[00:00.000 --> 00:07.680] Other Mapuche communities affected by oil exploitation are Bainemil, Nielaiko, Guiñoy Folil, and Catribain. [00:08.460 --> 00:15.560] Pania, Chevron San Jorge, and Repsolibf Oil companies operate in the lands that belong to these communities. [00:15.880 --> 00:20.460] That piece was produced by Hernán Scandizo, Pablo Indio, and Giulia Luisetti. [00:23.410 --> 00:26.310] You've been listening to Free Speech Radio News. [00:26.450 --> 00:27.790] I'm Aura Bogado. [00:32.240 --> 00:35.990] And you're listening to radio station WBAI in New York. [00:36.490 --> 00:38.380] It's just about 7 o'clock. [00:38.530 --> 00:42.520] Time for a special expanded edition of Off the Hook. [00:47.830 --> 00:52.330] The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall. [00:53.250 --> 00:57.810] I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call. [00:58.610 --> 01:00.610] We couldn't get much worse. [01:03.510 --> 01:06.050] Billy Bon for the best, expect the worst. [01:06.890 --> 01:09.630] I hope that's understood, but let me know. [01:51.260 --> 01:52.520] And a very good evening to everybody. [01:52.620 --> 01:53.790] The program is Off the Hook. [01:53.900 --> 01:56.040] Emmanuel Goldstein here with you for the next two hours. [01:56.120 --> 01:58.920] Yes, we're on for an expanded show tonight. [01:59.160 --> 02:02.920] And we only just found out about it about an hour or so ago. [02:03.160 --> 02:06.600] So we kind of had to scramble here to get things together. [02:06.640 --> 02:09.000] But I think you'll be pleased with what we've come up with. [02:09.600 --> 02:18.900] This is basically the middle of the first day, kind of the end of the first day of the WBAI fundraiser for the spring of the year 2005. [02:19.980 --> 02:25.880] And the theme for this first week is voices of dissent. [02:26.640 --> 02:35.510] And I can't think of a better group of people that would typify that particular categorization than a bunch of hackers and phone freaks and mischief makers. [02:36.260 --> 02:36.980] What do you think, Bernie? [02:37.000 --> 02:38.450] Do you think you fit into that category? [02:38.880 --> 02:45.160] I think most of the people on this show have been probably arrested for dissent, government dissent in one way or another. [02:45.300 --> 02:45.640] Isn't that true? [02:45.640 --> 02:47.460] Well, you know, I got arrested just for standing. [02:47.460 --> 02:48.460] I wasn't really dissenting. [02:48.620 --> 02:50.260] I have been arrested for dissenting in the past. [02:50.400 --> 02:52.000] But the most recent arrest... [02:52.000 --> 02:54.620] Yeah, I guess I qualify, since I can say the most recent arrest. [02:55.760 --> 02:56.580] Yeah, yeah. [02:56.760 --> 02:58.860] And you certainly qualify, Bernie, as a dissenter. [02:59.180 --> 03:06.140] As does our sometime guest, a ShapeShifter, and other people as well that we know. [03:06.500 --> 03:07.320] Yeah, absolutely. [03:08.140 --> 03:11.000] We're here with all kinds of interesting people in the studio. [03:11.320 --> 03:11.880] Mike is here. [03:11.980 --> 03:12.560] Jim is here. [03:13.520 --> 03:17.080] Redbird and Arseny and all kinds of other people will be joining us. [03:17.140 --> 03:19.120] Kevin Mitnick will be joining us in just a little while as well. [03:19.220 --> 03:26.800] And I guess, you know, he's a dissenter as well in various ways because he stood up to injustice, not really by choice. [03:27.160 --> 03:34.920] He found himself in a situation and wound up standing up for things that I guess he wasn't planning on standing up for. [03:35.760 --> 03:42.220] But before we get to him, I just would like to focus on some of the things that have been happening around us. [03:43.500 --> 03:45.300] Well, today was a very interesting day for one thing. [03:45.360 --> 03:49.120] Remember a couple of weeks ago, we talked about the panic that George W. [03:49.200 --> 03:53.740] Bush had where he had to run into the bomb shelter under the White House? [03:53.800 --> 03:54.560] That was because of what? [03:54.880 --> 03:56.800] An errant airplane or something like that? [03:57.940 --> 03:59.240] Same as it ever was. [03:59.340 --> 03:59.540] Yeah. [04:00.320 --> 04:01.180] An errant airplane. [04:01.180 --> 04:03.560] He heard that a dissenter was on the way. [04:03.780 --> 04:03.960] Yeah. [04:04.100 --> 04:04.300] Yeah. [04:04.840 --> 04:06.540] Needed to get out and get away from it. [04:06.760 --> 04:18.820] Today was even more of a fun scenario where an airplane actually came within, I think, five kilometers is what I saw on the coverage that I was watching of the White House. [04:19.020 --> 04:19.740] Five kilometers? [04:19.910 --> 04:20.060] Yeah. [04:20.180 --> 04:20.560] That's pretty far. [04:20.710 --> 04:22.470] Well, it seems pretty far to me. [04:22.680 --> 04:27.030] Like, if you were five kilometers away from me, you wouldn't be able to hear me unless you were listening to the radio. [04:27.030 --> 04:27.650] Three miles. [04:28.000 --> 04:28.360] Yeah. [04:28.530 --> 04:29.360] So, apparently... [04:29.360 --> 04:32.090] And I don't think they're counting from the ground up to the plane, were they? [04:32.760 --> 04:33.830] Where would they be counting from? [04:33.830 --> 04:34.320] I don't know. [04:34.360 --> 04:35.080] It's a secret service. [04:35.180 --> 04:36.590] You never know what to believe with them. [04:37.030 --> 04:38.320] Three kilometers away from the White House. [04:38.380 --> 04:43.270] I assume they mean if the White House went straight up into the air or however far up the plane was and then over. [04:43.460 --> 04:44.880] That was those five kilometers. [04:46.770 --> 04:48.740] So, anyway, today that happened. [04:49.770 --> 04:51.300] And all of Washington, D.C. [04:51.380 --> 04:54.090] went into this real panic. [04:55.020 --> 04:58.560] Now, Bernie, were you aware of the fact that the White House... [04:58.560 --> 05:01.120] First of all, I didn't know the White House had its own color code, just like New York City. [05:01.240 --> 05:06.720] But the White House went from yellow to orange and then to red for the first time ever. [05:07.020 --> 05:08.260] Red was hit in this country. [05:08.500 --> 05:08.560] Red? [05:08.560 --> 05:08.600] Wow. [05:09.200 --> 05:09.270] Wow. [05:09.580 --> 05:09.770] Yes. [05:09.920 --> 05:10.420] Did you hear about this? [05:10.520 --> 05:11.300] You didn't hear about this, Bernie? [05:11.860 --> 05:16.260] Do they have those sounds like they have on Star Trek when they go to Red Alert, it goes, What? [05:16.660 --> 05:16.940] What? [05:17.920 --> 05:18.420] That's good. [05:18.420 --> 05:18.720] That's very good. [05:18.860 --> 05:19.220] That's very good. [05:19.220 --> 05:20.100] I didn't know you could do that, Bernie. [05:20.220 --> 05:21.200] But I don't know. [05:21.200 --> 05:26.420] You know, I think you'd have to have access to the executive chambers of the White House to be able to find that out. [05:26.480 --> 05:27.780] But I'm sure they have something like that. [05:28.260 --> 05:29.920] If we were only a fly on the wall. [05:31.000 --> 05:32.760] Well, Dick Cheney had to be evacuated. [05:34.220 --> 05:36.020] To another secret undisclosed location? [05:36.080 --> 05:36.260] Yeah. [05:36.420 --> 05:37.700] Is that your computer making that noise, Bernie? [05:38.100 --> 05:38.420] Yeah. [05:38.540 --> 05:38.660] Yeah. [05:38.840 --> 05:40.240] Actually, that's the red alert sound. [05:40.240 --> 05:41.620] It's pretending to be a phone, I think. [05:42.620 --> 05:42.940] Yeah. [05:43.140 --> 05:47.120] Dick Cheney had to be evacuated from the White House, which I assume means... [05:47.820 --> 05:48.620] Well, actually, no. [05:48.800 --> 05:54.340] I saw his limousine tearing off into the streets at like 60 miles an hour. [05:54.480 --> 05:57.220] Just, you know, jump into the car and get the hell out of this place. [05:57.380 --> 05:58.120] That's what he did. [05:58.280 --> 05:59.980] But the president could stay there? [06:00.120 --> 06:02.200] The president was bicycling in Maryland. [06:02.520 --> 06:02.900] Oh, okay. [06:02.900 --> 06:04.000] So he continued to bicycle. [06:04.280 --> 06:07.920] And, you know, he had to finish the bike ride before he dealt with any other issues. [06:08.100 --> 06:12.400] I think it's about time that a president showed pro-bicycle anything. [06:12.400 --> 06:14.340] I don't think that was his intention at all. [06:14.940 --> 06:15.140] I don't. [06:16.000 --> 06:16.400] But... [06:16.400 --> 06:17.740] Was he falling off his bicycle? [06:18.160 --> 06:19.240] That I don't know. [06:19.480 --> 06:20.620] I'm sure we'll get a video of that later. [06:20.860 --> 06:24.700] I do know that Laura Bush and Nancy Reagan, of all people, were in the White House. [06:24.740 --> 06:27.760] And they were not evacuated along with Dick Cheney. [06:27.860 --> 06:30.440] They were taken to, quote-unquote, a secure location. [06:30.760 --> 06:33.380] So, you know, you can read all kinds of things into this. [06:33.640 --> 06:35.620] Dick Cheney, got to get him out of here right away. [06:36.020 --> 06:37.980] The wives, stick them in the basement. [06:38.440 --> 06:39.860] The president, he's bicycling. [06:40.040 --> 06:40.840] Okay, just let him be. [06:40.840 --> 06:43.000] Hey, you know, that's pretty much how the government runs. [06:44.200 --> 06:52.800] The weird thing about this, Emanuel, is that this Cessna plane, apparently it was a Cessna 150, which is a really tiny plane. [06:52.800 --> 06:55.160] Only two people can ride in this plane. [06:55.380 --> 06:58.880] And they both have to weigh 170 pounds or less each. [06:59.800 --> 07:01.680] It can only go about 100 miles an hour. [07:01.980 --> 07:04.320] It weighs about 1,000 pounds, the whole plane. [07:04.940 --> 07:07.260] You know, it's like two or three people could lift a plane off the ground. [07:07.260 --> 07:07.920] It's that late. [07:09.260 --> 07:14.640] And, you know, if one of these things hit a building, it just, you know, it would do what was no damage. [07:14.780 --> 07:19.380] And there's, it's not even big enough to carry a bomb of sizable weight to cause much damage. [07:19.380 --> 07:25.300] But you would think the radar system around the White House would be able to tell that this was such a tiny little plane. [07:25.440 --> 07:28.740] Well, yeah, but I mean, if you hit somebody with the plane, that would probably hurt quite a bit. [07:28.940 --> 07:31.620] I mean, if you throw a stone at somebody, that weighs a lot less than 1,000 pounds. [07:31.620 --> 07:35.140] Well, one of these things hit a plane, where was it? [07:35.240 --> 07:37.000] Does anyone remember one of these... [07:37.000 --> 07:37.280] Florida. [07:37.980 --> 07:39.860] Yeah, it was in Florida, like a year or two ago. [07:40.100 --> 07:40.660] Some crazy kid. [07:41.420 --> 07:43.780] Yeah, and it caused, like, it broke the window in the building. [07:43.900 --> 07:44.420] That was about it. [07:44.540 --> 07:45.900] It really didn't cause much damage. [07:46.460 --> 07:47.540] So, I don't know. [07:47.640 --> 07:50.240] It just sounds like they're really paranoid. [07:50.500 --> 07:54.940] Now, there's a conspiracy theory going around, which might have some merit. [07:54.940 --> 08:02.500] And that is, next week, Congress was supposed to be considering legislation to revise this. [08:02.500 --> 08:08.500] It was supposed to be this temporary no-fly zone around Washington, D.C., which is really a huge zone. [08:08.500 --> 08:10.060] It's, like, miles and miles and miles. [08:10.060 --> 08:24.780] And they were supposed to, you know, reduce this huge no-fly area and reopen the Reagan International Airport to, you know, to non, you know, to regular traffic again. [08:24.980 --> 08:37.670] And the story going around is that, well, they sort of hyped this particular warning alert just so that they could keep this vast no-fly zone in effect by, you know, exaggerating the threat. [08:37.670 --> 08:43.050] So, the conspiracy theory is that these guys in the airplane were actually agents of the government? [08:43.430 --> 08:44.050] Well, no. [08:44.140 --> 08:45.310] I don't think it goes that far. [08:45.450 --> 08:47.190] But who knows at this point? [08:47.500 --> 08:56.120] But apparently it was someone who was flying from Lancaster to North Carolina, and they just threw a straight line in the map and just went over that. [08:56.190 --> 09:00.190] Well, because the older maps that are more than, like, three or four years old don't have... [09:00.190 --> 09:05.140] The older aviation maps don't show this huge, expanded, post-9-11, no-flight zone. [09:06.610 --> 09:10.930] So, you know, maybe it was just a student who was just not aware of this new... [09:10.930 --> 09:12.400] It's only been in effect for, what? [09:12.620 --> 09:19.790] How is it, though, when you're up in the sky, you know, looking straight ahead, presumably, how do you know when to turn left and when to turn right? [09:19.790 --> 09:22.020] Are there signs saying, oh, this is a no-fly zone? [09:22.020 --> 09:24.580] Is there some kind of radar that buzzes or something? [09:24.880 --> 09:27.120] Yes, all the ground is painted red where you can't fly. [09:27.280 --> 09:28.380] You see, I think that would be smart. [09:28.380 --> 09:28.960] I really do. [09:29.240 --> 09:32.000] I think they should also paint the country so you know when you're crossing borders. [09:32.340 --> 09:33.580] And paint the right house red. [09:33.700 --> 09:34.360] Make it the red house. [09:35.140 --> 09:38.280] I thought all flight plans had to be pre-approved, though. [09:39.380 --> 09:42.860] Yeah, but I don't know if they're exact to the foot as to where you're going over. [09:43.520 --> 09:45.240] Plus, he might have strayed from his flight path. [09:45.240 --> 09:46.260] I guess that's also possible. [09:46.500 --> 09:57.440] You can fly into the zone if you have a flight path that's listed and you have a special transponder that broadcasts continuously your elevation. [09:57.440 --> 10:01.760] But apparently, these little Cessna 150s don't have that stuff. [10:01.960 --> 10:11.000] So, you know, when I heard about the story, I immediately thought of, you know, United Airlines and the flight attendants and all those people who are being screwed by their bankruptcy hearings. [10:11.000 --> 10:12.580] They lost their pension yesterday. [10:13.420 --> 10:18.600] So, you know, if anybody was going to demonstrate in disguise, I would expect it to be somebody affiliated with that. [10:18.600 --> 10:22.620] But, you know, it could be something a lot more simple than that particular scenario. [10:24.050 --> 10:25.440] So, yeah, a bit of fun. [10:25.660 --> 10:27.740] The color went all the way up to red. [10:27.820 --> 10:28.720] I don't know what that means. [10:28.960 --> 10:32.940] It meant a lot of people were running around, panicking, and nobody really knew what was going on. [10:33.020 --> 10:35.500] Some people in the White House weren't even told what was happening. [10:35.520 --> 10:41.840] Some members of the press, which apparently we'd be better off without in the eyes of the administration. [10:41.840 --> 10:46.050] Hardly the first time that the White House has snubbed the press. [10:46.740 --> 10:46.860] Yeah. [10:47.240 --> 10:49.540] But Cheney was out of there like a shot. [10:50.000 --> 11:00.960] And it's fun to see these things unfold, to watch how they develop, and to sort of figure out, you know, who's making the decisions, where people are being sent. [11:01.420 --> 11:04.120] You know, it's kind of educational in that regard. [11:04.320 --> 11:08.460] You can see a lot of impromptu stuff that you see happening. [11:08.460 --> 11:13.280] And it's always interesting to see what people pull out of their hats. [11:13.440 --> 11:15.560] I remember when Reagan was... [11:16.180 --> 11:18.200] Someone attempted to assassinate Ronald Reagan. [11:18.500 --> 11:22.320] All these guys in briefcases suddenly whipped Uzis out of these briefcases. [11:22.520 --> 11:25.320] And it's like, oh, now you get to know what's in those briefcases. [11:25.460 --> 11:26.060] I always wondered. [11:26.480 --> 11:27.120] That's right. [11:27.580 --> 11:27.960] So... [11:27.960 --> 11:32.360] I heard our old friend Tom Ridge, former director of Homeland Security. [11:32.500 --> 11:33.600] I heard him on the radio this morning. [11:33.780 --> 11:38.100] He was recorded earlier this week at a Homeland Security conference. [11:38.460 --> 11:42.800] And, um, he said, and I'm paraphrasing here, but these are the words he used. [11:42.960 --> 11:49.580] He said, uh, I don't care whether it's a color code or a numeric code or animals, but, uh... [11:49.580 --> 11:49.820] Animals? [11:50.300 --> 11:50.740] Animals. [11:51.060 --> 11:58.360] He was suggesting that maybe we should switch to an animal code as opposed to, you know, like, like giraffes or lions or whatever. [11:58.740 --> 11:59.820] It's just simply... [11:59.820 --> 12:00.280] He literally... [12:00.280 --> 12:01.560] I heard him say this on the radio this morning. [12:01.600 --> 12:03.300] He's been watching Barney too long. [12:04.040 --> 12:04.980] So is it... [12:04.980 --> 12:07.140] What happens if you have a giraffe? [12:08.340 --> 12:08.700] Yeah. [12:08.860 --> 12:11.460] Well, I think we need to question him a little bit more to find out what that means. [12:12.300 --> 12:16.300] Uh, well, uh, what I'm curious about, though, is the color code... [12:16.300 --> 12:18.300] And I don't want to spend too much more time on this because it is kind of silly. [12:18.420 --> 12:23.540] But the color code for the White House, is that related to Homeland Security or is that their own little color code? [12:23.680 --> 12:40.180] I was watching the press conference today and there was some confusion about this, uh, among members of the press, uh, and they were told that actually the Secret Service has its own color code that's existed since before 9-11, uh, and, and, uh, one of the members of the press asked if it was different colors. [12:40.340 --> 12:41.960] No, same colors, just different system. [12:42.200 --> 12:47.100] So they have the exact same colors, but they've, they've been using them for ages longer, apparently. [12:47.600 --> 12:49.080] So that's what got changed today. [12:49.240 --> 12:49.900] That's what got changed. [12:50.020 --> 12:51.380] Went from yellow to orange to red. [12:51.580 --> 12:52.960] I don't know what's supposed to happen at red. [12:54.020 --> 12:54.700] Red alert. [12:55.300 --> 12:55.700] Yeah. [12:55.920 --> 12:56.060] Yeah. [12:56.140 --> 12:57.280] And all those, those fun sounds. [12:58.080 --> 13:03.020] Um, okay, but, um, one of the more pressing issues, um, came out of D.C. [13:03.100 --> 13:06.220] this week as well, and that was the, uh, the whole Real ID initiative. [13:06.440 --> 13:07.360] Have you guys been following this? [13:07.920 --> 13:08.280] Somewhat. [13:08.540 --> 13:08.680] Yeah. [13:09.280 --> 13:10.700] And Bernie, I know you've been following this. [13:10.980 --> 13:16.880] Yeah, we mentioned it briefly on last week's show, and, uh, it did pass, uh, I believe yesterday it was signed into law. [13:17.000 --> 13:17.780] It was close, though. [13:17.960 --> 13:19.080] I mean, there was, you know, debate. [13:19.360 --> 13:19.880] 100 to one. [13:20.160 --> 13:20.920] 100 to zero. [13:21.080 --> 13:21.660] 100 to zero. [13:21.740 --> 13:21.860] Yes. [13:22.020 --> 13:22.420] All right. [13:23.320 --> 13:27.880] Almost, almost as, uh, it reminded me of the Patriot Act, which was passed. [13:27.900 --> 13:29.380] It was, uh, what, 99 to one. [13:29.560 --> 13:30.840] Wasn't that passed by voice vote? [13:31.060 --> 13:32.560] Well, no, that was the, uh, DMCA. [13:32.700 --> 13:33.000] Never mind. [13:33.820 --> 13:34.700] So many things. [13:34.760 --> 13:35.740] You just can't keep up with them all. [13:35.900 --> 13:36.180] Okay. [13:36.260 --> 13:37.440] So what is this Real ID business? [13:37.900 --> 13:41.660] The CALEA, the CALEA Act was passed with, uh, you know, without any, whatever. [13:41.960 --> 13:45.640] Now, now, what, what, what, as far as the Real ID thing, why should we be concerned about this? [13:46.740 --> 14:02.460] Well, uh, basically, it, it, it, it effectively creates, uh, a federal ID card system, um, where, you know, you used to think of countries like in Eastern Europe where, you know, it's difficult to travel without your, your federal government papers. [14:02.460 --> 14:19.320] Well, um, the federal government has now basically dictated standards that all states must comply with, including biometric standards, as I mentioned last week, that all, um, state ID cards, including driver's licenses, must comply with. [14:19.970 --> 14:33.760] And, uh, there's a lot of dangers, uh, for this, you know, not the least of which is, uh, you know, when you have a huge database like this, it's more subject to abuse, uh, the cards will be able to be read by third parties, like, you know, commercial entities, [14:33.780 --> 14:40.320] you go to a bar, you have to swipe your card to prove how old you are, and then they get all the other information, the biometric data off your card, et cetera. [14:40.820 --> 14:50.920] Um, it doesn't seem to be well thought out, and frankly, it's not really going to help with security that much, because the terrorists all had real IDs from states anyway. [14:51.380 --> 15:00.120] So I think this is just another way for the government to try to keep track of people, um, that, frankly, uh, people who are concerned about privacy, um, would have issue with. [15:00.320 --> 15:05.540] Well, okay, now that's, that's, that's what I'm questioning here, because we have driver's licenses in all the states. [15:05.540 --> 15:08.000] All 50 states have different versions of driver's licenses. [15:08.140 --> 15:16.080] Now, what this is basically doing is making all of that into the same version, uh, one, one particular type of driver's license. [15:16.200 --> 15:18.040] Now, does it go any further than just that? [15:18.460 --> 15:20.980] Well, it's vague as far as what the requirements are going to be. [15:21.100 --> 15:30.900] They, they left it wide open as far as saying, okay, well, uh, these aren't all the requirements, and, and there are no set standards for what the data is going to be, uh, encoded with. [15:31.060 --> 15:32.120] Are they going to have a magnetic stripe? [15:32.220 --> 15:33.080] Are they going to have RFID? [15:33.180 --> 15:34.340] Are they going to have a 2D barcode? [15:34.440 --> 15:36.600] They, this is all left open, so. [15:36.800 --> 15:37.020] Uh-huh. [15:37.240 --> 15:38.720] Well, at what point does that get addressed? [15:39.180 --> 15:39.760] I don't know. [15:40.040 --> 15:49.900] Yeah, that's, I think that's what we should be focusing on, because I think it's kind of, uh, inevitable that, uh, things will be standardized, and people will start using the same types of IDs in, in different parts of the country. [15:50.160 --> 15:52.240] I don't know if that necessarily is the threat. [15:52.380 --> 16:02.460] The threat is obviously what they're putting onto this ID, if they're putting your social security number on there, if, if, uh, we're required to carry our, our ID cards with us when we're not driving cars. [16:02.580 --> 16:07.380] Now, that's something that I have not seen any indication of this in the real ID, uh, legislation. [16:07.720 --> 16:15.080] It's, has anybody suggested that people who don't drive cars are going to be required to carry these things, or that people are required to carry them when they're not driving cars? [16:15.400 --> 16:23.040] If you want to enter a federal building, you will have to be carrying one of these cards or some other, uh, acceptable form of ID, like a passport. [16:23.280 --> 16:26.820] Well, my passport doesn't have an address on it, so that seems perfectly okay to me. [16:27.000 --> 16:35.440] I frequently show my passport when I want to protect my privacy compared to showing the driver's license or something, because it doesn't have my address or social security number or other stuff on it. [16:35.580 --> 16:36.920] And people take, take issue with that. [16:36.920 --> 16:41.720] I'm like, well, guess what, this is federal ID, and it doesn't get any better than that. [16:42.140 --> 16:43.740] I've never had trouble showing my passport. [16:43.960 --> 16:50.120] People, in fact, are impressed, because you get to hold it up like you're a cop or something, and they, they, they take a step back and they treat you with respect. [16:50.400 --> 16:55.320] Of course, a lot of places that are demanding ID will accept just about anything that you give them. [16:55.600 --> 17:04.470] Uh, to, today, to enter the building, they, they made me show an ID, and I gave them this card, which I made myself, and it does have my real name on it, but it's just a coincidence. [17:05.510 --> 17:09.320] Um, yeah, I, you know, I, I heard a great story from one of our listeners, actually. [17:09.550 --> 17:14.880] Uh, he had to take an SAT test, uh, last weekend, and apparently the school ID is not sufficient. [17:15.270 --> 17:19.270] You, you, you're not, uh, able to be recognized just based on the school ID alone. [17:19.580 --> 17:25.580] And he didn't have any kind of other ID, so he had to actually make a fake ID that would be acceptable. [17:26.100 --> 17:34.900] Um, and I don't know if he actually did that in the end, but, uh, it's, it's just really silly that, uh, all these ID requirements are being made, and they're very easy to get around, they don't really prove anything. [17:35.400 --> 17:48.770] We, we were talking about the, all the different forms of, of data that are going to be put on, uh, IDs nationwide under this act, but what people may or may not realize is the, that a lot of this information is already on, uh, licenses in different states, [17:48.990 --> 18:03.880] uh, in, in New York state, for instance, they have this giant, uh, two-dimensional barcode, uh, also apparently in New Jersey, uh, Redbird is showing me, uh, which, which has all this data, uh, and, and it's really kind of hard to know what it says unless you're a barcode reader, [18:04.050 --> 18:08.900] uh, but there's a, uh, a website called the swipe project that we've discussed before. [18:08.900 --> 18:26.460] It's not, uh, maybe a year or two ago, uh, where you can, you can scan in, uh, your license, and it will decode your barcode for you, or if you don't have access to a scanner, there's also a very informative chart, uh, by state showing what each state puts on its driver's license. [18:26.750 --> 18:29.380] So it's, uh, it's an interesting resource. [18:30.030 --> 18:44.590] Well, uh, obviously if this, uh, thing becomes standardized to the point where everybody has to carry, uh, a particular form of ID, we're, we're going to try and figure out all kinds of ways around it and ways to, uh, completely render the system, um, [18:44.810 --> 18:45.270] ineffective. [18:45.660 --> 18:48.570] Because that's just what we do with such dissidents, right? [18:49.490 --> 18:52.660] Uh, and that is the theme of this pledge drive, uh, dissidents. [18:52.920 --> 18:56.180] Well, not dissidents of the sort that, you know, it's bad noise, that kind of thing. [18:56.270 --> 18:57.940] No, uh, you know, dissenting. [18:58.510 --> 18:58.830] Yeah. [18:59.200 --> 19:08.460] One of the proudest moments of my life was when Bruce Sterling compared me, uh, to, uh, to Vaclav Havel, uh, and, and called me a dissident in my own country, which I thought was really kind of cool. [19:08.550 --> 19:09.420] I don't think I deserved it. [19:09.570 --> 19:11.730] I mean, you know, as a compliment, I don't think I deserved it. [19:12.320 --> 19:19.850] But, uh, I, I realized that we are all, uh, opposing various things that are going on around us in our own little ways. [19:20.070 --> 19:24.640] You know, we don't go into, uh, the world of computers and telephones say, I'm going to make a stand. [19:24.770 --> 19:29.290] I'm going to, uh, uh, uh, stand up against this particular oppression that happens around me. [19:29.400 --> 19:30.730] That comes to you afterwards. [19:31.010 --> 19:39.140] You know, when you're, when you're actually doing what you're interested in, all of a sudden you realize that, hey, I'm violating about 50 laws just by doing something that I like doing. [19:39.510 --> 19:44.810] And that's when you start realizing that there's more to this than just playing around with technology. [19:45.350 --> 19:56.210] And, um, somehow we've been thrust into the position where, uh, we, uh, we tell people about the various things that happen in the world and how it's changing and how it's becoming more and more restrictive. [19:56.590 --> 19:59.010] So it's a lot easier to be a dissident these days. [19:59.970 --> 20:01.210] I guess that's good news. [20:01.530 --> 20:02.490] I think it is. [20:02.550 --> 20:13.960] I think it is as long as people realize that, uh, um, it's a healthy thing to question, to stand up against what's going on around you and you don't, uh, self-censor, which, you know, a lot of people do. [20:15.070 --> 20:18.790] Now, uh, Bernie, of course, you're, you're, you're definitely a dissident. [20:19.090 --> 20:20.750] Uh, you, you certainly paid the price. [20:20.750 --> 20:22.420] Um, years ago. [20:23.110 --> 20:37.250] Um, and, uh, and subsequently, too, I've, uh, I've been visited, uh, by the Secret Service just for, uh, for trying to find out more information about, uh, their plans for, uh, political conventions and how to handle dissenters at conventions. [20:37.680 --> 20:43.640] I had, uh, Secret Service agents stop by my office and talk to my employer in a rather ominous tone. [20:44.400 --> 20:48.010] Um, apparently trying to get me fired, but it backfired on them. [20:48.400 --> 20:51.160] And, uh, you know, all I was, was trying to find out information. [20:51.330 --> 21:05.660] In fact, uh, I went to a, a meeting, uh, live on this show, uh, to, to broadcast, uh, uh, information about, uh, the Secret Service's plans here in Philadelphia to deal with dissenters during the 2000 Republican National Convention. [21:05.850 --> 21:06.570] I remember that. [21:06.660 --> 21:08.770] You, you were hustled out of the building live on the air, weren't you? [21:08.920 --> 21:09.460] Planning stage. [21:09.490 --> 21:10.830] I was sort of escorted out. [21:11.050 --> 21:12.730] But, um, but I was there for a while. [21:13.010 --> 21:19.270] And, um, uh, it didn't take kindly to, uh, my crashing real party and, uh, decided to pay me a visit. [21:19.420 --> 21:20.990] So, that's, that's the kind of thing that people can face. [21:20.990 --> 21:27.470] I think most people probably would have been fired at that point if the Secret Service came in and started saying things to their employer that might not be complimentary. [21:27.900 --> 21:32.140] But, uh, fortunately, uh, I have a, I have a very, uh, open-minded employer. [21:32.900 --> 21:33.210] Yeah. [21:33.290 --> 21:34.730] And a lot of people don't have that luxury. [21:34.850 --> 21:43.400] A lot of people have parents that, uh, that will, uh, uh, condemn their kids if they get into any sort of trouble whatsoever and won't understand why it might not be such a bad thing, what it is they're doing. [21:43.900 --> 21:45.850] So, yeah, having that support network is essential. [21:46.030 --> 21:54.460] And that's something that I've learned by doing this show and by, uh, working on the magazine is that, uh, the more of us there are, the more we can bounce things off of each other and, uh, you feel like you're not alone. [21:55.020 --> 22:01.830] And it's not something that, um, you know, you, you have to be ashamed of the fact that you get into trouble by asking questions or by being someplace you're not supposed to be. [22:02.540 --> 22:05.240] So, um, yeah, it's, it's, it's definitely a good thing. [22:05.540 --> 22:08.520] Bernie, I'd like to get more into your story a little bit later since we do have two hours tonight. [22:08.780 --> 22:14.050] Uh, maybe we can, uh, uh, sum up some of the, the highlights of, uh, of the various adventures you've been through. [22:14.160 --> 22:16.160] I know there's been, uh, more than one. [22:16.380 --> 22:27.200] Uh, Jim, of course, you've been through, uh, uh, the mill on, on a number of instances, uh, because you, um, you worked for the Metropolitan Transit Authority, the people that run our glorious subways here in New York. [22:27.760 --> 22:33.040] And, um, I guess you were asking a few too many questions or just experimenting a little too much or something. [22:33.220 --> 22:35.980] Yeah, essentially I was experimenting a little too much. [22:36.220 --> 22:46.000] And, uh, they've essentially lumped me together with, uh, other people who were experimenting and people who were blatantly, uh, defrauding the Transit Authority. [22:46.240 --> 22:52.310] And, uh, I ended up copying a plea and, uh, that sort of changed, uh, changed things. [22:52.660 --> 22:58.090] Well, a lot of people do have to plead guilty to something to get the whole thing over with. [22:58.200 --> 23:01.940] In fact, you know, that's something, uh, that, uh, Kevin had to do. [23:02.050 --> 23:03.760] That's something Phiber Optik had to do. [23:04.160 --> 23:07.850] Uh, you know, uh, Bernie, in your particular case. [23:08.700 --> 23:15.590] Yeah, well, it's kind of, uh, it's easy for people to say, well, you shouldn't plead guilty if, uh, if you don't feel you did anything wrong. [23:15.830 --> 23:28.070] But when you're being held, uh, against your will, basically in a cage for months after month after month, uh, you begin to realize that, well, if I just, uh, go with the flow, I can just be done with this thing. [23:28.400 --> 23:37.440] And, uh, I know it sounds like a cop-out, but, you know, until you've, until you've walked in those shoes, um, it might be wise to reserve judgment on that sort of a thing. [23:37.720 --> 23:48.380] Um, as it was, I, I never admitted to having, uh, uh, in fact, I was never even charged or alleged to have defrauded anyone or even attempted to defraud or anyone or any company. [23:48.420 --> 23:56.550] But, uh, just the possession of technology that could have been used for that, even though it had legitimate purposes, was enough for, uh, uh, Secret Service to get a conviction. [23:56.980 --> 24:02.200] And, um, frankly, that was not the whole reason, according to the prosecutor, why I was being held in the first place. [24:02.350 --> 24:03.780] But we could get into that later. [24:04.440 --> 24:06.550] Yeah, quite a lot of, uh, interesting stories. [24:06.760 --> 24:11.050] And, uh, we've talked about them all here on this particular radio program over the years. [24:11.610 --> 24:15.570] And, uh, boy, you know, what a, um, uh, what a time capsule it all is. [24:15.920 --> 24:18.550] You know, we started this show back in 1988. [24:19.330 --> 24:21.720] Uh, actually, that was the first ever show. [24:21.850 --> 24:24.040] Uh, it was kind of like a special in 1988. [24:24.780 --> 24:28.280] And, um, the, the show became a series, I believe, in 1991. [24:29.550 --> 24:31.520] And continued from there. [24:31.720 --> 24:34.280] And throughout it all, we, we've been following all kinds of stories. [24:34.280 --> 24:40.680] Not only the changing of technology, but the various cases that have, that have come about as a result of people playing with technology. [24:40.830 --> 24:44.380] Hackers that have been raided, uh, people who have, uh, been sent to prison. [24:45.140 --> 24:51.260] Um, other things going on in other countries, uh, very often affecting people right here in this room. [24:51.740 --> 24:53.350] Um, so it's fascinating. [24:53.500 --> 24:56.350] It's fascinating to, uh, uh, to listen to all that. [24:56.500 --> 25:00.440] And that's, um, that's part of the fun of doing radio is that you can go back and you can listen to that all. [25:00.760 --> 25:06.440] What I'm trying to do now is tie this into what we're offering here tonight, uh, during our special, uh, fun drive. [25:06.480 --> 25:10.070] Now, I know a lot of people listen to the program week after week, year after year. [25:10.900 --> 25:13.570] And, um, it's great to have you there. [25:14.070 --> 25:17.570] But did you ever think what a weird place this is? [25:17.920 --> 25:24.700] WBAI, the, the place where you hear all kinds of different voices talking about all sorts of different issues that you might not hear about any place else. [25:25.090 --> 25:26.880] This place is an anomaly. [25:27.200 --> 25:40.200] It's, it's not something you will find in other places and something that is always, ever since we started back in, uh, I believe 1960, something that has always been on the endangered species list. [25:40.570 --> 25:41.920] Uh, why is that? [25:42.020 --> 25:50.550] Because, um, well, we're not, uh, what part of that mega media conglomerate that owns just about every radio station in the world, or at least in this country. [25:51.180 --> 25:53.200] Uh, we depend on listeners. [25:54.220 --> 25:57.740] And if our listeners are not there, then we will not be there. [25:57.880 --> 25:58.760] As simple as that. [25:58.850 --> 25:59.810] We don't have commercials. [26:00.090 --> 26:02.920] Uh, not that anybody would advertise, uh, with the kinds of things we say. [26:03.570 --> 26:07.140] But, uh, we like to think of our listeners as our sponsors. [26:07.920 --> 26:11.180] Because by investing in us, you're investing in our future. [26:11.850 --> 26:12.310] All right. [26:12.350 --> 26:20.290] That said, uh, we have a number of different things that we're offering tonight, uh, to, uh, to help, uh, ease the pain of donating to the radio station. [26:20.400 --> 26:31.290] Now, obviously, you know, if you're really into the radio station, you should just pick up the phone, 212-209-2950, and, uh, make a pledge, regardless of all the nice things that we're going to give you in return. [26:32.280 --> 26:34.380] Regardless of that, that should be paramount. [26:34.540 --> 26:35.940] If that's in your head already, good. [26:36.280 --> 26:41.290] Listen to the things that we have, because, um, hopefully that will make things just a, a tad bit easier. [26:41.460 --> 26:46.940] For every pledge, $25 and above, uh, you will get, uh, an off-the-hook t-shirt. [26:47.440 --> 26:48.700] That's right, an off-the-hook t-shirt. [26:48.810 --> 26:53.790] Now, you won't find these online on our internet store because we don't offer it. [26:53.880 --> 26:55.920] We only offer it during, during, uh, pledge drives. [26:56.050 --> 26:56.640] Does anybody have one? [26:57.880 --> 26:58.280] All right. [26:58.380 --> 27:03.240] Hold it up to the microphone so everybody can see, uh, that, uh, this is a really kind of cool shirt. [27:03.400 --> 27:04.330] It says off-the-hook on it. [27:04.460 --> 27:07.070] It has the time and the station that the, that the show is on. [27:07.440 --> 27:10.000] Uh, and I guess if that ever changes, we'll have to change the shirt. [27:10.090 --> 27:12.520] But it's, uh, it's held for a number of years. [27:12.700 --> 27:15.540] It's a black shirt for our stereotypical hackers who wear nothing else. [27:15.660 --> 27:15.810] Yeah. [27:16.020 --> 27:16.330] Black t-shirt. [27:16.480 --> 27:17.040] Black t-shirt. [27:17.550 --> 27:18.790] It's, it's really cool. [27:18.980 --> 27:19.400] It's really cool. [27:19.480 --> 27:21.940] You wear that and, uh, people know that you're somebody with a brain. [27:22.480 --> 27:26.040] And, uh, not only that, but you're, you're kind of a walking billboard for the show as well. [27:26.160 --> 27:30.900] So, so we're advertising the show and getting out there and, uh, and more people will come aboard and listen. [27:31.280 --> 27:33.500] Uh, that's for a pledge of $25 and above. [27:33.880 --> 27:40.350] Uh, now we also have, um, uh, I was mentioning, listening to the, um, to the radio show. [27:40.720 --> 27:50.000] Uh, we have put all of the shows, all the shows are online for one thing, but we've also crammed them all onto a single DVD. [27:50.880 --> 28:01.780] Um, and we are offering that DVD with every single show from 1988 to the end of 2004, uh, for a combined pledge of $75. [28:01.780 --> 28:06.660] So you'll get that and you'll get the, um, off the hook t-shirt for a pledge of $75. [28:07.310 --> 28:08.460] How many shows is that? [28:08.790 --> 28:09.570] That's a lot of shows. [28:09.570 --> 28:10.200] That's a lot. [28:10.290 --> 28:11.180] It really is. [28:11.310 --> 28:12.850] It's a ridiculous amount of shows. [28:13.570 --> 28:20.460] Um, now, you know, you can download all of these of course, but it'll take you a very long time to do that, which is why we offer it, um, in, in one piece like this. [28:20.540 --> 28:22.330] And actually I should, I should point out something else too. [28:23.090 --> 28:24.260] I say it's one DVD. [28:24.720 --> 28:25.680] I'm actually lying. [28:25.940 --> 28:29.570] Um, because yes, we, we have put this out on a single DVD. [28:29.790 --> 28:31.070] It's called a dual layer DVD. [28:31.920 --> 28:39.400] Uh, some people are having problems with that format because older DVD drives don't read dual, uh, dual level, uh, DVDs very well. [28:39.760 --> 28:40.160] Okay. [28:40.610 --> 28:43.070] Uh, so what we're doing is we're splitting it into two. [28:43.160 --> 28:44.900] We're actually going to make this two DVDs. [28:45.040 --> 28:47.550] So you'll get two DVDs instead of just one. [28:47.700 --> 28:53.610] And that way you're, you're ensured that it will work on your DVD drive or computer or whatnot. [28:54.500 --> 28:56.640] Um, so, okay, that's for a pledge of $75. [28:56.850 --> 28:57.220] It goes on. [28:57.290 --> 29:00.140] It gets better for a pledge of a hundred bucks. [29:01.180 --> 29:04.020] This is where you have a choice of two different things. [29:04.740 --> 29:08.020] Uh, we made a movie a few years ago called Freedom Downtime. [29:08.940 --> 29:12.680] And, uh, a couple of years after the movie came out, we put it out on DVD. [29:13.740 --> 29:21.220] And the DVD has all kinds of extra features and, uh, Easter eggs, interviews, um, all sorts of fun stuff. [29:21.540 --> 29:27.050] And not only that, but the DVD is signed by myself and Kevin Mitnick. [29:27.900 --> 29:32.070] So right there, it's been devalued by us scrolling our names on it. [29:32.460 --> 29:33.940] And it's two different DVDs too. [29:34.040 --> 29:40.310] It's a, it's a dual DVD set, not a dual layer DVD, although it probably is that too, but it's a double DVD set, two DVDs. [29:40.400 --> 29:42.160] And we signed our names on both of them. [29:42.400 --> 29:43.070] That's right. [29:43.810 --> 29:46.640] So for a pledge of a hundred bucks... So you get a total of four signatures. [29:47.040 --> 29:48.180] Um, yeah. [29:48.810 --> 29:50.000] Two, two from each person. [29:50.200 --> 29:50.570] That's right. [29:50.680 --> 29:51.050] That's right. [29:51.090 --> 29:51.090] Wow. [29:51.090 --> 29:52.220] That's, that's, that's amazing. [29:52.380 --> 29:53.180] Yeah, absolutely. [29:53.460 --> 29:53.570] For ink. [29:54.400 --> 30:04.880] Uh, so yeah, for a pledge of a hundred bucks, you get that in addition to the other, other two things, uh, before that, the, uh, off the hook DVD and the off the hook t-shirt. [30:05.350 --> 30:06.720] Emmanuel, I'll give some quick math. [30:06.940 --> 30:11.880] And if you have, uh, most of the shows from 1988 through 2004, is that what you said? [30:12.070 --> 30:12.280] Yeah. [30:12.400 --> 30:12.900] All the shows. [30:13.180 --> 30:15.810] That comes close to 800 shows. [30:17.050 --> 30:20.660] That means we must be having a 1,000th show coming up some point. [30:20.780 --> 30:23.570] Uh, I guess we can get our calculators out and figure that out at some point. [30:23.900 --> 30:28.720] The people that calculated that countdown thing in the park, uh, the other week could probably work on this project also. [30:28.940 --> 30:29.070] Yeah. [30:29.500 --> 30:31.070] Well, I, I did some math too. [30:31.240 --> 30:36.790] And, and, uh, Emmanuel said we, we got regular in 1991 and had shows weekly from that point on. [30:37.090 --> 30:42.740] But that means that for a pledge of $75, that's only 15 cents a show. [30:43.240 --> 30:47.500] Even at our worst shows, I think it's worth more than 15 cents a show. [30:47.850 --> 30:49.200] Yeah, that's, that's something. [30:49.660 --> 30:52.780] Never thought of it that way, but yeah, I guess that, that, that does hold true. [30:53.350 --> 30:58.740] Uh, now there is also a, a brand new book out by Kevin Mitnick called The Art of Intrusion. [30:59.590 --> 31:05.260] And, uh, Kevin's going to be on in just a few minutes and he'll be discussing, uh, the book and various other things that, uh, he's been up to. [31:05.500 --> 31:13.020] Now you can, instead of the Freedom Downtime DVD for a hundred bucks, get a copy of The Art of Intrusion signed by Kevin. [31:13.640 --> 31:19.740] That's for a pledge of a hundred bucks in addition to the Off the Hook, um, DVD and the Off the Hook t-shirt. [31:19.920 --> 31:20.660] It's a tough choice. [31:20.660 --> 31:20.660] Right. [31:20.830 --> 31:22.740] 212-209-2950. [31:22.940 --> 31:27.180] Now for the person who needs to have everything, 150 bucks gets you the whole works. [31:27.350 --> 31:39.610] Freedom Downtime DVD, The Art of Intrusion book, both signed, the, um, Off the Hook complete DVD set, uh, and the Off the Hook t-shirt for a pledge of $150. [31:39.920 --> 31:41.540] 212-209-2950. [31:41.740 --> 31:45.050] Let's get some calls coming in because we do need to keep this place going. [31:45.160 --> 31:46.000] That's what it's all about. [31:46.200 --> 31:51.660] We, we donate what we can to make things easier, but in the end, we need those people to call in. [31:51.760 --> 31:53.380] 212-209-2950. [31:53.640 --> 31:53.940] Yes, Jim. [31:54.140 --> 32:01.610] You know, if, if, if, if these people, people out there listening, our, our fans, our, our loyal fans, fans need more incentive. [32:02.020 --> 32:09.180] If you get, if you get the DVD of Freedom Downtime, you can enter the 2600 Easter Egg Hunt. [32:09.920 --> 32:10.610] That's right. [32:10.810 --> 32:11.220] That's right. [32:11.310 --> 32:12.640] The 2600 Easter Egg Hunt. [32:12.720 --> 32:13.760] What is that all about, Jim? [32:13.980 --> 32:16.550] Well, you know, I, I, I read something by Emmanuel. [32:16.720 --> 32:17.920] Oh my goodness, that would be you. [32:18.290 --> 32:29.640] Uh, in the, in the last issue of the magazine, the, uh, the Easter Egg Hunt on DVDs, they have what are known as Easter Eggs, which is when you, you click on certain portions of the, of the screen or sometimes you don't click. [32:29.830 --> 32:31.740] But Jim, Easter has already passed. [32:31.880 --> 32:32.040] Yeah. [32:32.240 --> 32:32.980] It doesn't matter. [32:33.140 --> 32:34.330] These are just called Easter Eggs. [32:34.460 --> 32:37.240] And besides, Fabergé eggs are forever, are they not? [32:37.850 --> 32:38.220] All right. [32:38.290 --> 32:39.810] Well, you were straying way off the subject. [32:40.140 --> 32:41.660] Yes, we are, but it's Mike's fault. [32:41.780 --> 32:43.440] 212-209-2950. [32:43.680 --> 32:46.380] Continue with your discussion of Easter Eggs as we have three calls on the line. [32:46.640 --> 33:00.020] They're, they're, they're, they're cute little things that, the witty, witty things that you find on DVDs, uh, games, hidden games, hidden puns, hidden slogans, hidden signs, hidden visuals, hidden audio, hidden whatever. [33:00.220 --> 33:03.310] And we have more of that than any DVD set ever put out. [33:03.420 --> 33:11.790] And I, I, I'm not afraid to stand up and say that because I don't think there's any other DVD out there that has more Easter Eggs than this particular one. [33:11.790 --> 33:14.540] And if you win the Easter egg contest, Jim, what happens? [33:16.040 --> 33:17.260] You're a very happy person. [33:18.180 --> 33:19.540] But you get things. [33:19.680 --> 33:20.570] You get even more things. [33:20.830 --> 33:23.960] Yeah, I think you get a lifetime subscription to the magazine and all the back issues. [33:24.090 --> 33:24.460] All the back issues. [33:24.460 --> 33:25.160] Everything we sell. [33:25.290 --> 33:28.240] And a piece of every item of clothing sold. [33:28.740 --> 33:30.570] But you can't do it if you don't have the DVD. [33:30.830 --> 33:31.380] No, you don't. [33:31.460 --> 33:37.760] If you just look at the data on the DVD and say, well, this is an Easter egg, that's not good enough because you have to tell us how you got it. [33:38.180 --> 33:38.980] That's what's important. [33:39.070 --> 33:40.480] The deadline is September 1st. [33:40.570 --> 33:40.760] Right. [33:40.760 --> 33:46.830] And details are on our website, www.2600.com, and in the magazine, which you can find all over the place. [33:47.310 --> 33:50.940] But if you don't have the DVD, how can you look for the Easter eggs? [33:51.020 --> 33:58.640] We have six calls on the line, and hopefully many of those people are interested in the DVD and the book and the Off the Hook collection and the T-shirt. [33:58.760 --> 34:09.860] Yeah, it's a lot of stuff we're offering, but keep in mind the reason why we're doing this is because without this voice, without this radio station, we don't have very much to go with. [34:09.860 --> 34:17.380] The internet is fine, but a 50,000-watt radio station in the middle of New York City, that's really fine, and that's something that needs to be preserved. [34:17.660 --> 34:18.660] And think of it this way. [34:18.780 --> 34:24.220] What other radio show on this station during Pledge Week would give you a chance to make more than your pledge back? [34:25.400 --> 34:33.320] You pledge and get the DVD, and not only do you have this wonderful DVD, but you have a chance to get a lot more valuable stuff at no extra cost. [34:33.320 --> 34:38.940] Well, yeah, I don't want to sound too capitalistic here, but I guess that's the kind of thing that appeals to you fine. [34:39.180 --> 34:57.660] But keep in mind also that you're getting things which we consider to be of quality, you know, all kinds of interesting discussions, all sorts of documentary that tells you all kinds of interesting stories about the hacker world and just how these dissidents of the electronic age have dealt with certain issues. [34:57.660 --> 35:02.800] It's a story about the Kevin Mitnick saga that we'll get into in a little bit as well. [35:03.230 --> 35:09.400] Two hours that basically go over the period of time when he was imprisoned, and all kinds of other things as well. [35:09.480 --> 35:10.880] That's the Freedom Downtime DVD. [35:12.350 --> 35:19.520] The book, Kevin will be discussing the book in just a little bit, and of course the shows where we talk about all these things week after week. [35:19.520 --> 35:29.550] Now, I remember, Bernie, when you were languishing in prison in Pennsylvania, you somehow were able to call the radio station and talk to us week after week. [35:30.070 --> 35:32.380] And it was simply unbelievable. [35:33.380 --> 35:41.260] You know, the sounds of the prisoners in the background, the horrible noises that you'd constantly be hearing all the time, which you must have had to deal with 24 hours a day. [35:42.670 --> 35:45.020] Have you ever been able to listen to those radio shows yourself, Bernie? [35:46.750 --> 35:49.860] Actually, I've thought about doing it, and I've dissuaded myself. [35:50.050 --> 35:52.460] It's just... I don't want to hear it again, honestly. [35:53.000 --> 35:53.210] Yeah. [35:53.760 --> 35:54.900] Some of it is pretty painful. [35:55.020 --> 35:59.210] In fact, there was that one instance, and let me give you the phone number again, 212-209-295. [35:59.300 --> 36:04.940] We have a good number of calls there, but please, as many people as possible calling in is definitely a good thing for this place. [36:05.500 --> 36:13.860] There was a period where, towards the end, you were savagely beaten by somebody in prison, and you had your jaw wired shut. [36:13.860 --> 36:15.210] You were in a hospital bed. [36:16.190 --> 36:20.170] Somehow, you were able to call us after all of that had happened to you. [36:20.260 --> 36:23.130] We were, you know, we were worried, sick, wondering what condition you were in. [36:23.210 --> 36:24.260] They weren't telling us anything. [36:25.110 --> 36:29.650] And I just heard that show, actually, a few weeks ago, and it was simply... [36:29.650 --> 36:31.040] It was really disturbing. [36:31.260 --> 36:37.710] It was really disturbing just hearing how much they had done to you, yet you were able to somehow persist. [36:38.110 --> 36:40.880] And I think that's how you get into trouble all the time, because you persist. [36:40.880 --> 36:42.630] You keep asking the questions. [36:42.800 --> 36:43.690] You keep coming back. [36:43.880 --> 36:45.650] You keep doing what they tell you not to do. [36:46.610 --> 36:51.440] And they try and put you down however they can, but you got through that time, you know? [36:51.610 --> 37:07.670] As the warden very well put it, aptly put it, during that particular part of my ordeal, he said to me on the phone, as I was explaining to him how he's not going to have a choice about whether I can contact friends and family members about my condition. [37:07.960 --> 37:10.880] He said, you're making us look like a bunch of assholes. [37:12.550 --> 37:15.070] And I hope I can say that on the air, but that's what the warden said. [37:15.550 --> 37:17.050] Yeah, that's one of the words I think you can say. [37:17.150 --> 37:21.650] But, yeah, and the thing is, they were making themselves look like that in the first place. [37:21.650 --> 37:22.840] I told them he didn't need any help. [37:22.900 --> 37:24.130] Yeah, definitely not. [37:24.710 --> 37:32.150] Now, what happened after that, and I think, you know, it was probably a result of a lot of the action that was going on here on this radio station. [37:32.440 --> 37:35.340] They just suddenly released you. [37:35.710 --> 37:37.440] It was really, really kind of weird. [37:38.570 --> 37:46.650] Well, as the warden also later said, please, make your people stop calling our phone and fax lines. [37:46.840 --> 37:48.630] We can't get any phone calls through. [37:51.440 --> 37:59.260] So, I appreciate everyone who basically tied up the prison's phone and fax lines on my behalf because it apparently made a difference. [37:59.460 --> 38:03.420] They just wanted to rid themselves of the problem by relieving me. [38:03.650 --> 38:13.460] Even though I had been there months past my official parole date, mysteriously, my papers would always end up at the bottom of the pile. [38:13.460 --> 38:23.900] So, with the support of WPA listeners, I finally got myself out of a pretty horrible physical situation. [38:24.110 --> 38:24.340] Yeah. [38:24.590 --> 38:25.980] And forever grateful. [38:26.400 --> 38:29.300] And that just shows you the power that we all have. [38:29.300 --> 38:39.040] If we think together and act together and have something, some kind of a clearinghouse where there's information coming your way to let you know what's going on. [38:39.040 --> 38:45.520] And I like to think that we've served that interest over the past few years, past couple of decades, actually, almost. [38:46.830 --> 38:58.400] But we could never have done any of that without the listeners who have been there in the past and the listeners who are here now helping us to keep the station going, keep the station on the air. [38:58.610 --> 39:00.610] This couldn't have happened on a commercial radio station. [39:00.610 --> 39:02.670] No way they would not have allowed it. [39:02.670 --> 39:06.130] The Secret Service called this place trying to get us to stop. [39:06.300 --> 39:09.460] And they were told, basically, that you can't do that. [39:10.170 --> 39:20.110] That happens more than you might think, where authorities pressure journalists, pressure radio people, pressure anybody to not do what it is they're doing. [39:20.230 --> 39:22.540] And in most cases, most cases it works. [39:22.710 --> 39:23.610] Here, it does not. [39:23.760 --> 39:26.820] And that's because we know that our listeners are there for us. [39:26.860 --> 39:28.440] We don't have to worry about losing sponsors. [39:28.610 --> 39:31.000] 212-209-2950. [39:31.000 --> 39:32.500] Oh, please, don't let us down on that. [39:32.960 --> 39:36.610] Because without our sponsors, our listeners, we really are nothing. [39:36.820 --> 39:43.570] You talked about the Secret Service calling the radio station and asking for this programming to be stopped. [39:43.860 --> 39:51.710] But what happens, in addition to ignoring that threat, what a lot of these commercial radio stations do, they don't even wait for the call from the Secret Service. [39:51.960 --> 39:54.800] They know what the Secret Service is going to object to. [39:54.880 --> 39:57.500] They know what the folks in power are going to object to. [39:57.630 --> 39:58.780] And they don't say it. [39:58.880 --> 40:00.360] They don't need to be called. [40:00.360 --> 40:07.230] And this is the sort of thing that WBAI since its inception has been not doing. [40:07.460 --> 40:09.570] We say what they don't want us to say. [40:09.800 --> 40:13.570] And sometimes it's utterly inane, but a lot of times it isn't. [40:13.960 --> 40:25.210] And if you want that sort of freedom to be able to say these things on FM radio in the middle of Manhattan to continue, we appreciate your pledge today. [40:25.210 --> 40:27.630] 2-1-2-0-9-2-9-5-0. [40:27.730 --> 40:31.400] And again, we're offering all kinds of interesting things, hacker-related things. [40:31.800 --> 40:33.670] But there are other things, too, at the radio station. [40:33.670 --> 40:38.130] If for some reason you find yourself listening and you have no interest whatsoever in hacker stuff, call anyway. [40:38.150 --> 40:43.320] And there's other things that the friendly volunteers picking up the phone will be able to help you with. [40:43.320 --> 40:50.440] But for those of you who are interested in the kinds of things that we've been talking about over the years, we have all different pledge levels. [40:50.710 --> 40:54.940] Everybody pledging $25 and above gets a really spiffy off-the-hook t-shirt. [40:55.980 --> 41:05.280] For $75 and above, you get the off-the-hook DVD, which contains all of our shows from the first one in 1988 to the end of 2004. [41:06.480 --> 41:13.590] For $150, you get the Freedom Downtime DVD and Kevin Mitnick's new book, all of which are autographed. [41:13.670 --> 41:17.440] And you also get the off-the-hook DVD and the t-shirt as well. [41:18.130 --> 41:21.420] And for $100, you get to choose between one of those, the book or the DVD. [41:22.280 --> 41:25.940] A lot of different levels, a lot of different items, and hopefully a lot of calls. [41:25.940 --> 41:28.590] We have five calls on the line right now. [41:28.690 --> 41:31.380] And I know there are more than five people down there in the tally room. [41:31.850 --> 41:34.090] In fact, Arseney ran down there to answer phones. [41:34.550 --> 41:40.590] So you might wind up speaking to one of us on the air, on the phone down there, if you give a call. [41:40.690 --> 41:43.130] 212-209-2950. [41:43.150 --> 41:44.880] Let's see how many we can bring in. [41:45.670 --> 41:46.360] Six now. [41:46.520 --> 41:46.690] Okay. [41:46.860 --> 41:48.230] We can make that ten. [41:48.900 --> 41:52.800] I mean, even if you don't talk to one of us, all the volunteers are very interesting people. [41:52.860 --> 41:53.090] That's right. [41:53.130 --> 41:54.590] And some people prefer not to talk to us. [41:55.040 --> 41:56.840] I've known many people like that over the years. [41:57.790 --> 41:59.360] 212-209-2950. [41:59.360 --> 42:04.650] Well, but with every call, we move ever closer to the goals. [42:04.940 --> 42:11.040] The goal for this particular fundraiser, for the entire radio station, is a staggering $1.1 million. [42:11.940 --> 42:14.670] Now, that's a lot of money to many of us. [42:16.090 --> 42:20.150] But it's nothing compared to the budgets of commercial radio stations. [42:20.650 --> 42:33.090] So while it may sound unpleasant to be begging for money on the air, when you realize that we have three of these things a year, and we bring in about a million bucks each time, you can run a radio station on $3 million a year? [42:33.900 --> 42:34.780] That's unbelievable. [42:34.780 --> 42:35.730] But we do it. [42:35.800 --> 42:37.570] We've been doing it since the 60s. [42:37.650 --> 42:39.340] And we're going to continue to do it with your help. [42:39.340 --> 42:40.300] And here's the thing. [42:40.460 --> 42:46.480] I mean, I don't even know what you get for the millions and millions of dollars that other radio stations spend. [42:46.610 --> 42:48.320] I mean, the programming is not any better. [42:48.420 --> 42:54.590] In fact, the programming, a lot of times, is just filler in between the ads, which are the real product on commercial radio. [42:54.590 --> 43:10.760] What a lot of people don't realize when they listen to commercial radio is they're really paying for that as part of the cost of any of the commercial products and services that are advertised on commercial radio stations, or TV stations for that matter. [43:10.900 --> 43:20.400] So you're really paying a lot more out of your own pocket for the cost of that advertising, which you're also subjected to on the air, which you're not subjected to on WBAI. [43:20.400 --> 43:40.130] So you could really save money by just contributing to BAI and listening to it, not be subjected to commercial advertising, and try to stay away from commercial products that manufacturers of commercial products who support commercial radio stations, because it's something that you could probably avoid without too much trouble if you tried. [43:40.130 --> 43:49.320] I mean, again, these commercial radio stations, the product that they produce on commercial radio is not programming. [43:49.540 --> 44:01.560] What they have is ads, and in order to get people to listen to the ads, they put somewhat interesting programming every once in a while, or programming that some people think is interesting. [44:01.560 --> 44:03.880] But there's no diversity. [44:04.140 --> 44:14.980] There's no room for experimentation in that format, because if they try something experimental and it doesn't work, their product, which is the advertisers, pull out. [44:15.230 --> 44:17.060] They go away. [44:17.280 --> 44:21.560] Whereas with WBAI, if we do a show and maybe it's not so good, it doesn't matter. [44:21.560 --> 44:24.710] We either try it or we stop trying. [44:25.360 --> 44:35.400] And this kind of freedom to experiment, there's no other station that would even try putting hackers on the air, because they wouldn't know if it would work or not, except WBAI. [44:35.780 --> 44:38.540] And, you know, we really appreciate your support. [44:38.680 --> 44:42.200] Again, the number, 212-209-2950. [44:42.620 --> 44:49.420] We have all these wonderful premiums that we've talked about, but the real premium is the station itself, continuing. [44:52.560 --> 44:52.960] Yeah. [44:52.960 --> 44:53.820] You were saying, Bernie? [44:54.140 --> 44:55.580] I was just saying, very well said. [44:55.700 --> 44:56.960] The station itself is the premium. [44:57.960 --> 44:58.780] That's very true. [44:59.000 --> 45:03.680] And, you know, occasionally we get complaints saying, you guys always seem to be asking for money. [45:03.920 --> 45:22.660] Well, if you divvy it up, you can either listen to commercials seven days a week, 52 weeks a year on a commercial radio station, or you listen to us, if we're the only show you listen to, you hear us do it for three, at the most six hours a year, and we're not doing it all the way through the show. [45:23.160 --> 45:25.440] We've done it for about six, seven minutes now. [45:25.800 --> 45:28.040] We'll do it for another six, seven minutes in about an hour. [45:28.560 --> 45:29.340] And that's it. [45:29.500 --> 45:31.360] Fourteen minutes in one show. [45:32.140 --> 45:32.710] Well, yeah. [45:32.710 --> 45:36.100] You get that 14 minutes in every commercial show you listen to. [45:36.210 --> 45:37.080] And you don't have a choice. [45:37.080 --> 45:39.960] You don't have a choice because you have to pay for... [45:39.960 --> 45:44.500] Everything you buy has advertising, you know, included in the price somehow. [45:44.940 --> 46:01.230] So not only are you barraged with commercials everywhere you go, whether it's print commercials or radio or television or even in the movies now, you have to pay for it when you buy whatever it is they're selling because they've got to pay for all this advertising that goes to these commercial entities. [46:02.390 --> 46:03.540] It's, you know, it's horrible. [46:03.700 --> 46:06.020] And here, we don't expose you to that. [46:06.120 --> 46:07.710] Yeah, we expose you to this every now and then. [46:07.800 --> 46:10.230] But I think most listeners understand that. [46:10.460 --> 46:14.200] I get very few complaints from people that say, boy, I hate when you guys are asking for money. [46:14.230 --> 46:15.980] I think they understand why we have to do this. [46:16.180 --> 46:20.660] And I also think for the most part here at the radio station, we try to make it as pleasant as possible. [46:20.730 --> 46:23.600] And we try to inject as much interesting programming as possible. [46:23.820 --> 46:26.540] Again, 212-209-2950. [46:26.980 --> 46:30.100] Let's get one more flurry of calls before we go to our next guest. [46:30.700 --> 46:48.020] Again, for a pledge of $25, you will get an off-the-hook t-shirt, which you can wear proudly around your particular neighborhood or institution, and answer any questions that people might ask you as far as, what is this radio show that you listen to, and what is this radio station upon which it airs? [46:48.620 --> 46:55.000] For a pledge of $75, you will get every single show that we've ever done from 1988 to the end of 2004. [46:55.210 --> 46:58.420] They won't include this one because, well, you know, we can't put it on the DVD. [46:58.420 --> 47:00.210] All right, you understand that. [47:00.320 --> 47:03.980] But until the end of 2004, it's a lot of them. [47:04.200 --> 47:10.700] It'll take you many, many days to download them all from the internet, so this is a way to quickly have them all with you at all times. [47:10.860 --> 47:12.680] Sometimes you might need to reference something quickly. [47:12.820 --> 47:14.000] And people have done that, too. [47:14.120 --> 47:14.780] I'm not joking. [47:14.920 --> 47:19.210] People have used our radio program to learn more about various things in the past. [47:19.360 --> 47:24.340] If they want to hear what a particular phone switch sounds like, they can go back to 1992 and hear it. [47:25.100 --> 47:28.460] So for a pledge of $75, you'll get that and the t-shirt. [47:28.580 --> 47:30.300] 212-209-2950. [47:30.760 --> 47:40.980] For a pledge of $100, you'll get your choice of either the Freedom Downtime DVD, which is signed by myself and Kevin Mitnick. [47:41.440 --> 47:46.660] Freedom Downtime being the two-hour documentary that we made a couple of years ago about the Kevin Mitnick story. [47:47.420 --> 47:57.400] And the DVD includes another couple of hours, actually I think another three hours, of lost scenes, interviews, various other things that weren't included in the original release. [47:57.520 --> 47:58.840] And again, that's for a pledge of $100. [47:58.840 --> 48:06.460] You can choose that or you can get the new Kevin Mitnick book, The Art of Intrusion, which is signed by Kevin. [48:06.900 --> 48:09.710] And for a pledge of $150, you can get everything. [48:09.710 --> 48:10.710] You can get the book. [48:10.710 --> 48:11.420] You can get the DVD. [48:11.440 --> 48:14.480] You can get the Off the Hook DVD and the Off the Hook t-shirt. [48:14.480 --> 48:17.080] 2-1-2-2-0-9-2-9-5-0. [48:17.210 --> 48:18.860] We have five calls on the line right now. [48:20.000 --> 48:24.600] Let's add a few to that and then we can go right into our next feature. [48:26.790 --> 48:28.840] Gosh, where do we go from here? [48:30.400 --> 48:32.210] There's no place to go but up, I think. [48:32.880 --> 48:34.620] That implies that we're pretty far down. [48:34.820 --> 48:35.680] No, no, no, no, no. [48:36.120 --> 48:41.620] That was an open leading statement that you are choosing to ignore. [48:41.620 --> 48:51.140] Well, one of my favorite parts of doing this kind of a thing, and yeah, I do have my favorite parts of begging for money on the air, is looking up at the little calculator thing that we have here. [48:51.210 --> 48:53.020] Over the years, this is the system we've used. [48:53.080 --> 48:56.760] We have a little closed circuit camera and we focus on a calculator in another room. [48:56.860 --> 48:58.160] And that's our tally. [48:58.360 --> 49:03.460] Other radio stations might spend thousands of dollars on a more sophisticated system, but that's our system. [49:03.700 --> 49:07.960] Everyone, when they see the system for the first time, says, there has to be a better way. [49:08.340 --> 49:11.500] This is insane that you have a camera looking at a calculator. [49:11.710 --> 49:15.640] But no one has been able to come up with an actually better way. [49:15.820 --> 49:21.020] And what's more interesting is this is so much high tech than the previous system, which was a camera focused on a blackboard. [49:22.230 --> 49:22.600] Yeah. [49:22.860 --> 49:23.760] We never had that. [49:24.260 --> 49:24.680] I'm joking. [49:25.020 --> 49:27.360] We had a blackboard, I think, but everything was in the same room. [49:27.440 --> 49:28.800] But that was back in the 1930s. [49:30.430 --> 49:31.680] 212-209-2950. [49:31.800 --> 49:38.060] But what I was saying was, I like looking up there and seeing that, oh my God, we only have $250 right now. [49:38.340 --> 49:44.440] I know that's because they haven't had a chance to update the calculator yet, you know, because they're answering phones. [49:44.920 --> 49:52.040] So the more you guys call in, the bigger the thrill for us when they finally do have a lull and they're able to enter all those numbers. [49:52.140 --> 49:55.000] And then we look up and all of a sudden it's like, you know, several thousand dollars. [49:55.000 --> 49:58.960] It makes us feel like Jerry Lewis at the Muscular Dystrophy Telethon. [49:59.540 --> 50:01.260] Well, I wouldn't have used quite that analogy. [50:01.400 --> 50:09.200] But yeah, you know, it makes us feel pretty good as far as, you know, knowing that there are people out there and they care enough to call in and pledge some support for this place. [50:09.280 --> 50:10.900] Now, again, we take credit cards. [50:11.040 --> 50:12.060] We take all kinds of credit cards. [50:12.180 --> 50:14.560] We take Visa, MasterCard, American Express. [50:14.730 --> 50:15.580] We might even take Discover. [50:15.700 --> 50:16.620] You have to check on that one. [50:16.800 --> 50:19.140] If you have a Discover card, now's your chance to use it. [50:19.210 --> 50:19.560] That's right. [50:19.700 --> 50:21.200] 212-209-2950. [50:21.400 --> 50:24.040] We'd like to point out, no hackers touch your credit cards. [50:24.040 --> 50:26.500] No, well, first of all, that's not what hacking is about. [50:26.780 --> 50:31.340] That's mass media hacking has to do with things like that. [50:32.930 --> 50:35.460] And hopefully, if you listen to the radio show, you know that already. [50:35.680 --> 50:40.500] But we're always here to inform people as to just what hacking is all about. [50:40.730 --> 50:42.780] 212-209-2950. [50:43.180 --> 50:46.710] If you don't have, by the way, a credit card, they'll send you a bill and you can mail a check. [50:46.900 --> 50:47.200] That's right. [50:47.320 --> 50:47.800] You can mail a check. [50:47.960 --> 50:50.340] Some people even show up to the radio station cash in hand. [50:50.460 --> 50:51.420] That's how much it means to them. [50:51.420 --> 50:55.920] They take a trip all the way down here because they want to support the station that much. [50:56.400 --> 50:57.420] It's really cool. [50:57.520 --> 50:58.840] And we would not be anywhere without our listeners. [50:58.980 --> 51:00.340] 212-209-2950. [51:00.800 --> 51:01.760] That's our phone number. [51:01.920 --> 51:04.760] You're listening to an extended edition of Off the Hook. [51:04.860 --> 51:06.260] We're on until 9 o'clock tonight. [51:06.360 --> 51:10.140] Emmanuel Goldstein here with a cast of lots of interesting people. [51:10.280 --> 51:11.480] We have Redbird. [51:11.710 --> 51:12.480] We have Mike. [51:12.700 --> 51:14.780] We have Jim. [51:14.980 --> 51:16.200] And we have Bernie S. [51:16.360 --> 51:19.710] Joining us now on the telephone from St. Louis, Kevin Mitnick. [51:19.710 --> 51:20.480] Kevin, how are you doing? [51:20.840 --> 51:21.480] All right, Emmanuel. [51:21.480 --> 51:21.980] How are you? [51:22.160 --> 51:22.520] Pretty good. [51:22.600 --> 51:24.800] Now, you're in St. Louis giving talks. [51:25.060 --> 51:29.920] And I assume signing your book because that's all you seem to be doing these days is signing that book. [51:30.640 --> 51:31.680] This is the older book. [51:31.820 --> 51:34.040] I did a talk on the Art of Deception book. [51:34.180 --> 51:38.500] So I arrived in St. Louis last night and I go back home in the morning. [51:38.500 --> 51:41.780] So I'm just here for the, I guess, one and a half days. [51:41.780 --> 51:48.080] Now, I should point out, yes, this is, I guess, the sequel to your first book was the Art of Deception. [51:48.320 --> 51:49.760] And this is the Art of Intrusion. [51:49.900 --> 51:50.710] What's the difference? [51:51.080 --> 51:57.710] Well, the Art of Deception really covered, it was fictional stories built really around real events. [51:57.710 --> 52:01.180] But the names and places were changed to protect the guilty. [52:02.480 --> 52:16.940] And it really illustrated the weaknesses of the human element and how it's so easy for anyone to break into systems by just simply calling up somebody over the telephone or sending an email and so forth. [52:17.800 --> 52:36.320] The new book, The Art of Intrusion, is really a collection of stories that were written by myself and my co-author, Bill Simon, after interviewing a number of current black hat, and former black hat hackers who were breaking into systems illegally. [52:36.700 --> 52:56.900] So after interviewing, I'd say about 100 to 125, we picked the stories that either were the most entertaining or where the target was the most interesting, like if the target was particularly compelling, or where the attack or where the sophistication of the attack was interesting, [52:57.100 --> 53:05.540] because we wanted to demonstrate the number of the clever different attack vectors or points that are used to compromise systems and networks. [53:06.380 --> 53:17.680] So after interviewing umpting people, what we did is we chose, you know, a handful, and we told their stories of what they did, how they did it, why they did it. [53:17.680 --> 53:30.900] Um, and, uh, then at the end of each story, we discussed particular countermeasures that companies or consumers can do to minimize the chances the same attack would work against them. [53:31.060 --> 53:32.940] So that's, that's kind of the differences. [53:33.180 --> 53:49.900] One of the older book is more fictional stories that illustrate the social engineering, and the newer book is real stories that illustrate a number of different ways of how systems are broken into and how you can stop it. [53:50.460 --> 53:54.020] Now, I remember you were, uh, soliciting stories at the Fifth Hope. [53:54.200 --> 53:58.020] Uh, did you, uh, get much of a response from, from people at hacker conferences? [53:58.280 --> 53:58.860] Not really. [53:59.360 --> 54:01.540] Um, I don't know where the most of them. [54:01.800 --> 54:02.300] I'm sorry? [54:02.400 --> 54:04.620] They were afraid to, uh, come forward? [54:04.620 --> 54:12.900] I was at CanSec West in Toronto, uh, no, not Toronto, in Vancouver last year, and I sat down and I heard some very interesting stories. [54:12.900 --> 54:13.940] I was taking notes. [54:14.460 --> 54:20.440] Then at the end of it, I said, great, I'll put, you know, you're going to probably be really highly likely you end up in the book. [54:20.520 --> 54:23.080] Then they go, oh, no, no, no, no, no, you can't tell the story. [54:23.540 --> 54:24.400] And I go, what do you mean? [54:24.520 --> 54:27.000] And then they'd go, oh, well, we don't want to be kicked out of the system. [54:27.260 --> 54:35.180] In other words, I hadn't realized that they were talking about a current attack, you know, into a, you know, this was a large phone company, for example. [54:35.560 --> 54:37.820] And then, you know, it was pretty exciting and interesting. [54:38.230 --> 54:41.360] And then, and then I couldn't tell the story because they told me not to. [54:41.520 --> 54:43.060] So I respected their wishes, of course. [54:43.420 --> 54:48.480] And then the reason was, is because they were currently into their network and they didn't want to be locked out. [54:50.000 --> 54:50.640] I see. [54:50.840 --> 54:51.180] Interesting. [54:51.560 --> 54:54.180] So, you know, it's just like, they didn't give me permission. [54:54.180 --> 54:54.880] I couldn't do it. [54:55.360 --> 54:56.660] But you heard a good story, right? [54:57.340 --> 54:58.280] Yeah, it was quite interesting. [54:58.280 --> 55:03.540] It was quite interesting, not really the target, but the method that was used in that particular instance. [55:03.560 --> 55:06.160] So it was quite eye-opening. [55:06.320 --> 55:10.000] Can you give us an example of one of the stories in the book? [55:10.160 --> 55:13.500] I thought the most interesting was the actual, the Las Vegas hack. [55:13.680 --> 55:24.100] I don't know if you had an opportunity to take a look at the first chapter, but it was these guys that were kind of stellar programmers and they decided to take a trip. [55:24.100 --> 55:26.380] They actually lived in New York, coincidentally. [55:26.380 --> 55:31.900] And they decided to take a trip to Vegas with, I think, with their girlfriends. [55:32.230 --> 55:34.560] And one of the girlfriends, they were all playing video poker. [55:34.700 --> 55:39.100] And when their girlfriend says, hey, you guys know computers, isn't there something you can do to help us win? [55:39.660 --> 55:43.600] So back in their suite, they started brainstorming ideas about how to beat Vegas. [55:44.200 --> 55:55.820] So to make a long story short, what they had done is they had purchased a version of the video poker machine that was in several of the casinos that was made in Japan. [55:56.500 --> 55:58.320] And they took it back to New York. [55:59.700 --> 56:06.360] They took the... they basically dumped the firmware off the EEPROM, which was, you know, wasn't even protected. [56:06.620 --> 56:18.000] And then they wrote a disassembler themselves, disassembled the code, had identified that the program improperly used what they call a pseudo-random number generator. [56:18.210 --> 56:22.260] It's basically a random number generator that, like, chooses the carts, so to speak. [56:22.260 --> 56:25.780] And they figured out how they could write a program. [56:26.620 --> 56:34.280] And by actually having the machine there, they were able to determine when the random number generator was cycling and at what points it wasn't. [56:34.340 --> 56:37.280] So they're able to control it from the outside as a player. [56:37.620 --> 56:49.040] So what they were able to do is determine how to sync up with a pseudo-random number generator so they could predict precisely what cards would be dealt and when a royal flush would be dealt. [56:49.040 --> 56:52.680] So they basically took Vegas for nearly a million dollars. [56:52.960 --> 56:54.580] It was quite an interesting story. [56:54.780 --> 57:08.260] They built a little computer that fit into their shoe and they were able, you know, they first built this from a breadboard that they purchased at Radio Shack and they would actually input the cards via binary with their toes in their shoe. [57:08.480 --> 57:21.230] And then it would be a vibrator, like out of a Motorola Bravo pager, it would be a vibrator that would give them like a signal of how to play the hand using like a Morse code annotation. [57:21.230 --> 57:22.400] It was quite interesting. [57:23.000 --> 57:27.730] Now, the kind of people who told you that story, they weren't worried about coming back to Hauntham? [57:28.060 --> 57:35.300] No, because it happened, you know, past the statute of limitations, you know, federal statute of limitations in America for... [57:35.940 --> 57:39.780] Yeah, but not past the statute of vengeance that the people... [57:39.780 --> 57:43.140] Statue of vengeance that the statute of mafia doesn't forget. [57:43.420 --> 57:47.210] Well, I mean, I just would be very worried that you say they took Vegas for over a million dollars. [57:47.210 --> 57:50.320] That's something that I wouldn't boast about too many places. [57:50.560 --> 57:56.860] Apparently, they actually provided me with some of the code, you know, to, you know, verify that they were... [57:56.860 --> 58:01.230] Because don't forget, a lot of people could be trying to social engineer me over the phone. [58:01.230 --> 58:12.710] But these guys, from my research, seem to be genuine, but there was no 100% confidence level in any case. [58:15.940 --> 58:17.900] These guys remained anonymous, too. [58:18.660 --> 58:23.760] I interviewed two of the guys that were on the team, but they remained strictly anonymous. [58:24.900 --> 58:27.800] And you won't give up their identities, Matt? [58:27.820 --> 58:28.980] Well, you probably don't even know their identities. [58:29.580 --> 58:36.460] Well, I have their email addresses, but depending on their level of sophistication, it may or may not be trackable. [58:36.580 --> 58:37.360] For example, if... [58:37.810 --> 58:45.320] Even though you use a Hotmail or Yahoo address, if you log in from home, obviously, Yahoo and Hotmail keep logs of your IP. [58:45.620 --> 58:49.560] And, you know, once you have the IP or the ISP, you could subpoena that information. [58:50.160 --> 58:50.680] So it's quite easy. [58:52.850 --> 58:54.600] Bernie, you're allowed to talk to Kevin now, right? [58:54.700 --> 58:57.660] It used to be that the two of you couldn't talk because you were both convicted felons. [58:57.660 --> 58:59.840] But I think you're both allowed to talk to each other now, right? [59:00.710 --> 59:01.160] Yes. [59:01.380 --> 59:03.020] We're not going to run our control, however... [59:03.020 --> 59:03.900] Okay, then I'll permit it. [59:03.960 --> 59:04.230] Go ahead. [59:05.140 --> 59:05.760] Hi, Kevin. [59:06.480 --> 59:11.400] You are still not permitted to write about some things in a book that you sell. [59:11.520 --> 59:12.000] Isn't that correct? [59:12.340 --> 59:18.600] Well, up until January of 2007, I can't write my autobiography. [59:18.600 --> 59:21.140] I can't write the Kevin Mitnick story and profit from it. [59:21.710 --> 59:29.520] But the good news is, I've already talked to my current co-author, and we're going to work on the book and get it done. [59:29.520 --> 59:33.580] So by the time that date rolls around, we can go ahead and market it or sell it. [59:34.210 --> 59:39.520] So I'm going to work on the autobiography, the true story, not the John Markoff version. [59:39.680 --> 59:43.760] And that calls into question, I don't know if you've been reading the New York Times lately. [59:43.980 --> 59:45.920] You know, I was just about to bring this up, but go ahead. [59:45.920 --> 59:58.880] Yeah, about this guy in Sweden, the 16-year-old who allegedly hacked into Cisco and stole a copy of iOS, which is the code for their routers. [01:00:00.460 --> 01:00:06.780] It was interesting because when I was reading the story on the New York Times, I was actually interviewed on CNN yesterday about it. [01:00:06.800 --> 01:00:08.260] And I go, okay, what's your source material? [01:00:08.620 --> 01:00:10.620] And they said, oh, there's a big article in the New York Times. [01:00:10.730 --> 01:00:13.520] So I went to the site, and of course, it's written by John Markoff. [01:00:13.520 --> 01:00:20.210] So, you know, half, you know, I couldn't, even though I was reading it, you know, to me, it was like I was going, well, can this be believed? [01:00:20.480 --> 01:00:25.140] Because of what my personal experience with this guy, what is true and what isn't? [01:00:25.320 --> 01:00:30.860] So it was, you know, it was quite difficult to determine, you know, what's real and what isn't in this case. [01:00:31.080 --> 01:00:32.980] I just want to jump in here for a second. [01:00:33.120 --> 01:00:35.200] We've broken the $2,000 mark, which is great. [01:00:35.440 --> 01:00:38.260] We usually have gotten over $2,600 by this stage. [01:00:38.260 --> 01:00:46.420] So people, please, if you are holding off on that pledge, 212-209-2950 and help keep us on schedule, 212-209-2950. [01:00:46.620 --> 01:00:50.800] Now, I saw this article in yesterday's New York Times, and it had a great title. [00:00.000 --> 00:01.700] I just want to jump in here for a second. [00:01.840 --> 00:03.920] We've broken the $2,000 mark, which is great. [00:04.140 --> 00:06.980] We usually have gotten over $2,600 by this stage. [00:07.120 --> 00:13.520] So people, please, if you are holding off on that pledge, 212-209-2950 and help keep us on schedule. [00:13.720 --> 00:15.100] 212-209-2950. [00:15.620 --> 00:23.720] Now, I saw this article in yesterday's New York Times, and it had a great title, Internet Attack Called Broad and Long-Lasting by Investigators. [00:24.200 --> 00:27.700] And as you mentioned, Kevin, it was co-authored by John Markoff. [00:27.700 --> 00:40.440] Of course, he being the New York Times reporter who took an active interest in your pursuit and capture and wound up co-writing a book on it and being involved in a movie called Takedown. [00:40.600 --> 00:45.080] So, yeah, I can understand why you might take anything that he says with a grain of salt. [00:45.920 --> 00:49.400] But it is an interesting story, what's going on in Sweden. [00:49.860 --> 00:50.360] Oh, yeah. [00:50.500 --> 00:52.400] Well, Markoff, to me, has no credibility. [00:53.020 --> 01:01.900] In fact, a journalist in Australia just contacted him because he was writing a story about me because he wanted to get Markoff's side of the story. [01:01.900 --> 01:09.920] And Markoff just kept complaining, well, he read my email, he read my email, and it was just kind of... that wasn't even the question. [01:10.140 --> 01:13.200] But that's digressing onto some other issue. [01:13.580 --> 01:14.380] Yeah, it's quite interesting. [01:14.380 --> 01:30.360] Well, apparently, from what I could gather from the story, either the guy was extremely clever and was able to identify vulnerabilities on his own, or he was simply just exploiting known vulnerabilities that, you know, were already published. [01:30.400 --> 01:33.340] So that question remains to be answered. [01:33.560 --> 01:45.280] But then, of course, when he would get into these visit to target systems, he'd basically backdoor or modify the SSH daemon, which is the secure shell daemon for people that don't know. [01:45.400 --> 01:50.640] It's how people could remotely connect to a system and get a command line interface. [01:52.420 --> 02:00.000] You know, he basically backdoored it or trojanized it so it would store the login and passwords of any of the users that were logging in. [02:00.220 --> 02:06.920] And apparently, he was being monitored kind of in a fishbowl at some research laboratory, on some research laboratory network. [02:07.200 --> 02:21.840] And they saw him retrieve some login and passwords from Cisco and then supposedly log into one of Cisco's engineering systems and move a copy of iOS, which is their source code to their operating system somewhere. [02:22.220 --> 02:28.680] So it was quite interesting because of his age and because of his location and because of the profile of the case. [02:30.320 --> 02:35.140] Well, it was traced back to, I believe, a place called Uppsala in Sweden. [02:36.020 --> 02:53.780] And according to the New York Times story, which ran yesterday, federal officials and computer security investigators have acknowledged that the Cisco break-in last year was only part of a more extensive operation involving a single intruder or a small band in which thousands of computer systems were similarly penetrated. [02:54.820 --> 03:05.860] Investigators, both in the United States and Europe, say they've spent almost a year pursuing the case involving attacks on computer systems serving the American military, NASA, and research laboratories. [03:06.360 --> 03:11.200] Those break-ins exploited security holes that the authorities say now have been plugged. [03:11.600 --> 03:18.540] And beyond the Cisco theft, which I'm not sure if that's the proper word, but it is not clear how much data was taken or destroyed. [03:18.980 --> 03:30.100] Still, the case illustrates the ease with which Internet-connected computers, even those of sophisticated corporate and government networks, can be penetrated and also the difficulty in tracing those responsible. [03:30.840 --> 03:35.260] Now, the story goes on, and it's rather interesting reading. [03:35.600 --> 03:38.280] I don't know if Marco's going to get another book out of this or something. [03:38.540 --> 03:40.680] But they talk about the kid. [03:40.860 --> 03:44.820] Apparently, his handle was Staccato, S-T-A-K-K-A-T-O. [03:45.180 --> 03:54.700] And I noticed he actually checked into our IRC server a couple of times, came into the IRC channel, Pound 2600, I think sometime last year. [03:54.700 --> 03:57.460] And basically, he was just coming on from different military computers. [03:57.740 --> 04:00.880] And usually, when somebody does that, you assume that they've spoofed the address. [04:00.920 --> 04:11.600] But in his case, I think he really was coming on to IRC, logging as root on some defense contractor machine, defense machine, government machine. [04:12.740 --> 04:25.740] But it was kind of your typical story of just some bored teenager someplace finding a hole and exploiting it as much as possible. [04:25.880 --> 04:29.480] I thought this one particular sentence in the article was hilarious, though. [04:29.820 --> 04:39.920] A security expert involved in the investigation speculated that the Cisco programming instructions were stolen as part of an effort to establish the intruder's credibility in online chat rooms. [04:42.040 --> 04:45.140] That's what it all comes down to in the end, how we look in chat rooms. [04:45.580 --> 04:46.660] Yeah, the bragging rights. [04:47.640 --> 04:55.900] I kind of believe if this guy had any sophistication, it was to look through the source code to try to find any other vulnerabilities that could be remotely exploited. [04:56.920 --> 04:57.940] That would be logical. [04:58.980 --> 05:01.180] But then again, he could have used it as trading material. [05:01.440 --> 05:04.240] If he, in fact, is guilty of this, who really knows? [05:05.120 --> 05:05.560] That's true. [05:05.580 --> 05:06.820] We don't want to make the same mistakes. [05:06.820 --> 05:09.980] Just because John Markoff wrote a story about it doesn't mean it's true. [05:11.500 --> 05:12.380] Gee, you think? [05:13.140 --> 05:13.620] Exactly. [05:15.780 --> 05:17.020] And it's interesting. [05:17.020 --> 05:18.040] It's kind of old news. [05:18.220 --> 05:26.040] The case is a year old, so I'm surprised why it's being brought to the forefront now if it's year old news. [05:27.260 --> 05:31.040] Maybe because the guy was recently arrested. [05:31.520 --> 05:33.100] Apparently, they seized his computer. [05:33.480 --> 05:42.880] So probably the Swedish government is going to be doing some sort of forensics, I guess, to see what the guy was up to if he left anything that was unencrypted. [05:44.440 --> 05:46.300] There are some very interesting parts of this, though. [05:46.620 --> 05:51.720] They're talking about installing surveillance software to watch the guy. [05:51.720 --> 05:59.460] And watching as he tried to break into more than 100 locations on the Internet over two days and successfully gaining root access to more than 50. [05:59.880 --> 06:05.740] Now, that could be just media hype, or it could be indicative of a really bad security issue. [06:06.000 --> 06:14.320] Or it could have been just he wrote a piece of code to scan a range of IP addresses for a particular vulnerability. [06:14.320 --> 06:19.060] And maybe out of that whole range, it was a very simple process. [06:19.060 --> 06:24.860] Maybe 50 were vulnerable to whatever vulnerability he was looking for. [06:25.020 --> 06:34.880] So something very easy and standard was played up as something that's really super sophisticated. [06:35.620 --> 06:37.340] Now, I saw this online. [06:37.580 --> 06:39.720] I didn't see the actual copy of the New York Times. [06:39.800 --> 06:40.260] Does anybody know? [06:40.360 --> 06:41.780] Was this a front-page story? [06:42.560 --> 06:43.420] Does anybody know? [06:43.740 --> 06:44.160] Mike? [06:44.320 --> 06:44.940] No one knows. [06:45.020 --> 06:45.480] No one knows. [06:45.620 --> 06:46.720] Okay, we don't read the actual... [06:46.720 --> 06:47.420] Nobody reads the New York Times. [06:47.500 --> 06:49.220] We don't read the actual paper edition, apparently. [06:49.320 --> 06:51.000] But if anybody does know, I'd sure like to find out. [06:51.060 --> 06:54.660] Because if it were a front-page story, then I think we're seeing history repeat itself. [06:54.760 --> 07:04.660] Where something that really isn't that big a deal suddenly is on the front page of the New York Times, and all of a sudden, everybody is pursuing the guy or cracking down in some way. [07:05.460 --> 07:07.020] It's good for some things, I suppose. [07:07.160 --> 07:09.320] But when there's really no story there... [07:10.420 --> 07:16.460] You know, it's an interesting little bit of trivia here that this kind of thing was wide open for so long. [07:16.460 --> 07:17.980] But it did happen last year. [07:18.280 --> 07:24.260] Yeah, and it's really, you know, really the... I guess the key trigger point here is the theft of Cisco source code. [07:24.380 --> 07:31.620] And I'm sure that copies of Cisco source code was already circulating around the underground way before this guy got involved. [07:31.620 --> 07:38.780] Because I remember two years ago, at DEF CON, somebody came up to me and asked me if I wanted a copy of iOS, the source code. [07:39.000 --> 07:41.120] And, of course, I declined their offer. [07:41.640 --> 07:44.540] But, you know, I had to wonder, you know, how did they get a copy of it? [07:44.640 --> 07:47.780] So, to me, it was really, you know... [07:48.500 --> 08:07.640] It wasn't like allegedly stealing the schematics to the F-18, which apparently, Ciccato, if that's how you pronounce his name, apparently sent an email to somebody at a university, some woman, claiming that he stole the schematics to the F-18, which I think is highly doubtful. [08:08.240 --> 08:11.300] Well, yeah, this is the part of the article that's kind of funny as well. [08:11.400 --> 08:15.300] He boasted about all kinds of things, and that's what it's all about. [08:15.500 --> 08:18.000] But the problem is, Emmanuel, is what's true and what isn't. [08:18.040 --> 08:18.620] Exactly, yeah. [08:18.620 --> 08:24.820] And with John Markoff penning this article, you know, I call everything into question. [08:25.080 --> 08:30.180] If it was written by another journalist that night, you know, it takes orbit at face value. [08:30.360 --> 08:35.180] In all fairness, I don't think that this is particularly unique to John Markoff. [08:35.280 --> 08:45.000] I think a lot of people in the mass media these days would do similar things as far as taking advantage of a story and benefiting from it and writing books. [08:45.000 --> 08:48.040] And I just think that's the way the corporate media works. [08:49.800 --> 08:58.980] Yeah, you know, who knows, but if Cisco's source code was lifted, it is, you know, quite serious for Cisco, since it's their intellectual property. [08:59.460 --> 09:15.220] But don't you have to call into question, I mean, this is the thing that, like, kind of hit me in the face like a brick when I'm reading this article, is a company like Cisco certainly isn't going to allow remote access via SSH, like Secure Shell, or even with, [09:15.360 --> 09:28.260] you know, even if they're using Windows like Citrix or Terminal Services, you wouldn't think that a company like that would allow access from the perimeter, from outside their company, without two form factor authentication, something like a smart card, [09:28.440 --> 09:34.160] or a secure ID, or a one-time pad, or any of the other security technologies out there. [09:34.160 --> 09:48.760] I really find it hard to believe that a user with a, with a, simply having knowledge of a username and password would be able to gain access to the, to the systems that contain the source code to the, to their, to their projects. [09:48.780 --> 09:50.620] It just seems so unlikely. [09:50.920 --> 09:52.080] Well, there are all kinds of things. [09:52.300 --> 09:59.700] Every time you read a newspaper story or see a TV report about something which you have, even a little bit of knowledge, there's always something they miss. [09:59.700 --> 10:01.700] There's always something that they're just not telling you. [10:02.000 --> 10:05.300] And I'm sure this story is, is certainly no exception as far as that goes. [10:05.960 --> 10:06.520] So it's... [10:06.520 --> 10:10.500] Yeah, it'd be quite interesting to find out who this guy is and actually get his side of the story. [10:10.640 --> 10:15.140] But I'm sure his attorneys are probably advising him to, uh, not... [10:15.140 --> 10:16.160] Do something else. [10:16.200 --> 10:16.700] ...in the interviews. [10:16.960 --> 10:17.180] Yeah. [10:17.400 --> 10:18.800] Stay away from the damn computer. [10:19.520 --> 10:23.380] Uh, well, you know, I, I, I saw some parallels to, uh, to your case. [10:23.540 --> 10:33.040] So basically, uh, somebody was out there kind of hunting around for source code and, and, uh, got all this, uh, uh, massive amounts of, of, uh, attention as a result of that. [10:33.300 --> 10:35.020] Uh, what do you think is going through his head? [10:35.140 --> 10:38.240] Apart from the bragging rights in chat rooms, which who knows if that's even true? [10:38.840 --> 10:42.060] Uh, what, uh, how do you think someone like that is thinking? [10:43.120 --> 10:48.180] Well, right now they're thinking, you know, they're in a whole world of trouble and how do they get themselves out of that trouble? [10:48.640 --> 10:50.760] But, you know, I don't know what his motivation was. [10:50.940 --> 11:06.840] You know, usually somebody that's, uh, I would suspect his motivation was similar to mine, which was getting access to the source code to try to analyze, to see if there were any other vulnerabilities that could be used to remotely exploit Cisco routers. [11:07.100 --> 11:08.200] That's what you would think. [11:08.580 --> 11:20.920] But, you know, he could have had another, he could have been, if he did it, of course, he could have been trying to obtain any type of source code for, to trade for something else or to, uh, or to have, you know, as a trophy. [11:20.920 --> 11:21.800] I don't know. [11:22.000 --> 11:27.600] I mean, there's many different, uh, possibilities here and I just don't know who this guy is or anything about him. [11:27.860 --> 11:29.280] You know more about him than I do. [11:29.380 --> 11:32.220] I didn't even know he was on, uh, pound 2600 on IRC. [11:32.460 --> 11:33.880] Well, he's not on a regular basis. [11:33.940 --> 11:36.960] He basically came on, I think, three times in three different machines and just said, hey. [11:37.860 --> 11:39.720] And when nobody was impressed, he left. [11:40.320 --> 11:40.520] So... [11:41.300 --> 11:44.360] Yeah, everybody does that these days. [11:44.360 --> 11:49.520] But, no, you know, he, I guess he was really coming off on these machines, but the first thing he wanted to do was come on to IRC. [11:49.660 --> 11:51.000] It just seems kind of, kind of wacky. [11:51.460 --> 11:52.740] Well, there you know it was real. [11:53.200 --> 11:53.360] Yeah. [11:54.020 --> 11:54.340] Maybe. [11:54.960 --> 12:01.960] But, um, well, Kevin, let's, let's talk a little bit more about your book and maybe we can even take some phone calls and have listeners, uh, call in and, uh, ask a couple of questions. [12:02.460 --> 12:05.680] Um, now your book, uh, came out earlier this year. [12:06.060 --> 12:07.480] Yeah, in late March. [12:07.700 --> 12:08.220] Late March. [12:08.920 --> 12:10.860] And, uh, you, you've been on speaking tours. [12:11.120 --> 12:13.160] Every time I talk to you, you're in some other country. [12:13.160 --> 12:15.080] Uh, where have you been recently? [12:15.400 --> 12:16.880] It's like I live on a plane. [12:17.360 --> 12:18.720] And you hate flying. [12:18.900 --> 12:19.620] But I hate flying. [12:19.820 --> 12:21.700] That's what Ativan and alcohol help you with. [12:21.780 --> 12:22.300] No, I'm just kidding. [12:23.960 --> 12:25.400] You're not supposed to mix those. [12:25.600 --> 12:26.060] No, I'm just... [12:26.060 --> 12:34.920] Anyway, um, yeah, I was just recently in Australia, which was, uh, really, uh, that was, uh, that was a, uh, very interesting experience. [12:35.360 --> 12:39.300] Uh, I was in Sydney, Melbourne, and, uh, up in Byron Bay. [12:40.040 --> 12:43.140] And, uh, and then I, uh, was recently in Singapore. [12:43.160 --> 12:45.780] Singapore, and, uh... [12:45.780 --> 12:47.960] Did you get in trouble in Venice, Italy on Sunday? [12:48.360 --> 12:49.400] Did you get in trouble in Singapore? [12:49.580 --> 12:51.060] I know they have lots of rules and regulations. [12:51.500 --> 12:52.840] Yeah, that's what I was thinking. [12:52.840 --> 12:55.060] Oh, my God, how am I going to get through passport control? [12:55.600 --> 12:59.160] Um, you actually had gum with me, too, and they didn't take it, but they didn't see it either. [12:59.360 --> 13:00.000] But you didn't chew it. [13:00.060 --> 13:00.800] That's the important thing. [13:00.940 --> 13:05.800] Yeah, but, uh, on the landing card, this is kind of intimidating for anybody into drugs. [13:05.800 --> 13:09.660] It says, drug dealers will be executed, right on the landing card. [13:10.020 --> 13:10.380] Wow. [13:10.580 --> 13:15.140] Yeah, so that's, that's, that's like an in-your-face type of, uh, warning. [13:15.540 --> 13:18.080] Well, who is that supposed to, uh, dissuade at that point? [13:18.180 --> 13:19.300] I mean, isn't it kind of like... [13:19.300 --> 13:21.560] Because the drug dealers already have their drugs, right? [13:21.660 --> 13:22.420] On them, on the plane. [13:22.700 --> 13:30.400] I can imagine them, like, in a Cheech and Chong movie, going to the back, you know, going into the toilet in the back of the plane trying to, you know, flush their drugs down, right? [13:30.400 --> 13:33.100] Well, I guess, they don't execute people just for possession, just for dealing, right? [13:33.240 --> 13:35.960] So, I guess the message is, keep your drugs to yourself. [13:36.200 --> 13:41.260] That's pretty subjective, though, is, you know, how they determine whether you're a dealer is based on amount. [13:41.780 --> 13:43.840] Maybe you're a heavy pot smoker and you need a lot. [13:43.920 --> 13:44.240] I don't know. [13:44.380 --> 13:44.660] Yeah. [13:44.820 --> 13:52.320] It could be that there, there are, like, drug dealers who are, like, going to scope out Singapore to see if it's a good place to sell drugs or not, and they don't have any with them yet. [13:52.360 --> 13:54.820] What if you're a drug dealer on vacation in Singapore? [13:54.980 --> 13:56.920] Would you still be executed because that's your profession? [13:57.340 --> 13:59.540] You know, we could spend all hour on this stupid... [13:59.540 --> 14:02.740] Does it say illegal drug dealers or just drug dealers? [14:02.740 --> 14:03.680] Yeah, every pharmacist would be at risk. [14:03.680 --> 14:06.140] I was going to say, if you're a salesman for Merck, you're a dead man. [14:06.300 --> 14:08.400] Well, that's not a place to go if you work in a pharmacy, that's for sure. [14:08.700 --> 14:15.240] Yeah, and what's interesting is, like, they'll fine you for anything there for chewing gum, for littering, of course, well, that's in the U.S. [14:15.420 --> 14:19.740] If you go into a public bathroom and fail to flush the toilet, it's like a $500 fine. [14:19.840 --> 14:20.800] How do they know? [14:20.920 --> 14:21.360] How do they... [14:21.360 --> 14:21.880] Exactly. [14:22.480 --> 14:23.820] Maybe they have hidden cameras. [14:25.120 --> 14:28.160] I mean, I think they have cameras everywhere in that country. [14:28.160 --> 14:31.640] But, yeah, it was quite interesting. [14:31.980 --> 14:38.580] You know, I kept thinking of that case from years ago when that kid vandalized those cars and got his caning. [14:38.860 --> 14:39.640] Yeah, the caning. [14:39.960 --> 14:40.160] Yeah. [14:40.500 --> 14:43.180] You would have to wonder, do they have caning for hacking in Singapore? [14:43.620 --> 14:45.860] Well, who did you speak to in Singapore? [14:46.260 --> 14:47.040] Hewlett Packard. [14:47.180 --> 14:49.140] I did a talk for HP and Alturas. [14:49.580 --> 14:51.180] Did you meet any hackers while you were there? [14:51.820 --> 14:52.260] No. [14:52.720 --> 14:53.000] No. [14:53.000 --> 14:53.560] Wow. [14:54.000 --> 14:55.100] Did the subject come up? [14:55.200 --> 14:56.960] Unless they kept their mouth shut. [14:57.180 --> 15:00.860] Well, did the subject come up as to whether or not there were hackers in Singapore? [15:01.480 --> 15:02.180] Yeah, it did. [15:02.280 --> 15:07.800] And apparently, in one case, there was this young guy who was, like, in trouble for hacking at a school. [15:08.040 --> 15:10.020] You know, he was, like, in, like, middle school. [15:10.560 --> 15:11.940] And that's the only thing I heard of. [15:11.940 --> 15:19.240] Well, I'm not aware of any cases out of Singapore, but I don't even know if it's illegal hacking in Singapore. [15:19.420 --> 15:20.040] I didn't even ask. [15:20.440 --> 15:25.320] Some countries, they might not have laws that criminalize that type of activity. [15:25.520 --> 15:33.920] Well, the theme of this particular fund drive that we're in the middle of here at WBAI is dissent. [15:34.340 --> 15:39.100] And I guess to be a hacker in Singapore, you really would need to be a dissident. [15:39.100 --> 15:47.320] But, Kevin, what I'm curious about, over the years, when you first got involved with computers and phones and things like that, you were doing it because that's what you were interested in. [15:47.440 --> 15:52.460] But then you became kind of, I guess, a cult figure of sorts because of what was happening to you. [15:53.460 --> 15:59.720] Do you think that you can now be officially classified as a dissident in the eyes of the U.S. [15:59.800 --> 16:00.040] government? [16:00.680 --> 16:02.200] You know, I have no idea. [16:04.420 --> 16:07.320] Can you get a notation on your real ID? [16:07.320 --> 16:08.940] I got that on my passport. [16:09.080 --> 16:09.340] Dissident. [16:09.480 --> 16:10.760] They stamped it when I came into the country. [16:11.080 --> 16:11.500] That's hilarious. [16:11.620 --> 16:12.380] They know about me. [16:13.120 --> 16:15.400] Yeah, I have no idea. [16:15.840 --> 16:20.040] But I'm sure I'm in plenty of databases that are out there. [16:20.160 --> 16:22.400] And who know what flags are on those databases? [16:23.200 --> 16:23.580] Yeah. [16:23.760 --> 16:24.720] It was quite interesting. [16:25.060 --> 16:26.560] This happened just the other day. [16:26.820 --> 16:30.220] And I have a friend, I met him in Australia. [16:30.460 --> 16:31.520] And he's a journalist. [16:32.780 --> 16:35.960] And he wants to do a story on Christopher Boyce, you know, the spy? [16:36.500 --> 16:36.820] Okay. [16:36.900 --> 16:37.420] Of the Falcon? [16:37.660 --> 16:37.860] Yes. [16:38.180 --> 16:42.220] So he was, like, paroled, I don't know, like, a couple years ago. [16:43.680 --> 16:49.760] So my friend asked me, he says, well, can you, I have access to, you know, several PI databases that I subscribe to. [16:50.280 --> 16:52.820] And he asked me if I would, you know, track down Boyce for him. [16:53.460 --> 16:54.680] So I did my best. [16:54.800 --> 16:56.700] And I, like, found him in, like, San Francisco. [16:57.220 --> 16:58.620] But it was, like, an old address. [16:58.940 --> 17:06.200] So I called another information broker friend of mine who, you know, pays for better databases, you know, because he does it for a living. [17:06.680 --> 17:08.080] And then I got the address. [17:08.080 --> 17:13.180] And then through another broker got Boyce's phone number that he just moved up to, like, Wargon. [17:13.640 --> 17:16.240] And I called this guy on the phone, right? [17:16.340 --> 17:17.460] And I finally got him. [17:17.560 --> 17:18.180] I said, hey, Chris. [17:18.680 --> 17:19.240] He goes, yeah. [17:19.440 --> 17:20.300] I go, well, you don't know me. [17:20.300 --> 17:21.000] My name's Kevin. [17:21.440 --> 17:23.400] I have this journalist that really wants to talk to you. [17:23.400 --> 17:24.100] He's in Australia. [17:24.560 --> 17:25.740] He goes, well, who is this? [17:25.860 --> 17:26.260] Kevin who? [17:26.400 --> 17:27.260] And I gave him my name. [17:27.920 --> 17:29.400] And then he asked me for my phone number. [17:29.500 --> 17:32.060] He asked me, like, the 20 questions sort of thing. [17:32.340 --> 17:35.100] And then I gave him the email address of the journalist, right? [17:35.300 --> 17:37.500] And then after I hung up the phone, a thought came to me. [17:37.580 --> 17:38.600] I go, oh, my God. [17:38.820 --> 17:40.660] This guy's number is on my phone bill. [17:40.740 --> 17:41.120] Oh, yeah. [17:41.620 --> 17:42.940] You know, I'm going, oh, my God. [17:43.160 --> 17:44.760] What did I just do, right? [17:44.920 --> 17:48.800] Thinking, you know, calling this guy could actually, you know, raise red flags with me. [17:48.800 --> 17:54.340] And I'm sure he wasn't too happy with the prospects of your numbers showing up on his incoming bill. [17:54.820 --> 17:56.340] I don't know if he knew who I was. [17:56.480 --> 17:56.760] Uh-huh. [17:57.280 --> 17:58.100] I'm sure he does. [17:58.260 --> 17:58.540] I'm sure. [17:58.640 --> 18:03.680] You know, it's amazing to me how many people do know who you are, you know, no matter what part of the world you're in. [18:04.060 --> 18:06.760] And it's just, it's incredible how that, how do you think that happened? [18:06.820 --> 18:10.380] How do you think word got out to all the four corners of the world? [18:11.220 --> 18:13.140] I think I've read a lot through your efforts, Emmanuel. [18:13.140 --> 18:26.620] Well, through the, through, when I was going through my case with the federal government and I think through your efforts and efforts of people that were involved with 2600 that you were able to get the word out. [18:26.740 --> 18:39.420] And, of course, the government, and, of course, the mainstream media in covering my case, usually from a very negative perspective, because they were, you know, I was being treated as the Osama Ben Mitnick of the Internet, right? [18:39.420 --> 18:45.640] So, I think a lot had to do with the media, a lot had to do with your efforts of how people, you know, know the name. [18:47.000 --> 18:53.720] We should also credit the people who demonized you in the first place, because if it wasn't for their efforts, you wouldn't have gone through the hell you went through. [18:53.880 --> 18:54.580] Oh, absolutely. [18:54.980 --> 19:05.700] You know, like if, I mean, it was unbelievable, like when I read, you know, back to John Markoff again, but when I read the article, he had written a story that ended up on the front page above the fold in the New York Times. [19:05.700 --> 19:15.720] In 1983, I hacked into NORAD and nearly started World War III, and that line was like, pulled straight, straight out of the movie, 1983 movie War Games. [19:16.300 --> 19:27.480] So here, you know, people were attributing actions by actors, Matthew Broderick, in the movie Motion Picture War Games, to me as a person in real life. [19:27.660 --> 19:30.380] And then I was treated as if I had done these things. [19:30.560 --> 19:31.820] So it was, you know, real scary. [19:31.820 --> 19:34.520] Now, how fantasy could move into reality. [19:34.900 --> 19:42.120] Imagine, though, that everything that you had done, that you had been involved in, had been, say, 15 years in the future. [19:42.320 --> 19:42.940] All right. [19:43.000 --> 19:44.840] And it was a post-9-11 world. [19:45.340 --> 19:51.760] What do you think could have been worse, as far as the way that you were apprehended and treated after your capture? [19:51.760 --> 19:54.820] Maybe they could have put me in Guatamano Bay. [19:55.040 --> 19:56.040] I don't know. [19:57.180 --> 19:57.960] I don't know. [19:58.060 --> 20:03.720] I think we're a much more smarter cyber-aware world. [20:04.040 --> 20:25.860] So I think that a lot of the accusations that were being made about me, like the ability to dial up a modem in NORAD and communicate by whistling into the phone and starting a nuclear strike, if you recall that I was held for about a year in solitary confinement because of that threat that I supposedly posed, [20:25.920 --> 20:29.620] I think that our world today would just laugh that off. [20:30.120 --> 20:33.920] And back 10 years ago, you know, a federal judge actually believed it. [20:34.240 --> 20:34.300] Yeah. [20:34.360 --> 20:48.160] But don't you think, with all the increased paranoia of today, that whatever distinction between hacker and terrorist that we may have had in our heads would have been so much harder to defend, you know, I mean, I really think that... [20:48.160 --> 21:06.360] Well, I'm sure government prosecutors would make that argument, but I don't know if that would bode well for a jury, if a case went to jury trial, because I think the average person could make a distinction between somebody that breaks into a computer for other purposes than trying to influence a government, [21:07.300 --> 21:07.480] right? [21:07.640 --> 21:09.940] Because, I mean, what's the common definition of terrorism? [21:09.940 --> 21:24.420] And maybe Bernie knows this more than I do, is where you try to create fear, the fear or the threat of fear in a populace to change the way they do certain things. [21:24.980 --> 21:27.140] And that's defined, I think, as terrorism, right? [21:27.260 --> 21:36.680] Like flying aircraft into buildings in an effort to scare the American public to change some sort of policy or for retribution or whatnot. [21:37.260 --> 21:41.080] And that raises the whole question of what's the definition of cyberterrorism? [21:41.180 --> 21:48.320] How many people were truly terrorized, emotionally terrorized, by someone doing something on a computer? [21:48.500 --> 21:49.400] I don't see it. [21:50.020 --> 21:58.820] Yeah, and in fact, you hear about the threat of cyberterrorism that the government bandies about in an effort to scare the public into giving up more of their rights. [21:59.200 --> 22:03.880] It's like our Bill of Rights have been so watered down, they might as well be eliminated by now. [22:04.960 --> 22:08.740] And to get bigger budgets to fight, you know, computer-related crime. [22:08.880 --> 22:10.660] But what are the real terrorists going to do? [22:10.740 --> 22:17.740] Like hacking into a computer and what, turning off a telephone switch is really going to scare the heebie-jeebies out of the American population? [22:18.120 --> 22:19.280] No, not at all. [22:19.460 --> 22:32.640] What they're going to do is they're going to resort to physical type attacks, as they did in 9-11, to make it worrisome to ride the subway, to fly on a plane, you know, to walk down the street, to drink the water. [22:32.840 --> 22:37.080] You know, they're going to look at doing those type of attacks. [22:37.180 --> 22:51.460] And then maybe, just maybe, doing an attack maybe on the telecommunications infrastructure at the same time a physical attack is being made to make it difficult for emergency services to respond. [22:51.620 --> 22:55.560] But I don't see a cyberterrorism attack just in of itself. [22:55.560 --> 23:00.300] It's like hacking into a bank, hacking into the power grid, hacking into transportation. [23:01.320 --> 23:05.920] I just... because I don't think that creates the fear that the terrorists really want to create. [23:06.360 --> 23:09.140] You see, that's reality, what you've just said here. [23:09.360 --> 23:21.880] But the way that the mass media portrays it, every kid has the power to start a nuclear war, has the power to shut down power plants and cause all kinds of civil unrest because he knows too much. [23:22.020 --> 23:26.160] And I think a lot of people will buy into that because they believe it's the truth. [23:26.940 --> 23:27.440] Unfortunately. [23:27.780 --> 23:29.440] And these days... [23:29.440 --> 23:39.280] Remember, several years ago, this kid was war dialing in Massachusetts and he found a dial-up modem to some control system. [23:39.380 --> 23:45.000] And it turned out he didn't know what it was doing, but he was playing with a system that had no password requirement. [23:45.060 --> 23:51.560] And he actually turned off the power at some air traffic control center or some airport. [23:51.560 --> 23:52.600] He turned off the power. [23:53.480 --> 23:53.880] unknowingly. [23:54.620 --> 23:55.020] Right. [23:55.020 --> 24:07.340] What I'm saying is today, he would be treated as a terrorist, as somebody who knew exactly what he was doing, even if it was by accident, because they would say he has, you know, no business being, you know, in that particular area in the first place, [24:07.500 --> 24:08.680] which may or may not be true. [24:08.740 --> 24:14.600] But I think the real question is, how can such things be so wide open and so vulnerable to attack? [24:14.860 --> 24:17.800] You know, that's the real security hole. [24:20.420 --> 24:21.060] Exactly. [24:21.060 --> 24:35.220] With respect to the Swedish kid that's under investigation, we have to ask ourselves, why didn't these companies, why didn't these DOD contractors, why didn't these military governmental agencies patch their systems? [24:35.500 --> 24:41.560] Because according to Markov's article, he says, like, after, like, these systems have been patched now. [24:41.740 --> 24:43.280] Why weren't they patched before? [24:43.620 --> 24:45.400] What happened to their patch management? [24:45.580 --> 24:48.680] Why weren't they being vigilant about their own security? [24:48.920 --> 24:54.940] And I think that's why they became the low-hanging fruit, not only for the kid in Sweden, but probably for many others. [24:55.660 --> 24:56.120] All right. [24:56.140 --> 24:58.400] You're listening to an extended edition of Off the Hook. [24:58.920 --> 25:01.820] If you're tuning in for the Personal Computer Show, it is not on this week. [25:01.840 --> 25:03.100] I believe it's on next week. [25:03.220 --> 25:04.340] Someone correct me if I'm wrong. [25:04.800 --> 25:08.080] But we're in the middle of a fundraiser here at WBAI. [25:08.080 --> 25:13.420] We do this every few months so that we can keep the place going against all odds. [25:13.620 --> 25:15.960] Somehow we've managed to survive this long. [25:16.660 --> 25:21.000] Our tally is up to $2,264, which is nice. [25:21.000 --> 25:28.560] It's good, but it's not good enough because usually, usually after an hour, we're up around $3,000. [25:28.700 --> 25:30.460] So we need to bring in more calls. [25:30.580 --> 25:32.000] We need to bring in more calls now. [25:32.800 --> 25:35.040] 212-209-2950. [25:35.040 --> 25:37.140] We have several different pledge levels. [25:37.400 --> 25:46.500] Everybody pledging $25 or above will get a unique Off the Hook t-shirt that emblazons the name of the show, the radio station, the time it's on, the frequency, a lot of information for one t-shirt. [25:46.820 --> 25:48.140] It doesn't even take that much space. [25:49.020 --> 25:51.320] For a pledge of $75... It doesn't look cluttered, though. [25:51.440 --> 25:52.640] It does not look cluttered at all. [25:52.760 --> 25:54.000] No, it's really pretty cool. [25:54.080 --> 25:56.740] In fact, there's a lot of room for you to write something else on it if you want. [25:57.600 --> 26:02.960] For a pledge of $75, you'll get the complete DVD set of Off the Hook. [26:03.060 --> 26:04.180] Now, it's not a video DVD. [26:04.340 --> 26:05.400] It's an audio DVD. [26:05.600 --> 26:12.420] Basically, you put it on your computer or even your DVD player, your standalone one, and you can play audio files in MP3 format. [26:13.120 --> 26:21.980] Every single audio file that we have on this radio station from 1988 all the way to the end of 2004, it's really quite an achievement that we were able to cram all that in there. [26:22.800 --> 26:24.640] And we have that. [26:24.840 --> 26:25.740] That's for a pledge of $75. [26:25.820 --> 26:27.240] You'll get that plus the t-shirt. [26:27.660 --> 26:31.000] For a pledge of $150, you'll get everything. [26:31.200 --> 26:40.880] That's the Off the Hook DVD, the Off the Hook t-shirt, a signed autographed copy of Freedom Downtime, signed by myself and Kevin Mitnick, who we're talking to on the phone. [26:41.340 --> 26:46.520] And you'll also get a copy of Kevin's newest book, The Art of Intrusion, signed by Kevin himself. [26:46.740 --> 26:49.080] Kevin has been signing books left and right. [26:49.340 --> 26:50.480] I don't know how you do it, Kevin. [26:50.540 --> 26:53.600] I watched you sign things once, and you were like a machine. [26:53.600 --> 26:54.800] I need to get a stamp. [26:55.120 --> 27:00.540] Hey, when I was in Poland about a year ago, I had once signed like 600 books, and my hand was killed. [27:00.640 --> 27:07.780] It was actually like spasming because of just the overusage of the hand. [27:08.000 --> 27:08.180] Yeah. [27:08.940 --> 27:16.080] Well, I promise, if Kevin does get a stamp, it'll be after he signs the books that we're sending to you, because you'll get the original signature from Kevin himself. [27:16.760 --> 27:18.380] 212-209-2950. [27:18.600 --> 27:19.440] They have no calls. [27:19.540 --> 27:20.380] No calls on the line. [27:20.580 --> 27:21.720] We need to bring that up. [27:21.840 --> 27:26.420] We have all different pledge levels, from 25 all the way to 150 and beyond. [27:28.540 --> 27:31.240] You can always pledge as much as you want, of course. [27:31.380 --> 27:33.000] It will really help us out. [27:33.320 --> 27:34.020] Hey, Manuel. [27:34.280 --> 27:42.940] Remember I told you when we last spoke about when I was interviewed on CNN, they were doing a segment on cyberterrorism. [27:43.120 --> 27:53.420] So I started giving them my opinion that it's somewhat overhyped, and it's used more for government authorities to get more power and more money. [27:54.140 --> 27:56.400] And I think the real threats are physical. [27:56.660 --> 28:01.140] And my formatted segment turned out to be like 25 seconds before they cut me off the air. [28:01.320 --> 28:02.960] They cut you off the air for saying... [28:02.960 --> 28:03.880] Technical difficulty, right? [28:03.980 --> 28:05.400] They cut you off the air for saying that. [28:05.680 --> 28:06.500] Well, I don't know. [28:06.560 --> 28:09.620] They said they had technical difficulty, and then they just went on to something else. [28:09.780 --> 28:17.460] But I have a feeling, you know, deep down, that the segment producer wanted a scare piece, right? [28:17.880 --> 28:30.260] To somebody on the air to talk to the substantial threat that cyberterrorism is, you know, the substantial threat of cyberterrorism to the American populace. [28:30.880 --> 28:37.360] So I think because my interview wasn't in line with the agenda that I was cut off. [28:37.480 --> 28:38.280] But I don't know. [28:38.380 --> 28:38.860] I could be wrong. [28:39.480 --> 28:46.320] Well, you know, whether or not you were cut off in that particular instance, I think it does speak to the fact that the media wants to scare people. [28:46.460 --> 28:48.900] They want to put out these sensationalist stories. [28:49.560 --> 28:54.540] And, you know, if you don't play ball, either you'll get cut off or you just won't be talked to in the first place. [28:55.240 --> 29:01.400] And that's, unfortunately, I see that everywhere these days in all different subject matter. [29:01.580 --> 29:01.840] Yeah. [29:01.960 --> 29:20.380] But that still doesn't mean that every... even if you're in the public or private sector, you should... companies and entities need to do a risk assessment, determine what level of risk they're willing to live at, and then deploy countermeasures to bring them up to that level of risk, [29:20.440 --> 29:27.200] that risk acceptance level, regardless, you know, if you're a critical infrastructure or not. [29:27.300 --> 29:33.220] Of course, that bar would probably have to be a lot higher in the case that you're a critical infrastructure. [29:33.580 --> 29:41.560] But regardless of whether cyber-terrorism is here or not, it's still... you still ought to be vigilant about your information security. [29:42.440 --> 29:42.920] So... [29:42.920 --> 29:44.820] 212-209-2950. [29:45.020 --> 29:49.340] We have two calls on the line, and we really need to get that up to around 10. [29:50.280 --> 29:56.580] We do need a lot of calls, because this is the first day of the fundraiser here at WBAI, the spring fundraiser. [29:56.740 --> 29:58.760] We survive because of our listeners. [29:59.180 --> 30:00.480] And that's you. [30:00.660 --> 30:07.100] That's the people listening both on the internet and over the air here at 99.5 FM in New York City. [30:08.400 --> 30:14.400] WBAI is something that really, by all definitions of logic in the radio scene, should not exist. [30:14.540 --> 30:18.440] It should not be possible to have a station like this in the middle of the FM dial in New York City. [30:18.460 --> 30:19.360] But we do exist. [30:19.900 --> 30:24.520] We're a testament to the fact that listeners can make the impossible happen. [30:24.780 --> 30:27.700] And we're asking you to help us continue making the impossible happen. [30:27.720 --> 30:29.340] That's a good radio station slogan, isn't it? [30:30.060 --> 30:31.960] Making the impossible happen since 1960. [30:31.960 --> 30:33.240] That's what we've been doing here. [30:33.880 --> 30:35.860] 212-209-2950. [30:35.860 --> 30:41.860] You can join that crowd of people and people who have kept this place going for almost half a century now. [30:42.040 --> 30:43.800] 212-209-2950. [30:44.020 --> 30:46.120] We have all sorts of premiums. [30:46.640 --> 30:50.020] Everyone gets an off-the-hook t-shirt for pledges of $25 and above. [30:50.380 --> 30:58.080] And you'll get everything, including Kevin's new book, Autographed, a copy of Freedom Downtime, the documentary about Kevin's ordeal. [30:58.200 --> 30:59.880] Bernie S.'s ordeal is in there as well. [31:00.080 --> 31:03.900] And all sorts of other fun things exist on that double DVD set. [31:04.260 --> 31:05.020] You'll get that. [31:05.020 --> 31:12.380] You'll get the audio DVD of every single radio program we've done since from 1988 to the end of 2004. [31:12.660 --> 31:14.480] Now, Mike, you have a list of people to thank, I believe. [31:14.660 --> 31:14.800] Yeah. [31:14.860 --> 31:19.580] I really want to thank all these people because they really, as we've said, make this show happen. [31:19.880 --> 31:24.360] And we know there's other things they could be spending their money on, but we want to thank them. [31:24.800 --> 31:28.280] Rob from, I guess it's pronounced Oss in the Netherlands. [31:28.620 --> 31:29.620] How do you spell it? [31:29.920 --> 31:30.600] O-S-S. [31:31.100 --> 31:31.400] Really? [31:31.700 --> 31:31.860] Yeah. [31:32.620 --> 31:33.980] Open source systems, maybe? [31:34.260 --> 31:34.540] I don't know. [31:34.680 --> 31:35.720] Office of Strategic Services? [31:35.880 --> 31:36.960] All the way in the Netherlands. [31:37.160 --> 31:37.860] All the way in the Netherlands. [31:38.020 --> 31:38.060] Oh, yeah. [31:38.300 --> 31:38.860] Oh, that's nothing. [31:38.920 --> 31:40.280] I'm sure we'll get further than the Netherlands, right? [31:40.320 --> 31:42.380] Well, we've got Doris from Staten Island. [31:42.520 --> 31:42.960] There you go. [31:45.000 --> 31:46.440] Ryan from Medford, New York. [31:47.600 --> 31:49.500] Ann from Port Washington, New York. [31:49.580 --> 31:50.720] Oh, a lot of Long Island today. [31:50.880 --> 31:51.100] Yeah. [31:52.020 --> 31:53.740] Scott from Fargo, North Dakota. [31:54.040 --> 31:54.440] Fargo. [31:54.620 --> 31:54.960] Fargo. [31:55.020 --> 31:55.540] Yeah, Fargo. [31:57.380 --> 32:00.280] Joshua from State College in Pennsylvania. [32:00.560 --> 32:02.160] That's the name of a town, State College? [32:02.280 --> 32:02.400] Yeah. [32:02.560 --> 32:02.660] Yeah. [32:03.040 --> 32:05.820] You know, they have a name, they have a town in Pennsylvania called Hometown. [32:06.160 --> 32:06.780] I'm not kidding. [32:07.400 --> 32:08.640] Back me up on this, Bernie, right? [32:09.480 --> 32:11.560] There's Hometown, and then there's Frackville. [32:11.560 --> 32:12.080] Frackville. [32:12.080 --> 32:13.180] Well, of course, Frackville. [32:13.480 --> 32:15.420] And you'll learn about that in Freedom Downtime. [32:15.580 --> 32:16.020] Jim Thorpe. [32:16.180 --> 32:16.980] It's featured in the movie, yeah. [32:17.200 --> 32:20.520] Weren't you telling me that Phrack was started out here in St. Louis? [32:20.800 --> 32:21.440] That's right. [32:21.580 --> 32:21.920] That's right. [32:22.000 --> 32:31.020] The hacker magazine Phrack, which I believe is coming to an end this year, at least in its current incarnation, was started by two hackers who got in trouble. [32:31.020 --> 32:38.940] In fact, in very early years of this radio program, you'll hear their story, the infamous Emergency 911 document that was published. [32:39.660 --> 32:40.420] Or the Riggs case. [32:40.420 --> 32:40.820] Yes. [32:41.180 --> 32:42.920] Well, no, that was the Atlanta 3. [32:43.120 --> 32:44.780] That was, yeah, that was another case. [32:44.920 --> 32:45.780] It was related. [32:45.900 --> 32:48.460] It was related to the E-9-1 document, but the Phrack... [32:48.460 --> 32:48.820] Neidorf. [32:49.060 --> 33:01.340] Yeah, Craig Neidorf basically had to face all these huge legal bills after they dropped the case against him when it was discovered that the document they said was worth $80,000 turned out to be publicly accessible for $13. [33:02.780 --> 33:07.680] So they lied through their teeth, as usual, and left victims in their wake. [33:07.860 --> 33:10.960] So yeah, you know, that's part of the history of what we've been about here. [33:11.140 --> 33:12.320] Anyway, let's continue reading these names. [33:12.320 --> 33:15.340] We also want to thank Dale, who's from Franklin, Wisconsin. [33:16.400 --> 33:19.560] Charles, who's from Ketchum, Idaho, which is... [33:19.560 --> 33:19.980] Oh, right. [33:20.220 --> 33:22.860] Ketchum, which is something we try to avoid, but... [33:22.860 --> 33:23.300] What do you mean? [33:23.620 --> 33:24.740] Catching people. [33:24.900 --> 33:26.260] We like to let them get away. [33:26.260 --> 33:26.680] Oh, a pun. [33:26.740 --> 33:27.120] I get it. [33:27.220 --> 33:28.780] That was very clever there. [33:29.060 --> 33:30.040] We don't always succeed. [33:30.460 --> 33:31.580] So I'm trying harder than others. [33:31.760 --> 33:35.040] We want to also thank Eugene from Betterton, Maryland. [33:36.420 --> 33:38.120] Chris from Mount Vernon, New York. [33:39.300 --> 33:42.220] Is that Betterton as in this is a better town than the one next to us? [33:42.320 --> 33:42.960] I guess so. [33:43.020 --> 33:44.100] That must be how they got their name. [33:45.060 --> 33:45.940] One would think. [33:46.140 --> 33:50.720] Either from New York, New York, which is also a better town than some places. [33:50.760 --> 33:51.820] Let's not get that started. [33:52.080 --> 33:52.520] Okay. [33:52.740 --> 33:53.040] All right. [33:53.940 --> 33:58.860] John, who's from Scarborough in Ontario, in Canada. [33:59.120 --> 33:59.980] Okay, I've heard of them. [34:00.080 --> 34:00.780] They're very nice up there. [34:01.760 --> 34:03.740] Jan from East Orange in New Jersey. [34:04.520 --> 34:06.400] And Paul from Oakland, New Jersey. [34:06.680 --> 34:12.720] And there's also always on our show, there's always people who always want to remain anonymous and not be thanked on the air. [34:12.860 --> 34:14.260] And that was all those people, right? [34:14.640 --> 34:15.900] And we won't thank them now. [34:16.080 --> 34:17.020] The other pile. [34:17.100 --> 34:18.400] Those are the people who want their names read. [34:19.440 --> 34:19.880] Oh, no. [34:20.000 --> 34:20.360] Thanks. [34:20.500 --> 34:22.060] Thanks so much for everybody who called in. [34:22.200 --> 34:23.220] So we want to thank everyone who pledged. [34:23.320 --> 34:24.620] Now, we'd like to thank you too. [34:24.640 --> 34:26.680] But in order for us to thank you, you got to call us. [34:26.860 --> 34:29.240] And so far, I just see one person on the phone over there. [34:29.720 --> 34:30.520] We need more. [34:30.660 --> 34:36.120] We need to get that tally figure up, soaring past 3,000 and hopefully hitting 4,000 before we're off. [34:36.120 --> 34:39.980] And if you want to be thanked on the air, you can't be calling us two minutes before the end of the program. [34:40.200 --> 34:40.820] No, no. [34:40.940 --> 34:41.680] Because we'll thank you. [34:41.860 --> 34:44.380] We'll thank the little index card, but we won't be able to thank you on the air. [34:44.440 --> 34:46.640] Unless we burst in on the next show, which would be awfully rude. [34:47.280 --> 34:47.480] Yeah. [34:47.620 --> 34:49.940] They have their own pledgers to thank. [34:50.400 --> 34:54.640] Now, you know, we don't get anything out of this ourselves except the joy of begging for money on the air. [34:54.880 --> 34:58.120] In fact, we're donating all kinds of items to the radio station. [34:58.220 --> 35:01.900] The radio station doesn't pay a penny for anything that we give them. [35:02.400 --> 35:08.760] So we're donating the books we write, the films we make, the radio shows we produce, the t-shirts we make. [35:09.340 --> 35:11.640] It's all a labor of love. [35:11.800 --> 35:21.540] And it's something that we do quite gladly here because if it helps out, if it gets more people to call in, then it's worth whatever we have to put out to get that material in the first place. [35:21.720 --> 35:23.500] So please do your part. [35:23.800 --> 35:28.860] Call in, sponsor this place, invest in our future, 212-209-2950. [35:29.480 --> 35:35.460] Again, for $25, you'll get the Off the Hook t-shirt, which you can only get by pledging to the radio station. [35:35.600 --> 35:36.620] You can't get it any other way. [35:37.320 --> 35:41.480] For $75, you'll get the t-shirt plus the Off the Hook complete DVD. [35:41.920 --> 36:01.040] For $100, you'll get a choice of all that material, the Off the Hook DVD, the Off the Hook t-shirt, and either Kevin Mitnick's latest book, The Art of Intrusion, or a copy of Freedom Downtime DVD, all of which is signed and autographed by various people involved. [36:01.260 --> 36:03.320] And for $150, you can get everything. [36:04.520 --> 36:07.680] So a lot of choices there, a lot of different things. [36:08.220 --> 36:11.040] The most important thing, though, is supporting the radio station. [36:11.200 --> 36:13.860] For a $25 pledge, you become a member of the radio station. [36:13.860 --> 36:20.540] That means you can vote in all sorts of elections for various board members and things like that. [36:21.020 --> 36:23.340] This is a station run by the listeners. [36:23.700 --> 36:25.360] It's very important and it's very unique. [36:25.760 --> 36:27.400] 212-209-2950. [36:27.640 --> 36:28.600] We have two calls on the line. [36:28.740 --> 36:29.740] Let's see if we can make that four. [36:32.480 --> 36:32.960] Okay. [36:34.080 --> 36:38.060] I guess we've run out of ways to coerce people into calling. [36:41.160 --> 36:43.900] So maybe we should move into something else. [36:45.520 --> 36:47.400] Well, gosh, maybe we can take phone calls. [36:48.000 --> 36:49.560] Shall we try taking phone calls? [36:49.720 --> 36:50.260] Why not? [36:50.440 --> 36:51.140] It's very dangerous. [36:51.440 --> 36:55.620] 212-209-2900 is our dial-in line if you want to talk to. [36:55.760 --> 36:57.540] We have both Kevin Mitnick and Bernie S. [36:57.760 --> 36:59.340] on the phone with us. [36:59.440 --> 37:03.040] And we have a studio filled with interesting people to answer your questions. [37:03.220 --> 37:05.140] But please keep the pledges coming in, too. [37:05.260 --> 37:13.720] And maybe the people calling the on-air line can also help us convince people to call and pledge. [37:13.980 --> 37:23.480] And maybe also explain to us what you think the definition of dissent is and whether you think that the things you've heard over the past couple of hours fits that description. [37:23.900 --> 37:27.440] I think it does in ways that perhaps most people aren't aware of. [37:27.780 --> 37:36.080] Simply by playing with technology and learning and teaching other people, that in itself, unfortunately enough, is an act of dissent in these days. [37:37.800 --> 37:38.340] All right. [37:38.840 --> 37:41.120] 212-209-2900 is our dial-in line. [37:41.500 --> 37:44.860] And the pledge line, 212-209-2950. [37:45.020 --> 37:48.060] And I got to tell you, I'm a little worried because we have not even hit 3,000 yet. [37:48.540 --> 37:51.980] And it's vitally important that we go past that. [37:52.060 --> 37:54.420] And we have a lot of good items for people to call in for. [37:54.580 --> 37:56.480] 212-209-2950. [37:56.480 --> 37:58.460] So, let's take a listener phone call. [37:59.080 --> 37:59.760] And good evening. [37:59.860 --> 38:00.380] You're on the air. [38:01.140 --> 38:01.760] That's why, yeah. [38:01.820 --> 38:03.340] You've got to turn down your radio, though. [38:03.540 --> 38:04.120] I'm sorry. [38:04.200 --> 38:04.600] No, we're on. [38:05.160 --> 38:05.700] Oh, yeah. [38:05.800 --> 38:06.380] Sorry about that. [38:06.500 --> 38:06.620] Yeah. [38:06.900 --> 38:10.920] I'd like to know, Kevin, do you remember when life wasn't annoying? [38:11.680 --> 38:12.740] Oh, I remember. [38:12.740 --> 38:15.760] How do you... what do you think about different voicemail systems that, like... [38:15.760 --> 38:17.100] It's less annoying a few minutes ago. [38:17.620 --> 38:29.440] I like to... I talk to a lot of people that, when I tell them, like, about, like, when you call different things that, um, for example, Geico, I'll... if you... I'll give you an example, like... [38:29.900 --> 38:32.440] If there's a question somewhere, please get to it. [38:32.600 --> 38:32.800] All right. [38:32.860 --> 38:36.920] The point is that when you call something like, like Geico, I'll, um... [38:38.620 --> 38:40.460] Do you need to make those noises, Rebel? [38:40.600 --> 38:45.820] I can't do it on this line, but, um, when you call it... I'll just... I'll just narrate. [38:45.980 --> 38:53.100] When you call it, it says, welcome to Geico Direct, uh, for... for the policy, press one for whatever, press two. [38:53.240 --> 38:57.440] You press zero, because you don't want to, um, go through the, um, and we're sorry. [38:57.700 --> 38:59.640] Either it says that, or it just repeats... [38:59.640 --> 39:00.280] Question, Rebel. [39:00.460 --> 39:00.740] Question. [39:01.360 --> 39:01.940] Uh, no, no. [39:02.500 --> 39:03.400] Not question, Ud. [39:03.400 --> 39:05.880] The question is, is that, don't you just hate those... [39:05.880 --> 39:06.780] And I'm using a... [39:06.780 --> 39:07.440] Yes, yes. [39:07.440 --> 39:09.880] The answer to your question is, yes, we do hate that. [39:10.180 --> 39:10.720] Good evening. [39:10.800 --> 39:11.360] You're on the air. [39:12.100 --> 39:12.360] Hello? [39:12.600 --> 39:13.180] Yes, go ahead. [39:13.420 --> 39:14.860] You're a bunch of communists. [39:15.620 --> 39:16.300] Yes, we are. [39:21.700 --> 39:24.220] We somehow lost Kevin on... No, we lost... [39:24.220 --> 39:24.780] We lost Kevin. [39:24.780 --> 39:25.600] Who's still on the line? [39:26.160 --> 39:26.900] I'm still on the air. [39:26.920 --> 39:27.940] Okay, Bernie, you're still on. [39:27.940 --> 39:28.840] We lost Kevin somehow. [39:29.020 --> 39:33.020] That shouldn't have happened, because that button is supposed to protect that line, and it didn't. [39:33.480 --> 39:34.660] Ah, I have a theory. [39:34.900 --> 39:37.400] Where's the feedback from, uh, Rebel's, uh, radio? [39:37.760 --> 39:38.860] I don't know if we can blame Rebel. [39:39.220 --> 39:43.160] A 2600, uh, cycle tone that may have hung up the phone. [39:43.340 --> 39:45.700] Well, you know, back in the 80s, maybe, but I don't know about now. [39:45.720 --> 39:49.540] I think this phone system actually predates, uh, that working. [39:49.540 --> 39:50.720] How are we communists? [39:51.000 --> 39:51.560] Good Lord. [39:51.740 --> 39:54.180] I think Kevin just ran, uh, but anyway. [39:54.440 --> 39:59.260] I don't think Kevin ran, because if Kevin ran, we would have heard the little beeps that you hear when somebody hangs up. [39:59.420 --> 39:59.760] Okay. [40:00.040 --> 40:01.280] Yeah, that's, that's how it works. [40:01.720 --> 40:09.000] Uh, but, uh, please, uh, I know that's, uh, that's, that's one of the, uh, views out there, that we're a bunch of commies. [40:09.280 --> 40:20.540] I don't really see how anything we were talking about tonight, uh, could, uh, define us in that particular way, uh, and if you feel that way, fine, you know, whatever, but, uh, there's, there's a big radio spectrum out there. [40:20.660 --> 40:28.380] There's a lot of different people, a lot of different ideas and thoughts, and if that's a threat to you, maybe you need to, uh, you know, ask yourself, why, why is that a threat? [40:28.520 --> 40:32.840] Why is that something that, uh, I will not tolerate anybody else, uh, being a part of? [40:33.320 --> 40:42.740] And if you think that, uh, this place does matter, then please give a call, 212-209-2950, pledge whatever you can afford, use your credit card, uh, pay by check, whatever. [40:43.360 --> 40:45.780] But, uh, that's, that's the most important part of all this. [40:45.920 --> 40:50.840] What's more disturbing is that, uh, is that that man was definitely not a regular listener because if he was... [40:50.840 --> 40:51.440] Oh, how do you know? [40:51.640 --> 40:54.120] Well, because I am, I am blatant to Republican. [40:54.580 --> 40:55.200] Am I not? [40:55.340 --> 40:56.820] Has that not been established over the years? [40:56.820 --> 40:59.440] I think people think you're being sarcastic whenever you say that. [40:59.440 --> 40:59.780] Really? [40:59.960 --> 41:00.120] Yeah. [41:00.360 --> 41:05.500] Even when I espouse reactionary ideas that, that get me in trouble with callers, that, that they call up? [41:05.500 --> 41:07.220] Because everything you say sounds sarcastic. [41:07.460 --> 41:08.480] Well, that is true. [41:08.660 --> 41:09.140] I will grant that. [41:09.140 --> 41:10.480] See, right there, right there. [41:10.660 --> 41:11.220] You did it again. [41:11.460 --> 41:13.420] You're, you're being sarcastic by saying, yes, that's true. [41:13.640 --> 41:14.800] You don't really think that's true. [41:15.560 --> 41:19.160] Well, if I don't really think that's true, then I'm not being sarcastic and I am a Republican. [41:19.160 --> 41:20.280] You just can't help yourself, can you? [41:20.320 --> 41:20.860] Do you hear that? [41:21.100 --> 41:21.420] I'm not. [41:21.440 --> 41:22.540] Tinged with sarcasm. [41:23.260 --> 41:23.980] My goodness. [41:24.780 --> 41:27.200] You know, after two hours, we really get on each other's nerves. [41:28.140 --> 41:29.620] But at least we're getting some phone calls. [41:29.740 --> 41:31.340] 212-209-2950. [41:31.560 --> 41:32.900] Please join the people on the line. [41:33.260 --> 41:34.760] I'm going to try to get Kevin back. [41:34.900 --> 41:37.240] Can you guys carry on the conversation while I attempt to do that? [41:37.320 --> 41:39.140] Because I have to go through a switchboard and everything. [41:39.340 --> 41:40.000] We can try. [41:40.120 --> 41:40.440] All right. [41:40.740 --> 41:41.320] I hope we don't. [41:41.340 --> 41:43.260] I don't know how easy it would be, but we'll attempt it. [41:43.260 --> 41:44.480] Don't let his sarcasm get to you. [41:44.620 --> 41:45.780] What is the number again? [41:45.780 --> 41:54.540] The number, I think, I might even forget that it's 212-209-2950 to call up and pledge. [41:54.540 --> 42:02.860] Of course, if you want to call and talk on the air with Kevin Mitnick, assuming we can get him back, that number is 212-209-2900. [42:03.980 --> 42:12.160] And again, if you call the 2950 number to pledge, you will really be supporting this sort of thing. [42:12.160 --> 42:26.340] As you heard, other media outlets, they invite Kevin on the air, and then as soon as he says something that doesn't fit their preconceived notion of what they say, they invent a technical difficulty and get rid of him. [42:26.500 --> 42:34.700] Here at WBAI, we may have real technical difficulties, but we invite him back and we let him say what he wants to say. [42:35.100 --> 42:37.320] And I think we have him right now. [42:37.440 --> 42:39.300] I have retrieved Kevin from the abyss. [42:40.020 --> 42:42.060] Yeah, somebody hacked into our phone connection. [42:42.480 --> 42:43.180] Apparently so. [42:43.580 --> 42:50.200] I think if you say the C word, which that guy said, that automatically disconnects line 12, which is what you're on right now. [42:50.740 --> 42:51.960] Let's hope that doesn't happen again. [42:52.180 --> 42:53.660] Should we try it with other ideologies? [42:53.840 --> 42:54.820] Yeah, other ideologies. [42:55.000 --> 42:57.380] Call a socialist, maybe, and then that won't happen. [42:57.940 --> 42:59.260] Kevin, I have a question for you. [42:59.500 --> 42:59.900] Yes. [42:59.900 --> 43:05.800] Yeah, you have the golden opportunity to go to the Dayton Ham Fention weekend. [43:05.800 --> 43:06.300] When is it at? [43:07.840 --> 43:10.980] It's May 19th, 20th, and 21st. [43:11.000 --> 43:12.060] It's not this weekend coming up. [43:12.080 --> 43:12.820] It's the one after that. [43:13.000 --> 43:14.180] But I'll be in Venice, Italy. [43:14.800 --> 43:16.180] My heart's going to be breaking. [43:17.120 --> 43:18.260] Well, you better... [43:18.260 --> 43:25.340] I think you should come next year because your friend from the FCC, Riley Hollingsworth, comes every year and does a talk. [43:26.040 --> 43:35.040] And it would be good to put you two together and have a little debate about why the FCC did not want to renew your amateur radio license. [43:35.580 --> 43:38.360] Wait, is this guy going to be defending current FCC policy? [43:38.840 --> 43:39.180] Yes. [43:39.340 --> 43:40.380] Oh, I'm so there. [43:40.380 --> 43:41.200] I really am. [43:41.960 --> 43:45.660] Yeah, I mean, I have the most expensive FCC license in the world. [43:45.660 --> 43:47.000] I'm still paying off the lawyer. [43:48.000 --> 43:50.500] It was about 20K to fight that case. [43:50.500 --> 44:03.660] And you know that it was a selective issue because a lot of people don't know this, but I had a co-defendant involved in my case, a guy named Louis DePayne, who you probably heard of him any well in Bernie. [44:04.000 --> 44:08.420] And he is also an amateur radio operator, and he was convicted of a felony in the case. [44:08.600 --> 44:11.760] And yet, they never even bothered going after his ham license. [44:11.760 --> 44:24.940] So, what it turns out to be is probably these people in the FCC were bored, and they, you know, and I provided some exciting, you know, exciting time to break the monotony, a distraction. [44:25.540 --> 44:34.940] Even Robert Hanson, who was convicted by the federal government of espionage and is serving a life sentence, his amateur radio license was not taken away. [44:35.220 --> 44:36.300] What can he do? [44:36.420 --> 44:37.240] I don't think he could use a rig, though. [44:37.400 --> 44:39.400] Yeah, what can he do with an amateur radio license in prison? [44:39.700 --> 44:41.420] You'd think they'd just still want to take the radio. [44:41.420 --> 44:45.740] So, they'd still want to take the license away, just as a symbolic measure, like they tried to do with Kevin. [44:46.540 --> 44:54.560] Yeah, that really was pretty unbelievable, they actually tried to do that, especially since your crime had nothing to do with violation of any FCC rules. [44:55.360 --> 44:55.640] It's just another kind of punishment. [44:55.640 --> 44:57.080] Right, they tried to make it so, though. [44:57.160 --> 45:05.460] They tried to claim that by dialing into a modem, I violated some FCC regulation, which I never had. [45:11.420 --> 45:15.080] I showed up in court, you know, into their, like, kangaroo court. [45:15.180 --> 45:15.400] Yes. [45:16.360 --> 45:19.400] I was wearing the same tie as the prosecutor. [45:19.760 --> 45:24.900] So, the prosecutor looked at me really funny and goes, wow, I mean, interesting tie. [45:24.980 --> 45:27.120] And I go, yeah, great minds think alike. [45:27.280 --> 45:31.220] You know, I kind of, you know, complimented him and shook his hand and smiled. [45:31.220 --> 45:36.160] And ever since that time, it was like, I think the prosecutor started to like me, right? [45:36.380 --> 45:38.960] Oh, I thought he just got spooked and couldn't put a sentence together. [45:39.200 --> 45:42.620] No, no, no, no, because I actually complimented him, even though I was an adversary. [45:42.940 --> 45:45.000] So, I think in the long run, it actually helped. [45:45.180 --> 45:48.500] Do you really think that a prosecutor would drop a case because somebody complimented someone on his tie? [45:48.500 --> 45:53.280] No, but I think he didn't think I was this Osama Ben Mitnick that I was made out to be. [45:54.240 --> 45:54.780] Are you still laughing? [45:54.780 --> 46:04.500] Because don't forget, when people meet you and they see you for, you know, themselves, they have an opportunity to form an opinion other than just reading a story, right? [46:04.660 --> 46:07.100] Well, Charles Manson had that effect on people, I know. [46:07.840 --> 46:09.000] Very pleasant in person. [46:09.140 --> 46:11.060] You'd never guess what was inside his mind. [46:11.480 --> 46:12.640] I have it myself now. [46:12.640 --> 46:13.980] He doesn't return my letters. [46:15.740 --> 46:17.420] 212-209-2950. [46:17.580 --> 46:19.200] We have three calls on the pledge line. [46:19.320 --> 46:20.480] Please, this is your last chance. [46:20.480 --> 46:25.300] We only have a few minutes left in this program, and we're still waiting to get over that 3,000 mark. [46:25.300 --> 46:29.920] I can only hope that the people in the tally room have not yet had a chance to add up the calls that have come in. [46:30.860 --> 46:34.260] But we are here during this special week. [46:34.340 --> 46:35.240] We won't be here next week. [46:35.360 --> 46:36.620] We won't be here the week after that, even. [46:37.200 --> 46:44.860] So if you want to support Off the Hook, this is your opportunity, and we're trying to make it as pleasant as possible by offering all these really cool things. [46:45.740 --> 46:47.380] 212-209-2950. [46:47.540 --> 46:50.480] $25 gets you the Off the Hook t-shirt. [46:50.960 --> 46:52.420] $150 gets you everything. [46:52.600 --> 46:54.780] Freedom Downtime Autographed by Kevin and myself. [46:55.560 --> 46:58.580] And Kevin's new book, The Art of Intrusion, Autographed by Kevin. [46:58.960 --> 47:02.900] The Off the Hook DVD set, every show from 1988 to 2004. [47:02.900 --> 47:06.860] It's all there for a pledge of $150, or just a t-shirt for $25. [47:06.900 --> 47:08.780] All kinds of other combinations are possible. [47:09.680 --> 47:11.260] 212-209-2950. [47:12.180 --> 47:15.500] Do you think we should try the on-air line again? [47:16.440 --> 47:17.920] I think we can manage. [47:18.000 --> 47:22.320] All right, let's give it a shot, and hopefully it'll work this time. [47:22.700 --> 47:23.820] Good evening, you're on the air. [47:23.820 --> 47:24.280] Houston. [47:24.920 --> 47:25.320] Hello? [47:25.800 --> 47:26.100] Go ahead. [47:26.800 --> 47:31.600] Hey, I was calling, because you guys were wondering about if anybody had the article on the front of the New York Times. [47:32.780 --> 47:34.260] What page it was on, yes. [47:34.720 --> 47:35.980] Yeah, it's on the front page. [47:36.060 --> 47:37.200] It was on the front page. [47:37.680 --> 47:41.160] I'm looking at it right in front of me, it's right on the front page. [47:41.360 --> 47:42.560] Above or below the fold? [47:43.600 --> 47:47.500] It's right above, it's the top, it's right next to the main picture. [47:47.740 --> 47:48.440] How about that? [47:48.440 --> 47:48.920] Oh my God. [47:49.120 --> 47:52.260] Kevin, that's better than you, weren't you below the fold? [47:52.260 --> 47:53.780] No, no, no, he put me above the fold. [47:53.880 --> 47:54.480] You were above the fold. [47:54.560 --> 48:04.940] Same type of hacker story, similarity of obtaining source code, and then, of course, making assumptions that he can't necessarily know. [48:05.160 --> 48:08.780] You realize, though, that Markov doesn't really have any say as to where the story goes. [48:09.080 --> 48:13.980] It actually, it goes along the left side, and then, of course, it's continued on page C5. [48:13.980 --> 48:18.380] I'm sure that's where they hide all the extra stuff, you know, like the 20,000 credit card numbers and whatnot. [48:19.200 --> 48:22.200] Yeah, he's actually not guilty of anything, and yeah. [48:22.540 --> 48:23.000] Yeah, that's right. [48:23.080 --> 48:26.680] He said that I stole 20,000 credit card numbers. [48:27.140 --> 48:31.560] And what's amazing is that was so true, certainly that they would have charged me with that. [48:31.840 --> 48:34.320] I mean, that would have been like, you know, their number one charge. [48:34.500 --> 48:43.240] Well, in context, that was a file of 20,000 credit card numbers that were being passed all over the place and was even reported on in 2,600 six months earlier. [48:43.740 --> 48:51.860] And way, way, I think, on D14 of the same issue, they mentioned that, oh, by the way, he never used any of these cars and is not being accused of it. [48:51.960 --> 48:52.460] So that's why... [48:52.460 --> 48:53.520] No, no, actually, what I... [48:53.900 --> 49:10.980] Actually, what was stored on the well was the entire NetCom user accounting database that included everyone's, you know, name, address, you know, the whole customer database, which also included, if it was a method of payment of a credit card, their credit card number. [49:10.980 --> 49:14.700] But the article made it sound like you just had a list of credit card numbers. [49:15.180 --> 49:19.080] Yeah, and you were somehow supposedly the infamous one that had them all, huh? [49:19.740 --> 49:20.160] Of course. [49:20.160 --> 49:21.020] That got them all and everything. [49:21.420 --> 49:24.680] And I'm surprised you didn't say I memorized them all, so now they have to erase my memory. [49:24.840 --> 49:25.060] Yeah. [49:25.500 --> 49:27.280] Yeah, maybe you whistled them out of somewhere. [49:27.400 --> 49:27.740] Who knows? [49:28.000 --> 49:28.580] That's it. [49:28.820 --> 49:30.700] Building stuff out of tuna cans and stuff. [49:30.820 --> 49:36.540] Kevin, I just wanted to say, I got all your books and everything, and it's good to see that you're doing better now. [49:37.000 --> 49:38.200] Yeah, much better. [49:38.440 --> 49:38.820] Thank you. [49:38.860 --> 49:39.160] Thank you. [49:39.160 --> 49:40.340] Thank you for your support. [49:40.860 --> 49:41.780] It's very kind of you. [49:42.060 --> 49:43.100] Thanks for that call. [49:43.480 --> 49:43.820] All right. [49:43.880 --> 49:44.640] You guys have a good one. [49:44.700 --> 49:45.240] I'll keep listening. [49:45.460 --> 49:45.740] All right. [49:45.800 --> 49:46.120] Take care. [49:46.380 --> 49:49.600] And I'm happy to say that we have, in fact, broken the 3,000 mark. [49:49.740 --> 49:50.120] We're up to... [49:50.120 --> 49:50.360] Oh, wow. [49:50.380 --> 49:50.760] Look at that. [49:50.860 --> 49:51.780] See, this is what I like. [49:51.940 --> 49:52.920] I looked a second ago. [49:53.060 --> 49:53.600] We're at 3,100. [49:53.600 --> 49:54.520] I just looked now. [49:54.620 --> 49:55.700] We're at 3,639. [49:56.380 --> 49:57.780] How did we get to nine? [49:58.420 --> 50:02.360] Who's the wise guy who pledged a single dollar units there? [50:03.100 --> 50:04.200] Well, we want to thank them. [50:04.280 --> 50:09.020] Yeah, thanks very much, because, you know, the odd numbers, that's always what I'm into. [50:09.160 --> 50:11.240] I mean, not many other shows probably have that. [50:11.600 --> 50:12.440] No, that's true. [50:12.940 --> 50:27.440] And, you know, not to compete with other stations that beg for money, but some of those stations, this amount of money would be peanuts to them as well, because they make this amount in corporate grants, and it's almost the same thing as a commercial, [50:27.560 --> 50:28.200] almost as bad. [50:29.380 --> 50:31.560] Bernie, was that you agreeing, or you answered somebody? [50:31.560 --> 50:33.720] Oh, I thought I was agreeing with something someone near me was saying. [50:33.980 --> 50:34.220] Oh, okay. [50:35.120 --> 50:37.240] Another radio show that you're involved in at the moment. [50:37.680 --> 50:42.980] But, yes, so, basically, a lot of the other stations are very, very good at this. [50:43.120 --> 50:48.680] They have, you know, the tote bags and the mugs and all that kind of thing, and a lot more coming in. [50:48.840 --> 50:49.700] For the Porsches? [50:50.220 --> 50:51.040] Sometimes Porsches. [50:52.280 --> 50:53.740] All sorts of things like that. [50:54.020 --> 51:00.560] So, yeah, 36, 39 might seem like a very humbling figure if you've been exposed to that kind of a thing for very long. [51:01.000 --> 51:08.620] But to us, it's a lot, and to us, we'll stretch it every possible way to get the most out of it so that we can keep this place here. [51:08.780 --> 51:11.600] If you like tote bags and mugs, we do have them, though. [51:11.940 --> 51:12.980] We have tote bags and mugs. [51:13.560 --> 51:17.320] WBI mug and tote bag and gold packages and all kinds of things. [51:17.420 --> 51:29.480] Well, yeah, I mean, obviously, I'm not maligning tote bags and mugs, but just kind of the mentality of we exist to sell the tote bag and mug more than we exist to provide interesting, innovative, and controversial programming. [51:29.700 --> 51:30.780] That's what we're about. [51:31.160 --> 51:31.820] Uh-huh. [51:32.080 --> 51:35.600] 212-209-2950 is our pledge line. [51:35.720 --> 51:37.000] We have two calls on that line. [51:37.180 --> 51:40.600] Let's have one last flurry of activity. [51:40.880 --> 51:42.720] It gets a 4,000... [51:42.720 --> 51:43.700] You think we can do it, Jim? [51:44.380 --> 51:44.860] I'm... [51:44.860 --> 51:46.420] Because you sounded sarcastic when you said that. [51:46.480 --> 51:47.620] Oh, you thought... [51:48.340 --> 51:49.540] All right, that sounded genuine. [51:49.920 --> 51:51.740] 212-209-2950. [51:51.740 --> 51:57.180] Now, your accusations of sarcasm were themselves sarcastic, which just takes us to a whole new level. [51:57.220 --> 51:58.340] Can we stop the meta-analysis? [51:58.340 --> 52:01.080] You're going to be inside my head now telling me what's behind my accusations? [52:01.380 --> 52:02.420] I think it's clear. [52:02.700 --> 52:02.920] Uh-huh. [52:03.140 --> 52:03.720] All right. [52:04.320 --> 52:06.240] Well, please, let's put an end to this. [52:06.320 --> 52:07.740] Let's get over the 4,000 mark. [52:07.840 --> 52:09.780] 212-209-2950. [52:10.160 --> 52:14.200] Again, we have all kinds of interesting premiums, unique to Off the Hook. [52:14.420 --> 52:16.640] We have copies of Freedom Downtime autographed. [52:16.700 --> 52:17.700] We have books. [52:18.040 --> 52:19.460] We have shirts. [52:19.460 --> 52:22.580] We have DVD collections of the radio show. [52:22.740 --> 52:32.140] So if you're just tuning in for the first time ever, and you're somewhat interested, I don't want to say you like what you hear, but you're somewhat interested and you want to hear more, that's the best way to do it. [52:32.360 --> 52:39.300] Get the DVD with all the radio shows from 1988 to 2004, and all of your questions will be answered, and more. [52:40.140 --> 52:41.480] New questions will be formed. [52:41.940 --> 52:44.740] Let's answer some new questions by the current callers. [52:44.860 --> 52:46.140] Let's see if we can squeeze one more in. [52:46.200 --> 52:46.380] All right. [52:46.420 --> 52:46.780] Let's try. [52:48.200 --> 52:48.960] And good evening. [52:49.080 --> 52:49.420] You're on. [52:49.840 --> 52:50.200] Oh. [52:50.720 --> 52:52.200] I guess that person lost interest. [52:52.340 --> 52:52.680] Good evening. [52:52.860 --> 52:53.340] You're on. [52:54.020 --> 52:54.380] Ah. [52:54.540 --> 52:54.940] Good evening. [52:55.100 --> 52:55.480] How are you doing? [52:55.720 --> 52:56.040] Okay. [52:56.200 --> 52:56.560] Yourself? [52:56.940 --> 52:57.560] I'm fine. [52:57.680 --> 52:57.980] I'm fine. [52:58.200 --> 52:58.340] Good. [52:58.440 --> 53:00.400] Trying to get that last, you know, a few hundred bucks in. [53:00.620 --> 53:00.820] Yeah. [53:00.920 --> 53:01.620] You better pay. [53:02.260 --> 53:03.780] Well, paying is the other part of it. [53:03.780 --> 53:04.860] Pledging is the first part. [53:05.740 --> 53:06.100] True. [53:06.740 --> 53:07.020] True. [53:07.020 --> 53:07.740] What's on your mind? [53:08.000 --> 53:12.140] I just wanted to encourage people to call in because, you know, you have a very unique show. [53:12.340 --> 53:15.880] You're a very unique person, and the people there are very interesting people, and... [53:15.880 --> 53:16.040] All right. [53:16.040 --> 53:16.880] Who's using Windows? [53:18.700 --> 53:20.040] Someone's using Windows out there. [53:20.180 --> 53:20.400] Okay. [53:22.060 --> 53:34.740] So, and you guys are really fantastic, and this station is an asset to the city and to the country, and, you know, it's a place that really needs your individual support. [53:34.740 --> 53:36.540] It's the only reason that this place exists. [53:37.360 --> 53:42.380] And I strongly encourage everyone who's listening to call up. [53:42.460 --> 53:43.020] Hey, you... [53:43.020 --> 53:44.580] It's been 25 bucks, 50 bucks, whatever. [53:44.740 --> 53:45.140] You're good. [53:45.180 --> 53:47.200] You've got three people in the studio taking out credit cards. [53:48.120 --> 53:48.880] Not bad. [53:49.700 --> 53:51.200] We could use somebody like this. [53:51.320 --> 53:54.280] Well, thank you, former Bronxboro President Fernando Ferrer. [53:55.480 --> 53:56.360] Where did he come from? [53:56.460 --> 53:59.120] No, I'm just saying, you know, he's sounding like a politician. [53:59.380 --> 54:00.440] You know, we're a credit to the city. [54:00.580 --> 54:02.080] Bloomberg wouldn't say that, but Ferrer might. [54:03.740 --> 54:04.940] We're a true credit to the city. [54:05.540 --> 54:06.900] 212-209-2950. [54:07.060 --> 54:08.260] Anything else that you wanted to say, caller? [54:08.360 --> 54:09.620] Whip out your credit cards, folks. [54:10.060 --> 54:11.620] Any other comments besides... [54:11.620 --> 54:12.860] No, just thank you very much. [54:12.940 --> 54:13.160] Okay. [54:13.260 --> 54:14.320] Thanks so much for your support. [54:15.080 --> 54:17.580] If you want to take that, caller's... Why am I echoing? [54:17.580 --> 54:17.940] I don't know. [54:18.000 --> 54:18.980] It happens to the phone sometimes. [54:19.200 --> 54:24.040] If you want to take that, caller's advice, the number, again, is 212-209-2950. [54:24.820 --> 54:25.080] Okay. [54:25.140 --> 54:25.960] I hear lots of activity. [54:26.060 --> 54:27.300] Bernie, are you walking around the street? [54:27.300 --> 54:32.320] Well, there's just so much enthusiasm here in Philadelphia for Off the Hook and for WBAI. [54:32.440 --> 54:36.880] And I think if anyone has been listening for two hours now, you obviously enjoy the show. [54:37.080 --> 54:42.960] And you really deserve... WBAI deserves your support, because you're not going to hear this on any other radio station in the country. [54:43.040 --> 54:47.120] And most radio listeners don't tune in for entire blocks. [54:47.160 --> 54:50.300] They tune in and out five minutes here, ten minutes there. [54:50.300 --> 55:02.200] So, if you're one of those people who's listening to us for the first time, maybe you're on your way to, you know, Z100 or something, and you just didn't turn the dial strongly enough and you wound up here, this is a very unique radio station in New York City. [55:02.340 --> 55:06.540] We've been here since 1960, and we broadcast all kinds of interesting stuff. [55:07.020 --> 55:11.740] And if you want to be a part of that, Off the Hook is on every Wednesday from 7 to 8 p.m. [55:11.740 --> 55:14.760] We're not on next week or the week after, though, because of the fundraising activities. [55:15.400 --> 55:23.900] But you can be a very important part of our community by pledging your support to this radio station, ensuring that we're around for the decades to come. [55:24.080 --> 55:31.600] 212-209-2950, all kinds of really cool stuff for people who call up with interest in Off the Hook. [55:31.720 --> 55:36.320] We have the Off the Hook t-shirt, so that you'll never forget when this radio program is on. [55:36.380 --> 55:41.920] You simply have to look at the shirt, assuming you're not wearing it, in which case you'll have to ask somebody else, unless you can read backwards. [55:43.700 --> 55:48.900] And for $75, you'll get the shirt, and you'll get the DVD with all the shows. [55:49.100 --> 56:00.440] And for $100, you'll get a choice of all that, plus either a book or a DVD autographed by myself or Kevin, myself and or Kevin, Freedom, Downtime, and The Art of Intrusion. [56:00.540 --> 56:01.840] For $150, you get everything. [56:02.060 --> 56:03.760] How many total signatures is that? [56:03.880 --> 56:04.820] I've been meaning to do that. [56:04.920 --> 56:06.520] Well, Kevin signs the books. [56:07.160 --> 56:11.760] He signs two of the DVDs, and I sign two of the DVDs, so that's five signatures altogether. [56:11.760 --> 56:13.720] Wow, that's almost worth it just for that. [56:13.800 --> 56:15.020] You signed the book once, right, Kevin? [56:15.300 --> 56:15.600] Yes. [56:15.920 --> 56:16.100] Okay. [56:17.060 --> 56:21.440] Kevin, give us more information on the book in the moments that we have left, The Art of Intrusion. [56:21.740 --> 56:22.760] Tell us a little bit about it. [56:22.760 --> 56:29.020] Okay, well, it's basically a very interesting collection of stories, of interviews that I had done. [56:29.020 --> 56:35.200] And it basically tells the stories in the same way that we did in The Art of Deception. [56:35.860 --> 56:42.700] And it's the stories of how people are able to break into some of the most resilient systems out there. [56:42.940 --> 56:47.240] But more importantly, what the mindset is of the different people. [56:47.240 --> 56:59.860] In one chapter that we call, I think it's called Stealing Your Intellectual Property, is I interviewed two guys that are, today, they work as security professionals. [57:00.320 --> 57:06.020] You know, they work on books, you know, as part of a team, and they also do consulting. [57:06.020 --> 57:18.500] But by night, they continue to be hackers, and they're basically trophy hunting, and they're able to compromise many of the different large organizations out there. [57:18.660 --> 57:20.780] They take a copy of their source code as a trophy. [57:21.040 --> 57:26.980] And in some cases, what they're doing is they're contributing to these underground cracker sites. [57:27.180 --> 57:46.500] So, for example, if there's programs that are protected by licensing code, what they're doing is they're going into these companies, they're taking the licensing code from the companies themselves, they're building a program, a graphical user interface around the code that they have taken, [57:46.700 --> 57:52.460] and basically are publishing the program to generate licensing keys and stuff like that. [57:52.640 --> 58:06.380] And what's interesting about the story is these guys continue to take the risk, even though they work as whitehead hackers during the day, and the time and persistence that they'll go to, to get into their targets. [58:06.640 --> 58:16.360] And it gets really into their mindset, how they do it, and then I get into, well, how do you protect yourself against the particular vulnerabilities that they use to get in? [58:16.640 --> 58:18.220] So, it's quite interesting. [58:18.420 --> 58:20.760] That's The Art of Intrusion, the latest book by Kevin Mitnick. [58:21.040 --> 58:25.460] We've been talking with Kevin Mitnick, Bernie S., and various other people here in the studio. [58:25.460 --> 58:27.240] So, special edition of Off the Hook. [58:27.340 --> 58:43.000] Again, you can get an autographed copy of that book for a pledge of $100, or you can get that along with the Freedom Downtime DVD, which tells the whole story for a pledge of $150, along with the Off the Hook t-shirt and DVD collection of all of our shows. [58:44.420 --> 58:46.000] 212-209-2950. [58:46.740 --> 58:48.700] We're very, very close to that $4,000 mark. [58:48.700 --> 58:51.320] I am going to assume we're going to go over it, because I saw a few calls come in. [58:51.320 --> 58:58.340] But please, if you do want any of that material, you have about a minute and a half to call in, because we're off the air at that point. [58:59.260 --> 59:01.360] 212-209-2950. [59:01.640 --> 59:03.420] I want to thank everybody for participating. [59:03.700 --> 59:07.600] Thank the people here at the radio station and the volunteers down in the tally room. [59:08.000 --> 59:13.400] And all of those who are poised by their phone, about to dial right now, special thank you to you. [59:13.980 --> 59:16.560] We'll see you again in three weeks. [59:16.900 --> 59:19.400] And Kevin, Bernie, you have yourselves a good night. [59:19.400 --> 59:20.620] I'll see you guys soon, huh? [59:21.100 --> 59:22.760] Yeah, thank you for having us on your show. [59:22.980 --> 59:23.300] All right. [59:23.560 --> 59:24.060] Take care, then. [59:25.060 --> 59:26.340] This is WBAI New York. [01:01:59.050 --> 01:02:10.030] The Committee for Social Justice in Colombia invites you to an afternoon of thoughtful expression, politics, poetry, and music on Saturday, May 14th from noon to 5 p.m. at Native's Theatre.