[00:00.000 --> 00:06.040]  Zainab Bangura is executive director of Sierra Leonean NGO, the National Accountability Group.
[00:06.280 --> 00:10.040]  I think one of the biggest challenges we have is dealing with the impunity.
[00:10.780 --> 00:20.180]  And I think if we have Charles Taylor, the special court should have been justifiable in a much bigger sense.
[00:20.920 --> 00:27.080]  I wish, I think Charles Taylor should be brought from the courts so that the courts will regain its credibility.
[00:31.320 --> 00:36.220]  For Free Speech Radio News, I'm Rupert Cook in Freetown, Sierra Leone.
[00:37.240 --> 00:42.180]  And you're listening to 99.5 FM, WBAI New York.
[00:42.500 --> 00:46.140]  It's 7pm, time for Off the Hook.
[01:48.320 --> 01:49.680]  And good evening, everyone.
[01:49.860 --> 01:51.260]  The program is Off the Hook.
[01:51.540 --> 01:52.820]  And this is Red Hacked here.
[01:52.980 --> 01:54.780]  I'm joining you from WBAI Studios.
[01:55.580 --> 01:56.980]  Here I have with me Jim.
[01:57.240 --> 01:57.500]  Hello.
[01:58.220 --> 01:58.720]  Mike.
[01:59.080 --> 01:59.580]  Hi there.
[01:59.800 --> 02:00.220]  Redbird.
[02:00.520 --> 02:00.880]  Good evening.
[02:01.320 --> 02:01.840]  Arseny.
[02:02.020 --> 02:02.200]  Hi.
[02:02.800 --> 02:03.320]  Walter.
[02:03.760 --> 02:03.960]  Hello.
[02:03.960 --> 02:06.560]  On the phone, we have Bernie S.
[02:07.400 --> 02:08.460]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:08.960 --> 02:09.520]  Hi, Bernie S.
[02:09.820 --> 02:11.260]  And we also have Emanuel.
[02:11.620 --> 02:12.120]  Hello, Emanuel.
[02:12.640 --> 02:13.660]  Is this payphone working?
[02:14.120 --> 02:15.760]  Uh, yes.
[02:16.020 --> 02:16.680]  Quite loud.
[02:16.930 --> 02:19.020]  What foreign country are you joining us from this week?
[02:19.140 --> 02:19.580]  Uh, Chicago.
[02:20.020 --> 02:20.200]  Oh.
[02:20.490 --> 02:25.740]  And, um, yeah, it's interesting because I've sailed all the way across the country since the last time I spoke to you.
[02:25.820 --> 02:28.640]  By the way, I really want to apologize for last week's show.
[02:28.640 --> 02:38.300]  I had no idea the wind sounded so bad on the radio, and I just listened to it a little while ago, and, uh, that was so distracting, and it was so nice of you guys to put up with it.
[02:39.490 --> 02:40.840]  You could have put a sock on it.
[02:40.990 --> 02:47.800]  Well, you know, I did try putting a sock on it, and I tested it later, and the wind was still there, and the person I was calling couldn't hear me.
[02:48.000 --> 02:50.840]  So, maybe that was the effect that you wanted to achieve.
[02:51.060 --> 02:52.500]  There was probably a hole in your sock.
[02:52.900 --> 02:55.100]  Uh, well, there's no need to get personal about this.
[02:55.360 --> 02:57.060]  Um, maybe I could have put something else over it.
[02:57.060 --> 03:01.680]  But, well, you know, the point is that the satellite phone really sucks on the Pacific Ocean.
[03:01.800 --> 03:03.580]  I don't know why, but it does.
[03:03.900 --> 03:06.500]  And, um, I had a crystal blue sky there.
[03:06.800 --> 03:08.220]  I wasn't able to get a good signal.
[03:08.780 --> 03:14.840]  Right now, on a landline, we're landline to landline for the first time in a while, and I just want to say that that feels really good.
[03:14.960 --> 03:15.920]  Wait, wait, we can't have this.
[03:16.060 --> 03:22.640]  Someone has got to come in there and, like, uh, make the wires, like, uh, barely touch each other or something so that you sound bad.
[03:22.880 --> 03:24.940]  No, it's, it's Verizon to Ameritech.
[03:24.940 --> 03:28.480]  And, uh, yeah, I'm speaking to you on Ameritech payphone, which for some reason rings.
[03:28.740 --> 03:31.520]  They have signs all over the place saying these phones don't take incoming calls.
[03:31.660 --> 03:32.020]  Well, guess what?
[03:32.080 --> 03:32.600]  This one does.
[03:32.940 --> 03:39.000]  So, it's always a good idea when you see a sign to immediately disobey it and see if the rules really apply.
[03:39.200 --> 03:41.640]  So, the phone has a phone number on it, I assume, right?
[03:41.780 --> 03:42.320]  Well, yeah.
[03:42.320 --> 03:43.180]  I didn't just guess it.
[03:43.280 --> 03:44.420]  It has a phone number right on it.
[03:44.480 --> 03:48.080]  That would be silly for them to say it doesn't take incoming calls and assign it a phone number.
[03:48.200 --> 03:51.860]  I'm not sure why they put the phone number on phones that don't take incoming calls, but they do.
[03:52.800 --> 03:55.640]  We'll see if it cuts you off after some time period or not.
[03:55.820 --> 03:57.960]  Well, if it does, hopefully, you'll call me back.
[03:58.720 --> 04:01.540]  It'll, you know, it'll be like old times when we lose our connections.
[04:01.920 --> 04:02.980]  Uh, can I, can I say a couple?
[04:03.080 --> 04:06.780]  I'm, I'm sitting here in the Amtrak first class lounge in Chicago.
[04:06.940 --> 04:17.500]  Now, normally I would never be allowed into such an establishment as this, but they had to let me in because I wound up paying a huge amount for, uh, for my train tickets across the country.
[04:18.000 --> 04:19.760]  I got, uh, and I want to warn people about this.
[04:19.900 --> 04:22.520]  I got something known as a rumet.
[04:22.860 --> 04:25.760]  Now, rumet is a word that only Amtrak could make up.
[04:26.180 --> 04:28.400]  Uh, maybe, maybe it is a real word.
[04:28.500 --> 04:28.820]  I don't know.
[04:28.940 --> 04:30.040]  Jim, do you know about these kind of things?
[04:30.520 --> 04:33.120]  It's, it's what's known as a portmanteau word.
[04:33.360 --> 04:41.300]  They, they sort of jam two words together and shove it both ends until, uh, sometimes letters pop out of the middle and, and it joins together.
[04:41.480 --> 04:43.360]  What you're saying, Jim, basically is it's not a word.
[04:44.280 --> 04:45.300]  It's a word.
[04:45.680 --> 04:50.400]  It's, it's created artificially, but then again, there's an argument to be made that all words are artificial.
[04:50.730 --> 04:57.360]  Well, let me just say, I, I, I recently posted a, um, a, uh, travel journal entry, uh, concerning the rumet.
[04:57.920 --> 05:03.660]  And, uh, I typed it in a word processor that I usually use and rumet did not turn up as a misspelled word.
[05:03.740 --> 05:05.850]  Rumet turned up as a word that actually existed.
[05:06.090 --> 05:13.830]  The, the words though that I used to describe Amtrak and the rumet, words that I cannot say on the radio, they did show up as misspelled words.
[05:13.980 --> 05:16.540]  Apparently my, my, uh, dictionary is a bit prudish.
[05:17.240 --> 05:21.850]  What, uh, words did they suggest that you were trying to type is, uh, is the question I ask.
[05:21.980 --> 05:22.980]  Well, we have an understanding.
[05:23.350 --> 05:26.140]  Um, I don't tell the dictionary how to do its job.
[05:26.180 --> 05:27.680]  It doesn't tell me what words to use.
[05:28.160 --> 05:30.710]  So, um, it just told me that that's a bad word.
[05:30.860 --> 05:31.760]  You know, I guess it is.
[05:31.830 --> 05:32.580]  It is a bad word.
[05:32.760 --> 05:37.760]  I'm reminded of an article I read, uh, in the, in a Canadian paper recently.
[05:37.860 --> 05:43.540]  Apparently the Canadian, uh, press has issued a new, uh, book of guidelines for how to spell things and whatnot.
[05:43.830 --> 05:55.640]  And there was an article about one, uh, entry in particular, which they, uh, informed us, rhymed with duck and luck and, and is, uh, found in the dictionary between, uh, you know, two entries that they gave.
[05:55.800 --> 06:03.460]  But they, this whole article, which was about the fact that the Canadian press says you can now use this word, uh, the article itself did not use the word.
[06:03.600 --> 06:05.920]  It was, it was amusing in a sort of, uh, childish way.
[06:05.920 --> 06:05.950]  Yeah.
[06:06.180 --> 06:07.300]  Danced around the word, eh?
[06:07.450 --> 06:07.660]  Yeah.
[06:08.240 --> 06:19.300]  Well, let me just, uh, very quickly, uh, mention for people considering taking Amtrak across the country, really, uh, you probably should take some kind of medication before you do this.
[06:19.960 --> 06:25.860]  I have never in my life been subjected to such torment as, as far as just, uh, trying to sleep on a train.
[06:26.060 --> 06:27.860]  First of all, here, here's the, here's the issue.
[06:28.300 --> 06:28.460]  All right.
[06:28.830 --> 06:34.480]  Tell me if you think this is as obvious as I thought it was when I looked at it, you walk into this little room at, which is basically like a closet.
[06:34.830 --> 06:36.020]  That's what they really should call it.
[06:36.460 --> 06:38.800]  And the bed is parallel to the track.
[06:39.320 --> 06:46.950]  Now, when you, when you go to European trains or Asian trains or any other train in the world, the, the, the beds are perpendicular to the track.
[06:47.040 --> 06:55.260]  And, and what I think that, that makes a big difference in is the movement as you are actually coming down the track and the train is kind of like, you know, swaying from side to side.
[06:55.460 --> 06:57.000]  I thought this when I first saw it.
[06:57.100 --> 07:04.340]  And when I tried to sleep later that night, it was confirmed because I was, I was flung out of the bed twice and all kinds of things were falling.
[07:04.660 --> 07:06.620]  And, and it was a horrible situation.
[07:06.720 --> 07:08.900]  I, I have whiplash because of this.
[07:09.220 --> 07:10.980]  It seems like such a simple thing.
[07:11.120 --> 07:14.860]  Make the bed face the right way and you won't have such, such horrible motion.
[07:15.360 --> 07:21.140]  And also maybe make the room just a little bit bigger so you don't whack your head every time you, you stand up or just move an inch to the side.
[07:22.460 --> 07:26.920]  So such things like this really make a difference in whether a trip is a good one or a bad one.
[07:27.120 --> 07:29.240]  And, and, you know, the people on the train are very nice.
[07:29.560 --> 07:30.880]  They, they try to make you comfortable.
[07:30.880 --> 07:32.180]  There's only so much they can do.
[07:32.360 --> 07:33.420]  The tracks are bad.
[07:33.710 --> 07:36.380]  They're, they're bumpiest tracks I think I've ever seen in my life.
[07:37.040 --> 07:40.220]  Somehow Amtrak has tracks that have potholes in them.
[07:40.300 --> 07:41.760]  That's what it feels like when you're going down them.
[07:41.760 --> 07:46.380]  You suddenly get this, this amazing bump and everyone's head hits the ceiling.
[07:47.220 --> 07:49.040]  I, I, I, you know, I've traveled in Mongolia.
[07:49.120 --> 07:51.060]  I've traveled in China, Russia, all over the place.
[07:51.400 --> 07:56.560]  Nothing, nothing compares to this kind of, um, uh, of bad track and, and stupid design.
[07:58.710 --> 07:59.300]  Really nothing.
[07:59.450 --> 08:00.340]  You paid how much for this, Emmanuel?
[08:00.900 --> 08:05.980]  Oh, well, you have to pay about 500 bucks to get the roommate just to, uh, to get to Chicago.
[08:05.980 --> 08:08.300]  Then you have to do it again from Chicago to New York.
[08:08.740 --> 08:15.480]  Now there's another, uh, there's another level above that, which is, uh, more like a, um, a, a regular room.
[08:15.480 --> 08:16.620]  I haven't actually seen that.
[08:16.840 --> 08:23.380]  But the people who are in that room, I've talked to a number of them, they say that the beds are perpendicular to their tracks in those rooms.
[08:23.880 --> 08:30.520]  So apparently if you want to be treated the same way that you would be treated, um, on a European train, you have to pay something on the order of 1500 bucks.
[08:31.640 --> 08:41.000]  Oh, and you know, it's, it's really something, you know, with, with, with, with gas prices going up to $4 a gallon or whatever they're at now, this would be a great opportunity for Amtrak to get some, some more customers.
[08:41.220 --> 08:48.260]  Instead, they, they, they simply keep their prices at these astronomical levels and the service, um, you know, not, not, not in a very good shape.
[08:49.480 --> 08:57.830]  Well, the part of the problem with Amtrak is that they're required, uh, by the federal government to operate a whole bunch of routes that no one wants to take.
[08:58.020 --> 09:07.020]  So when they have routes that people do want to take, they have to really, uh, raise the prices to cover their losses on these, uh, unpopular routes.
[09:07.140 --> 09:11.840]  Well, I don't understand why other countries don't seem to have those same problems because they have trains that go everywhere.
[09:12.000 --> 09:14.420]  Roots that people want to go, roots that people don't want to go.
[09:14.720 --> 09:21.400]  Uh, I think, you know, it's got to be a priority, uh, to have train service that's decent, acceptable and affordable.
[09:21.880 --> 09:32.200]  Well, because the, these companies are subsidized, uh, by governments that believe that it's a, a priority to have a viable, uh, non-car national transportation system.
[09:32.660 --> 09:40.580]  And, uh, George Bush and his oil friends and not to mention Bill Clinton and his oil friends and, and all the rest of them do not share this priority.
[09:41.160 --> 09:43.780]  Well, that's, uh, just a damn shame if I may say so.
[09:44.500 --> 09:47.460]  Um, but that's, that's my little spiel on, um, on Amtrak.
[09:47.580 --> 10:00.260]  I'm sitting here, uh, in the, uh, the first class lounge, which, as I said, because I bought that ticket that, um, uh, not only do I get free food on the train, which is actually quite good, uh, but I get to go to the lounge and hang out.
[10:00.620 --> 10:09.500]  It, it worked out kind of, kind of, um, well for me because the train arrived about an hour and a half ago from Los Angeles and my train to New York leaves in a couple of hours.
[10:09.640 --> 10:13.320]  So it, it's the perfect window of opportunity to do off the hook from a pay phone here.
[10:14.320 --> 10:15.520]  Was the train on time?
[10:15.840 --> 10:17.000]  No, the train was an hour late.
[10:17.140 --> 10:18.360]  That's not bad for Amtrak.
[10:18.640 --> 10:19.400]  It's pathetic.
[10:19.600 --> 10:21.560]  Every other country I've been in, the trains are on time.
[10:21.660 --> 10:22.160]  I don't understand.
[10:22.280 --> 10:24.300]  There was nothing, there was no reason for it to be late.
[10:24.440 --> 10:32.100]  I'm just saying Amtrak is often an hour late going from New York to Boston, which is about four hours going, going from, you know, LA to Chicago.
[10:32.100 --> 10:34.360]  You'd expect them to be all the later.
[10:34.760 --> 10:35.960]  Here, here, here's what I suggest.
[10:36.200 --> 10:44.180]  You know how in schools you have, uh, exchange programs where, say, a bunch of students go to a foreign country and people from a foreign country come here.
[10:44.600 --> 10:46.700]  Let's do that with our train people.
[10:47.020 --> 10:52.780]  Let's have a bunch of Germans come here and just work on the system for, say, a month and a half.
[10:53.140 --> 10:56.340]  That'll be enough time to, to at least get it in the right direction.
[10:56.980 --> 10:58.640]  Things will be running on time.
[10:59.060 --> 11:00.860]  Trains will actually not be bumpy.
[11:01.360 --> 11:02.640]  The tracks might be in better shape.
[11:02.840 --> 11:03.940]  You know, give them carte blanche.
[11:04.040 --> 11:05.000]  Give them all the money they need.
[11:05.080 --> 11:06.500]  Let them fix the system, please.
[11:06.680 --> 11:07.440]  We, we need this.
[11:08.540 --> 11:09.900]  That would be un-American.
[11:10.700 --> 11:11.340]  Yes, exactly.
[11:13.760 --> 11:16.160]  Um, let me also say a couple of words about the freighter.
[11:16.700 --> 11:17.920]  The freighter was amazing.
[11:18.260 --> 11:26.780]  Um, I know it didn't sound that way with, with all the wind and the satellite, uh, reception, but it is something I really recommend if people want to, um, uh, travel on the seas.
[11:26.980 --> 11:32.880]  I liked it much better than, than the Queen Mary 2, uh, because you were actually on a boat with a crew of people.
[11:33.000 --> 11:34.180]  You got to know who they were.
[11:34.380 --> 11:36.380]  You got to see the, the operation of the ships.
[11:36.500 --> 11:37.560]  I went down to the engine room.
[11:37.660 --> 11:38.620]  It was the most incredible thing.
[11:38.720 --> 11:42.680]  I saw the, uh, uh, the, um, uh, radio operations.
[11:42.720 --> 11:45.740]  I saw, uh, what it's like in the bridge.
[11:46.260 --> 11:51.280]  Um, people basically just, uh, cleaning, cleaning the deck and painting, uh, outside.
[11:51.700 --> 11:53.800]  It's really a, a very intimate experience.
[11:54.340 --> 11:56.960]  And you get a sense that you're, you're part of a crew.
[11:57.320 --> 11:59.880]  You're actually on the ocean and it's easy to do.
[11:59.960 --> 12:03.600]  It's, it's cheaper than, than, um, uh, than cruises as well.
[12:04.000 --> 12:10.100]  And I said, I'd give out some, um, some information, uh, on, um, on how other people can do this.
[12:10.240 --> 12:13.320]  So I'm just trying to look at my computer now to, uh, to get that information.
[12:14.040 --> 12:20.380]  Uh, if you want information on freighter travel, uh, this is the URL I used and I, I recommend these people.
[12:20.500 --> 12:21.380]  They, they did a good job.
[12:21.480 --> 12:26.620]  They got me all the information I needed and they, they made the reservations and it worked out really nicely.
[12:26.940 --> 12:29.960]  It's called traveltips.com and that's spelled kind of weird.
[12:30.080 --> 12:30.900]  So let me, let me spell it.
[12:31.020 --> 12:36.680]  It's www.travel, uh, T-R-A-V-L-T-I-P-S.com.
[12:36.860 --> 12:37.620]  There's no E in that.
[12:37.760 --> 12:41.420]  So it's T-R-A-V-L-T-I-P-S.com.
[12:41.640 --> 12:47.840]  Uh, they're actually located in Queens, which I thought was kind of, uh, ironic considering I was booking a freighter from Tokyo.
[12:48.480 --> 12:52.240]  Is this a case of, uh, like leaving off the E for savings or something?
[12:52.360 --> 12:57.560]  I think it's leaving off the E for, uh, I don't know what, what it's for, for someone else got there first.
[12:58.000 --> 12:59.020]  I'm not really sure.
[12:59.440 --> 13:04.900]  Uh, but, um, they, they have freighters that go everywhere and you can go literally around the world on one of these things.
[13:05.060 --> 13:08.680]  Uh, cost me, uh, just about a thousand bucks to do this.
[13:08.920 --> 13:13.920]  Uh, and that's, that's 10 days on the water with food, with, uh, boarding and with travel, of course.
[13:14.360 --> 13:19.680]  Uh, you know, it's up to the freighter company how much they actually charge, but these guys are good as far as telling you the facts.
[13:20.320 --> 13:25.860]  Um, and also as far as, as the satellite phone, I said I was going to get information on that as well.
[13:26.820 --> 13:30.860]  Um, and let's see, it's, uh, it's called the Personal Satellite Network.
[13:30.880 --> 13:35.420]  And you gain information there at, uh, www.skyhelp.net.
[13:35.580 --> 13:36.660]  That's skyhelp.net.
[13:37.060 --> 13:38.120]  Uh, they were very helpful.
[13:38.540 --> 13:42.680]  Uh, as, as we heard, the, uh, the technology kind of comes and goes sometimes.
[13:43.160 --> 13:44.220]  Uh, not their fault.
[13:44.360 --> 13:48.540]  They're, they're just, uh, the provider of the, uh, of the service of the phone itself.
[13:48.540 --> 13:54.900]  I was able to, to rent a phone at a fairly good price, uh, for a few months, uh, and, and take it with me.
[13:55.080 --> 13:56.260]  And it, it did come in handy.
[13:56.340 --> 14:00.060]  When I was on the Trans-Siberian Express, when I was on the Queen Mary 2, it helped out.
[14:00.260 --> 14:08.560]  And it was just also kind of, um, uh, kind of a, a nice security blanket to know that I had this way of communicating in the middle of nowhere.
[14:08.560 --> 14:12.000]  And that, it would work some of the time anyway, or most of the time usually.
[14:12.620 --> 14:17.600]  Uh, also, I was able to receive SMS messages, and for some reason that doesn't cost anything to receive SMS.
[14:19.020 --> 14:20.200]  Can you call 9-1-1?
[14:21.480 --> 14:22.260]  What, right now?
[14:22.960 --> 14:23.960]  No, no, obviously.
[14:24.120 --> 14:28.160]  No, from the, uh, from the, uh, the, uh, what happens if you call 9-1-1 from an Iridium phone?
[14:28.300 --> 14:29.260]  Well, I didn't try that.
[14:29.260 --> 14:32.420]  I mean, you know, I didn't know who I would get in the middle of the high seas.
[14:34.100 --> 14:45.060]  Well, I think, uh, I would like to know if they're, uh, part of this, uh, requirement that all wireless carriers must, uh, provide, uh, location and, uh, 9-1-1 service.
[14:45.240 --> 14:47.440]  Because the network does know where you are, obviously.
[14:47.900 --> 14:55.200]  Uh, and if you're in the United States, uh, you would think that the government would, uh, have an interest in locating you if you're calling 9-1-1.
[14:55.580 --> 14:57.660]  Uh, I'll have to research that.
[14:57.700 --> 14:58.140]  It's interesting.
[14:58.820 --> 14:59.240]  Yeah.
[14:59.240 --> 15:06.620]  Well, I don't know if they, they would qualify as a wireless carrier under that definition, uh, being a satellite, uh, provider.
[15:06.780 --> 15:13.240]  But, yeah, it's, that's something that, uh, I guess, maybe we should ask that question rather than dialing and causing all kinds of problems all over the world.
[15:13.480 --> 15:13.920]  I agree.
[15:14.080 --> 15:21.240]  Like, Iridium does, does qualify for, uh, requiring to, um, uh, make it systems available for, uh, U.S.
[15:21.340 --> 15:22.180]  government wiretapping.
[15:22.680 --> 15:30.060]  So, um, you know, if they, if they put that infrastructure in place, then, uh, then E9-1-1 stuff should, uh, should be there, too.
[15:30.240 --> 15:30.740]  We'll find out.
[15:31.060 --> 15:31.220]  Yeah.
[15:31.600 --> 15:34.400]  Now, uh, this is actually the last leg of, of my journey.
[15:34.540 --> 15:45.860]  I guess I kind of decided to kind of make a run for it and head home because, uh, well, the money's running out, you know, I just, uh, I was also running a little bit late because the freighter was, uh, a day or two, uh, behind schedule as well.
[15:45.860 --> 15:48.460]  I spent a couple of days in Los Angeles, had fun there.
[15:48.680 --> 15:53.460]  I've never had fun in Los Angeles before, but it was, um, it was kind of, um, uh, not hot.
[15:53.920 --> 15:55.520]  It's usually hot whenever I go there.
[15:55.860 --> 15:57.060]  Uh, and I hung out downtown.
[15:57.340 --> 16:02.820]  I actually hung out in, um, in the neighborhood known as Little Tokyo, which was very nice considering I had just come from big Tokyo.
[16:03.300 --> 16:12.340]  And there are a number of, um, of things there that I recognized from the other place that I thought maybe I wouldn't see again, you know, products that you would find in a convenience store, things like that.
[16:12.460 --> 16:13.500]  So it was, it was rather nice.
[16:13.500 --> 16:19.200]  Uh, I hightailed over to, to Chicago on the Amtrak and I'm, uh, heading back, uh, to New York.
[16:19.460 --> 16:22.700]  Uh, so basically next week I'll be back in the studio.
[16:22.700 --> 16:26.260]  However, in, uh, true traditional style next week, we're preempted.
[16:27.460 --> 16:32.080]  So, uh, we'll be on again in two weeks with the fundraising edition of off the hook.
[16:32.280 --> 16:33.820]  And, uh, I should be in the studio then.
[16:35.380 --> 16:36.900]  Well, we all look forward to it.
[16:37.660 --> 16:39.840]  Yes, it, uh, should be, should be a lot of fun.
[16:40.040 --> 16:43.100]  And we look forward of course to our, our listeners, uh, support.
[16:44.100 --> 16:44.500]  Yes.
[16:45.180 --> 16:53.640]  And, uh, we hope you enjoyed this, um, this, uh, round the world whirlwind tour that, uh, I've been involved in that a number of us have been involved in.
[16:53.740 --> 16:58.900]  I think just about everybody, uh, in, in the studio has at some point been somewhere over there.
[17:00.080 --> 17:00.980]  That's pretty vague.
[17:00.980 --> 17:09.940]  Well, I mean, you were over in, in Holland, Bernie was in Holland, uh, a red bird and, and arsony and, uh, a good number of people were over there at some point.
[17:10.750 --> 17:11.100]  Yeah.
[17:11.380 --> 17:11.750]  Okay.
[17:12.180 --> 17:13.750]  How, how long have you been on this trip now?
[17:13.880 --> 17:14.400]  How many days?
[17:14.640 --> 17:15.140]  Oh gosh.
[17:15.140 --> 17:18.620]  Well, um, I think it's going to wind up being 76 days total.
[17:19.680 --> 17:20.680]  Oh, and less than 80.
[17:20.900 --> 17:21.140]  That's good.
[17:21.180 --> 17:24.900]  You know, I don't know why everybody makes such a big deal of the fact that I'm, I made it around the world less than 80 days.
[17:25.100 --> 17:34.400]  You know, in, in, in, in the book, they, they were going on a particular route and it was very close to the equator, a lot more land area and a lot harder to make it to these places.
[17:34.400 --> 17:34.660]  Yeah.
[17:34.860 --> 17:39.420]  I could have made it around the world in 50 days if I really wanted to, maybe even less than that without taking an airplane.
[17:39.680 --> 17:42.680]  Well, you could just go to the, the top and, you know, kind of walk in a circle.
[17:42.680 --> 17:45.860]  I could just go to the North Pole and walk around in a circle and do the whole thing in three seconds.
[17:47.910 --> 17:49.060]  Maybe I'll do that next.
[17:49.580 --> 17:50.010]  There you go.
[17:50.470 --> 17:52.340]  Can you, uh, can you walk to the North Pole?
[17:52.530 --> 17:52.900]  That would really be a problem.
[17:52.970 --> 17:54.030]  Antarctica might be easier.
[17:55.030 --> 17:58.970]  Uh, Antarctica actually would be harder because getting to the South Pole can be a bit of a pain.
[17:59.040 --> 18:00.600]  Right, but there's a land mass there.
[18:00.600 --> 18:02.210]  It's not like there's a computer train up to, uh, North Pole either.
[18:02.210 --> 18:05.080]  We got an email from someone who's currently at the South Pole.
[18:05.300 --> 18:05.640]  Yes.
[18:05.880 --> 18:07.230]  So I, I hear, yeah.
[18:07.360 --> 18:10.580]  And we're going to try and, uh, call that person at some point in the next few weeks, I believe.
[18:11.030 --> 18:12.620]  That sounds like a, quite the idea.
[18:12.820 --> 18:15.470]  I guess they have, uh, voice over IP down there.
[18:15.820 --> 18:20.710]  And there's a daily satellite window during which this service, uh, is active.
[18:20.790 --> 18:25.400]  So currently, I guess our show is, is, uh, in that window.
[18:25.690 --> 18:29.320]  And so we have to kind of coordinate with the window and, and all this stuff.
[18:29.510 --> 18:31.970]  Oh, prop the window open and, uh, make a phone call.
[18:31.970 --> 18:33.140]  Go down there and see what happens.
[18:33.290 --> 18:35.250]  It shifts backwards by four minutes daily.
[18:35.670 --> 18:37.490]  Well, we have, uh, all kinds of news.
[18:37.690 --> 18:41.730]  Uh, you guys have anything, uh, that you'd like to mention before, uh, I read a couple of stories here.
[18:42.210 --> 18:44.540]  I've, I've got a couple of interrelated stories, actually.
[18:44.970 --> 18:45.690]  Interrelated to what?
[18:46.080 --> 18:47.270]  Interrelated to each other.
[18:47.880 --> 18:48.290]  Okay.
[18:48.670 --> 18:49.730]  It's all about Google.
[18:50.120 --> 18:51.600]  Google is taking over the world.
[18:51.770 --> 18:52.620]  Well, we all know that.
[18:52.620 --> 18:59.040]  Well, Google is buying up, uh, fiber, uh, unused, uh, all around the country.
[18:59.290 --> 19:01.510]  Thousands and tens of thousands of miles.
[19:01.750 --> 19:07.800]  And they're looking at, uh, renting or perhaps even buying the old Port Authority Commerce building on 8th Avenue.
[19:07.800 --> 19:09.990]  Some New Yorkers may know this building.
[19:10.140 --> 19:17.670]  This is an Art Deco building noted for its internal elevators that can carry 18-wheeler trucks up to the 20th floor.
[19:17.860 --> 19:25.170]  It takes up a whole block at, uh, 11th Avenue, uh, and, uh, sorry, 8th Avenue and West 15th Street.
[19:25.170 --> 19:26.840]  It's, uh, it's a landmark.
[19:27.290 --> 19:37.490]  And Google may be taking over large parts of it and, uh, acting as a internet of its own with all the, uh, wiring, the networking that it's, uh, buying up.
[19:38.290 --> 19:40.450]  Do you know exactly what it is they're planning on doing?
[19:40.860 --> 19:42.360]  No one seems to know.
[19:43.430 --> 19:43.900]  Uh...
[19:43.900 --> 19:44.820]  Someone's gotta know.
[19:45.010 --> 19:46.580]  No one seems to know.
[19:46.580 --> 19:50.360]  Could it have something to do with their free Wi-Fi service that they're starting to set up?
[19:50.490 --> 19:51.640]  That's, that's the other thing.
[19:51.880 --> 19:55.010]  Google is starting to set up free Wi-Fi all over the place.
[19:55.010 --> 19:59.930]  Uh, it's in the extremely early stages, but, uh...
[19:59.930 --> 20:01.770]  But that hardly requires all this fiber.
[20:01.990 --> 20:06.840]  No, no, but it's useful in connecting the various Wi-Fi spots to each other.
[20:07.030 --> 20:08.990]  It's sort of like making an internet of one's own.
[20:09.140 --> 20:10.490]  But it's interesting.
[20:10.690 --> 20:15.080]  They've, they've already released a beta version of a VPN client that goes through their servers.
[20:15.580 --> 20:19.930]  Um, and this is under, under the domain wifi.google.com.
[20:20.380 --> 20:23.750]  Um, but they, they apparently want to set up some sort of free Wi-Fi service.
[20:23.750 --> 20:29.470]  And then, of course, the VPN would protect you when you're connected to it, so your data wouldn't be flying out there in the open.
[20:29.670 --> 20:30.060]  In the open.
[20:30.250 --> 20:34.990]  However, their privacy policy does say that Google may log information from your web page requests.
[20:35.440 --> 20:38.560]  Uh, and so people are wondering about that, but they don't know.
[20:38.580 --> 20:41.790]  Right, this is, this is probably a tremendous data mining opportunity for Google.
[20:42.010 --> 20:42.120]  Right.
[20:42.120 --> 20:51.250]  They're probably making a whole boatload more than they're actually, uh, going to end up investing in it over, over, uh, an amount of time just by the dating data mining opportunities.
[20:51.640 --> 20:57.770]  If you can see all the traffic that people are using, especially in an area like New York City, that's, that's tremendously useful to advertisers.
[20:57.800 --> 21:03.380]  You know, you offer a free service, but at the same time you find out what people are going to, what they're looking at, et cetera, et cetera.
[21:03.380 --> 21:13.430]  And kind of, I don't know if you could do a personal, a profile of a person doing that, or if it would just be general, okay, well, these are the most popular websites, et cetera, et cetera.
[21:13.640 --> 21:14.880]  Well, you, you, you can.
[21:15.140 --> 21:15.490]  You can.
[21:15.640 --> 21:16.880]  And I'm sure they have that ability, but...
[21:16.880 --> 21:29.040]  If they somehow make each VPN client have kind of an idea of its own, um, perhaps every time you connect through the Google secure VPN, it, it, it knows what your interests are and targets the advertising, uh, on Google itself.
[21:29.040 --> 21:37.580]  And, and I, I'll find it interesting to see what they, uh, what they come up with as far as solutions to people using networks like Tor, where, where this would actually prevent them from doing that.
[21:38.100 --> 21:42.360]  And, uh, and you could look, you could find information on Tor, which is, uh, an anonymizing network.
[21:42.560 --> 21:45.120]  It's, it's an onion router, at tor.eff.org.
[21:45.270 --> 21:47.820]  Have we figured out when Google is actually going to become evil?
[21:48.540 --> 21:52.340]  Well, you know, there's some people that actually think that Google is evil now.
[21:52.740 --> 21:58.980]  Uh, state controller Alan Hevesy, uh, is, uh, is combating Google activists.
[21:58.980 --> 22:03.320]  Or more accurately, he's combating or trying to combat Google Earth.
[22:03.620 --> 22:12.400]  Because keep in mind, he's a trustee, uh, of, uh, the state pension fund, which owns $25 million of Google stock.
[22:12.780 --> 22:24.900]  And he sent them a nasty letter telling them that Google Earth is dangerous because it has, uh, photos, uh, satellite photos of various, uh, possible terror targets in the city.
[22:25.210 --> 22:31.140]  Especially the Empire State Building, Grand Central Terminal, Yankee Stadium, the Indian Photos of Yankee Stadium?
[22:31.320 --> 22:31.460]  Yeah.
[22:31.560 --> 22:32.300]  Photos of Yankee...
[22:32.300 --> 22:32.740]  Oh, my God.
[22:32.880 --> 22:34.670]  How can we possibly protect ourselves now?
[22:34.690 --> 22:35.210]  Exactly.
[22:35.710 --> 22:38.710]  This is something that no terrorist has ever had access to before.
[22:38.720 --> 22:42.860]  No terrorist has ever walked past Yankee Stadium at all.
[22:43.080 --> 22:43.450]  Ever.
[22:44.190 --> 22:47.690]  Let alone gone to Monument Park and looked at Babe Ruth's plaque.
[22:47.690 --> 22:49.000]  We need to nip this thing in the bud.
[22:49.100 --> 22:49.220]  Exactly.
[22:49.220 --> 22:51.340]  I mean, the next thing you know, Central Park is going to be revealed.
[22:52.780 --> 22:58.220]  Google's, uh, Google's corporate, uh, mission statement, uh, I think the first thing in it is, uh, do no evil.
[22:58.580 --> 23:02.800]  And so that's, uh, that's what everybody's wondering is, see if they're going to be hypocritical about that.
[23:03.240 --> 23:08.540]  Who's to say all these other Wi-Fi providers don't mind, uh, their traffic data as well, though?
[23:08.690 --> 23:09.360]  I'm sure they do.
[23:09.500 --> 23:16.190]  And, and I think that's why anonymizing networks are really, really good solution and, and almost necessary if you're going to be using public Wi-Fi hotspots.
[23:16.190 --> 23:22.880]  But, uh, using, using software, I mean, obviously you could connect to Google Wi-Fi and use your own kind of VPN client to tunnel through it.
[23:22.950 --> 23:25.000]  One would assume, unless they somehow filter that.
[23:25.100 --> 23:26.380]  They may block everything, but yeah.
[23:26.780 --> 23:26.980]  They could filter it.
[23:26.980 --> 23:39.240]  But, um, now you're kind of associating a program with the connection, something that can travel from place to place with the user more so than if I go to a free Wi-Fi hotspot, the only thing that they can correlate is my MAC address, which...
[23:39.240 --> 23:39.900]  Which can be changed.
[23:39.900 --> 23:46.930]  It can change and, uh, also harder to, you know, modify data or send data with that, so...
[23:46.930 --> 23:47.400]  Yeah.
[23:47.400 --> 23:50.300]  Most people don't go around changing their MAC address, although it's easy to do.
[23:50.600 --> 23:51.220]  Oh, and, and...
[23:51.220 --> 24:05.210]  A MAC address, by the way, we should clarify, has nothing to do with the Macintosh computer, but is, is, uh, an identifier that's built into, uh, every, uh, network card, either wireless or wired, and is, uh, hard to change, although not always impossible.
[24:05.210 --> 24:05.670]  Right.
[24:05.760 --> 24:09.190]  And it, and it usually correlates with the manufacturer of the, the card and whatnot.
[24:09.380 --> 24:15.980]  But, uh, but one of the problems is what if, what if Google requires some sort of authentication, for example, a username and password, and that makes it...
[24:15.980 --> 24:16.780]  Gmail account.
[24:16.950 --> 24:18.020]  Right, like a Gmail account.
[24:18.220 --> 24:23.430]  And, and that makes it much easier for them to track the individual user rather than just anonymous internet traffic.
[24:23.600 --> 24:23.760]  So...
[24:23.760 --> 24:32.520]  It's interesting to note that Gmail is one of the services that does not display the IP when you send mail, such as Hotmail, and I believe Yahoo, uh, does that as well.
[24:32.520 --> 24:39.380]  So, it, I think it says something to their motive is that that is not revealed quite so easily, even though I'm sure they have the information.
[24:39.960 --> 24:45.380]  Well, I'm, I'm sure they store it, but they also use that information for a lot of other things, such as advertising, especially advertising.
[24:45.580 --> 24:49.620]  That's one of the main points of being, of them being able to, to search for keywords through your email.
[24:49.960 --> 24:54.500]  But, uh, but we, what we don't know is how they use that information internally and what other information is stored.
[24:55.670 --> 24:57.240]  I mean, we don't know this for anybody.
[24:57.860 --> 25:02.020]  I mean, T-Mobile has this network of hotspots they should actually pay for.
[25:02.480 --> 25:04.500]  And I'm sure they're as evil as anybody.
[25:04.710 --> 25:04.840]  Sure.
[25:04.960 --> 25:10.320]  But I mean, it's just, it's just bringing this, this issue to light that, that this is definitely possible and you have to be careful with any wifi.
[25:10.580 --> 25:22.170]  It's interesting to see Google branch out into all these different services and technologies and, and, and to kind of just to ponder about what kind of, uh, correlations they can make that other companies can't because they're not as wide reaching.
[25:22.170 --> 25:26.450]  Google started as a search engine and look, you know, we have so much more now.
[25:26.640 --> 25:27.060]  And it's interesting.
[25:27.060 --> 25:29.080]  Now you guys mentioned, uh, T-Mobile.
[25:29.190 --> 25:30.960]  I've got a great little story about T-Mobile here.
[25:31.120 --> 25:32.460]  If we're done talking about Google.
[25:32.720 --> 25:32.950]  Okay.
[25:33.670 --> 25:34.020]  All right.
[25:34.220 --> 25:34.860]  Glad you approved, Jim.
[25:35.360 --> 25:41.240]  Uh, a, uh, Massachusetts teenager, uh, reportedly hacked into Paris Hilton cell phone account.
[25:41.240 --> 25:42.720]  We heard about this earlier in the year.
[25:42.840 --> 25:45.880]  He's been sentenced to 11 months in a juvenile facility.
[25:46.560 --> 25:53.640]  Uh, if in case you don't remember, so every phone number stored in Hilton cell phone or posted online when her account was hacked earlier this year.
[25:53.640 --> 25:54.480]  I'm sorry.
[25:54.710 --> 25:54.980]  Yeah.
[25:55.100 --> 25:55.540]  We remember.
[25:55.720 --> 25:55.840]  Thanks.
[25:56.210 --> 25:57.560]  I, I, I, I remember vividly.
[25:57.980 --> 26:04.720]  Uh, and, uh, a Washington post report last Wednesday identified Hilton as a victim of the seven, uh, a 17 year old Massachusetts boy.
[26:05.100 --> 26:07.020]  Uh, he's a juvenile under federal law.
[26:07.190 --> 26:13.240]  Prosecutors would not name him or confirm Hilton as a victim, citing federal law that keeps such information under seal on juvenile cases.
[26:13.720 --> 26:15.740]  Uh, but everybody seems to know about this anyway.
[26:16.380 --> 26:19.620]  Uh, he was sentenced last week in U S district court in Boston.
[26:19.980 --> 26:23.620]  Uh, the charges include hacking into internet and telephone service providers.
[26:24.100 --> 26:31.540]  Theft of personal information and posting it on the web and making bomb threats to high schools in Florida and Massachusetts all over a 15 month period.
[26:32.060 --> 26:34.300]  So, uh, regular crime spree here.
[26:35.120 --> 26:50.820]  Um, interesting though, that, uh, they, they, they found the guy who, uh, who allegedly did it, but they don't really say much about the massive security hole that T-Mobile had that allowed somebody to simply call up on the phone and get this information and be able to reveal so much about one,
[26:50.930 --> 26:55.220]  one person, see pictures, see phone numbers, get all kinds of things.
[26:55.400 --> 26:57.340]  It was, it was, it was, it was kind of revealing to me.
[26:57.480 --> 27:00.670]  Well, that would, that would make it their fault and not the, uh, not the 17 year old kids.
[27:00.780 --> 27:07.020]  Well, I mean, he definitely has some complicity in it, but, uh, certainly a massive security hole like that has got to be looked at.
[27:07.170 --> 27:11.220]  I actually was the victim myself of some kind of T-Mobile massive security problem.
[27:11.220 --> 27:15.210]  Uh, as soon as I got off the freighter, I wanted to check my, my voicemail.
[27:15.320 --> 27:17.840]  Cause I hadn't been able to check my voicemail in several weeks on T-Mobile.
[27:18.350 --> 27:20.980]  And I called voicemail, you know, and then asked my password.
[27:20.980 --> 27:22.780]  I noticed that they changed the prompt.
[27:23.000 --> 27:25.840]  The, uh, the different woman saying, please enter your password.
[27:25.980 --> 27:29.740]  And she was asking me to enter the pound sign afterwards, which she had never done before.
[27:30.410 --> 27:35.260]  And as soon as I gave the password, she scalded me and said that it was, it was a bad password.
[27:35.800 --> 27:39.240]  And, you know, we went back and forth a little bit and, uh, you know, she wouldn't budge.
[27:39.960 --> 27:50.100]  And, uh, turns out, um, I, I, I called my T-Mobile phone from my, my CDMA phone just to see if maybe somebody had hacked my account, which I didn't think somebody would.
[27:50.260 --> 27:51.860]  There's a very long, big password.
[27:52.500 --> 28:03.190]  And sure enough, there's this, um, there's this guy named Tim Schablowski who's not available right now, but if you want to leave a message, please, uh, leave it at the sound of the tone.
[28:03.320 --> 28:08.380]  Now I couldn't figure out why Tim Schablowski would, would be using my voicemail account.
[28:08.380 --> 28:12.170]  Uh, when I still had my phone, he wasn't able to pick up the phone.
[28:12.360 --> 28:14.600]  He would just be able to, to retrieve messages.
[28:14.800 --> 28:15.800]  There's no real advantage to that.
[28:16.080 --> 28:18.380]  So I called T-Mobile and I said, Hey guys, what gives?
[28:18.820 --> 28:20.880]  Uh, and they, they passed me all over the place.
[28:21.080 --> 28:35.000]  Finally, I arrived at some technical person's desk and he said, yeah, you know, what happens sometimes is that, um, voicemail accounts get swapped and one person gets another person's greeting and, uh, and they get the passwords get swapped as well.
[28:35.000 --> 28:36.080]  We don't know why it happens.
[28:36.220 --> 28:36.960]  Literally, that's what he said.
[28:37.040 --> 28:39.980]  We don't know why this happens, but what we can do is just reset it.
[28:40.730 --> 28:43.220]  Unfortunately, resetting it meant all of my messages were lost.
[28:43.360 --> 28:48.800]  So everybody who left me a message, uh, the entire time I was away, I'm not going to get it because T-Mobile erased it.
[28:48.960 --> 28:51.580]  And I'm sure Tim Schablowski lost all his messages too.
[28:51.580 --> 29:07.800]  Now, what, what I think the security hole in this case was the, the Paris Hilton case was, uh, regarding their, their secret, uh, let's see, their secret questions when they, when they ask you, okay, to verify your identity, what is your mother's maiden name or what is your favorite pet's name or something like that?
[29:07.880 --> 29:10.600]  And I believe that's what, uh, that's what the issue was in this case.
[29:10.740 --> 29:17.140]  And, and all that kid did was guess, hey, wait, well, I could find all this information on her online and, and that, you know, her pet's name is also online.
[29:17.140 --> 29:23.800]  And, and, and they, they allowed him access to the account that way by guessing, uh, her dog's name or knowing her dog's name.
[29:24.220 --> 29:29.710]  And, uh, and that's, that's, that's why it's kind of, uh, frustrating when these companies ask for, uh, something like that.
[29:29.860 --> 29:41.800]  And, and really the only solution, um, since, since usually they will not make you an account without answering a question like this is just to kind of come up with something random for each different carrier since that data usually isn't treated as secure at all.
[29:41.800 --> 29:50.900]  And, or, or use, come up with a, a new pet name or, or, or maiden name that's not something that actually exists that you use for everything.
[29:51.040 --> 29:55.040]  But the problem is the, uh, the, the services usually don't treat that as secure data.
[29:55.040 --> 29:56.300]  So it's usually not encrypted.
[29:56.480 --> 29:59.140]  It's usually not, uh, putting, put through a hashing algorithm.
[29:59.540 --> 30:01.500]  It's not, it's not usually treated as secure information.
[30:01.500 --> 30:03.800]  So people can, can obtain that quite easily.
[30:03.960 --> 30:06.360]  It's usually displayed on the screen when, when they access your account.
[30:06.710 --> 30:11.500]  So that can then be used to access another provider's account that's in your name as well, if you use the same one.
[30:11.890 --> 30:23.740]  So one of, one of the, one of the, I guess, only solutions is to come up with something different for each provider and make sure you keep a list of that because it'd get difficult to, uh, to keep a, to keep track of that in your head if you're using different pet names for every provider.
[30:23.960 --> 30:25.620]  It's no different than it was 20 years ago.
[30:25.760 --> 30:28.460]  Come up with a secure way of keeping the information private.
[30:28.620 --> 30:30.580]  It's amazing these companies have not learned this by now.
[30:30.820 --> 30:48.600]  There was a letter, uh, written by one of the, uh, Democratic senators, uh, to the FBI, uh, thanking the FBI for its, uh, hard work in, in this, uh, very important, uh, Paris Hilton case, uh, but wondering, uh, when exactly the FBI was going to get around to investigating the,
[30:48.620 --> 30:55.600]  uh, break in of, uh, certain, uh, Senate computers by Republican staffers that happened, uh, some time ago.
[30:56.540 --> 30:57.380]  Good question.
[30:57.720 --> 30:58.450]  Really good question.
[30:58.670 --> 31:00.580]  I haven't heard if they replied or not yet.
[31:00.580 --> 31:03.670]  Bernie, you had a good question I saw on, uh, on the list.
[31:04.060 --> 31:11.540]  Um, uh, apparently, uh, Bush gave some kind of a speech in New Orleans and, uh, you noticed, uh, mysterious hump on his back again?
[31:12.380 --> 31:18.000]  Yeah, when he was standing in front of, uh, um, that famous square there, Jackson Square, I think?
[31:18.120 --> 31:18.880]  Yeah, Jackson Square.
[31:19.060 --> 31:22.360]  Jackson Square there in New Orleans, uh, you know, where feet were.
[31:22.500 --> 31:27.820]  His, uh, his advanced crew brought in all these giant generators to illuminate the background, great stagecraft and all that.
[31:27.820 --> 31:34.100]  Uh, and of course, when they, when they shut him down and towed the generators away, everybody booed because they thought they were getting electricity finally.
[31:34.340 --> 31:44.100]  But anyway, I know, I was watching this live and as he was turning to get to the podium, I noticed this mysterious hump thing on his back again, which there's been pictures before.
[31:44.100 --> 31:49.760]  We first saw this during one of the, uh, uh, with, uh, Kerry debates.
[31:50.350 --> 32:05.580]  And, um, you know, a lot of people, uh, suspected this might be some sort of radio receiver, uh, with a, like a wireless earpiece so people could, you know, so his handlers could, uh, could, uh, dictate to him as he's, uh, making talking points, that sort of thing.
[32:05.710 --> 32:06.320]  That hasn't been proven.
[32:06.320 --> 32:07.260]  It's just pure speculation.
[32:07.380 --> 32:10.860]  But nobody has seen this hump for, you know, many months.
[32:10.860 --> 32:13.040]  And, and now it's appeared again.
[32:13.760 --> 32:18.100]  Uh, the White House just sort of acknowledged and, and, and, and sort of laughed it off.
[32:18.210 --> 32:20.500]  Like, oh, it was bad, bad tailoring of his suit.
[32:20.620 --> 32:21.930]  Well, this time he wasn't wearing a suit.
[32:22.040 --> 32:23.140]  It was just the shirt alone.
[32:24.190 --> 32:29.360]  And, uh, one time, at one point, uh, Bush was asked this, uh, on television, what, you know, what, what the hell is this hump?
[32:29.540 --> 32:32.900]  And, and, uh, he said, it was just a bad, a badly tailored shirt.
[32:33.020 --> 32:36.320]  Well, I can't believe he'd be wearing that same shirt if it's badly tailored.
[32:36.430 --> 32:38.520]  And I'm sure his tailor would take, take offense.
[32:38.520 --> 32:42.240]  And so it raises the, the, the, uh, this issue again.
[32:42.480 --> 32:45.040]  What is this mysterious hump on the president's back?
[32:45.170 --> 32:47.670]  You say that Bush was asked directly what it was?
[32:48.130 --> 32:48.480]  Yes.
[32:48.760 --> 32:48.980]  Yes.
[32:48.980 --> 32:51.380]  It was, uh, well, one can research this online.
[32:51.380 --> 32:53.640]  And, uh, and of course everything on the internet is true.
[32:54.240 --> 32:57.760]  Um, but, uh, no, this was, uh, this was some television interview.
[32:58.020 --> 33:00.500]  And somebody asked him, what, you know, what was this thing on your back?
[33:00.640 --> 33:03.340]  And he laughed it off and said, oh, it's just a badly tailored shirt, apparently.
[33:03.340 --> 33:07.080]  I was going to say, it's probably Karl Rowe's hand up his, up his back.
[33:08.400 --> 33:10.400]  Well, it's, uh, it's definitely a mystery.
[33:10.580 --> 33:13.690]  Is there any, uh, picture of the latest, uh, incident of this?
[33:14.560 --> 33:17.860]  Um, I looked the day afterwards online.
[33:18.100 --> 33:20.100]  I couldn't find anything, but I haven't looked since.
[33:20.580 --> 33:27.640]  Um, I, I saw it on C-SPAN and I don't know whether C-SPAN videos are, uh, downloadable or not.
[33:27.640 --> 33:28.880]  It would be an awful lot of data.
[33:29.350 --> 33:30.480]  They, they often are.
[33:30.950 --> 33:31.620]  C-SPAN.
[33:32.260 --> 33:32.480]  Okay.
[33:32.720 --> 33:34.300]  This sounds like a job for one of our listeners.
[33:34.300 --> 33:36.760]  If you can find the speech that, uh, George W.
[33:36.880 --> 33:37.860]  Bush made, when was it?
[33:37.980 --> 33:38.520]  Last Thursday?
[33:39.450 --> 33:39.640]  Yeah.
[33:40.080 --> 33:40.260]  Okay.
[33:40.360 --> 33:42.720]  In New Orleans, uh, Jackson Square.
[33:43.170 --> 33:47.540]  Um, if you can find video of that online, please, uh, email us and we will tell everybody.
[33:47.620 --> 33:50.580]  And we can all look at the hump together and try to figure out what it is.
[33:50.580 --> 33:51.190]  Ooh.
[33:51.480 --> 33:56.760]  It doesn't seem like it would be a transmitter since there's, there are much easier places to hide one on, like on a belt or something.
[33:57.000 --> 33:59.840]  Yeah, that's what doesn't make, nothing makes sense about this.
[34:00.560 --> 34:13.260]  But it's, I mean, if you've seen the pictures online of this previous appearance, which is from many different sources, uh, including reputable news, so-called reputable news sources, uh, it's, uh, it's not, you know, there's, there's something there,
[34:13.500 --> 34:14.840]  but who knows what it is.
[34:15.200 --> 34:16.600]  Now, Redbird, I wanted to ask you something.
[34:16.600 --> 34:22.560]  Uh, there's a, a story circulating in computer world about this guy who has, uh, gone around.
[34:22.700 --> 34:23.600]  His name is Peter Wallace.
[34:23.860 --> 34:31.540]  Uh, he's been going around to hotels, uh, and, um, and reading the hotel room keys that he has given.
[34:31.640 --> 34:42.930]  Now he's claiming, he's claiming that, uh, he has found his name and credit card information in unencrypted form on the back of some of these hotel room access cards.
[34:43.840 --> 34:47.160]  And, um, uh, he's, he's basically just going around from place to place.
[34:47.340 --> 34:54.980]  He won't say what hotels do this, but it seems kind of bizarre that a hotel would put that kind of information on the back of a hotel card, don't you think?
[34:55.120 --> 34:56.260]  It seems very strange.
[34:56.440 --> 35:00.380]  Uh, I've, I've actually gotten the opportunity to read quite a few hotel room, uh, key cards.
[35:00.800 --> 35:04.480]  And, uh, and from what I found, a lot of them aren't any standard format.
[35:04.660 --> 35:12.600]  Uh, it's just raw binary data that, that can be interpreted and you can find, you can find things such as your room number and checkout date and, and common things like that.
[35:12.760 --> 35:17.680]  But I haven't found any information on any of them that links it to your name or your credit card information at all.
[35:17.900 --> 35:26.540]  Uh, usually that, that information is looked up in a database, uh, by the hotels systems and, uh, and, and it correlates to your room number and, and possibly the checkout date.
[35:27.000 --> 35:29.500]  But, uh, but, but some of them are in standard form.
[35:29.660 --> 35:33.240]  And, and again, uh, on those, the, the same data can be found.
[35:33.340 --> 35:37.540]  It's usually just a room number and, uh, and the checkout date and a couple of other things.
[35:37.640 --> 35:40.180]  But, but the other things are, are very small bits of data.
[35:40.320 --> 35:42.880]  Nothing nearly as long as a credit card number or a name.
[35:43.260 --> 35:45.840]  Um, and, and, and I've read a lot of key cards.
[35:45.980 --> 35:46.540]  What the heck?
[35:46.620 --> 35:51.820]  A lot of people came up to me during, during the talk on magnetic stripe technology about, uh, hey, can you read this card?
[35:51.920 --> 35:52.460]  Can you read that card?
[35:52.560 --> 35:55.920]  And, and none of them really had any personal data on the, uh, on the hotel room key.
[35:55.920 --> 35:59.520]  So, if that person is listening, I'd, I'd, I'd like to find out more information about that.
[35:59.600 --> 36:04.260]  And maybe we can share it with our listeners because it's, it's not the sort of thing that you should really keep from people.
[36:04.480 --> 36:07.800]  Um, it, it would help protect their privacy and, and what not if they knew about it.
[36:07.880 --> 36:12.840]  And then maybe they could, they could start making demands from, uh, you know, the institutions that, that grant these key cards.
[36:13.100 --> 36:15.720]  To not, please not include my data on this card.
[36:15.780 --> 36:20.060]  Yeah, I, I, I don't understand why somebody would, would say something like this and then not tell you where it happened.
[36:20.060 --> 36:22.580]  I think that's a very important detail to give out.
[36:22.720 --> 36:28.320]  Uh, whose, whose, uh, privacy are you protecting by not telling the world that they're invading privacy by doing this?
[36:28.380 --> 36:33.880]  If I could just jump in on this one, um, snopes.com, which I found in general to be a very good site.
[36:33.880 --> 36:34.740]  They're not always right.
[36:34.820 --> 36:35.720]  Well, they're not always right.
[36:35.820 --> 36:36.140]  That's true.
[36:36.140 --> 36:39.900]  But, in fact, there's another site about snopes.com that says snopes.com is a hoax.
[36:40.020 --> 36:40.420]  All right, all right.
[36:40.520 --> 36:43.920]  Well, irrespective, uh, generally they do their research on things.
[36:44.260 --> 36:56.520]  Wait, let me tell you the problem with snopes.com and, and the, and the reason why this is relevant here is that snopes.com has a, a very strong tendency to take the word of, of corporations at, as true.
[36:56.820 --> 37:02.360]  Uh, they, they assume that corporations don't lie to them and that's, uh, not always a valid assumption.
[37:02.380 --> 37:03.140]  Mike, what are you saying?
[37:03.460 --> 37:05.120]  But, but I'm sorry to, sorry to interrupt.
[37:05.120 --> 37:05.300]  All right.
[37:05.460 --> 37:06.860]  Well, I was just going to take a quote from it.
[37:06.980 --> 37:13.280]  Apparently rumors like this about things being encoded on, uh, hotel cards have been circulating since 2003.
[37:14.480 --> 37:31.660]  Um, and I'm sorry, you'll have to believe the corporation on this one, but, uh, the vice president of, uh, the Hilton, or of, of loss prevention for Hilton, uh, said that certainly modern security systems are sufficiently sophisticated that personal identifying information could be encoded onto hotel card keys.
[37:31.660 --> 37:35.560]  To do so, however, it would be pointless and would create additional work and expense.
[37:36.340 --> 37:45.640]  Um, hotel card keys would contain a serial number to identify an individual physical card, a room number, uh, and beginning and ending dates for when the card is valid.
[37:45.640 --> 37:50.080]  But there's no basis for the card to contain the occupant's name or credit card information.
[37:50.660 --> 37:58.760]  And that vice president, uh, said that they had personally verified with their three access control system providers that their card keys did not contain any personal information.
[37:58.760 --> 38:00.940]  And that pretty much correlates with what I found.
[38:01.120 --> 38:06.840]  I haven't actually read that, but, uh, but it does, it does seem very similar to the sort of data that I have found on, on these cards.
[38:07.020 --> 38:12.000]  What may be possible is to create a card that can open a door, uh, using a magnet, mag stripe encoder.
[38:12.280 --> 38:18.360]  Um, but, but I do not think it's possible to, to obtain any sort of personal information unless you have access to the hotel's database.
[38:18.360 --> 38:28.560]  And someone else raised the possibility that, uh, the hotel is making a card that you can use to charge things, say, say, at the restaurant and charge directly to your credit card.
[38:28.620 --> 38:30.400]  In other words, they're making a copy of your credit card.
[38:30.840 --> 38:37.600]  Um, that's certainly possible, but, uh, again, without the actual evidence showing that it's happening, uh, it's just simply theoretical.
[38:37.640 --> 38:46.040]  What would be silly about that would be that they actually, I mean, they would already theoretically have the serial number correlated with you and your account at this hotel.
[38:46.700 --> 38:48.380]  So, they wouldn't have to put your credit card.
[38:48.500 --> 38:53.440]  They could say, well, they can take the, the, the, the hotel card to the restaurant and charge something with it.
[38:53.540 --> 38:54.840]  And then they just charge your credit card.
[38:54.920 --> 38:57.320]  But they don't have to put the actual credit card number on the card.
[38:57.340 --> 39:00.360]  They don't have to, but there's plenty of incompetent people out there writing systems.
[39:00.360 --> 39:13.380]  So, I mean, the thing is that a claim like this is impossible to really disprove because there's always the possibility that the hotel that Redbird hasn't checked yet is the one that's doing that.
[39:13.500 --> 39:18.400]  On the other hand, like, you know, if you check enough hotels, then...
[39:18.400 --> 39:23.640]  But it's difficult to prove because the person won't actually give any information, which kind of puts the whole issue in question.
[39:23.800 --> 39:27.300]  And that leads me to ask, how did it become a story if he didn't give any information out?
[39:28.320 --> 39:29.940]  Well, the media never really...
[39:30.540 --> 39:31.860]  Required information before.
[39:32.140 --> 39:33.780]  Let me throw in some ambiguous facts.
[39:33.960 --> 39:40.460]  In 1996, I stayed in Vegas, and I, unfortunately, in about four different hotels over the course of three weeks.
[39:41.000 --> 39:48.860]  And I know at one of them, my room key, which was a mag stripe key, was used to charge something.
[39:49.360 --> 39:51.760]  And I don't remember if it was charged back to my room.
[39:51.820 --> 39:53.260]  In fact, I know it was charged back to my room.
[39:53.420 --> 39:55.340]  So I don't necessarily...
[39:55.340 --> 40:02.640]  You can't really tell from that whether or not it was just the room data, or it was the credit card data on the door key.
[40:03.100 --> 40:08.860]  I've been on a cruise ship where you could use the cruise ship card, your key card, to charge things.
[40:09.060 --> 40:09.380]  Exactly.
[40:09.740 --> 40:13.160]  But I mean, it seems silly for them to put your credit card number on it.
[40:13.400 --> 40:15.720]  Most likely, it's just linking the room number with your name.
[40:15.800 --> 40:16.560]  But we can leave it at this.
[40:16.560 --> 40:27.480]  If anybody has any technical information as far as what he found on this card, what hotels this applies to, and possibly some samples for us to play with, that would be very interesting.
[40:27.640 --> 40:33.360]  And hopefully, we can share that information with the listeners as to what hotels do this and what their policies are on that.
[40:33.360 --> 40:37.500]  Now, I've got a fascinating story that moved on Associated Press recently.
[40:37.900 --> 40:40.660]  And this is for all those people who think they're safe.
[40:40.760 --> 40:43.480]  Well, you may not be safe at all, no matter what you do.
[40:44.040 --> 40:53.320]  If spyware and keylogging software weren't a big enough threat to privacy, researchers have figured out a way to eavesdrop on your computer simply by listening to the clicks and clacks of the keyboard.
[40:53.820 --> 41:02.720]  Those seemingly random noises when processed by a computer were translated with up to 96% accuracy, according to researchers at the University of California at Berkeley.
[41:02.980 --> 41:13.340]  It's a form of acoustical spying that should raise red flags among computer security and privacy experts, said Doug Tygar, a Berkeley computer science professor and the study's principal investigator.
[41:13.920 --> 41:18.180]  Researchers used several 10-minute audio recordings of people typing away at their keyboards.
[41:18.380 --> 41:25.280]  They fed the recordings into a computer that used an algorithm to detect subtle differences in the sounds as each letter is struck.
[41:25.480 --> 41:30.440]  On the first run, the computer had an accuracy of about 60% for characters and 20% for words.
[41:30.960 --> 41:37.010]  After spelling and grammar checks were deployed, the accuracy for individual letters jumped to 70% and words to 50%.
[41:38.760 --> 41:43.000]  This kind of thing really just... it's scary.
[41:43.200 --> 41:51.240]  It's interesting because it would seem to me that they're employing kind of an old cryptographic technique in that... so they have all these sounds, right?
[41:51.580 --> 42:04.860]  And with cryptography, especially with ciphers that are like substitution ciphers and whatnot, and Caesar ciphers, if you have enough data, it's easy to figure out what letter is what because of the frequency of the letters.
[42:04.980 --> 42:07.820]  So if someone's typing in the English language, E's are going to be very prevalent.
[42:08.440 --> 42:09.800]  I think S's also...
[42:10.900 --> 42:13.860]  There are frequencies of letters that are going to show up a lot.
[42:14.220 --> 42:16.440]  So it would seem that they're recording this.
[42:16.560 --> 42:17.280]  They're getting all this data.
[42:17.420 --> 42:19.040]  Ten minutes of typing is a lot of characters.
[42:19.260 --> 42:26.960]  And then they can correlate the different sounds with the kind of frequency analysis of the letters to figure out what the words were.
[42:27.260 --> 42:39.640]  It's worth noting, too, that the CIA was doing this back in the 1960s with both mechanical and electric typewriters, and primarily with the IBM Selectric series.
[42:39.800 --> 42:49.060]  They had mapped out the audio signatures of the keys, which were remarkably similar among the identical models in different IBM Selectrics.
[42:49.180 --> 42:56.500]  There's a book called Spooks, written by Jim Hoogan, H-O-U-G-A-N, that has a lot of information about this.
[42:56.600 --> 42:57.960]  So this is not a new technique.
[42:57.960 --> 43:02.060]  It's been around for many decades, courtesy of your tax dollars.
[43:02.280 --> 43:05.420]  I've actually played with this a little bit on my own.
[43:05.720 --> 43:13.380]  And what you can do is you can plot the frequency and the amplitude of each frequency.
[43:13.380 --> 43:23.120]  If you run a four-year transform on this audio file that you have, it'll convert the sounds into a chart of frequency and their amplitude.
[43:23.120 --> 43:30.360]  And if you could do that on sort of a waterfall display with the amplitude representing darker shades of gray.
[43:30.500 --> 43:32.840]  And it's hard to explain over the air what this looks like.
[43:32.880 --> 43:42.420]  You can really see, as you hit each character, that you get a very distinct pattern for each character, especially if you're using a laptop with a built-in microphone.
[43:42.540 --> 43:44.600]  And I've tried this on my laptop as well.
[43:44.740 --> 43:56.860]  And if you mapped out every key for the keyboard, you would definitely be able to correlate that with the sound of each key being typed if you could run this very simple four-year transform.
[43:57.080 --> 43:58.920]  And there's libraries to do this all over the place.
[43:59.080 --> 43:59.960]  And there's a trick.
[44:00.160 --> 44:03.540]  I remember using back in the 80s with my...
[44:05.280 --> 44:06.000]  What was it?
[44:06.180 --> 44:10.740]  Model 100 laptop computer from Radio Shack, which was a neat little machine.
[44:11.900 --> 44:17.320]  You could put the rubber bands like orthodontic rubber bands.
[44:17.480 --> 44:19.260]  They're only about a quarter of an inch in diameter.
[44:19.820 --> 44:23.540]  You could put those around the shaft of each key switch.
[44:23.800 --> 44:30.080]  And then when you strike the keys from your keyboard, it used to make a clickety-clack noise on that portable laptop's keyboard.
[44:30.260 --> 44:35.760]  But when you put the orthodontic rubber bands underneath each key around the shaft, it was totally silent.
[44:35.760 --> 44:46.540]  So that could be an electronic countermeasures method just to get some orthodontic rubber bands around the shafts of your keyboard keys.
[44:46.720 --> 44:49.780]  You could also play loud music, and that might make it a little bit more difficult.
[44:50.060 --> 44:51.660]  Yeah, I saw that in all the president's men.
[44:52.440 --> 44:55.600]  If you have, for example, some spy...
[44:55.600 --> 45:05.300]  This would actually be a silly application of it, but if you had spyware or malware or something that was actually recording the audio from your sound card, from the microphone input of your sound card, and you have a microphone built into your laptop,
[45:06.060 --> 45:11.820]  this data can be analyzed based on the model of laptop you have and the characteristic sounds of that keyboard.
[45:12.000 --> 45:13.020]  And it's very simple to do.
[45:13.100 --> 45:18.720]  You can play with this on your own if you just play with some Fourier transform libraries and graph this stuff.
[45:18.820 --> 45:20.520]  And it's very interesting to see what it looks like.
[45:20.680 --> 45:24.220]  It would be an interesting method of corporate espionage or any kind of espionage.
[45:24.560 --> 45:29.420]  If the software is running on your laptop, it could just go into the keyboard driver.
[45:29.500 --> 45:32.880]  Right, well, that's why I said it would be a silly application.
[45:32.880 --> 45:35.200]  But you can do the same thing with a microphone placed near the keyboard.
[45:36.060 --> 45:39.080]  Speaking of presidents, I understand the new $10 bill was released today?
[45:39.620 --> 45:39.940]  Yes.
[45:40.720 --> 45:42.800]  Tell me it doesn't have Ronald Reagan's face on it.
[45:42.900 --> 45:43.440]  Please tell me that.
[45:43.440 --> 45:44.060]  No, it's the same.
[45:44.220 --> 45:46.620]  It doesn't have a president on it, or an ex-president.
[45:47.680 --> 45:48.000]  Wow.
[45:48.300 --> 45:52.060]  You know, that would have really caused problems with me, because I wouldn't be able to use $10 bills anymore.
[45:52.060 --> 45:54.480]  Oh, please, change the $10 bill, then.
[45:56.160 --> 46:01.340]  I love how they say that the $20 bill has been very successful.
[46:04.380 --> 46:05.700]  What choice do you have?
[46:05.820 --> 46:06.880]  They print money.
[46:07.040 --> 46:08.140]  It could be Mickey Mouse on there.
[46:08.160 --> 46:09.220]  You'll have to use it.
[46:09.520 --> 46:11.080]  You could refuse to use it.
[46:11.160 --> 46:13.800]  You just promised to, if Reagan goes on it.
[46:14.240 --> 46:14.400]  Yeah.
[46:15.340 --> 46:16.860]  Do you pass through St. Louis?
[46:17.660 --> 46:19.180]  No, I pass through Kansas City, though.
[46:19.420 --> 46:20.540]  Oh, because if you were in...
[46:20.540 --> 46:21.900]  Kansas City, Missouri, or Kansas City, Kansas?
[46:22.080 --> 46:23.720]  Kansas City, Missouri, but they're right next to each other.
[46:23.880 --> 46:27.440]  If you were in St. Louis on Saturdays, you could hear off the hook.
[46:28.260 --> 46:30.240]  Oh, there's a radio station broadcasting us, man.
[46:30.280 --> 46:43.780]  Yes, KWUR, which is 90.3 FM in St. Louis, is going to be, has actually started broadcasting us as of last Saturday and all future Saturdays at 2 p.m.
[46:43.920 --> 46:44.440]  Central Time.
[46:44.440 --> 46:47.080]  So, if you're listening on there, then welcome.
[46:47.440 --> 46:51.980]  And if you live in St. Louis and are not listening on there, then you could try starting.
[46:52.400 --> 46:55.620]  Yeah, send us an email, that2600.com, and let us know.
[46:55.860 --> 47:05.660]  You can also write to us through regular snail mail, off the hook, care of WBAI, 120 Wall Street.
[47:06.440 --> 47:07.160]  10th floor.
[47:07.640 --> 47:08.160]  New York.
[47:08.680 --> 47:09.300]  New York.
[47:09.580 --> 47:12.100]  1-0-0-0-5.
[47:12.100 --> 47:16.240]  You know, there's enough of us that we could split that, you know, piece among everyone, if you really want.
[47:16.280 --> 47:17.680]  I really do feel left out.
[47:17.780 --> 47:22.260]  Just getting this perfected, it's going to take a while, but one day, one day perhaps.
[47:23.120 --> 47:24.340]  Should we take some phone calls?
[47:24.520 --> 47:26.760]  I'd like to take phone calls, but that's a couple of more items.
[47:27.040 --> 47:33.740]  I saw a very funny ad in the back of USA Today, which I was forced to read on Amtrak, the paper, not the ad.
[47:34.960 --> 47:36.180]  You were forced to read.
[47:36.340 --> 47:40.980]  Well, it was sort of handed to me with the intention that, you know, it would be polite for me to read it.
[47:42.100 --> 47:43.840]  It did, but, you know, you don't have to read the ad.
[47:44.040 --> 47:45.380]  Or you'd be thrown off the train.
[47:45.640 --> 47:46.300]  Yeah, it's possible.
[47:46.340 --> 47:46.800]  It was implied.
[47:46.800 --> 47:47.460]  It wasn't said.
[47:48.000 --> 47:52.420]  But the ad was a full-page ad, and it just basically said, Wi-Fi, why bother?
[47:52.620 --> 47:54.280]  Get broadband access instead.
[47:55.180 --> 47:57.980]  Basically, it was an advertisement trashing Wi-Fi.
[47:58.140 --> 48:03.880]  Wi-Fi hotspots only work in limited locations, while broadband access works coast-to-coast in over 60 metropolitan areas.
[48:03.880 --> 48:04.700]  This is a horizon, right?
[48:04.700 --> 48:05.660]  Of course.
[48:06.320 --> 48:15.620]  And, you know, basically, they're just trying to get people to stop using the free internet access that is pretty much everywhere these days.
[48:15.680 --> 48:17.520]  That so many people accidentally provide.
[48:17.980 --> 48:18.200]  Yeah.
[48:18.540 --> 48:22.780]  And to them, I say, you know, Verizon Wireless, why bother with that?
[48:22.920 --> 48:25.780]  Get a wired phone with a cable modem instead.
[48:26.520 --> 48:31.200]  Well, I mean, if you're on the go or moving around, it's nice to be able to connect sometimes.
[48:31.400 --> 48:33.220]  Well, then I'm sure you can get somebody else to do it for you.
[48:33.220 --> 48:36.660]  And speaking of silly advertisements, I have a real quick one I want to share.
[48:36.780 --> 48:44.560]  I was looking at an ad for the IBM ThinkPad, and one of their slogans was, Lose the wires, and while you're at it, lose the hackers.
[48:44.840 --> 48:56.560]  And I thought that was kind of bizarre, because out of all the companies, IBM should really be the one to not use that word inappropriately, since they're involved with a lot of open-source initiative projects.
[48:56.900 --> 48:59.740]  And a lot of hackers were involved in the development of Wi-Fi.
[49:00.440 --> 49:01.160]  So, go figure.
[49:01.760 --> 49:02.720]  Well, what can you do?
[49:03.220 --> 49:04.060]  Should I take some phone calls?
[49:04.120 --> 49:05.700]  2-2-2-0-9-2-9-0?
[49:06.600 --> 49:07.000]  Sure.
[49:07.300 --> 49:08.200]  Let's give it a shot.
[49:11.280 --> 49:11.920]  Good evening.
[49:12.060 --> 49:12.560]  You're on the air.
[49:12.900 --> 49:13.720]  Let's give it a shot.
[49:15.000 --> 49:15.400]  Hello.
[49:16.060 --> 49:17.920]  Could you please turn down your radio?
[49:19.060 --> 49:20.300]  Is this your new phone?
[49:21.160 --> 49:21.840]  Oh, boy.
[49:22.560 --> 49:23.080]  All right.
[49:24.780 --> 49:25.560]  Let's try that.
[49:26.380 --> 49:27.460]  Let's try a different one.
[49:28.440 --> 49:29.580]  And good evening.
[49:29.920 --> 49:30.480]  You're on the air.
[49:32.020 --> 49:32.220]  Hello.
[49:32.520 --> 49:32.740]  Hello.
[49:33.140 --> 49:33.480]  Oh, hi.
[49:33.540 --> 49:34.020]  This is Mike.
[49:34.440 --> 49:35.140]  Hello, Mike.
[49:35.300 --> 49:36.140]  From Somerset, New Jersey.
[49:37.220 --> 49:37.500]  What's going on?
[49:37.500 --> 49:38.160]  Hi, Somerset.
[49:38.420 --> 49:38.960]  How are you?
[49:39.080 --> 49:39.440]  How are you?
[49:40.080 --> 49:40.320]  Good.
[49:40.320 --> 49:41.060]  I had a question.
[49:41.920 --> 49:46.740]  I was thinking about getting, like, satellite for TV, but I wanted to get internet connection.
[49:48.280 --> 49:50.760]  Does satellite offer that, or is it good?
[49:50.860 --> 49:51.460]  Is it reliable?
[49:52.140 --> 49:57.920]  You can get internet by satellite, but if you live in an area where there are other options, you should take them.
[49:58.860 --> 50:02.060]  It's good for very remote areas, but it's very...
[50:02.060 --> 50:03.580]  there's a big delay.
[50:04.460 --> 50:04.880]  Oh, okay.
[50:05.320 --> 50:06.140]  Is it really a big delay?
[50:06.580 --> 50:07.640]  It's very latent, yes.
[50:07.820 --> 50:08.560]  And it depends.
[50:08.700 --> 50:22.700]  There are some two-way satellite systems which would offer you broadband in both directions, but in a lot of cases, the download is quick because they're sending the data to you, but as far as you communicating out, you still have to use a modem, I think.
[50:23.460 --> 50:27.340]  Okay, so if I really wanted to get satellite, what options do I have?
[50:27.400 --> 50:28.620]  Would DSL be better at that?
[50:28.800 --> 50:29.200]  Absolutely.
[50:29.900 --> 50:30.260]  Absolutely.
[50:30.320 --> 50:34.420]  Satellite connections are very latent, so you can get bandwidth, but it'll be very latent.
[50:34.760 --> 50:35.900]  You'll see a large delay.
[50:36.160 --> 50:42.660]  Try not to get DSL through Verizon because they're swine, and they force you to get the DSL through them.
[50:42.940 --> 50:49.860]  And when I get back, I'm going to be engaged in one hell of a fight with these people who have not shown up for four appointments to install a DSL line for another company.
[50:50.380 --> 50:50.780]  Oh, really?
[50:50.960 --> 50:51.180]  Yeah.
[50:51.300 --> 50:54.780]  Are they expensive DSLs or better than, say, a cable modem?
[50:55.780 --> 50:57.080]  It depends what you're trying to do.
[50:57.140 --> 50:59.300]  Are you running servers or do you just want access to the net?
[50:59.700 --> 51:00.900]  No, I just want access to the net.
[51:01.000 --> 51:03.500]  Then there's no reason why a cable modem won't do exactly what you want to do.
[51:04.080 --> 51:04.520]  No, obviously.
[51:04.580 --> 51:10.380]  But if I get cable modem, then I really want to get satellite for TV unless I just get TV through cable also.
[51:10.380 --> 51:13.480]  You can get digital cable and you get almost exactly the same thing.
[51:14.060 --> 51:14.480]  Yeah.
[51:15.380 --> 51:16.040]  Sometimes more.
[51:16.960 --> 51:19.000]  We would be paying more if you get...
[51:19.480 --> 51:22.520]  You're going to have to really call the companies and compare their rates.
[51:22.700 --> 51:23.020]  They vary.
[51:23.020 --> 51:24.180]  It's all pretty much the same range.
[51:24.480 --> 51:24.740]  Go ahead.
[51:24.860 --> 51:25.060]  Okay.
[51:25.440 --> 51:25.640]  All right.
[51:25.720 --> 51:26.020]  Good luck.
[51:26.180 --> 51:26.740]  Thank you.
[51:27.000 --> 51:27.140]  Yep.
[51:28.540 --> 51:29.220]  All right.
[51:30.540 --> 51:31.680]  Let's take another phone call.
[51:32.800 --> 51:33.740]  And good evening.
[51:33.740 --> 51:34.520]  You're on the air.
[51:34.980 --> 51:56.620]  Hi, this is Kay from Elmhurst and I was listening to you guys talk about the magnetic strip cars and I know that like in in Carnival Cruises, they have like the magnetic strip cards that actually do have your credit card information because it's a cashless chip and I'm wondering like how much of that is easily accessible to like the next person.
[51:56.880 --> 51:58.560]  Well, what we're saying is that the...
[51:58.560 --> 51:59.740]  Maybe you can turn on your radio.
[52:00.380 --> 52:03.980]  What we're saying is that it's probably not your credit card information.
[52:03.980 --> 52:13.420]  It's probably linked to your room and then that's just added to the bill, which you pay by credit card but there's not actually any credit card processing going on with the card that you're using.
[52:13.960 --> 52:16.900]  Redbird, did you read my card from the Queen Mary 2?
[52:18.200 --> 52:19.380]  I didn't get that, did I?
[52:19.440 --> 52:21.320]  Okay, I have that card on me.
[52:21.460 --> 52:25.680]  They gave me a little credit card type thing with my face on it and they encoded something.
[52:25.820 --> 52:27.480]  So maybe they encoded my credit card information.
[52:27.560 --> 52:30.520]  Well, if you think about it also, for a cruise ship, you're in the middle of the ocean.
[52:30.700 --> 52:38.440]  For them to verify your credit card every time you charge something on the ship would mean that they'd have to somehow get out to the credit card company and then it would have to come back.
[52:38.800 --> 52:44.720]  It would be much easier if they just kept a record of all your charges on the ship and then charged your credit card.
[52:44.780 --> 52:46.140]  All right, that's probably what's happening.
[52:46.240 --> 52:48.080]  Do you have this card from your cruise?
[52:48.440 --> 52:55.600]  No, I don't but I'm wondering when they finally do return them, is that data kept on there?
[52:55.620 --> 52:56.800]  Is it purely erased?
[52:56.940 --> 52:59.660]  I mean, I'm just wondering if in fact they do have credit cards.
[52:59.740 --> 53:02.860]  Most hotels and things like that, they reuse the card.
[53:02.860 --> 53:06.560]  They're very easily reusable so you wouldn't really have to worry too much about that.
[53:06.840 --> 53:19.180]  I mean, it's theoretically possible to find the residual flux lines and all that and possibly get the old data but most likely there's no personal data on there anyway so you don't have to really worry about it.
[53:19.180 --> 53:23.900]  It doesn't seem to make any sense that they would put your credit card on there because they'd have to verify it over and over again.
[53:23.900 --> 53:50.120]  I always make a point I always make a point to take my cards with me if I'm at a hotel and I check out I just say I lost my card one, I like to see what's on the card and two, if there's anything on there why with a hotel same with a cruise ship which I've never been on but if I were you can bet I keep my I even kept my mag stripe card from federal prison so and you weren't supposed to do that
[53:50.120 --> 53:53.900]  either I believe Bernie also kept your mag stripe card from Hope.
[53:54.620 --> 53:55.420]  This is true.
[53:56.580 --> 54:05.420]  Well, anybody anyway, if anybody wants to send any in I'll be happy to see what I can find on them for you and any information that you want kept confidential will of course be done.
[54:05.620 --> 54:22.380]  If your credit card number's on it you'll know because of all the mysterious antenna parts that Bernie If you are fearful of us taking your credit card information which may not be there off this card I'm sure you can email us and we can arrange for you to come someplace and do it and retain possession of the card.
[54:22.600 --> 54:40.300]  I don't think we need to be all cloak and dagger about this but how about this bring it to a 2600 meeting a week from this Friday we'll have a card reader there if there's anything that you'd like to know what's on your credit card we'll tell you we'll show you Sounds good Well not a 2600 meeting the one in the city Oh yeah I'm only thinking one city What's in your wallet?
[54:40.600 --> 54:40.900]  Alright
[54:51.070 --> 54:58.710]  should we take good evening you're on the air hello oh apparently I hung up on them sorry good evening Why would you do that?
[54:58.870 --> 55:28.190]  It was an accident good evening you're on the air Hello fellas Hi Hi Emmanuel Hello I've been wanting to contribute something for y'all's pledge drive I was at the last hackers convention and I bought a few of those great silkscreen posters the red and black contrasty ones The Big Brother posters Yeah and I framed it I framed out a few of them one for myself and then I framed out one for you guys
[55:28.190 --> 55:31.230]  in hopes that I could bring it to you Thank you.
[55:31.230 --> 55:35.290]  And you guys could auction it off, put a flat price on it, or whatever.
[55:35.650 --> 55:37.090]  Oh, we'd just like to have it, I think.
[55:37.590 --> 55:42.310]  Well, I do give it to the show, so however you use it is up to you.
[55:42.310 --> 55:43.890]  But it's really beautiful.
[55:43.890 --> 55:47.510]  I had it really professionally framed, and it's great.
[55:47.750 --> 55:51.350]  Send us an email, OTH at 2600.com, and we'll work something out.
[55:52.790 --> 55:54.110]  OTH at 2600.
[55:54.250 --> 55:54.690]  Okay.
[55:55.010 --> 55:55.790]  Yeah, off the hook.
[55:55.930 --> 55:56.510]  I'll do that.
[55:56.730 --> 55:57.810]  Thanks for your interest.
[55:57.990 --> 55:58.390]  Okay, buddy.
[55:58.630 --> 55:59.010]  Take care.
[55:59.130 --> 55:59.270]  Bye.
[56:00.310 --> 56:00.710]  All right.
[56:01.690 --> 56:03.750]  One more, or should we call it a night?
[56:04.250 --> 56:05.150]  One more quick phone call.
[56:05.150 --> 56:05.990]  It's 56.
[56:06.430 --> 56:06.730]  56.
[56:06.910 --> 56:07.590]  Make it really quick.
[56:07.730 --> 56:08.070]  All right.
[56:09.570 --> 56:10.350]  And good evening.
[56:10.370 --> 56:10.950]  You're on the air.
[56:12.590 --> 56:12.950]  Hello.
[56:13.570 --> 56:14.190]  No, that was quick.
[56:14.910 --> 56:15.950]  That was a quick phone call.
[56:16.030 --> 56:16.630]  I guess that's it.
[56:16.810 --> 56:20.190]  Let me just close off by saying, uh-oh.
[56:20.650 --> 56:21.650]  I guess I can't.
[56:23.350 --> 56:25.310]  Why don't you guys say something while they're making an announcement here?
[56:25.430 --> 56:25.870]  All right.
[56:26.090 --> 56:29.610]  Well, thanks, everyone, for listening, and we'll be back in two weeks.
[56:29.610 --> 56:30.450]  No, don't say that.
[56:30.570 --> 56:31.830]  I don't say something to fill the time.
[56:32.330 --> 56:38.390]  I just want to say it's been a lot of fun the last however many weeks it's been, where I've been on the road, and you guys have been there in the studio.
[56:38.990 --> 56:40.730]  I look forward to being back there really soon.
[56:40.810 --> 56:42.350]  Of course, it won't be next week, because we won't be on.
[56:42.470 --> 56:46.470]  But in two weeks, we'll all be together, and it'd be great to be back in New York City.
[56:46.550 --> 56:49.210]  But again, thanks, especially to you, Redhack, for engineering all this time.
[56:49.230 --> 56:49.570]  No problem.
[56:49.570 --> 56:51.330]  I hope it wasn't too trying an experience.
[56:51.570 --> 56:53.450]  Well, I was trying, but I'll get through it.
[56:53.550 --> 56:54.170]  I'll get over it.
[56:54.570 --> 56:55.050]  All right.
[56:55.250 --> 56:56.190]  We'll get you the best help.
[56:56.530 --> 56:56.890]  Thanks.
[56:57.390 --> 56:57.670]  All right.
[56:57.930 --> 56:59.130]  We'll see everyone in two weeks.
[56:59.630 --> 57:03.730]  I've been everywhere, man, across the deserts bare, man.
[57:03.870 --> 57:05.770]  I breathe the mountain air, man.
[57:06.050 --> 57:08.010]  I've traveled, I've had my share, man.
[57:08.230 --> 57:09.410]  I've been everywhere.
[57:11.850 --> 57:24.230]  I've been to Pittsburgh, Parkersburg, Gravelburg, Colorado, Ellersburg, Rexburg, Vicksburg, Eldorado, Laramore, Atmore, Havist, North, Chattanooga, Chastain, Nebraska, Alaska, Opa, Black, Baraboo, Waterloo, Kalamazoo, Kansas City, Sioux City, Cedar City,
[57:24.390 --> 57:25.310]  Dodge City, what a pity.
[57:25.490 --> 57:27.130]  I've been everywhere, man.
[57:27.390 --> 57:29.110]  I've been everywhere, man.
[57:29.130 --> 57:31.450]  across the deserts bare, man.
[57:31.710 --> 57:33.510]  I breathe the mountain air, man.
[57:33.790 --> 57:35.790]  I've traveled, I've had my share, man.
[57:36.010 --> 57:37.350]  I've been everywhere.
[57:41.250 --> 57:42.750]  I've been everywhere.