[00:00.000 --> 00:10.140]  In 2005, the Essex County LOC of the Millions More Movement calls on Christians, Muslims, and people of all faith to arise and stand to meet the challenges of our time.
[00:10.400 --> 00:12.780]  The Unity meeting begins at 6.30 p.m.
[00:13.000 --> 00:17.360]  at Muhammad's Mosque, number 25, 312 Washington Street, Newark, New Jersey.
[00:17.660 --> 00:19.060]  Guest speakers include Rev.
[00:19.220 --> 00:24.380]  Ron Christian of the Christian Love Baptist Church and Minister Akbar Muhammad of the Nation of Islam.
[00:24.380 --> 00:29.580]  For more information, please call 973-624-5532.
[00:29.740 --> 00:33.640]  That's 973-624-5532.
[00:37.980 --> 00:40.540]  And you listen to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:40.760 --> 00:42.380]  It's time for Off the Hook.
[00:56.030 --> 00:57.500]  Okay, we're going to try that again.
[00:57.810 --> 00:58.500]  There we go.
[02:43.890 --> 02:44.310]  Hello.
[02:47.050 --> 02:50.310]  We're having a bit of technical snafus here at the radio station.
[02:51.830 --> 02:52.810]  But not to worry.
[02:52.990 --> 02:59.890]  Not to worry because everything is going to be just fine, perfect, and it's all going to work out in the end.
[02:59.970 --> 03:01.130]  That's what's important.
[03:01.590 --> 03:04.870]  We have a bit of a skeleton cast tonight.
[03:06.430 --> 03:08.350]  It being the day before Thanksgiving.
[03:09.490 --> 03:12.190]  A lot of people have chosen to leave town.
[03:13.370 --> 03:14.450]  Can't say I blame them.
[03:17.390 --> 03:19.350]  So we have no Mike.
[03:20.130 --> 03:21.490]  We have no Jim.
[03:23.130 --> 03:24.290]  We have no Arsene.
[03:26.070 --> 03:27.050]  And we have no Red Act.
[03:29.350 --> 03:31.790]  I don't think I've ever given a non-intro like that before.
[03:33.630 --> 03:34.730]  But we do have a Bernie.
[03:34.870 --> 03:35.370]  Do we have a Bernie?
[03:37.630 --> 03:38.590]  I don't think we have a Bernie.
[03:38.790 --> 03:39.770]  He never picked up his phone.
[03:40.390 --> 03:46.050]  Things were so hectic here that we were dialing phones and putting them on hold before the people actually answered because the phones were just ringing and ringing.
[03:46.270 --> 03:54.150]  And, you know, the last thing you can do is wait around for somebody to pick up while you're trying to, like, you know, negotiate with various machines that aren't being very nice.
[03:54.790 --> 03:56.590]  Um, so Bernie, are you there?
[03:56.650 --> 03:57.090]  Yes or no?
[03:58.550 --> 03:59.190]  I see.
[04:01.390 --> 04:01.770]  Okay.
[04:01.990 --> 04:02.190]  All right.
[04:02.250 --> 04:02.670]  Fine, Bernie.
[04:02.870 --> 04:03.510]  Be that way.
[04:04.090 --> 04:05.250]  We have no Bernie either.
[04:07.850 --> 04:10.530]  So tonight, uh, we have me, Emmanuel.
[04:11.050 --> 04:13.790]  We have, uh, Redbird over there.
[04:13.910 --> 04:14.390]  Good evening.
[04:14.790 --> 04:15.790]  And we got Walter.
[04:16.070 --> 04:16.370]  Hey.
[04:16.510 --> 04:20.930]  Usually the quiet one, but I think tonight you're going to have to, uh, do your share of, uh, of, uh, talking.
[04:21.570 --> 04:22.790]  Um, okay.
[04:22.910 --> 04:24.950]  Well, first of all, this is important.
[04:25.370 --> 04:27.490]  And let me just hang up on Bernie here since he's not there.
[04:28.330 --> 04:30.990]  Bernie, you know where to call if, uh, if you need to reach us.
[04:31.790 --> 04:34.150]  Um, a warning.
[04:35.870 --> 04:37.470]  A warning to all the listeners out there.
[04:37.550 --> 04:39.870]  The FBI, yes, they're, they're out there.
[04:40.010 --> 04:41.350]  That's, that's a warning right in itself.
[04:41.350 --> 04:56.550]  Uh, but they've issued an alert to be on the lookout for unsolicited emails sent by them or supposedly sent by them that tell computer users that their internet surfing is being monitored by the agency.
[04:56.650 --> 04:58.570]  In fact, it reads something like this.
[04:58.630 --> 05:00.430]  They have, um, on FBI.gov.
[05:00.610 --> 05:01.950]  In fact, it's on the front page.
[05:02.370 --> 05:03.770]  This is what the message says.
[05:03.830 --> 05:13.170]  Dear sir slash madam, we have logged your IP address on more than 30 illegal websites with, uh, the word website capitalized.
[05:14.030 --> 05:14.630]  Important.
[05:15.030 --> 05:16.450]  Please answer our questions!
[05:16.710 --> 05:17.370]  Exclamation point.
[05:17.930 --> 05:19.590]  The list of questions are attached.
[05:21.690 --> 05:26.910]  Now, if you're going to go to the trouble of fooling people like this, get the grammar right.
[05:27.450 --> 05:28.190]  All right?
[05:28.590 --> 05:32.510]  The, the, the subject of the sentence is list, not questions.
[05:32.730 --> 05:33.770]  Questions, that's the object.
[05:34.090 --> 05:37.510]  So, the, the, the verb should be plural, not singular.
[05:37.830 --> 05:39.190]  The list is.
[05:39.790 --> 05:40.950]  The questions are.
[05:41.470 --> 05:43.390]  The list of questions is.
[05:44.030 --> 05:45.750]  Not the list of questions are.
[05:46.990 --> 05:50.050]  Although, I could be talking to the FBI here because I've known them to make that mistake, too.
[05:50.630 --> 05:52.190]  But anyway, uh, the letter goes on.
[05:52.330 --> 05:53.310]  The list of questions are attached.
[05:53.430 --> 05:57.710]  Yours faithfully, Stephen Allison, Federal Bureau of Investigation-FBI.
[05:58.430 --> 06:00.110]  Which is an interesting way of saying that, too.
[06:00.990 --> 06:06.950]  Um, according to the FBI, um, this is, this is, this is kind of, this is kind of stupid.
[06:07.790 --> 06:09.510]  Uh, who are the emails from?
[06:10.350 --> 06:11.690]  This is on, on their page.
[06:11.830 --> 06:12.890]  They, they answer this question.
[06:12.990 --> 06:20.290]  To date, they're being sent out with email addresses of mail at FBI.gov, post at FBI.gov, and admin at FBI.gov.
[06:21.270 --> 06:23.050]  Yeah, way not to answer the question, guys.
[06:23.070 --> 06:25.050]  They asked, who are the emails from?
[06:25.170 --> 06:26.270]  Now, you're saying they're from you?
[06:26.270 --> 06:27.350]  I don't think they're from you.
[06:27.470 --> 06:28.250]  They're from somebody else.
[06:28.350 --> 06:30.470]  Why don't you tell us what the headers really say?
[06:30.630 --> 06:34.510]  Well, these email addresses are obviously email addresses that they would actually be using at the FBI.
[06:35.470 --> 06:36.390]  But yeah, that's true.
[06:36.550 --> 06:37.070]  It's true.
[06:37.170 --> 06:40.530]  But, you know, I mean, the same thing happens to us at 2600.
[06:40.670 --> 06:44.430]  People get mail from, from people who don't exist at 2600.com.
[06:44.430 --> 06:51.350]  I don't know who does this or why, but they, they send things out and then people get angry at us for sending out mail that we never sent out in the first place.
[06:52.010 --> 06:52.570]  All right.
[06:52.810 --> 06:57.330]  Um, but if we explain what's going on, we say, it's not us.
[06:57.490 --> 06:58.770]  It's, this is the person doing it.
[06:58.890 --> 06:59.910]  We'll, we'll tell them who's doing it.
[07:00.730 --> 07:09.250]  Anyway, uh, the FBI, uh, did not send these emails, according to the news story, does not send any other unsolicited emails to the public.
[07:10.130 --> 07:12.950]  That's according to an agency spokesman.
[07:12.950 --> 07:22.690]  Um, as many harmful computer viruses are located in email attachments, the FBI said it strongly encourages computer users not to open attachments from unknown recipients.
[07:23.850 --> 07:26.470]  You know, I don't think I've ever opened an attachment in my life.
[07:26.750 --> 07:28.230]  Do you open attachments as a rule?
[07:28.430 --> 07:29.850]  Occasionally, I open attachments.
[07:30.110 --> 07:30.930]  From unknown people?
[07:31.050 --> 07:32.310]  Not from unknown people, no.
[07:32.490 --> 07:39.110]  But, uh, interestingly enough, I have had a lot of people tell me about this, uh, this email from the CIA or the FBI.
[07:39.110 --> 07:39.770]  The FBI, yeah.
[07:39.870 --> 07:43.250]  And, and a, uh, and a side effect of this was one of them calling the FBI.
[07:43.450 --> 07:46.610]  Well, of course, this is not before consulting with me.
[07:46.790 --> 07:46.990]  Uh-huh.
[07:47.170 --> 07:48.370]  And, and what did the FBI tell them?
[07:48.790 --> 07:50.810]  I don't think they wanted, I wanted to hear it, really.
[07:51.150 --> 07:51.450]  Uh-huh.
[07:52.690 --> 07:54.230]  Okay, so that's, that's the big news of the day.
[07:54.290 --> 07:58.370]  It's not really that big, but I figure, you know, we'll, uh, we'll just kind of, uh, let people know.
[07:59.830 --> 08:05.290]  Um, maybe, uh, maybe you want to try Bernie on your cell phone, see if he's actually around, and we can try and bring him in.
[08:05.690 --> 08:09.610]  Because I see lines ringing, but, you know, people know those numbers, so I'm not going to pick those up.
[08:09.990 --> 08:11.550]  Uh, this is, this is big news.
[08:11.650 --> 08:12.590]  Walter, you'd be interested in this.
[08:12.910 --> 08:18.610]  Um, a town in Idaho has voted to change their name to secretsanta.com.
[08:20.010 --> 08:20.890]  I'm not kidding.
[08:21.050 --> 08:21.610]  I'm not kidding.
[08:21.770 --> 08:22.510]  This is, this is real.
[08:22.790 --> 08:33.490]  Officials in the northern Idaho town of Santa, Idaho, have voted to rename the 115-person Hamlet secretsanta.com to hype an online gift exchange management service.
[08:33.610 --> 08:35.630]  Is there any limit to how dumb people can be?
[08:36.310 --> 08:37.330]  Is there any limit?
[08:38.690 --> 08:40.370]  Um, yeah, I guess you could do that.
[08:40.690 --> 08:42.750]  Yeah, that's, that's, that's a yes on that.
[08:43.070 --> 08:44.470]  Secret messages being passed back and forth.
[08:45.050 --> 08:57.050]  Um, last minute legal wrangling left unclear whether the, uh, the water board, water board for Santa, the town's only official, uh, body, had the authority to approve a new moniker.
[08:57.290 --> 09:04.790]  Uh, even so, the board voted in favor of becoming secretsanta.com in exchange for an undisclosed sum from a planned documentary on the name change.
[09:05.410 --> 09:08.070]  You know, money, that's what drives people to do these crazy things.
[09:08.730 --> 09:11.190]  That's, um, remember Truth and Consequences in, in, in New Mexico?
[09:11.490 --> 09:14.030]  They, they renamed their, their town after a popular game show.
[09:14.710 --> 09:16.290]  And I guess it had to do with money as well.
[09:16.550 --> 09:18.190]  Yeah, this is happening all over the place.
[09:18.490 --> 09:19.330]  Where else is it happening?
[09:19.430 --> 09:20.510]  I think we should cash in.
[09:21.590 --> 09:25.330]  Yeah, let's, let's change New York City to, uh, I don't know, google.com or something.
[09:25.410 --> 09:26.030]  That'd be kind of cool.
[09:26.790 --> 09:40.030]  How long is it going to be before somebody out there, uh, say with the name, uh, I don't know, Josephine or something, is going to say, I'm josephine.com, you know, and, and change her name to that and be known as, as that person and, and, and, you know,
[09:40.150 --> 09:48.050]  have a domain name with a top level domain and everything, you know, and, and, and get all kinds of money from, from, uh, advertising promotions and things like that.
[09:50.230 --> 09:52.330]  Anyway, um, you, you conveyed a message?
[09:52.470 --> 09:53.190]  I conveyed that message.
[09:53.210 --> 09:53.610]  Okay, good.
[09:54.430 --> 09:55.510]  What's the problem with him anyway?
[09:56.230 --> 09:56.870]  Sprint PCS?
[09:56.990 --> 09:59.110]  Is it, is it, is that what, uh...
[09:59.110 --> 10:01.170]  It's, it's as good a person to blame it on as anyone.
[10:01.250 --> 10:01.510]  Okay.
[10:02.490 --> 10:05.230]  All right, I think this is, uh, this is Bernie here.
[10:05.330 --> 10:05.890]  Bernie, is this you?
[10:06.850 --> 10:07.170]  Greetings.
[10:07.470 --> 10:08.570]  Boy, what, what, what happened to you?
[10:09.410 --> 10:12.230]  Uh, it's a long story, but I'm glad, uh, I'm glad to be on tonight.
[10:12.350 --> 10:13.650]  All right, well, glad to have you.
[10:14.690 --> 10:16.190]  Uh, you missed a couple of big stories.
[10:16.350 --> 10:21.730]  The FBI sending out, uh, scare mail in a town in Idaho changing its name, but, uh, other than that, it's been pretty routine.
[10:22.050 --> 10:23.430]  Yeah, it's been, it's been pretty normal.
[10:23.910 --> 10:24.230]  Okay.
[10:25.150 --> 10:28.570]  Uh, Sony is being sued under anti-spyware laws.
[10:28.590 --> 10:30.190]  I think you guys might have heard about this.
[10:30.490 --> 10:31.730]  It's very popular lately.
[10:32.010 --> 10:32.290]  Uh-huh.
[10:32.690 --> 10:37.070]  Well, they, they basically, what is it, they, they put something on a music CD.
[10:37.310 --> 10:39.270]  They, they put a root kit on a music CD.
[10:39.810 --> 10:41.090]  You want to tell the folks what that's all about?
[10:41.290 --> 10:47.950]  It's, it's, apparently some kind of DRM thing that they're trying to implement here with, uh, with audio CDs.
[10:48.070 --> 10:50.050]  I, I really, honestly don't know all the details.
[10:50.290 --> 10:50.470]  Uh-huh.
[10:50.470 --> 10:52.530]  So I'm not the best person to, uh, to ask about it.
[10:52.750 --> 10:54.590]  But, uh, a lot of people have been having problems.
[10:54.710 --> 10:58.670]  If you try to, uh, uninstall it, supposedly you can no longer, um, boot Windows.
[10:58.990 --> 11:01.450]  And, uh, and a couple of other issues people have been having as well.
[11:01.590 --> 11:04.110]  And so, uh, it's, it's made a lot of people very upset.
[11:04.550 --> 11:04.750]  Uh-huh.
[11:05.250 --> 11:09.510]  And now, uh, Sony is being sued, uh, by the state of Texas.
[11:10.290 --> 11:12.790]  Uh, now, this is the part that kind of angers me here.
[11:12.990 --> 11:21.930]  Uh, the Texas lawsuit said the so-called XCP technology that Sony had quietly included on more than 50 CD titles leaves computers vulnerable to hackers.
[11:22.330 --> 11:25.590]  No matter what happens, hackers are always the ones who get blamed.
[11:25.650 --> 11:29.350]  Here we have a big corporation putting all this crap onto a CD.
[11:29.690 --> 11:30.190]  Admitting to it.
[11:30.210 --> 11:37.050]  Basically breaking into people's computer systems and installing things that aren't supposed to be there and causing all kinds of problems.
[11:37.630 --> 11:42.570]  Hackers are the ones sitting back watching it all happen yet somehow they're still the ones that are the threat.
[11:43.230 --> 11:44.170]  Why is this?
[11:45.930 --> 11:46.810]  Nobody seems to know.
[11:47.090 --> 11:47.570]  I'm sorry, Bernie.
[11:47.630 --> 11:47.810]  Go ahead.
[11:48.310 --> 12:02.970]  It's just, it's a, I think it's a legal sleight of hand that's been going on for maybe 15, 20 years now where, uh, uh, if there, if someone causes an, causes or even points out a vulnerability in a system, then, uh, they're blamed.
[12:02.970 --> 12:12.230]  But in this case, it really is to blame because, uh, they're the ones that created the vulnerability in people's personal computers without their permission.
[12:12.870 --> 12:14.130]  Yeah, Sony is the...
[12:14.130 --> 12:14.670]  I'm sorry, go ahead.
[12:14.810 --> 12:17.850]  Sony is the quote-unquote hacker in this case, really.
[12:18.210 --> 12:18.690]  Right?
[12:18.750 --> 12:23.450]  They've installed software on your computer without your knowledge that opens it up to vulnerabilities.
[12:23.910 --> 12:34.210]  And I've heard, actually, the uninstall, uh, uninstalling this software, the procedure they posted leaves other vulnerabilities on your computer.
[12:34.610 --> 12:35.050]  Really?
[12:35.710 --> 12:35.970]  Yep.
[12:37.410 --> 12:53.850]  Lately, if you've played one of these Sony, uh, music discs on your computer, the best thing to do is just reformat your hard drive and reinstall your operating system because you have no way of knowing, uh, how, uh, how much more you've been made vulnerable as a result of this.
[12:53.950 --> 13:08.070]  By the way, one of the other things that Sony, uh, spyware did, when you just played a music CD on your computer, it would report, without your knowledge or permission, uh, report to Sony what songs you played and, and when and how often sort of thing,
[13:08.290 --> 13:09.770]  which is really spooky.
[13:09.990 --> 13:10.590]  Yeah, it is.
[13:10.790 --> 13:11.710]  It absolutely is.
[13:12.150 --> 13:28.110]  I mean, imagine that information, you know, if you ever got investigated by some sort of law enforcement agency, let's say, you know, you were friends with, with Bin Laden or something like that, just to, to give you the most extreme example, do you think that law enforcement would not want to see what songs you were listening to,
[13:28.770 --> 13:33.290]  what TV programs you watched, every possible detail about your life, of course they're going to want to know this.
[13:33.450 --> 13:42.530]  So that's going to filter down to, to people who aren't number one terrorists, people who are just maybe suspicious in some way and then eventually just to everybody just so we know what's going on.
[13:42.670 --> 13:48.650]  And then these, these large corporations become central focal points for them to, oh, I have a subpoena here, give me all the information.
[13:49.530 --> 13:51.570]  And, uh, it all goes on without your knowledge, so.
[13:51.890 --> 13:54.710]  Well, uh, hopefully if you listen off the hook, you'll know about these things.
[13:55.290 --> 13:58.590]  Uh, they've recalled the CDs, 2.1 million though have been sold.
[13:58.750 --> 14:12.190]  So if you bought CDs by, uh, um, such musical outlets as Van Zandt, uh, the Bad Plus, uh, Neil Diamond, Celine Dion, uh, those are some of the titles, but, uh, I don't have a full list here unfortunately.
[14:13.370 --> 14:17.470]  But it just annoys me how no matter what, no matter how evil corporations are, it's still the hackers that are the threat.
[14:17.570 --> 14:18.490]  That just, that just gets me.
[14:18.590 --> 14:20.170]  And there's another instance of that too this week.
[14:20.470 --> 14:24.370]  Iowa State University will be victimized by hackers this weekend.
[14:24.910 --> 14:25.290]  Yeah.
[14:25.630 --> 14:27.630]  And school officials are just fine with that.
[14:27.830 --> 14:37.290]  That's because the hackers will be applying their demonic talents to help educate a new generation of network security professionals during the Big 12 Schools 2005 Cyber Defense Competition.
[14:38.050 --> 14:38.510]  Yeah.
[14:38.730 --> 14:40.730]  And the headline to this is from Information Week.
[14:40.930 --> 14:44.790]  The headline is Iowa State IT students to try their luck against hackers.
[14:45.430 --> 14:47.170]  Now, isn't that sort of a contradiction there?
[14:47.330 --> 14:48.650]  Aren't they becoming the hackers?
[14:48.930 --> 14:52.630]  They're the ones that are going to be trying their luck against the corporations perhaps.
[14:53.170 --> 14:55.770]  You know, against the people designing network security.
[14:56.290 --> 15:02.370]  But the headline makes it seem as if they're fighting against hackers when in actuality they're learning hacker skills which is a good thing.
[15:02.470 --> 15:03.730]  I think it's certainly a good thing.
[15:03.830 --> 15:17.490]  It helps the people who are in charge of the security understand the point of view of people who like to explore it from an outside perspective saying, okay, well, here are some of the threats that I know some of the inside people obviously don't think about because they're so common and whatnot.
[15:18.670 --> 15:20.570]  The competition works in the following way.
[15:20.650 --> 15:26.970]  The student teams set up their networks to support a range of business-related tasks, such as checking email, browsing the web.
[15:27.650 --> 15:33.650]  A neutral team of students act as users using a dedicated workstation to perform those computing tasks.
[15:33.650 --> 15:35.710]  That must be the fun part, just being a user.
[15:36.370 --> 15:44.970]  Then the team of hackers, about a dozen volunteers from the IT security community, most of whom represent private companies that are members of the FBI's local InfraGuard chapter.
[15:45.410 --> 15:46.950]  That's kind of scary right there.
[15:47.390 --> 15:50.890]  Start launching the attacks they've been working on independently for weeks.
[15:51.370 --> 15:54.590]  They're given a connection to the network and we tell them to do your worst.
[15:55.170 --> 16:07.130]  The winning team on which each member is given a $100 gift certificate for the school bookstore is determined by a team of judges based on the team's effectiveness in fending off the stream of attacks over an 18-hour period starting Friday night.
[16:16.510 --> 16:19.730]  is written and it sounds as if this is real.
[16:19.870 --> 16:29.890]  It sounds as if there is such a thing called InfraGuard and that these quote-unquote hackers are actually volunteers from the IT security community.
[16:31.570 --> 16:33.490]  Or something akin to the Hitler Youth.
[16:33.530 --> 16:34.330]  I'm not sure which.
[16:34.390 --> 16:39.730]  I don't know if I can go that for it but it's pretty weird.
[16:40.250 --> 16:43.350]  Well, hey, the Pope was part of the Hitler Youth so, I mean, you can't whatever.
[16:45.010 --> 16:45.690]  Okay, you know what?
[16:46.370 --> 16:48.470]  I might have been mistaken when I first reported this.
[16:48.550 --> 16:51.610]  It seems that if the students are the ones trying...
[16:51.610 --> 16:52.770]  Maybe the headline is right.
[16:52.890 --> 16:59.830]  Maybe the headline is they're trying their luck against these IT professionals that are members of the FBI's local InfraGuard chapter.
[16:59.950 --> 17:00.610]  It's kind of bizarre.
[17:01.230 --> 17:08.050]  People who are part of the FBI chapter here are the ones being hackers and the students are...
[17:08.690 --> 17:09.790]  You know, you look at this.
[17:09.850 --> 17:11.150]  Tell me if it makes any more sense to you.
[17:11.250 --> 17:18.170]  But, I read it before the show and I thought I understood it but now I read it again and it's like you see something in a different way.
[17:19.550 --> 17:22.690]  Hey, there's a new AT&T logo.
[17:23.390 --> 17:24.290]  So I heard.
[17:24.390 --> 17:25.590]  So I heard there's yet another one.
[17:26.610 --> 17:28.430]  First of all, why is there a new AT&T logo?
[17:29.570 --> 17:45.450]  Well, I think when SBC successfully made a bid for the remnants of AT&T and is absorbing it and taking on the name of AT&T just because it has better name recognition than SBC, they decided they'd change the logo a little bit.
[17:45.990 --> 17:48.710]  And it really doesn't look much like the old one.
[17:48.810 --> 17:52.230]  It's still a circular thing, but it kind of looks like a toy marble.
[17:52.390 --> 17:54.450]  It definitely lost the Death Star look.
[17:54.650 --> 17:57.350]  Well, yeah, the Death Star look is something they wanted to move away from, I understand.
[17:57.370 --> 17:58.450]  And I'm going to miss that.
[17:59.030 --> 18:01.310]  Well, it looks like something a child might have made.
[18:01.630 --> 18:02.070]  Yeah.
[18:02.370 --> 18:07.330]  And even the font, the letters, the font for the letters is very, almost circus-like.
[18:07.470 --> 18:08.270]  They forgot to capitalize.
[18:08.810 --> 18:10.090]  It's not something they do anymore.
[18:10.090 --> 18:10.530]  It's all lowercase.
[18:10.690 --> 18:11.250]  It's all lowercase.
[18:11.350 --> 18:13.910]  Well, I guess that's the 21st century.
[18:15.010 --> 18:16.570]  Redbird, you saw the story?
[18:16.810 --> 18:25.070]  It seems like the students are competing against volunteers from the IT security community, some of which are from the FBI infrarian chapters.
[18:25.150 --> 18:27.670]  Okay, that totally changes the perspective of that story for me.
[18:27.830 --> 18:29.550]  I mean, I thought they were learning hacker skills.
[18:29.730 --> 18:30.610]  They're not learning hacker skills.
[18:30.730 --> 18:32.610]  They're learning how to be victimized by hackers?
[18:32.790 --> 18:43.990]  No, it seems like the security community, the IT security community is learning how to be victims of hackers, preferably so that they can improve their own security.
[18:44.290 --> 18:44.730]  Who are the hackers here?
[18:44.770 --> 18:47.630]  Are they the students or are they the IT people that are coming in from the FBI?
[18:48.010 --> 18:49.150]  It doesn't really say.
[18:49.150 --> 18:50.190]  Yeah, it's very confusing.
[18:50.810 --> 18:55.010]  All right, if anybody out there is part of it didn't help very much.
[18:56.770 --> 18:59.810]  Okay, Bernie, do you have any interesting stories down there in Philadelphia?
[19:01.350 --> 19:05.450]  Well, basically the reason I was late, there was a big high-rise fire next to where I worked.
[19:05.510 --> 19:05.770]  Oh, dear.
[19:05.910 --> 19:08.050]  That delayed me, but it looks like nobody was hurt.
[19:08.170 --> 19:10.170]  So that has nothing to do with the theme of this show.
[19:11.570 --> 19:16.750]  One of our listeners wrote in regarding
[19:20.410 --> 19:25.070]  airline boarding passes and his experiences with that message?
[19:25.270 --> 19:26.470]  I don't think I have that one.
[19:26.650 --> 19:27.130]  Is that a new one?
[19:27.370 --> 19:38.450]  That was from Beefcake who says that he has had many dealings with the Transportation Security Administration, TSA, the friendly folks who search you when you go onto an airplane.
[19:38.790 --> 19:50.870]  And he has found that that doesn't necessarily mean you're going to be searched if your boarding path has the dreaded, was it four S's in the corner?
[19:50.990 --> 19:51.690]  Yes, four S's.
[19:54.230 --> 19:55.290]  So it's interesting.
[19:55.450 --> 20:07.250]  Apparently he's experienced this many times and not been searched for the four S's, but I'd be interested in hearing from any other listeners who have gotten one of these dreaded boarding passes with the four S's in the corner and not been searched.
[20:07.330 --> 20:11.690]  But as far as I know, everyone I know who's had one has been selected for special treatment.
[20:12.350 --> 20:15.030]  Every time I've gotten one, I've certainly gotten searched.
[20:15.250 --> 20:19.170]  And occasionally when I haven't gotten one, I've had, I think this was actually in Amsterdam.
[20:19.390 --> 20:25.850]  Someone from whatever their equivalent of the TSA is, stick a sticker on my boarding pass and say, okay, I want you to search him.
[20:27.710 --> 20:32.070]  Well, I haven't gotten one in a while, but then again, I haven't flown in a while, so that's one way to stay out of their sights.
[20:33.270 --> 20:46.990]  But they're expanding, you know, they're pointing you out in the subway now, they're pointing you out on, you know, buses and various other means of transportation, so if you're suspicious, you're going to get looked at under more suspicious eyes.
[20:47.010 --> 20:48.530]  suspicious or if you look suspicious?
[20:48.730 --> 20:52.250]  Well, you are suspicious in their eyes if you look suspicious.
[20:52.930 --> 20:54.290]  In fact, if you question them.
[20:54.730 --> 20:55.510]  I'm always suspicious.
[20:55.750 --> 20:59.030]  Does that make me a suspicious person?
[20:59.090 --> 20:59.430]  Absolutely.
[20:59.750 --> 21:02.930]  I mean, does it make me suspicious looking in their eyes if I'm always suspicious?
[21:03.090 --> 21:04.570]  I mean, it's like, which is it?
[21:04.770 --> 21:06.230]  It's only getting worse, I'll tell you that.
[21:13.830 --> 21:17.530]  email that people write to us.
[21:18.130 --> 21:19.510]  And you can write to us too.
[21:19.790 --> 21:22.830]  OTH at 2600.com.
[21:23.230 --> 21:24.790]  Or you can send us snail mail.
[21:25.470 --> 21:25.770]  Off the hook.
[21:26.010 --> 21:27.610]  Care of WBAI.
[21:28.210 --> 21:29.510]  120 Wall Street.
[21:30.150 --> 21:30.870]  10th floor.
[21:31.190 --> 21:32.190]  New York, New York.
[21:33.610 --> 21:34.050]  Oh.
[21:35.590 --> 21:36.830]  You want to take this one, Redbird?
[21:36.970 --> 21:37.890]  Do you know the zip code?
[21:38.850 --> 21:39.290]  10005.
[21:39.510 --> 21:39.970]  That's very good.
[21:40.030 --> 21:40.170]  Okay.
[21:41.450 --> 21:41.950]  All right.
[21:41.990 --> 21:43.110]  That was Jim's task.
[21:43.110 --> 21:45.190]  And we fulfilled it ourselves this time.
[21:46.950 --> 21:47.270]  Okay.
[21:47.290 --> 21:49.850]  So let's look at some of the mail that we've been getting.
[21:50.130 --> 21:52.010]  We got kind of a weird piece of mail.
[21:52.150 --> 21:55.050]  This supposedly is some sort of a time capsule thing.
[21:55.170 --> 21:59.130]  We've got this piece of mail that says, thanks for contributing to the Forbes.com email time capsule.
[21:59.750 --> 22:02.550]  You will need to click on the following URL, blah, blah, blah.
[22:03.170 --> 22:04.110]  And then we got a message.
[22:04.250 --> 22:09.390]  I thought I would send you guys an email from the email time capsule that Jim mentioned on the November 16, 2005 show.
[22:09.690 --> 22:10.490]  I love the show.
[22:10.630 --> 22:11.410]  As of now, who knows?
[22:11.410 --> 22:12.970]  You guys might turn Nazi in a year.
[22:13.110 --> 22:13.510]  Yeah, right.
[22:13.770 --> 22:16.150]  Maybe by the time you guys get this, the war will be over.
[22:16.370 --> 22:17.750]  Watch an atheist pray.
[22:18.690 --> 22:20.190]  I hope this finds you well.
[22:20.550 --> 22:21.850]  An electronic message in a bottle.
[22:22.790 --> 22:24.830]  Signed, the Funk Gun.
[22:26.130 --> 22:26.450]  Okay.
[22:26.450 --> 22:27.650]  Now... See, what I think happened is...
[22:27.650 --> 22:29.150]  Why did we get this message now?
[22:29.250 --> 22:30.150]  We're supposed to get this in a year.
[22:30.230 --> 22:35.050]  It sort of defeats the purpose of the whole thing if we get the message as sort of a verification that we're going to get a message in a year.
[22:35.050 --> 22:40.230]  The purpose of the service seemed to be to send yourself an email in the future.
[22:40.510 --> 22:43.030]  So presumably you were the person who wrote that message.
[22:43.170 --> 22:46.170]  It would be sent back to you saying, okay, this is the message you wrote.
[22:46.270 --> 22:47.950]  We'll send it to you in whatever time period.
[22:47.950 --> 22:49.430]  What's the point of sending it in the first place?
[22:49.470 --> 22:50.390]  You send it in a year.
[22:50.490 --> 22:52.610]  You don't send it to verify that, yeah, we're going to send.
[22:52.690 --> 22:53.270]  That's stupid.
[22:53.890 --> 22:54.510]  It's stupid.
[22:54.630 --> 23:01.310]  What I think might have happened, maybe, maybe this person put our email address in as the person sending it instead of his.
[23:01.590 --> 23:02.510]  Maybe that's what happened.
[23:03.010 --> 23:06.870]  And while he would have gotten the confirmation, we got the confirmation instead.
[23:06.990 --> 23:09.770]  That's... I hope that's what happened because it's monumentally stupid otherwise.
[23:10.030 --> 23:10.810]  I don't remember.
[23:10.810 --> 23:13.710]  I just think the purpose was to send yourself an email in the future.
[23:13.870 --> 23:14.310]  And so that...
[23:14.310 --> 23:16.110]  Well, there's no need to because we already sent the email.
[23:16.250 --> 23:17.430]  We've already gotten the email.
[23:17.730 --> 23:19.870]  So why do we need to see the same email again in a year?
[23:19.970 --> 23:21.950]  Well, because... I don't know.
[23:22.070 --> 23:27.650]  It's like having a time capsule on your bookshelf and then digging up a time capsule that's exactly the same.
[23:28.430 --> 23:29.390]  Where's the fun in that?
[23:29.670 --> 23:31.050]  You already know what it's going to say.
[23:32.330 --> 23:33.250]  Well, I don't know.
[23:33.250 --> 23:33.670]  Yeah.
[23:34.010 --> 23:36.150]  It's... I would have done it differently.
[23:37.110 --> 23:37.510]  Okay.
[23:37.530 --> 23:44.010]  We had a lot of feedback on our talk about what was going on in Tunisia with the internet conference.
[23:44.390 --> 23:46.410]  People talking about who controls the internet.
[23:46.970 --> 23:48.670]  This anonymous listener wrote in.
[23:48.710 --> 23:50.510]  Actually, you know, it's possible this listener isn't anonymous.
[23:50.630 --> 23:52.850]  I have to remind our listeners, sign your email.
[23:53.650 --> 23:55.450]  We cut off the headers when we read the email.
[23:55.550 --> 23:58.010]  So if you don't put your name at the end, we don't have a name and you're anonymous.
[23:58.150 --> 23:58.950]  So this person's anonymous.
[23:59.270 --> 24:00.970]  I might be better off being anonymous too.
[24:00.970 --> 24:02.850]  We, the USA, invented the internet.
[24:02.930 --> 24:04.770]  That being a fact, we should control it.
[24:04.890 --> 24:08.210]  If someone else wants to invest in investing something better, they can control it.
[24:09.510 --> 24:12.010]  Well, I'm glad it's been spelled out for us.
[24:12.610 --> 24:19.150]  But you know, when you invent something, it doesn't mean that your people get to hold on to it for the rest of eternity.
[24:19.430 --> 24:20.310]  Things develop.
[24:20.730 --> 24:23.870]  You know, all kinds of things have been... Who invented fire?
[24:24.090 --> 24:26.230]  You know, everybody gets to use these things.
[24:26.570 --> 24:27.770]  Everybody gets to develop them.
[24:28.050 --> 24:31.910]  Or maybe a better analogy would be the telecommunications networks.
[24:32.070 --> 24:35.550]  And the Russians apparently invented the telephone.
[24:35.830 --> 24:39.690]  Well, I didn't bring up the telephone specifically because I didn't want to start a whole big fight about who invented it.
[24:39.830 --> 24:41.130]  Because I know that's going to happen.
[24:41.770 --> 24:42.570]  But you're right.
[24:42.690 --> 24:42.830]  Yeah.
[24:42.990 --> 24:50.410]  Obviously, you can't say the person who invented the telephone, his country gets to make all the rules and regulations and control the networking.
[24:52.770 --> 24:53.370]  Okay.
[24:53.910 --> 24:57.270]  Another letter on that subject.
[24:57.670 --> 25:01.790]  You stated that the .gov and .mil domains are US only.
[25:02.070 --> 25:04.770]  That's just because the net started out US centric.
[25:04.950 --> 25:10.370]  There is an implied .us following every existing URL that doesn't end with an explicit other country code.
[25:10.530 --> 25:14.170]  The Ecuadorian government has net addresses that end with .gov.ec.
[25:14.490 --> 25:17.470]  And the military has URLs ending with .mil.ec.
[25:17.690 --> 25:20.430]  And every other country has such examples or the capability of having them.
[25:20.570 --> 25:22.770]  The same for all other countries around the world.
[25:22.890 --> 25:26.150]  Each of them can use .mil and .gov followed by their own country code.
[25:26.850 --> 25:30.050]  There's no sinister force restraining the usage of .mil and .gov.
[25:30.230 --> 25:31.490]  Signed, Will from St. Louis.
[25:31.650 --> 25:33.750]  Well, you know, that's sort of what we were saying.
[25:33.910 --> 25:34.770]  That, yeah, that's true.
[25:34.770 --> 25:37.570]  You can do whatever you want with your two-letter country code.
[25:38.250 --> 25:42.950]  What I was... the point I was making was that I don't think it's fair that we get the default like that.
[25:43.070 --> 25:50.790]  I think, you know, the net has evolved enough into a worldwide community where everybody should be on equal footing and to make .mil simply mean U.S.
[25:50.930 --> 25:53.310]  military and everybody else has to append their two-letter country code.
[25:53.810 --> 25:54.250]  Why?
[25:54.610 --> 26:05.250]  You know, other than us rubbing our noses or rubbing their noses in our perceived fact that we're superior to everybody else, you know, I could see why that might cause resentment.
[26:05.930 --> 26:13.810]  And, you know, it's not a good way to maintain control of the internet if that's what you want because everybody's going to see you as abusing it.
[26:14.130 --> 26:19.610]  And it's that kind of an attitude that might have started causing problems all around the world and in other areas as well.
[26:20.090 --> 26:20.450]  So...
[26:20.450 --> 26:21.930]  I mean, like real life and... yeah.
[26:22.310 --> 26:22.670]  Exactly.
[26:22.950 --> 26:29.830]  I mean, this type of we're better than the rest of the world attitude hasn't been playing too well lately.
[26:30.250 --> 26:31.370]  So, I don't know.
[26:31.450 --> 26:32.570]  It just might be food for thought.
[26:32.730 --> 26:35.410]  Yeah, people have been taking exception to it, saying, I kind of disagree.
[26:35.430 --> 26:36.950]  Maybe you're not better than everybody else.
[26:37.070 --> 26:39.410]  Maybe, you know, you need to be taken down a peg or two.
[26:39.410 --> 26:44.170]  And, you know, I see the net as something that it can work.
[26:44.170 --> 26:54.450]  It can work in ways where maybe not a government is running it, but maybe simply a committee of people from all different parts of the world.
[26:54.770 --> 26:58.090]  You know, that's not part of any government.
[26:58.090 --> 27:01.570]  That's not beholden to a particular regime or anything like that.
[27:02.810 --> 27:04.510]  You know, that's something I think we have to work on.
[27:04.630 --> 27:08.410]  But the way it is now, I see why the rest of the world finds that unacceptable.
[27:08.410 --> 27:10.970]  You know, it's just going to get worse.
[27:12.510 --> 27:16.330]  But moving to the rest of the world, yeah, you know, there's all kinds of weird things.
[27:16.390 --> 27:18.910]  Have you been following this Al Jazeera memo, Bernie?
[27:19.810 --> 27:20.550]  I have not.
[27:20.750 --> 27:22.230]  I didn't get a copy of it myself.
[27:22.390 --> 27:23.570]  Well, you know, and that's the thing.
[27:23.730 --> 27:27.570]  We probably won't get a copy of it because what's happened is... well, here's the gist of it.
[27:28.290 --> 27:34.650]  There is supposedly a memo that the Daily Mirror over in London has been reporting on.
[27:34.770 --> 27:38.570]  This memo details a conversation that George W.
[27:38.690 --> 27:44.050]  Bush had with Tony Blair, where Bush was considering bombing Al Jazeera.
[27:44.530 --> 27:47.010]  Yeah, because he didn't like what they were saying.
[27:47.230 --> 27:49.930]  That sounds pretty terroristic right there.
[27:50.470 --> 27:55.670]  Now, of course, the White House has scoffed at this rather heartily.
[27:55.790 --> 27:56.630]  They said, this is nonsense.
[27:56.630 --> 27:59.110]  This is something that could never happen.
[27:59.330 --> 28:11.230]  But what's kind of strange about all this is that over in the UK, those media organizations that were about to publish the details of the leaked document have been ordered not to by the government.
[28:11.970 --> 28:25.570]  The government's top lawyer warned editors in a note after the Daily Mirror newspaper reported on Monday that a secret British government memo said Blair had talked Bush out of bombing the broadcaster in April of last year.
[28:27.370 --> 28:34.510]  So if the report is correct, this would be both shocking and worrisome not only to Al Jazeera, but to media organizations all across the world.
[28:34.510 --> 28:37.270]  That's according to a statement from Al Jazeera.
[28:37.850 --> 28:47.110]  The media said the memo came from Blair's Downing Street office and turned up in May last year at the local office of Tony Clark, then a member of parliament for the town of Northampton.
[28:47.670 --> 28:49.910]  Clark handed the document back to the government.
[28:51.850 --> 28:54.010]  It's kind of scary, really.
[28:54.210 --> 29:03.570]  I mean, you know, if this thing is fake, as the Bush administration seems to be saying it is, why then would a government in another country say that you can't release this?
[29:03.990 --> 29:07.830]  And another question is, which Al Jazeera office was this going to be?
[29:07.930 --> 29:09.830]  Was this going to be the headquarters in Qatar?
[29:10.130 --> 29:14.970]  Or was this going to be the press office in Baghdad?
[29:15.230 --> 29:16.290]  Or where?
[29:16.290 --> 29:19.410]  I'm pretty sure it's the country that we're bombing at the moment, which was Iraq.
[29:19.670 --> 29:20.970]  So it would be Baghdad.
[29:21.410 --> 29:23.050]  I don't think they were actually going to bomb Qatar.
[29:23.150 --> 29:24.230]  That would be something if they did that.
[29:24.910 --> 29:30.830]  Of course, our forces have killed at least one reporter from Al Jazeera back in 2003.
[29:32.910 --> 29:35.750]  It's very worrisome and troubling.
[29:35.930 --> 29:42.450]  But my point is, if someone is out there with that memo, obviously people have it.
[29:42.530 --> 29:50.930]  But according to the Official Secrets Act of the UK, which is one of the things that's wrong with the UK right now, they are not allowed to disclose it.
[29:51.030 --> 29:55.470]  But if it were to anonymously make its way over here, we're under no such obligation.
[29:55.970 --> 30:07.230]  So, you know, I just hope somebody over there who has access to this thing will do the right thing and get that memo out to a country that is able to release it to the world.
[30:07.750 --> 30:09.090]  Carefully, carefully do this.
[30:09.350 --> 30:10.330]  Oh, you do it carefully.
[30:10.470 --> 30:11.270]  We're going to do it blatantly.
[30:11.790 --> 30:14.390]  If we get that memo, we're going to tell the world about it.
[30:15.230 --> 30:21.330]  Now, you know, people seem to be more concerned with the leaks than with the actual scandal.
[30:21.510 --> 30:22.650]  It's like, my God, how did you get this?
[30:22.730 --> 30:25.310]  Never mind what it says, but you shouldn't have this.
[30:25.970 --> 30:31.570]  I can sort of see the point, but you got to look at the bigger picture and you have to look at what these memos are saying.
[30:31.730 --> 30:37.370]  For instance, we talked about this a few weeks ago, the secret prisons that are all over the world, supposedly run by the CIA.
[30:38.090 --> 30:46.770]  Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist says he is more concerned about the leak of information regarding secret CIA detention centers than activity in the prisons themselves.
[30:47.130 --> 30:49.790]  He doesn't care if there's torture going on.
[30:49.870 --> 30:51.050]  He doesn't care if there are secret prisons.
[30:51.170 --> 30:52.750]  He doesn't care if the Geneva Conventions are broken.
[30:52.950 --> 30:56.630]  He cares that there's a leak and somebody's telling the world about this.
[30:57.210 --> 31:00.550]  I mean, it's just we are so diametrically opposed.
[31:00.710 --> 31:08.450]  The people I know and the people running things, it's amazing that we can communicate at all or that will ever be able to communicate at all.
[31:08.830 --> 31:10.030]  They just do not get it.
[31:10.090 --> 31:11.970]  They don't see what is wrong with their actions.
[31:12.970 --> 31:13.870]  I think they get it.
[31:13.990 --> 31:16.210]  They're just trying to divert attention from the actions.
[31:16.530 --> 31:17.290]  But whatever.
[31:17.510 --> 31:19.130]  Do you think they think what they do is wrong?
[31:19.190 --> 31:19.970]  I don't think they do.
[31:20.070 --> 31:22.950]  No, I don't think... I think they feel justified in doing whatever they want to do.
[31:23.130 --> 31:25.770]  But I'm just saying that... whatever.
[31:26.770 --> 31:29.310]  I don't think we'll ever... I think they understand exactly what they're doing.
[31:29.410 --> 31:32.770]  I don't think this is done out of naivete or unknowingness.
[31:33.270 --> 31:34.710]  They're... do what they want to do.
[31:34.810 --> 31:40.090]  Well, I think they honestly believe they're doing God's work and they're doing, you know, what is right for the world.
[31:40.090 --> 31:41.530]  And they don't see how that's harmful.
[31:41.730 --> 31:43.790]  And it's the same thing with running the internet.
[31:43.790 --> 31:50.050]  It's the same thing with all the we're better than you things that we seem to be doing here.
[31:50.350 --> 31:52.730]  And it's easy to fall under that spell.
[31:52.850 --> 31:57.570]  It's easy to say, well, we're doing a better job than they would do, so let's continue doing that.
[31:58.670 --> 32:07.750]  Meanwhile, the EU is writing a joint letter to the United States seeking clarification about the illegal prisons that might be run in their countries by the CIA.
[32:08.010 --> 32:14.170]  It's funny how that story has sort of evaporated from the pages of American media, and you only see it overseas now.
[32:14.730 --> 32:16.370]  But that's corporate media for you.
[32:18.590 --> 32:19.110]  Okay.
[32:20.670 --> 32:21.930]  Some more letters here.
[32:22.230 --> 32:24.010]  OTH at 2600.com.
[32:25.510 --> 32:30.750]  We know you feature some old corporate songs in previous shows, but we thought companies didn't do it anymore.
[32:31.130 --> 32:33.730]  Apparently, we were wrong, and we have an example of this here.
[32:34.190 --> 32:49.110]  Thanks to a glitchy monitor, we called a company known as BenQ, only to be serenaded while on hold with what can only be described as a longing love song for computer parts, done in the style of a boy band with an R&B beat.
[32:50.590 --> 32:52.030]  Okay, let's get a dial tone here.
[32:53.230 --> 32:57.830]  We're going to call them at their toll-free hotline.
[33:00.390 --> 33:03.510]  And we're going to follow the instructions here to be put on hold.
[33:04.930 --> 33:07.370]  Thank you for calling BenQ America Corporation.
[33:07.830 --> 33:09.610]  For English, please press 1.
[33:09.710 --> 33:10.630]  Okay, we're supposed to do that.
[33:12.770 --> 33:15.010]  Thank you for calling BenQ America Corp.
[33:15.110 --> 33:17.150]  For technical support, please press 1.
[33:17.150 --> 33:18.450]  Okay, we want technical support.
[33:18.990 --> 33:21.150]  Thank you for calling BenQ technical support.
[33:21.370 --> 33:26.990]  Please visit our website at www.benq.com for drivers and product information.
[33:27.330 --> 33:28.630]  Your call may be recorded.
[33:28.930 --> 33:30.210]  Please wait on the line for assistance.
[33:31.790 --> 33:32.850]  Thank you for holding.
[33:33.070 --> 33:34.210]  Someone will be with you shortly.
[33:34.530 --> 33:35.150]  Hopefully not.
[33:35.310 --> 33:35.690]  Hopefully...
[33:35.690 --> 33:36.090]  Here we go.
[33:47.880 --> 33:50.460]  Now, it's supposedly saying, open up your heart and let me in.
[33:50.460 --> 33:52.200]  Day and night, I want you right here with me.
[33:52.420 --> 33:54.300]  BenQ, I'm crazy, crazy for you.
[33:54.620 --> 33:54.980]  BenQ.
[33:58.920 --> 33:59.640]  Let's listen.
[34:15.340 --> 34:16.700]  BenQ, thank you, BenQ.
[34:16.860 --> 34:18.460]  I'm so crazy.
[34:20.100 --> 34:22.940]  Crazy and in the way you.
[34:23.920 --> 34:25.540]  Oh my God.
[34:26.020 --> 34:27.920]  Because I know it's true.
[34:29.000 --> 34:32.840]  Why don't you open up your heart and...
[34:32.840 --> 34:35.020]  Talk about a company that's full of itself.
[34:37.180 --> 34:38.340]  I like it.
[34:38.340 --> 34:39.940]  Yeah, well that's...
[34:41.100 --> 34:43.120]  That is something else, I gotta say.
[34:44.440 --> 34:44.840]  Okay.
[34:44.840 --> 34:47.680]  I think all companies should be required to come up with their own songs.
[34:47.680 --> 34:49.800]  Because it's more entertaining that way to hear...
[34:49.800 --> 34:50.980]  Just to laugh at them.
[34:51.100 --> 34:51.500]  Don't you think?
[34:51.720 --> 34:52.400]  Yeah, I guess.
[34:52.500 --> 34:54.120]  But, you know, they had to have auditions.
[34:54.140 --> 34:57.040]  They had to get a band that could actually sing and give them these lyrics.
[34:57.200 --> 34:59.520]  And tell them to completely sell out their standards.
[35:01.140 --> 35:06.380]  Anyway, thanks to Damama, Jama, and Axiom for sending in that little nugget there.
[35:06.380 --> 35:06.680]  Wow.
[35:07.460 --> 35:11.620]  What other companies can you think of that would have to come up...
[35:11.620 --> 35:17.080]  You know, we could say, you have to come up with your own theme song that we could really have some fun with.
[35:17.100 --> 35:23.780]  I'm sure there's a lot of companies out there that would be hard-pressed to come up with a good theme song and therefore be unintentionally funny.
[35:24.300 --> 35:26.120]  Well, The Wiz had a pretty good one, didn't they?
[35:27.200 --> 35:27.920]  Like nobody...
[35:27.920 --> 35:28.340]  Nobody...
[35:28.340 --> 35:29.640]  Yeah, nobody beats The Wiz.
[35:30.060 --> 35:30.260]  Nobody beats The Wiz.
[35:30.340 --> 35:32.840]  And didn't they even, like, write a Broadway play?
[35:34.120 --> 35:35.140]  Oh yeah, that's right.
[35:35.140 --> 35:37.260]  Or something was based on something.
[35:37.360 --> 35:37.640]  I don't know.
[35:37.780 --> 35:40.360]  But yeah, it's corporate anthems.
[35:40.580 --> 35:44.720]  Well, Jello Biaffer played a bunch of his corporate anthems at one of the Hopes a couple of years ago.
[35:45.740 --> 35:46.840]  And it's nothing new.
[35:46.980 --> 35:47.580]  It's nothing new.
[35:47.680 --> 35:49.900]  But it's just fun to see that the tradition carries on.
[35:50.040 --> 35:53.000]  So if you have a corporate anthem that's somewhere on hold, please let us know about it.
[35:53.040 --> 35:54.540]  We'd like to give it a call.
[35:55.740 --> 35:56.920]  Okay, we're going to be taking phone calls.
[35:57.000 --> 35:58.780]  212-209-2900.
[35:58.960 --> 36:02.580]  We got a letter today from a friend of ours over in Mongolia, Todd.
[36:03.200 --> 36:07.160]  If you listened to the other radio show, you might have heard us talking about him.
[36:07.520 --> 36:09.180]  Actually, I don't think he was on the other radio show.
[36:09.280 --> 36:15.940]  He was our god when we were over in Ulaanbaatar wandering around.
[36:15.940 --> 36:18.820]  He showed us various fun parts of the city.
[36:19.620 --> 36:25.320]  And I was really amazed by Mongolia.
[36:25.460 --> 36:28.440]  And now Bush has to go over there and ruin it all.
[36:29.100 --> 36:31.660]  He has to draw this attention to it.
[36:31.780 --> 36:33.440]  I thought it was the one unspoiled place.
[36:33.560 --> 36:36.540]  But now, today he called it our third neighbor.
[36:36.660 --> 36:37.500]  What does that even mean?
[36:38.060 --> 36:38.800]  Does anybody know what...
[36:38.800 --> 36:40.400]  How could they be our third neighbor?
[36:40.680 --> 36:41.800]  Who's the second neighbor?
[36:41.900 --> 36:43.240]  Well, it'd be Mexico and Canada.
[36:44.760 --> 36:46.320]  Undoubtedly, he was taught that, right?
[36:46.400 --> 36:47.440]  Because they're our neighbors.
[36:47.860 --> 36:50.420]  How could Mongolia be our third neighbor, then?
[36:50.540 --> 36:53.200]  I guess Russia would be our third neighbor because Alaska, right?
[36:53.600 --> 36:54.320]  And Cuba?
[36:54.520 --> 36:55.160]  Cuba's a neighbor?
[36:55.580 --> 36:55.860]  Mm-hmm.
[36:56.460 --> 36:57.360]  We have a lot of neighbors.
[36:57.500 --> 36:59.040]  Well, yeah, but Mongolia is not one of them.
[36:59.120 --> 36:59.480]  I'm sorry.
[36:59.780 --> 37:00.680]  It can't be a neighbor.
[37:00.880 --> 37:01.680]  Who are you to rank that?
[37:01.680 --> 37:04.540]  They adjoin Russia and they adjoin China.
[37:05.380 --> 37:07.660]  I don't know if they're talking about geography here.
[37:07.840 --> 37:10.360]  Well, then the word doesn't make any sense anymore, then.
[37:10.520 --> 37:12.060]  I mean, what other kind of neighbor is there?
[37:13.620 --> 37:13.980]  Yeah.
[37:14.240 --> 37:17.560]  I mean, you know, Mr. Rogers, he was, you know, you were with him.
[37:17.700 --> 37:18.140]  No, never mind.
[37:18.820 --> 37:19.540]  Let's read the letter.
[37:19.860 --> 37:23.560]  I think he's really scraping the... Bush is really scraping the barrel for...
[37:23.560 --> 37:31.380]  Because Mongolia apparently sent 100 soldiers to fight with the coalition, if you want to call it that, in Iraq.
[37:31.380 --> 37:36.800]  And I think Bush is really scraping the barrel looking for third neighbors.
[37:37.060 --> 37:43.400]  And if that's what qualifies a country, then, you know, he's really at the end of his rope.
[37:44.200 --> 37:45.400]  Yeah, yeah, maybe.
[37:46.140 --> 37:53.260]  Anyway, in this letter, Todd writes, Since Emmanuel came here last summer, I wanted to write about the Bush visit this past Monday.
[37:53.580 --> 37:55.620]  I could go on at length, and we'll try to keep it brief.
[37:55.660 --> 37:58.800]  For the past five years, I've been living and working in the field of development in Mongolia.
[37:58.800 --> 38:07.500]  As I watched on television, I had a sickening feeling, beginning with the starstruck Mongolian president, who awkwardly covered his heart with his right hand during the national anthem, just as Bush did.
[38:07.840 --> 38:11.460]  The rest of the visit, the president mimicked Bush's every move.
[38:11.480 --> 38:14.060]  He kept glancing sideways, checking to see what he was doing.
[38:14.140 --> 38:15.400]  It was absolutely heartbreaking.
[38:15.940 --> 38:22.640]  Bush essentially led a pro-war pep rally, thanking Mongolia for sending 100 troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and for believing in the war on terror.
[38:23.220 --> 38:30.260]  Bush then called Mongolia America's third neighbor, pledging $11 million to outfit soldiers for upcoming peacekeeping operations.
[38:30.640 --> 38:34.500]  The visit was the climax of several high-level official visits from the U.S.
[38:34.560 --> 38:39.180]  this year, which included the Secretaries of State and Defense, the House Speaker, and several generals.
[38:40.180 --> 38:45.800]  Mongolia officially has Bush fever, and it is obvious that the Mongolian government will do whatever the U.S.
[38:45.920 --> 38:46.780]  asks it to do.
[38:47.240 --> 38:49.620]  People are beginning to wonder what all these visits mean.
[38:50.080 --> 38:51.540]  Some seem to think the U.S.
[38:51.600 --> 38:55.000]  is looking to open secret torture prisons, as Mongolia would be perfect for them.
[38:55.580 --> 38:59.740]  Here, there is a low population density and a corrupt government with a horrible human rights record.
[39:00.100 --> 39:01.720]  Secondly, many believe the U.S.
[39:02.160 --> 39:07.680]  administration is laying the foundation to prepare for war with China in the future, as China will soon take over the U.S.
[39:07.720 --> 39:09.500]  as the world's top consumer of oil.
[39:09.860 --> 39:12.800]  Just the thought of a billion people with SUVs makes me ill.
[39:12.800 --> 39:19.440]  And lastly, there are those who simply think the current administration is desperate and is looking for support anywhere it can find it.
[39:19.820 --> 39:21.540]  I was curious to hear what people in the U.S.
[39:21.540 --> 39:28.300]  thought of the visit, or if it was even news, as well as what people think this U.S.-Mongolian relationship is headed towards.
[39:29.060 --> 39:33.100]  I'd just like to add there was not a single protest or demonstration against his visit.
[39:33.100 --> 39:39.540]  I know many foreigners who want it to, but it's just not possible, as you need permission from the government in order to protest.
[39:39.800 --> 39:40.380]  Signed, Todd.
[39:40.560 --> 39:41.660]  Todd, good to hear from you again.
[39:42.000 --> 39:46.980]  And it's just, it's kind of weird to see Mongolia in the news after having visited it.
[39:48.060 --> 39:57.900]  Was the Mongolian president sort of mimicking our own president in ways like trying to escape a press conference by exiting the room to a locked door?
[39:59.320 --> 40:01.140]  Yeah, you know, that's all I ask for.
[40:01.240 --> 40:15.400]  I'll stop, I'll stop with, you know, the bush bashing if he just gives one, you know, one press conference debate, something where he's not protected, you know, where he has to answer, he has to stand up for, you know, for what it is he allegedly believes in.
[40:15.540 --> 40:18.580]  I just want to see that, like they do in England, you know, like they do in most parts of the world.
[40:19.760 --> 40:22.040]  Okay, we have some train information.
[40:22.300 --> 40:25.560]  Now, Redbird, you took a trip down to, to where exactly today?
[40:25.560 --> 40:28.780]  I took a trip down to the World Trade Center path station.
[40:29.940 --> 40:39.340]  And what's interesting now is that most of the, actually all of the turnstiles down there and all of the MetroCard vending machines down there have what they call SmartLink.
[40:41.940 --> 40:42.680]  SmartLink is what?
[40:42.980 --> 40:43.460]  SmartLink.
[40:43.860 --> 40:52.160]  SmartLink is this new card that they're going to be using for the path to begin with and then probably into the MTA system as well.
[40:52.620 --> 40:56.580]  So I went down there and I was, I was playing around with, with some of the stuff they have.
[40:56.720 --> 41:00.980]  And the option is now on the MTA vending machines.
[41:01.140 --> 41:03.760]  So you can, you can go down there, you know, select English and whatnot.
[41:03.920 --> 41:05.800]  And, you know, the MetroCard option is still there.
[41:06.700 --> 41:07.740]  There's a couple of other options.
[41:07.860 --> 41:10.500]  And then there's also this big SmartLink option that's there.
[41:10.960 --> 41:14.380]  And, and you cannot purchase a card, but you can read a card if you have one.
[41:14.540 --> 41:16.660]  And now I don't have one, but I have a Chicago.
[41:16.780 --> 41:17.720]  How would you get a card then?
[41:17.840 --> 41:21.060]  You mean any, any, any kind of RFID type card?
[41:21.060 --> 41:25.060]  No, it's, it's specifically the SmartLink cards that they sell, but they don't, they don't sell them yet.
[41:25.820 --> 41:28.420]  I spoke with one of the employees that was wandering around down there.
[41:28.560 --> 41:30.340]  Well, how could you have a SmartLink card if they don't sell them?
[41:31.160 --> 41:32.440]  They're testing the system apparently.
[41:32.640 --> 41:32.840]  Okay.
[41:32.920 --> 41:33.680]  I don't know.
[41:33.680 --> 41:39.180]  Um, but I did, I did try to, uh, to read another RFID card, which happens to come from the Chicago system.
[41:39.300 --> 41:39.420]  Okay.
[41:39.500 --> 41:41.340]  The Chicago card, they already have this in place there.
[41:41.480 --> 41:41.660]  Uh-huh.
[41:41.820 --> 41:43.640]  And, uh, they use, they use Cubic as well.
[41:43.820 --> 41:48.780]  So it's, it's, it's probably either an identical or, or incredibly similar system.
[41:48.960 --> 41:50.540]  So is this a PATH thing or is this an MTA thing?
[41:50.540 --> 41:56.000]  Well, they're going to, they're going to start it on the PATH and, uh, and probably incorporate it to the MTA as well.
[41:56.140 --> 41:59.320]  Now, it should be noted that Chicago uses the exact same system as New York.
[41:59.320 --> 42:01.640]  They, they both are run by the same company, Cubic Transportation System.
[42:01.640 --> 42:06.960]  So I'm kind of surprised why aren't they introducing it in the MTA system because that's the same system, not the PATH system.
[42:07.040 --> 42:12.360]  Well, the PATH system, I, you know what, I don't know all that much about the PATH system, but it may, uh, it may be the same.
[42:12.540 --> 42:17.060]  Cubic may now have a contract with the Port Authority to, to work on their system as well.
[42:17.340 --> 42:21.780]  Just recently they had upgraded all the turnstiles to accept, uh, paper ride Metro cards as well.
[42:22.340 --> 42:25.780]  It just, it just makes it a lot more convenient for people who have to come from Jersey and transfer.
[42:25.780 --> 42:32.560]  Well, so what this means basically is that people will be able to, to buy a card and not have to swipe it, just hold it or something?
[42:32.780 --> 42:38.300]  All you have to do is, is hold it close to one of the readers on, on one of the turnstiles and it supposedly lets you in.
[42:38.580 --> 42:42.880]  So, uh, I did try it with the Chicago card and, and just to play around.
[42:43.260 --> 42:47.100]  And, uh, the vending machine said that they are not, this is not a valid card.
[42:47.260 --> 42:50.480]  And, uh, and that's pretty much the exact same message that the turnstile said.
[42:50.860 --> 42:53.620]  Um, so, so the RFID is active down there.
[42:53.760 --> 42:56.760]  So, which, which leads me to believe that they are testing the system now.
[42:56.860 --> 43:03.300]  So if anyone has any information about any testing that's going on, if they have any cards that they could send us or anything like that, that'd be, that'd be very cool.
[43:03.500 --> 43:07.520]  But the path, the path reader actually read the Chicago card.
[43:07.680 --> 43:07.900]  Yes.
[43:08.020 --> 43:10.040]  But it recognized it as not being the right card.
[43:10.100 --> 43:10.700]  As not being valid.
[43:10.800 --> 43:13.160]  I brought a, uh, I brought an HF receiver down there also.
[43:13.560 --> 43:15.740]  Tuned it to, uh, 13.56 megahertz.
[43:16.100 --> 43:19.940]  And, uh, when you hold it up to one of the, one of the readers, there's a nice AM carrier there.
[43:19.940 --> 43:21.400]  What's 13.56 megahertz?
[43:21.520 --> 43:24.180]  That's, that's the frequency that, uh, this RFID system uses.
[43:24.480 --> 43:25.380]  It's very, it's very common.
[43:25.600 --> 43:26.700]  It's, it's, it's everywhere almost.
[43:27.260 --> 43:29.940]  Uh, there's, there's also a couple of other LF frequencies.
[43:30.140 --> 43:31.160]  There's UHF frequencies in use.
[43:31.240 --> 43:33.480]  But HF is, is by far the most common around here.
[43:34.100 --> 43:37.260]  Well, this is something that's not new in many parts of the world.
[43:37.500 --> 43:40.240]  A lot of people, uh, use systems like this every day.
[43:40.440 --> 43:42.100]  So it'll be nice to have it in New York, I guess.
[43:42.180 --> 43:43.520]  I mean, what's, what's the main advantage of it?
[43:43.680 --> 43:46.000]  Well, I, I don't really see all that many advantages.
[43:46.260 --> 43:49.600]  If, uh, if the MagSripe readers worked a little bit better, it could, it could be that.
[43:49.940 --> 43:51.240]  You know, it could be just about the same.
[43:51.480 --> 43:53.380]  The Path turnstiles are actually pretty good.
[43:53.620 --> 43:56.300]  Uh, they, they, I rarely, I rarely see read errors with them.
[43:56.900 --> 44:01.360]  But, uh, these should be a little bit, a little bit better as far as reliability goes.
[44:01.520 --> 44:04.660]  There's no MagSripe to, uh, to be damaged or anything like that.
[44:04.760 --> 44:07.880]  But what I'm kind of concerned about is, is possibly cloning them.
[44:08.080 --> 44:19.640]  You know, having, having someone being able to read your card, you know, in your wallet or purse or whatever while you're not looking, you're bumping, bumping up next to you in the train or something like that with a reader and then, uh, and then making a clone of your card.
[44:19.800 --> 44:21.720]  So, that's, that's one of my concerns right now.
[44:22.100 --> 44:25.680]  Um, but I'm sure we'll play with this in, in the future when it, it becomes more available.
[44:25.940 --> 44:31.640]  And we actually saw a, uh, the other day, um, uh, Redbird and I were, uh, uh, going through New York.
[44:31.740 --> 44:36.640]  Which station was it where there was a, uh, a MetroCard reader, a swipe reader that was just wide open.
[44:36.980 --> 44:39.560]  The, the, the lock had not been locked and it was sort of half open.
[44:39.700 --> 44:44.720]  So I just opened it all the way and was looking at all the mechanisms and then they're like, let's get out of here before they catch it.
[44:46.100 --> 44:48.780]  This was, uh, this was on 29th street in, uh, Park Avenue.
[44:49.760 --> 44:51.700]  So this, this was at one of the six train stops.
[44:51.940 --> 44:56.060]  Which is the same subway station used in the taking of Pelham one, two, three, just a little tidbit there.
[44:56.600 --> 44:56.880]  Yes.
[44:57.180 --> 44:57.520]  28th street.
[44:57.600 --> 44:57.960]  I'm sorry, right?
[44:58.160 --> 44:59.140]  20, well, it's 28th street.
[44:59.280 --> 44:59.340]  Yeah.
[44:59.820 --> 45:01.540]  So, uh, so that, so that's where that was.
[45:01.640 --> 45:06.100]  So it should be interesting to see where the, uh, where the RFID stuff goes, but for now it's going to be tested on the path trains.
[45:06.140 --> 45:09.040]  And if anybody has any information or test cards or anything like that, they could send us.
[45:09.320 --> 45:09.660]  That would be great.
[45:09.660 --> 45:09.800]  Yeah.
[45:09.920 --> 45:10.620]  We'd love to know about this.
[45:10.740 --> 45:11.900]  It sounds, uh, sounds pretty interesting.
[45:12.240 --> 45:14.740]  Uh, again, our phone number two and two, two zero nine, two nine hundred.
[45:14.840 --> 45:19.400]  This is fascinating because last week we didn't have the internet and the phone lines were packed as soon as we announced the number.
[45:20.020 --> 45:21.460]  Today, the internet is, is up.
[45:21.620 --> 45:24.460]  Our internet feed is going out there and we have two calls on the line.
[45:24.660 --> 45:26.440]  So people may be traveling.
[45:26.560 --> 45:29.840]  We're asking for people to call in and tell us what's on their minds.
[45:29.960 --> 45:31.460]  You know, feedback, that kind of thing.
[45:31.800 --> 45:33.040]  Two and two, two zero nine, two nine hundred.
[45:33.140 --> 45:35.400]  I'm going to read this letter and then I'm going to look at the phones again.
[45:35.520 --> 45:36.160]  Hopefully they'll be full.
[45:37.780 --> 45:45.500]  Every month, I purchase a 30-day MetroCard and make sure to get a receipt under the assumption that the receipt will be needed to obtain a refund if the card is lost.
[45:45.920 --> 45:49.440]  After losing my card this morning, however, I've learned that my assumption was incorrect.
[45:49.700 --> 46:04.240]  After calling customer service, I was simply asked to tell them the number of the credit card I used to purchase the MetroCard, and they will now credit my American Express account for the amount equal to the unused portion of the MetroCard, in this case $5.06 for two lost days.
[46:04.480 --> 46:08.740]  What's interesting is seeing the obvious flaw in the system, at least from the MTA standpoint.
[46:09.040 --> 46:19.320]  If someone only needed a MetroCard for, let's say, five days, instead of buying a seven-day card for $24, an ethically challenged person could buy the 30-day card and then report it lost after the fifth day.
[46:19.520 --> 46:21.440]  The cost for the five days would be $10.
[46:22.020 --> 46:24.160]  Actually, $12.65.
[46:25.120 --> 46:25.760]  Signed, Louie.
[46:25.920 --> 46:34.300]  Well, there's other flaws associated with this, including privacy flaws, whereas it's very obvious if the only information they need to know is your credit card.
[46:34.300 --> 46:47.560]  They obviously have a very large database of credit card numbers associated with serial numbers of MetroCards, because also when you report it stolen, they disable the serial number on you so that you can't continue to use it once you've reported it stolen.
[46:47.800 --> 46:53.560]  So it's kind of interesting to see the association here between your personal information.
[46:53.820 --> 47:00.480]  They could get a lot of information from a credit card number and the MetroCard serial number, so they can track you, know exactly who you are, etc.
[47:01.120 --> 47:02.100]  All right, let's take some phone calls.
[47:02.180 --> 47:04.320]  2-1-2-2-0-9-2-9-hundred.
[47:04.880 --> 47:05.420]  Good evening.
[47:05.600 --> 47:05.880]  You're on.
[47:06.520 --> 47:07.460]  All right, let's take some phone calls.
[47:07.600 --> 47:08.200]  2-1-2-2...
[47:08.200 --> 47:09.640]  Please turn down your radio, folks.
[47:10.320 --> 47:10.700]  Go ahead.
[47:10.880 --> 47:11.840]  Sorry about that.
[47:12.380 --> 47:14.400]  Um, yes, I am...
[47:14.400 --> 47:15.160]  Nah, I'm sorry.
[47:15.240 --> 47:15.840]  I can't forgive it.
[47:15.880 --> 47:16.240]  I'm sorry.
[47:16.380 --> 47:17.140]  I tried.
[47:17.340 --> 47:18.520]  I looked into my soul.
[47:18.840 --> 47:22.660]  I said... he said he was sorry and you know, I can... I just can't do it.
[47:22.740 --> 47:23.380]  I can't forgive him.
[47:23.740 --> 47:24.380]  I tried.
[47:24.380 --> 47:24.760]  It's hard.
[47:24.880 --> 47:25.080]  It's hard.
[47:25.080 --> 47:25.420]  I did try.
[47:25.480 --> 47:26.080]  You saw me try, right?
[47:26.080 --> 47:27.060]  You tried really hard.
[47:27.080 --> 47:27.280]  Good evening.
[47:27.400 --> 47:27.740]  You're on the air.
[47:28.220 --> 47:28.920]  I can't forgive him.
[47:29.360 --> 47:29.840]  I tried.
[47:30.120 --> 47:31.420]  Please turn down your radio.
[47:32.520 --> 47:32.960]  Hello.
[47:33.380 --> 47:33.580]  Hello.
[47:33.780 --> 47:34.000]  Yes.
[47:34.580 --> 47:41.880]  Um, according to... well, do you need more than, uh... Okay, according to the, uh, head of the ACLU in Connecticut, Uh-huh.
[47:41.980 --> 47:49.840]  A member of the Yale University staff is currently on the payroll of the FBI to spy on students.
[47:50.120 --> 47:50.460]  Really?
[47:51.120 --> 47:54.160]  Uh, I'm trying to put this, uh, on a DVD.
[47:54.160 --> 47:58.180]  And I'd be glad to send it to you if I could, uh, manage to get it.
[47:58.240 --> 47:59.820]  I got it on a VHS tape right now.
[48:00.180 --> 48:00.380]  Okay.
[48:00.500 --> 48:01.300]  Where did you see this?
[48:01.980 --> 48:10.480]  Uh, this is a, uh, uh, uh, a, uh, public forum on the Patriot Act that took place in Westport, Connecticut, uh, on October 30th.
[48:10.860 --> 48:11.260]  Okay.
[48:11.340 --> 48:13.880]  And now what is this person supposedly spying on students for?
[48:14.960 --> 48:18.080]  Um, well, I think it has to do with the Patriot Act.
[48:18.380 --> 48:18.700]  Okay.
[48:19.020 --> 48:21.520]  Uh, where should I send the tape?
[48:21.760 --> 48:22.860]  I'll give you the address again.
[48:23.220 --> 48:23.620]  Okay.
[48:23.740 --> 48:23.840]  Ready?
[48:24.260 --> 48:25.560]  Uh, let me get my pad.
[48:25.840 --> 48:26.180]  All right.
[48:28.180 --> 48:29.380]  Anyone gets his pad there?
[48:30.100 --> 48:30.820]  Yes, indeedy.
[48:30.900 --> 48:31.340]  Go ahead.
[48:31.460 --> 48:31.500]  Okay.
[48:31.500 --> 48:32.560]  We're giving out the address now.
[48:32.700 --> 48:39.540]  It's, uh, WBAI care of, I'm sorry, off the hook care of WBAI, which you know all that part already.
[48:40.160 --> 48:41.360]  Uh, 120 Wall Street.
[48:41.960 --> 48:42.800]  Uh, 10th floor.
[48:44.380 --> 48:44.920]  You get that?
[48:45.000 --> 48:45.440]  The 10th floor?
[48:46.620 --> 48:49.460]  Um, 12th Street, 10th floor, yes.
[48:49.840 --> 48:50.740]  Uh, the city of New York.
[48:50.860 --> 48:51.400]  New York, New York.
[48:51.820 --> 48:52.100]  Correct.
[48:52.760 --> 48:54.300]  1-0-0-0-5.
[48:55.200 --> 48:55.480]  Okay.
[48:55.700 --> 48:59.220]  Well, uh, as soon as I can get it, I guess you could, uh, watch a VHS tape, right?
[48:59.440 --> 49:00.300]  Oh, yeah, we can do that.
[49:00.480 --> 49:00.760]  Okay.
[49:00.760 --> 49:01.540]  I'll send it off to you.
[49:01.660 --> 49:01.900]  All right.
[49:01.960 --> 49:03.500]  Thanks so much for, uh, for that information.
[49:04.560 --> 49:05.680]  Uh, VHS tape in the mail.
[49:05.820 --> 49:06.080]  That's great.
[49:06.260 --> 49:06.620]  Uh, good evening.
[49:06.680 --> 49:07.080]  You're on the air.
[49:07.220 --> 49:07.440]  All right.
[49:07.520 --> 49:08.280]  Thanks so much for, uh...
[49:08.280 --> 49:08.460]  Hello?
[49:08.460 --> 49:09.200]  Yeah, go ahead.
[49:10.020 --> 49:10.520]  Hey, guys.
[49:10.520 --> 49:15.380]  Um, I have a question about voice-over IP and alarm security systems.
[49:15.880 --> 49:16.340]  Okay.
[49:16.600 --> 49:17.420]  We'll try our best.
[49:17.880 --> 49:25.540]  Optimum Voice has been, uh, advertising that they'll work with your home alarm system with something they call advanced wiring.
[49:26.020 --> 49:30.880]  But the fact is that they do not support, um, uh, uh, a tone.
[49:31.000 --> 49:34.920]  They go with tone, but they don't do, uh, uh, what's it called?
[49:35.140 --> 49:37.000]  The other thing, not a tone, but it's like a rotary.
[49:37.260 --> 49:37.600]  Mm-hmm.
[49:37.600 --> 49:39.720]  Uh, they don't do the backup for that.
[49:39.720 --> 49:46.000]  So for fire, it's basically, uh, not up to the codes or the guidelines or whatever.
[49:46.320 --> 49:49.300]  And my alarm system does not work with it at all.
[49:49.920 --> 49:53.880]  So I was wondering if you've covered this at all, if anybody's complained about it.
[49:54.000 --> 49:57.780]  Because they don't even tell you until you cut your, uh, your original Verizon line.
[49:58.900 --> 49:59.380]  Ooh.
[49:59.720 --> 50:01.160]  Uh, Bernie, any insight on this?
[50:01.160 --> 50:02.540]  So let me get this straight.
[50:02.640 --> 50:10.640]  You're saying that, uh, um, for instance, you have an auto dialer on your home alarm system that'll call the authorities or you or someone if there's an alarm condition.
[50:10.640 --> 50:19.640]  You're saying that because it uses a dial pulse or rotary dialing, like the t-t-t-t-t-t-type dialing, it uses that instead of touch tones?
[50:19.640 --> 50:23.260]  It won't work with your voice over IP telephone interface?
[50:23.700 --> 50:26.280]  The pulse is a backup, especially for fire.
[50:26.820 --> 50:30.400]  And the voice over IP says it'll work with alarm systems.
[50:30.760 --> 50:33.240]  Of course, it's your responsibility to make sure it works.
[50:33.360 --> 50:42.980]  But nowhere on the website and nowhere during the sales process do they say, make sure it's compatible with your alarm system or make sure your alarm system is compatible with voice over IP.
[50:43.300 --> 50:49.140]  And people should know about this before they sign up and cancel their Verizon line or whatever they have.
[50:49.460 --> 50:52.500]  Worse than just signing up and not getting what they're paid for.
[50:52.960 --> 50:58.400]  It could fail to report a fire or a break-in or something like that.
[50:58.780 --> 51:02.800]  And you're depending on it to protect your life and property.
[51:02.800 --> 51:06.100]  And it won't work because they didn't tell you that this doesn't work.
[51:06.100 --> 51:11.440]  Well, basically, you find out because your alarm system will tell you there's a communications breakdown.
[51:11.880 --> 51:12.180]  Interesting.
[51:12.660 --> 51:14.080]  But it's too late.
[51:14.620 --> 51:16.280]  Yeah, by then you've already paid your money.
[51:16.600 --> 51:22.640]  Well, definitely get the word out about this and see if other listeners might have similar stories.
[51:22.680 --> 51:23.940]  But thanks for the info.
[51:24.580 --> 51:30.100]  On that note, sort of the opposite of that note, having to do with trying to get Verizon service...
[51:31.160 --> 51:34.500]  Actually, trying not to get Verizon service when you need Verizon to do something.
[51:34.500 --> 51:43.900]  I'm referring, of course, to my DSL nightmare, trying to get a DSL line installed here in Manhattan without using Verizon as the DSL company, using a different company.
[51:44.140 --> 51:46.160]  Verizon still has to come and install the line.
[51:46.440 --> 51:49.280]  But they're not making any money, so there's no interest in them doing that.
[51:49.360 --> 51:50.020]  Well, guess what?
[51:50.060 --> 51:52.320]  We filed a complaint with the Attorney General of New York.
[51:52.320 --> 51:55.340]  And there is now a complaint on record.
[51:56.720 --> 52:01.660]  And I understand that it's been rescheduled for some time next month.
[52:01.660 --> 52:03.440]  And we'll see if that changes.
[52:03.560 --> 52:11.260]  But, you know, I've heard from several different people, independently of each other, that when Verizon comes by, they've been seen doing this.
[52:11.620 --> 52:12.680]  Repairmen come...
[52:12.680 --> 52:15.000]  And I'd like to know if other people have experienced the same thing.
[52:15.000 --> 52:19.060]  They pull into a driveway, and they never get out of the truck.
[52:19.060 --> 52:21.220]  They pull out again, and they leave.
[52:21.300 --> 52:22.400]  And they claim that nobody was home.
[52:22.500 --> 52:23.380]  They don't ring the bell.
[52:23.660 --> 52:24.620]  You ever heard about this, Bernie?
[52:26.200 --> 52:34.620]  I've witnessed this myself with both Verizon and Comcast and other companies that are supposed to show up within a certain time window.
[52:34.800 --> 52:36.520]  And sometimes they just never come at all.
[52:36.640 --> 52:37.500]  Sometimes they just...
[52:37.500 --> 52:41.680]  They may have this GPS tracking in their vehicle, so they have to show that they were there.
[52:42.080 --> 52:46.020]  But, you know, they just go there and listen to a song on the radio, or eat a sandwich, and then leave.
[52:46.940 --> 52:48.380]  What do you think they were doing in your case?
[52:48.460 --> 52:50.720]  Did they stop by at all, or just pull in and leave?
[52:50.880 --> 52:59.720]  Well, it's kind of hard to say, because this is an apartment, you know, a few flights up, where somebody was staying for the entire day, waiting for the bell to ring.
[52:59.900 --> 53:01.260]  And they simply lied about it.
[53:01.300 --> 53:03.180]  They said they rang the bell and nobody was there.
[53:03.300 --> 53:04.020]  We've tested the bell.
[53:04.180 --> 53:04.860]  It works perfectly.
[53:05.780 --> 53:06.640]  Four times now.
[53:06.820 --> 53:07.940]  Four times this has happened.
[53:08.900 --> 53:15.600]  And, you know, when they lie like this, they say, you're the problem, and we're going to blacklist you, so you can't ever get service from us.
[53:15.720 --> 53:17.380]  You know, this is what they stoop to.
[53:17.560 --> 53:26.440]  And in the past, of course, I've successfully had a DSL line, and they have come and cut the line, and otherwise vandalized it to make it more difficult.
[53:26.940 --> 53:40.260]  And it's, it's really, I can't believe these are the kinds of things that they do, but it's been, it's been said so many times by providers, by people who have been customers, that it's, you know, it's not something that I feel is in any way in doubt.
[53:40.900 --> 53:42.700]  Let's see if we can take one more phone call.
[53:43.460 --> 53:44.360]  Let's go over here.
[53:44.460 --> 53:44.800]  Good evening.
[53:44.980 --> 53:45.680]  You're on the air.
[53:47.140 --> 53:47.740]  Go ahead.
[53:48.620 --> 53:54.440]  Hey, speaking about installations, just wondering what you think about the whole fiber-optic system now?
[53:55.260 --> 53:55.660]  BIOS.
[53:55.880 --> 53:57.700]  You mean optic to, fiber-optic to the home?
[53:58.100 --> 54:02.040]  Yeah, whatever, yeah, the new glass wires connecting to the house.
[54:02.800 --> 54:04.440]  Well, gee, this, this is it, right?
[54:04.500 --> 54:07.460]  This is the thing that, that's going to make everything work perfectly, right?
[54:07.560 --> 54:09.500]  This is, it can't get any faster than this, right?
[54:09.800 --> 54:10.900]  Because it's pure light.
[54:13.620 --> 54:14.540]  I don't know.
[54:14.720 --> 54:16.180]  Bernie, do they have that done by you yet?
[54:16.840 --> 54:17.240]  BIOS.
[54:17.240 --> 54:26.080]  Well, not in, they have Fios advertising Hummers, Hummers that are, that are silkscreened with Fios logos driving around Center City.
[54:26.180 --> 54:27.980]  You almost got, yeah, you almost got hit by one.
[54:28.180 --> 54:32.980]  And when I asked the woman where it's available, she said, well, you can't get it in Philadelphia yet, just in the suburbs.
[54:33.960 --> 54:39.260]  And there's one suburb, I just read a story today, I don't have it in front of me, but we can talk about it next week.
[54:39.460 --> 54:51.420]  There's one suburb where there's a huge war going on between Verizon trying to market Fios, which really the whole idea is to get cable, is to basically, provide video services, TV television programming over this fiber optic cable.
[54:51.520 --> 54:55.440]  Verizon wants to be your cable TV provider only through a fiber optic pipe going into your house.
[54:55.440 --> 55:11.460]  And the, and, uh, uh, uh, cable vision, the, uh, there, the existing cable company in that area is, is having a huge political war with Verizon and there's, and then claiming that Verizon is putting up all these ugly green boxes, uh, on, in people's lawns.
[55:11.480 --> 55:13.100]  And it's, uh, it's just, it's a huge thing.
[55:13.220 --> 55:16.380]  And there's this, like, it's like political, uh, negative ads.
[55:16.540 --> 55:20.600]  I just, I just want to know if anybody actually has the service and how the service works.
[55:20.600 --> 55:22.020]  You know, that's what I'm curious about.
[55:22.160 --> 55:22.780]  Of course, you know...
[55:22.780 --> 55:25.560]  Not in Philadelphia, but in the suburbs, there's a few people getting it.
[55:25.760 --> 55:33.500]  Um, I would be interested in getting myself because the price seems reasonable, but we don't know if there's any catch-22s involved with, uh, doesn't do everything you want or who knows.
[55:33.620 --> 55:35.120]  It'll be a dog's age before I see it.
[55:35.160 --> 55:37.920]  And of course, I'm on a blacklist, so I may never see it.
[55:38.320 --> 55:38.840]  I don't know.
[55:39.260 --> 55:45.460]  Uh, but, uh, if you have any, uh, information like that, please feel free to write to us, O-T-H, at 2600.com.
[55:45.900 --> 55:47.460]  And, uh, you've been listening to Off the Hook.
[55:47.540 --> 55:50.640]  Of course, we'll be back again next week with another exciting edition.
[55:50.920 --> 55:52.440]  Until then, have a good night.
[55:54.780 --> 55:58.140]  Oh, and stay tuned for the Personal Computer Show coming up next.
[55:59.060 --> 56:02.300]  Me, man, fast, epic, gas, and I'll drop a bag.
[56:02.500 --> 56:04.600]  Got Steve outside, down a full pack.
[56:05.020 --> 56:07.020]  Everything's cool and everything's smooth.
[56:08.800 --> 56:11.460]  I walk up to the teller, I give her the letter.
[56:11.460 --> 56:15.800]  She gives me the loop with buckered up lips and a wink that I found cute.
[56:16.020 --> 56:18.520]  And I said, baby, baby, baby.
[56:19.160 --> 56:21.400]  At that time, the ass tapped me with the knife.
[56:21.560 --> 56:22.960]  He said, it's time to go, you know.
[56:23.180 --> 56:25.220]  So out the door, we go back to the ride.
[56:25.360 --> 56:28.180]  With Steve inside and alive and off we drive.
[56:28.680 --> 56:30.380]  See, I hurt my lower lumbar.
[56:30.460 --> 56:34.140]  You know we never get far ridin' around in a stolen police car.
[56:34.280 --> 56:36.620]  So we dropped it off and piled in the caddy.
[56:36.780 --> 56:37.720]  Steve was the driver.
[56:37.900 --> 56:40.320]  Cause I had to talk to my man about something.
[56:42.360 --> 56:44.760]  I don't have to take a nap.
[56:44.760 --> 56:44.940]  I don't have to take a nap.
[56:45.280 --> 56:45.520]  I don't have to take a nap.
[56:45.520 --> 56:45.600]  I don't have to take a nap anymore.
[56:46.260 --> 56:51.160]  And so on Thursday, December 1st, 2005, a guest of the L.O.S.
[56:51.260 --> 56:59.480]  and a million members of the call for Christians, Muslims, and people of all faiths to rise and stand to meet with challenges of honor.
[57:00.060 --> 57:03.440]  The community meeting is that we have a guest
[57:07.380 --> 57:07.480]  speaker.
[57:07.840 --> 57:10.480]  Guest speakers include Reverend Ron Fischman,
[57:36.240 --> 57:39.240]  We'll be right back.
[57:49.400 --> 57:53.820]  Oh, I've been back so long.
[57:54.080 --> 57:55.400]  Don't excuse me, sir.
[57:55.420 --> 58:01.340]  On December 1st, 50 years ago, Sister Rosa Parks was arrested for standing up against Rachel Segregate.
[58:01.580 --> 58:14.740]  To commemorate the event, a coalition of community, labor, social, and artist activists are urging you to join in the National Day of Absence on December 1st against poverty, racism, and war.
[58:14.760 --> 58:17.780]  No work, no school, no shopping.
[58:18.320 --> 58:20.160]  Demand that our troops come home now.
[58:20.420 --> 58:29.600]  Demand justice for Katrina evacuees, jobs at a living wage, and that they cut the military budget rather than health care, education, or housing.
[58:29.860 --> 58:38.900]  For more information about local activities and participation in this National Day of Absence, please call 212-633-6646.
[58:39.200 --> 58:42.340]  That's 212-633-6646.
[58:49.700 --> 59:09.400]  December 1st marks the 50th anniversary when Rosa Parks, the entire black community of Montgomery, Alabama, and a little-known preacher named King determined that they were not going to stand for Jim Crow and racial segregation any more.
[59:09.400 --> 59:23.360]  And so on Thursday, December 1st, 2005, the Essex County LOC of the Millions More Movement calls on Christians, Muslims, and people of all faith to arise and stand to meet the challenges of our time.
[59:23.360 --> 59:26.240]  The unity meeting begins at 630 p.m.
[59:26.240 --> 59:26.880]  Oh Closed Atborough 느�