[00:00.920 --> 00:03.620] Bush and his people aren't just ordinary Republicans. [00:03.880 --> 00:05.320] They're not ordinary Christians either. [00:05.540 --> 00:07.880] They're dangerous Christian fascists out to make the U.S. [00:07.900 --> 00:10.120] a religious dictatorship and plunge the U.S. [00:10.240 --> 00:12.300] and the world into a high-tech dark aegis. [00:12.480 --> 00:18.600] Join Lister Hewen Lowe on Burn Baby Burn Wednesday night into Thursday morning, January 13th from 4 a.m. [00:18.660 --> 00:19.440] to 6 a.m. [00:19.500 --> 00:27.480] when he engages revolutionary communists Carl Dix and Sansara Taylor on raising the resistance tempo to defeat the Bush Christian fascist agenda. [00:27.480 --> 00:31.820] So listen Wednesday night into Thursday morning, January 13th from 4 a.m. [00:31.860 --> 00:32.520] to 6 a.m. [00:32.580 --> 00:39.780] on Burn Baby Burn for a wide-ranging conversation about the battle for the future and a revolutionary way out with Carl Dix and Sansara Taylor. [00:52.570 --> 00:57.810] And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York in case you haven't figured that out already. [00:59.570 --> 01:01.150] It's just about 7 o'clock. [01:03.510 --> 01:06.310] And time for... time for Off the Hook. [01:06.770 --> 01:10.410] Oh my God, can anything else get more screwed up in this place? [01:12.490 --> 01:14.010] Okay, you know what we're going to try to do? [01:14.010 --> 01:15.670] We're going to try to put that in the other CD player. [01:16.490 --> 01:18.290] And the odds are very slim. [01:18.650 --> 01:20.070] I put it in the one that worked. [01:20.390 --> 01:21.710] This is the one that's broken. [01:22.050 --> 01:23.070] Let's see if it's any better. [01:24.170 --> 01:25.110] Hey, it is. [01:50.750 --> 01:51.150] Okay, [02:42.580 --> 02:43.360] we're trying to get Bernie S. [02:43.440 --> 02:44.040] on the phone here. [02:44.220 --> 02:50.540] And, of course, the phone system is joining in with the CD players and making things as difficult as possible. [02:50.540 --> 02:52.020] Well, let's all say hi. [02:53.700 --> 02:54.680] Greetings, everybody. [02:55.800 --> 02:57.160] Off the Hook is on the air. [02:58.440 --> 02:59.360] Despite the odds. [03:03.450 --> 03:05.310] And we're trying to reach Bernie right now. [03:07.110 --> 03:08.950] We're not really sure where he is. [03:11.510 --> 03:17.810] But we're using our special technique to track him, no matter where in the world he might be. [03:17.810 --> 03:18.630] The 800 number? [03:18.850 --> 03:20.290] Yes, the 800 number. [03:20.770 --> 03:23.090] And let's see what happens if we get a connection. [03:25.730 --> 03:27.490] Your call is being connected. [03:27.750 --> 03:28.290] Please wait. [03:28.750 --> 03:31.810] Okay, and that's the official announcement from the person that... [03:32.990 --> 03:33.810] At the switchboard. [03:33.950 --> 03:35.350] Yeah, at the switchboard, exactly. [03:35.930 --> 03:36.730] Let's see what happens. [03:40.670 --> 03:44.510] Sorry, there is no acknowledgment from your requested number. [03:48.570 --> 03:51.670] Sorry, there is no acknowledgment from your... [03:51.670 --> 03:54.050] That sounds like the Thai recording that we got last week. [03:54.050 --> 03:56.110] Which means that Bernie S. [03:56.250 --> 03:57.130] is back in the United States. [03:57.130 --> 03:58.750] He brought the Thai phone with him. [03:59.170 --> 04:06.390] And I was hoping that we'd be able to call that Thai phone and have it ring in the United States and somehow rack up a huge bill for somebody. [04:06.390 --> 04:07.190] I'm not sure who. [04:08.310 --> 04:09.750] But I guess that's not to be. [04:09.850 --> 04:11.270] So we'll call his regular number. [04:12.650 --> 04:13.050] Okay. [04:13.950 --> 04:17.930] And hopefully he'll answer that one and explain to us why his Thai phone is not working. [04:18.170 --> 04:19.770] I'm not sure how that would work exactly. [04:20.290 --> 04:24.270] But if you bring a phone into another country from here, it'll work right away. [04:25.150 --> 04:26.790] All right, now we need to enter our special code. [04:27.790 --> 04:29.830] Which we won't air over the air. [04:31.530 --> 04:33.610] And the next voice you hear should be that of Bernie S. [04:42.520 --> 04:42.880] Hello? [04:43.140 --> 04:43.820] Hello, Bernie. [04:44.020 --> 04:45.420] This is Emmanuel, and you're on the air. [04:45.860 --> 04:47.380] Oh, I'm back in the United States. [04:47.560 --> 04:50.860] Well, we mentioned that already, but we'd like to know why your Thai phone isn't working. [04:51.980 --> 04:54.380] Oh, well, maybe because it's not on in Thailand? [04:54.840 --> 04:56.140] It's not on in Thailand. [04:57.780 --> 05:00.080] Well, it's on here in this country, right? [05:00.640 --> 05:01.620] Yeah, I turned it off. [05:01.740 --> 05:02.380] You turned it off. [05:03.400 --> 05:05.640] Okay, so you're saying if you turn it back on, it'll start working? [05:06.280 --> 05:15.520] Actually, no, I made a mistake and bought a phone that only works on the 900 megahertz and 1800 megahertz band. [05:15.520 --> 05:15.880] Oh, Bernie. [05:16.300 --> 05:18.640] Which is not the U.S. [05:18.700 --> 05:18.920] band. [05:19.020 --> 05:19.720] No, it's not. [05:19.980 --> 05:20.160] It was an inexpensive phone. [05:20.200 --> 05:23.100] It was only 2,600 baht in Thai currency. [05:23.320 --> 05:25.780] Well, 2,600 baht is what exactly in U.S. [05:25.880 --> 05:26.140] currency? [05:26.140 --> 05:27.200] About $65. [05:27.980 --> 05:30.200] That's still pretty significant for a phone that doesn't work. [05:30.560 --> 05:36.580] Yeah, but next time I can use it in Europe when I go back to Europe, maybe for the summer CCC camp. [05:36.700 --> 05:37.020] That's true. [05:37.100 --> 05:38.680] Or you could lend it out to somebody who is going to Europe. [05:38.980 --> 05:41.620] In fact, I lent it to somebody this morning who is going to Italy. [05:41.860 --> 05:42.420] Oh, there you go. [05:42.440 --> 05:43.840] You could start a little business with this. [05:44.380 --> 05:45.800] Now, how does it work exactly? [05:46.120 --> 05:46.980] Where do you get the bill from? [05:47.060 --> 05:48.680] Does the bill come to you from a Thai company someplace? [05:48.680 --> 05:51.260] Well, this was a prepaid service. [05:52.640 --> 05:54.220] I just bought the phone for cash. [05:54.360 --> 05:54.940] It's all anonymous. [05:55.220 --> 05:56.800] And I bought the SIM card. [05:56.940 --> 05:58.260] And then I can buy minutes. [05:58.660 --> 06:04.500] I bought minutes from the woman I bought it from in this little internet cafe on the island of Koh Chang off the coast of Cambodia. [06:04.500 --> 06:12.320] And she had a huge collection of used SIM cards where you snap the SIM chip out of the car. [06:12.420 --> 06:15.620] She had like a thousand different cards in her collection. [06:15.800 --> 06:16.880] She was very proud to show that to me. [06:17.120 --> 06:19.040] So can you refill that phone here? [06:20.360 --> 06:21.980] I don't know about filling it here. [06:22.020 --> 06:24.980] I probably could get the minutes online with a credit card. [06:24.980 --> 06:30.960] But I bought additional minutes in Bangkok later on in my trip from a guy who... [06:30.960 --> 06:34.440] From this guy with a card table set up on a street market. [06:34.740 --> 06:36.980] He had phone cards for sale. [06:37.200 --> 06:40.840] And he was also selling fried crickets as snacks. [06:43.220 --> 06:43.780] Wow. [06:45.180 --> 06:46.500] That's something, Bernie. [06:46.700 --> 06:48.740] Tell us, any adventures on your trip back? [06:49.880 --> 06:51.880] There was a stowaway on my plane. [06:52.940 --> 07:05.840] And it caused a huge amount of interest with the Transportation Security Administration people, TSA, and the Icemen, Immigration and Customs Enforcement. [07:06.040 --> 07:06.580] There must have been... [07:06.580 --> 07:18.060] In the Anchorage Airport, which is like this tiny little airport, not as small as the one in Tran near Cambodia, but there must have been 30... [07:18.060 --> 07:20.360] In this tiny little airport, there must have been 30 Icemen. [07:21.880 --> 07:24.640] All very upset about this stowaway. [07:24.760 --> 07:32.320] Apparently, a 20-year-old woman got onto the plane in Taipei, which is where we stopped for fuel after we left Bangkok. [07:32.740 --> 07:33.880] This is a large plane. [07:34.040 --> 07:35.860] This is a 747-400. [07:36.860 --> 07:42.780] Somehow, she got on the plane either without a boarding pass or when she got off Anchorage. [07:42.980 --> 07:45.060] We had like a one-hour layover. [07:45.660 --> 07:51.240] She either deliberately lost all her ID or she just got on the plane without any ID. [07:51.660 --> 07:53.120] But she couldn't get back on the plane. [07:53.220 --> 07:58.780] But they knew she'd been on the plane because someone in the flight crew had said, well, she was on the plane before. [08:00.040 --> 08:01.360] But she wouldn't tell... [08:01.360 --> 08:11.540] The story goes, as all the rumors were going around and talking, the story goes that she wouldn't reveal her identity to the Icemen, the U.S. [08:11.680 --> 08:13.200] Immigration and Customs Enforcement people. [08:13.640 --> 08:24.340] And she also allegedly feigned some kind of medical problem that would require her, like a seizure kind of thing. [08:24.440 --> 08:26.180] It would require her to get to the hospital right away. [08:26.360 --> 08:28.940] So when you say she was a stowaway, though, she was sitting in a chair. [08:29.580 --> 08:30.500] She was sitting in a chair. [08:30.500 --> 08:31.400] In a baggage compartment somewhere. [08:31.400 --> 08:34.080] But not... apparently not... [08:34.080 --> 08:39.400] You know, when you hear stowaway, you think they're like in a suitcase underneath the luggage area or something. [08:39.520 --> 08:41.820] Which would be very cold and hard to breathe down there. [08:42.680 --> 08:45.620] But anyhow, it was a big issue. [08:46.140 --> 08:48.440] We were delayed six hours because of this. [08:48.600 --> 08:48.860] Really? [08:49.080 --> 08:49.400] Six hours? [08:49.460 --> 08:50.080] In Anchorage? [08:50.380 --> 08:56.480] Yeah, there were like 300 people on the plane who were delayed for six hours in Anchorage because of this stowaway situation. [08:56.980 --> 09:02.820] They, after about two and a half, three hours, they let us back on the plane for another... [09:02.820 --> 09:04.740] And then we sat there for another hour. [09:05.020 --> 09:14.660] And then they had us all get back off the plane again and decided to search all our luggage very, very intently because they weren't sure whether this woman had booked... [09:14.660 --> 09:16.720] or had checked any luggage on the plane. [09:16.860 --> 09:19.040] So they went through every single person's luggage. [09:19.360 --> 09:21.760] It was a huge fiasco. [09:22.780 --> 09:23.220] Unreal. [09:23.940 --> 09:25.160] So what finally happened? [09:25.340 --> 09:25.600] She apparently never made it. [09:25.720 --> 09:26.200] She what? [09:26.520 --> 09:31.640] She apparently never made it to the United States as a free person, which might have been her intention. [09:33.020 --> 09:34.400] Which is, I guess, unfortunate. [09:34.740 --> 09:40.640] But in any case, our flight was delayed six hours back that way. [09:40.720 --> 09:45.940] So it ended up being like a close to a 30-hour trip instead of a 24-hour trip. [09:46.120 --> 09:46.520] Wow. [09:47.100 --> 09:47.600] Long enough. [09:48.040 --> 09:49.200] Well, I'm glad you're back. [09:49.400 --> 09:54.600] And, of course, you were in Thailand, which has been the scene of much devastation over the past month or so. [09:55.200 --> 09:58.360] And I guess that's an experience you'll remember for quite a long time. [09:58.660 --> 10:00.060] I'll never forget it, Emmanuel. [10:00.240 --> 10:06.580] And there's a lot of things in Thailand you would not expect to see from a third-world country standpoint. [10:06.760 --> 10:08.140] It's so modern there. [10:08.720 --> 10:11.560] The subway system is amazingly modern. [10:11.680 --> 10:13.580] They just finished building it this August. [10:14.300 --> 10:15.340] They just opened it. [10:15.420 --> 10:16.140] It's brand new. [10:16.140 --> 10:18.400] And it uses subway tokens. [10:18.600 --> 10:22.240] But the tokens are these coin-shaped RFID chips. [10:22.420 --> 10:25.420] They're dispensed by a machine. [10:26.080 --> 10:27.640] And they're very cheap, too. [10:27.780 --> 10:33.440] You can ride two stops for basically a quarter. [10:33.920 --> 10:36.560] About a quarter in American money. [10:37.440 --> 10:41.860] If you want to go all the way to the other end of the system, it's still less than a dollar. [10:41.860 --> 10:43.320] So it's inexpensive. [10:43.460 --> 10:44.580] It's very fast. [10:44.800 --> 10:45.540] It's sleek. [10:45.680 --> 10:46.140] It's clean. [10:47.020 --> 10:48.860] I like the FAIR instruments. [10:48.860 --> 10:50.140] These are the RFID tokens. [10:50.880 --> 10:53.260] You can buy them anonymously. [10:53.400 --> 10:54.400] And they're one-time use. [10:54.500 --> 10:57.560] It's not like you can buy a token and use it over and over and over again. [10:57.880 --> 11:00.940] And when you depart out of the system, it keeps your token. [11:01.840 --> 11:06.260] So you don't want to buy more money than you need. [11:07.180 --> 11:10.680] Traffic signals are another example of high-tech transportation there. [11:11.060 --> 11:13.420] All the traffic lights there, they're like ours. [11:13.540 --> 11:17.420] They're red, green, and yellow, except they're all LEDs like ours. [11:17.540 --> 11:27.300] But right next to the traffic signals is an LED numeric display, a big number, that shows you how many seconds are left before the light changes. [11:28.060 --> 11:31.300] So when the light turns red, it stays like 120. [11:31.580 --> 11:33.620] It's like a two-minute red light. [11:34.300 --> 11:37.840] And so everybody sits there, and they get to know when the light's going to change. [11:37.880 --> 11:39.380] You don't fall asleep, I guess. [11:39.700 --> 11:43.640] And then when it changes to yellow, it goes to like five seconds. [11:43.840 --> 11:46.240] And when it goes to green, it's a minute or whatever. [11:46.400 --> 11:50.980] But it's just really intriguing to look up and see how many seconds are left on all these lights at an intersection. [11:51.160 --> 11:56.820] I've seen that, actually, at a bunch of don't-walk signs throughout the world where they count down. [11:57.040 --> 11:59.120] So I guess maybe that's a trend of some sort. [11:59.240 --> 12:03.960] Every major intersection in Bangkok has these, and I think it makes a lot of sense. [12:04.240 --> 12:15.900] Well, the problem with them is that people, like, if they know there's only two seconds left on the red, they may go before they should and cause an accident. [12:16.180 --> 12:17.920] Well, people do that with yellow lights anyway. [12:17.920 --> 12:24.180] They see the yellow light on the opposing part of the intersection, and they'll jump the gun, too. [12:24.180 --> 12:26.440] But I don't think that's uniquely Thai. [12:26.720 --> 12:27.220] No, no, no. [12:27.860 --> 12:29.420] It's the same principle, exactly. [12:31.400 --> 12:31.880] Okay. [12:32.080 --> 12:33.480] Well, Bernie, glad you're back. [12:33.780 --> 12:41.780] And I guess we have to think of the next adventure where we can journey into other parts of the world and find strange things and relate them. [12:42.580 --> 12:44.300] Anything else you want to share? [12:45.340 --> 12:59.200] Along the topic of technology, I was stunned to see so many Internet cafes in Thailand, not just in the big city of Bangkok, but this little town of Suratani, which I went down to for this... [12:59.200 --> 13:08.040] I flew to Suratani, which is in southern Thailand, for the sole purpose of taking a 10-hour train, railroad train trip, back to Bangkok, just to see the country from this train. [13:08.340 --> 13:09.880] It's the old diesel railroad. [13:10.180 --> 13:12.280] It was really an amazing trip, seeing the country that way. [13:12.280 --> 13:20.400] But, anyway, while I was in Suratani, there were four on this little street near where the hotel was, and there aren't how many hotels there. [13:20.540 --> 13:25.380] There were four Internet cafes right next to each other, and they were all crammed with school kids. [13:25.560 --> 13:29.800] I mean, just hundreds of kids in these four Internet cafes that were next to each other. [13:30.120 --> 13:36.900] And apparently it's becoming a problem there with young people using the Internet too much. [13:36.900 --> 13:47.420] Because I picked up a magazine there called Student Weekly, and it's written in English for Thais who are learning English. [13:47.420 --> 13:55.900] And there's this little article that said, Getting Offline, Support and Understanding are Keys for Helping Addicts. [13:56.040 --> 14:02.820] And first I thought it was talking about drug addicts or alcohol addicts, but it says here... [14:02.820 --> 14:04.180] Let's see here. [14:05.720 --> 14:06.920] Each teenage... [14:06.920 --> 14:18.500] And they're really talking about Internet gaming, I guess, and it says each teenage game addict needs not only proper mental care from psychiatrists, but also strong support and understanding from their parents. [14:19.080 --> 14:34.040] And there's this whole organization that says in response to the problem, the Institute of Child and Adolescent Mental Health, or ICAN, has opened a rehab clinic to help improve children's behavior and guide parents through the fast pace of the online world. [14:34.800 --> 14:38.800] And there's three different levels of Internet addiction they refer to here. [14:38.960 --> 14:40.640] Beginning, intermediate, and serious. [14:41.520 --> 14:42.620] Let's hear about the serious. [14:43.820 --> 14:44.300] Serious. [14:44.460 --> 14:54.020] Solutions vary from a one-day seminar and overnight camp for families whose children are still only experimenting to months of rehabilitation for serious cases. [14:54.240 --> 14:54.860] Oh my goodness. [14:56.040 --> 14:59.820] So all these kids I saw in there looked like serious cases to me because they were just... [14:59.820 --> 15:03.420] they were just, you know, enthralled with this Internet gaming. [15:03.500 --> 15:04.600] Some of them were coding, too. [15:04.780 --> 15:05.640] It was amazing. [15:06.200 --> 15:08.140] Well, there's some danger out there, I guess. [15:08.600 --> 15:10.080] Well, apparently they think so. [15:10.200 --> 15:10.700] And there wasn't... [15:10.700 --> 15:12.940] We were talking about SMS messages last week, too. [15:13.180 --> 15:19.680] There was another article in this magazine about a groom who canceled his wedding on his wedding day. [15:19.680 --> 15:22.880] He sent an SMS message to his betrothed. [15:25.340 --> 15:35.640] And it said, everything was going well until December 13th when he began behaving differently and showed doubts about the marriage, Norlinda said, to the New Straits Times. [15:35.900 --> 15:40.560] And he went missing shortly after, and his own family said they couldn't reach him. [15:40.660 --> 15:46.480] On the afternoon of December 17th, she received his text message canceling the wedding and asking her to forgive him. [15:46.620 --> 15:48.920] And the message was, we were not meant to be together. [15:49.640 --> 15:52.660] So, you know, people are using SMS for all kinds of things. [15:52.760 --> 15:55.860] He probably would have gone into more detail except there's a two-line limit on SMS. [15:56.240 --> 15:58.260] So he had a good excuse not to go into too much. [15:58.360 --> 15:58.640] Yeah. [15:58.880 --> 15:59.500] Well, that's something. [15:59.720 --> 16:01.080] There's been a lot of attention to SMS. [16:01.080 --> 16:02.840] We're going to get into that in just a little bit. [16:02.960 --> 16:07.260] But there was a really good story that went out today on... [16:07.260 --> 16:12.880] Actually, it went out yesterday, yesterday evening, on Security Focus by Kevin Paulson. [16:13.040 --> 16:14.480] It's all about T-Mobile. [16:14.780 --> 16:19.140] And it's kind of shocking security hole that they've had for a while. [16:19.240 --> 16:20.800] Yeah, they've known about it since July, right? [16:20.980 --> 16:22.740] Actually, since last March. [16:23.280 --> 16:30.860] Sophisticated computer hacker had access to servers at wireless giant T-Mobile for at least a year, which he used to monitor U.S. [16:31.000 --> 16:41.520] Secret Service email, obtain customers' passwords and social security numbers, download candid photos taken by sidekick users, including Hollywood celebrities. [16:42.020 --> 16:42.480] Big deal. [16:43.400 --> 16:55.560] 21-year-old Nicholas Jacobson was quietly charged with the intrusions last October after a Secret Service informant helped investigators link him to sensitive agency documents that were circulating in underground IRC chat rooms. [16:55.720 --> 17:04.900] The informant also produced evidence that Jacobson was behind and offered to provide T-Mobile customers' personal information to identity thieves through an internet bulletin board. [17:05.400 --> 17:08.240] The government's handling the case well away from the spotlight. [17:08.420 --> 17:08.700] The U.S. [17:08.800 --> 17:26.400] Secret Service, which played the dual role of investigator and victim in the drama, said Tuesday it couldn't comment on Jacobson because the agency doesn't discuss ongoing cases, a claim that's perhaps undermined by the 19 other Operation Firewall defendants who were discussed in a Secret Service press release last fall. [17:27.280 --> 17:28.620] Pretty interesting stuff. [17:28.940 --> 17:34.320] T-Mobile apparently knew of the intrusions actually, you're right, by July of last year, although this happened I believe in March. [17:34.740 --> 17:37.240] They have not issued any public warning. [17:37.620 --> 17:53.600] According to court records, the massive T-Mobile breach first came to the government's attention in March 2004 when a hacker using the online moniker Ethics posted a provocative offer online and basically offering to give information on anybody who has a T-Mobile account. [17:55.440 --> 18:06.860] Basically, this also involved the Secret Service because this Secret Service agent, Peter Kavitschia, he's a Secret Service cybercrime agent in New York, if you're listening, hi. [18:07.500 --> 18:18.340] He was the agent who last year spearheaded the investigation of Jason Smathers, a former ALL employee accused of stealing 92 million customer email addresses from the company to sell to a spammer. [18:18.720 --> 18:29.300] The agent was also an adopter of mobile technology and he did a lot of work through his T-Mobile sidekick, an all-in-one cell phone, camera, digital organizer, and email terminal. [18:29.540 --> 18:36.720] The sidekick uses T-Mobile servers for email and file storage and the stolen documents had all been lifted from Kavitschia's T-Mobile account. [18:37.600 --> 18:41.720] Kavitschia didn't respond to an email query from Security Focus on Tuesday. [18:41.940 --> 18:51.500] But I find it incredible that the Secret Service actually is conducting business through a T-Mobile sidekick unencrypted, completely open to anybody intercepting it. [18:51.580 --> 18:53.600] And now, of course, it's turned into a big scandal. [18:53.820 --> 18:58.720] What I thought was interesting about the article was, are you going to read it to the end or can I just... [18:58.720 --> 19:05.040] Basically, the Secret Service isn't being very open about this case because somebody... [19:05.040 --> 19:11.380] Well, someone's told Security Focus that they're trying to recruit this guy to work with him to catch other people. [19:12.360 --> 19:15.720] so they don't want to blow it up and make everyone know about it. [19:15.740 --> 19:19.460] But I think what's really amazing here is that T-Mobile didn't notify their customers about this. [19:19.640 --> 19:20.640] Which they're supposed to. [19:20.720 --> 19:21.620] They're supposed to do this. [19:21.940 --> 19:23.040] It's a gaping security hole. [19:23.100 --> 19:29.920] But I really find it unbelievable that the Secret Service would use technology in this way so insecurely. [19:30.620 --> 19:33.580] Since when do you have so much faith in the Secret Service? [19:33.680 --> 19:36.140] Well, I mean, you know, it's just you expect better. [19:36.320 --> 19:39.600] I mean, you don't always get better, but you do expect that they have some... [19:39.600 --> 19:44.680] What the Secret Service really excels at is having lots of big men and they're mostly men with guns. [19:44.980 --> 19:48.540] I mean, I never really thought of them as especially smart. [19:49.220 --> 19:50.360] Well, here's your proof. [19:50.580 --> 19:51.640] Bernie, what do you have? [19:51.880 --> 19:56.040] Well, I was just going to mention this isn't the first time they've used an insecure communications medium. [19:56.040 --> 20:00.480] I think back in, what was it, 97, at a big... [20:01.720 --> 20:04.840] I think it was a big volunteerism conference here with President Clinton. [20:05.100 --> 20:17.600] The Secret Service was broadcasting all of their, you know, really sensitive and confidential communications over a wireless text messaging system, really a paging system, but it was a two-way paging system. [20:17.980 --> 20:32.540] And all kinds of information, like a president phone call, phone calls for the president, like who's calling the president, and their callback numbers, and where the president is from moment to moment, and that all got posted online, intercepted out of thin air. [20:33.080 --> 20:47.280] And the Secret Service, I don't think, is particularly bright from my personal experiences with them, they're book smart, but they're not really that clever, especially when it comes to securing their own communication. [20:47.560 --> 20:51.420] So I doubt this will be the last time that they're caught with their pants down. [20:51.540 --> 20:56.200] I just find it amazing, though, that almost everybody we know would know better than to do this. [20:56.380 --> 21:03.660] And yet these are the people in charge of supposedly protecting the president and, you know, the American way of life, and they continually do these stupid things. [21:03.660 --> 21:05.580] I just, you know, I think it's worthy of note. [21:05.780 --> 21:06.340] That's all. [21:06.780 --> 21:07.400] So noted. [21:07.900 --> 21:13.000] But it's also interesting that they were able to obtain pictures that people were sending over these things. [21:13.180 --> 21:19.240] Now, the big scandal is they have pictures of Demi Moore and Paris Hilton and all kinds of other people that nobody cares about. [21:20.000 --> 21:26.500] And these pictures, apparently, were taken on these little sidekick phones and, I guess, sent somewhere. [21:26.580 --> 21:28.400] You can't really download the pictures yourself. [21:28.400 --> 21:40.700] No, what he did is, yeah, they would be sent to, like, T-Mobile's service which, you know, would store the pictures and, since he had access to the customer databases, he just finds what Paris Hilton's username and password is and logs in as her and then gets the pictures. [21:40.880 --> 21:41.140] Uh-huh. [21:41.380 --> 21:41.520] Yeah. [21:42.020 --> 21:43.800] Boy, that's something, all right. [21:43.980 --> 21:50.860] And that's probably going to get more attention than the fact that the Secret Service is, you know, compromising security by using technology this way. [22:00.900 --> 22:04.180] to the point that T-Mobile really ought to be notifying its customers. [22:04.660 --> 22:05.640] Yeah, it would be nice, wouldn't it? [22:05.720 --> 22:11.340] Yeah, there's actually a law where if customer information is breached, they're supposed to notify people. [22:11.340 --> 22:12.660] I think that law is only in California. [22:12.860 --> 22:13.160] Oh, is it? [22:13.160 --> 22:13.800] Yeah, it's a state law. [22:14.200 --> 22:14.860] Yeah, but... [22:14.860 --> 22:19.980] But there may be similar laws in other states, so if you're whatever state you're in, try to find out. [22:20.120 --> 22:22.260] And then if you're a T-Mobile customer, complain loudly. [22:22.660 --> 22:29.060] Yeah, and I'm a T-Mobile customer and I'm offended by this because who knows what kind of information was leaked out there. [22:30.480 --> 22:32.740] All right, something to keep informed about. [22:33.080 --> 22:39.580] We got this from a reader, which I thought was kind of weird on the phone company subject. [22:40.260 --> 22:42.780] A wedding invitation or wedding announcement. [22:43.020 --> 22:49.360] Singular wireless and AT&T wireless invite you and everyone in our family to share in the joy of our coming together. [22:49.820 --> 22:51.380] This union... [22:51.380 --> 22:52.220] Stop it. [22:52.340 --> 22:52.660] Just stop. [22:52.680 --> 22:53.420] Look at it. [22:53.680 --> 22:55.240] It's a wedding came in envelope. [22:55.380 --> 22:56.740] I received one in the mail also. [22:56.740 --> 22:57.920] I promptly threw it out. [22:57.920 --> 23:00.320] It's got this little thin piece of paper I don't know what that's used for. [23:00.860 --> 23:05.520] This union will raise the bar in wireless and strengthen our commitment to service and innovation. [23:05.840 --> 23:11.000] Therefore, feel secure in knowing that the network you've grown to trust will continue to be the one to rely on. [23:11.320 --> 23:14.440] No RSVP necessary because we probably won't get it anyway. [23:14.680 --> 23:16.660] You're already part of the family. [23:17.200 --> 23:21.740] See how this union will benefit you at www.newsingular.com. [23:22.240 --> 23:24.080] Reception to follow immediately. [23:24.360 --> 23:25.100] Oh, isn't that clever? [23:25.180 --> 23:26.500] And then they have a little five bar thing. [23:27.620 --> 23:30.120] Well, have they consummated their union yet? [23:30.780 --> 23:33.680] You know, that's a question I really don't even want to think about. [23:35.680 --> 23:42.760] But the person who sent this in wrote, I was laughing until I thought that the cost passed on to the consumers and the underlying social message. [23:43.160 --> 23:46.900] Marriage is too sacred for gays and lesbians but fine for corporations. [23:47.860 --> 23:49.620] Well, it's worthy of note. [23:49.740 --> 23:51.180] Thanks very much for sending that in. [23:51.620 --> 24:01.020] I thought the state that these were sent out from, I thought the marriage was supposed to be between one man and one woman, not between one company and another. [24:01.200 --> 24:02.120] What state was it sent out from? [24:02.180 --> 24:03.200] We didn't get the original envelope. [24:04.360 --> 24:05.000] Do you know? [24:05.960 --> 24:06.660] Good point. [24:06.660 --> 24:08.080] New York? [24:08.240 --> 24:10.720] Well, I think all states now pretty much have this... [24:11.240 --> 24:15.580] Well, 11 states were just voted on a referenda along those lines. [24:15.800 --> 24:18.180] But New York, we want them, I think. [24:19.180 --> 24:19.660] Okay. [24:20.180 --> 24:20.840] Let's see. [24:21.000 --> 24:30.240] We mentioned that we had a lot of SMS information and we got a fair amount of mail concerning SMS. [24:30.240 --> 24:43.060] We were talking about using SMS technology to maybe notify people in the event that, say, a tsunami is coming and that got a bit of response from various people. [24:43.720 --> 24:53.960] One person writes in, bear in mind when millions of messages are being sent simultaneously, if the networks over there are anything like the UK ones, you'll get a lot of failed message sending attempts because the networks are so clogged up. [24:54.320 --> 24:59.880] At New Year's Eve and New Year's Day, people were getting messages on their phones four to eight hours after they were originally sent. [25:00.060 --> 25:01.200] Something to consider maybe. [25:01.380 --> 25:01.900] Signed, Mark. [25:02.420 --> 25:10.800] Well, is SMS technology so flaky that you can't send a huge number of messages without them being delayed many hours? [25:10.900 --> 25:11.520] Maybe in the UK. [25:12.240 --> 25:20.640] Well, I know during various protests here in New York where I signed on to various SMS alerts, I wouldn't get the messages for hours. [25:20.840 --> 25:21.560] That is true. [25:21.900 --> 25:22.220] Jim? [25:22.480 --> 25:27.860] I think we've been doing this show long enough to know that the secret of technology is keep it simple, stupid. [25:28.120 --> 25:36.000] A simple siren and with backup systems I think is preferable to relying on text messaging to get people out of the way of a tsunami. [25:36.280 --> 25:37.120] I have a question. [25:37.220 --> 25:42.600] Did you send me an SMS Habit 2005 at midnight or did you send it after midnight? [25:42.760 --> 25:44.480] Because I got it at 6.12pm here. [25:44.740 --> 25:47.960] I sent it as close to midnight as I could from Amsterdam. [25:48.280 --> 25:51.980] Of course, I couldn't get an SMS message out because everybody else seemed to be doing the same thing. [25:52.100 --> 25:53.160] So yeah, it does get clogged up. [25:53.240 --> 25:59.720] But I think SMS is a technology that doesn't take as much bandwidth obviously as a voice call. [26:01.620 --> 26:04.920] And that's something that, you know, can be improved. [26:05.220 --> 26:05.980] We can have it. [26:05.980 --> 26:06.720] The SMS messages... [26:06.720 --> 26:09.920] Didn't the SMS messages I sent from Thailand get through rather quickly? [26:10.340 --> 26:11.120] I think so. [26:11.300 --> 26:12.020] Yeah, pretty quickly. [26:12.180 --> 26:12.760] Pretty quickly, yeah. [26:12.840 --> 26:14.720] But you know, you weren't sending it to millions of people at once. [26:15.000 --> 26:15.480] That's right. [26:15.600 --> 26:17.620] And I believe that would cause some problems. [26:18.000 --> 26:33.020] Along the lines of what Jim just mentioned about a simple siren, there was a lot of stuff reported in the news that there were no sort of warning systems or alert systems in Thailand where the island of Phuket is. [26:33.200 --> 26:39.780] On my railroad trip from Suratani back to Bangkok, I went to some very remote areas of southern Thailand. [26:40.280 --> 26:49.740] One area was not very far away, maybe just a 15-20 minute drive from where Phuket is and got hammered by the tsunami. [26:49.980 --> 27:01.940] I saw villages with a tower in the middle of the village with big siren horns pointing in four directions, you know, one of these four-piece horns on top of the tower. [27:03.380 --> 27:05.520] Apparently, they have some sort of warning system there. [27:05.600 --> 27:23.160] Now, I don't know whether these sirens on top, these horns on top of towers in the middle of fishing villages, which are really like no technology there other than this, were for warning about tsunamis or warning or just for like the news of the day or for music or whatever, [27:23.300 --> 27:33.160] but they already have something in place for getting a sound signal, an audio signal to the whole village down there in a lot of the villages that I went through. [27:33.580 --> 27:36.660] So, you know, it looks like a lot of the infrastructure is already in place. [27:38.600 --> 27:46.060] This listener from Finland writes in, SMS is 8, is the, okay, you know this red hack day. [27:46.480 --> 27:52.160] It's 8 cents he's saying or he says 8 can't, C-A-N-T is can't they, no, they use euros over there anyway. [27:52.340 --> 27:54.320] So I think it's 8 cents and it's a typo there. [27:54.800 --> 28:01.920] A message or 9.6 something, I guess 9.6 euros for a thousand in a month by my provider. [28:02.060 --> 28:07.140] It's a very easy service to use if you just know the number of the person you want SMS and messages delivered to them. [28:08.380 --> 28:15.540] MMS is starting to be more standard as more people have phones that use that technology and of course that you can transmit pictures and sound as well. [28:16.220 --> 28:17.220] Thanks for that information. [28:17.700 --> 28:22.940] During the January 5th show you were speaking about why Americans don't use text messages as often as people in other countries. [28:23.140 --> 28:27.800] My wife is from London, England and she was telling me that most of the people she knew don't have contracts. [28:27.800 --> 28:35.180] They use prepay or pay-per-use phones and that it's cheap or very, it's free or very cheap rather to send text messages. [28:35.580 --> 28:41.280] Because they use prepay it's more cost efficient to use SMS messages than to actually place a phone call. [28:42.620 --> 28:43.300] Signed Jason. [28:43.420 --> 28:44.880] Jason, thanks very much for that information. [28:45.080 --> 28:45.640] Yeah, it is true. [28:45.840 --> 28:47.900] It's less intrusive for many people as well. [28:48.780 --> 28:52.260] But then there was this article that came out in the New York Times this week. [28:52.600 --> 28:56.700] Young cell users rack up debt one message at a time. [28:57.260 --> 29:02.580] And it's basically this saga of how these people are getting these huge phone bills. [29:02.740 --> 29:03.660] Hundreds and hundreds of dollars. [29:03.740 --> 29:06.020] This guy got a $400 cell phone charge. [29:06.200 --> 29:11.780] You have to love the New York Times ability to like find three isolated examples and turn it into a trend. [29:12.280 --> 29:14.360] Well, you know, I think it might be a trend. [29:14.560 --> 29:15.280] What do you say, right? [29:15.420 --> 29:24.240] I actually, someone like at my mother's office, their son racked up an $800 phone bill buying cell phone ringtones. [29:24.720 --> 29:26.400] Yeah, you know, that's the other ripoff. [29:26.880 --> 29:28.360] Buying a cell phone tone. [29:28.480 --> 29:29.740] I don't get that at all. [29:29.900 --> 29:38.500] You download this tone and then they say clearly on their website if you change your tone you have to buy it again even though you've already bought what it wants in the same tone. [29:38.940 --> 29:40.340] It depends on the way your phone works. [29:40.480 --> 29:40.660] Yeah. [29:41.000 --> 29:42.660] Some phones have a finite storage. [29:42.940 --> 29:49.280] But I mean, there are certain things when they introduce these things into billing such as paying when you receive a phone call it sort of becomes the norm and people get used to it. [29:49.680 --> 29:53.620] Paying for receiving text messages that's something that a lot of phone companies do. [29:53.820 --> 30:00.880] They charge you and you could easily bankrupt somebody by sending them a thousand text messages and they're paying something like 10 cents each for these things. [30:01.100 --> 30:09.240] It racks up very quickly and if you just if you look at a standard exchange between people it's like, hey, and the person says hey back what are you doing? [30:09.340 --> 30:09.540] Nothing. [30:09.640 --> 30:10.080] What do you want to do? [30:10.120 --> 30:11.540] And every one of those is 10 cents. [30:12.020 --> 30:14.240] Sometimes the person getting them is 10 cents as well. [30:14.360 --> 30:25.140] If you don't have a particular plan and there are very inexpensive plans $10 for unlimited for instance but if you don't have that and you're a heavy text user it can rack up pretty quickly. [30:25.300 --> 30:33.840] Or also a lot of people use AOL Instant Messenger and there's an SMS gateway for that where they send text messages to your phones when someone sends you a message. [30:34.020 --> 30:35.060] I know a couple people use that. [30:35.520 --> 30:48.160] So especially with something like that if someone on the other end, like I've done this forgets that you're sending it to a cell phone I'll send them six messages in the course of 10 seconds because I'm just continuing a thought and hitting enter a couple of times. [30:48.420 --> 30:53.940] Speaking of SMS and cell phones we have a guest in the studio that Redbird has brought with us with him. [30:54.460 --> 30:57.140] You found this in the subway just a little while ago. [30:57.340 --> 30:58.860] Do you want to tell us what this is? [30:58.980 --> 31:00.040] I don't know much about it. [31:01.200 --> 31:01.520] A cell phone. [31:01.660 --> 31:02.320] You'll hand it over. [31:03.180 --> 31:04.200] Take a look at this thing here. [31:05.260 --> 31:05.580] Okay. [31:06.640 --> 31:08.180] It's a Hello Moto. [31:09.000 --> 31:10.100] What in the world does that mean? [31:10.620 --> 31:11.560] That's what they call it? [31:11.600 --> 31:12.220] Hello Moto? [31:13.200 --> 31:13.520] Okay. [31:13.520 --> 31:14.360] We're booting it up now. [31:14.380 --> 31:15.040] It's in M mode. [31:15.240 --> 31:17.520] And we expect and what is this? [31:17.600 --> 31:17.820] Chinese? [31:18.320 --> 31:18.620] Okay. [31:18.720 --> 31:19.260] It's a T-Mobile. [31:19.360 --> 31:20.600] It's a T-Mobile phone and it's in China. [31:20.700 --> 31:21.500] Oh, look at the little girl. [31:21.740 --> 31:22.320] It's AT&T wired. [31:22.480 --> 31:24.420] She must be like three years old. [31:24.540 --> 31:25.600] It says T-Mobile right on it. [31:25.860 --> 31:28.120] Oh, it says T-Mobile at the top and AT&T at the bottom. [31:28.280 --> 31:28.780] It's very confusing. [31:29.800 --> 31:32.780] And it also says but she must be three years old or something. [31:32.920 --> 31:33.440] Is this her phone? [31:33.640 --> 31:34.780] I don't think so somehow. [31:35.240 --> 31:39.260] I hope not because I can't imagine how she's going to get home without being able to call somebody. [31:39.640 --> 31:40.760] Okay, so we're going to leave this phone on. [31:40.860 --> 31:41.940] Hopefully somebody will call. [31:42.300 --> 31:43.700] And what else can we do? [31:43.840 --> 31:45.380] If you find a cell phone, what do you do? [31:46.120 --> 31:47.340] Call the numbers listed. [31:47.860 --> 31:48.260] Yeah. [31:48.720 --> 31:49.520] Call the numbers listed? [31:49.520 --> 31:52.960] I lost a cell phone and someone sent you a text message in Amsterdam if you remember. [31:53.120 --> 31:54.640] Oh, it's vibrating. [31:55.080 --> 31:57.280] And this means a message. [31:57.560 --> 31:58.600] Undoubtedly there's a message. [32:01.000 --> 32:02.480] What in the world is this? [32:02.680 --> 32:04.060] It's Chinese, I think. [32:16.900 --> 32:17.820] It's a nice ringtone. [32:18.020 --> 32:19.000] This is a ringtone? [32:19.060 --> 32:20.320] It's just voicemail notification. [32:20.900 --> 32:22.120] It keeps going, too. [32:22.500 --> 32:23.460] It's Celine Dion. [32:24.020 --> 32:25.140] It says voicemail. [32:25.200 --> 32:26.080] I don't think it's ringing. [32:27.360 --> 32:29.200] Why don't you hit send and see if someone answers? [32:29.920 --> 32:30.620] All right, stopped. [32:31.180 --> 32:31.560] Okay. [32:32.000 --> 32:32.960] Well, voicemail... [32:32.960 --> 32:36.540] This phone's going to ring, I'm sure, and we'll pick it up and tell the person where their phone is. [32:36.780 --> 32:37.560] So if you find... [32:37.560 --> 32:38.520] Is there battery power on this? [32:38.540 --> 32:39.240] Yeah, there's a full battery. [32:39.240 --> 32:42.760] So by the end of the night, we're going to reunite this phone with its owner. [32:42.880 --> 32:45.220] It's one of the many public service things we do here at Off the Hook. [32:46.160 --> 32:46.580] All right. [32:48.000 --> 32:49.240] We just found it on the ground? [32:49.540 --> 32:50.520] It was on the staircase. [32:50.540 --> 32:52.140] I'm kind of surprised nobody else picked it up. [32:52.320 --> 32:52.600] Wow. [32:52.820 --> 32:53.260] What station? [32:53.980 --> 32:56.980] 34th Street, and actually, I think it was Penn Station. [32:57.400 --> 32:58.040] Penn Station. [32:58.120 --> 33:01.080] Well, there's a lot of people walk through Penn Station, so that could belong to anybody. [33:01.220 --> 33:02.640] They could be in Philadelphia by now. [33:02.740 --> 33:02.940] All right. [33:02.960 --> 33:07.840] What we can also do is find out the phone number by calling somebody else with that phone and getting a caller ID. [33:07.860 --> 33:09.520] Yeah, if we can find the contacts. [33:09.540 --> 33:10.320] This is in Chinese. [33:10.320 --> 33:10.980] It's impossible. [33:11.000 --> 33:11.700] All the menus are in Chinese. [33:11.700 --> 33:13.280] I'm trying to find how to switch it to English. [33:13.500 --> 33:13.720] All right. [33:13.840 --> 33:17.920] Well, don't switch it to, like, you know, a different dialect or something, or nobody will be able to understand it. [33:18.020 --> 33:18.200] That's true. [33:19.060 --> 33:19.420] Okay. [33:19.600 --> 33:30.100] Now, you were in the subway conducting some tests because there is a breaking story this week that MTA has finally woken up and fixed a security hole of some sort. [33:30.180 --> 33:30.980] What's this all about? [33:30.980 --> 33:37.280] Well, there's a fairly well-known exploit of the system where you bend a card a certain way and you get a free ride. [33:38.500 --> 33:43.640] And supposedly, they have this fixed, or they're starting to get it fixed, but not really. [33:45.040 --> 33:45.480] Well... [33:45.480 --> 33:47.180] It sounds very vague there. [33:47.400 --> 33:47.540] Right. [33:48.060 --> 33:52.480] Well, to understand how the exploit works, you have to kind of understand what's on the MetroCard first. [33:52.680 --> 33:52.880] Okay. [33:52.960 --> 33:54.460] So I can explain that a little bit. [33:54.900 --> 33:55.860] The card is... [33:55.860 --> 33:58.380] The MetroCard's our two-track system, okay? [33:58.860 --> 34:01.760] There's tracks one and two. [34:02.100 --> 34:04.280] You'll notice that the mag stripe is actually pretty wide. [34:04.880 --> 34:06.860] It would normally be a three-track mag stripe. [34:07.120 --> 34:11.940] But track one and two acts is kind of like one big, wide track. [34:12.300 --> 34:16.420] I don't know if they're two separate tracks and they're written two separately, but they always contain the same data. [34:16.960 --> 34:19.040] Track three is a static track. [34:19.340 --> 34:20.980] None of the data ever changes on there. [34:21.220 --> 34:25.720] And some of the examples of what's stored on there is like the serial number and the expiration date and some other stuff. [34:26.660 --> 34:36.820] And track one and two is where all the variable information is stored, like the card type, place of purchase, which happen to be static fields on the variable track. [34:36.820 --> 34:37.580] They never change. [34:37.760 --> 34:47.260] And the variable fields are things like the place that you last used it, the location, how many times you've used it, how much money is left, and things like that. [34:50.160 --> 34:53.180] And tracks one and two have two records, okay? [34:53.340 --> 34:56.180] So the current record is at the end of the strip. [34:56.340 --> 34:58.020] The last record is at the front of the strip. [34:58.180 --> 35:01.080] So you buy a new card, for example, $10 card. [35:01.580 --> 35:04.000] Okay, both records are set to $10. [35:04.220 --> 35:04.700] You just bought it. [35:04.820 --> 35:05.060] It's brand new. [35:05.100 --> 35:05.800] You've never used it. [35:06.260 --> 35:07.280] You swipe it once. [35:08.020 --> 35:11.900] The current record says that you have $8 left. [35:12.000 --> 35:13.660] The last record says that you have $10 left. [35:13.760 --> 35:16.200] You swipe it again, six and eight, and that's how it works. [35:17.080 --> 35:21.640] What the bend does, you put a bend at the current record. [35:21.780 --> 35:25.080] Yeah, don't do this because it's illegal, but this is what people are doing all throughout the city. [35:25.180 --> 35:25.660] And you'll get caught. [35:25.920 --> 35:27.940] Yeah, but tell us how the bend works. [35:27.960 --> 35:30.640] So you put the bend in the current record, okay? [35:30.720 --> 35:31.640] It creates a read error. [35:31.840 --> 35:32.540] You swipe it. [35:32.620 --> 35:34.220] It says, please swipe again at this turnstile. [35:34.540 --> 35:36.120] It just says, please swipe again, sorry. [35:37.360 --> 35:40.320] Tries to reread it, realizes it can't read it. [35:40.480 --> 35:45.460] It says, please swipe again at this turnstile, and then the card is unbend at that point so that it can write back. [35:45.760 --> 35:51.340] And this is where it falls back to using the last record, which says you still have $2 remaining. [35:51.800 --> 35:54.220] So you swipe it again and that's it. [35:54.300 --> 35:55.840] You get a free ride, but you can never use that. [35:56.040 --> 36:00.980] You can never use it again on that card because both records now say that there's no money left on it. [36:01.160 --> 36:04.000] Okay, so this only works on cards with no value. [36:04.220 --> 36:10.200] You bend them, you swipe them twice, and then unbend them, swipe them a third time, and you get a free ride. [36:10.200 --> 36:17.320] This here is much more information than you'll find in the New York Post article, which just insinuates that dangerous things are possible. [36:19.020 --> 36:22.340] So with the MTA, this is... [36:22.340 --> 36:32.660] The New York Post article says that something to the effect that after you swipe the card, you have to swipe it again when it has less than two fares remaining. [36:32.780 --> 36:38.660] So anything between like $2 and probably $3.99, you'll have to swipe it again. [36:38.940 --> 36:41.120] And they say that it erases... [36:41.980 --> 36:45.820] Or some news articles have said that it erases the track, but it really doesn't. [36:45.900 --> 36:48.540] What it does is it pretends that it's a transfer. [36:48.740 --> 36:56.740] So when you swipe it again, the data gets rewritten from the current record to the last record, and the current record says how much is actually remaining. [36:56.880 --> 36:58.820] So both of them now say how much you have left. [36:58.880 --> 37:03.920] For example, if you have a card with $2.50, one record will say $2.50, another will say $4.50. [37:04.320 --> 37:08.620] Okay, so you swipe it again, it'll be $50 and $2.50. [37:08.620 --> 37:14.220] Okay, and then you swipe it one more time and it treats it as a transfer and you'll have $50 and $50 so that you can't use a bend trick anymore. [37:14.780 --> 37:20.960] Okay, so basically the MTA is slowly fixing this by upgrading turnstiles one by one? [37:21.020 --> 37:26.120] Yes, you'll find that some turnstiles you'll have to swipe it twice when you have $2 left on your card. [37:26.260 --> 37:27.340] Some turnstiles you don't. [37:27.740 --> 37:28.120] Uh-huh. [37:28.120 --> 37:30.660] So is the problem going away for them? [37:30.960 --> 37:32.160] It's going away. [37:32.320 --> 37:33.900] There are other ways to get around this. [37:34.140 --> 37:34.400] There are. [37:34.640 --> 37:35.900] There are still ways to get... [37:35.900 --> 37:35.920] Wait, wait. [37:36.000 --> 37:38.500] Does this mean you can no longer transfer on your last use of the card? [37:38.500 --> 37:41.260] You can transfer because it's still the subway. [37:41.460 --> 37:42.420] You're still within the subway. [37:42.420 --> 37:43.820] No, but what if I want to take a bus? [37:43.940 --> 37:44.080] Yeah. [37:44.240 --> 37:45.460] You can still transfer to a bus. [37:45.680 --> 37:45.820] Okay. [37:46.800 --> 37:47.060] Jim? [37:47.060 --> 37:54.700] When it's said that the card is treated as if it is a transfer, what he means is a transfer of money from one card to another. [37:54.920 --> 38:01.420] Well, it actually does set the transfer bit on the card, so it actually does think it's a transfer, but you're still able to transfer to a bus. [38:01.900 --> 38:02.300] Right. [38:02.400 --> 38:04.360] We're using the word transfer for two different things. [38:04.360 --> 38:09.620] One to have your body physically transferred from the train to the bus and one to transfer money from one card to another. [38:09.960 --> 38:10.700] Sort of, yeah. [38:11.780 --> 38:12.080] Okay. [38:12.320 --> 38:19.300] Well, I'm starting to understand this, but what I'd like to know, though, is will this solve The MTA's problems, or is there still going to be some security hole? [38:19.460 --> 38:24.980] Well, I mean, if you think about what I just explained, and most people who use the BenTrick don't actually know how it works. [38:25.040 --> 38:26.280] They just know that it does work. [38:26.400 --> 38:29.340] So, I mean, they don't actually know what's going on. [38:29.340 --> 38:34.220] So they usually mess up, which is why you'll see tons of cards all over the floor with Benz in them. [38:34.460 --> 38:35.440] And, you know, what is this? [38:35.520 --> 38:37.080] Well, that's what people were trying to do. [38:39.700 --> 38:57.740] What doesn't happen is that when you still have money left on the card, okay, you still have the last record saying that you have, let's say, for example, $8, and the current record says $6, okay, you can still do the trick by putting a Benz in the $6 record, [38:58.020 --> 39:05.880] okay, using it, and you'll still get... you'll end up with a card that has $6 left on it, even though you should have ended up with a card that had $4. [39:05.960 --> 39:11.700] But the MTA can presumably detect this after the fact and disable the card entirely, if they so choose. [39:11.920 --> 39:15.260] Well, but they don't seem to do that with paper ride cards. [39:15.260 --> 39:23.760] And also, this is there because sometimes strips will get, you know, screwed up in your pocket, and you'll actually need this to be able to get through. [39:23.880 --> 39:25.480] Otherwise, there'd be jams at the turnstiles. [39:26.940 --> 39:27.420] All right. [39:27.480 --> 39:29.640] So it sounds like there's still a bit of investigation to do. [39:29.720 --> 39:33.320] And that's what we're going to keep doing on this radio program. [39:34.280 --> 39:34.920] Anything else? [39:35.360 --> 39:36.420] I think that's about it. [39:36.620 --> 39:36.860] Okay. [39:37.000 --> 39:39.160] Well, it's been an interesting week for the MTA. [39:39.160 --> 39:39.180] Okay. [39:40.120 --> 39:46.080] 212-209-2900 is our phone number if you have any questions or feedback on anything that we've discussed so far. [39:46.500 --> 39:54.320] And it's really... there's been a lot of other things going on in the world as well that I'd like to sort of touch upon. [39:55.380 --> 40:02.040] In Washington, D.C., for instance, this story was in the Washington Post two days ago. [40:02.440 --> 40:11.580] Metro police officers are using new behavioral profiling techniques as they patrol subway stations, identifying suspicious riders and pulling them aside for questioning. [40:11.880 --> 40:21.500] The officers are targeting people who avoid eye contact, loiter, or appear to be looking around transit stations more than other passengers. [40:21.680 --> 40:24.020] Boy, are we going to be in trouble if we go to D.C.? [40:24.020 --> 40:26.140] Nobody in New York makes eye contact. [40:26.400 --> 40:26.860] Yeah. [40:27.140 --> 40:27.260] Yeah. [40:27.320 --> 40:28.340] Well, that's why they're doing it in D.C. [40:28.580 --> 40:28.980] Oh, okay. [40:29.120 --> 40:30.200] They're supposed to be friendly in D.C. [40:30.780 --> 40:36.800] Anyone identified as suspicious will be stopped and questioned about what they are doing and where they are going. [40:37.160 --> 40:41.140] This is part of preparations for tighter security during the presidential inauguration. [40:41.620 --> 40:52.500] The officers have been trained by the Transportation Security Administration to take notice of the same behavioral characteristics and patterns that airport security officials watch for. [40:53.100 --> 41:03.400] The TSA is working with the Secret Service, which is overseeing inauguration security, on plans to bring in as many as 500 airport screeners from across the country to assist with the security. [41:03.580 --> 41:08.300] According to people familiar with the plans, we spoke on the condition of anonymity because the plans are not final. [41:08.580 --> 41:14.320] The TSA employees will screen people along the parade routes and other locations using metal detection equipment. [41:15.060 --> 41:15.760] Oh, boy. [41:15.960 --> 41:16.400] I don't know. [41:16.540 --> 41:17.800] It's kind of disheartening. [41:17.900 --> 41:20.260] So they're just going to catch, like, depressed people or something? [41:21.880 --> 41:22.280] Yeah. [41:22.540 --> 41:22.880] Yeah, apparently. [41:23.060 --> 41:25.760] They can just team up with, like, the mental health department or something. [41:25.780 --> 41:28.040] Think of all those women fondled on the parade route now. [41:28.720 --> 41:32.240] I don't think it's going to work in New York. [41:32.500 --> 41:33.700] I don't think so. [41:33.700 --> 41:35.220] But we'll see if they try to do it anyway. [41:35.680 --> 41:38.780] I'd go one further and say I don't think it's going to work in Washington either. [41:38.900 --> 41:39.060] Yeah. [41:39.180 --> 41:39.340] Okay. [41:39.420 --> 41:40.280] Well, let's say that as well. [41:41.940 --> 41:44.280] The inauguration is scheduled for a week from tomorrow. [41:44.980 --> 41:47.620] And, well, you know, it's the biggest unnecessary thing I can think of. [41:47.660 --> 41:48.600] What's the point of this? [41:48.600 --> 41:58.780] It's just, if Bush had any brains, and we know the answer to that, he'd cancel the thing, donate the money to Tsunami Relief, and everybody would think he's a cool guy and he wouldn't have protesters to deal with. [41:58.840 --> 41:59.860] But that's not what's going to happen. [42:00.140 --> 42:02.880] It's going to be madness and mayhem and expense. [42:03.100 --> 42:06.800] Isn't it like some number of millions of dollars, like 30 million or something? [42:06.860 --> 42:07.520] Something like that. [42:07.520 --> 42:08.500] It's completely unnecessary. [42:08.940 --> 42:15.740] Just like the Condoleezza Rice hearings are completely unnecessary because it's going to confirm her anyway, but maybe they'll ask her some tough questions next week. [42:15.800 --> 42:20.500] And we'll be airing that here on this radio station next Tuesday and Wednesday, I believe, throughout the day. [42:20.640 --> 42:21.820] So be sure to tune in for that. [42:22.000 --> 42:22.420] It'll be interesting. [42:23.300 --> 42:33.320] Computer hackers have captured the names, social security numbers, and other information of more than 30,000 students and staff at George Mason University that happened earlier this month. [42:34.100 --> 42:42.220] The university, which is in Fairfax, near Washington, D.C., discovered on January 3rd that intruders had hacked into a server containing the protected information. [42:42.640 --> 42:46.840] The university has since notified all students and staff, which is more than T-Mobile ever did. [42:46.840 --> 42:51.500] The school established an information hotline and turned the case over to campus police. [42:51.820 --> 42:56.160] We don't know if this is an inside job or an outside job at this point, they're saying. [42:56.400 --> 43:03.900] Before the hacking, the university was in the process of replacing students' social security numbers with other internal numbers to protect against identity theft. [43:04.620 --> 43:10.640] That was in response to a law passed last year requiring social security numbers to be removed from various ID cards. [43:10.860 --> 43:11.920] It's about time. [43:11.920 --> 43:14.880] Yeah, I mean, at Columbia, they still use your social security number. [43:15.120 --> 43:15.900] On your ID card? [43:16.080 --> 43:18.380] Yeah, I've read my ID card and it still has a social security number. [43:18.420 --> 43:19.900] On the strip or on the actual... [43:19.900 --> 43:20.020] On the strip. [43:20.600 --> 43:21.420] They don't print it. [43:21.560 --> 43:22.140] They don't print it. [43:22.140 --> 43:23.940] But, you know, whenever you go anywhere. [43:23.940 --> 43:31.300] Or, you know, if I go to the ID office and say, there's something wrong with my card, they say, okay, write your social security number down and we'll fix it for you. [43:31.520 --> 43:31.880] Uh-huh. [43:31.880 --> 43:35.900] So, it's the nuttiest thing I've ever heard of. [43:35.980 --> 43:41.300] I actually have a tip for people who are, I guess, applying to college at the moment. [43:41.520 --> 43:46.680] And that is, on the very first form you fill out, omit your social security number. [43:46.800 --> 43:50.340] And they will usually assign you a random number. [43:50.540 --> 43:54.900] If you do that, then that random number will stick with you for four years. [43:55.000 --> 43:55.880] I have a question, though. [43:56.020 --> 43:56.620] But otherwise, no. [43:56.760 --> 44:01.320] If you're asked on the spot for your social security number, first of all, is it a law to carry a social security card? [44:01.500 --> 44:02.040] It's not. [44:02.480 --> 44:02.740] All right. [44:03.200 --> 44:07.240] Now, what happens if you forget your social security number and you need it right then on the spot? [44:07.240 --> 44:07.780] What do you do? [44:07.920 --> 44:08.860] You can't do anything. [44:09.300 --> 44:11.240] I mean, you can't just conjure it up out of nothing. [44:11.300 --> 44:13.400] So, they're going to have to figure out a solution for you. [44:13.460 --> 44:15.240] Find a MagStripe reader and read my card. [44:15.980 --> 44:16.400] Well, no. [44:16.440 --> 44:17.380] But you already have it on a card. [44:17.480 --> 44:27.480] I'm saying if somebody is applying for something, like a Blockbuster ID, and they're insisting that you have to give them your social security number, you don't have a card and you don't remember what it is, maybe they'll just randomly generate a number for you. [44:27.480 --> 44:31.560] Can you apply for, like, an ID number in the States that's not your social security number? [44:31.760 --> 44:36.740] Yeah, that's often used by people who are trying to pull some tax scam, a taxpayer identification number. [44:36.760 --> 44:41.980] Right, but if you don't want to give it to every, you know, to, like, your credit card companies and all that, then that would be a good number to have. [44:42.160 --> 44:45.780] Yeah, well, there are solutions, and we can explore those as well. [44:46.000 --> 44:48.480] Also, this bit of good news from Las Vegas. [44:49.640 --> 44:56.420] Apparently, Las Vegas' McCarran International Airport next week will officially begin offering complimentary Wi-Fi access to the public. [44:56.740 --> 44:59.820] Parts of the network have been operating in TESMA for the past several weeks. [44:59.860 --> 45:00.520] Get this quote. [45:01.140 --> 45:08.840] This is a little bit uncharacteristic for us, providing something for free, said Randall Walker, Director of Aviation for Nevada's Clark County. [45:08.840 --> 45:14.720] Maybe someday when the market matures and becomes more the business model for cell phones, we might start charging a fee for Wi-Fi. [45:14.960 --> 45:19.660] But right now, we're offering it for free because we didn't like the business models that were available. [45:20.240 --> 45:21.980] So, that's kind of cool. [45:22.220 --> 45:24.280] Also, uncharacteristic is the honesty. [45:24.440 --> 45:24.840] Someone's calling. [45:25.180 --> 45:25.620] Honesty. [45:25.700 --> 45:26.160] Should I answer? [45:26.300 --> 45:27.080] Someone's calling the phone? [45:27.380 --> 45:30.100] Yeah, why don't you pick up and see if you can work out something. [45:30.720 --> 45:32.060] Oh, you do it. [45:34.920 --> 45:35.360] Okay. [45:35.360 --> 45:35.800] Hello. [45:36.900 --> 45:37.340] Hi. [45:38.160 --> 45:39.380] Ask if they're looking for the phone. [45:39.500 --> 45:41.300] Are you looking... do you speak English? [45:45.240 --> 45:46.740] Sorry, do you speak English? [45:47.100 --> 45:48.440] The owner lost her phone. [45:48.580 --> 45:48.960] His phone. [45:48.960 --> 45:49.800] Their phone. [45:50.400 --> 45:50.400] Their phone. [45:50.460 --> 45:50.860] Okay. [45:50.920 --> 45:51.860] Well, you work that out. [45:51.980 --> 45:54.060] There's actually... there's a recent calls list we can call. [45:54.200 --> 45:54.360] Uh-huh. [45:54.360 --> 45:55.220] Someone will speak English. [45:55.500 --> 45:55.700] Okay. [45:56.400 --> 45:57.920] Apparently, that wasn't the person calling. [45:58.020 --> 45:58.660] They did not speak English. [45:58.820 --> 45:59.060] All right. [45:59.120 --> 46:01.600] We will reunite this phone with its owner. [46:02.340 --> 46:02.740] Somehow. [46:03.820 --> 46:04.220] Okay. [46:06.120 --> 46:08.700] 212-209-2900 is our phone number. [46:09.060 --> 46:11.460] Let's take a phone call and see who's out there. [46:11.580 --> 46:11.880] Good evening. [46:11.960 --> 46:12.360] You're on the air. [46:12.660 --> 46:13.060] What? [46:13.120 --> 46:13.760] I got through? [46:14.800 --> 46:15.540] Well, I'm sorry. [46:16.940 --> 46:17.520] Good evening. [46:17.580 --> 46:18.080] You're on the air. [46:19.360 --> 46:19.720] 212-209-2900 is our phone number. [46:19.720 --> 46:19.740] Okay. [46:20.900 --> 46:24.860] Let's try and get some more variety of phone calls there. [46:25.900 --> 46:27.020] What else do we have here? [46:29.380 --> 46:30.020] Should we take that one? [46:30.020 --> 46:31.940] I wonder if they were genuinely excited or... [46:31.940 --> 46:33.440] Well, they were a little too excited. [46:33.620 --> 46:37.540] We have an automatic machine here that sort of cuts in and does that. [46:38.640 --> 46:39.760] Some comments on the U.S. [46:39.840 --> 46:40.460] visit program. [46:42.020 --> 46:43.600] Both times I flew to the U.S. [46:43.700 --> 46:47.600] in November 2003 and July 2004, when U.S. [46:47.620 --> 46:59.820] visit was in place for those requiring visas, there were times when the queue for foreigners was very long and the queue for Americans very short, and the airline employees managing the queues directing a number of people in the foreigner's queue to the American side to speed things up. [46:59.900 --> 47:01.480] This is in reply to what I noticed last week. [47:02.140 --> 47:07.720] The fact that this happened on both occasions suggests it is routine, and this would require fingerprinting machines on both sides. [47:08.340 --> 47:12.580] Of course, it's still quite possible that eventually they'll start fingerprinting Americans as well. [47:12.640 --> 47:13.540] They're calling again, aren't they? [47:14.280 --> 47:14.960] Go ahead. [47:15.140 --> 47:16.660] We'll turn you down while you're doing that. [47:16.700 --> 47:17.680] See if you can negotiate something. [47:18.540 --> 47:19.740] What you say... [47:19.740 --> 47:23.580] Also, what you say looks like a cheap $20 webcam is, in fact, just that. [47:23.720 --> 47:29.860] Foreigners are not normally iris-scanned, but they are digitally photographed using those little cameras. [47:30.460 --> 47:33.480] I saw this procedure being done with people ahead of me in the queue last time. [47:33.560 --> 47:38.500] These observations come from our friend RiskTaker, who is one of our contributors. [47:38.660 --> 47:39.620] No, I'm sorry. [47:39.820 --> 47:40.660] I lost their phone. [47:41.000 --> 47:43.060] You can get maybe a home phone number for that person. [47:43.160 --> 47:44.620] We can call them and tell them we have their... [47:44.620 --> 47:45.980] Why are they hanging up on us? [47:45.980 --> 47:46.960] We're trying to help them. [47:47.060 --> 47:47.580] Do you want me to call? [47:47.680 --> 47:48.760] There's a recent calls list. [47:48.820 --> 47:50.240] I can call somebody and help this be... [47:50.240 --> 47:52.440] Let's do that after the show, because it's kind of distracting. [47:52.660 --> 47:59.660] If we get the owner, it would be a nice, cheerful reunion type of a thing I was hoping to accomplish here, like they do on Channel 4 sometimes, but I guess that's not going to happen. [48:00.160 --> 48:01.080] All right, let's take a phone call. [48:01.160 --> 48:01.480] Good evening. [48:02.000 --> 48:02.820] You're on the air. [48:03.500 --> 48:05.360] Oh, you know, that was your big chance, and you blew it. [48:05.440 --> 48:05.960] Let's try over here. [48:06.040 --> 48:06.320] Good evening. [48:06.440 --> 48:06.960] You're on the air. [48:07.460 --> 48:07.680] Hello. [48:07.880 --> 48:08.320] Yes, go ahead. [48:08.500 --> 48:09.140] Yes, good evening. [48:09.540 --> 48:09.980] How are you doing? [48:09.980 --> 48:12.360] First of all, I listen to your shows as often as I possibly can. [48:12.460 --> 48:13.500] You have a great show on the air. [48:13.760 --> 48:14.020] Thank you. [48:14.900 --> 48:15.920] I have a problem. [48:16.760 --> 48:17.460] I'm blind. [48:17.720 --> 48:21.360] So what happened was I got Verizon Online dial-up. [48:21.520 --> 48:21.940] All right. [48:22.040 --> 48:25.720] Because I used to be with RollNet, which is, you know, the people there don't speak English. [48:26.440 --> 48:29.460] So the reason I got rid of them, and I went to Verizon Online. [48:30.300 --> 48:34.900] So what happened was I got dial-up, and the reason I got it, I can't even use it. [48:36.040 --> 48:36.400] Really? [48:38.200 --> 48:39.840] So they want me to know. [48:40.180 --> 48:42.860] They say, well, if you want to avoid that problem, get DSL. [48:44.480 --> 48:45.480] What's the problem exactly? [48:46.040 --> 48:48.140] That I can't get through on dial-up. [48:48.280 --> 48:48.660] Oh, okay. [48:50.100 --> 48:51.840] And you're dialing the right numbers and all that, right? [48:51.960 --> 48:52.100] Yeah. [48:52.100 --> 48:53.100] Everything is... [48:53.100 --> 48:54.580] No, it sounds like it's going to go through. [48:54.860 --> 48:55.040] Yeah. [48:55.280 --> 48:57.880] And everything, and then all of a sudden, it just doesn't go on. [48:58.060 --> 49:00.100] This is true no matter what you're trying to connect to? [49:01.200 --> 49:02.200] Dial-up internet. [49:02.740 --> 49:02.920] Uh-huh. [49:02.980 --> 49:04.260] But what service are you using? [49:04.520 --> 49:04.820] Verizon. [49:05.460 --> 49:07.060] You're dialing up into Verizon. [49:07.260 --> 49:07.440] Mm-hmm. [49:07.700 --> 49:10.140] And their own dial-up numbers are always busy. [49:10.480 --> 49:10.780] Yep. [49:11.700 --> 49:13.780] Have you tried numbers in different areas? [49:14.240 --> 49:14.380] Yeah. [49:14.680 --> 49:15.800] And they're busy there, too? [49:16.080 --> 49:16.320] Yeah. [49:16.780 --> 49:18.900] And evidently, it's because they're pushing DSL. [49:19.360 --> 49:19.740] Uh-huh. [49:19.860 --> 49:22.000] And tying up their lines, too, at the same time. [49:22.720 --> 49:27.100] I mean, you know, when you first dial it, it sounds like it's going to go through. [49:27.300 --> 49:28.820] And as soon as you go through, it knocks you right off. [49:29.640 --> 49:31.880] Oh, you get connected, and then it knocks you off? [49:31.980 --> 49:32.120] Yeah. [49:32.940 --> 49:38.660] It sounds like a Verizon tactic I've run into before, where they basically make the service as bad as possible, so you want to upgrade to something better. [49:39.060 --> 49:39.300] Mm-hmm. [49:39.760 --> 49:41.360] There are other companies you can use. [49:41.500 --> 49:44.760] You can get DSL from other companies, or you can use dial-up to other companies. [49:44.960 --> 49:46.960] There's no reason why you have to be stuck with Verizon. [49:47.200 --> 49:47.320] Yeah. [49:47.780 --> 49:49.720] I know, but I thought that Verizon was going to be okay. [49:50.500 --> 49:51.140] That's why I did that. [49:51.140 --> 49:52.760] Well, now you learned that they're not. [49:54.620 --> 49:56.060] Well, you know, they're all kinds... [49:56.060 --> 49:56.580] Where are you located? [49:56.620 --> 49:57.080] In New York? [49:57.240 --> 49:57.480] New Jersey. [49:57.660 --> 49:58.040] New Jersey. [49:58.420 --> 50:00.420] There's all kinds of dial-up services. [50:00.640 --> 50:02.180] I mean, Panix is one that comes to mind. [50:02.520 --> 50:02.860] Panix? [50:03.100 --> 50:04.760] Yeah, P-A-N-I-X dot com. [50:05.100 --> 50:05.700] They're great. [50:05.840 --> 50:09.600] There's all kinds of other entities out there, you know. [50:10.060 --> 50:11.860] Companies that aren't as big as Verizon. [50:11.860 --> 50:16.080] And then when you call up their technicians, they tell you everything is okay from this end. [50:16.220 --> 50:19.280] And I have people look at my computer, and the connections are okay, and everything is fine. [50:19.440 --> 50:19.620] Yeah. [50:19.920 --> 50:29.100] Well, just to be safe, call something that's not a provider, something that has, you know, an access number of some sort that you know you can connect to, just to make sure it's not your equipment, anything on your end. [50:30.560 --> 50:34.940] And, you know, once you eliminate that, then you can look around for an alternative of some sort. [50:34.980 --> 50:43.700] Yeah, the thing is, I was going to ask you, since they told me that DSL will be fine, I'm willing to spend the next $10, because they charge you like $19.95 for dial-up. [50:43.920 --> 50:44.220] Uh-huh. [50:44.800 --> 50:45.400] Which is a lot for dial-up. [50:45.400 --> 50:46.880] Would DSL solve my problem, you think? [50:47.820 --> 50:49.160] Well, ADSL is pretty cheap. [50:49.180 --> 50:50.900] I think it's not much more expensive than that. [50:51.160 --> 50:51.280] $30. [50:51.580 --> 50:52.080] $30, yeah. [50:52.160 --> 50:56.440] So you might look into that and get something more dependable, although, you know, it's not as dependable. [50:56.440 --> 50:59.660] Well, in New Jersey, you shouldn't have trouble, but I've heard some horror stories. [50:59.740 --> 51:01.320] Since when I was with WorldNet, I never had a problem. [51:01.600 --> 51:01.820] Uh-huh. [51:01.940 --> 51:02.920] Then maybe you should go back to them. [51:03.580 --> 51:05.520] No, because I don't have them anymore. [51:05.720 --> 51:06.080] Uh-huh. [51:06.400 --> 51:10.300] I wanted to keep my service, you know, with the phone company that I'm using. [51:10.480 --> 51:10.660] Yeah. [51:10.860 --> 51:11.800] So I can get billed. [51:12.120 --> 51:15.060] Well, you can always switch back, you know, if things don't go right. [51:15.660 --> 51:22.840] As far as DSL goes, just be aware that it's always on, so you want to make sure that your system is up-to-date so it doesn't get anything nasty. [51:22.920 --> 51:24.460] Yeah, well, you know, it's not always on for me. [51:25.180 --> 51:26.140] It disconnects a lot of times. [51:26.140 --> 51:26.760] But never mind that. [51:26.980 --> 51:27.200] Theoretically. [51:27.300 --> 51:27.800] Thanks for your call. [51:27.900 --> 51:29.060] Let's take another call. [51:29.060 --> 51:29.780] Let's go over here. [51:29.980 --> 51:30.440] Good evening. [51:30.560 --> 51:31.020] You're on the air. [51:31.940 --> 51:33.040] Why does that person keep calling? [51:33.760 --> 51:34.300] Good evening. [51:34.440 --> 51:34.880] You're on the air. [51:35.240 --> 51:36.060] Very monotone there. [51:36.220 --> 51:36.380] Yeah. [51:36.900 --> 51:38.880] Earlier, we were trying to reach Bernie S. [51:39.000 --> 51:40.720] on his phone from Thailand. [51:41.100 --> 51:41.540] Uh-huh. [51:41.980 --> 51:43.320] Yeah, we tried and we failed. [51:43.920 --> 51:46.020] No, the line was tied in knots. [51:48.280 --> 51:48.760] That's good. [51:48.980 --> 51:50.300] Ask Bernie while he's there. [51:50.380 --> 51:50.800] Ask Bernie. [51:50.860 --> 51:51.980] Oh, you know, Bernie's not here. [51:52.180 --> 51:55.020] And Bernie's not here because I forgot to press a certain key button. [51:55.160 --> 51:55.820] Bernie, I'm sorry. [51:55.820 --> 51:57.220] I disconnected you. [51:58.520 --> 52:00.240] Well, shall we try to get Bernie back? [52:00.360 --> 52:01.300] Bernie, why don't you call in? [52:01.380 --> 52:04.000] And you have a way of calling in on that special line. [52:04.160 --> 52:05.120] Maybe we'll get you there. [52:05.580 --> 52:06.040] Good evening. [52:06.060 --> 52:06.580] You're on the air. [52:08.240 --> 52:08.720] Go ahead. [52:09.600 --> 52:09.920] Yeah. [52:10.040 --> 52:10.240] Hello. [52:10.240 --> 52:13.860] So, I have a question for the young lady who was talking about the MetroCard. [52:14.660 --> 52:15.100] Okay. [52:15.380 --> 52:17.420] Well, that wasn't a young lady, but never mind. [52:17.480 --> 52:17.720] Go ahead. [52:17.780 --> 52:18.580] What's your question? [52:19.020 --> 52:19.200] Yeah. [52:19.280 --> 52:20.900] Now, I'm a Subway user. [52:20.900 --> 52:22.740] I use the Subways on a daily basis. [52:22.960 --> 52:23.280] Okay. [52:23.280 --> 52:27.060] And I use the MetroCard because I can't use tokens anymore. [52:27.760 --> 52:28.500] Well, no. [52:28.640 --> 52:29.740] There are no more tokens. [52:29.940 --> 52:30.320] That's right. [52:30.320 --> 52:30.640] That's right. [52:30.640 --> 52:31.280] And they don't work. [52:31.400 --> 52:31.620] Uh-huh. [52:31.640 --> 52:33.320] Because I still have tokens. [52:33.440 --> 52:34.000] There are tokens. [52:34.140 --> 52:34.880] I have them myself. [52:35.200 --> 52:36.160] And I can't... [52:36.160 --> 52:37.760] The hole closed up. [52:38.020 --> 52:38.360] Yeah. [52:38.460 --> 52:39.140] They closed that. [52:39.220 --> 52:39.500] Yeah. [52:39.620 --> 52:40.720] You can contact... [52:40.720 --> 52:41.820] The first security hole they closed. [52:41.940 --> 52:44.560] You can contact them and they may take them back. [52:44.920 --> 52:46.880] Now, I'm visually impaired. [52:47.080 --> 52:47.380] Uh-huh. [52:47.380 --> 52:49.020] And I have an electronic dog that... [52:49.820 --> 52:52.500] I won't even ask, but continue because we're running out of time. [52:52.740 --> 52:57.460] It helps me navigate and circumvent the system. [52:57.680 --> 53:06.260] You know, in other words, if the light is red, if the light is green, to cross the street, to buy a car, you know, to have a coffee. [53:06.960 --> 53:07.400] Okay. [53:07.620 --> 53:09.460] You know, the dog will mobulate me. [53:09.700 --> 53:10.020] All right. [53:10.020 --> 53:15.620] So, now, the question is, this electronic dog sometimes erases my MetroCard, and I say bad dog. [53:15.740 --> 53:16.020] Ah. [53:17.340 --> 53:17.700] Well... [53:17.700 --> 53:18.280] Does that work? [53:19.380 --> 53:20.100] That's, uh... [53:20.100 --> 53:21.620] You want to tackle that one, Redbird? [53:22.120 --> 53:23.320] I don't know what to say. [53:23.740 --> 53:29.580] I guess magnetic waves of some sort, which apparently emanate from his electronic dog, is it? [53:30.880 --> 53:32.520] They could affect the MetroCard. [53:33.100 --> 53:37.480] And, well, what you can do in a situation like that, you can send the MetroCard in, right? [53:37.560 --> 53:37.980] Yes, you can. [53:37.980 --> 53:39.260] And they have the serial number there. [53:39.260 --> 53:45.920] So, we're glad we were able to help you with that problem, and hope that maybe you contact us with another one in the future. [53:46.820 --> 53:47.560] Let's go over here. [53:47.600 --> 53:48.020] Thanks for the call. [53:48.160 --> 53:48.580] Yeah, good evening. [53:48.700 --> 53:49.060] You're on the air. [53:49.340 --> 53:49.480] Yes. [53:49.580 --> 53:50.060] Hi, guys. [53:50.260 --> 53:50.440] Hi. [54:14.780 --> 54:16.680] You can just read it if it's not, you know, an emergency. [54:17.040 --> 54:17.180] Right. [54:17.280 --> 54:21.240] The other thing is that text messaging appears to... requires more mental work. [54:21.800 --> 54:22.980] I think that's great. [54:23.000 --> 54:28.280] I would like to see the youth using it more often because it requires spelling, et cetera. [54:28.940 --> 54:32.020] Oh, well, you know, spelling, they kind of sometimes don't use that. [54:32.160 --> 54:32.840] Yeah, they'll shorten that. [54:32.940 --> 54:35.060] They'll change the word you to just a capital... [54:35.060 --> 54:38.360] Yeah, sometimes they just bypass the spelling, and you get all kinds of weird words. [54:38.360 --> 54:39.940] But thanks for your call. [54:40.160 --> 54:41.920] Let's go up here. [54:42.280 --> 54:43.200] And good evening. [54:43.300 --> 54:43.720] You're on the air. [54:44.220 --> 54:50.700] I'm just wondering, did I ever tell you the story about Verizon where they... [54:51.560 --> 55:08.680] When they started giving DSL, they were normally giving everyone the 700 download and the 128 upload, and about a few months ago, they improved their technology so that they're now giving 1.5 for DSL and 386 upload. [55:09.080 --> 55:09.940] I called... [55:09.940 --> 55:10.480] They were called... [55:10.480 --> 55:16.860] Every time you call them for anything, they try to upsell you with a contract for a year. [55:17.060 --> 55:21.840] Finally, I just asked them, how can I get the new 1.5? [55:22.040 --> 55:24.420] Can I upgrade my DSL? [55:24.540 --> 55:26.240] Can I buy a new DSL line? [55:26.420 --> 55:30.200] They said, oh, that was available free for all of our customers. [55:30.200 --> 55:31.240] I insisted. [55:31.260 --> 55:32.920] Why didn't you tell us? [55:32.920 --> 55:40.400] Because every time I called you, you would insist on wasting my time trying to sell me products and services and all this. [55:40.460 --> 55:48.660] And he told me point blank, and I verified this with another worker, Verizon told their workers not to volunteer that information. [55:48.660 --> 56:03.000] If a customer found out on his or her own and asked them, they would admit it, but not to volunteer that all DSL users who were originally under the 768 plan could get free upgrades to 1.5. [56:03.360 --> 56:06.900] And when I got the upgrade, it only took me two hours. [56:07.060 --> 56:12.240] Two hours later, because of the Verizon paid, it allows you to test your DSL speed. [56:12.620 --> 56:14.260] Two hours later, it was upgraded. [56:14.500 --> 56:20.060] Once I got the OK, I said, yes, I wanted upgraded, of course. [56:20.720 --> 56:22.320] After that, two hours later. [56:22.320 --> 56:29.580] So all Verizon customers who brought it before the 1.5 are eligible to get the 1.5 upgrade free. [56:29.720 --> 56:34.840] And it only takes two hours from the time you give them permission to the time that your speed is upgraded. [56:35.160 --> 56:35.480] Okay. [56:35.960 --> 56:41.300] Just, yeah, basically all they have to do is send a new configuration file to your DSL modem. [56:41.420 --> 56:47.160] And that would, the rules usually, like with cable modems and DSL modems, I mean, there are limitations as far as the line goes. [56:47.160 --> 56:53.660] But it's the rule, as far as what speed you can get, is on the modem itself, in a configuration file that you just send downstream. [56:54.440 --> 56:56.320] So it shouldn't, you know, it doesn't... [56:56.320 --> 56:57.400] It's standard practice. [56:57.600 --> 57:06.960] It's standard practice that companies don't tell you about better deals and that they instruct their representatives not to do that and that they get in trouble if they volunteer that information. [57:06.960 --> 57:08.300] They are advertising it now, though. [57:08.360 --> 57:09.460] They say it's double the speed. [57:09.460 --> 57:13.600] But I guess they're not voluntarily sending new configurations to people's modems. [57:13.760 --> 57:13.980] Yeah. [57:14.920 --> 57:16.360] Well, you know, we're just about out of time. [57:17.160 --> 57:19.020] I want to thank everybody for calling in. [57:19.140 --> 57:22.440] And you can write to us, O-T-H at 2600.com. [57:23.020 --> 57:28.220] And you can also send us paper mail at OffTheHook, care of WBAI, 120 Wall Street, New York, New York. [57:28.420 --> 57:30.280] 1-0-0-0-5. [57:31.180 --> 57:32.840] And that's going to just about do it. [57:33.000 --> 57:35.720] Stay tuned for the Personal Computer Show coming up next. [57:35.960 --> 57:36.340] See ya. [57:37.820 --> 58:05.320] Well, you wonder why I always dress in black Why you never see bright colors on my back And why does my appearance seem to have a somber tone Well, there's a reason for the things that I have on I wear the black for the poor and the beaten down Living in the hopeless, [58:05.600 --> 58:39.120] hungry side of town I wear it for the prisoner who has long paid for his crime But is there because he's a victim of the time I wear the black for those who've never read Or listen to the words that Jesus said About the road to happiness through love and charity Why you think he's talking straight to you and me Well, [58:39.340 --> 59:20.440] we're doing mighty fine, I do suppose In our streak of lightning, cars, and fancy clothes But just so we're reminded Of the ones who are held back Up front, there ought to be a man in black I wear it for the sick and lonely old For the reckless ones whose bad trip left them cold I wear the black in mourning For the lives that could have been Each week we lose a hundred fine young men And I wear it [59:20.440 --> 59:59.280] for the thousands who have died Believin' that the Lord was on their side I wear it for another hundred thousand who have died Believin' that we all were on their side Well, there's things that never will be right I know And things need changing everywhere you go But till we start to make a move To make a few things right You'll never see me wear a suit of white Oh, [59:59.380 --> 01:00:17.760] I'd love to wear a rainbow every day And tell the world that everything's okay But I'll try to carry off a little darkness on my back Till things are brighter I'm the man in black [01:00:25.210 --> 01:00:35.330] You are listening to Pacifica Valley WBAI 99.5 FM in New York City. [01:00:35.690 --> 01:00:36.950] Get up, stand up. [01:00:38.190 --> 01:00:40.190] Stand up for your right. [01:00:41.350 --> 01:00:43.150] Get up, stand up. [01:00:44.410 --> 01:00:46.410] Stand up for your right. [01:00:47.490 --> 01:00:49.330] Get up, stand up. [01:00:50.590 --> 01:00:52.570] Stand up for your right. [01:00:53.610 --> 01:00:55.670] Get up, stand up for your right.