[00:02.140 --> 00:05.540]  Hi, I'm Bernard White, Program Director here at WBAI.
[00:05.620 --> 00:11.440]  And I'm taking this moment to thank all of our faithful listeners and let you know that we appreciate your support.
[00:11.640 --> 00:13.580]  In fact, we could not survive without it.
[00:13.800 --> 00:20.500]  However, looking back through our records, we see that there are some of you who have not yet honored your pledges from the last Fund Drive.
[00:20.740 --> 00:29.060]  Therefore, we're requesting that those of you who pledged in the October 2004 Fund Drive take this opportunity to honor your past pledges.
[00:29.060 --> 00:34.860]  We know that sometimes things come up that make it difficult to follow through on your commitment.
[00:35.100 --> 00:41.880]  However, we hope that things have kind of straightened themselves out and you will take this moment to honor your pledge.
[00:42.040 --> 00:43.400]  We appreciate your support.
[00:43.620 --> 00:44.040]  Thank you.
[00:52.300 --> 00:54.260]  And it's just about 7 o'clock.
[00:54.260 --> 00:58.020]  You're listening to radio station WBAI in New York.
[00:58.300 --> 01:00.700]  It's time now for Off the Hook.
[02:25.950 --> 02:27.150]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:27.350 --> 02:28.570]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:28.670 --> 02:35.710]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you for the next hour or so, along with a whole bunch of characters here and on the phone.
[02:36.490 --> 02:39.950]  As we settle in for the first show in a couple of weeks.
[02:40.170 --> 02:42.030]  And I think we're here for a while.
[02:42.190 --> 02:48.390]  We're not preempted for the next, well, the next week at least, from what I have heard, which is sort of unprecedented.
[02:49.730 --> 02:51.090]  Very good evening to everybody.
[02:51.790 --> 02:54.090]  Bernie, you're down there in Philadelphia, I believe.
[02:54.370 --> 02:56.350]  Yes, on a landline, so I may sound different.
[02:56.550 --> 02:57.450]  You sound much better.
[02:58.090 --> 02:58.890]  Listen to that.
[02:59.430 --> 02:59.830]  Wow.
[02:59.830 --> 03:03.650]  Well, I'm using special voice enhancing equipment, so I sound much more professional.
[03:03.650 --> 03:05.350]  It's how phone calls used to sound.
[03:06.770 --> 03:16.170]  Actually, it's going through a T1, so it's not purely analog, but it's better than a 4 kilobit per second vocoder on Sprint PCS.
[03:16.290 --> 03:22.210]  Well, I mean, it's just amazing to me how we've become used to the way cell phones sound and how crappy they sound.
[03:22.230 --> 03:22.810]  And they really do.
[03:22.910 --> 03:26.690]  They sound awful compared to the good old-fashioned Bell analog days.
[03:26.690 --> 03:35.110]  We're really putting up with a lot, and not to mention the poor audio quality with digital cell phones is the latency, which, I don't know if you ever try to...
[03:35.110 --> 03:38.710]  Everybody tries to get a word in edgewise sometimes during a cell phone conversation.
[03:39.230 --> 03:41.630]  It's very difficult to do because there's that delay.
[03:42.110 --> 03:43.130]  You know what you also have?
[03:43.150 --> 03:43.690]  Hold on a second.
[03:44.210 --> 03:45.270]  No, it's not you.
[03:45.430 --> 03:46.210]  It's us.
[03:46.630 --> 03:47.450]  Do you hear that hum?
[03:48.070 --> 03:48.690]  What's humming?
[03:49.090 --> 03:51.110]  I think it's the cart machine.
[03:51.790 --> 03:53.590]  The cart... What's making that noise?
[03:53.590 --> 03:55.670]  Oh, that was just some other equipment I have here.
[03:55.810 --> 03:56.790]  Pay no mind to this.
[03:56.810 --> 04:05.930]  No, something... If someone can track down the source of that low-pitched hum that's coming from somewhere around here and kill it, whatever it is, because it's driving me insane.
[04:06.030 --> 04:07.550]  I think it's very small people drilling.
[04:08.050 --> 04:09.110]  Whatever it is, yeah.
[04:09.410 --> 04:11.030]  And unplug that thing, too.
[04:11.950 --> 04:13.750]  Bernie, you had a very interesting encounter.
[04:14.030 --> 04:15.530]  You came up here to see the gates.
[04:15.790 --> 04:16.870]  What did you think of the gates, by the way?
[04:18.110 --> 04:19.630]  Oh, it was pretty amazing.
[04:19.750 --> 04:23.050]  Just the scale of this project was pretty amazing.
[04:23.050 --> 04:24.150]  What color were they, Bernie?
[04:24.510 --> 04:25.170]  They were orange.
[04:25.310 --> 04:25.450]  All right.
[04:25.530 --> 04:27.470]  I just wanted to make sure you actually came up, you know?
[04:27.610 --> 04:29.770]  And I have a piece of one of the curtains.
[04:29.930 --> 04:30.690]  Are you kidding me?
[04:30.690 --> 04:32.510]  You're not supposed to take pieces of the gates.
[04:32.550 --> 04:33.450]  I did not take... I did not...
[04:33.450 --> 04:37.810]  You know, Chris goes... He's one of our listeners, and he is going to be really upset now.
[04:37.950 --> 04:40.170]  I did not deface any of the gates.
[04:40.590 --> 04:41.010]  All right.
[04:41.110 --> 04:42.690]  Well, tell us what you thought of them.
[04:42.690 --> 04:47.630]  There was a... They had a few guides there explaining to people what was where and so forth.
[04:47.950 --> 04:51.830]  And one of them, I asked if I could take her picture.
[04:52.810 --> 04:53.810]  And she said, sure.
[04:53.930 --> 04:55.370]  Her name is Dominique Borrell.
[04:56.150 --> 04:59.170]  And I showed her the picture of my digital camera, and she liked the picture so much.
[04:59.190 --> 05:00.030]  She said, oh, could you email me?
[05:00.110 --> 05:00.750]  That's a great picture.
[05:01.350 --> 05:02.430]  And so I said, sure.
[05:02.550 --> 05:03.290]  And she gave me her address.
[05:03.470 --> 05:10.410]  And then she handed me a piece of cloth from one of the curtains on one of the gates.
[05:10.590 --> 05:14.350]  Apparently, they were... The volunteers were given a few pieces of the material.
[05:14.970 --> 05:17.710]  So I have an actual piece of the exhibit.
[05:19.270 --> 05:19.950]  I'm sorry, Brian.
[05:20.350 --> 05:24.370]  We basically just let you tread water there for a second because we were trying to figure out where this hum is coming from.
[05:24.470 --> 05:27.630]  We found out it's only in my headphones, so we're not going to worry about it anymore.
[05:27.850 --> 05:28.510]  It's only in your head?
[05:28.510 --> 05:29.790]  Yeah, yeah.
[05:30.030 --> 05:30.890]  I guess so.
[05:31.350 --> 05:34.730]  But you had an interesting encounter coming up here to New York.
[05:35.250 --> 05:39.690]  You had some kind of a run-in with people in train stations, and you were taking pictures and things.
[05:39.750 --> 05:40.290]  What happened?
[05:40.490 --> 05:40.810]  Well, yeah.
[05:41.050 --> 05:46.770]  I departed from Philadelphia at the Big 30th Street Station, which used to be Pennsylvania Railroad Station.
[05:47.010 --> 05:54.590]  And before I departed, I decided to buy my New Jersey transit ticket there, which I would use from Trenton to New York's Penn Station.
[05:54.590 --> 05:58.370]  I would travel via SEPTA from Philly to Trenton.
[05:58.370 --> 06:04.230]  But anyway, the NJT ticket machine was down, and there were two technicians working on it, and a bunch of people were standing in line.
[06:04.470 --> 06:07.230]  And the other machine they had at that station for that is down.
[06:07.630 --> 06:13.350]  So we're all waiting, and while the machine was open, and they were poking around in its innards, I figured, oh, what a great picture.
[06:13.350 --> 06:15.930]  So I took a picture, and they just went crazy.
[06:16.610 --> 06:19.730]  I took a picture of this open ticketing machine.
[06:20.210 --> 06:22.370]  When you say they, who's they?
[06:22.370 --> 06:28.810]  These were two New Jersey transit employees whose job was to fix broken ticketing machines.
[06:30.510 --> 06:33.650]  And they got really irate at me for taking that picture.
[06:33.850 --> 06:38.530]  And then I was going to take another one, and they were, like, standing in front of it with their arms out.
[06:38.670 --> 06:39.950]  It was crazy.
[06:39.950 --> 06:41.250]  I hope you got a picture of that.
[06:41.450 --> 06:48.070]  Well, no, at that point, I said, listen, I don't want to upset you, but I'm...
[06:48.070 --> 06:49.810]  You're on assignment for off the hook.
[06:49.830 --> 06:50.610]  You have to take pictures.
[06:50.910 --> 06:51.590]  It's important.
[06:52.090 --> 06:55.850]  Well, they said that they were going to confiscate my camera.
[06:56.090 --> 06:59.770]  And I said, well, I'm standing here in a public place taking pictures.
[07:00.890 --> 07:07.490]  And they said, well, if this was a New Jersey transit cop, and we're going to try to find one, he'll confiscate your camera.
[07:07.490 --> 07:09.010]  Yeah, because they weren't law enforcement people.
[07:09.150 --> 07:11.230]  They're just, you know, technicians.
[07:11.410 --> 07:13.290]  So a New Jersey transit cop would...
[07:13.290 --> 07:13.850]  Well, they weren't even...
[07:13.850 --> 07:23.070]  They were going to try to find a New Jersey transit cop who don't really work at 30th Street Station, but they do travel on the trains the full route from 30th Street Station to Trenton and back and forth.
[07:23.190 --> 07:25.730]  They just sort of, like, ride the trains back and forth.
[07:25.850 --> 07:27.450]  But a Philadelphia cop wouldn't have done this?
[07:27.810 --> 07:32.290]  Well, he apparently preferred a New Jersey transit cop, which he couldn't find.
[07:33.450 --> 07:35.670]  So I said, well, how about an Amtrak cop?
[07:35.770 --> 07:37.210]  Could we see an Amtrak cop?
[07:37.610 --> 07:41.010]  You're having this discussion with them in the train station as to which cop would be best.
[07:41.050 --> 07:48.250]  And there was a big crowd of people there, so I felt confident that this wouldn't be done, like, under cover of darkness, like most police operate and, you know, get away with stuff without witnesses.
[07:48.250 --> 07:49.930]  A big crowd of people watching this exchange?
[07:50.150 --> 07:51.010]  Yeah, that was funny.
[07:51.190 --> 07:55.350]  So I felt quite secure that there were plenty of witnesses here to this inane conversation.
[07:55.350 --> 08:03.890]  And so I walked over to... I actually suggested to the other technician, let's go over and talk to these Amtrak cops over there.
[08:04.050 --> 08:07.350]  So we walked about, you know, a couple hundred feet to some two Amtrak cops.
[08:07.430 --> 08:16.270]  And they both confirmed that, no, you can possess and use cameras anywhere in 30th Street Station that's in normal areas that the public would be working, you know, standing around.
[08:17.130 --> 08:25.870]  And the technician, the one technician walked back with me, he was quite upset that, perturbed that his, you know, theory that this was illegal was way off.
[08:25.930 --> 08:29.410]  And if Amtrak cops say that, I guess that applies to all of Penn Station here in New York as well.
[08:30.270 --> 08:36.190]  One would think so, but apparently there's these overlapping jurisdictions and nobody seems to really have the straight story.
[08:36.550 --> 08:41.690]  But the other technician said, well, if you call this number on the front of the machine here, you'll see that it really is illegal.
[08:42.570 --> 08:46.490]  So I wrote down the number and I, actually, I was trying to dial the number right there.
[08:46.570 --> 08:49.430]  He said, well, you won't get a hold of them now because it's the weekend.
[08:49.630 --> 08:50.630]  This is Sunday morning.
[08:51.310 --> 08:55.210]  So come Monday, I started making phone calls.
[08:55.310 --> 08:58.310]  That number didn't work because it was an 800 number that you can only call from New Jersey.
[08:59.130 --> 09:06.030]  And I finally called and through a bunch of dead ends, I finally reached the New Jersey Transit Police Headquarters up in Newark.
[09:07.010 --> 09:18.730]  And I spoke with Captain Luccarelli, who I was advised by someone else, is the person who could really answer my question about the legality of taking pictures and the legality of confiscating cameras and so forth.
[09:18.850 --> 09:20.330]  And what did Captain Luccarelli have to say?
[09:20.450 --> 09:28.030]  Well, he, first he confirmed that the New Jersey Transit Police have absolutely no jurisdiction in Philadelphia's 30th Street Station, so they can't do anything.
[09:29.970 --> 09:31.810]  Then he wanted to know who I was.
[09:31.810 --> 09:33.930]  He was pretty interested in why I was asking these questions.
[09:33.930 --> 09:41.510]  And I just told him I was a New Jersey Transit customer and I want to comply with all your regulations and laws and just want to keep up on that stuff.
[09:42.330 --> 09:55.030]  So I explained the incident to him, and he admitted, finally, that there's no law or statute that prohibits taking photos or videos in public areas at 30th Street Station or any other train stations served by New Jersey Transit.
[09:55.490 --> 10:09.790]  But he did say that they frown on people taking pictures, and they always attempt to get voluntary compliance, that was his phrase, by asking people to turn over their film or memory cards for review by, quote, qualified security personnel.
[10:10.030 --> 10:18.250]  How in God's name can you voluntarily ask somebody to turn over their film and expect any kind of voluntary compliance with that?
[10:18.250 --> 10:21.590]  Well, apparently they don't make it really clear that it's voluntary when they demand it.
[10:22.250 --> 10:26.550]  Do you really have to ask, is this voluntary, or do I have to really do this?
[10:26.930 --> 10:29.070]  Always ask questions, in my opinion.
[10:29.270 --> 10:30.210]  And that's what you do.
[10:30.350 --> 10:31.490]  It sometimes gets you into a lot of trouble.
[10:31.750 --> 10:34.910]  Oh, it has gotten me in many pieces of trouble, but it makes for an interesting life.
[10:35.130 --> 10:44.790]  So I asked Captain Luccarelli if I could have the email address of one of these qualified security personnel so I could email him these pictures so they could be suitably reviewed.
[10:44.790 --> 10:47.990]  And he declined to give me the email address.
[10:48.330 --> 10:50.070]  You are in such trouble sometimes.
[10:51.170 --> 10:55.930]  So, okay, but we're going to get those addresses anyway, somehow, and find out how to do this.
[10:55.950 --> 11:07.690]  Better than that, Captain Luccarelli admitted that the New Jersey Transit employees were actually wrong for threatening to take my camera away and for using the false pretext of a non-existent law as justification.
[11:08.330 --> 11:13.970]  Now, I asked him if it would be a criminal offense if I had threatened to take someone's camera away under false pretext.
[11:14.750 --> 11:16.790]  And he said, yes, that would be illegal if I did that.
[11:16.790 --> 11:21.730]  But he stopped just short of admitting the New Jersey Transit technicians had committed a crime by doing just that.
[11:21.750 --> 11:22.770]  Well, cops can break the law.
[11:22.890 --> 11:23.490]  They do it all the time.
[11:23.570 --> 11:25.090]  These are not even cops who had threatened me.
[11:25.230 --> 11:28.930]  These were New Jersey Transit ticket machine technicians.
[11:29.230 --> 11:31.070]  Did they actually threaten to take your camera away themselves?
[11:31.210 --> 11:33.070]  Yeah, they said, I'm going to take that camera away from you.
[11:33.130 --> 11:34.510]  Oh, I see.
[11:35.570 --> 11:36.190]  Very interesting.
[11:36.330 --> 11:38.010]  But he seemed really exasperated by the whole thing.
[11:38.110 --> 11:39.210]  He just seemed exhausted.
[11:39.210 --> 11:43.930]  He said, because we talked for about 10, 15 minutes, and he said, look, we're doing the best we can.
[11:44.110 --> 11:46.270]  And since 9-11, we have to be really careful.
[11:46.890 --> 11:48.110]  And I agreed with him.
[11:48.230 --> 11:50.890]  I said, being very careful was a really good practice.
[11:50.890 --> 11:54.670]  And I'd hope that New Jersey Transit employees would be more careful in the future.
[11:54.830 --> 11:56.310]  And what would they say and what would they do?
[11:57.530 --> 11:57.850]  Yes.
[11:57.930 --> 11:59.210]  Did he catch your subtle...
[11:59.910 --> 12:04.070]  I don't know if he quite... At that point, I think he just wanted to get off the phone.
[12:04.170 --> 12:06.670]  Yeah, I can imagine that that was probably the theme of the whole conversation.
[12:07.850 --> 12:17.130]  I think we should get some cameras confiscated by some cheap campers, especially for this purpose, and see what the qualified security people have to say about the photos we took.
[12:17.370 --> 12:19.130]  Well, I don't know if you get feedback on them.
[12:19.270 --> 12:33.150]  We should take some really interesting pictures, and I'm not going to qualify that any further, but just take a lot of really interesting pictures and then be caught with the camera in a train station, have them confiscated, just so they can go on a wild goose chase and try to figure out what these other interesting pictures are all about.
[12:33.150 --> 12:39.050]  They probably have people who have no... their only job is to review these pictures from confiscated cameras, I guess, you know?
[12:39.930 --> 12:40.610]  What a job.
[12:40.890 --> 12:41.630]  Yeah, what a job.
[12:41.890 --> 12:42.310]  I was just going to ask...
[12:42.310 --> 12:42.990]  Tax dollars at work.
[12:43.430 --> 12:46.450]  I was just going to ask, where do they bring these?
[12:46.630 --> 12:51.010]  I mean, do they have equipment to read every type of memory card and...
[12:51.010 --> 12:54.190]  Well, it's probably not too difficult to... there's only certain standard types.
[12:54.190 --> 12:57.670]  So they would be taking these and then returning them to you via mail or something?
[12:58.350 --> 12:58.750]  Jim...
[12:58.750 --> 13:00.810]  Well, it's not really clear that they return things to you.
[13:00.810 --> 13:01.870]  Yeah, two things.
[13:01.990 --> 13:05.970]  You should have asked for a snail mail address where you could mail prints of the pictures for review.
[13:06.210 --> 13:08.550]  Yeah, well, I thought the email address was a good question.
[13:08.630 --> 13:22.910]  And the other thing is, you know, the easy thing to do is they have some mail clerk who gets all these submissions and immediately decides by telepathy that, well, it's too much security revealed in this photo, on this memory card.
[13:22.910 --> 13:26.710]  It saves money having to read the memory cards and develop the film.
[13:26.710 --> 13:36.550]  Well, if any listeners are interested in finding out more about this, Captain Luccarelli's telephone number is area code 973-491-8213.
[13:36.550 --> 13:44.070]  And he seems pretty qualified at being able to answer any questions related to the confiscation of cameras or threatening people with taking their cameras, you know, that kind of stuff.
[13:44.190 --> 13:45.310]  Now, this is not for the subway.
[13:45.330 --> 13:47.010]  This is for Amtrak stations?
[13:47.210 --> 13:48.790]  This is for New Jersey Transit.
[13:48.990 --> 13:49.910]  Just New Jersey Transit?
[13:50.050 --> 13:50.150]  Right.
[13:50.150 --> 13:53.590]  Okay, which basically covers from New York down to Trenton.
[13:53.590 --> 13:54.130]  Right.
[13:54.510 --> 13:54.950]  Okay.
[13:55.370 --> 13:59.110]  And they go hitherto, also other places, off the beaten path.
[13:59.910 --> 14:02.250]  Now, where was your initial encounter with these workers?
[14:04.030 --> 14:04.470]  Yeah.
[14:04.950 --> 14:06.350]  I thought it was in Philadelphia, apparently.
[14:06.350 --> 14:07.450]  It was, at 30th Street Station.
[14:07.650 --> 14:08.850]  But they have a New Jersey Transit.
[14:09.030 --> 14:12.350]  Even though no New Jersey Transit trains travel to Philadelphia...
[14:12.350 --> 14:12.870]  That's what I was wondering.
[14:12.870 --> 14:24.070]  They have two New Jersey Transit ticket machines there so people can buy their tickets in advance so that when they get to Trenton... Because a lot of times there's only like a few seconds from... They don't coordinate this very well.
[14:24.150 --> 14:35.730]  When the SEPTA train, the R7, gets to Trenton, invariably there's only moments to spare between when you get off that train and you have to get on the New Jersey Transit train to New York's Penn Station.
[14:35.850 --> 14:39.090]  And there's no time to get tickets because, you know, there'd be a long line of people.
[14:39.250 --> 14:40.290]  It just doesn't work.
[14:40.390 --> 14:47.350]  So people who are smart get their tickets in Philly so they don't miss the connecting train to New York and have to wait another hour for the next train.
[14:47.950 --> 14:50.470]  So I guess they finally put tickets down there.
[14:50.590 --> 14:54.010]  But by the way, those machines were running Windows 98.
[14:55.270 --> 14:59.770]  Does not New Jersey Transit run a service from Philadelphia to Atlantic City?
[15:01.590 --> 15:02.630]  You know they do.
[15:03.230 --> 15:04.910]  But no, I don't think... No, they don't.
[15:04.930 --> 15:05.870]  It's not from Philadelphia.
[15:06.150 --> 15:08.310]  It's from on the other side of the river.
[15:08.310 --> 15:08.850]  Okay.
[15:09.550 --> 15:11.550]  So you take a... How would you know that, Mike?
[15:11.810 --> 15:13.110]  You know, I know all kinds of things.
[15:13.270 --> 15:14.430]  You can take a PATCO line.
[15:14.570 --> 15:24.210]  You can take a PATCO line from Philadelphia to... Well, PATCO is a very mysterious thing that you got down there, sort of like our PATH trains up here.
[15:24.630 --> 15:28.610]  So once you get across the river, then you can take New Jersey Transit down to Atlantic City.
[15:29.230 --> 15:29.630]  Okay.
[15:29.770 --> 15:36.610]  Well, listen, let's continue on with this theme of threats in train stations and things like this.
[15:36.610 --> 15:39.410]  This is a story that has been breaking today.
[15:39.930 --> 15:45.930]  Evidence that the suspects in the Madrid train bombing may have also been setting their sights on Grand Central Terminal.
[15:46.270 --> 15:48.930]  But New York City officials are downplaying the report.
[15:49.170 --> 15:57.430]  Now, a Spanish newspaper reported today that detailed plans of the New York transit hub were found on a computer seized from the home of one of the suspects.
[15:57.650 --> 16:05.570]  The paper site sources close to the investigation is saying a handmade drawing of station and specialized technical information about it were on the hard drive.
[16:05.570 --> 16:06.570]  I'm not sure.
[16:06.670 --> 16:09.830]  They drew a picture and then, I guess, scanned it or something like that.
[16:10.070 --> 16:15.130]  But city officials have acknowledged the seized laptop but said it was not particularly a cause for alarm.
[16:15.350 --> 16:17.810]  There's no information about a specific plot to attack Grand Central.
[16:17.910 --> 16:25.070]  Now, I think this is pretty interesting because it sort of parallels what happened with the Citigroup building earlier last year.
[16:25.910 --> 16:28.210]  And there was no specific threat there.
[16:28.270 --> 16:34.150]  I think there were pictures of various buildings found somewhere in Afghanistan or Iraq or something like that.
[16:34.150 --> 16:42.770]  And they used that as pretext to basically shut down the building to the public and to install metal detectors, which are there to this day.
[16:44.470 --> 16:47.930]  And here, the city is downplaying it.
[16:48.030 --> 16:49.370]  So, you know, it's kind of a conflict.
[16:49.890 --> 16:54.550]  You wonder what makes them downplay it once and react completely historically another time.
[16:54.650 --> 16:59.830]  It's also completely vague as to what it means to say they found a handmade drawing on this guy's computer.
[16:59.830 --> 17:08.410]  For all we know, he could have just been, you know, before he got to Madrid, he could have just been downloading drawings of terminals all across the world and not drawn by him.
[17:08.550 --> 17:15.590]  I have some personal experience about this interpretation of hand-drawn drawings by federal law enforcement people.
[17:15.810 --> 17:16.130]  Yes.
[17:16.130 --> 17:37.230]  When my home was raided back in 1995 by the Secret Service, by the time my pretrial dates came up in court, it was announced by the Secret Service in court to the judge that they found a sketch, a hand-drawn sketch of a bomb in my personal files.
[17:38.450 --> 17:40.670]  And I'm like, what the hell are they talking about?
[17:42.210 --> 17:58.230]  And finally I found out what they were talking about was a drawing of a model rocket engine that my friend Bob gave me back in the 70s when I was in high school on how to build a model rocket engine without having to pay Estes, you know, too much money for their E-engines,
[17:58.350 --> 18:00.850]  which are the ones that make your rockets go higher.
[18:01.110 --> 18:01.810]  And I had that.
[18:01.910 --> 18:03.590]  I just, you know, I collect all kinds of information.
[18:03.810 --> 18:05.650]  Are you sure you want to be confessing this on the air?
[18:05.650 --> 18:06.970]  Well, sure.
[18:07.270 --> 18:09.230]  I mean, statute of limitations is over.
[18:09.370 --> 18:10.070]  It was 10 years ago now.
[18:10.210 --> 18:18.490]  But in any case, anybody who knew anything about chemistry or physics would look at this and say, this couldn't possibly be a bomb because it's not an enclosed thing.
[18:18.490 --> 18:20.190]  There's a nozzle on it and all that.
[18:20.810 --> 18:27.430]  And, you know, but they, I believe, consciously misrepresented this as a sketch of a bomb.
[18:27.590 --> 18:30.050]  So who knows what this sketch really is that they're talking about.
[18:30.150 --> 18:35.730]  It would be nice if it were in the public record so people would look at it and say, it's not really what it is anyway.
[18:35.950 --> 18:42.910]  But, you know, the other thing, and I'm no expert on bombing train stations, but I don't think you need to draw a map in order to pull it off successfully.
[18:42.910 --> 18:47.570]  You can just plant things in various places and they go boom and that's that.
[18:48.310 --> 18:50.310]  People have sketches for all kinds of different reasons.
[18:50.430 --> 18:57.810]  Yeah, it might be of interest that this guy had some kind of relationship with the 311 bombers, but, you know, sketches...
[18:57.810 --> 18:59.970]  I mean, I think the city is right in downplaying it.
[18:59.970 --> 19:13.410]  I just wonder why obvious other vague type of references aren't also downplayed because it's ridiculous to live in complete fear and panic and to restrict people's movements the way that they've been doing in other cases.
[19:13.670 --> 19:14.830]  Now, this is...
[19:14.830 --> 19:21.930]  I don't know if you guys read Bruce Schneier's Cryptogram newsletter, but it's a terrific publication that's out there.
[19:22.130 --> 19:23.310]  And there's a recent issue.
[19:23.590 --> 19:26.650]  You can see it at www.schneier.com.
[19:26.730 --> 19:30.430]  That's S-C-H-N-E-I-E-R.com slash crypto-gram.
[19:31.890 --> 19:35.510]  Bruce spoke at our last HOPE conference on a variety of issues.
[19:35.610 --> 19:37.170]  But this is something interesting.
[19:37.470 --> 19:44.790]  He was participating in a working group studying the security and privacy of SecureFlight, SecureFlight being the U.S.
[19:44.890 --> 19:48.670]  government's program to match airline passengers with a terrorist watch list.
[19:49.490 --> 19:54.790]  That's why certain people with certain names get pulled off planes, even though they don't know what's going on.
[19:56.550 --> 20:03.510]  Basically, he came up with four conclusions that I think are pretty interesting to sum up here.
[20:03.610 --> 20:14.210]  One, assuming we need to implement a program of matching airline passengers with names on terrorism watch lists, SecureFlight is a major improvement in almost every way over what is currently in place.
[20:14.210 --> 20:19.110]  And by this, I mean the matching program, not any potential uses of commercial or other third-party data.
[20:19.630 --> 20:23.890]  Two, the security system surrounding SecureFlight is riddled with security holes.
[20:24.130 --> 20:30.770]  There are security problems with false IDs, ID verification, the ability to fly on someone else's ticket, airline procedures, etc.
[20:31.030 --> 20:36.750]  There are so many ways for a terrorist to get around the system that it doesn't provide much security.
[20:37.190 --> 20:40.950]  Three, the urge to use this system for other things will be irresistible.
[20:40.950 --> 20:47.830]  It's just too easy to say, as long as you've got the system that watches out for terrorists, how about also looking for this list of drug dealers?
[20:48.010 --> 20:50.370]  And by the way, we've got the Super Bowl to worry about, too.
[20:51.110 --> 20:56.710]  Once SecureFlight gets built, all it takes is a new law and we'll have a nationwide security checkpoint system.
[20:56.870 --> 21:00.390]  So when you go through an airplane, who knows what they'll...
[21:00.390 --> 21:01.910]  You know, if you have an unpaid parking ticket...
[21:01.910 --> 21:02.230]  Exactly.
[21:02.410 --> 21:02.930]  ...they'll know about it.
[21:03.170 --> 21:12.350]  And number four, a program of matching airline passengers with names on terrorism watch lists is not making us appreciably safer and is a lousy way to spend our security dollars.
[21:13.850 --> 21:17.850]  And it's absolutely a terrific point, I think.
[21:19.770 --> 21:25.830]  Basically, the point he makes is that this only works if somebody is getting onto an airplane.
[21:26.330 --> 21:26.990]  You know?
[21:27.110 --> 21:30.550]  And if somebody wants to blow up a shopping mall, it doesn't work there at all.
[21:31.550 --> 21:34.330]  It's completely a silly waste of security money.
[21:34.490 --> 21:41.410]  I think it still comes down to the fundamental issue of they're trying to get all this data in a centralized location so that they can apply it to whatever they want.
[21:41.550 --> 21:42.330]  That's the thing.
[21:42.570 --> 21:43.770]  Yeah, to whatever they want.
[21:43.970 --> 21:52.630]  Now, what Schneier says here, if I had millions of dollars to spend on terrorism security and I had a watch list of potential terrorists, I would spend that money investigating those people.
[21:52.850 --> 21:59.190]  I would try to determine whether or not they were a terrorism threat before they got to the airport or even if they had no intention of visiting an airport.
[21:59.190 --> 22:02.370]  I would try to prevent their plot regardless of whether it involved airplanes.
[22:02.650 --> 22:05.010]  I would clear the innocent people and I would go after the guilty.
[22:05.250 --> 22:10.010]  I wouldn't build a complex computerized infrastructure and wait until one of them happened to wander into an airport.
[22:10.210 --> 22:12.310]  It just doesn't make security sense.
[22:14.030 --> 22:14.470]  Thoughts?
[22:14.590 --> 22:16.570]  This is why they don't let Bruce Schneier run the bus.
[22:17.330 --> 22:21.270]  Well, you know, when a security expert says this doesn't make security sense, I think you got to listen.
[22:21.750 --> 22:22.030]  You really got to listen.
[22:22.030 --> 22:34.950]  But security is, as Bruce Schneier has pointed out himself, security or what they call security really has nothing to do with security, but it's primarily motivated by business interests in this and many other cases.
[22:35.070 --> 22:36.810]  Security theater, he calls it.
[22:37.290 --> 22:37.870]  Yeah, yeah.
[22:38.010 --> 22:39.070]  That's an appropriate term.
[22:40.610 --> 22:42.150]  And what's that you have over there, Redbird?
[22:42.210 --> 22:43.490]  It looks like a subway map.
[22:43.630 --> 22:44.590]  It is a subway map.
[22:44.590 --> 22:47.030]  That's the limited edition subway map.
[22:47.110 --> 22:53.770]  It was on the news a couple of days before I got my hands on one, which is probably less, a little bit longer than, you know, seven, eight days.
[22:53.770 --> 22:54.710]  What's unique about it?
[22:54.850 --> 23:00.390]  Well, what's unique about it is that they have a pointer to an item that doesn't yet exist.
[23:00.690 --> 23:02.850]  And this is what the map says in the front.
[23:02.990 --> 23:06.610]  It's the map to New York City's 2012 Olympic bid.
[23:06.850 --> 23:11.210]  And this came out just as the Olympic Committee was coming into the city.
[23:11.690 --> 23:22.070]  And it was distributed at supposedly most of the token booths, but I've only been able to obtain it at one, which doesn't have it anymore, and that was at Grand Central.
[23:22.070 --> 23:26.170]  This is the 2005 map, and it has fictitious locations on it.
[23:26.210 --> 23:30.510]  Yes, it has the West Side Stadium pointed out on the map itself.
[23:30.630 --> 23:30.810]  Oh, really?
[23:30.890 --> 23:31.290]  How nice.
[23:31.390 --> 23:32.250]  The West Side Stadium.
[23:32.870 --> 23:34.530]  It also has a photograph of it.
[23:34.610 --> 23:35.950]  It does have a photograph of it.
[23:35.990 --> 23:36.710]  And what they also...
[23:36.710 --> 23:37.990]  Does it have the Second Avenue subway?
[23:38.110 --> 23:38.610]  Does it have that?
[23:38.790 --> 23:39.170]  No, no.
[23:39.170 --> 23:39.990]  I didn't think so.
[23:40.330 --> 23:43.630]  Well, I mean, there's a limit to how much lying the MTA can do.
[23:43.770 --> 23:44.010]  Yeah.
[23:44.210 --> 23:47.550]  It has the Olympic Village there, and that doesn't exist yet either.
[23:47.730 --> 23:47.910]  Right.
[23:47.910 --> 23:56.590]  So basically, they pointed out on the subway map itself every location of every event that would take place in the 2012 Olympics.
[23:56.790 --> 24:07.170]  And what they also did is they eliminated the railroad map from the backside and put in place basically the same thing that they had in the front, but they expanded it to New Jersey and out a little bit further.
[24:07.350 --> 24:11.570]  But the thing is, I want one of these maps, and they're very hard to find right now.
[24:11.610 --> 24:15.610]  In fact, every subway booth clerk I've talked to has said they don't exist.
[24:15.610 --> 24:15.890]  Right.
[24:15.990 --> 24:19.170]  I've tried to get it at quite a few locations today.
[24:19.450 --> 24:23.510]  And actually, most of the token booth clerks had no idea what I was talking about.
[24:23.630 --> 24:27.510]  I mean, I went up to them, and they're like, oh, no, you know, we don't have a 2005 map yet.
[24:27.530 --> 24:28.310]  They haven't been made yet.
[24:28.310 --> 24:30.090]  And I'm like, yes, they have, you know.
[24:30.430 --> 24:33.410]  And they were very intent on the fact that, you know, these haven't been made yet.
[24:33.410 --> 24:36.290]  So I took it out of my backpack, and I'm like, it looks exactly like this one.
[24:37.890 --> 24:46.810]  I was looking at my map like this on the train up to New York on Sunday of somebody who's on the show kindly mailed one to me last week.
[24:46.950 --> 24:48.930]  So I used it on Sunday when I was walking around New York.
[24:49.390 --> 24:52.490]  And someone was looking over my shoulder at the map.
[24:52.610 --> 24:53.710]  It was sitting behind me on the train.
[24:53.890 --> 24:55.630]  And they said, where do you get that map?
[24:57.250 --> 24:59.550]  It had all these things on there that don't exist.
[25:00.010 --> 25:00.950]  Wait, you got one too, Bernie?
[25:01.210 --> 25:02.750]  I got one in the mail last week.
[25:02.970 --> 25:03.650]  Oh, okay.
[25:03.670 --> 25:04.850]  It was kind enough to mail one to me.
[25:04.990 --> 25:06.030]  Oh, you mailed one to Bernie.
[25:06.150 --> 25:06.870]  Okay, well, that's good.
[25:07.070 --> 25:10.070]  But if anyone out there knows how to get them, please let us know.
[25:10.250 --> 25:14.570]  O-T-H at 2600.com because these are interesting little items to have.
[25:14.570 --> 25:16.510]  Supposedly, they printed a half million of them.
[25:16.750 --> 25:28.110]  I talked to someone at Grand Central today and the only person who seemed to be knowledgeable about these things and he told me that they were very limited and that they probably weren't going to be receiving any more of them.
[25:28.390 --> 25:29.930]  Each station got like a box.
[25:30.590 --> 25:35.050]  So we got to fan out across the city after the show and see if we can find a station that hasn't given them all away.
[25:35.230 --> 25:35.390]  Right.
[25:36.170 --> 25:39.150]  You just handed me a MetroCard that's got a whole bunch of Olympic events on the back.
[25:39.410 --> 25:40.990]  There's propaganda all over the city.
[25:41.110 --> 25:41.270]  It's amazing.
[25:41.890 --> 25:42.570]  It's unbelievable.
[25:42.750 --> 25:43.910]  Who's paying for all this?
[25:43.910 --> 25:44.550]  That's what I want to know.
[25:44.550 --> 25:44.870]  We are.
[25:44.970 --> 25:45.450]  Of course we are.
[25:45.590 --> 25:46.370]  Taxpayers are definitely paying.
[25:46.370 --> 25:48.990]  I thought the Olympics were supposed to be totally non-taxpayer funded.
[25:49.130 --> 25:49.430]  I guess that didn't happen.
[25:49.430 --> 25:52.810]  Every city that has hosted the Olympics has wound up paying for it for decades afterwards.
[25:52.990 --> 25:55.550]  Montreal is still paying for their Olympics in 1976.
[25:56.050 --> 25:58.330]  It's a disaster waiting to happen.
[25:58.890 --> 25:59.970]  It's going to be like Greece.
[26:00.650 --> 26:01.710]  Yeah, it'll be like Greece.
[26:02.650 --> 26:03.690]  Why would it be like Greece?
[26:03.730 --> 26:18.630]  Not the musical, but when Greece hosted the Olympics it was just this huge production fiasco getting everything built in time and it was just with all the contractors and things weren't finished and it cost everybody who lives in Greece a huge amount of money.
[26:19.270 --> 26:28.770]  Well, I mean, I think mostly my main reason is because of how the NYPD proved themselves during the RNC to be completely incapable of handling crowds of any sort.
[26:29.430 --> 26:33.290]  Do you really want to live under that kind of police state again in 2012?
[26:33.290 --> 26:35.130]  and God knows how bad it'll get then.
[26:36.870 --> 26:38.290]  So, anyway, enough of that.
[26:38.990 --> 26:41.070]  We had an interesting development with T-Mobile.
[26:42.070 --> 26:50.850]  Of course, we all heard about the Paris Hilton nonsense and for those, I guess, who have been in a coma the last couple of weeks, yes, she had her cell phone hacked, apparently, and all her information got out.
[26:50.910 --> 26:52.590]  I think her information is being passed around the room.
[26:53.110 --> 26:53.770]  Who has it?
[26:53.930 --> 26:54.110]  Okay.
[26:54.330 --> 26:55.330]  Anything good in there?
[26:55.710 --> 26:55.950]  No?
[26:56.750 --> 26:57.710]  Celebrity phone numbers.
[26:57.850 --> 26:58.530]  Celebrity phone numbers.
[26:58.630 --> 26:59.790]  So we can call Eminem, right?
[27:00.350 --> 27:00.710]  Probably.
[27:00.750 --> 27:03.230]  Call Eminem right now and be dead by 8 o'clock, probably.
[27:04.850 --> 27:06.370]  He has a 917 number.
[27:06.630 --> 27:07.710]  He has a 917 number.
[27:07.790 --> 27:08.350]  But never mind that.
[27:08.430 --> 27:11.190]  The point is, all this information, what information is on there?
[27:11.350 --> 27:12.130]  Phone numbers?
[27:12.690 --> 27:13.030]  Pictures.
[27:13.410 --> 27:14.290]  Pictures are on there?
[27:14.350 --> 27:14.570]  Yes.
[27:14.750 --> 27:15.690]  Emails are on there?
[27:16.510 --> 27:16.910]  How?
[27:17.730 --> 27:18.730]  Those are her emails?
[27:18.970 --> 27:19.570]  Oh, my goodness.
[27:19.690 --> 27:20.030]  Look at those.
[27:20.110 --> 27:21.030]  You can't show those on the air.
[27:22.410 --> 27:22.810]  Okay.
[27:22.970 --> 27:31.690]  So, now, for the panicking listeners out there, how in God's name does somebody hack into your telephone and get your picture issues?
[27:31.970 --> 27:34.390]  Did they hack into her telephone or did they hack into T-Mobile?
[27:34.490 --> 27:35.410]  Who wants to take this first?
[27:35.490 --> 27:36.390]  Everyone's raising their hands.
[27:37.530 --> 27:38.410]  Go ahead, Redbird.
[27:38.610 --> 27:38.850]  All right.
[27:38.910 --> 27:39.050]  Sure.
[27:39.210 --> 27:50.210]  Well, what happened really was it's a vulnerability that exists in many services online where, okay, they have so many, you know, requirements for what your password has to be.
[27:50.290 --> 27:54.030]  People tend to forget them so they have to have a mechanism in place to retrieve them.
[27:54.030 --> 28:02.050]  And so, they come up with, you know, the idea of, all right, well, give us a question that only you would know and that's what we'll use to prove your identity.
[28:02.250 --> 28:02.870]  What is my name?
[28:02.990 --> 28:03.130]  Right.
[28:03.230 --> 28:08.490]  Or what is, you know, my favorite dog which I think is, in the case of Paris Hilton, what the question actually ended up being.
[28:09.110 --> 28:12.050]  And someone used that just, you know, to simply...
[28:12.050 --> 28:12.450]  Wait.
[28:12.990 --> 28:16.510]  This is verified that that's how people got in because of a secret question?
[28:16.610 --> 28:16.750]  Right.
[28:16.850 --> 28:18.230]  From a couple of news sources anyway.
[28:18.630 --> 28:19.110]  That's what it was.
[28:19.110 --> 28:25.230]  See, the way I deal with that, like Hotmail does the same thing and all kinds of online services where they ask you a question.
[28:25.330 --> 28:28.890]  You always make the answer to the question something that isn't an answer to the question.
[28:29.050 --> 28:31.130]  Like, you know, what is my favorite color?
[28:31.270 --> 28:32.010]  The answer is six.
[28:32.230 --> 28:32.430]  Right.
[28:32.550 --> 28:35.830]  But a problem with that also is that they don't treat that data very securely.
[28:35.850 --> 28:45.910]  It's usually unencrypted or it's, you know, it's usually sent in the clear and stored in the clear and, you know, it's not secure information at all and the way most companies implement it is just completely horrible.
[28:46.370 --> 28:51.570]  So, somebody was able to, first of all, find out what her secret question was.
[28:51.790 --> 28:52.490]  Well, they prompt you.
[28:52.610 --> 28:53.650]  They tell you what it is.
[28:53.770 --> 28:53.910]  Okay.
[28:54.610 --> 28:56.370]  When you call them on the phone or is this online?
[28:56.450 --> 28:57.910]  I don't know how this person did it.
[28:58.010 --> 28:58.230]  All right.
[28:58.450 --> 29:01.870]  And so somebody, I guess, guessed the answer?
[29:02.010 --> 29:04.310]  Well, I think this was publicly available information.
[29:04.310 --> 29:06.170]  I think it was her dog's name or something like that.
[29:06.270 --> 29:06.390]  Okay.
[29:06.430 --> 29:07.870]  But we talked about this a few weeks ago.
[29:09.230 --> 29:11.750]  Did it not change or did it just happen again?
[29:12.350 --> 29:13.250]  I don't know.
[29:13.410 --> 29:13.650]  Okay.
[29:14.990 --> 29:20.210]  So, basically, somebody simply got into her account and through that account.
[29:20.370 --> 29:21.790]  Now, how did they get access to all this information?
[29:21.930 --> 29:25.150]  How did they get access to pictures and to emails and to things like that?
[29:25.330 --> 29:29.690]  It seems as though T-Mobile stores all this online in a database and not on the actual phone.
[29:29.690 --> 29:31.990]  For all subscribers or just for people that use Sidekicks?
[29:31.990 --> 29:33.110]  I'm not familiar with the service.
[29:33.310 --> 29:33.550]  Uh-huh.
[29:34.010 --> 29:35.670]  Leo, you seem to have something to contribute to this.
[29:35.690 --> 29:44.770]  It's a service called MyMobile or MyT-Mobile which stores your information online, but not everybody's.
[29:44.810 --> 29:46.330]  It's only people who use Sidekick.
[29:46.770 --> 29:47.150]  Right.
[29:47.150 --> 29:53.650]  And the Sidekick, all of it's basically, whatever you put on it is not stored on a Sidekick, it's stored on a...
[29:53.650 --> 29:54.190]  Stored online.
[29:54.950 --> 30:02.110]  And you can access it from your Sidekick or you can go online and enter your username and password.
[30:03.250 --> 30:06.830]  And from what I heard, how was basically...
[30:06.830 --> 30:13.090]  how her email was received is basically somebody called up T-Mobile and said, hey, can you send me my password?
[30:13.330 --> 30:16.190]  Because the password is sent directly to the mobile phone.
[30:16.370 --> 30:20.590]  And he said that my mobile is dead, the battery's died and the...
[30:21.070 --> 30:21.370]  Uh-huh.
[30:21.610 --> 30:23.010]  He just probably said it over the line.
[30:23.390 --> 30:30.110]  Well, it sounds to me like using a Sidekick is not a good idea if the phone company is not very secure.
[30:30.930 --> 30:34.470]  So, I guess, you know, partially her fault, partially T-Mobile's fault.
[30:35.930 --> 30:36.690]  But there's more.
[30:36.850 --> 30:39.630]  There's more involving T-Mobile that is of interest.
[30:39.750 --> 30:41.470]  Of course, this is something that's pretty ancient.
[30:41.610 --> 30:42.970]  We've been talking about this for quite some time.
[30:43.730 --> 30:45.810]  And they're not the only company to be afflicted by this.
[30:46.070 --> 30:57.230]  But basically, if you have a voicemail account, which everybody does who uses T-Mobile, you can set it so that you have no password at all.
[30:57.330 --> 31:10.550]  And what that means is that you simply, you simply, from your telephone, the telephone that you're using, the T-Mobile phone, you don't have to enter a password if that phone number is what's calling voicemail.
[31:10.610 --> 31:14.150]  If you call from, say, a landline, then it's going to know you're not the same phone number.
[31:14.290 --> 31:16.430]  It's going to require a password at that point.
[31:17.050 --> 31:33.330]  What people are able to do, and we've demonstrated this, is simply fake caller ID and make it seem as if you're calling from your own cell phone or someone else's cell phone and then not be prompted for a password and be able to be able to simply check the messages.
[31:33.450 --> 31:34.410]  Yes, Leo, you have something on this too.
[31:34.510 --> 31:39.070]  Well, actually, by default, I'll auto-login is turned on.
[31:39.230 --> 31:46.550]  But if you call your cell phone, if you call a person's cell phone with the number spoofed, their phone will still ring.
[31:46.970 --> 31:53.850]  But how it's done is T-Mobile has a centralized voicemail service number which is 805-MESSAGE.
[31:54.010 --> 32:03.970]  And basically, you spoof the person's cell phone number is caller ID, call 805-MESSAGE, and the 805-MESSAGE sees that your caller ID is of that person and lets you into their voicemail.
[32:04.030 --> 32:04.910]  Yeah, that's basically it.
[32:06.570 --> 32:11.750]  It's monumentally stupid, especially when you're using a non-secure way to verify somebody's ID.
[32:14.310 --> 32:15.670]  It's very convenient, though.
[32:16.050 --> 32:18.430]  I guess it's convenient to some degree.
[32:18.570 --> 32:19.410]  I mean, everybody offers it.
[32:19.510 --> 32:20.270]  Sprint offers it.
[32:20.390 --> 32:21.970]  I think Verizon offers it.
[32:22.010 --> 32:22.330]  I'm not sure.
[32:22.430 --> 32:23.850]  Bernie, you get that on Sprint, don't you?
[32:23.910 --> 32:31.350]  Sprint has been guilty of this for, what, years now without really verifying your identity.
[32:31.730 --> 32:40.350]  Unless you opt in to using a password to access your voicemail, it's vulnerable to anyone who can spoof your caller ID into their system.
[32:40.610 --> 32:48.090]  Yeah, and, you know, they even say, spokesman Brian Zedar of T-Mobile says, by default, customers are not required to put a password on their voicemail.
[32:48.330 --> 32:51.530]  If you enable the password protection, it solves the problem.
[32:51.930 --> 32:54.790]  I ask, why have the problem in the first place?
[32:55.270 --> 32:59.910]  You know, it's really silly to have a system where you don't have a password.
[32:59.910 --> 33:03.310]  But, of course, you should have a password for something as important as voicemail.
[33:03.470 --> 33:09.990]  Well, it goes back to this problem which is being created where people don't want to remember all these passwords for all these different systems.
[33:11.370 --> 33:17.170]  And, you know, software people have just really not come up with a good solution to that problem yet.
[33:17.750 --> 33:20.610]  Well, you know, in this day and age, you're going to need to remember passwords.
[33:20.770 --> 33:22.110]  It's just the way it is.
[33:22.190 --> 33:28.670]  I mean, if you want to write them down someplace and keep them on your purse, and I guess that's one solution, not a very secure one, but it's one thing you can do.
[33:29.550 --> 33:30.670]  But it's really...
[33:31.170 --> 33:39.670]  I just can't believe at this stage in the game that we're using companies that don't require passwords for something as important as voicemail.
[33:39.810 --> 33:41.070]  It doesn't work on Sprint, though.
[33:41.630 --> 33:42.850]  Why doesn't it work on Sprint?
[33:43.270 --> 33:49.910]  Sprint and apparently all the other companies do not use the Color IT to verify the mobile phone.
[33:50.570 --> 33:51.410]  Yes, they do.
[33:51.890 --> 33:52.570]  Sprint does.
[33:52.670 --> 33:53.250]  They did.
[33:53.870 --> 33:58.530]  Maybe they changed it, but we tried it with other cell phone carriers and it does not work.
[33:58.770 --> 34:00.490]  They did like over a year ago.
[34:00.810 --> 34:00.950]  Oh.
[34:01.570 --> 34:02.310]  Well, they changed the system.
[34:02.530 --> 34:06.170]  But analog-in still works, but it doesn't work from outside.
[34:06.470 --> 34:11.350]  There's some that are either using NEI or the cell phone itself to verify.
[34:11.670 --> 34:12.130]  Okay.
[34:12.970 --> 34:13.810]  Moving on.
[34:15.010 --> 34:20.430]  There's a mobile phone virus that's on the loose, a version of the Kabir.
[34:20.570 --> 34:21.290]  Am I pronouncing that right?
[34:21.750 --> 34:22.270]  Kabir?
[34:22.410 --> 34:22.770]  Kabir?
[34:22.870 --> 34:23.190]  I don't know.
[34:23.610 --> 34:34.050]  Kabir virus has turned up in two Nokia 6600s on display in a California cell phone store in what is believed to be the first on-the-ground sighting of the virus in the United States.
[34:34.450 --> 34:42.270]  Just how the phones were infected isn't known, but it would have been very easy given that both were on public display in a Santa Monica, California shop's window.
[34:42.270 --> 34:56.970]  Anyone walking past the store could have dosed the handsets via their built-in Bluetooth antennas and announcing the infection antivirus company F-Secure did not specify exactly when the infections were discovered.
[34:57.710 --> 35:05.670]  Two sources familiar with the sighting said the phones in the window could have been spreading the virus to passers-by, although additional instances haven't been reported.
[35:05.850 --> 35:09.550]  A Nokia representative refused to give any comment on this.
[35:09.690 --> 35:11.650]  Cover your phone's mouth when it coughs.
[35:11.650 --> 35:13.650]  What in God's name are we talking about here?
[35:13.650 --> 35:16.530]  Walking past a store your phone gets infected with a virus?
[35:17.050 --> 35:22.330]  Yeah, well, Bluetooth is a technology that's used in a lot of gadgets nowadays.
[35:22.870 --> 35:37.590]  It's meant for personal area networks, so, you know, you're, for example, with cell phones it's usually used to connect it to your laptop when it's near your laptop or your computer or whatever and you can just transfer contacts back and forth, things like that,
[35:37.670 --> 35:55.070]  so, but any kind of data could be theoretically pass between it, so if you've got a cell phone that's got some infection in its system that can be spread via the Bluetooth technology, anyone within the range of the Bluetooth and has Bluetooth enabled would be able to pick it up.
[35:55.810 --> 35:56.210]  Unbelievable.
[35:58.290 --> 36:01.590]  It's just, some of these things that are happening today are just really kind of funny.
[36:02.770 --> 36:04.550]  What is a cell phone via a studio phone?
[36:04.690 --> 36:05.330]  Anyway, does anybody know?
[36:05.470 --> 36:06.510]  Anybody have this happen to them?
[36:07.010 --> 36:14.990]  This one just displays it's like a banner and that's all it does, but I mean, it could have been designed to do things more malicious.
[36:15.310 --> 36:16.770]  Yeah, it's probably just a proof of concept.
[36:17.050 --> 36:17.170]  Yep.
[36:17.710 --> 36:33.410]  Speaking of malicious, during the six-month period that ended last Tuesday, actually a couple of Tuesdays ago, 3,896 prank calls to Chicago's 911 emergency center were placed from a pair of phone numbers at a single west side address in Chicago, according to the Sun-Times.
[36:33.410 --> 36:41.650]  It was not known how many times Chicago police officers were dispatched, but it wasn't long before the address became notorious among 9-11 call takers.
[36:42.150 --> 36:55.710]  Today, City Hall will reportedly announce an arrest in that case and bring the hammer down on 500 people whose phones have been used to place 50,672 bogus 9-11 calls since mid-August.
[36:57.830 --> 37:02.010]  According to them, some of them are just kids, but this is not purely a problem defined by children.
[37:02.010 --> 37:11.550]  It includes adults who get a kick out of seeing police and fire resources dispatched when there's no real emergency, according to a spokesman from the city's Office of Emergency Management and Communications.
[37:11.650 --> 37:19.130]  We're sending a message loud and clear as a city that this behavior is unacceptable, and if you choose to misuse emergency resources, it's going to cost you a lot of money.
[37:19.130 --> 37:22.090]  We simply cannot afford to be wasting our valuable resources.
[37:22.490 --> 37:31.550]  It's just amazing to me that they could have 3,896 prank calls coming from a single house before they actually do something about it.
[37:32.010 --> 37:34.150]  You know, I mean, the police know where you're calling from.
[37:34.350 --> 37:39.730]  Well, you know, 3,895 calls is one thing, but that last call is really just too much.
[37:39.750 --> 37:45.830]  Well, it's like they suddenly got a system that can do something about it, and now they're like, okay, that's the end, no more playing around here.
[37:46.290 --> 37:49.550]  But, you know, as a kid, you know, I knew you don't prank 911.
[37:50.190 --> 37:53.650]  These guys can find out where you're calling from no matter what.
[37:53.830 --> 38:01.650]  Plus, it's just really stupid to use up the resources of emergency response people that could be responding, otherwise be responding to people who are really in trouble.
[38:02.890 --> 38:03.250]  Absolutely.
[38:03.570 --> 38:06.210]  Sometimes it's easy to accidentally call 911, though.
[38:06.290 --> 38:07.170]  I've done that in the past.
[38:07.310 --> 38:08.890]  Well, yeah, animals can do it, too.
[38:09.090 --> 38:11.610]  You know, they can, birds can pick the numbers.
[38:11.770 --> 38:16.810]  Area codes that are close, like 914, because if you dial the one first, it still will go through to 911.
[38:17.110 --> 38:19.990]  If I dial one 911, it'll go through, so.
[38:20.430 --> 38:23.010]  Yeah, you're not trying to call long-distance 911 or anything like that.
[38:24.010 --> 38:28.990]  But, yeah, okay, but you don't have that many kind of misdials, you know, by accident.
[38:29.290 --> 38:29.770]  Right, obviously.
[38:29.970 --> 38:31.950]  So that kind of thing is, again...
[38:31.950 --> 38:36.150]  Your dog or your cat could, you know, knock the phone off the hook and step on the phone.
[38:36.310 --> 38:43.870]  And there was one case, a famous case I remember reading about, that there were all these 911 calls coming into the center from this house, and they couldn't figure out why.
[38:43.870 --> 39:01.910]  And it turns out the woman had her phone in her kitchen with a basket hanging in the kitchen full of tomatoes, and one of the tomatoes at the bottom was rotten and was dripping juice into the telephone keypad, like a desk phone, and it was shorting something out and just making random pulses,
[39:02.090 --> 39:03.630]  some of which ended up being 911.
[39:03.850 --> 39:05.450]  It took them weeks to figure out what this was.
[39:05.610 --> 39:09.210]  I wondered why she didn't throw out the rotten tomato sooner, but these things happen.
[39:10.170 --> 39:11.730]  Yeah, they do, I guess.
[39:12.070 --> 39:12.470]  Interesting.
[39:13.570 --> 39:16.510]  Okay, we have another sort of challenge for our listeners here.
[39:16.630 --> 39:20.370]  This is involving our old friends over at the Motion Picture Association of America.
[39:20.370 --> 39:20.930]  Remember them?
[39:22.270 --> 39:26.470]  Yes, well, they never left, but we did a little research.
[39:26.690 --> 39:30.350]  A bunch of us went out to see a film last week called Bad Education, a good film.
[39:30.470 --> 39:34.830]  I recommend it to people, but for some reason, it was rated NC-17.
[39:35.790 --> 39:39.510]  And we were trying to figure out why a film like that was rated NC-17.
[39:39.650 --> 39:41.770]  I mean, it has some adult content, but why not R?
[39:43.710 --> 39:56.550]  And basically, if you dig around on the MPAA website, you see that basically, they say this rating declares that the rating board believes this is a film that most parents will consider too adult for their youngsters under 17.
[39:56.770 --> 39:57.690]  No children will be admitted.
[39:57.930 --> 40:03.530]  NC-17 does not necessarily mean obscene or pornographic in the oft-accepted or legal meaning of these words.
[40:03.870 --> 40:06.690]  The board does not and cannot mark films with those words.
[40:06.810 --> 40:25.650]  These are legal terms, and for courts to decide, the reasons for the application of an NC-17 rating can be violence or sex or aberrational behavior or drug abuse or any other elements which, when present, most parents would consider too strong and therefore off-limits for viewing by their children.
[40:26.270 --> 40:28.870]  Now, this raises the obvious question of who's the board?
[40:29.230 --> 40:30.650]  Well, that's an interesting point.
[40:30.730 --> 40:35.250]  The board consists of between 8 and 12 people, according to them.
[40:35.410 --> 40:38.590]  According to them, 8 and 12 people make all the decisions.
[40:38.590 --> 40:54.930]  Now, this is a film that I certainly would have, you know, given an R rating to, but not an NC-17, and I think it's, you know, it's their closed values that basically made this something that they feared more than something else that would be even more violent or graphic.
[40:55.150 --> 40:56.610]  Now, we have 8 people in this room right now.
[40:56.690 --> 40:57.390]  Can we be the board?
[40:57.530 --> 40:57.730]  No.
[40:57.870 --> 40:58.490]  No, you can't.
[40:58.730 --> 41:00.970]  It's basically a very...
[41:00.970 --> 41:01.650]  Actually, I was wrong here.
[41:01.730 --> 41:04.950]  8 to 13 members of the board who serve for periods of varying length.
[41:05.070 --> 41:12.410]  They work for the Classification and Rating Administration, funded by fees charged to producers slash distributors for the rating of their films.
[41:12.410 --> 41:15.270]  And these guys are located in Los Angeles.
[41:15.630 --> 41:19.890]  Now, just think about the amazing power this small group of people have.
[41:20.370 --> 41:21.010]  You know?
[41:23.070 --> 41:24.410]  It boggles the imagination.
[41:24.550 --> 41:24.810]  Right, Hector?
[41:24.850 --> 41:25.750]  Let me just get...
[41:25.750 --> 41:30.150]  The fine difference between R and NC-17 is that no one under 17 can get in...
[41:30.150 --> 41:30.430]  That's right.
[41:30.430 --> 41:31.370]  ...versus getting in with their parents.
[41:31.430 --> 41:32.950]  NC-17, nobody under 17.
[41:33.070 --> 41:35.870]  In fact, a couple of people we were with got proofed at the theater.
[41:36.130 --> 41:37.470]  Now, that's another interesting point.
[41:37.730 --> 41:40.230]  They keep saying this is a voluntary system.
[41:40.230 --> 41:41.390]  Everyone's volunteering.
[41:41.650 --> 41:46.110]  But I hear of cases where theater owners are fined for letting people in who are underage.
[41:46.230 --> 41:47.770]  So, how is it voluntary then?
[41:47.890 --> 41:48.790]  Jim, do you know something about this?
[41:48.930 --> 41:49.830]  You're just gesturing?
[41:50.450 --> 41:50.890]  Okay.
[41:52.770 --> 41:55.050]  Anyway, it's an interesting system.
[41:55.050 --> 42:00.890]  And I think it's something that we should figure out how it works and figure out how it can maybe work better.
[42:01.530 --> 42:07.290]  You know, 8 to 13 people, they decide what is morally proper and what is not morally proper.
[42:07.410 --> 42:09.210]  And everybody uses that as gospel.
[42:10.030 --> 42:14.410]  What's also very strange is that the ticket salesperson didn't know what the law was.
[42:14.470 --> 42:18.570]  She didn't know why, you know, she either could or couldn't sell this ticket to us.
[42:18.670 --> 42:18.870]  Uh-huh.
[42:18.990 --> 42:19.150]  Yeah.
[42:19.850 --> 42:24.350]  I imagine ignorance of the law is almost a requirement these days in various places.
[42:24.730 --> 42:33.130]  But it's just, you know, lots of times you see the ratings, you see the descriptions and the previews of certain things like, you know, simulated violence.
[42:33.130 --> 42:35.930]  That's why this thing got PG-13 or whatever.
[42:37.450 --> 42:45.050]  These guys sit around, they see every film that comes out and they're the ones that make the decision and it's based solely on their value system.
[42:45.670 --> 42:50.490]  Nothing having to do with maybe this part of the country is different from, you know, the middle of the country.
[42:51.170 --> 42:54.610]  Maybe, you know, different people have different values.
[42:55.130 --> 42:55.810]  Nothing like that.
[42:55.930 --> 42:58.210]  So there's only one board that reviews all the films?
[42:58.350 --> 42:58.570]  Apparently.
[42:58.690 --> 43:04.550]  According to this, according to the MPAA website, I got this information from MPAA.org and that's very disturbing.
[43:04.750 --> 43:07.830]  So it's not like jury duty where there's a different group for every one.
[43:07.950 --> 43:08.230]  No, I thought...
[43:08.230 --> 43:10.930]  There's just one board who's always around.
[43:10.930 --> 43:13.650]  I thought this was something that, you know, we could get involved in.
[43:13.750 --> 43:17.350]  Sort of like, you know, the draft board of the selective service.
[43:17.530 --> 43:30.050]  I actually got to the point where they were sending me the application form and telling me I had to go to training in Chicago and I could be part of the draft board and decide who gets to go and who doesn't get to go to the military or who gets to stay,
[43:30.170 --> 43:31.070]  who doesn't get to stay, whatever.
[43:31.070 --> 43:32.450]  And it's that easy.
[43:32.610 --> 43:33.810]  It's that easy to get involved.
[43:33.810 --> 43:35.930]  Here, I see no such application.
[43:36.630 --> 43:37.250]  Arsene is here.
[43:37.470 --> 43:37.630]  Yeah.
[43:38.830 --> 43:47.770]  Valenti does write that the people that review the films are on... it doesn't say specifically for how long, but I don't think this is like their full-time job.
[43:48.390 --> 43:49.450]  But how could it not be?
[43:49.510 --> 43:50.650]  Do you know how many films come out?
[43:50.730 --> 43:51.310]  Well, that's why.
[43:51.390 --> 43:53.990]  That's why it has to be more than just that group of 13 people.
[43:54.290 --> 43:58.870]  It would be interesting if anyone lives in L.A., if they know how this works.
[43:58.870 --> 44:00.170]  Yeah, that's what it's all about.
[44:00.230 --> 44:03.210]  We want to know how this works, because this is a system that affects everybody.
[44:03.470 --> 44:04.650]  But how does it work?
[44:04.850 --> 44:07.050]  I mean, how many movies come out in a week?
[44:07.230 --> 44:08.690]  Maybe a dozen?
[44:08.930 --> 44:11.310]  In a year, it's about 800 in the United States.
[44:11.530 --> 44:12.290]  Okay, who can do that?
[44:12.290 --> 44:16.450]  There's literally not enough time for a group of 13 people to screen all the films.
[44:16.610 --> 44:18.630]  And I imagine they're looking at it at the same time.
[44:18.750 --> 44:23.270]  So I think it is a full-time thing if we believe what this thing says.
[44:23.730 --> 44:25.150]  And what kind of accountability?
[44:25.410 --> 44:26.330]  Who says what?
[44:26.430 --> 44:27.430]  When is this done?
[44:27.550 --> 44:28.670]  How is it open to review?
[44:29.290 --> 44:33.390]  How do we know it's not just Jack Valenti getting a videotape and sitting at home and making decisions on his own?
[44:34.510 --> 44:35.570]  It could very well be.
[44:35.570 --> 44:37.230]  Well, because Jack Valenti is not eight people.
[44:37.450 --> 44:39.250]  But also, the...
[44:39.250 --> 44:41.210]  Well, he says he's eight people, but who knows?
[44:41.730 --> 44:46.650]  But, I mean, the fact that they say that the board is eight to 13 people, but maybe they split it up.
[44:46.870 --> 44:49.850]  You know, okay, you four watch this movie, you...
[44:49.850 --> 44:51.470]  Get their kids to help out, that kind of thing.
[44:51.470 --> 45:02.610]  Does anyone know if this is an actual law, or is it just sort of a private rule that under-17-year-olds can't go to these films?
[45:02.730 --> 45:11.530]  I mean, is this a local, state, or federal statute that legally prohibits the admission of minors?
[45:11.530 --> 45:26.490]  Or is this just a fiat dictated down by the MPAA that their member movie theaters are required to comply with?
[45:26.490 --> 45:28.310]  Well, Marcini, I think you have an answer for that.
[45:28.350 --> 45:34.270]  Yeah, the small bit of research that I did, there's a group called NATO, which is the...
[45:34.270 --> 45:34.550]  NATO?
[45:35.130 --> 45:37.450]  ...National Association of Theater Owners, and I have a feeling...
[45:37.450 --> 45:38.710]  Oh, that's too good to be true.
[45:38.970 --> 45:41.870]  I have a feeling this is... and it's sort of like...
[45:41.870 --> 45:42.910]  And they call themselves NATO.
[45:43.030 --> 45:43.110]  Yeah.
[45:43.170 --> 45:44.710]  We're not just doing that to be wise guys, right?
[45:44.950 --> 45:46.070]  No, that's what the website...
[45:46.550 --> 45:57.990]  It's sort of a union for people that own movie theaters, and I have a feeling that they get a lot of benefits from complying with this rating system from the MPAA or MPAA's influence.
[45:58.210 --> 46:05.170]  But these benefits or why they just... why they adhere to ratings at all, I don't know why.
[46:05.810 --> 46:06.270]  All right.
[46:06.310 --> 46:10.530]  If anybody out there has more information on this, definitely something of interest that we'd like to sort of study.
[46:10.950 --> 46:19.210]  And just like any computer or phone system, you know, knowing how it works, knowing where it's vulnerable, knowing how it's being abused, those are all vital things to be made public.
[46:19.210 --> 46:26.050]  Our email address, OTH at 2600.com, or you can write to us here at the radio station, off the hook.
[46:26.410 --> 46:31.510]  Care of WBAI, 120 Wall Street, New York, New York.
[46:31.730 --> 46:34.050]  1-0-0-0-5.
[46:34.490 --> 46:35.190]  That's right.
[46:35.690 --> 46:40.770]  And please send us whatever information you have or can share with us.
[46:40.890 --> 46:42.050]  We've got some listener mail here.
[46:42.170 --> 46:43.030]  We're going to take some phone calls.
[46:43.130 --> 46:45.890]  212-209-2900 is our phone number.
[46:47.830 --> 46:48.550]  Let's see.
[46:48.710 --> 46:52.830]  Some people have been writing in asking about podcasting, the radio program.
[46:52.950 --> 46:54.890]  Mike, I believe you know something about this.
[46:55.290 --> 46:58.510]  Tell us what podcasting is and how it works specifically.
[46:58.850 --> 47:09.990]  Podcasting, besides being a very silly word, is an extension to RSS, which is a method of sending headlines among news sites, basically.
[47:11.210 --> 47:14.430]  I'm simplifying so people who email us to come play.
[47:14.450 --> 47:15.650]  Sending headlines between...
[47:15.650 --> 47:18.930]  Well, sending headlines from a news site to wherever.
[47:19.750 --> 47:20.890]  Wherever being where?
[47:20.990 --> 47:28.570]  Wherever being traditionally a client program on your computer so you can see all the headlines from all the websites you like to look at all in one place.
[47:28.570 --> 47:31.110]  So you're running, what, basically a browser.
[47:31.330 --> 47:36.430]  You have a browser open and it tells you when there are headlines coming from various other sites that you choose.
[47:36.430 --> 47:37.470]  Yes, basically.
[47:37.650 --> 47:42.150]  But I'm hearing about people being able to listen to the radio program on their iPods now and things like that.
[47:42.170 --> 47:42.690]  What's that all about?
[47:42.850 --> 47:54.250]  So podcasting is an extension to this RSS where in addition to the headline you can say there's a bit of audio or really any multimedia format attached to this particular headline.
[47:54.250 --> 48:00.610]  So when at 2600 we post new off the hook online, many of our listeners probably click on that every week.
[48:00.610 --> 48:06.630]  Like, in the RSS, we attach, here's where you can actually download the off the hook.
[48:07.450 --> 48:17.770]  So then you can get some software which will automatically download this MP3 and send it to your iPod, which is where the name comes from, or really wherever.
[48:18.690 --> 48:19.130]  Wow.
[48:19.210 --> 48:23.950]  So it's like an automated way to get the radio show whenever it's updated.
[48:24.270 --> 48:25.130]  Well, that's pretty cool.
[48:25.230 --> 48:29.570]  And we do have it, despite the fact that people are still emailing us and asking for it.
[48:29.570 --> 48:32.770]  And people who use this system know how to sign up for it, right?
[48:32.870 --> 48:33.810]  It's on our website.
[48:34.050 --> 48:34.390]  Yes.
[48:34.490 --> 48:34.650]  It's easy.
[48:34.690 --> 48:38.330]  There's a button towards the bottom right of the screen that says RSS.
[48:38.850 --> 48:39.190]  Okay.
[48:39.190 --> 48:41.210]  So you can stop asking us about it because we have it.
[48:41.350 --> 48:41.630]  Jim.
[48:41.810 --> 48:50.410]  And if you're interested in other podcasts, we have a couple of URLs, podcastalley.com and iPodder.org.
[48:51.170 --> 48:57.050]  For the best podcasts of the day, you might want to try podcastbunker.com.
[48:57.670 --> 48:58.550]  Do they list us?
[48:59.250 --> 49:00.130]  Unfortunately, no.
[49:00.310 --> 49:02.630]  Well, then we shouldn't be listing them if they're not listing us.
[49:02.850 --> 49:06.670]  Well, you know, we start scratching their back, they might start scratching ours.
[49:06.750 --> 49:08.910]  I don't want to touch them until they start listing us.
[49:09.070 --> 49:09.810]  Well, email them.
[49:10.050 --> 49:10.570]  All right.
[49:11.730 --> 49:22.670]  Here's our listener who says, I heard your story on the radio about chasing the car, referring to Redbird and myself on the high-speed chase throughout New York City, trying to catch a person who fled an accident scene.
[49:22.670 --> 49:24.370]  I don't know how that turned out, if they ever found the guy.
[49:25.070 --> 49:32.410]  But you should have said to the cops that you saw a gun or drugs or a weapon of mass destruction in the back seat to say you thought you saw something.
[49:32.530 --> 49:33.550]  That might help next time.
[49:33.870 --> 49:36.390]  Yeah, that might help get us locked up for some reason.
[49:36.390 --> 49:40.190]  But I don't know if it's wise to be calling in false reports.
[49:40.430 --> 49:42.970]  So that's where the weapons of mass destruction went.
[49:44.370 --> 49:44.930]  Yeah.
[49:46.070 --> 49:53.950]  This person writes in saying he has seen a report about misdirected SMSs, basically Germans sending SMSs from South Africa.
[49:53.950 --> 49:57.490]  They arrive in a place named Hemau.
[49:57.670 --> 49:58.990]  It's H-E-M-A-U.
[49:59.950 --> 50:03.070]  Those people then get a computerized voice reading the SMS.
[50:03.830 --> 50:05.290]  Basically, what happens is this.
[50:05.410 --> 50:10.030]  To reach Germany from South Africa, you need to dial 0-9-4-9 and then the area code.
[50:10.190 --> 50:15.110]  However, somehow the whole thing gets messed up and the whole number arrives at the SMS center in Germany.
[50:15.430 --> 50:18.350]  All German mobile phone area codes start with 1.
[50:18.810 --> 50:24.530]  It then sees a number starting with 0-9-4-9-1 and thinks it's the area code 9-4-9-1.
[50:24.730 --> 50:26.990]  However, that is the area code of Hemau.
[50:27.550 --> 50:29.650]  Therefore, the people there get the SMSs.
[50:31.130 --> 50:32.010]  Oh, okay.
[50:32.790 --> 50:33.750]  Cassandra sent that in.
[50:34.730 --> 50:36.450]  Sounds like a lot of mayhem over there.
[50:37.350 --> 50:39.610]  2-1-2-2-0-9-2-9-0-9-0 is our phone number.
[50:39.790 --> 50:42.050]  And we'll take phone calls in just a moment.
[50:42.250 --> 50:43.210]  I'll be over there next week.
[50:43.390 --> 50:44.130]  You'll be where?
[50:44.430 --> 50:45.930]  At the CBIT conference.
[50:46.110 --> 50:46.910]  Is that coming up again?
[50:46.990 --> 50:48.830]  That's the one with like a billion people that go to it?
[50:48.870 --> 50:50.830]  Well, only 600 and some thousand.
[50:51.030 --> 50:52.230]  Oh, okay.
[50:52.410 --> 50:57.150]  It's the world's largest telecom and IT conference in Hanover, Germany.
[50:57.150 --> 50:58.170]  And it's big.
[50:58.510 --> 50:59.850]  It sure sounds big.
[51:00.190 --> 51:01.910]  And, wow.
[51:02.470 --> 51:04.390]  Hopefully, you'll be able to call us from there.
[51:05.150 --> 51:06.110]  Here's one other letter.
[51:06.230 --> 51:07.310]  And then we'll take phone calls after that.
[51:07.430 --> 51:08.750]  2-1-2-2-0-9-2-9-0.
[51:09.570 --> 51:15.250]  Apparently, now, when you buy a ticket to get into one of the parks at Walt Disney, there's an additional step to actually get into the park.
[51:15.390 --> 51:22.310]  When my family and I had arrived at Animal Kingdom, we purchased the tickets, basically a piece of paper with a bar strip on the back and some Disney character on the front.
[51:22.470 --> 51:34.450]  But when I got up to the gate to give them my ticket, I was required to put two of my fingers, the index and middle finger specifically, into this device that apparently matches up the ticket I presented with my fingers.
[51:34.730 --> 51:41.230]  Now, apparently, it looks at the measurements of your fingers and then links that to the ticket that you put through a reader, similar to subway passes or airline tickets.
[51:41.370 --> 51:44.150]  But it seems to be an odd way to tie a ticket to a person.
[51:44.390 --> 51:48.970]  The paranoid side of me started to wonder if they were possibly taking fingerprints of people coming into the park.
[51:49.130 --> 51:57.790]  If you think about the amount of people that visit Walt Disney World, the government would have a huge database of people's fingerprints from all over the world, something to match up with the airport system, perhaps.
[51:58.090 --> 52:04.310]  I wanted to take some time to look at the device before I actually put my hand in it, but they basically push you along to get you through the gate and into the park.
[52:04.730 --> 52:09.410]  I found it surprising that so many people were just going through the gate doing this without really asking why.
[52:09.910 --> 52:10.750]  Tom from Chicago.
[52:10.810 --> 52:13.070]  Well, certainly something we should be looking into.
[52:13.270 --> 52:17.890]  And yes, people who go to Walt Disney World don't tend to question things, and it would be a great way to gather fingerprints.
[52:17.890 --> 52:19.630]  Did he say exactly what it was?
[52:19.670 --> 52:22.290]  I mean, did he use his fingers later in the park?
[52:23.710 --> 52:28.970]  I imagine he must have used them for something, but I don't know about using them in a device that Walt Disney World supplied.
[52:29.170 --> 52:30.850]  But I don't know.
[52:30.890 --> 52:31.710]  You've got to look at these things.
[52:31.890 --> 52:35.230]  Anytime somebody asks you to put your fingers someplace, they might be up to no good.
[52:36.210 --> 52:37.730]  212-209-2900.
[52:37.850 --> 52:38.430]  Good evening.
[52:38.530 --> 52:39.150]  You're on the air.
[52:39.970 --> 52:40.730]  Hi, how are you doing?
[52:41.390 --> 52:43.070]  I've got three things.
[52:43.210 --> 52:45.750]  One about the MPAA rating system.
[52:46.730 --> 52:50.850]  What they mean by voluntary is a film doesn't have to have a rating to be shown.
[52:51.730 --> 52:54.250]  But you need to have a rating to advertise it.
[52:55.430 --> 52:55.910]  Really?
[52:55.970 --> 52:57.630]  It doesn't sound very voluntary to me.
[52:58.070 --> 52:58.370]  Right.
[52:58.830 --> 53:03.430]  But the type of art films that usually get the NC-17 don't really need it.
[53:04.510 --> 53:12.530]  And two things about, you know, security run amok is a friend of mine is an architecture student.
[53:12.530 --> 53:15.790]  And she was making drawings in the Fleet Center in Boston.
[53:16.030 --> 53:17.550]  It's not called the Fleet Center anymore.
[53:17.750 --> 53:18.770]  The Derek Jeter Center.
[53:19.010 --> 53:20.590]  It gets a different name every day, apparently.
[53:20.830 --> 53:23.930]  Last year when she was there, it was called the Fleet Center.
[53:23.970 --> 53:24.210]  Okay.
[53:24.830 --> 53:26.050]  And I guess it was before...
[53:26.570 --> 53:29.230]  She was just making sketches for her architecture class.
[53:29.450 --> 53:35.050]  And someone came up to her, flashed some ID, and asked her what she was doing and confiscated her drawings.
[53:36.090 --> 53:36.790]  You're kidding.
[53:37.210 --> 53:37.630]  No.
[53:38.030 --> 53:38.350]  Wow.
[53:40.950 --> 54:00.490]  And then a filmmaker who's made his entire, you know, business that came, you know, filming out of windows of trains as he traveled across the country made a statement at the Independent Spirit Awards last Saturday about how his camera was confiscated.
[54:00.870 --> 54:02.110]  And where did that happen?
[54:02.710 --> 54:04.130]  He was on a train.
[54:04.390 --> 54:09.390]  He didn't specifically say where he was, but he's already, you know, he's fighting it.
[54:09.390 --> 54:14.010]  He's taking it to the ACLU and, you know, trying to get his camera back.
[54:14.010 --> 54:19.150]  He said he's been taking pictures out of the, out of train windows for 20 years now.
[54:19.290 --> 54:21.130]  He's taking pictures out of a train window?
[54:21.430 --> 54:23.970]  Out of a train, just taking pictures of landscapes.
[54:24.590 --> 54:24.990]  And...
[54:24.990 --> 54:27.470]  And somebody decided that this was threatening.
[54:28.270 --> 54:34.830]  I did this for nine hours when I was in Thailand a couple of months ago, and the train conductor walked past me several times and smiled.
[54:34.990 --> 54:36.450]  He didn't have any problem with it at all.
[54:36.790 --> 54:38.290]  No, it's ridiculous.
[54:39.610 --> 54:45.270]  So I just, you know, these are our, you know, paranoia at work, basically.
[54:45.530 --> 54:47.090]  Just wanted to let you know what's going on.
[54:47.570 --> 54:48.090]  All right.
[54:48.150 --> 54:49.990]  Well, thanks for that cheerful bit of news there.
[54:50.130 --> 54:52.270]  Taking pictures out of a train window now.
[54:52.530 --> 54:53.350]  I don't believe it.
[54:54.010 --> 54:57.770]  Mike, you have an update on the IndyMedia subpoena situation.
[54:57.970 --> 55:04.450]  We've mentioned briefly that IndyMedia in New York City has been subpoenaed three times over the past several months.
[55:05.090 --> 55:08.950]  And one, usually they just kind of go away when they realize that we have lawyers.
[55:09.290 --> 55:12.730]  But in this most recent case, the city kept trying to subpoena us.
[55:12.830 --> 55:13.630]  But they lost.
[55:14.090 --> 55:14.650]  They lost.
[55:14.750 --> 55:15.110]  They lost.
[55:15.270 --> 55:15.850]  When did they lose?
[55:16.210 --> 55:17.170]  This past Friday.
[55:17.750 --> 55:17.930]  Great.
[55:18.010 --> 55:20.790]  So the judge actually found that the city had no right to...
[55:20.790 --> 55:25.830]  The city was basically on a fishing expedition and all the information is there in Google.
[55:26.310 --> 55:29.310]  The information they were searching so they didn't need to harass IndyMedia.
[55:29.610 --> 55:29.990]  Yes.
[55:30.290 --> 55:30.470]  Okay.
[55:30.590 --> 55:32.050]  Well, sometimes the court system works.
[55:33.130 --> 55:33.670]  Good evening.
[55:33.670 --> 55:39.550]  Is there any accountability going to be towards the people who violated IndyMedia's rights?
[55:39.730 --> 55:40.310]  Of course not.
[55:40.530 --> 55:41.070]  Of course not.
[55:41.330 --> 55:41.670]  Good evening.
[55:41.750 --> 55:42.090]  You're on the air.
[55:42.610 --> 55:42.930]  Hi.
[55:43.070 --> 55:45.370]  This is regarding the rating system.
[55:45.370 --> 55:50.410]  I actually had a run-in with a theater trying to see South Park.
[55:50.630 --> 55:58.730]  When it came out, I was 25 and my girlfriend was 26 and they refused us admittance without showing them ID and then declared that it was a law.
[55:59.350 --> 56:08.930]  I challenged them on that and they actually brought a police officer over because I refused to show them ID until they told me what act of Congress gave them the right to see it.
[56:09.110 --> 56:09.690]  Oh, my God.
[56:10.110 --> 56:19.650]  They brought a police officer over who explained that it was not a law to all parties involved and I said, well, then, will you tell them to let me in?
[56:19.730 --> 56:26.330]  At which point, the theater pointed to a sign which said, we may refuse admittance to anyone at any time for any reason.
[56:26.790 --> 56:27.770]  Well, that is true.
[56:28.970 --> 56:29.750]  Absolutely true.
[56:29.910 --> 56:30.530]  Absolutely true.
[56:30.670 --> 56:39.330]  And not to their benefit, as far as I can tell, for enforcing that against a 25- and a 27-year-old who are trying to see a perfectly legitimate movie.
[56:39.730 --> 56:40.630]  I thought she was 26.
[56:41.190 --> 56:42.250]  No, she was 27.
[56:42.250 --> 56:42.990]  I was 25.
[56:43.670 --> 56:46.130]  Okay, well, it sounds like you're well above whatever limit they put on.
[56:46.150 --> 56:47.410]  That was NC-17, I take it.
[56:48.010 --> 56:49.530]  No, that was for South Park.
[56:49.650 --> 56:51.610]  I can't remember what rating that got, actually.
[56:51.710 --> 56:52.710]  I think it might have been R.
[56:52.910 --> 56:53.410]  Yeah, it was R.
[56:53.470 --> 56:54.050]  It was R?
[56:54.230 --> 56:54.390]  Yeah.
[56:54.750 --> 56:55.510]  It was an R movie.
[56:55.530 --> 56:55.810]  Wow.
[56:57.190 --> 57:02.350]  I saw Godfather 2 when I was 14 or something or maybe it was Godfather 1 and that was definitely underage.
[57:02.750 --> 57:03.810]  Wasn't it rated G, though?
[57:03.950 --> 57:04.370]  No, it was R.
[57:04.470 --> 57:04.810]  Oh, okay.
[57:05.970 --> 57:07.070]  Because that just has violence.
[57:07.990 --> 57:13.810]  When I was very young, they seemed to have no problem, but in today's world, they stopped me from doing everything.
[57:14.070 --> 57:14.530]  Yeah.
[57:14.710 --> 57:15.270]  All right.
[57:15.330 --> 57:16.450]  Thanks for that info.
[57:16.610 --> 57:19.710]  And this definitely seems to be generating a lot of interest.
[57:20.150 --> 57:25.970]  It's a fascinating system and one that affects all of us and apparently run by very, very few people.
[57:26.410 --> 57:29.990]  Places now, a lot of places have like policies where they have to card everybody.
[57:30.390 --> 57:31.590]  Things like alcohol.
[57:31.750 --> 57:35.450]  I've been with my mother when she's been carded and she's obviously not under 21.
[57:36.930 --> 57:41.390]  So, you know, sometimes it's a little ridiculous, but that's how it is.
[57:41.550 --> 57:41.850]  All right.
[57:41.930 --> 57:43.330]  Let's take one more phone call and then we're out of here.
[57:43.630 --> 57:43.990]  And good evening.
[57:44.030 --> 57:44.470]  You're on the air.
[57:44.970 --> 57:45.730]  Oh, hallelujah.
[57:46.110 --> 57:47.070]  I've been trying to get on.
[57:48.070 --> 57:55.070]  The T-Mobile hack was an insider and he pled guilty to being an insider and getting this information.
[57:55.370 --> 57:57.650]  He basically gave people access to other people's accounts?
[57:58.510 --> 57:59.710]  He did all this stuff.
[57:59.710 --> 58:03.390]  He downloaded the files and then he put them on other servers and gave them to other people.
[58:03.750 --> 58:04.050]  Uh-huh.
[58:04.150 --> 58:07.590]  So it wasn't a question of breaking a security requirement?
[58:07.870 --> 58:08.550]  No, no.
[58:08.830 --> 58:14.570]  No, I mean, if we're talking about the same thing, which I believe we are, it was on securityfocus.com.
[58:14.670 --> 58:15.230]  I'll send you a link.
[58:15.410 --> 58:15.730]  Okay.
[58:15.890 --> 58:16.750]  Thanks for your call.
[58:16.810 --> 58:20.490]  Sounds like T-Mobile should be liable then if it was their employee who did this.
[58:20.590 --> 58:21.730]  Yeah, I think so too.
[58:21.930 --> 58:27.610]  Listen, we're out of time but I want to remind people that 2600 meetings coming up this Friday all throughout the world.
[58:27.750 --> 58:33.230]  Check www.2600.com slash meetings and you'll get all the information there.
[58:33.830 --> 58:39.830]  Putting a bunch of things up on the site in the next week, we have old episodes of the radio program Brain Damage from the old days.
[58:40.310 --> 58:47.450]  We also are going to have off-the-hook DVDs and the VCDs from The Fifth Hub all becoming available this week.
[58:47.630 --> 58:49.470]  So keep checking the website for that.
[58:50.590 --> 58:52.270]  We'll be back again next week.
[58:52.770 --> 58:55.250]  Until then, OTH at 2600.com.
[58:55.330 --> 58:55.530]  Good night.
[59:03.500 --> 59:21.140]  I'm so glad to be here tonight and I'm so glad to be home And I believe I've got a message for every woman and every man here tonight that never needed somebody to love Someone to stay with them all the time When they're up and when they're down You know,
[59:21.380 --> 59:31.880]  sometimes you'll get what you want Then you're gonna lose what you have And I believe every woman and every man here tonight listen to my song To save the whole world.
[59:36.110 --> 59:40.950]  Everybody wants somebody.
[59:41.770 --> 59:46.430]  Everybody wants somebody.
[59:48.580 --> 59:50.400]  Someone to love you.
[59:51.380 --> 59:52.940]  Someone to kiss.
[59:54.020 --> 59:55.760]  Sometimes to miss you.
[59:56.540 --> 59:58.300]  Someone to squeeze.
[59:59.180 --> 01:00:01.060]  Someone to leave.
[01:00:24.970 --> 01:00:30.630]  When the sun go down.
[01:00:31.190 --> 01:00:33.070]  Ain't nobody else.
[01:00:33.770 --> 01:00:36.290]  That's what I need, baby.
[01:00:36.910 --> 01:00:39.030]  That's why I say I love you.
[01:00:39.490 --> 01:00:41.830]  That's why I say I love you.
[01:00:42.550 --> 01:00:44.350]  Living here, say yeah.
[01:00:45.070 --> 01:00:46.570]  Living here, say yeah.
[01:01:06.320 --> 01:01:10.920]  When the sun go down, but ain't nobody else around.
[01:01:11.920 --> 01:01:13.880]  That's when I'm all by myself.
[01:01:14.770 --> 01:01:16.620]  That's when I need to love a dog.
[01:01:17.180 --> 01:01:18.160]  That's what I need.