[00:00.380 --> 00:02.460]  That is our challenge.
[00:02.700 --> 00:04.120]  That is our duty.
[00:04.500 --> 00:08.800]  That is our only way out of this dark tunnel of self-destruction.
[00:09.220 --> 00:18.000]  Unless we trip, no solution looks remotely like these hellholes of prison, which is itself a part of the problem.
[00:18.340 --> 00:21.800]  From Death Row, this is Mumia Abu-Jamal.
[00:22.000 --> 00:25.840]  These commentaries are produced by Noelle Hanrahan for Prison Radio.
[00:27.500 --> 00:32.120]  Free Speech Radio News is an independent program, filling in for Aldo Bogado.
[00:32.340 --> 00:33.760]  I'm Mitch Cheserich in Washington.
[00:36.300 --> 00:39.340]  And this is radio station WBAI New York.
[00:39.520 --> 00:41.060]  The time is 7 o'clock.
[00:41.460 --> 00:42.800]  Time for Off the Hook.
[00:59.540 --> 01:00.920]  It's going to get much worse.
[01:01.240 --> 01:06.260]  From Billy Bon for the best, it's back the worst.
[01:07.000 --> 01:08.800]  I hope that's understood.
[01:09.000 --> 01:09.780]  From Billy Bon.
[01:27.780 --> 01:29.360]  All right, put it away, put it away.
[01:29.640 --> 01:32.280]  We can't pop the champagne bottle in the studio.
[01:32.280 --> 01:33.060]  We all know this.
[01:34.860 --> 01:35.380]  Okay.
[01:35.700 --> 01:42.220]  We're celebrating here at WBAI the ruling against the NSA.
[01:42.880 --> 01:44.380]  Now, are we premature, Mike?
[01:44.720 --> 01:45.400]  I think so.
[01:45.560 --> 01:47.200]  You think we're premature with the celebrations?
[01:47.200 --> 01:48.320]  I mean, it's good to celebrate.
[01:48.500 --> 01:49.460]  We might as well celebrate now.
[01:49.520 --> 01:50.780]  Put the bottle away, we'll celebrate afterwards.
[01:50.940 --> 01:52.560]  Wait, maybe we have nothing to celebrate about.
[01:52.680 --> 01:54.220]  I think we should celebrate right now.
[01:54.340 --> 01:54.620]  Okay.
[01:54.960 --> 01:56.840]  Because this decision is...
[01:56.840 --> 01:57.640]  People don't know.
[01:57.760 --> 01:58.820]  It's a very good decision.
[01:59.320 --> 02:02.140]  Is it right for us to launch right into the show without introducing everybody?
[02:03.020 --> 02:03.960]  Yeah, I think so.
[02:04.020 --> 02:04.620]  I don't think it is.
[02:04.700 --> 02:04.820]  Oh.
[02:04.960 --> 02:08.380]  Let's observe some decorum here and say hello, Bernie S.
[02:08.480 --> 02:09.160]  down there in Philadelphia.
[02:09.920 --> 02:10.230]  Greetings.
[02:10.480 --> 02:10.760]  I agree.
[02:10.890 --> 02:12.700]  It was a good and short-lived decision.
[02:12.890 --> 02:15.340]  And you're fading out because we're not talking about it yet, but we will be.
[02:15.940 --> 02:16.280]  Walter?
[02:16.600 --> 02:16.890]  Hey.
[02:17.240 --> 02:17.560]  Redbird?
[02:17.780 --> 02:18.170]  Good evening.
[02:18.800 --> 02:19.120]  Jim?
[02:19.480 --> 02:19.720]  Hello.
[02:20.580 --> 02:21.500]  And not Kevin?
[02:21.840 --> 02:22.070]  Hello.
[02:22.840 --> 02:24.280]  I feel really silly calling you that.
[02:24.350 --> 02:25.660]  I think I'm just going to call you Kevin from now on.
[02:25.720 --> 02:26.620]  It all works.
[02:26.850 --> 02:29.070]  I'm almost getting sick of you calling me different names.
[02:29.120 --> 02:32.040]  I could call you Kevin number two because you wore the number two button that helped.
[02:33.220 --> 02:34.220]  You were number two, right?
[02:34.350 --> 02:35.100]  I was number two.
[02:35.140 --> 02:35.400]  All right.
[02:35.660 --> 02:36.460]  I was number two.
[02:37.140 --> 02:37.460]  Well...
[02:37.460 --> 02:38.340]  I was the real number two.
[02:38.340 --> 02:39.660]  It can't be more than one number two.
[02:39.720 --> 02:40.260]  Yes, I can.
[02:40.260 --> 02:40.640]  Which one of you is number two?
[02:40.820 --> 02:41.880]  There's the old number two.
[02:42.480 --> 02:43.280]  There's the new number two.
[02:43.280 --> 02:44.140]  Which one is the old one?
[02:44.200 --> 02:44.820]  Which one is the new one?
[02:44.840 --> 02:46.120]  There's the next number two.
[02:46.120 --> 02:46.800]  The next number two.
[02:46.860 --> 02:48.020]  There's the former number two.
[02:48.020 --> 02:49.480]  Okay, well, I'm confused.
[02:49.800 --> 02:50.960]  There's the earlier number two.
[02:50.960 --> 02:52.740]  I was number six, that's all I know, and I didn't like that.
[02:52.740 --> 02:53.620]  There's the later number two?
[02:53.740 --> 02:54.600]  Bernie, what number were you?
[02:56.040 --> 02:58.240]  I was number two, but I was also...
[02:58.240 --> 02:59.100]  Not another one.
[02:59.120 --> 02:59.700]  Number 132.
[03:00.020 --> 03:01.000]  Say this again, you were what?
[03:01.260 --> 03:04.260]  I was number... I think 134, actually, it was.
[03:04.380 --> 03:06.320]  But I was also known as number two.
[03:06.460 --> 03:07.340]  You can't pick two.
[03:08.360 --> 03:10.280]  Well, somehow I ended up with two numbers.
[03:10.440 --> 03:11.080]  It's very strange.
[03:11.980 --> 03:14.040]  Sounds like you hacked the system, Bernie.
[03:14.260 --> 03:15.080]  That's what it sounds like to me.
[03:15.300 --> 03:15.820]  All right, let's get...
[03:15.820 --> 03:16.480]  Not even trying.
[03:16.620 --> 03:18.480]  Let's get to the serious matters at hand.
[03:18.680 --> 03:24.420]  Now, the NSA, it was a bad week for them in court, actually last week.
[03:24.660 --> 03:33.900]  A federal judge ruled the government's warrantless wiretapping program was unconstitutional, ordered an immediate halt to it, which was a setback to the White House.
[03:34.300 --> 03:38.560]  And somehow, the Justice Department appealed the decision.
[03:39.260 --> 03:42.640]  And by appealing it, they don't have to immediately halt it.
[03:42.700 --> 03:43.540]  I'm not sure how that works.
[03:43.540 --> 03:49.200]  When you're found guilty of something, you don't get to continue committing the crime, do you, during the appeal process?
[03:49.900 --> 03:51.440]  Apparently, you do if you're the government.
[03:51.660 --> 03:55.280]  There's a lot of special rules for the government, and this may be one of them.
[03:55.460 --> 03:55.780]  Wow.
[03:56.600 --> 03:58.980]  Okay, so you think it's premature for us to be celebrating?
[03:59.120 --> 04:03.460]  No, I think we should celebrate right now because I think this decision is going to get overturned on appeal.
[04:03.660 --> 04:06.340]  Well, then that's nothing to celebrate if we're doomed in the end.
[04:06.520 --> 04:07.100]  Well, you know.
[04:07.160 --> 04:09.280]  Put your blinders on and top the court.
[04:09.400 --> 04:10.700]  Bernie, what's your idea?
[04:10.700 --> 04:12.020]  I agree with Mike.
[04:12.200 --> 04:13.740]  It's going to be a short-lived decision.
[04:13.980 --> 04:16.140]  It's just a Sixth Circuit decision.
[04:16.560 --> 04:18.030]  Actually, it was a district court.
[04:18.240 --> 04:19.530]  It wasn't even a circuit court.
[04:19.590 --> 04:22.530]  Yeah, the Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division.
[04:22.830 --> 04:27.260]  This is like as low as you can go as far as the federal court hierarchy.
[04:27.530 --> 04:30.460]  I don't think insulting the court is going to help us at this point.
[04:31.360 --> 04:33.260]  Let's be happy for what we've gotten.
[04:33.900 --> 04:36.850]  The judge said that basically this is unconstitutional.
[04:36.850 --> 04:42.540]  It seems like a very obvious decision to us, but what kind of argument is the government going to use?
[04:43.000 --> 04:51.020]  Well, if you look through the decision, which you can get from the website of the ACLU or other places, there's a sort of...
[04:51.020 --> 05:00.600]  First, they discuss the state secrets privilege, which is where the government says, we can't even talk about this, let alone respond to the argument, just go away now.
[05:00.600 --> 05:11.320]  And then they get to the issue of standing, which means whether or not the people who sued actually have any right to sue.
[05:11.560 --> 05:36.220]  And there's an interesting legal maneuver that was taken where these are sort of journalists and other activists, just people who are Muslims, who sued, saying, this is impeding my ability to communicate with folks overseas because they won't talk to me because they are assuming that the government is listening to the phone calls.
[05:37.100 --> 05:39.960]  But, Mike, if they have nothing to hide, what are they afraid of?
[05:40.220 --> 05:41.600]  Yeah, well, that's...
[05:41.600 --> 05:43.060]  Oh, you're not going to answer that question, huh?
[05:43.200 --> 05:44.180]  You must have something to hide.
[05:44.320 --> 05:46.060]  They must... I must have something to hide.
[05:46.200 --> 05:47.080]  They may or may not.
[05:48.540 --> 05:53.940]  So there's that issue of standing, and then there's all these other technical, legal issues.
[05:55.680 --> 06:04.080]  And just each one, they sort of narrowly convince this judge, but it's a real house of cards, unfortunately, I think.
[06:04.740 --> 06:10.200]  And I don't think that the... I'd love to be wrong, by the way.
[06:10.340 --> 06:13.020]  It would make me very happy if what I say here is wrong.
[06:13.520 --> 06:17.260]  But I think the government is going to get out of this on some technicality.
[06:18.280 --> 06:32.000]  And it might be worth noting that even if they don't get out of it, and the government loses all the way to the Supreme Court, we will never know if they keep doing it because they violated the Constitution while they were doing it and refused to even tell Congress about it.
[06:33.440 --> 06:37.760]  Or, you know, our oversight in Congress, for whatever that's worth.
[06:38.000 --> 06:44.280]  So they're just going to keep doing this regardless of what any court says, because they've shown their willingness to break a law with abandon.
[06:44.780 --> 06:53.340]  The thing is, there could be several more secret programs right now that The New York Times has not gotten around to uncovering and probably never will because they've been intimidated into silence.
[06:53.980 --> 06:56.340]  So, yeah, even... good point, Barney.
[06:56.460 --> 06:59.900]  Even if this case is won, who knows what else is out there?
[07:01.340 --> 07:02.400]  Certainly, we don't know.
[07:03.260 --> 07:07.360]  Okay, continuing with the world of terror and today's terror news.
[07:07.520 --> 07:08.360]  You guys hear about this?
[07:08.500 --> 07:09.480]  This just happened.
[07:09.540 --> 07:10.600]  I don't have a story.
[07:10.720 --> 07:11.560]  I just heard it on the radio.
[07:11.560 --> 07:25.200]  But apparently, an airplane on the way from Amsterdam to Mumbai was turned around and brought back to Amsterdam because, get this, passengers were passing their cell phones around.
[07:26.760 --> 07:29.940]  Nothing was said about the cell phones being on or them making phone calls.
[07:29.960 --> 07:31.500]  They were just passing them around.
[07:31.740 --> 07:33.600]  It seems like the sort of thing we would do.
[07:33.720 --> 07:34.220]  Yeah, it does.
[07:34.380 --> 07:35.880]  And it made people nervous.
[07:35.880 --> 07:40.400]  And there was at least one case of a passenger not having his seatbelt on.
[07:40.560 --> 07:44.740]  And the sign, the sign that said seatbelt must be on was still on.
[07:44.940 --> 07:46.440]  This wasn't during takeoff or anything like that.
[07:46.480 --> 07:48.020]  It was while that sign was still on.
[07:48.120 --> 07:55.320]  So that, passing around some cell phones and someone getting up before that little thing goes off, that was enough to turn the plane around.
[07:55.460 --> 07:55.960]  And get this.
[07:56.060 --> 07:59.420]  This plane was on its way from Amsterdam to Mumbai, which is in India.
[07:59.540 --> 08:00.960]  And Amsterdam, as you know, is in the Netherlands.
[08:02.940 --> 08:06.000]  The concern was so great that the U.S.
[08:06.200 --> 08:12.700]  air marshals on board blew their cover to basically get the situation under control.
[08:12.820 --> 08:15.060]  Now, someone explain to me, why are the U.S.
[08:15.140 --> 08:19.120]  air marshals on a flight from Netherlands to India, Jim?
[08:19.600 --> 08:21.280]  Well, yeah, there is one reason.
[08:21.520 --> 08:24.360]  It was a Northwest Airlines airplane.
[08:25.000 --> 08:26.120]  So it was a U.S.
[08:26.260 --> 08:26.540]  carrier.
[08:27.340 --> 08:30.680]  So they're there to protect the, what, the captain and the stewardesses?
[08:30.680 --> 08:34.780]  I don't know the logic they're in, but there is some basis of logic.
[08:34.780 --> 08:37.690]  It's not as insane for that reason as we think.
[08:37.690 --> 08:38.240]  Oh, come on.
[08:38.330 --> 08:39.570]  It's as insane as we think.
[08:39.570 --> 08:39.880]  No, no.
[08:39.950 --> 08:44.260]  It's as insane for other reasons, like passing cell phones around and getting up ahead of the seatbelts.
[08:44.260 --> 08:48.170]  But can you imagine if there was an air marshal for every citizen on board that plane from their country?
[08:48.420 --> 08:49.040]  I mean...
[08:49.040 --> 08:51.740]  Oh, in other words, dueling air marshals?
[08:51.810 --> 08:52.600]  Yeah, it's nutty.
[08:52.740 --> 08:53.120]  I like that idea.
[08:53.120 --> 08:54.550]  Why wasn't there a Dutch air marshal?
[08:54.550 --> 08:55.990]  Why wasn't there an Indian air marshal?
[08:56.170 --> 08:56.970]  Maybe there were.
[08:57.520 --> 08:58.110]  Maybe there were.
[08:58.160 --> 08:58.970]  They didn't blow their cover.
[09:00.740 --> 09:03.640]  There was a whole series of incidents this week where...
[09:03.640 --> 09:07.420]  Well, we talked about the 60-year-old woman who had the facial cream last week.
[09:07.420 --> 09:08.310]  Yeah, that was last week.
[09:08.420 --> 09:09.710]  But this week there was a mutiny.
[09:09.830 --> 09:11.450]  Did you hear about the mutiny in London?
[09:11.850 --> 09:11.930]  Oh, yeah.
[09:12.090 --> 09:12.640]  Tell us about that.
[09:14.240 --> 09:24.170]  British holidaymakers, this is according to the Daily Mail, were staged an unprecedented mutiny, refusing to allow their flight to take off until two men they feared were terrorists were forcibly removed.
[09:24.630 --> 09:29.070]  And there's this whole two-printed pages article.
[09:29.520 --> 09:40.670]  And as far as I can tell, the only evidence, you know, why did they feel these two men were terrorists, as far as I can tell, they were just men of Asian appearance apparently talking Arabic.
[09:40.950 --> 09:46.900]  Well, I mean, look, you got to go on whatever you have at your disposal, and apparently that's enough these days.
[09:47.470 --> 09:49.310]  And the same thing happened with the guy wearing the shirt, right?
[09:49.430 --> 09:50.660]  Had some Arabic writing on it.
[09:50.970 --> 09:52.310]  No, I was thinking about this.
[09:52.420 --> 09:56.490]  I would like to, I would like to, when I get on an airplane next, have a shirt with Arabic writing on it.
[09:56.540 --> 09:57.970]  That says something like, peace.
[09:58.420 --> 10:00.050]  And just see what the reaction is.
[10:00.170 --> 10:02.640]  Well, this guy, Raid, tried that.
[10:03.260 --> 10:05.900]  And he was told he couldn't wear that shirt on the plane.
[10:06.640 --> 10:14.810]  The representatives of JetBlue forced him to change his T-shirt, and they said it was like going to a bank with a T-shirt reading, I am a robber.
[10:15.170 --> 10:15.970]  Who said that?
[10:16.590 --> 10:18.260]  Representatives of JetBlue Airways.
[10:18.380 --> 10:19.520]  They said that on the record.
[10:19.730 --> 10:20.690]  They said that to him.
[10:21.610 --> 10:23.850]  Did anybody besides him report that, though?
[10:23.970 --> 10:26.400]  I mean, that's what I'm a little dubious about.
[10:26.550 --> 10:27.790]  I mean, I suppose he could be lying.
[10:28.050 --> 10:35.450]  Well, I just, I would like to hear an official statement from JetBlue saying that wearing an Arabic T-shirt is like walking into a, what, being a bank robber in a bank?
[10:35.690 --> 10:38.760]  Going to a bank with a T-shirt reading, I am a robber.
[10:40.830 --> 10:45.570]  Yeah, I'm definitely, look, if you guys want to get together and make some Arabic T-shirts, because we're talking about a language now.
[10:45.570 --> 10:49.090]  We're talking about, we're not talking about a phrase saying, I'm a terrorist or something stupid like that.
[10:49.190 --> 10:53.900]  We're talking about, you know, a language, a culture, a people, and that kind of thing cannot stand.
[10:54.090 --> 10:56.900]  But the T-shirt actually said was, we will not be silent.
[10:56.900 --> 10:58.970]  And it said it in both Arabic and English.
[10:59.110 --> 11:00.160]  That sounds like a threat, though.
[11:00.280 --> 11:02.990]  Yeah, you don't have to know Arabic to know what it said.
[11:03.860 --> 11:06.580]  Okay, anything else in the fun world of air travel?
[11:07.040 --> 11:08.640]  Well, yes, Jim.
[11:08.820 --> 11:09.780]  The number six train.
[11:10.080 --> 11:11.280]  The number six train.
[11:11.350 --> 11:12.230]  It's not exactly an airline.
[11:12.460 --> 11:15.680]  Well, no, but it's acting like one lately.
[11:15.680 --> 11:17.440]  You heard about what happened the other day.
[11:18.520 --> 11:19.040]  Apparently...
[11:19.040 --> 11:19.780]  It arrived on time?
[11:21.280 --> 11:21.800]  What?
[11:22.330 --> 11:27.210]  Apparently, a number six train somehow got searched for suspicious liquids.
[11:27.560 --> 11:29.400]  What do you mean the six train got searched for it?
[11:29.700 --> 11:29.990]  Where?
[11:29.990 --> 11:31.040]  You did not hear this?
[11:31.140 --> 11:31.940]  Obviously, I didn't.
[11:31.990 --> 11:35.180]  But even if I did, for the benefit of our listeners, I'm pretending I didn't.
[11:35.560 --> 11:42.280]  The number six train, the subway train in New York called the number six, which is part of a division of trains known as the IRT.
[11:42.300 --> 11:43.380]  All right, get on with it.
[11:44.970 --> 11:48.640]  Goes north and south along the east side of Manhattan and into the Bronx.
[11:50.140 --> 11:57.260]  Apparently, a train was stopped twice in and around Midtown for reasons that are still not totally clear.
[11:57.260 --> 12:01.230]  There, someone reported something suspicious dealing with liquids.
[12:01.610 --> 12:04.700]  Cops got on, asked people if they were carrying liquids.
[12:04.960 --> 12:11.080]  In at least two instances, confiscated water bottles and then let the train proceed.
[12:11.560 --> 12:13.110]  See, now, this is what I don't get.
[12:13.320 --> 12:22.110]  They're freaking out over people bringing water bottles and other liquids onto airplanes, but they're not freaking out if you bring it onto a bus or a train or a shopping mall or down the street or anything like that.
[12:23.080 --> 12:24.960]  So it makes very little sense.
[12:24.970 --> 12:29.520]  And I guess it just kind of shows the absurdity of somebody says, hey, that could be a problem, and everybody freaks out over it.
[12:29.540 --> 12:30.850]  Yeah, anything can be a problem.
[12:31.330 --> 12:32.520]  It's always been the case.
[12:33.080 --> 12:33.440]  Emmanuel?
[12:33.680 --> 12:34.180]  Yes, go ahead, Bernie.
[12:35.820 --> 12:43.700]  Along those lines in the subject of mass transportation and alleged dangerous liquids, a highly reputable newspaper in the U.K.
[12:43.800 --> 12:57.940]  called The Sun had a story this week that gel inserts, sometimes referred to as chicken fillets in brassieres, will have to be removed before boarding a plane.
[12:58.020 --> 12:59.460]  And they quoted a U.S.
[12:59.970 --> 13:03.700]  Transportation Security Administration, TSA representative, who said, quote,
[13:08.970 --> 13:29.900]  Now, I've not been able to find any substantiating stories along these lines, but it is interesting because these same gel-like substances that are banned in every other type of container do exist in this type of article of clothing in some cases.
[13:29.900 --> 13:34.160]  So, you know, that would be the true definition of a binary weapon, I think.
[13:34.350 --> 13:37.060]  So what about gel-like substances inside of people?
[13:38.330 --> 13:42.830]  That's true, but that would be harder to extricate if you're going to mix them.
[13:42.920 --> 13:56.940]  But if you had a brassiere that had two gelatinous bags of fluid that could be mixed together to create an explosive, then that would be what's called a binary weapon.
[13:57.260 --> 13:59.780]  So it raises all kinds of questions.
[13:59.900 --> 14:05.320]  And I'm hoping this doesn't cause undue concern in people who wear such attire.
[14:05.490 --> 14:07.760]  But this show makes me feel so insecure sometimes.
[14:07.760 --> 14:08.330]  It really does.
[14:08.380 --> 14:09.160]  We need to do more.
[14:09.350 --> 14:13.140]  We need to have checkpoints everywhere and lie detectors and loyalty.
[14:13.420 --> 14:13.830]  Oh, this is Walter.
[14:14.090 --> 14:21.160]  On my way here, walking down Broadway between, I think, Pine and Cedar, there were a couple of guys getting ready to defuse a bomb, apparently.
[14:21.160 --> 14:23.260]  They were putting on the bomb squad gear.
[14:23.520 --> 14:24.090]  It was really heavy.
[14:24.200 --> 14:24.490]  Where exactly?
[14:24.700 --> 14:26.210]  On Broadway, right a couple of blocks up.
[14:26.400 --> 14:26.580]  Really?
[14:26.730 --> 14:27.560]  Pine and...
[14:27.560 --> 14:28.640]  Between Pine and Cedar.
[14:28.990 --> 14:29.200]  Huh.
[14:29.420 --> 14:29.710]  Interesting.
[14:29.900 --> 14:31.780]  We saw them putting on the really heavy...
[14:31.780 --> 14:33.020]  And you were able to just walk right by them.
[14:33.140 --> 14:33.260]  Yeah.
[14:33.660 --> 14:35.590]  Well, they asked me to cross the street.
[14:36.640 --> 14:37.460]  Let's cross the street.
[14:37.560 --> 14:38.960]  Something might blow up in a minute.
[14:39.610 --> 14:39.970]  Okay.
[14:40.140 --> 14:43.350]  Well, it's probably just a sandwich somebody left at a Starbucks or something.
[14:43.560 --> 14:44.900]  It's crazy all over the place.
[14:44.900 --> 14:45.590]  Okay.
[14:45.830 --> 14:53.330]  And this story, too, despite all the ongoing privacy concerns and legal disputes involving companies bidding on the project, the U.S.
[14:53.490 --> 14:59.300]  State Department supposedly began issuing smart chip-embedded passports to Americans last Monday.
[14:59.420 --> 14:59.800]  Is this true?
[14:59.940 --> 15:00.800]  Did this actually start happening?
[15:00.990 --> 15:01.350]  I don't know.
[15:01.470 --> 15:02.700]  I have to renew my passport soon.
[15:02.710 --> 15:05.920]  I've come across a couple of stories in which they said, yes, it was.
[15:06.260 --> 15:06.460]  Really?
[15:06.460 --> 15:09.710]  I can tell you in a month or so, however long it takes.
[15:09.820 --> 15:13.470]  Well, I'd like to know now if anybody out there has gotten their passport in the last couple of days.
[15:13.660 --> 15:13.940]  Tell us.
[15:14.060 --> 15:15.380]  Well, I guess you wouldn't get it right away.
[15:15.520 --> 15:17.660]  But interesting.
[15:17.880 --> 15:23.470]  You're going to have a chip that contains all the data contained in the paper version, your name, your birth date, your gender.
[15:23.470 --> 15:27.830]  And it can be read by electronic scanners at airports that are so equipped.
[15:28.040 --> 15:32.830]  The State Department says they will speed up going through customs and help enhance border security.
[15:33.040 --> 15:37.900]  But privacy groups continue to raise concerns about the security of the electronic information.
[15:38.090 --> 15:48.300]  And a German computer security expert earlier this month demonstrated how personal information stored on the documents could be copied and transferred to another device.
[15:48.300 --> 15:59.820]  I never really understood this whole RFID and the passports thing anyway because all of the passports that are issued now have magnetically readable ink on the bottom of them.
[15:59.970 --> 16:05.380]  And there's going to be no substitute for showing the passport to the security agent anyway.
[16:05.610 --> 16:11.560]  And I just don't see the difference between scanning it through a magnetic reader and tapping it, you know, on an RFID reader.
[16:11.710 --> 16:13.020]  I just don't see the difference.
[16:13.020 --> 16:26.260]  Well, I mean, do you think this is something where perhaps a terminal will get overcrowded with people and they won't have time to have a face-to-face conversation with everybody so they'll just herd everyone through and just do a cursory glance to see that the picture matches or something like that?
[16:26.320 --> 16:27.710]  I mean, customs would never do that.
[16:27.970 --> 16:30.090]  That's not the direction we've been heading in lately anyway.
[16:30.200 --> 16:33.380]  Actually, last time I came into the country, it got like that and they just let everybody in.
[16:33.560 --> 16:36.820]  They didn't even check anybody because they were connecting flights.
[16:36.820 --> 16:37.760]  People were about to miss them.
[16:37.850 --> 16:39.820]  So they said, okay, everybody just come on in.
[16:40.330 --> 16:41.350]  And it was great.
[16:41.350 --> 16:42.490]  Just like the old days.
[16:43.390 --> 16:54.710]  But speaking of mass screening and quick, I guess, detection of things, Newburgh, New York.
[16:54.970 --> 16:55.520]  Yes.
[16:55.730 --> 16:58.280]  Newburgh City Police.
[16:58.520 --> 17:00.110]  This is New York, I believe.
[17:00.470 --> 17:01.110]  Yes.
[17:01.710 --> 17:06.200]  They will have one of the first automated license plate scanners in the area.
[17:06.860 --> 17:15.820]  This is like a hyper-fast cop typing in all the license plates he passes and it promises to catch scofflaws, drivers with lapsed insurance or registrations.
[17:17.080 --> 17:21.880]  The chief of police there said, one of the guys who trained us said it's almost not fair to criminals.
[17:22.160 --> 17:25.710]  The scanner is called the Mobile Plate Hunter 900.
[17:26.770 --> 17:33.080]  Yeah, it works with technology similar to the E-ZPass express lane sensors that commuters now have.
[17:33.340 --> 17:38.530]  Cameras mounted in the police car scan the surroundings and identify license plate shaped objects.
[17:38.990 --> 17:39.380]  Interesting.
[17:40.010 --> 17:44.010]  They read the numbers, they compare them against the data in the cruiser's laptop monitor.
[17:44.210 --> 17:49.440]  If a driver is wanted by police, if unpaid tickets have gone to warrant, the machine alerts the officer.
[17:49.710 --> 17:56.030]  The scanner can even read plates of oncoming cars while both the cruiser and the targeted vehicle are doing 75 miles per hour.
[17:56.100 --> 17:58.620]  So that's basically a combined speed of 150 miles an hour there.
[17:59.250 --> 18:02.470]  The scanner is capable of recognizing how many numbers a minute?
[18:02.580 --> 18:03.140]  Anybody want to guess?
[18:04.750 --> 18:05.530]  3,000?
[18:05.770 --> 18:06.490]  That's a good guess, Jim.
[18:06.550 --> 18:07.050]  Very good guess.
[18:07.160 --> 18:08.340]  Oh, I didn't even read the article.
[18:09.380 --> 18:09.530]  No.
[18:09.730 --> 18:11.160]  You're so wrong, but it's a good guess.
[18:12.060 --> 18:14.380]  No, I was just impressed with the speed when you came up with that.
[18:14.510 --> 18:16.270]  But, Mike, you seem to know.
[18:16.770 --> 18:17.050]  No.
[18:17.620 --> 18:18.180]  I don't know.
[18:18.290 --> 18:18.530]  Okay.
[18:18.710 --> 18:19.160]  So guess.
[18:19.290 --> 18:20.100]  How do I seem to know?
[18:20.210 --> 18:20.530]  I don't know.
[18:20.550 --> 18:21.710]  You have this smug look on your face.
[18:21.840 --> 18:22.550]  I'm going to guess.
[18:22.920 --> 18:23.660]  It's per minute?
[18:24.380 --> 18:24.920]  Per minute.
[18:25.080 --> 18:25.510]  No, per minute.
[18:25.620 --> 18:25.970]  Per minute?
[18:26.120 --> 18:26.230]  Yeah.
[18:27.360 --> 18:28.840]  How many license plates can it scan?
[18:29.080 --> 18:29.360]  120.
[18:29.820 --> 18:30.680]  That's a good guess, too.
[18:30.710 --> 18:31.820]  That's a better guess than Jim's.
[18:32.080 --> 18:32.900]  A better guess than Jim's.
[18:32.900 --> 18:33.750]  Okay, what's the answer?
[18:33.790 --> 18:35.940]  No, because he just said it with more assurance, I think.
[18:36.050 --> 18:36.920]  Oh, that's why it's better.
[18:37.010 --> 18:37.700]  Do you have a guess, Bernie?
[18:37.700 --> 18:38.140]  Go ahead.
[18:38.580 --> 18:40.530]  I would guess more than 300.
[18:40.920 --> 18:41.620]  More than 300?
[18:41.940 --> 18:42.250]  Yes.
[18:42.510 --> 18:43.290]  Okay, that's good, too.
[18:43.490 --> 18:44.010]  That's good.
[18:44.290 --> 18:45.360]  Do you know how I know this?
[18:45.580 --> 18:46.440]  How do you know this?
[18:46.640 --> 18:54.320]  Because I saw this type of system demonstrated at the CBIT trade show, technology show in Hanover, Germany, last year.
[18:54.400 --> 18:56.380]  And it was truly amazing.
[18:56.510 --> 19:01.140]  It had these little slide cars going around with mini license plates with a camera point on them.
[19:01.250 --> 19:03.840]  And these cars were flying by faster than you can see them.
[19:03.860 --> 19:06.860]  And it was racking up these plate numbers instantaneously.
[19:06.860 --> 19:08.340]  Hundreds, hundreds of minutes.
[19:08.470 --> 19:08.710]  Wait a minute.
[19:08.790 --> 19:09.440]  I'm concerned, though.
[19:09.510 --> 19:11.200]  How did these little cars...
[19:11.200 --> 19:13.580]  How are they driving around inside a conference really fast?
[19:13.880 --> 19:16.470]  Well, they had a slot car set up.
[19:16.600 --> 19:19.660]  You know, these model cars on little model cars going around a track.
[19:20.140 --> 19:20.920]  And they had cameras.
[19:21.030 --> 19:26.210]  It was sort of a miniature version of reality, where you have cameras and cars on highways.
[19:26.580 --> 19:27.050]  Okay.
[19:27.920 --> 19:36.750]  And the license plates were in all just really fascinating, as these license plates were in all kinds of different fonts, including Arabic, which, you know, I can't even read.
[19:36.990 --> 19:37.230]  Wow.
[19:37.360 --> 19:39.820]  It was catching these things hundreds a minute.
[19:39.960 --> 19:40.550]  I was really impressed.
[19:40.680 --> 19:42.030]  These were little tiny model cars?
[19:42.620 --> 19:42.970]  Yes.
[19:43.380 --> 19:44.400]  Running around a track.
[19:44.530 --> 19:44.900]  So...
[19:44.900 --> 19:45.440]  Like fly cars.
[19:45.600 --> 19:45.750]  So...
[19:45.750 --> 19:48.770]  Does this thing have some kind of magnifying glass, or can it really read things that small?
[19:48.770 --> 19:49.550]  No, it was a camera.
[19:49.750 --> 19:52.340]  It was probably just a couple of feet away from the cars.
[19:52.340 --> 19:54.920]  It was too scale, is what he's saying.
[19:55.360 --> 19:55.680]  Exactly.
[19:55.990 --> 19:59.030]  So they'll catch that Stuart Little sooner or later, I guess.
[19:59.290 --> 19:59.530]  All right.
[19:59.620 --> 20:03.210]  Well, the correct answer, by the way, is 10,000 numbers a minute.
[20:03.360 --> 20:06.490]  Oh, so since I was the closest without going over, I get one of these.
[20:06.580 --> 20:09.960]  Yeah, but your answer was just badly, badly worded and phrased and delivered.
[20:10.300 --> 20:10.900]  So, no.
[20:11.840 --> 20:13.940]  But 10,000 numbers a minute, that's something.
[20:14.050 --> 20:14.380]  That's a lot.
[20:14.460 --> 20:19.790]  What I want to know, though, is if a cop passes somebody going the other direction, 75 miles per hour, they're both doing 75...
[20:19.790 --> 20:20.490]  What do they do about it?
[20:20.490 --> 20:24.210]  How in God's name is he going to turn around, figure out which car it is, and get to him in time?
[20:24.360 --> 20:24.820]  I don't...
[20:24.820 --> 20:25.860]  And also, there's cops everywhere.
[20:26.100 --> 20:28.580]  Where are there 10,000 cars passing by in a minute?
[20:28.640 --> 20:29.550]  That was a thought, yeah.
[20:30.320 --> 20:32.340]  Well, let's say you pass by a huge parking lot.
[20:32.400 --> 20:32.770]  I don't know.
[20:32.920 --> 20:33.340]  I don't know.
[20:33.440 --> 20:33.900]  Why would you...
[20:33.900 --> 20:35.580]  Yeah, why would you need 10,000 numbers a minute?
[20:35.640 --> 20:36.270]  That's insane.
[20:37.720 --> 20:39.160]  I guess they can do it by airplane.
[20:39.440 --> 20:40.360]  I have to...
[20:40.360 --> 20:45.270]  I have to go out on a limb here and suggest civil disobedience for this.
[20:45.320 --> 20:47.530]  I am almost disgusted.
[20:47.750 --> 20:48.290]  Well, what does that mean?
[20:48.360 --> 20:49.530]  Does it not go outside your house ever?
[20:49.530 --> 20:50.180]  No, no, no.
[20:50.180 --> 20:53.640]  You know these things that you put on cars and on buses for advertising?
[20:54.140 --> 20:59.880]  Essentially, it's a plastic sheet with many little dots on it so you can see out, but people generally can't see in.
[20:59.960 --> 21:01.250]  What they see is the advertising.
[21:01.470 --> 21:01.620]  Okay.
[21:02.380 --> 21:10.290]  It's very common on buses, particularly buses in Las Vegas going to Las Vegas and other gambling destinations.
[21:10.680 --> 21:19.490]  But anyway, you make one of these with many, many illustrations of license plates on it and you put it on your car and all your friends' cars.
[21:19.490 --> 21:22.050]  I think that would drive this system batty.
[21:22.960 --> 21:23.180]  Okay.
[21:23.290 --> 21:24.340]  Well, that's something, I guess.
[21:24.420 --> 21:27.230]  But still, if it's reading 10,000 numbers a minute, I don't think it's going to make a dent.
[21:28.620 --> 21:31.230]  It'll have 50 more that go nowhere.
[21:31.510 --> 21:35.200]  But Jim, it's just going to ignore those ones and give you the right ones and then say, hey, go get this guy.
[21:35.320 --> 21:39.580]  What I'm curious about, though, does it also tell you the kind of car that is attached to it?
[21:39.660 --> 21:41.010]  So, you know, how's a cop going to know?
[21:41.010 --> 21:44.580]  It should tell you the type of car that it should be attached to.
[21:44.900 --> 22:00.180]  That's a common feature of most databases that police have access to from their vehicles because, obviously, it's an often committed crime, especially for robbers and burglars, to put a license plate that doesn't belong on the car on a given car.
[22:00.180 --> 22:07.660]  If they've stolen one car, they'll go somewhere else, get a license plate off of somebody who's parked in their own driveway, put that on.
[22:07.790 --> 22:19.160]  So if the first car is, you know, a license plate, ABC, whatever, it's a green Ford, it's been stolen, they're driving around in a green Ford, but the license plate is 123, the cops will not match it.
[22:19.440 --> 22:22.320]  Now, when you're parked in your own driveway, you can cover up your license plate, right?
[22:22.420 --> 22:25.020]  I mean, I don't know why you want to exactly, but you could.
[22:25.140 --> 22:28.980]  If you have parking tickets, you could put like a thing over your car, like it's a new car or something like that.
[22:29.100 --> 22:34.020]  I know you can legally park it in a garage, you can legally park it behind a fence.
[22:34.020 --> 22:36.860]  I'm not sure if you can block the license plate.
[22:36.960 --> 22:37.720]  On your own property.
[22:37.860 --> 22:38.740]  I am not sure.
[22:38.880 --> 22:39.460]  I'm sure you can.
[22:39.840 --> 22:41.080]  I don't think that's going to do very much.
[22:41.100 --> 22:44.600]  If there's any NYPD officer out there, I'd love to hear about that one.
[22:44.620 --> 22:46.050]  Yeah, because they know the law so well.
[22:46.050 --> 22:46.840]  They really do.
[22:46.980 --> 22:48.660]  No, but they know what they're likely to do.
[22:48.780 --> 22:51.680]  Yeah, you can't take pictures of that building because it's the Patriot Act.
[22:51.840 --> 22:54.520]  No, they may not know the law, but they know what they're going to do.
[22:54.640 --> 22:56.580]  Well, that's true, but that's two totally different things.
[22:56.740 --> 23:01.280]  What I'm concerned about, though, they're driving up and down streets, photographing license plates immediately.
[23:04.020 --> 23:05.640]  They're parked, like, crammed right next to each other.
[23:05.740 --> 23:06.660]  I don't know if that's even possible.
[23:07.260 --> 23:07.500]  Yep.
[23:07.960 --> 23:08.580]  It is possible?
[23:09.080 --> 23:09.440]  Absolutely.
[23:09.600 --> 23:10.280]  How do they do that?
[23:11.080 --> 23:16.460]  Because the optical character recognition software, these algorithms are really well written.
[23:16.880 --> 23:17.920]  And you could have...
[23:17.920 --> 23:21.480]  You could just point this at a parking lot, and it would snag them all.
[23:21.550 --> 23:23.400]  Yeah, but a parking lot, the cars are facing out.
[23:23.420 --> 23:27.420]  If you're parked down a street, you could be, like, crammed one inch away from the car in front of you.
[23:27.420 --> 23:28.640]  Yeah, I mean, if somebody is...
[23:28.640 --> 23:38.720]  If you're backed into another car, and there's only, like, an inch between your car and the car behind you when you're parked, obviously, it's not going to see that license plate, which I recommend to everyone else.
[23:38.720 --> 23:39.460]  That's what we have to do, then.
[23:39.500 --> 23:45.680]  We have to park as close to the car in front of us and in back of us as possible, which means we have to really brush up on our parallel parking skills.
[23:46.040 --> 23:46.240]  Yep.
[23:46.240 --> 23:46.840]  All right.
[23:47.100 --> 23:48.440]  Now we know how to fight this.
[23:48.600 --> 24:00.860]  I don't see most of the features of this device, though, as being actually usable or enforceable, because, like you said, I mean, how are you going to possibly enforce violations when you've got, you know, that many cars coming at you on a highway going in the opposite direction?
[24:01.050 --> 24:01.740]  Yeah, but think about it.
[24:01.840 --> 24:10.860]  Amber Alerts, instantly they'll find the guy and just go beyond the Amber Alerts to just someone suspected of something, you know, treason or God knows what.
[24:11.380 --> 24:12.180]  It'll be so easy.
[24:12.280 --> 24:13.640]  You can't even leave your house.
[24:13.640 --> 24:22.240]  Well, E-ZPass already does this for running tolls or having a low balance or using a tag in a vehicle that you don't register to.
[24:22.290 --> 24:24.440]  But generally, you know where the E-ZPass detectors are.
[24:24.540 --> 24:27.620]  I know there are some hidden ones, but generally, you know where they are.
[24:27.740 --> 24:28.340]  This could be anywhere.
[24:28.460 --> 24:41.200]  I have a challenge for the community of our listeners, and that is the challenge to design an infrastructure for a congestion charging program where it costs money to drive in a city that does not destroy privacy.
[24:41.200 --> 24:43.920]  I'm very interested in if that problem can be solved.
[24:44.860 --> 24:45.120]  Okay.
[24:45.220 --> 24:47.960]  None of the powers that be are interested, but I am.
[24:48.660 --> 24:48.900]  Yeah.
[24:49.320 --> 24:49.480]  All right.
[24:49.520 --> 24:53.580]  Moving on to tapping and listening in and things like that.
[24:54.280 --> 24:57.500]  This is rather interesting from Australia.
[24:57.680 --> 25:10.160]  New South Wales Deputy Premier John Watkins is demanding ride council in Sydney's Northwest come clean about monitoring devices that have been placed in thousands of residents' trash bins.
[25:10.680 --> 25:11.140]  Yes.
[25:11.320 --> 25:20.500]  Mr. Watkins says the council has placed tracking devices in up to 90,000 bins to monitor the level of waste coming from each household.
[25:21.200 --> 25:28.620]  He says the council has failed to consult ratepayers about the installation of microchips in garbage bins and that residents need to know what is behind the bin bugging.
[25:28.740 --> 25:31.980]  Will it result in higher rates or increased charges for heavier bin loads?
[25:31.980 --> 25:36.320]  He said, residents really deserve to know the answer before the surveillance starts, not after.
[25:36.980 --> 25:39.290]  Residents, at the end of the day, are paying for this covert caper.
[25:39.400 --> 25:41.000]  They have a right to know what's going on.
[25:41.810 --> 25:43.380]  It's kind of distressing.
[25:43.380 --> 25:47.240]  And the same thing with the clipper chip and various other instances like this.
[25:48.130 --> 25:49.020]  Digital telephony.
[25:49.200 --> 25:56.680]  People are more concerned about who's paying for it rather than the fact that you have this big brother-ish type of thing watching what you're doing, watching your garbage now.
[25:56.680 --> 25:58.640]  You have to give me that article.
[25:58.820 --> 26:05.420]  My sister lives in New South Wales and her boyfriend is a bigwig in the government there.
[26:05.550 --> 26:08.400]  And I can see if I can dig anything up on that.
[26:08.880 --> 26:09.080]  Okay.
[26:09.290 --> 26:10.660]  And find out how much waste he produces.
[26:11.140 --> 26:13.440]  Because that's apparently what they want to know about.
[26:13.980 --> 26:29.920]  And continuing along with weird surveillance, Bernie, I think you're the one who alerted me to this story, they actually, the whole JonBenet Ramsey, which of course is the main topic of the story of the show tonight is going to be, the whole JonBenet Ramsey thing is back in the news.
[26:30.080 --> 26:39.660]  But apparently, apparently what they have been doing over the last 10 years in order to solicit a confession from somebody, they wiretapped her grave.
[26:39.660 --> 26:40.820]  Is this correct?
[26:41.540 --> 26:59.100]  Yeah, they set up a transmitter, a little radio transmitter with a microphone and somehow concealed it near the grave tombstone of JonBenet Ramsey, the six-year-old girl, hoping to eavesdrop on any confession as someone walks up to the grave and says,
[26:59.200 --> 27:00.600]  I'm sorry, I killed you, or whatever.
[27:01.360 --> 27:02.620]  This is really bizarre.
[27:03.040 --> 27:05.480]  I mean, people say all kinds of things in front of tombstones.
[27:06.240 --> 27:07.460]  And who knows?
[27:07.680 --> 27:09.340]  I mean, this is a real private thing.
[27:09.420 --> 27:14.080]  Who knows how many people walked up to that tombstone and said things that they wouldn't say in public?
[27:15.240 --> 27:20.760]  Well, no disrespect intended to any dead people anywhere, and especially not in this case.
[27:20.880 --> 27:32.580]  But man, if you know where she's buried and you go up to that tombstone and you just start rattling off all this nonsense about terrorism and killing people and various things like that, do you really think that the black cars will come?
[27:33.350 --> 27:35.380]  Well, apparently they were monitoring this stuff.
[27:35.520 --> 27:38.120]  I don't know where they had their monitoring station.
[27:38.120 --> 27:42.380]  It had to have been not too far away to pick up the signal, maybe within a mile or so.
[27:42.380 --> 27:51.790]  But I'm curious as to how they powered this device, too, whether it was an electro, you know, some kind of photovoltaic cell or whether it was batteries they had to replace every so often.
[27:51.820 --> 27:53.180]  But it's an intriguing idea.
[27:53.180 --> 27:56.600]  So the next time you're in front of a tombstone, be careful what you say.
[27:56.660 --> 28:07.580]  Yeah, and it definitely wouldn't be cool for you to go there with like a recorder or something, a tape recorder, and leave that there playing suspicious things so that when they do come charging into the cemetery, all they find is a machine and not a person.
[28:07.740 --> 28:08.220]  Don't do that.
[28:09.050 --> 28:12.220]  Was there someone there like listening to this thing 24-7?
[28:12.520 --> 28:14.820]  Well, I don't think it was somebody sitting next to the grave in a chair.
[28:15.260 --> 28:15.920]  How do they know?
[28:16.020 --> 28:20.520]  Someone could go up there all the time and say, I killed her, and they have to listen.
[28:20.640 --> 28:24.540]  How long before every tombstone is equipped with some kind of monitoring device?
[28:24.540 --> 28:30.000]  Because people do confess not only killing the person, but maybe tax fraud, maybe infidelity.
[28:30.140 --> 28:32.080]  A private detective might be interested in this.
[28:32.460 --> 28:33.320]  Yeah, so...
[28:33.760 --> 28:34.500]  Call Steve Rambam.
[28:34.540 --> 28:35.880]  You think you're safe in the grave?
[28:35.880 --> 28:37.140]  No, no, think again.
[28:37.500 --> 28:48.920]  Now, everybody knows, or it seems very likely, that this man who has confessed is a little unstable and possibly not the murderer.
[28:49.040 --> 28:49.460]  Gee, you think?
[28:49.900 --> 29:02.180]  So, assuming that he's not, and now that the news that the grave has been bugged is out, are they going to continue when they get back to knowing that they need a confession?
[29:02.850 --> 29:06.550]  Or has this sort of spoiled this line of inquiry?
[29:07.660 --> 29:11.050]  Well, I hope we didn't spoil it, because that wasn't really a front-page story, was it?
[29:11.780 --> 29:12.260]  That they...
[29:12.260 --> 29:14.400]  No, I think I was just buried inside a story that...
[29:14.400 --> 29:15.720]  Yeah, by the way, they did this as well.
[29:15.860 --> 29:17.240]  Nice use of words, buried.
[29:17.500 --> 29:19.540]  Yeah, well, that wasn't intentional.
[29:20.290 --> 29:23.780]  Okay, moving on to phone companies and fun things like that.
[29:23.860 --> 29:26.540]  Now, Verizon really pulled a good one this week.
[29:26.540 --> 29:43.640]  Now, a tax was eliminated, and the very same day, I believe, that the tax was eliminated, the federal tax called the Universal Service Fund on DSL customers, Verizon went and replaced it with its own fee that comes out to be about four cents less.
[29:43.960 --> 29:46.720]  And that money goes directly to Verizon now.
[29:47.620 --> 29:50.240]  Bernie, is this kind of thing something we should be surprised at?
[29:50.840 --> 29:56.100]  Well, I mean, if there's any doubt that Verizon was a really sleazy company, this should remove all doubt.
[29:56.580 --> 29:57.460]  And this is...
[29:57.460 --> 29:59.080]  We're talking about a few dollars a month here.
[29:59.240 --> 30:17.920]  I mean, a typical Verizon DSL customer would pay 30-some dollars a year for this federal excise tax, which was going to the Universal Service Fund, which was ruled unconstitutional recently in federal court, and phone companies no longer allowed to charge it.
[30:17.920 --> 30:34.820]  Verizon just sort of came up with this ambiguously vague-named fee for, like, the cost for them to collect whatever, and charged almost exactly the same amount to their customers, hoping that their customers would not see any difference in their bill,
[30:34.900 --> 30:43.120]  and therefore they wouldn't complain, like, about this new fee, because they were... the previous month they were being charged a tax for that same amount.
[30:43.290 --> 30:44.240]  It's really sleazy.
[30:44.380 --> 30:46.080]  And this is a huge amount of money.
[30:46.080 --> 30:51.520]  This is, like, millions and millions of dollars Verizon was trying to scam out of their customers by coming up with this bogus fee.
[30:51.900 --> 30:55.480]  It almost maxed exactly the amount of tax that they weren't allowed to charge anymore.
[30:55.680 --> 31:02.540]  Well, again, it's millions of dollars, but for us, it's just a couple of bucks, so we're not going to complain, especially since the money is not changing.
[31:02.540 --> 31:03.550]  We're not seeing a rise.
[31:03.600 --> 31:05.000]  We're actually seeing it go down a little bit.
[31:05.120 --> 31:08.860]  So, hey, it's smoke and mirrors, and they'll probably get away with it.
[31:09.140 --> 31:21.000]  Most people look at the bottom line on their phone bill, and, you know, if that hasn't changed much, especially if it's a DSL account, it's not going to change if you, you know, if you don't make any phone calls and it's just using DSL alone, it's going to be a fixed rate.
[31:21.050 --> 31:25.260]  And if it only is the same, if it's only off a few cents a month, nobody's going to notice anything.
[31:25.260 --> 31:28.820]  I would bet you the vast majority of Verizon DSL comes to customers.
[31:28.940 --> 31:31.780]  And Bell South pulled the same dirty trick as well, by the way.
[31:32.330 --> 31:37.960]  If customers don't see any change in their bottom line bill, they're not going to pay any attention.
[31:38.180 --> 31:43.280]  And that's exactly what Verizon and Bell South were planning to do, and it's just the ultimate in sleaze.
[31:43.420 --> 31:48.000]  Now, Mike, you have a late-breaking story on new Verizon charges, I believe.
[31:48.240 --> 32:03.580]  Yeah, well, this is an article that I read this week, and it's called Verizon introduces a new charge you at whim plan, which is apparently a new service package for its wireless and residential customers that would charge them widely varying, but always high fees every month,
[32:03.720 --> 32:07.020]  depending on how the communications giant feels at the time.
[32:07.260 --> 32:24.780]  The Verizon spokesman says, our charge at whim packages offer the same mediocre quality and insufferable level of customer service you've come to expect, but it adds an unjustified, arbitrary, and if you'll allow us to boast, frankly unjustifiable method of determining just how much you'll pay for them.
[32:24.780 --> 32:32.620]  And packages start at, he says, oh, $69.99 a month, let's say, and went into effect about three or four months ago.
[32:33.440 --> 32:33.880]  Unbelievable.
[32:34.240 --> 32:34.790]  It really...
[32:34.790 --> 32:36.540]  I have trouble believing it myself.
[32:36.580 --> 32:39.540]  I have trouble distinguishing fact from fiction these days, and...
[32:39.540 --> 32:40.700]  It comes from a good source, though.
[32:40.820 --> 32:41.600]  What source would that be?
[32:42.050 --> 32:42.720]  The Onion.
[32:42.900 --> 32:43.220]  The Onion.
[32:43.380 --> 32:45.280]  Okay, well, they've never been wrong before, that's for sure.
[32:46.140 --> 32:48.240]  All right, and continuing on with Verizon here.
[32:48.360 --> 32:52.720]  Verizon is considering selling its landlines.
[32:52.720 --> 32:58.440]  This is what the company was for in the first place, phone connections, you know, the wire that goes to your house.
[32:58.700 --> 32:59.920]  No, they want to get out of that business.
[33:00.050 --> 33:06.860]  They want to sell their landlines in New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont, the company's entertaining offers from more than one company to purchase them.
[33:07.260 --> 33:15.460]  The sale of the 1.6 million telephone lines and polls in the three states could net Verizon between $2 billion and $3 billion.
[33:15.900 --> 33:18.840]  Now, I'm wondering, do you think they're going to sell these, like, you know, poll by poll?
[33:18.980 --> 33:20.320]  Because I could go in for one poll.
[33:20.480 --> 33:21.360]  I'd like to have a poll.
[33:21.360 --> 33:22.640]  Well, yeah, it could be fun.
[33:22.760 --> 33:24.960]  Wouldn't it be fun to just buy somebody's poll in Connecticut?
[33:25.240 --> 33:25.540]  Wait.
[33:25.790 --> 33:28.080]  And then they got to pay you some kind of fee or something like that?
[33:28.200 --> 33:29.680]  Why don't we go in as a group?
[33:29.920 --> 33:33.200]  We'll buy everything from the central office to one specific phone.
[33:33.860 --> 33:35.680]  Our friend Bobcat, that would be perfect.
[33:35.960 --> 33:38.540]  From Bobcat's phone to the central office.
[33:39.800 --> 33:40.600]  Okay, great.
[33:40.860 --> 33:42.700]  We charge them, say, $1,000 a month.
[33:42.940 --> 33:43.980]  All right, I like the sound of that.
[33:44.960 --> 33:46.320]  Continuing with Verizon.
[33:47.120 --> 33:48.260]  Actually, this isn't just Verizon.
[33:48.260 --> 33:49.480]  This is a bunch of different companies.
[33:50.220 --> 33:53.880]  After years of hesitation, some of the largest wireless companies in the U.S.
[33:53.920 --> 34:02.280]  are starting to allow advertising on their cell phone networks with the hope that these small screens eventually will rival the Internet as a powerful marketing venue.
[34:02.820 --> 34:12.160]  Sprint, Nextel, and Verizon Wireless have both been running trials of banner ads on their wireless information and entertainment services since earlier this year.
[34:12.500 --> 34:16.480]  Sprint is planning to make an announcement about its ads program in the coming weeks.
[34:16.480 --> 34:17.340]  Looking forward to that, Bernie.
[34:17.980 --> 34:28.480]  According to people familiar with its plan, Sprint is also conducting trials of video ads which appear for 10 seconds or so before the desired service appears.
[34:29.140 --> 34:29.980]  Oh, my God.
[34:29.980 --> 34:30.820]  I can't believe it.
[34:30.960 --> 34:33.570]  So you guys are going to have to deal with advertising on your phones?
[34:33.820 --> 34:34.520]  Here's the thing.
[34:35.480 --> 34:37.760]  Accessing these services is very expensive.
[34:37.760 --> 34:39.220]  I pay by the kilobyte.
[34:39.300 --> 34:40.780]  A lot of people pay by the kilobyte.
[34:40.860 --> 34:46.050]  If a banner ad is a few kilobytes, you have to pay to look at this stupid ad.
[34:46.050 --> 34:52.040]  But besides wasting the time downloading over the not particularly fast connection, it's really bad.
[34:52.240 --> 34:53.720]  Companies have done that for a long time, actually.
[34:54.020 --> 35:01.220]  I used to get SMSs when AT&T was popular before they converted over to Singular all the time about new AT&T services.
[35:01.420 --> 35:07.700]  And if you were paying by the text message on a particular service plan, you got charged for that.
[35:07.920 --> 35:10.700]  Well, I've heard about that from a bunch of different people.
[35:10.780 --> 35:12.020]  This has been going on for a long time.
[35:12.020 --> 35:13.720]  But I don't know.
[35:14.240 --> 35:17.840]  It's only recently that I've started seeing this on my phone.
[35:19.260 --> 35:25.720]  On T-Mobile, has anybody gotten that kind of spam, I guess, on a T-Mobile phone?
[35:26.570 --> 35:26.980]  No?
[35:27.150 --> 35:27.570]  I don't know.
[35:27.740 --> 35:28.880]  I just started getting it recently.
[35:29.050 --> 35:30.550]  I'm actually looking for a message right now.
[35:31.220 --> 35:33.650]  Scrolling through the hundreds of messages I've gotten in the last couple of days.
[35:33.650 --> 35:38.840]  A lot of the times, if the carrier sends you the text message, it doesn't count as part of your...
[35:38.840 --> 35:39.280]  Yeah, I know.
[35:39.360 --> 35:45.040]  But it still makes you look at your phone and read something that you really shouldn't be reading.
[35:45.240 --> 35:52.110]  I also don't know who has the time to actually verify their bill that closely that they didn't, in fact, get charged for that message.
[35:53.300 --> 35:56.920]  Sometimes it's broken down by the number that sent it to you.
[35:57.040 --> 35:58.200]  And I don't know.
[35:58.520 --> 36:00.150]  It gets complex, I guess.
[36:00.320 --> 36:00.550]  Yeah.
[36:00.670 --> 36:01.040]  Here it is.
[36:01.040 --> 36:04.300]  It always goes to something called Blinko.
[36:04.880 --> 36:06.980]  It says, Blinko Editor's Pick.
[36:07.070 --> 36:08.240]  I don't know who this Blinko is.
[36:08.240 --> 36:09.130]  I think that's the company.
[36:09.610 --> 36:11.300]  It always says that in the openings.
[36:11.300 --> 36:14.800]  And it comes from extension 42222.
[36:15.540 --> 36:18.340]  And it tells you to reply with a certain text to this thing.
[36:18.460 --> 36:22.320]  And I'd like to reply with something else that maybe will take down their server or something like that.
[36:22.440 --> 36:26.380]  Because these people are sending me messages on my phone, which I did not ask for.
[36:26.570 --> 36:27.900]  They're invading my privacy.
[36:28.150 --> 36:29.200]  They're annoying me.
[36:29.320 --> 36:30.020]  They're causing me grief.
[36:30.020 --> 36:32.610]  And I'd like to return the favor, if at all possible.
[36:32.720 --> 36:34.070]  So if anyone can figure out a way.
[36:34.220 --> 36:45.960]  Although it is ridiculously simple for anybody to simply log on to email or something like that and just scroll through all the T-Mobile possible numbers or Verizon numbers.
[36:46.590 --> 36:48.980]  It's as easy to do as email spam.
[36:48.980 --> 36:52.820]  Because almost every cell phone number has an email address assigned that's accessible.
[36:53.170 --> 36:53.260]  Yeah.
[36:53.340 --> 36:55.240]  I'm actually surprised there isn't a lot more of that going on.
[36:55.460 --> 36:55.520]  Right.
[36:56.380 --> 37:03.720]  Plus, you know, T-Mobile, actually, I don't know if this still works, but you cannot send cuss words through email to a T-Mobile phone.
[37:03.880 --> 37:04.320]  Do you know this?
[37:04.500 --> 37:04.980]  Try it.
[37:05.000 --> 37:05.740]  We've tested this.
[37:05.960 --> 37:06.150]  We've tested this.
[37:06.240 --> 37:10.320]  If you've tried it, and obviously we can't give examples over the air, but SMS works fine.
[37:10.320 --> 37:15.840]  But if you were to send an email to a T-Mobile phone and put in a certain word, either the...
[37:15.840 --> 37:17.020]  I think the mail just doesn't get delivered.
[37:17.020 --> 37:17.590]  I think it doesn't get delivered.
[37:17.590 --> 37:19.780]  It doesn't get delivered, and you don't get a bounce, so you don't even know.
[37:19.880 --> 37:20.280]  But try it out.
[37:20.380 --> 37:24.380]  If you know somebody with a T-Mobile phone, send a good cuss message out to them.
[37:24.540 --> 37:26.320]  It's got to be one of the seven dirty words, I think.
[37:27.050 --> 37:28.300]  And see if it ever gets to them.
[37:28.400 --> 37:29.000]  I don't think it will.
[37:29.800 --> 37:30.050]  All right.
[37:31.300 --> 37:31.550]  Emmanuel.
[37:31.820 --> 37:32.440]  Yes, go ahead, Bernie.
[37:33.110 --> 37:39.550]  One more phone company-related story, and this is really related to Boeing, the aircraft company.
[37:39.550 --> 37:48.360]  They've announced that they're going to cancel their Connection in-flight internet access, which they spent over a billion dollars developing over the past few years.
[37:48.500 --> 37:49.440]  This was a service.
[37:49.630 --> 37:53.650]  It was a Wi-Fi service in a jet airline.
[37:54.070 --> 37:59.720]  In fact, Laszlo and I used that service on a Lusanza flight back from Budapest earlier this year.
[37:59.760 --> 38:06.360]  And it worked nicely for browsing email and instant messaging and web browsing.
[38:06.360 --> 38:11.020]  But I did some trace routes and discovered the latency was like up to 1,000 milliseconds.
[38:11.840 --> 38:15.650]  So voice over IP and other stuff like that was just out of the question.
[38:16.790 --> 38:22.200]  So they had given us free 30-minute promotional cards to use, so it didn't cost us anything.
[38:22.200 --> 38:36.980]  But personally, I think one of the reasons this project went belly up was that we discussed on the show a few months ago that the United States government under the Patriot Act and the U.S.
[38:37.070 --> 38:48.300]  Marshall Service were insisting that they have real-time access to monitor all communications to and from an airplane and to have free access to that communications medium.
[38:48.590 --> 38:55.630]  So my guess is that that is probably what may have been the final straw to break the back of this project.
[38:56.360 --> 38:58.760]  It would probably be very expensive for the U.S.
[38:58.840 --> 39:12.550]  Marshals to monitor all these Wi-Fi connections on a plane and be able to individually or collectively terminate all the connections, which is what the law requires.
[39:12.880 --> 39:17.090]  And Boeing probably just threw in the towel and said, we can't even possibly do this for you guys.
[39:17.710 --> 39:20.040]  So thanks to your government, you can't have Wi-Fi on a plane.
[39:20.240 --> 39:20.670]  Well, okay.
[39:20.740 --> 39:22.340]  That is, in fact, the reason why.
[39:22.440 --> 39:23.550]  A billion dollars to develop this.
[39:23.700 --> 39:29.800]  It could also just be that if it costs a billion dollars to make, that what they have to charge their customers is more than anyone wants to pay.
[39:29.800 --> 39:30.630]  Okay.
[39:31.260 --> 39:31.700]  Email.
[39:31.900 --> 39:35.070]  Our email address, as always, O-T-H at 2600.com.
[39:35.150 --> 39:36.020]  We love hearing from you.
[39:36.200 --> 39:39.940]  And we'll be taking phone calls in just a moment, 212-209-2900.
[39:40.570 --> 39:48.800]  Got a lot of responses from people sending in their local ANAC numbers, which basically is an automatic number announcement.
[39:49.130 --> 39:50.340]  Tells you what your phone number is.
[39:50.610 --> 39:56.130]  In our area, it's, I believe, 958 or 9580 or various variations thereof.
[39:57.190 --> 40:03.070]  TJ says, a ringback number I found in Colorado Springs, Colorado, is 999 plus any four digits.
[40:03.200 --> 40:05.170]  It does not require the area code.
[40:06.170 --> 40:09.540]  Phil writes in and says, I'm responding to your request for information about phone numbers.
[40:09.540 --> 40:11.480]  You can dial to have your own phone number read out.
[40:11.780 --> 40:21.880]  Anyone on MTS, which is Manitoba Telecom Systems in Canada, which covers all of Manitoba, can just dial 644-4444.
[40:21.880 --> 40:26.200]  And a recording will read out whatever phone number this number has been dialed from.
[40:26.860 --> 40:32.520]  We also got some mail about the differences between caller ID and ANI.
[40:33.070 --> 40:39.920]  In a recent Off the Hook, you were very briefly talking about VoIP, voiceover IP, and 800 numbers, and ANI.
[40:39.920 --> 40:43.280]  I happen to have 800 numbers and use VoIP, so I was able to do tests.
[40:43.590 --> 40:54.420]  Using IAX2 providers such as voxy.com or voipjet.com that allow you to send any caller ID you want, the ANI actually shows up as the caller ID you send.
[40:54.610 --> 40:55.440]  Very interesting.
[40:56.050 --> 41:03.610]  Using foreign VoIP providers such as voipcheap.com or similar, your ANI shows up as some 212 number.
[41:03.820 --> 41:08.440]  I called that number and was asked to enter a card number after having been able to choose between Spanish and English.
[41:08.440 --> 41:11.380]  It sounds like some low-budget calling card service.
[41:11.610 --> 41:12.520]  Signed, CyberToy.
[41:12.590 --> 41:13.360]  Thanks for that information.
[41:13.540 --> 41:14.540]  And also this letter.
[41:14.840 --> 41:22.800]  In reference to your discussion on August 9th of anonymous 800 numbers, I would like to point out that the ANI transfer does not always match the calling party's number.
[41:22.940 --> 41:25.150]  In most cases it will, but there are exceptions.
[41:25.700 --> 41:28.860]  The same applies with cell phone calls to other cells.
[41:29.020 --> 41:32.110]  Sometimes the number used to identify the cell is a completely different number.
[41:32.340 --> 41:36.170]  Of course, it can be tracked back to the call originator, so the NSA will find us.
[41:36.650 --> 41:38.050]  Thanks very much for sending it in.
[41:38.050 --> 41:41.590]  And Brandon, Kevin, you've done some research into this, I believe.
[41:41.800 --> 41:45.070]  And, well, the difference basically between ANI and caller ID.
[41:45.460 --> 41:49.220]  If I understand it correctly, ANI is the billing number usually.
[41:49.420 --> 41:53.280]  Yeah, there's absolutely no way you can really block ANI or spoof it.
[41:53.480 --> 41:54.240]  It's there.
[41:54.420 --> 41:57.240]  But you can spoof, as everyone knows, caller ID.
[41:58.110 --> 42:01.590]  How does that, basically, these voip companies allow you to do that?
[42:01.880 --> 42:03.760]  And it's still going on to this day?
[42:04.380 --> 42:06.720]  It's kind of discreet.
[42:07.070 --> 42:10.500]  Some companies will let you do it and just kind of put a blind eye towards it.
[42:10.650 --> 42:13.200]  Others are much more thorough with no.
[42:13.650 --> 42:13.840]  Yeah.
[42:14.380 --> 42:16.170]  But the ANI, is it always sent?
[42:16.650 --> 42:17.050]  No.
[42:17.260 --> 42:17.840]  It's not always sent.
[42:17.900 --> 42:19.200]  What determines whether or not it gets sent?
[42:19.960 --> 42:20.650]  Crazy things.
[42:20.840 --> 42:21.070]  Really?
[42:21.170 --> 42:21.500]  Crazy things.
[42:21.500 --> 42:29.040]  But you can cause an ANI fail, which will just send the caller ID number of the CO, which is usually your area code in 000000.
[42:29.610 --> 42:32.280]  And then you get a confused operator that asks for your number.
[42:32.440 --> 42:35.590]  And then, I believe that's a way to fake out ANI, because you tell her your number.
[42:35.780 --> 42:37.960]  And then, isn't ANI then transferred from that point on?
[42:38.550 --> 42:39.000]  Somewhat.
[42:39.000 --> 42:39.360]  But no.
[42:39.520 --> 42:43.240]  Most calling centers don't have the ability to forward ANI.
[42:43.340 --> 42:48.880]  So you can cause an ANI fail, call one of these 800 numbers, because they can't forward the ANI.
[42:49.200 --> 42:52.240]  It's an ANI fail, and you technically, anonymously call these.
[42:52.540 --> 42:52.880]  Really?
[42:53.020 --> 42:53.200]  Okay.
[42:53.420 --> 42:53.760]  Interesting.
[42:53.760 --> 42:56.380]  So, yeah, there's a lot of differences out there.
[42:56.880 --> 42:59.110]  People think that you send your number...
[42:59.110 --> 43:14.440]  For instance, if you have like an office line or something like that, and you call somebody using that office line, and ANI is registered, say call an 800 number, and it shows up on some ANI monitoring screen, you'll probably see the number for the main office of your organization,
[43:14.440 --> 43:16.540]  because that's the billing number.
[43:17.090 --> 43:19.670]  Whereas caller ID, you'll see the actual POTS line.
[43:19.800 --> 43:20.540]  You'll see that number.
[43:20.540 --> 43:25.480]  And a lot of people don't realize that that information is accessible in so many different ways.
[43:25.480 --> 43:30.320]  For instance, as we mentioned, faking out caller ID, and we've played with this a number of times.
[43:30.500 --> 43:37.170]  If you simply change the number that's calling somebody, well, what do you think is going to happen?
[43:37.380 --> 43:42.080]  The phone company that delivers that information is also going to do a lookup on that number and deliver the name.
[43:42.600 --> 43:44.000]  And it's brilliant.
[43:44.000 --> 43:44.700]  It really is.
[43:45.730 --> 43:47.560]  Let's say you have a phone number.
[43:47.680 --> 43:48.500]  You don't know who it belongs to.
[43:48.520 --> 43:55.100]  You simply figure out a way to spoof caller ID, send that number to you, and then you'll see the name of the person attached to it.
[43:55.180 --> 43:56.420]  And there's no way to block that.
[43:56.560 --> 43:57.260]  There's no way to block that.
[43:57.260 --> 44:00.620]  It's a very cool lookup table that you have access to when you do that stuff.
[44:00.660 --> 44:03.920]  And the thing is that you're not bothering anybody either, because you're not ringing their phone to get that information.
[44:04.060 --> 44:05.620]  You're not calling somebody in social engineering.
[44:05.680 --> 44:07.520]  You're simply changing a number in a setting.
[44:07.920 --> 44:08.700]  It's that simple.
[44:08.700 --> 44:14.800]  And whether or not you have an unlisted number, it's irrelevant because that caller ID information is almost always sent out.
[44:14.940 --> 44:17.400]  Very few people think to change the name on their caller ID.
[44:17.580 --> 44:22.060]  And that's something that people think they're protected against when they, you know, unlist themselves.
[44:22.280 --> 44:22.480]  Yeah.
[44:22.620 --> 44:23.320]  And that's caller ID.
[44:23.420 --> 44:29.200]  A&I, that's, as Kevin said, that's difficult to block, impossible to spoof.
[44:29.360 --> 44:29.860]  Almost impossible.
[44:29.940 --> 44:30.640]  I don't think it's impossible.
[44:30.720 --> 44:31.920]  I think it's almost impossible.
[44:31.920 --> 44:34.680]  Well, it's not really difficult to spoof.
[44:34.840 --> 44:35.760]  It's actually quite easy.
[44:35.940 --> 44:39.240]  AT&T kindly provided a number that will just cause an A&I fail.
[44:39.860 --> 44:40.820]  Yeah, that's a failure.
[44:41.060 --> 44:42.520]  You want to send a fake A&I.
[44:43.140 --> 44:43.960]  That's what you want to do.
[44:44.240 --> 44:45.220]  Is it easy to do that?
[44:45.440 --> 44:45.620]  No.
[44:45.880 --> 44:46.060]  Okay.
[44:46.220 --> 44:47.000]  That's the part.
[44:47.120 --> 44:48.860]  That's what we're striving for here.
[44:49.920 --> 44:50.240]  Okay.
[44:50.400 --> 44:51.680]  We have other pieces of mail here.
[44:52.160 --> 44:53.080]  Greetings, Off the Hook crew.
[44:53.180 --> 44:55.360]  Why is the Uncensored Off the Hook not listed in the archives?
[44:55.500 --> 44:56.320]  I'd really like to hear it.
[44:56.420 --> 44:56.820]  Signed, Eric.
[44:57.160 --> 44:59.120]  Well, Eric, actually, it's online.
[44:59.120 --> 45:00.140]  It's not in the archives.
[45:00.360 --> 45:01.900]  I guess we're debating whether or not to put it in the archives.
[45:01.920 --> 45:03.520]  Because it didn't actually air over the radio.
[45:03.780 --> 45:10.920]  But if you go to the hopenumber6.net website, you'll see, as of today, all of the talks now have audio.
[45:10.980 --> 45:19.340]  And they have high-quality audio and low-quality audio, which, depending on your bandwidth, is to choose whichever one you want to download.
[45:19.580 --> 45:26.500]  Every single talk that was at the Hope Conference in track A and track B, which I think one exception, is on there.
[45:26.580 --> 45:31.040]  And that one exception took place after midnight, so we couldn't archive that one, unfortunately.
[45:31.680 --> 45:32.900]  But everything else is up there.
[45:33.020 --> 45:38.560]  And, in fact, the videos, the Hope videos, are going to be available for you to obtain in the next day or so.
[45:38.680 --> 45:41.020]  So keep an eye on the Hope No.
[45:41.100 --> 45:45.400]  6 website and on the 2600.com website for announcements as far as that goes.
[45:45.400 --> 45:45.800]  Hope No.
[45:45.920 --> 45:48.980]  6, memories of a fantastic conference.
[45:49.320 --> 45:50.680]  And you can hear the show.
[45:50.680 --> 45:53.100]  You can hear all the other panels that took place as well.
[45:53.200 --> 45:54.320]  So I'll get to hear some panels.
[45:54.680 --> 46:01.060]  Yeah, those of us who actually were working at the conference and didn't get to see anything, we can actually relax now and enjoy the conference.
[46:01.400 --> 46:02.120]  And you can, too.
[46:02.120 --> 46:04.280]  If you didn't make it to the conference, it's the best way to do it.
[46:04.380 --> 46:10.440]  So look for that announcement, and the next day or so we'll be taking orders, I guess.
[46:11.240 --> 46:13.760]  Again, our phone number 212-209-2900.
[46:14.160 --> 46:16.000]  Let's read one last letter, and then we'll go to the phones.
[46:16.540 --> 46:17.160]  Do you're off the hook?
[46:17.240 --> 46:23.680]  I would take the website rankings of Alexa.com, mentioned by a caller two shows ago, with a grain of salt.
[46:23.820 --> 46:32.180]  The way that Alexa decides which sites are the most popular is simply by recording every website that each user who has the Alexa toolbar visits.
[46:32.840 --> 46:38.460]  They have a large number of users, so it's likely a rather accurate ranking system, but it is in no way definitive.
[46:38.800 --> 46:46.560]  With regards to hacking your way up to the number 2600 rank, I think we were like 60,000 or something, and it's in the entire world.
[46:46.880 --> 46:49.540]  We want to get up to 2600, which I think would be impossible.
[46:50.260 --> 46:57.840]  A start would be to tell every fan of 2600 to install the Alexa toolbar and visit the 2600 website on a regular basis, like maybe once a second.
[46:58.440 --> 47:02.840]  That would certainly at least help you move up in the rankings until a better hack is discovered, signed DF.
[47:02.940 --> 47:04.120]  I wouldn't tell our listeners that.
[47:04.120 --> 47:04.860]  No, I wouldn't tell them either.
[47:04.980 --> 47:05.840]  I would read the letter, though.
[47:06.000 --> 47:15.000]  I think it's probably pretty skewed because the kind of people who are likely to download the Alexa toolbar are probably more inclined to go to certain sites than others anyway.
[47:15.160 --> 47:21.440]  But there's not really a very accurate way of getting overall statistics other than having some kind of a client install them.
[47:21.460 --> 47:28.140]  I can tell you, a lot of people visit our website, and we're happy when they do, but we don't want to be up with Amazon, those crazy people like that.
[47:28.420 --> 47:34.440]  And 60,000 may seem like a low ranking, but when you consider it's every website in the world, it's not that bad.
[47:34.640 --> 47:35.720]  It's pretty interesting, in fact.
[47:35.740 --> 47:36.800]  Give yourself a pat on the back.
[47:36.900 --> 47:37.120]  Yeah.
[47:37.880 --> 47:38.240]  Okay.
[47:38.840 --> 47:47.640]  You can write to us, email, OTH at 2600.com, or snail mail, off the hook, care of WBAI, 120 Wall Street.
[47:48.060 --> 47:48.480]  New York.
[47:48.840 --> 47:49.120]  Ooh.
[47:49.640 --> 47:50.300]  Okay, that's it.
[47:50.340 --> 47:50.660]  You're out.
[47:50.740 --> 47:50.920]  I'm out.
[47:50.960 --> 47:51.260]  You're out.
[47:51.380 --> 47:51.640]  You're done.
[47:52.280 --> 47:53.280]  120 Wall Street.
[47:53.740 --> 47:54.440]  Tenth floor.
[47:54.720 --> 47:55.140]  New York.
[47:55.440 --> 47:57.020]  Who wants to read the second New York?
[47:57.120 --> 47:58.160]  No, you blew it.
[47:58.240 --> 47:58.460]  All right.
[47:58.540 --> 48:01.160]  First, you were reading my New York, and then you jumped in on Walter.
[48:01.520 --> 48:01.960]  All right.
[48:01.960 --> 48:02.820]  That's just not acceptable.
[48:03.320 --> 48:03.880]  No, I'm sorry.
[48:03.980 --> 48:04.300]  I'm sorry.
[48:07.120 --> 48:07.900]  Kevin, you want the second New York?
[48:08.020 --> 48:10.980]  Okay, you have a new guy here who's going to do a good job, I hope.
[48:11.120 --> 48:11.920]  Let's start from the top.
[48:12.540 --> 48:16.780]  Off the hook, care of WBAI, 120 Wall Street.
[48:17.310 --> 48:17.960]  Tenth floor.
[48:18.220 --> 48:18.640]  New York.
[48:18.860 --> 48:19.320]  New York.
[48:19.740 --> 48:20.040]  One.
[48:20.380 --> 48:22.020]  Zero, zero, zero, five.
[48:22.890 --> 48:24.180]  Watch and learn, Redbird.
[48:24.320 --> 48:24.700]  Watch and learn.
[48:24.740 --> 48:26.000]  Walter is not usually here.
[48:26.200 --> 48:26.440]  Uh-huh.
[48:26.580 --> 48:27.660]  Well, maybe now he hasn't sent it.
[48:28.100 --> 48:28.920]  That's a bad excuse.
[48:29.060 --> 48:29.900]  It's still part of the address.
[48:30.060 --> 48:32.540]  Okay, 212-209-2900 is our phone number.
[48:32.620 --> 48:34.420]  Let's take a listener phone call down here.
[48:34.540 --> 48:34.800]  Good evening.
[48:34.880 --> 48:35.300]  You're on the air.
[48:35.920 --> 48:38.140]  I always pick wrong, don't I?
[48:38.460 --> 48:38.920]  Let's go over here.
[48:38.980 --> 48:39.240]  Good evening.
[48:39.320 --> 48:39.800]  You're on the air.
[48:40.940 --> 48:41.420]  Go ahead.
[48:41.640 --> 48:41.740]  Yes, hi.
[48:41.840 --> 48:42.300]  Good evening.
[48:42.520 --> 48:43.100]  What's on your mind?
[48:43.240 --> 48:43.800]  Yes, hi.
[48:43.900 --> 48:44.940]  Appreciate your show.
[48:46.460 --> 48:47.860]  Would like to get...
[48:47.860 --> 48:48.600]  I'd miss...
[48:48.600 --> 48:57.420]  I tell you, I backed off you guys when I heard you couldn't get your mind around the fact that the pathological liars had given us the correct story around 9-11.
[48:57.640 --> 48:59.560]  I'm back to being a regular listener.
[49:00.540 --> 49:06.580]  You know, the deal I think we asked for before, get us a second hour and we'll talk about 9-11 stuff.
[49:06.720 --> 49:08.340]  But there's just not enough time to talk about it.
[49:08.380 --> 49:08.440]  Yeah, I understand.
[49:08.540 --> 49:12.580]  Let me just recommend, out of Canada, which is interesting, comes a magazine.
[49:12.820 --> 49:14.260]  It's almost 200 pages.
[49:14.260 --> 49:15.400]  A friend gave it to me.
[49:15.500 --> 49:16.760]  It's called Global Outlook.
[49:16.760 --> 49:21.980]  So, it's globaloutlook.ca and they have all the scholars.
[49:22.300 --> 49:25.400]  You know, there's been a limited hangout in terms of C-SPAN.
[49:25.540 --> 49:28.200]  That's called the limited hangout intelligence talk.
[49:28.380 --> 49:29.600]  But what I want to ask you guys...
[49:29.600 --> 49:32.380]  One question is, Global Outlook, one outlook or plural outlooks?
[49:34.230 --> 49:35.120]  Globaloutlook.ca.
[49:35.380 --> 49:36.220]  So, it's singular, right?
[49:37.160 --> 49:37.600]  Yes.
[49:37.700 --> 49:38.520]  Okay, single outlook.
[49:38.640 --> 49:38.980]  Okay, got it.
[49:39.340 --> 49:40.280]  What's your question, quickly?
[49:40.540 --> 49:47.220]  And they brought together, you know, all the different scholars who tell us about basic physics and aeronautics and David Ray Griffin.
[49:47.440 --> 50:03.920]  But the question that I have for you guys, because you provide valuable information, okay, and I forgive you for those lapses, but for those of us who missed the first part, because sometimes I have, coming up on my phone, my caller ID, it'll be all zeros,
[50:04.080 --> 50:08.460]  and I find out that having worked as a journalist, that some people...
[50:08.460 --> 50:13.780]  So, I need some clear, coherent, layperson's explanation about...
[50:13.780 --> 50:18.920]  Because I missed the third part where you talked about using cards to change caller ID.
[50:19.100 --> 50:25.460]  Those of us on the ground need to know how it works and how we can track down those mysterious calls.
[50:25.500 --> 50:32.300]  I know some 800 numbers that I call, even though I have a private number, that the numbers will actually come up with them.
[50:32.300 --> 50:33.160]  I find that interesting.
[50:33.320 --> 50:34.320]  So, I'll look for further...
[50:34.320 --> 50:41.020]  I'll listen over the air, but I want to hear more about the caller ID in layperson's terms so that we can all understand it.
[50:41.060 --> 50:42.000]  And I appreciate you guys.
[50:42.120 --> 50:42.320]  All right.
[50:42.360 --> 50:42.600]  Thanks.
[50:42.700 --> 50:43.280]  Thanks for your call.
[50:43.400 --> 50:48.340]  Well, basically, I think she's interested in tracking down people who are blocking the caller ID and sending all zeros.
[50:48.540 --> 50:51.360]  First of all, all zeros is not necessarily a blocked caller ID.
[50:51.520 --> 50:53.500]  It might be some kind of failure.
[50:53.500 --> 50:56.300]  It might be a fake caller ID number.
[50:58.620 --> 51:10.220]  Without other methods, there really isn't a way you can track down that person, unless maybe you're reading their A&I or something like that, or have some other means of tricking them into giving you their phone number.
[51:11.040 --> 51:14.100]  If she was interested in sending out that information, that's pretty easy to do.
[51:14.220 --> 51:16.680]  You simply call one of the VoIP providers, right?
[51:17.140 --> 51:18.180]  They're easy to come by.
[51:18.320 --> 51:18.940]  Anybody can do it?
[51:19.140 --> 51:19.960]  Anyone can do it.
[51:20.080 --> 51:20.260]  Yeah.
[51:20.520 --> 51:30.800]  But as she said that her caller ID was coming with all zeros, when you cause an A&I fail, it usually sends the area code and all zeros of your local central office.
[51:30.800 --> 51:32.780]  So it might have been showing that.
[51:33.120 --> 51:38.520]  So it might have been an A&I failure that she was experiencing then, in which case it's even harder for her to figure out who the person was.
[51:38.580 --> 51:38.800]  Yes.
[51:39.080 --> 51:48.160]  When I receive all zeros on a caller ID, usually the call is being made via credit card or some other non-traditional phone method.
[51:48.340 --> 51:50.540]  In which A&I is not necessarily passed?
[51:51.140 --> 51:53.440]  Yeah, there's some thought of that.
[51:54.230 --> 51:58.440]  But it's not a landline, and it's not usually inside the United States if it is.
[51:58.440 --> 52:06.200]  So, I mean, I guess the best answer is that, yeah, it's still possible to block your identity if you know what you're doing, but there are a lot of ways you can get caught up if you don't know what you're doing.
[52:06.640 --> 52:07.120]  And Emanuel?
[52:07.280 --> 52:07.800]  Yes, go ahead, Bernie.
[52:08.080 --> 52:15.900]  The caller asked for us to advise her as to which toll-free numbers can determine her number when she calls them.
[52:16.100 --> 52:22.000]  Basically, any toll-free number can be set up so that when you call it, they will have your A&I.
[52:22.000 --> 52:29.220]  So, you can just generally assume as a rule, you have no privacy, even if you block your caller ID when you call a toll-free number.
[52:29.440 --> 52:29.760]  That's right.
[52:30.220 --> 52:31.620]  But there is a way around that.
[52:31.660 --> 52:33.680]  I've discovered myself, and I do this for my cell phone.
[52:33.860 --> 52:36.520]  You can go out and buy one of these prepaid phone cards.
[52:37.380 --> 52:41.420]  It's got to be one that calls a non-toll-free number to access the system.
[52:41.620 --> 52:44.540]  Like, I'm in Philadelphia, so I bet it's called a red card.
[52:44.680 --> 52:45.480]  It's like five bucks.
[52:45.600 --> 52:46.540]  It gives me a couple hours.
[52:47.370 --> 53:00.300]  You call a toll-free number, which you can block your caller ID to, and then from there, you can enter the code number, and then the number you want to call, which the red cards do allow you to enter a toll-free number.
[53:00.440 --> 53:02.860]  So, that prevents the toll-free number.
[53:02.940 --> 53:08.060]  I've called toll-free numbers that will read back your A&I, and it has worked.
[53:08.260 --> 53:09.560]  So, there is a way around it.
[53:09.680 --> 53:12.680]  So, now, are you using a disposable phone, or are you using a phone card?
[53:12.680 --> 53:18.540]  I'm using my regular cell phone, and I've used a disposable phone card, which you can buy for $500.
[53:18.940 --> 53:21.020]  One company I've had is called the Red Card.
[53:21.180 --> 53:29.800]  So basically, you're picking up your phone, you're calling an access number, you're entering your code, then you're calling a toll-free number, and then you're calling the number that you want to call in the end?
[53:30.260 --> 53:30.460]  Right.
[53:30.560 --> 53:35.980]  No, the access number to call into the calling card system is a local number.
[53:36.540 --> 53:39.520]  Because if you call a toll-free number, that'll defeat the purpose, because your A&I will be shot.
[53:39.540 --> 53:39.660]  Right.
[53:39.740 --> 53:42.540]  But then you have to enter the code after that, and then you call a toll-free number.
[53:42.540 --> 53:43.640]  And then a toll-free number, exactly.
[53:43.840 --> 53:46.640]  I have it programmed with a big string, a big macro in my cell phone.
[53:46.740 --> 53:53.440]  So basically, I can just hit one number and then the toll-free number I want to call, and I've blocked my number from going to those people, and it does work.
[53:53.600 --> 53:56.580]  And the people who do this are suspicious just because they're doing that.
[53:58.760 --> 53:59.080]  Unbelievable.
[53:59.240 --> 54:02.540]  But yeah, that's one way it definitely can work.
[54:03.000 --> 54:05.100]  But I should point out something else that's kind of cool.
[54:05.200 --> 54:07.260]  This used to work, so I can talk about it now freely.
[54:07.260 --> 54:10.800]  But there was a company called Zetel back in the day, a few years ago.
[54:11.520 --> 54:13.800]  And they had a system.
[54:14.460 --> 54:15.480]  They still do.
[54:15.540 --> 54:17.760]  It's called Trinsic now, but the system doesn't work anymore.
[54:17.900 --> 54:26.880]  Where basically, you can call somebody who has a Zetel line, had a Zetel line, and if they're not in, it'll try them on their cell phone or whatever number they program in.
[54:27.060 --> 54:29.680]  And it does this by basically transferring the call.
[54:29.840 --> 54:35.620]  So if you're out of your office, say, your cell phone will ring, and you'll hear the Zetel computer say, Hey, I have a call for this person.
[54:35.860 --> 54:39.100]  Press 1 to accept, or don't do anything, and it'll just give them voicemail.
[54:39.440 --> 54:40.140]  Okay, great.
[54:40.320 --> 54:42.560]  Let's say the person blocked their caller ID.
[54:43.400 --> 54:46.200]  Going to your house, going to your office, it'll say blocked.
[54:46.380 --> 54:51.020]  However, when it transferred the call, it passed A&I for some reason.
[54:51.040 --> 54:58.080]  So even if they blocked their number, you would get their number if you were using your cell phone or you were part of that transferred call someplace.
[54:58.080 --> 54:59.240]  It was great.
[54:59.480 --> 55:02.140]  We found so many people that way who were trying to block their numbers.
[55:02.280 --> 55:05.440]  By we, I mean, you know, a few friends that were trying to track some people down.
[55:06.280 --> 55:07.280]  There's always a way.
[55:07.420 --> 55:09.560]  There's always a way if you look around.
[55:11.140 --> 55:17.800]  Kevin, do you want to give out maybe one VoIP provider that our listeners can use to have fun like this?
[55:18.480 --> 55:21.660]  I actually can't think of one off the top of my head, that VOIP Jet.
[55:21.960 --> 55:22.440]  VoIP Jet?
[55:22.600 --> 55:23.740]  Do they allow you to do that?
[55:24.480 --> 55:24.880]  Yes.
[55:24.880 --> 55:31.320]  I mean, I was just looking at a list of all the ones that actually allow caller ID spoofing, and I've just completely blanked on them.
[55:31.500 --> 55:31.760]  Okay.
[55:31.960 --> 55:36.640]  Well, hopefully you can still play these games in years ahead.
[55:37.220 --> 55:37.600]  Good evening.
[55:37.640 --> 55:38.000]  You're on the air.
[55:38.280 --> 55:38.860]  Oh, dear.
[55:39.160 --> 55:39.360]  Okay.
[55:39.420 --> 55:40.200]  Let's go over here.
[55:40.400 --> 55:40.780]  Good evening.
[55:40.880 --> 55:41.300]  You're on the air.
[55:42.400 --> 55:43.140]  Speak up, please.
[55:43.360 --> 55:43.600]  Yes.
[55:43.660 --> 55:43.880]  Hello.
[55:44.200 --> 55:44.500]  Hi.
[55:44.600 --> 55:46.640]  I recently found a cell phone.
[55:46.980 --> 55:52.900]  Is there any way I can do something to have it put under my name and my phone number?
[55:52.900 --> 55:54.580]  But it's somebody else's.
[55:54.920 --> 55:55.420]  Somebody else's cell phone.
[55:55.420 --> 55:56.180]  I don't know who it is.
[55:56.920 --> 56:01.480]  Well, do you have the phone number of the person that, I mean...
[56:01.480 --> 56:02.300]  How do you...
[56:02.300 --> 56:02.920]  Well, you know, okay.
[56:03.040 --> 56:09.340]  First of all, assuming you've tried everything to get it back to the original owner by looking at the phone book and calling people in the phone book and saying...
[56:09.340 --> 56:11.080]  How do I know who to look up in the phone book?
[56:11.140 --> 56:12.600]  Well, no, not the phone book phone book.
[56:12.660 --> 56:13.600]  The phone book on the phone.
[56:13.760 --> 56:14.420]  Oh, I don't know.
[56:14.620 --> 56:14.880]  Okay.
[56:15.080 --> 56:15.820]  It has a menu.
[56:15.980 --> 56:19.580]  And you look in the menu and you say, oh, look, it's, you know, Dolores here.
[56:19.580 --> 56:25.180]  Call her, say, hey, I found this cell phone and do you know who it might belong to or maybe whose phone number this is is calling you.
[56:25.760 --> 56:31.880]  Assuming you've tried all of that and you've come up empty, then I guess you can keep the cell phone for yourself.
[56:32.020 --> 56:33.160]  Now... What provider is it?
[56:33.200 --> 56:33.720]  Yeah, what provider?
[56:34.740 --> 56:35.100]  Verizon.
[56:35.740 --> 56:42.780]  See, the thing is if a cell phone is stolen or lost and they report it as such, they'll blacklist the serial number and you won't be able to use it.
[56:42.880 --> 56:45.220]  Yeah, so the cell phone itself will not work.
[56:45.220 --> 56:45.900]  It's kind of a scam.
[56:45.900 --> 56:51.560]  If there's a GSM provider like T-Mobile or AT&T or Singular or whatever, then you can simply use it again.
[56:52.160 --> 56:56.400]  Ironically, for thieves, a stolen cell phone can't always be used to call 911.
[56:57.540 --> 56:58.380]  That's true, too.
[56:58.720 --> 57:09.100]  Okay, listen, we're out of time, but I want to go out tonight with something that a listener sent us in tribute to the talk of number stations that we've had over the past few years, a few years, a few weeks.
[57:10.160 --> 57:18.580]  We have this piece by a listener called Sepulveda, or maybe that's the band's name, I'm not sure, but this is basically a bunch of recordings of number stations.
[57:18.640 --> 57:20.500]  So, we'll see you next week.
[57:20.660 --> 57:21.020]  Enjoy.
[57:22.660 --> 57:22.780]  Enjoy.
[57:31.260 --> 57:31.780]  Enjoy.
[57:32.500 --> 57:32.860]  Enjoy.
[57:33.900 --> 57:34.220]  Enjoy.
[57:35.160 --> 57:35.680]  Enjoy.
[57:50.910 --> 57:51.430]  Enjoy.
[57:51.430 --> 57:51.450]  Enjoy.
[57:52.870 --> 57:53.010]  Enjoy.
[57:54.190 --> 57:54.550]  Enjoy.
[57:54.550 --> 58:02.550]  5, 6, 8, 6, 2, 2...
[58:03.130 --> 58:03.130]  Mike!
[58:03.790 --> 58:05.390]  Delta Mike!
[58:06.250 --> 58:07.950]  Delta Mike!
[58:08.670 --> 58:10.170]  Delta Mike!
[58:10.890 --> 58:21.490]  08, 7, 4, 07, 4, 07, 3, 6...
[58:43.100 --> 58:58.380]  Peles... Peles... Peles... chest... Peles...
[58:58.380 --> 59:05.640]  8, 1, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3.
[59:05.660 --> 59:06.760]  I say again.
[59:06.960 --> 59:08.440]  I say again.
[59:08.800 --> 59:09.700]  I say again.
[59:12.100 --> 59:16.480]  6, 7, 0, 8, 5.
[59:19.400 --> 59:23.740]  5, 3, 7, 2, 5.
[59:26.360 --> 59:37.620]  8, 0, 4, 8, 7, 7, 0, 1, 7.