.940 --> 12:25.160] Interesting. [12:25.300 --> 12:26.780] I'm going to type in John Kerry and see what I get. [12:26.780 --> 12:32.940] Well, Mike, why don't you sell stickers or t-shirts or something to get around this? [12:33.560 --> 12:35.860] I know that's not the point, but... [12:35.860 --> 12:37.880] First of all, I don't have time for that. [12:38.080 --> 12:40.960] And I still don't think they'd let me. [12:41.040 --> 12:45.380] I don't think they would let me sell anti-Covance stickers on the keyword Covance. [12:45.460 --> 12:48.480] Maybe on the keyword sticker, but who's going to search for sticker? [12:48.900 --> 12:51.580] All three advertisements for John Kerry are positive advertisements. [12:51.840 --> 12:52.000] Yeah. [12:52.100 --> 12:52.600] That's interesting. [12:52.740 --> 12:53.300] Now George W. [12:53.440 --> 12:54.440] Bush has no advertisements. [12:55.520 --> 12:57.700] I guess if you don't have anything good to say, you don't say anything at all. [12:57.840 --> 12:59.720] That's Google's way of dealing with this. [13:00.300 --> 13:03.080] Well, any more legal type of news from them? [13:03.280 --> 13:14.100] One bit of news actually is that a court in Switzerland has ruled that it is legal in Switzerland to publish the information, the photographs and video of Covance's animal abuse practices. [13:15.000 --> 13:16.640] So if you're in Switzerland, it's legal. [13:16.800 --> 13:20.380] If you're in the U.S., no one knows because they don't apparently have any lawyers here. [13:21.240 --> 13:24.600] So it's looking good for fans of free speech. [13:24.760 --> 13:24.940] You know what? [13:24.980 --> 13:25.900] I mistyped George W. [13:26.040 --> 13:26.100] Bush. [13:26.240 --> 13:28.520] I put a J in front of his name so that's why it didn't come up with anything. [13:28.640 --> 13:29.600] So I'm typing it again. [13:30.780 --> 13:32.060] Oh boy, there are a lot of ads. [13:32.160 --> 13:32.900] There are a lot of ads. [13:34.720 --> 13:35.980] But none of them seem to be negative. [13:36.720 --> 13:38.060] No, none of them seem to be negative at all. [13:38.200 --> 13:40.960] And with all the negative things that people have to say about that man. [13:42.140 --> 13:42.420] Yeah. [13:42.680 --> 13:43.220] That's interesting. [13:43.340 --> 13:48.060] I mean, you know, you don't really see many anti-Coke ads on television or anti-Pepsi ads or anything like that. [13:48.100 --> 13:48.780] I'd love to see them. [13:48.960 --> 13:50.800] In fact, I'd like to know when you make a movie, you know, [13:54.080 --> 13:56.400] boy, Pepsi really tastes awful. [13:56.580 --> 13:57.760] Can you say that in a movie? [13:58.280 --> 13:58.980] What do you think, Jeff? [13:59.680 --> 14:00.900] You probably could. [14:01.820 --> 14:02.540] It's just... [14:02.540 --> 14:03.900] Pepsi wouldn't pay you then. [14:04.020 --> 14:04.360] Well, no. [14:04.480 --> 14:07.520] I know Pepsi isn't going to pay for that but would they sue you? [14:07.660 --> 14:09.000] Would they sue you for saying that? [14:09.100 --> 14:10.180] And I've never seen it in a film. [14:10.420 --> 14:11.980] Coke might send a check. [14:12.880 --> 14:13.760] Yeah, that's the point. [14:13.840 --> 14:17.400] They couldn't sue you because it's a character saying it unless, of course, it's a documentary. [14:17.740 --> 14:18.760] Believe me, they could sue you. [14:18.900 --> 14:19.360] They could call it... [14:19.360 --> 14:20.160] It's called dilution. [14:20.960 --> 14:21.320] Dilution? [14:21.580 --> 14:22.380] Yeah, dilution. [14:22.660 --> 14:23.140] That's right. [14:23.400 --> 14:25.080] You're destroying their trademark or something. [14:25.300 --> 14:26.100] Something like that. [14:27.680 --> 14:28.140] Oh, well. [14:28.640 --> 14:28.800] All right. [14:28.840 --> 14:33.100] I just typed animal torture into Google and I see no advertisements supporting that. [14:33.260 --> 14:37.040] I guess negative ads wouldn't show up at all. [14:37.060 --> 14:40.540] There was PETA, people eating tasty animals. [14:40.740 --> 14:41.320] That's what it says. [14:41.760 --> 14:43.220] Speaking of animal torture... [14:43.220 --> 14:44.040] That was taken off. [14:44.340 --> 14:44.980] Right, right. [14:45.100 --> 14:47.160] That's a very old story, though. [14:47.660 --> 14:51.660] But currently, animal torture and the web and free speech. [14:52.000 --> 15:01.460] There's an organization called Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty, which at the end of May, they had seven animal rights advocates connected to that group arrested. [15:01.760 --> 15:08.120] But what's most fascinating about this case is that only two of the seven arrested are connected to that group. [15:08.300 --> 15:10.560] The other five are supposedly... [15:10.560 --> 15:16.260] And you have to read the Times article and sort of see what they're not quite saying. [15:16.260 --> 15:25.960] But the other five are only charged with interstate stalking because of the website because they apparently read the website and did what was suggested. [15:26.620 --> 15:30.260] And the prosecutor suggested that... [15:31.160 --> 15:31.280] Oh. [15:32.040 --> 15:47.060] There was a list on the site that suggested the top 20 terror tactics to be used against the company and individuals connected to the company, including invading offices, chaining gates shut, writing graffiti on cars and houses, flooding houses with garden hoses, [15:47.520 --> 15:52.340] smashing windows, and sending defective email messages in attempts to damage computers. [15:52.920 --> 15:54.500] So, uh... [15:54.500 --> 15:57.160] That's kind of interesting because, uh... [15:57.160 --> 16:00.080] The conspiracy allegations... [16:00.080 --> 16:00.820] No... [16:00.820 --> 16:04.760] No direct communication between anybody, just apparently reading the website. [16:04.760 --> 16:13.580] I may be wrong, but I've tried to look this up and I can't see any allegations that say that they actually communicated five of these people. [16:14.280 --> 16:15.500] And yet they're charged with conspiracy. [16:16.180 --> 16:18.320] It's not hard to be charged with conspiracy these days. [16:18.500 --> 16:19.000] Well, yeah. [16:19.280 --> 16:19.700] It really isn't. [16:19.760 --> 16:22.320] I'm sure this is conspiracy that we're doing right here, right now. [16:23.320 --> 16:27.620] Well, I'd like to welcome our special surprise guest, Steve Rombaum, from... [16:28.020 --> 16:30.000] Well, if you've been to any of the HOPE conferences... [16:30.000 --> 16:31.320] Nobody's more surprised than me. [16:31.680 --> 16:32.660] You look pretty shocked. [16:33.420 --> 16:40.920] He's given a talk, I think, at every single HOPE conference, back at the first one, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2002, and you'll be speaking again in 2004. [16:41.260 --> 16:41.660] Correct. [16:42.000 --> 16:42.240] Wow. [16:42.500 --> 16:43.020] That's something. [16:43.020 --> 16:44.840] With the assistance of... [16:44.840 --> 16:46.240] Did you find me a victim? [16:46.740 --> 16:48.320] We're going to talk about that in a second. [16:48.960 --> 16:49.680] Don't be scared. [16:49.880 --> 16:52.580] It's going to be a good victim type of a thing. [16:52.880 --> 16:53.600] Be scared. [16:53.820 --> 16:53.900] Yeah. [16:55.020 --> 16:58.260] Now, Steve has a special thing planned for this year. [16:58.980 --> 17:07.160] And what we're going to do is take a look at a couple of stories and we'll go into Steve's victim and we'll take some phone calls and have all kinds of fun like that. [17:07.640 --> 17:12.840] Steve, I recall that you were a card-carrying severe risk from the last conference. [17:12.840 --> 17:13.220] Is that right? [17:13.380 --> 17:14.740] No, actually, he doesn't... [17:14.740 --> 17:15.040] Well, no, no. [17:15.100 --> 17:15.980] They upgraded me. [17:16.340 --> 17:17.360] Did you get a severe risk? [17:17.440 --> 17:17.580] No. [17:17.840 --> 17:18.040] Yes. [17:18.140 --> 17:22.660] He was upgraded at the conference to a severe risk card-carrying card-holder. [17:22.920 --> 17:24.260] One of the proudest moments of my life. [17:24.280 --> 17:26.200] So you do have one of the severe cards? [17:26.300 --> 17:27.100] The red ones, right? [17:27.100 --> 17:27.600] Okay, the red ones. [17:27.660 --> 17:27.760] Yeah. [17:27.760 --> 17:30.360] It now has a bullet hole in it. [17:31.620 --> 17:33.360] With you, I don't know if you're joking. [17:33.700 --> 17:34.580] I am joking. [17:34.620 --> 17:35.600] It may have saved his life. [17:36.000 --> 17:36.340] Correct. [17:37.460 --> 17:39.100] Okay, let's take a quick look at the news. [17:39.300 --> 17:42.040] Some fun things that have been going on over the past few weeks. [17:42.540 --> 17:43.140] A plane... [17:43.140 --> 17:43.600] This is great. [17:43.700 --> 17:52.580] A plane passenger slapped a federal air marshal after refusing to sit down and ignoring instructions to end her cellular phone call, which she said would have been rude. [17:53.440 --> 17:54.520] Oh, I mean, yeah. [17:54.700 --> 17:56.520] You can't really argue with that, can you? [17:57.820 --> 18:04.400] Lilia Belkova has been jailed since being charged with assaulting a federal officer and interfering with a flight crew last Wednesday as a U.S. [18:04.500 --> 18:06.640] Airways flight prepared to take off from Miami to Philadelphia. [18:08.480 --> 18:16.360] According to prosecutors, she refused flight attendant's instructions to turn off her cell phone as flight 26 taxied for takeoff, saying, It is rude to hang up on people. [18:16.360 --> 18:18.040] I don't have to turn my phone off. [18:18.620 --> 18:25.060] Well, I think, you know, this could be a good test case of the rights of people to continue talking on their cell phones when... [18:25.060 --> 18:26.700] But it's not rude to slap someone. [18:26.860 --> 18:27.400] That was my fault. [18:27.620 --> 18:28.440] Well, here's the thing. [18:28.620 --> 18:29.120] Listen to this. [18:29.220 --> 18:35.900] After ignoring more flight crew instructions, one of two air marshals ordered Belkova to be seated and put a hand on her shoulder to show her where to sit. [18:36.100 --> 18:39.400] She reached back and slapped the air marshal across the face, causing minor swelling. [18:39.900 --> 18:40.720] Now, here's the thing. [18:41.180 --> 18:42.960] Al-Qaeda operatives take note. [18:43.560 --> 18:46.220] This is how you get the air marshals to identify themselves. [18:46.220 --> 18:47.920] You cause some kind of a ruckus. [18:48.040 --> 18:49.540] The air marshal stands up, guides you to your seat. [18:49.620 --> 18:50.740] You know who the air marshal is. [18:51.140 --> 18:55.340] I mean, isn't that kind of dumb, you know, to reveal your identity that way? [18:55.860 --> 19:13.420] Well, I know there's many cases where people who did not identify themselves as law enforcement officers put their hands on or otherwise technically assaulted someone who retaliated and then the defendant was charged with assaulting a law enforcement officer even though they had no way of knowing they were a law enforcement officer. [19:13.660 --> 19:22.780] But this woman really had to get Zsa Zsa's lawyer because Zsa Zsa's lawyer got her off, I think, or with a very light sentence for slapping a law enforcement officer. [19:23.840 --> 19:24.280] Yeah. [19:24.280 --> 19:25.360] Yeah, apparently that's overage. [19:25.360 --> 19:26.480] And that one was uniformed. [19:26.780 --> 19:27.780] Yeah, that was uniformed. [19:27.900 --> 19:28.020] Yeah. [19:28.440 --> 19:28.780] Traffic stop. [19:29.320 --> 19:29.540] Yeah. [19:29.980 --> 19:31.620] Okay, we'll be watching that case. [19:31.680 --> 19:40.000] I heard something similar happen in Vietnam where somebody was banned from flying in the domestic airline forever because they refused to turn their phone off as well. [19:40.980 --> 19:43.460] Those of you thinking of being DEA informants, take note of this. [19:43.640 --> 19:58.700] Federal investigators are frantically trying to determine what happened to a missing laptop computer that contains sensitive data on as many as 100 drug enforcement administration investigations around the country, including a wealth of information about many of the agency's confidential informants. [19:59.140 --> 20:01.080] A lot of nervous people in the country tonight. [20:01.300 --> 20:04.760] And how much they were being paid by the DEA to be federal informants. [20:04.760 --> 20:06.160] Oh yeah, all kinds of things. [20:06.300 --> 20:08.420] Actually, that's true, it was an Excel spreadsheet. [20:08.960 --> 20:09.280] Really? [20:09.400 --> 20:11.660] And the agent lied about it. [20:11.840 --> 20:12.280] Yeah, well... [20:12.280 --> 20:17.440] First he said it was stolen, then he said, well, I lost it, but I didn't want to tell the truth. [20:17.580 --> 20:22.600] First he said that he left it in the trunk of his car while he went to get coffee and it got stolen. [20:23.740 --> 20:26.920] And then he said that to avoid embarrassment. [20:27.080 --> 20:28.500] Well, guess what he's getting a lot of right now? [20:28.680 --> 20:34.400] He said that actually what he had done, he had accidentally damaged the computer, he destroyed it, and threw it into a dumpster. [20:34.760 --> 20:35.700] In that order? [20:35.940 --> 20:36.620] In that order. [20:37.260 --> 20:50.600] Investigators are rather upset right now, and they basically are saying that the computer included more than 4,000 pages of case-filed data, including enough details about the informant's work that it could allow drug traffickers to figure out who they are. [20:50.680 --> 20:53.680] Their actual names weren't listed there, but enough information was. [20:54.760 --> 20:57.860] I think the informants are probably more upset than anyone right now. [20:57.940 --> 20:59.000] Yeah, I would say so. [20:59.600 --> 21:00.720] What I don't understand is... [21:00.720 --> 21:03.440] Doesn't that be a lesson to anyone who considers being a federal informant? [21:03.540 --> 21:14.440] Well, if you look at the GAO report that predated this incident, you see there's been something like 2,500 laptops with secure information lost in five years. [21:14.740 --> 21:15.920] That's how many they've lost? [21:16.080 --> 21:17.140] I thought that's how many they had. [21:17.540 --> 21:19.620] 2,500 laptops lost. [21:19.980 --> 21:20.420] Wow. [21:20.540 --> 21:21.340] There's a GAO report. [21:21.460 --> 21:21.560] Yeah. [21:21.620 --> 21:22.240] That is something. [21:22.880 --> 21:25.240] Well, you know, I wonder, why don't they just use encryption? [21:25.400 --> 21:28.200] Is there a reason why they don't do that on their computers, Mike? [21:28.460 --> 21:29.180] Yeah, they're dumb. [21:29.180 --> 21:36.020] Well, okay, that's one theory, but, you know, it seems like a very logical thing to do with something like that. [21:36.080 --> 21:44.620] And I must say that as a friend of anarchists, I much appreciate the fact that law enforcement is dumb, but, you know, it doesn't change that fact. [21:45.180 --> 21:45.460] Okay. [21:46.340 --> 21:47.460] Well, continuing here... [21:47.460 --> 21:48.080] They're not that dumb. [21:48.540 --> 21:49.700] Well, in this case, they are. [21:49.760 --> 21:51.340] In this case, they definitely... [21:52.020 --> 21:56.500] I don't know what's going on here, but the policy should be to have encryption as a default, I think. [21:56.500 --> 21:57.940] I don't see why it wouldn't be. [21:58.900 --> 22:04.600] Plans for a national ID card scheme risk changing the relationship between the British state and its citizens. [22:05.620 --> 22:09.780] That's according to an information watchdog who has a name, Richard Thomas. [22:10.180 --> 22:10.680] That's right. [22:10.740 --> 22:12.760] He's the information commissioner. [22:13.000 --> 22:18.620] He said he had initially greeted the plans with healthy skepticism, but the details had changed his view to increasing alarm. [22:19.040 --> 22:24.160] The government hopes a pilot scheme will pave the way for compulsory identity cards within the next decade. [22:28.140 --> 22:30.200] Basically, what's happening here... [22:30.740 --> 22:31.700] I'll read his comments. [22:31.840 --> 22:33.800] That's probably the best way to sum this up. [22:33.920 --> 22:40.240] This is beginning to represent a really significant sea change in the relationship between state and every individual in the country. [22:41.060 --> 22:46.040] It's now clear the scheme was not just about identity cards, but about a national identity register, he said. [22:46.180 --> 22:49.100] It's not just about citizens having a piece of plastic to identify themselves. [22:49.100 --> 22:55.100] It's about the amount, the nature of the information held about every citizen, and how that's going to be used in a wide range of activities. [22:55.660 --> 22:59.340] The government had addressed worries of what's known as function creep. [22:59.520 --> 23:04.320] That's the plans going further than initially envisaged in terms of the information held about people. [23:04.720 --> 23:09.360] There are concerns the plans are too open-ended about how the information could be shared between different agencies. [23:10.000 --> 23:20.760] Last month, 10,000 volunteers began what they call trialing the cards, is a British term, I guess, which will include biometric details such as iris scans, fingerprints, or facial dimensions. [23:21.440 --> 23:30.300] Starting in 2007, all new passports and driving licenses will include biometric data, and there will be separate identity cards for those who do not drive and don't have passports. [23:30.480 --> 23:40.200] By 2012, that's the next time Venus goes in front of the sun, it's estimated that 80% of workers will have the card or a combined driving license or passport. [23:40.500 --> 23:44.260] And the Home Office hopes the scheme will be compulsory by 2013. [23:44.960 --> 23:46.380] And they're calling it voluntary. [23:47.240 --> 23:53.640] They're still calling it voluntary because I guess they're not saying it's a law that you have to have it, but they're making it so it's impossible to live without one. [23:54.640 --> 23:55.400] It's kind of frightening. [23:55.620 --> 23:56.760] This sounds like a segue to me. [23:57.380 --> 23:58.060] Like a segue? [23:58.300 --> 23:59.100] Yeah, like we're... [23:59.100 --> 24:01.040] Oh, it's a segue to what Steve has to talk about, absolutely. [24:01.280 --> 24:01.520] Absolutely. [24:01.660 --> 24:03.760] But I have actually another story that's even more... [24:04.460 --> 24:05.400] A little scooter? [24:06.420 --> 24:07.580] Not those, not those. [24:07.740 --> 24:10.620] But it makes you wonder, you know, is anybody surprised by this? [24:10.640 --> 24:11.580] This is happening in England. [24:11.720 --> 24:12.480] This is really happening. [24:12.580 --> 24:13.060] It's not fiction. [24:13.280 --> 24:19.960] Well, remember Beyond Hope, the metric card talk I gave on Sunday, which was also a worship service, Revelations 1316. [24:20.540 --> 24:24.400] No one could buy nor sell, but they had the mark of the beast in their hand. [24:24.560 --> 24:26.740] A nice little national identity card. [24:27.240 --> 24:29.680] Yeah, I know, it's apocalyptic tripe until it comes true. [24:30.320 --> 24:33.460] Well, it looks like it might be coming true a lot sooner than we have feared. [24:33.620 --> 24:36.820] I was just going to point out that a lot of this is at the demand of the U.S. [24:36.960 --> 24:37.240] government. [24:38.120 --> 24:43.140] These biometric identifiers and passports, basically they won't let people into the U.S. [24:43.280 --> 24:45.180] unless they have these biometric identifiers. [24:45.340 --> 24:53.420] So a lot of European countries that kind of don't want this for their own citizens are being bowled over by the U.S. [24:53.520 --> 24:56.160] State Department and acceding to the demands. [24:56.220 --> 24:57.340] I don't think the U.K. [24:57.460 --> 24:58.640] government can be accused of that. [24:59.060 --> 25:00.060] Maybe not the U.K. [25:00.140 --> 25:02.760] government, but a lot of countries are in this boat. [25:04.280 --> 25:08.520] Well, if they're doing it, they're doing it because it's a very convenient excuse. [25:08.900 --> 25:15.180] There's almost no government that doesn't want every possible bit of detail on its citizens. [25:15.180 --> 25:20.200] And if they can blame the U.S., that's considerably more convenient for them. [25:20.360 --> 25:23.280] Yeah, I can't imagine any individual being... [25:23.280 --> 25:28.040] Any government saying that individual rights are necessarily that greater thing. [25:28.040 --> 25:30.780] They all want to be able to watch and see what's going on. [25:30.780 --> 25:35.880] In fact, most of this data is already in the hands of European governments. [25:36.000 --> 25:36.840] You have health I.D. [25:36.960 --> 25:37.340] cards. [25:37.540 --> 25:41.720] You have, in many cases, internal passports. [25:41.960 --> 25:45.080] You have driver's licenses that cross-reference everything. [25:46.920 --> 25:56.080] Americans don't understand the normally accepted level of government intrusiveness around the world everywhere except America. [25:56.540 --> 25:57.320] For now. [25:57.660 --> 25:58.980] But that's about to change, too. [25:59.500 --> 26:00.100] Listen to this. [26:00.320 --> 26:03.040] And this will lead into what Steve has to tell us. [26:03.480 --> 26:07.500] You're on your way to work in the morning, and you place a call on your wireless phone. [26:07.620 --> 26:18.440] As your call is relayed by the wireless tower, it's also relayed by another series of towers to a microwave antenna on top of Mount Weather between Leesburg and Winchester, Virginia, and then beamed to another antenna on top of an office building in Arlington, [26:18.660 --> 26:20.600] where it's recorded on a computer hard drive. [26:20.780 --> 26:32.700] The computer also records your phone's digital serial number, which is used to identify you through your wireless company's phone bill that the defense Advanced Research Projects Agency already has on record as part of your permanent file. [26:33.040 --> 26:39.000] A series of sophisticated computer programs listens to your phone conversation and looks for keywords that suggest suspicious activity. [26:39.220 --> 26:43.340] If it picks up on those words, an investigative file is opened and sent to the Department of Homeland Security. [26:44.040 --> 26:58.620] Congratulations, Big Brother has just identified you as a potential threat to the security of the United States because you might have used words like takeout, as in taking someone out when you were in fact talking about ordering takeout for lunch, or D-Day as in deadline for some nefarious activity when you were talking about going to the new World War II memorial. [26:59.380 --> 27:08.740] If you are lucky, an investigator at DHS will look at the entire conversation in context and delete the file, or he or she may keep the file open even if they realize the use of words was innocent. [27:08.920 --> 27:17.800] Or they may decide you are indeed a threat and set up more investigation, including a wiretap on your home and office phones, around-the-clock surveillance, and much closer looks at your life. [27:18.140 --> 27:31.360] Welcome to America, 2004, where the actions of more than 150 million citizens are monitored 24-7 by the TIA, the Terrorist Information Awareness, originally called Total Information Awareness, Program of DARPA, DHS, and the Department of Justice. [27:32.540 --> 27:33.020] Emmanuel. [27:33.340 --> 27:33.800] Go ahead. [27:34.200 --> 27:36.360] That article was fraught with errors. [27:36.520 --> 27:38.660] I actually wrote it in the I agree completely. [27:38.880 --> 27:44.380] Well, I think this article is basically letting imagination run away with it to some degree, but... [27:44.380 --> 27:49.720] The address of the building, for those of you who care, is 3625 Fairfax Drive in Arlington. [27:49.720 --> 27:55.760] Let's just look at what is wrong with the article, though, what is not realistic, and what is. [27:55.800 --> 27:56.780] Who's on the other end of the phone? [27:56.820 --> 27:57.640] That's Bernie S., by the way. [27:57.900 --> 27:58.280] Oh, Bernie. [27:58.300 --> 27:59.120] Bernie, introduce yourself. [27:59.460 --> 27:59.900] Hi, Steve. [28:00.100 --> 28:01.140] No, no, we've met. [28:01.140 --> 28:01.920] I didn't know it was you. [28:02.220 --> 28:03.300] Do you want to go first? [28:03.820 --> 28:04.100] I'm the one who... [28:04.100 --> 28:04.940] No, you can go ahead. [28:05.000 --> 28:07.900] I'm the one who handed you the severe risk card at... [28:07.900 --> 28:08.300] Yeah. [28:08.560 --> 28:09.100] No, no, no. [28:09.160 --> 28:10.080] I know who you are. [28:10.220 --> 28:11.320] Well, let's take it from the top. [28:11.380 --> 28:12.060] He's got your info. [28:12.060 --> 28:16.360] First of all, TIA is not who monitors telephone conversations. [28:16.700 --> 28:23.400] Second of all, to get a list of telephone calls, they don't need to do that. [28:23.580 --> 28:31.920] They can get it directly from dumps from the cellular carriers, which, as of yet, they don't do because you still need a warrant for that. [28:32.400 --> 28:36.500] Third of all, keyword searching is not something TIA does. [28:36.940 --> 28:39.120] TIA is strictly database. [28:41.200 --> 28:52.980] And actually, this is a phenomenal segue, because this is one of the things that, after our discussion last night, we decided that I was going to talk about today. [28:53.840 --> 28:58.300] You have a situation now in the United States where the U.S. [28:58.420 --> 29:07.140] government is doing an end run both around the Constitution, around Congress's intent, and around the Freedom of Information Act. [29:08.440 --> 29:09.820] Let me be specific. [29:11.180 --> 29:21.920] The original TIA, Total Information Awareness, and all of the various programs that were put together by Admiral Poindexter, were pretty much shot down by Congress and by government outcry. [29:22.840 --> 29:24.220] They weren't funded. [29:24.480 --> 29:26.240] They were regulated against. [29:26.600 --> 29:28.580] And in theory, they were shut down. [29:29.080 --> 29:30.920] In reality, here's what happened. [29:31.080 --> 29:34.140] First of all, President Bush, who... [29:34.140 --> 29:36.920] We won't go into the politics of this. [29:37.460 --> 29:50.880] President Bush allocated a black budget for database compiling and database activities related, in theory, to detecting terrorists, number one. [29:51.940 --> 29:52.500] Number two... [29:52.500 --> 29:59.020] So, the budget, which was not approved by Congress, now exists, and it's not subject to congressional scrutiny. [29:59.240 --> 29:59.340] Right. [30:00.380 --> 30:12.500] Number two, DARPA was given the oversight to this, and DARPA, very, very intelligently, contracted to private industry, which does two things. [30:12.880 --> 30:19.120] Number one, these are not governmental files, so they are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act requests. [30:19.560 --> 30:29.860] Number two, they're not subject to any scrutiny by anyone, because these are privately held proprietary files, trade secrets, blah, blah, blah. [30:30.200 --> 30:54.940] Companies like Sisint, companies like ChoicePoint, are taking massive amounts of data, massaging it in-house, indexing it in ways that nobody ever dreamed possible, making relational databases that are truly remarkable, creating AI searching, which, by the way, [30:54.960 --> 31:01.960] is one of the good things that they're doing, which allows not just name matches, but logical nearby name matches. [31:01.980 --> 31:09.500] For example, one of the problems was that Osama bin Laden, when it's translated from the Arabic, there's 17 possible transliterations. [31:09.980 --> 31:13.880] Up until recently, if Osama bin Laden wanted to come into the U.S. [31:14.060 --> 31:14.840] And use his real name. [31:15.020 --> 31:22.280] With a variation of his name, he would have gotten in, unless somebody would have spotted it using human intelligence. [31:24.100 --> 31:45.500] You have a situation now where essentially everything that is known about you, or can be known, or can be extrapolated to, is in a database which is being included in a massive relational database. [31:45.840 --> 31:52.400] That data, which is not subject to any kind of oversight, even though it's being funded by the government. [31:52.680 --> 31:59.360] For example, Sisint got an eight million dollar grant for something called the Threat Matrix, to develop a program. [32:01.640 --> 32:06.420] That data is now being cross-referenced with governmental data. [32:06.600 --> 32:12.740] And governments are doing another end run, in that they're turning their data over to Sisint and ChoicePoint. [32:12.940 --> 32:27.240] It then becomes their data, and by that I mean driver license, motor vehicle, voter registration, real property, bankruptcies, liens, mortgages, UCC filings, which are a fantastic source of information. [32:27.420 --> 32:33.020] And all of that is being massaged by these private companies, and then being spit back to the government. [32:33.420 --> 32:51.700] So if I want to know essentially, everywhere you've ever lived, everywhere you've ever worked, who you talk to on the telephone, who your relatives are, where you spend your money, what sort of magazines you read, what your political orientation is, what's your sexual preferences. [32:51.900 --> 32:53.240] There's databases for that. [32:53.400 --> 32:54.380] How could that be in a database? [32:54.940 --> 32:55.840] How could that be in a database? [32:56.140 --> 33:02.660] Well, to begin with, if you subscribe to Out Magazine, chances are you're not a heterosexual Republican. [33:04.840 --> 33:10.280] You know, let me just go off on a tangent here. [33:10.580 --> 33:15.460] What can be extrapolated to accurately is astounding. [33:15.640 --> 33:31.160] My favorite example, which I've told you before, is Volkswagen actually determined that people who buy large amounts of peanut butter and own cats would buy Volkswagen Beetles at a higher rate than the general public. [33:31.300 --> 33:33.120] They were able to predict that. [33:33.400 --> 33:35.340] Now, why that is, I don't know. [33:35.340 --> 33:36.160] Well, I think we all know. [33:36.480 --> 33:37.140] Well, maybe. [33:37.280 --> 33:43.540] But that is an outrageous example of what's possible. [33:43.920 --> 33:53.400] Quaker Oats collects political preferences on their customers because certain people with certain politics buy more Quaker Oats products. [33:53.660 --> 33:54.840] I'm just curious, Steve. [33:54.940 --> 33:57.100] Was that crunchy or smooth peanut butter? [33:57.380 --> 33:59.160] You know, I'll have to look into that. [33:59.240 --> 34:00.960] I'll have an answer by the convention for you. [34:00.960 --> 34:04.860] Um, this information is out there. [34:05.100 --> 34:20.540] There is almost nothing that you do the minute you leave your apartment or your home that is not indexed, quantified, cross-referenced, and in a database somewhere. [34:20.740 --> 34:23.060] And this is not open to any kind of scrutiny whatsoever. [34:23.480 --> 34:24.700] How do you find out about something? [34:24.820 --> 34:26.240] That's the bothering thing. [34:26.340 --> 34:27.300] How do you find out it exists? [34:27.300 --> 34:29.540] Let me digress one more time. [34:29.720 --> 34:33.820] I am not opposed to massive databases. [34:34.140 --> 34:37.680] And I am not opposed to information being gathered on people. [34:37.800 --> 34:39.240] Of course, there's good reasons for it. [34:39.460 --> 34:46.040] I mean, if I hire a nanny, I want to be able to check and see if she has a child molestation arrest. [34:46.840 --> 34:55.200] If I, if my son's camp hires a bus driver, I want to know, has he ever been arrested for drunk driving? [34:55.800 --> 35:04.440] Um, I would like to be able to check the character and the quality and the bona fides of someone I hire as an employer. [35:04.680 --> 35:10.540] I think that banks have a right to know if somebody's a deadbeat before they give them a $500,000 mortgage. [35:10.560 --> 35:13.880] But you don't need their political affiliation or their sexuality or anything like that. [35:14.820 --> 35:16.160] That's certainly true. [35:16.400 --> 35:24.180] And, and, and, and let me say the biggest problem with information is it can never be locked down. [35:24.620 --> 35:35.380] I tell you as an investigator that I have sources for any type of information that I want, including information I have no right to your credit card bills, your phone bills. [35:35.520 --> 35:37.420] It is a felony for me to get those. [35:37.620 --> 35:42.480] Nevertheless, there are people who sell them to me with 24 hour turnaround for less than a hundred bucks. [35:43.500 --> 35:49.840] And, and this is not a secret to anybody I'm sure listening to this, to this radio show, if I can guess it's your average listener. [35:50.660 --> 35:57.180] Um, the problem is number one, information does not stay in a lockbox and never will. [35:58.120 --> 36:05.400] Problem is number two, information always migrates to being used for purposes. [36:05.660 --> 36:06.440] It wasn't intended. [36:07.540 --> 36:20.080] Uh, I can tell you when I was a war crimes investigator, I was able to take shipping records, ship manifests, and use it to trace entire units of war criminals. [36:21.380 --> 36:23.820] Never intended, never dreamt of in the fifties. [36:24.080 --> 36:24.220] Mm-hmm. [36:24.380 --> 36:27.660] These things were fed into databases for genealogists. [36:28.040 --> 36:30.080] I used them to find Nazi war criminals. [36:30.620 --> 36:31.160] Fascinating. [36:31.660 --> 36:39.160] How about census, census data that was gathered, uh, uh, uh, prior to World War II, uh, was used to round up Japanese citizens. [36:39.160 --> 36:39.660] Absolutely. [36:39.660 --> 36:41.920] American citizens who have Japanese descent. [36:42.120 --> 36:57.940] And, you know, I'll, I'll tell you, if you want to, if you want to be really, really worried about the concept that DARPA, the army, essentially, the military is managing this military, uh, uh, is managing this database program. [36:58.560 --> 37:02.260] Look at the history of the army as regards invasion of privacy. [37:02.320 --> 37:04.460] And I'm not talking about rounding up the Japanese. [37:04.600 --> 37:09.860] I'm not talking about the war protesters that MacArthur fired on during World War I. [37:10.080 --> 37:13.680] I'm talking about the fifties, sixties, and seventies. [37:13.920 --> 37:26.100] You know, I, I did a, uh, a program for, uh, the History Channel, uh, the search for Abbie Hoffman, why Abbie Hoffman was not found during his time on the run. [37:26.240 --> 37:30.600] And I was brought on board as an expert on finding people. [37:30.820 --> 37:37.300] One of the things that I did to prep myself was I filed FOIA requests for all of Abbie Hoffman's files. [37:37.760 --> 37:40.700] The biggest file I got was from the U.S. [37:40.840 --> 37:41.080] Army. [37:41.620 --> 37:42.500] The U.S. [37:42.800 --> 37:47.340] Army had an intelligence team monitoring Abbie Hoffman for about three years straight. [37:48.360 --> 37:51.960] Undercover agents, surveillance, everything you can imagine. [37:52.120 --> 38:03.100] People who are active duty military were detached, their orders, you know, to do with defense of the nation. [38:03.400 --> 38:04.780] Abbie Hoffman was never in the army, right? [38:05.680 --> 38:06.620] You know, I don't know. [38:06.760 --> 38:07.440] I would hope not. [38:07.480 --> 38:08.380] I don't, I can't imagine. [38:08.560 --> 38:13.820] You know, as an American who wants the army to be able to protect them, I hope not. [38:14.440 --> 38:17.100] I mean, stand up comic for the U.S.O. [38:17.140 --> 38:21.600] maybe, but I, I would not want to see Abbie Hoffman with a government gun. [38:21.740 --> 38:24.100] He was not, uh, he was not employed by the military. [38:24.260 --> 38:25.300] I read many of his books. [38:25.500 --> 38:26.680] It was not part of his life. [38:26.880 --> 38:29.340] Jim, wouldn't he have had a selective service card though? [38:29.700 --> 38:31.860] Which puts him under the purview of the army technically? [38:32.300 --> 38:32.700] No. [38:33.100 --> 38:34.940] It absolutely does not. [38:35.100 --> 38:35.200] No? [38:35.320 --> 38:42.420] You, you have to actually be, be drafted or, or sign on the dotted line to, to be subject to military justice. [38:42.700 --> 38:48.240] Well, now, I just have a question concerning, uh... Or you have to be in Afghanistan and they just throw you in Guantanamo. [38:48.480 --> 38:57.560] Concerning the black budget and, and, and not being accountable to anybody, how is it then that you have the information that they're doing this if they don't have to answer to anybody and if it's all secretive? [38:58.580 --> 39:10.840] Because, and, and, and try to restrain your hissing, I own probably the largest privately held investigative support service in the country. [39:11.300 --> 39:13.260] I know what my competitors do. [39:13.420 --> 39:14.380] I sell to them. [39:14.480 --> 39:15.260] They sell to me. [39:15.400 --> 39:20.680] And for 99.9% of what they do, I'm enormously supportive. [39:21.160 --> 39:29.040] I just think that they saw this enormous, never-ending, government money stream and sold a bit of their souls. [39:29.280 --> 39:30.160] I know what they do. [39:30.380 --> 39:35.940] And not only do I know what they do, I'm going to document it and put it up on a screen at the Hoke Convention. [39:36.200 --> 39:36.880] Let's go into that. [39:37.640 --> 39:38.400] You're looking... [39:38.400 --> 39:45.400] But first, I need a person who has lived a little bit of their life and is very daring. [39:45.900 --> 39:47.140] We're looking for a victim. [39:47.320 --> 39:48.380] This is for the conference. [39:48.380 --> 39:48.600] Yes. [39:48.900 --> 40:00.060] And this is, for anybody listening who feels they might want to be a part of this, what Steve has offered to do is take, I guess, your basic information, like, what, your name or something? [40:00.380 --> 40:00.800] Well, no. [40:00.960 --> 40:04.620] It's going to be, it's going to be... Here's the situation in a nutshell. [40:05.900 --> 40:16.900] And let me preface this by saying it is entirely up to me who I accept or reject for this little experiment, experiment, public experiment. [40:16.920 --> 40:21.760] I have my own criteria, which I'll get into very briefly later. [40:21.920 --> 40:26.460] But I am looking for someone who has lived a bit of their life. [40:26.580 --> 40:28.540] In other words, they have a record trail. [40:28.780 --> 40:32.000] This is not going to work if a 16-year-old kid volunteers. [40:32.580 --> 40:46.220] I need somebody who is in their late 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, somebody who has held a job, bought things, has a credit card, you know, property, wife, husband, kids, whatever. [40:46.440 --> 40:46.620] Okay. [40:46.980 --> 40:51.060] Somebody who, if I investigate, I will actually find a life. [40:51.340 --> 40:51.760] Okay. [40:52.080 --> 40:53.460] So that's the first criteria. [40:54.140 --> 40:58.300] The second criteria is this has to be a normal person. [40:58.480 --> 40:59.120] What does that mean? [40:59.400 --> 41:01.820] Well, I did this for the insurance industry. [41:02.400 --> 41:06.280] And I put up something on my website, which was a big mistake. [41:06.420 --> 41:09.680] I should have circulated it privately within the insurance industry. [41:09.680 --> 41:21.340] And basically, about two-thirds of the people that I got were people who wanted to know if their fellow residents of the planet Galaxo could find them. [41:22.480 --> 41:29.500] Basically, I want people who have not only had a life, they've had a relatively normal life. [41:29.600 --> 41:29.760] Okay. [41:30.060 --> 41:40.520] If you've spent 20 years in prison or five years in a mental institution, you have my sympathy, don't contact What if you've spent a year and a half in prison, like Bernie did? [41:42.040 --> 41:42.820] Federal prison? [41:43.440 --> 41:43.880] Yes. [41:44.300 --> 41:45.300] Oh, so then you're easy. [41:45.380 --> 41:46.100] You're on PACER. [41:47.260 --> 41:48.480] What database is that again? [41:48.640 --> 41:49.040] PACER. [41:49.140 --> 41:50.100] P-A-C-E-R. [41:50.520 --> 41:52.780] It's uscourts.gov. [41:52.900 --> 41:54.780] Pacer.uscourts.gov. [41:55.680 --> 42:00.620] Every federal criminal record is now online. [42:01.080 --> 42:02.240] For anybody to look at? [42:02.260 --> 42:03.120] For a public record. [42:03.840 --> 42:04.320] Interesting. [42:04.460 --> 42:05.000] Public record. [42:05.560 --> 42:17.620] Well, every criminal record since 1982, it will give your name, where you were locked up, your inmate registry number, which I'm sure you know by heart, Bernie, and your date of release. [42:18.420 --> 42:22.640] You can also look up B-O-P.gov and find inmates that way. [42:22.640 --> 42:23.260] Yes, that's correct. [42:23.480 --> 42:24.160] That's correct. [42:24.160 --> 42:27.020] But for that, you have to have actually done time. [42:27.900 --> 42:29.980] PACER has every index. [42:30.760 --> 42:37.600] And even if you copped a plea and, you know, you didn't room with Martha Stewart, you'll be in there. [42:37.600 --> 42:38.480] Will you be able to know... [42:38.480 --> 42:39.120] What if you were not convicted? [42:39.900 --> 42:40.940] It doesn't matter. [42:41.440 --> 42:43.700] It has all the indexes. [42:44.000 --> 42:47.780] Now, will you be able to know things like traffic tickets, parking tickets? [42:47.800 --> 42:48.060] Yes. [42:48.240 --> 42:51.000] Look, here's in a nutshell what I want to do. [42:51.160 --> 42:54.380] I want somebody to volunteer to have their privacy invaded. [42:54.760 --> 42:58.180] And I'll give this email address out a couple of times. [42:58.240 --> 42:59.140] Let me give it out now. [42:59.400 --> 43:04.700] If you are interested in being a victim, but listen to everything I have to say before you decide. [43:05.240 --> 43:07.980] Send your name, address, and phone number. [43:08.520 --> 43:11.720] An actual real phone number, not a voicemail. [43:11.920 --> 43:17.740] Something I can reach you at during normal working hours, which will be 7 a.m. [43:17.900 --> 43:18.860] to 8 p.m. [43:19.580 --> 43:20.160] Eastern Time. [43:20.740 --> 43:28.340] Send this information to invademyprivacy at skiptraceamerica.com. [43:30.340 --> 43:33.700] Invademyprivacy at skiptraceamerica.com. [43:33.860 --> 43:35.620] No hyphens or underlines or anything in there? [43:35.700 --> 43:36.960] No hyphens, no underlines. [43:37.220 --> 43:50.300] This is a... and for those of you who are annoyed by the concept and want to send 500 email bombs, let me just tell you, this is an address that will be disconnected and blocked in a few days. [43:50.480 --> 43:50.660] Yes. [43:50.840 --> 43:53.260] So, please volunteer now. [43:53.540 --> 43:54.420] Well, now... [43:54.420 --> 43:55.920] Here is what's going to happen. [43:56.120 --> 44:03.360] You are going to have to sign an excruciatingly detailed and extremely frightening personal release. [44:04.780 --> 44:08.500] It's going to essentially say, we're going to find out everything about you. [44:08.740 --> 44:10.560] This may be humiliating. [44:10.680 --> 44:12.340] This may cause you emotional distress. [44:12.620 --> 44:15.500] This may cause you mental or physical pain. [44:16.380 --> 44:22.000] Nevertheless, you give us permission to do it, and you give us permission to broadcast this information. [44:22.380 --> 44:24.100] Now, obviously, we're going to be gentlemen about it. [44:24.180 --> 44:31.040] When we put your phone bill up on the big screen at 2600, we will black out your installation address. [44:31.160 --> 44:33.820] We will black out most of your phone number. [44:34.000 --> 44:38.000] We will black out the last day that you call. [44:38.660 --> 44:39.940] But we will put it up. [44:40.380 --> 44:47.620] Your credit card bill, if you're a guy and you're buying women's underwear and you're not married, that will be up there. [44:47.720 --> 44:48.720] And don't have a girlfriend. [44:49.020 --> 44:51.080] Yeah, I was just going to say, you've got a lot of girlfriends. [44:51.520 --> 44:53.400] Okay, if you... [44:53.400 --> 44:55.060] What, you're going to know if somebody has a girlfriend, too? [44:55.060 --> 44:55.780] Are you going to be able to tell that? [44:55.780 --> 45:00.960] If you are purchasing online at spankme.com, if there's such a thing, there has to be, right? [45:01.280 --> 45:01.680] Probably. [45:01.900 --> 45:02.040] Yeah. [45:02.680 --> 45:04.400] It will be up on the screen. [45:04.860 --> 45:07.340] We will find out everything about you. [45:07.340 --> 45:08.360] That we can. [45:09.200 --> 45:16.760] Things that we should not legally be able to find, you are going to give us a waiver and let us do, because we can do it illegally. [45:16.760 --> 45:18.900] There are people who can do it legally. [45:19.540 --> 45:21.500] And that's what we're trying to demonstrate. [45:21.960 --> 45:36.560] Everyone is bitching and whining about government intrusiveness, databases, privacy, but almost none of the people are able to make informed comment or have an informed opinion about this. [45:36.820 --> 45:38.520] Nobody really knows what's out there. [45:38.660 --> 45:42.660] And we want to demonstrate this in the most graphic and personal way possible. [45:42.860 --> 45:50.600] So, if you're willing to humiliate yourself for a little bit, you're doing it for a good cause, because you're educating people as to how much information can actually be obtained. [45:50.840 --> 45:51.020] Right. [45:51.140 --> 45:51.880] We need a victim. [45:51.960 --> 45:55.820] It's probably a good idea not to be wanted in any states, though, if you want to volunteer for this. [45:56.000 --> 46:01.440] Yeah, don't put me in a situation of having to not call the authorities. [46:01.880 --> 46:02.820] Okay, the address again. [46:03.660 --> 46:09.340] It is invademyprivacy at skiptraceamerica.com. [46:09.540 --> 46:13.780] Okay, and the person that Steve does select for this will get free admission to the conference. [46:14.320 --> 46:14.880] How's that? [46:15.120 --> 46:16.420] They may not want to come. [46:16.700 --> 46:17.440] Well, that's possible. [46:17.520 --> 46:18.460] You do have to show up. [46:18.540 --> 46:19.380] You do have to show up. [46:19.520 --> 46:23.800] I think if you don't show up, then we unshade the last four digits of every number. [46:24.220 --> 46:26.640] No, that's a thought. [46:27.620 --> 46:27.800] Yeah. [46:27.940 --> 46:29.920] Do you disclude the medical records as well? [46:30.120 --> 46:31.100] I'm afraid so. [46:31.380 --> 46:31.660] Wow. [46:32.060 --> 46:32.580] That's amazing. [46:32.740 --> 46:37.680] Emmanuel, now, if I were in the witness protection program, it wouldn't be... [46:37.680 --> 46:38.920] You don't want to volunteer if you're in the witness... [46:38.920 --> 46:39.340] All right, all right. [46:39.420 --> 46:41.280] I just... how does that work with this... [46:41.280 --> 46:47.220] Well, if you're a 65-year-old man and it shows that you were born eight years ago, there's going to be a question in my mind. [46:47.920 --> 46:49.680] Well, that's not how witness reallocation works, is it? [46:49.740 --> 46:52.120] They would show that you're born somewhere else as somebody else. [46:52.120 --> 46:54.200] Actually, there's a real problem. [46:54.340 --> 47:00.940] I have actually found people in the witness protection program and I was threatened with prosecution by the U.S. [47:01.260 --> 47:03.020] Attorney's Office in Philadelphia as a result. [47:04.840 --> 47:08.720] There are really, really huge holes in the witness protection program. [47:08.860 --> 47:21.540] The best thing the witness protection program does for you is it lets you go somewhere and live your life with the documents that are now needed in America to exist. [47:23.320 --> 47:26.980] It does not create a history for you. [47:27.120 --> 47:32.360] You will not have a 20-year-old or a 25- or a 50-year-old financial history. [47:32.880 --> 47:35.180] Not one that will stand up to scrutiny. [47:36.980 --> 47:39.920] And do they have any laptops lying around with lists of people? [47:39.920 --> 47:41.860] I would not be surprised. [47:42.080 --> 47:43.080] Okay, let's take some phone calls. [47:43.200 --> 47:48.820] We have Steve Rambam here who is one of our speakers at the Fifth Hope and he's offering an interesting challenge to some people. [47:49.000 --> 47:52.660] And if you have any questions or comments, 212-209-2900. [47:52.760 --> 47:53.500] We only have a few minutes. [47:53.680 --> 47:54.860] And again, we're preempted next week. [47:54.980 --> 47:59.720] So please, let's hear from as many people as we can in the limited time that we have. [47:59.880 --> 48:00.520] Let's go over here. [48:00.700 --> 48:01.060] Good evening. [48:01.200 --> 48:01.380] You're on. [48:01.380 --> 48:04.080] Yeah, I'd like to ask the guest a question. [48:04.280 --> 48:05.280] All right, Rebel, make it fast. [48:05.460 --> 48:05.520] Okay. [48:06.400 --> 48:15.080] There are a lot of people that have phone numbers that like, there's these things that say, to get a job, call 718 such and such to get a job. [48:15.220 --> 48:19.560] And then they transfer you and then they tell you to call like a 500 number or 900 number. [48:19.800 --> 48:23.720] I try to get a listing of who those people are that scam people. [48:24.380 --> 48:32.180] These posters are being put in like low-income neighborhoods that tell people how to get a job, like they say, call this number. [48:32.360 --> 48:38.240] Now, they're just trying to get you to call a number and they just read the want there for the paper when you call that number. [48:38.280 --> 48:39.680] And your point is what? [48:39.840 --> 48:46.020] My point is, how do I get a listing of that so that I can like... Because whenever I call a phone company, they say they don't have a listing. [48:46.020 --> 48:48.380] Public Service Commission Freedom of Information Act. [48:48.860 --> 48:49.560] Next question. [48:49.700 --> 48:49.960] All right. [48:50.060 --> 48:50.380] Thank you. [48:51.360 --> 48:52.040] Let's go over here. [48:52.100 --> 48:52.360] Good evening. [48:52.440 --> 48:52.680] You're on. [48:53.700 --> 48:54.480] No, you're not. [48:54.620 --> 48:54.780] Okay. [48:54.920 --> 48:55.160] Let's go. [48:55.160 --> 48:57.280] Now, that's my type of call. [48:57.360 --> 48:57.560] Yeah. [48:58.120 --> 48:59.660] Boy, they call twice. [48:59.880 --> 49:00.340] Over here now. [49:00.420 --> 49:00.680] Good evening. [49:00.820 --> 49:00.980] You're on. [49:01.920 --> 49:02.920] Hello, Steve? [49:03.400 --> 49:03.920] Go ahead. [49:04.820 --> 49:05.260] Yes? [49:05.520 --> 49:09.980] I saw... I heard that you are a federal informant. [49:10.040 --> 49:11.220] That's from a good source. [49:11.380 --> 49:11.760] Okay. [49:11.840 --> 49:12.240] Enough of that. [49:12.580 --> 49:17.780] You know, I've got to tell you, that is the worst phony accent I've ever heard. [49:17.900 --> 49:18.800] There was line noise, though. [49:18.820 --> 49:19.560] They had line noise. [49:19.600 --> 49:23.180] That's almost like... What's the guy on Bullwinkle? [49:23.820 --> 49:24.880] Boris Badenough. [49:25.160 --> 49:29.320] That... I think he wanted to hire me to look for... for Moose and Crazy Squarrel. [49:29.860 --> 49:30.260] All right. [49:30.500 --> 49:31.840] Let's try to stick to the topic here. [49:31.880 --> 49:32.100] Good evening. [49:32.200 --> 49:32.480] You're on the air. [49:33.060 --> 49:33.640] See you, Gail. [49:34.380 --> 49:35.020] All right. [49:35.280 --> 49:35.960] We have, uh... [49:35.960 --> 49:37.840] You have an interesting listener base. [49:37.840 --> 49:40.020] Well, there's... there's some wackos out there for sure. [49:40.140 --> 49:40.440] Good evening. [49:40.540 --> 49:41.000] You're on the air. [49:41.880 --> 49:42.360] Go ahead. [49:43.380 --> 49:43.540] Oops. [49:43.740 --> 49:43.860] I... [49:43.860 --> 49:44.340] Don't be shy. [49:44.560 --> 49:45.620] I didn't press the right button there. [49:45.720 --> 49:46.060] Good evening. [49:46.180 --> 49:46.620] You're on the air. [49:47.660 --> 49:48.080] All right. [49:48.100 --> 49:48.720] What's going on here? [49:48.800 --> 49:50.620] You know, we haven't been on for so long, we lose our audience. [49:50.620 --> 49:52.040] I don't think you gave the phone number. [49:52.260 --> 49:52.560] I did. [49:52.640 --> 49:54.860] 212-209-2900 is our... is our phone number. [49:54.920 --> 49:55.840] But they know the phone number. [49:55.940 --> 49:57.820] They've been calling the show for... for years. [49:58.280 --> 49:58.960] Jeff, you pick a number. [49:59.060 --> 49:59.860] I'm not doing bad here. [50:00.000 --> 50:00.060] All right. [50:00.060 --> 50:00.540] I'll help you out here. [50:00.820 --> 50:01.120] All right. [50:01.180 --> 50:01.520] There you go. [50:01.800 --> 50:02.560] You didn't press it either. [50:02.660 --> 50:02.740] See? [50:02.780 --> 50:03.200] It's still ringing. [50:03.900 --> 50:04.040] All right. [50:04.100 --> 50:04.260] Hello. [50:04.280 --> 50:04.720] You're on the air. [50:04.800 --> 50:05.040] Go ahead. [50:06.440 --> 50:06.720] WBAI? [50:06.840 --> 50:07.000] Yes. [50:07.060 --> 50:07.300] You're on. [50:08.100 --> 50:14.080] At one time, you mentioned cell phones, and you thought that AT&T made the better cell phones. [50:14.300 --> 50:16.680] I want to trade mine in for a good one. [50:17.140 --> 50:18.720] Do you suggest AT&T? [50:19.980 --> 50:25.140] That's really not what we're talking about tonight, but, you know, it's a crapshoot. [50:25.180 --> 50:25.740] It really is. [50:26.380 --> 50:27.520] Lots of phones can be good. [50:27.600 --> 50:28.260] Lots of phones can be bad. [50:28.300 --> 50:28.740] They pretty much will. [50:28.940 --> 50:30.680] Yeah, they do pretty much in one way or another. [50:30.780 --> 50:31.160] Go ahead, Jeff. [50:31.300 --> 50:31.600] Try again. [50:31.760 --> 50:32.360] I'm doing better here. [50:33.580 --> 50:35.360] See, the button goes in twice. [50:35.360 --> 50:36.120] That's the problem. [50:36.120 --> 50:37.080] All right. [50:37.780 --> 50:38.240] You want to try that one? [50:38.420 --> 50:38.600] Okay. [50:38.620 --> 50:38.940] There we go. [50:39.040 --> 50:39.280] Good evening. [50:39.400 --> 50:39.580] You're on. [50:40.300 --> 50:40.940] Hey, good evening. [50:41.600 --> 50:42.140] Go ahead. [50:42.340 --> 50:52.940] I'd like to know, well, first off, in a more pragmatic sense, I mean, to just get someone's information by them giving you your name doesn't seem like it's doing much. [50:53.080 --> 51:02.920] But secondly, I'd like to know, how would you, what sort of scrutiny does an individual go through now, post 9-11, if they're applying for a passport? [51:03.160 --> 51:04.820] Like, who looks at that information? [51:04.820 --> 51:12.700] Well, to begin with, Department of Homeland Security does, but everything, and I mean everything, is now cross-referenced. [51:15.380 --> 51:24.080] When you fill out a passport application, you're giving all your basic identifiers, and that's all that's needed to own someone's history. [51:24.080 --> 51:31.880] I can find out where you were born, where you went to school, everywhere you've ever lived, everywhere you've ever worked. [51:31.880 --> 51:41.520] But if you fly on the airlines, the main scrutiny, by the way, is going to be if this is your first passport. [51:42.040 --> 51:50.320] Well, one of the reasons I ask that is because I actually know people who are using the names of people who are deceased. [51:50.600 --> 51:50.920] Right. [51:50.920 --> 51:53.320] And they have had, like, no problems. [51:53.520 --> 51:54.620] They have driver's license. [51:54.840 --> 51:55.040] Right. [51:55.200 --> 51:57.060] You know, I mean, the whole shebang. [51:57.340 --> 51:57.560] Right. [51:57.580 --> 52:04.860] And by the way, for those of you who do that, the best is to take the identity of someone who died overseas. [52:05.420 --> 52:05.760] Really? [52:05.760 --> 52:06.280] Yes. [52:06.580 --> 52:11.760] And for whom there is not a form called Death of an American Abroad Filed. [52:12.120 --> 52:13.520] Because basically the U.S. [52:13.800 --> 52:24.780] government doesn't know, unless there's been a Social Security Administration claim, or there's been something that's happened to invalidate or put a flag on that Social Security. [52:24.780 --> 52:26.900] Now, are you saying an American citizen had died abroad? [52:27.040 --> 52:27.280] Correct. [52:27.620 --> 52:29.340] Well, actually, let me say this. [52:29.340 --> 52:40.160] Actually, Emmanuel, I was looking at an old issue of 2600 from 92, where there was actually something in there about that, just, you know, for reference. [52:40.400 --> 52:53.660] But also, I mean, just right here in the U.S., even if you're, I mean, it could be, I mean, that's obviously the best way to obtain, you know, a good identity, but you can even take people who are right here. [52:53.660 --> 53:01.820] You would be surprised at the backlog of the New York, of American justice system right now. [53:02.020 --> 53:04.720] Well, you're talking about, you're talking about identity theft. [53:04.980 --> 53:09.820] I'm talking about identity theft on steroids, which is identity assumption. [53:10.320 --> 53:13.580] That's not, that is an actual terminology that's used. [53:14.120 --> 53:19.480] Identity theft, pretty much, you know, anyone can do it. [53:19.480 --> 53:34.700] You drop a credit card receipt in the wrong place, you throw out the wrong stuff in your garbage, somebody busts open your mailbox in your apartment building and steals your mail on the day you get your credit card bills and your bank records, things like that. [53:34.700 --> 53:41.840] It is very, very easy to assume someone's identity for a brief period, to steal someone's identity. [53:42.320 --> 53:52.580] Assuming their identity and using it for a long-term basis and doing things like applying for passports, applying for driver's licenses, things like that, that's a real trick. [53:52.580 --> 53:53.820] And that requires skill. [53:54.100 --> 53:56.380] What are the legalities with that, by the way, as far as... [53:57.520 --> 53:59.220] Multiple, multiple felonies. [54:00.160 --> 54:01.500] And appropriately so. [54:02.220 --> 54:04.600] All right, 212-209-2900 is taking another phone call. [54:04.820 --> 54:05.680] Good evening, you're on. [54:06.460 --> 54:07.300] All right, yes. [54:08.960 --> 54:09.460] Go ahead. [54:09.460 --> 54:11.680] My question was, let me just step away from the radio. [54:13.300 --> 54:32.840] My question was, how thorough can you investigate someone who has a juvenile record that was supposed to have been sealed and, you know, the situation may have happened back in, you know, how many years back, you know, pick what you could break into and give the listeners an idea of, [54:32.900 --> 54:37.060] you know, people who committed felonies when they're juveniles and how well is that really sealed? [54:38.080 --> 54:45.600] Well, I would hope that it's very well sealed, but in truth, there's one big, one enormous loophole. [54:45.840 --> 54:51.700] In not just many jurisdictions, but most jurisdictions, the juvenile record is sealed. [54:52.000 --> 54:54.660] The court index still exists. [54:54.660 --> 55:03.820] So I will find out that John Doe, in fact, was arrested in 1977 for shoplifting. [55:04.380 --> 55:08.280] But when I go to pull the record, it will be sealed. [55:08.800 --> 55:10.920] So can I find out about the arrest? [55:11.240 --> 55:12.560] I can find that... [55:12.560 --> 55:13.440] The answer is yes. [55:13.440 --> 55:17.860] I can find out with no special skills, no trickery, no breaking into records. [55:18.140 --> 55:19.580] Can I find out the details? [55:19.780 --> 55:20.560] Probably not. [55:21.180 --> 55:22.460] Unless you talk to people. [55:22.480 --> 55:24.300] Unless I do break the law. [55:24.700 --> 55:25.800] Or just ask around. [55:25.800 --> 55:32.020] And by the way, juvenile records are like every other sealed confidential record. [55:32.040 --> 55:35.460] If you're willing to pay, sooner or later, you will find a source. [55:37.140 --> 55:38.000] And good evening, you're on the air. [55:39.780 --> 55:40.340] Go ahead. [55:41.060 --> 55:41.820] Hey, how you doing? [55:41.900 --> 55:42.240] Hi, thanks. [55:42.620 --> 55:43.280] Okay, where are you calling from? [55:43.880 --> 55:44.260] London. [55:44.780 --> 55:45.520] Okay, what's on your mind? [55:46.000 --> 55:52.480] Yeah, I was just going to ask Steve, I think, if there's any actual web resource for finding out. [55:52.600 --> 56:02.480] I just found it very interesting the way he was able to reel off different databases like PACER and other information acts where you could actually write to and request the information from. [56:02.620 --> 56:10.640] I was wondering if there's any kind of resource that lists or has compiled a list of kind of information where you can get that kind of knowledge from. [56:10.640 --> 56:13.100] Ask me that question in about six weeks. [56:13.360 --> 56:18.360] There will be a book called The Hard-Boiled Computer, which will have everything. [56:19.240 --> 56:20.000] Your book? [56:20.280 --> 56:20.700] Yes. [56:20.960 --> 56:21.420] Oh, great. [56:21.940 --> 56:24.260] That's a totally unintended plug. [56:27.200 --> 56:27.720] Okay. [56:28.000 --> 56:29.080] It really was unintended. [56:29.380 --> 56:29.660] It's really fascinating. [56:29.820 --> 56:31.680] I studied history, so I did it for a major. [56:31.920 --> 56:37.000] I find it quite interesting the way you can go back through time through some of these personal records. [56:37.000 --> 56:38.940] I think it's quite a fascinating topic. [56:39.560 --> 56:40.080] Absolutely. [56:40.620 --> 56:41.020] Good job. [56:41.120 --> 56:41.960] I don't have a credit card. [56:42.840 --> 56:43.800] Probably better off. [56:44.100 --> 56:44.940] Thanks for the call. [56:44.940 --> 56:45.300] Don't worry. [56:45.400 --> 56:46.360] We still know who you are. [56:46.480 --> 56:49.300] It's amazing how you set that up from so far away. [56:49.760 --> 56:50.460] It's beautiful. [56:50.740 --> 56:54.640] Isn't it incredible how not only can I throw my voice, I can do it with a British accent? [56:56.240 --> 56:58.340] Steve, I want to thank you for being in the studio. [56:58.580 --> 56:58.740] Always a pleasure. [56:58.740 --> 56:59.640] I want to pick your brain tonight. [57:00.080 --> 57:05.660] And again, let's give out that email address for anybody who wants to be a victim at The Fifth Hope, so Steve can track down all your information. [57:05.960 --> 57:07.880] We will be gentle. [57:07.880 --> 57:10.020] Please send us an email. [57:10.420 --> 57:18.900] It's invademyprivacy at skiptraceamerica, S-K-I-P-T-R-A-C-E-A-M-E-R-I-C-A dot com. [57:19.600 --> 57:19.960] Okay. [57:20.540 --> 57:24.480] And again, information on The Fifth Hope can be found at www.hope.net. [57:24.920 --> 57:27.400] And, oh yes, Red Hack, we have a very quick announcement to make. [57:27.600 --> 57:31.220] We're going to have a movie room that's going to be running around the clock at this conference. [57:31.600 --> 57:31.940] Yeah. [57:32.600 --> 57:38.260] What we're looking for right now is ideas or submissions of movies to show during the conference. [57:38.740 --> 57:41.160] There's a lot of time, so we can fit a lot of things in. [57:41.160 --> 57:51.200] And if you have anything that you think should be shown or that you yourself have made and would like to submit, you can email us at moviesat2600.com. [57:52.080 --> 57:52.440] Okay. [57:52.720 --> 57:52.860] Yeah. [57:53.040 --> 57:58.800] And we're especially looking for all kinds of web submissions, too, things that are only found on the Internet. [57:59.020 --> 57:59.060] Right. [57:59.060 --> 58:08.420] So if you're out there and you have something that you're either making or you know of that hasn't appeared on the big screen or on TV or anything like that, it might be kind of cool to show as we have a movie room around the clock. [58:08.420 --> 58:09.480] Moviesat2600.com. [58:09.800 --> 58:10.700] We'll see you in two weeks. [58:10.800 --> 58:10.960] Good night. [58:30.930 --> 58:31.650] Good night. [58:57.010 --> 59:00.250] For you are him and he is you.