[00:00.000 --> 00:03.860]  Finally, music legend James Brown's career will come full circle tomorrow.
[00:04.220 --> 00:12.100]  Friends of Brown announced that his body will be brought to rest on the stage of the legendary Apollo Theater in Harlem, where Brown made his explosive career debut.
[00:12.520 --> 00:16.780]  The public will be permitted to visit the Apollo to have one more look at Brown on Thursday.
[00:17.040 --> 00:21.480]  The viewing will be followed by a private ceremony in Brown's hometown of Augusta, Georgia.
[00:21.700 --> 00:26.640]  And on Friday, another public ceremony in Augusta at the James Brown Arena.
[00:32.640 --> 00:35.700]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:35.700 --> 00:38.340]  It's 7-0-1 time for Off the Hook.
[00:43.570 --> 00:56.330]  The telephone keeps ringing So I ripped it off the wall I cut myself while shaving Now I can't make a cough We couldn't get much worse
[00:59.520 --> 01:05.400]  Mom, for the best, expect the worst I hope that's understood One big leap, boom!
[01:27.460 --> 01:48.000]  And a very good evening to everybody The program is Off the Hook Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening This is our last show of 2006 Joined tonight by Jim over there in the corner Hello And there's Redbird Good evening Mike Hi And over in the other corner is not Kevin Yeah,
[01:48.120 --> 01:49.120]  hello And Bernie S.
[01:49.200 --> 01:54.340]  joins us from Philadelphia Good evening You're actually on a landline this time, right Bernie?
[01:54.680 --> 02:13.240]  Yeah, I figured I'd try something different Last show of the year Yeah, you know, it's a good technology You might want to try using it more And let's see if there's a difference between your usual crappy cell phone coverage I keep adding extension cords to my handset And I keep tripping over it as it gets a few hundred feet Uh-huh Now,
[02:13.360 --> 02:21.840]  in shows past where you've used a landline you've also been on a headset and I think that makes it actually sound fainter So you're actually holding a regular bell receiver up to your ear right now, right?
[02:22.480 --> 02:30.860]  Yes, with a cushiony cushion on the back which makes it rest on my shoulder very nicely Who actually makes the phone?
[02:31.580 --> 02:50.240]  It's actually made by a company called Intertel Intertel It's an old analog phone system but it works very well Let's spend the entire show talking about who makes our phones And what people are calling in on we'll discuss A few years ago we could have done that We could have talked about Western Electric and the old bell phones that you could drop out a window and they'd still work Can you drop
[02:50.240 --> 02:51.320]  that phone out of a window, Bernie?
[02:51.420 --> 02:52.340]  And it would still work?
[02:52.640 --> 03:08.920]  Uh, well, considering on the fifth floor probably not It'd be like the beginning of the old SCTV show where they just throw TVs out the window and they smash on the sidewalk Right It would be like that And then you probably wouldn't be working because it's your job Yes Throwing a phone out the window isn't the best thing to do Well,
[03:08.940 --> 03:11.600]  actually, it would be job security for me Would it?
[03:11.680 --> 03:11.820]  What?
[03:11.920 --> 03:13.180]  Because you'd be crazy then or something?
[03:13.340 --> 03:34.180]  Well, then I'd just have to keep replacing the phones and installing new ones as they break Oh, because that's what you do Yes Oh, very nice, very nice Okay, well, this is the last show of the year as we mentioned Next time we're on the air it will be 2007 So we're going to be going over some highlights of the last year and maybe looking forward to next year if it doesn't seem too scary But a
[03:34.180 --> 03:55.440]  couple of stories first which I thought were rather interesting Our friend Stuart from Tokyo sent us this article which coincidentally enough comes from the Bloomberg News Network Apparently, the title says George Orwell was right Spy cameras see Britain's every move We sort of knew this already It's Saturday night in Middlesbrough,
[03:55.600 --> 04:11.730]  England and drunken university students are celebrating the start of the school year known as Freshers Week All that aside, though One of them picks up a traffic cone and runs down the street I don't know if he put it on top of his head or something like that but you can just picture the whole scenario Suddenly,
[04:11.730 --> 04:14.820]  a disembodied voice booms out from above You!
[04:15.020 --> 04:15.900]  In the black jacket!
[04:16.040 --> 04:16.600]  Yes, you!
[04:16.760 --> 04:17.420]  Put it back!
[04:17.980 --> 04:38.360]  And the confused student obeys as his friends look bewildered People are shocked when they hear the cameras talk but when they see everyone else looking at them they feel a twinge of conscience and they comply said Mike Clark, a spokesman for Middlesbrough Council who recounted the incident The city has placed speakers in its cameras allowing operators to chastise miscreants who drop coffee cups
[04:38.360 --> 05:03.860]  ride bicycles too fast or fight outside bars So basically 70 years after 1984 people in England are being watched like never before there's 4.2 million spy cameras and as we've mentioned here on this show every citizen is filmed 300 times in a day Police have built the world's largest DNA database and Prime Minister Tony Blair said all Britons should carry biometric identification cards to help
[05:03.860 --> 05:28.600]  fight the war on terror It's simply unbelievable But the funny thing about this is that they have a particular office There are 29 cameras run by the police at this single road junction in the London borough of Hammersmith and what they have is I guess in their headquarters the police headquarters they have this windowless room with a giant bank of TV screens and the city is monitored around the
[05:28.600 --> 05:47.180]  clock at the touch of a button officers can focus on any neighborhood zoom in on people's faces and speak to them So I'd love to be in that room just to hear what's going on people yelling at various people that aren't actually in the room It must be a hub of activity Now when they say they've got the system to cut down on crime Did they tell the residents that the crime they would be cutting down
[05:47.180 --> 05:49.340]  on was drunk people running away with traffic cones?
[05:50.200 --> 05:54.540]  Because I would be thinking like murder, rape would be my top priorities.
[05:54.800 --> 05:57.140]  Well, those require a bit more surveillance.
[05:57.200 --> 06:01.200]  We have to have cameras floating in the air and following people into dark alleys and things like that.
[06:01.420 --> 06:05.680]  But, you know, this is really nothing new because I encountered the same thing in London many years ago.
[06:06.120 --> 06:15.400]  I wasn't the drunken person on top of the fountain in Piccadilly Circus, but I saw somebody who was, and they were jumping on top of the fountain and the voice came out of nowhere saying, get down from there, young lady.
[06:15.820 --> 06:16.880]  And she did.
[06:17.380 --> 06:24.040]  In Washington, D.C., I once dropped a rapper on the ground in the metro and a voice yelled at me to pick it up.
[06:24.100 --> 06:25.620]  I think I was in high school then.
[06:25.840 --> 06:27.260]  So that was a long, long time ago.
[06:27.620 --> 06:29.160]  So this is really not that new.
[06:29.240 --> 06:30.280]  I guess it's just getting better.
[06:31.540 --> 06:31.860]  Jim?
[06:32.100 --> 06:34.940]  The problem with this is that it doesn't always work.
[06:35.100 --> 06:51.140]  There's the classic example from 10 or 15 years ago in the Chicago transit system where some woman was beaten half to death during a mugging with the person minding the camera, who at that time was not supposed to yell at the mugger, yelling all the way through.
[06:51.620 --> 06:56.320]  And the mugger just ignored the disembodied voice and continued beating the victim.
[06:56.360 --> 07:01.580]  Well, I think if you know it's a disembodied voice, then you're likely to not be as phased by it.
[07:01.640 --> 07:04.100]  These people had no idea the camera is going to start speaking to them.
[07:04.160 --> 07:11.120]  And I think once we get used to cameras speaking to us, we'll probably give them the finger more often or just walk away and not worry about it as much.
[07:11.240 --> 07:13.760]  But the facial recognition software, that's sort of a new development.
[07:14.380 --> 07:17.540]  And how good that gets, that could be scary.
[07:18.420 --> 07:21.660]  That could be scary for muggers, but also for law-abiding citizens.
[07:23.240 --> 07:26.360]  Okay, we have this hacker story, quote unquote hacker story.
[07:26.460 --> 07:29.440]  Turkish hacker depletes 10,000 bank accounts.
[07:30.040 --> 07:39.660]  Criminal enterprise comprised of 10 individuals who drained the accounts of 10,580 customers by sending virus infected emails was busted in Istanbul.
[07:40.000 --> 07:45.300]  Reports indicate the suspects saved the email addresses of academics and journalists in separate files.
[07:45.720 --> 07:52.180]  The ringleader of the enterprise, Ali Y, not Ali G, Ali Y, has a master's degree.
[07:52.600 --> 07:54.500]  It's great how they don't give the last name at all.
[07:54.880 --> 08:01.040]  Has a master's degree from Istanbul University in the Department of Turkology and speaks five languages.
[08:01.380 --> 08:04.540]  Don't look at me like you've never heard the phrase Department of Turkology before.
[08:05.340 --> 08:18.160]  Anti-fiscal offenses teams, that's a great phrase too, conducted simultaneous operations on addresses in various Turkish cities, which I'm not going to try to pronounce, but they're really interesting sounding.
[08:18.840 --> 08:33.040]  During the search conducted in the suspects' homes and offices, they found one laptop, 34 CDs, four hard disks, 18 account books, six ATM cards, nine Western Union receipts, a fake deed title, and ID cards.
[08:34.040 --> 08:42.500]  The suspects reportedly sent virus infected emails to 3,450,000 addresses and subsequently drained 10,850 bank accounts.
[08:42.580 --> 08:43.760]  I guess that's the payoff.
[08:44.240 --> 08:45.460]  That's a pretty high success rate.
[08:45.460 --> 08:49.380]  If you're out there spamming 3.4... can someone do the math?
[08:49.580 --> 08:50.540]  That's one per what?
[08:51.200 --> 08:52.320]  Somebody with a calculator?
[08:52.320 --> 08:57.340]  3.4 million addresses and they got 10,850 bank accounts out of that.
[08:57.600 --> 08:58.740]  I just think it's important to know.
[08:59.480 --> 09:02.940]  It's a tiny fraction of a percent, but it's enough to make it worthwhile for criminals.
[09:03.620 --> 09:09.480]  Considering how much spam goes out there, yeah, but what kind of virus infected email would somebody send... You said 10,000?
[09:09.720 --> 09:10.920]  10,580, yes.
[09:10.980 --> 09:12.000]  Yeah, one out of 340.
[09:12.460 --> 09:13.420]  One out of 340?
[09:13.720 --> 09:14.260]  Not so bad.
[09:14.400 --> 09:14.820]  Not so bad.
[09:15.160 --> 09:15.980]  One third of a percent.
[09:16.120 --> 09:22.480]  So for every 340 pieces of spam that go out there, with a virus infected email, you could get someone's bank... control of their bank information.
[09:22.660 --> 09:22.760]  Yeah.
[09:23.060 --> 09:23.280]  Wow.
[09:23.580 --> 09:26.100]  But what kind of virus would do that?
[09:26.200 --> 09:26.840]  Anybody have an idea?
[09:27.400 --> 09:28.620]  I think it's a misnomer.
[09:28.820 --> 09:31.540]  It may be something as simple as a good old back orifice.
[09:32.260 --> 09:33.140]  Or a key logger.
[09:33.260 --> 09:33.660]  Very simple.
[09:33.880 --> 09:37.460]  You get all their login information, bank account login information, stuff like that.
[09:37.720 --> 09:37.960]  Uh-huh.
[09:39.180 --> 09:40.080]  Well, I suppose.
[09:41.100 --> 09:42.480]  How can people protect against this?
[09:42.660 --> 09:43.500]  Don't open attachments?
[09:43.500 --> 09:45.360]  You know, it's the age-old thing.
[09:45.520 --> 09:46.200]  Don't open email.
[09:46.320 --> 09:49.180]  You don't know who... you know, where you don't know the sender.
[09:49.420 --> 09:57.220]  Obviously, don't run applications that you're unfamiliar with that you... that don't come from a trusted source or use operating systems less susceptible to this stuff.
[09:58.000 --> 09:58.980]  There's a lot of solutions.
[09:59.180 --> 10:01.360]  Which operating systems are less susceptible to this stuff?
[10:01.820 --> 10:03.400]  Linux, Mac OS, there's a bunch of them.
[10:04.500 --> 10:05.400]  We all agree with that?
[10:05.640 --> 10:05.840]  Yeah.
[10:06.240 --> 10:10.640]  If it seems to come from your bank or a trusted source, they generally have spellcheck.
[10:11.020 --> 10:17.440]  If they start spelling your name wrong, simple words wrong, it's probably somebody from a third world country.
[10:17.500 --> 10:21.000]  I've seen signs that have been posted in my bank, and they spell things wrong.
[10:21.080 --> 10:21.580]  That's true.
[10:21.580 --> 10:23.140]  Nobody spells things right anymore, Jim.
[10:23.420 --> 10:24.240]  Those days are over.
[10:24.300 --> 10:29.080]  And the thing is, the sign is produced on a computer... the thing is, the sign is produced on a computer with spellcheck.
[10:29.500 --> 10:29.920]  Mm-hmm.
[10:30.140 --> 10:31.720]  And you'd think that they could get it right.
[10:32.820 --> 10:34.300]  Maybe they just don't activate it.
[10:34.400 --> 10:34.660]  I don't know.
[10:34.700 --> 10:34.980]  I don't know.
[10:35.320 --> 10:36.200]  Um, okay.
[10:36.380 --> 10:38.520]  And then, uh, this is kind of interesting, too.
[10:38.680 --> 10:39.840]  Uh, a listener, N.W.
[10:39.980 --> 10:40.980]  Bell, sent this in to us.
[10:41.280 --> 10:47.280]  Uh, not sure if you guys are still interested in finding out about the different models of voting machines out there, but if so, you may want to check out this page.
[10:47.420 --> 10:48.400]  I'm going to give out the URL.
[10:48.660 --> 10:51.160]  There's not a tiny URL attached to this, so you're going to have to take notes.
[10:51.660 --> 11:06.980]  www.mmd, that's Mary Mary David, .admin.state.mn, as in Minnesota, .us, slash surplus, slash auctions, slash online, slash voting.htm.
[11:07.580 --> 11:17.160]  And basically, if you got the gist of it from that URL, it's an online auction being held by the state of Minnesota for a couple of ES&S electronic voting machines.
[11:17.520 --> 11:21.820]  The page includes a number of pictures and a slightly more complete description.
[11:22.220 --> 11:26.200]  Uh, there's no reserve, no special requirements to bid, but they're not going to ship them.
[11:26.280 --> 11:30.140]  The winning bidder has to go to, uh, to Bemidji, Minnesota.
[11:30.760 --> 11:31.220]  Bemidji.
[11:31.320 --> 11:31.780]  Bemidji?
[11:31.860 --> 11:32.800]  You've actually heard of this place?
[11:32.800 --> 11:35.800]  Yeah, someone I vaguely know had a wedding there.
[11:36.440 --> 11:37.680]  Bemidji, what a strange name.
[11:38.000 --> 11:39.500]  That's like Norwegian or something, isn't it?
[11:39.600 --> 11:39.920]  Could be.
[11:40.100 --> 11:40.560]  I don't know.
[11:40.700 --> 11:41.120]  I didn't go.
[11:41.320 --> 11:45.140]  Anyway, it sounds like one of those Turkish names I didn't read, and I got trapped into reading it anyway.
[11:45.660 --> 11:48.820]  Uh, anyway, you have to go to Bemidji, Minnesota, to get them in person.
[11:49.240 --> 11:53.800]  Um, but apparently there's no, uh, software attached, which I think...
[11:53.800 --> 11:55.440]  Doesn't help if you're investigating.
[11:55.700 --> 12:04.240]  Yeah, I'm not sure how good... It might just be a huge paperweight, but, um, it's worth checking out, so, um... You should put in a bid of at least ten bucks.
[12:05.060 --> 12:05.640]  Yeah, yeah.
[12:06.040 --> 12:08.340]  I don't know what, uh... And you gotta go pick it up.
[12:08.440 --> 12:13.060]  You have to be at least 18 years of age to, uh, yeah, and you have to have room to carry a voting machine.
[12:13.100 --> 12:13.860]  How big are these things?
[12:14.700 --> 12:15.060]  They don't tell you.
[12:15.060 --> 12:15.780]  He said they're electronic.
[12:15.960 --> 12:17.520]  They could, they could potentially be small.
[12:17.820 --> 12:19.140]  You can look over the, uh, details there.
[12:19.140 --> 12:21.760]  This could be the ones that are, like, six feet wide and five feet high.
[12:21.960 --> 12:22.100]  Mm-hmm.
[12:22.240 --> 12:26.580]  You might need a pickup truck or something, but, uh, it's all... Or a telephone company van would work.
[12:26.660 --> 12:27.540]  A telephone company van?
[12:27.860 --> 12:29.600]  Uh, don't know if we know of any of those.
[12:30.120 --> 12:38.020]  Uh, now, Bernie, um, speaking of elections, I took the liberty of, uh, checking your, uh, election results, uh, the other day.
[12:38.240 --> 12:46.420]  Uh, you had trouble voting, and you had to fill out a form, and they gave you an actual website address to check to see if your vote was ever counted.
[12:46.860 --> 13:01.080]  And, uh, I went to that address, um, and I got, when I clicked on, on the, uh, selection to use the online search, I got, server error in slash application, the resource cannot be found.
[13:01.380 --> 13:01.940]  Oh, great.
[13:02.060 --> 13:02.600]  That was broken.
[13:03.520 --> 13:05.920]  Uh, it seems like they've just sort of walked away from this.
[13:06.000 --> 13:08.400]  Did you ever get any kind of confirmation that your vote actually counted?
[13:08.580 --> 13:18.680]  I got a confirmation about two weeks ago that it had not been counted, uh, but I've just been too busy, end of year with business and stuff, to, uh, um, to go to voter registration and say, hey, what's up with that?
[13:18.900 --> 13:19.360]  Mm-hmm.
[13:19.360 --> 13:35.100]  Um, the, the, the, the, uh, strangely, the URL on the receipt I got when I voted, uh, with the provisional ballot, it was handwritten, um, the check marks and boxes that we should be, um, that URL is not the exact URL for going there.
[13:35.120 --> 13:42.920]  You have to dig down several layers on that site, on that page, to find the place to enter the, uh, uh, enter the receipt number.
[13:43.320 --> 13:43.740]  Mm-hmm.
[13:43.920 --> 13:47.740]  So I'm, for some of our more clever listeners, we're able to figure that out.
[13:47.860 --> 13:50.140]  But maybe you weren't, or maybe it's just down altogether.
[13:50.480 --> 13:54.680]  Well, no, I thought it was pretty clever, because I went to the, uh, the page that says provisional ballot status.
[13:54.860 --> 13:55.080]  Okay.
[13:55.260 --> 14:00.060]  To determine the status of your provisional ballot, please follow the instructions below at least three days after election day.
[14:00.520 --> 14:05.160]  Now, you can also call 1-877-VOTES-PA, or 8-6-8-3-7-7-2.
[14:05.540 --> 14:10.100]  Follow the instructions to determine if your ballot was counted, partially counted, or not counted.
[14:10.360 --> 14:10.760]  Partially.
[14:10.820 --> 14:11.600]  Partially counted.
[14:11.780 --> 14:14.100]  I'll give a half vote to, uh, to this guy.
[14:14.380 --> 14:16.600]  Or, use the online search.
[14:16.600 --> 14:18.360]  And I clicked on online search and got that error.
[14:18.420 --> 14:20.160]  Have you tried calling the, uh, the telephone number?
[14:20.740 --> 14:21.640]  Um, I have.
[14:21.740 --> 14:25.680]  And it's an automated system, um, using touchdowns and voice response.
[14:25.940 --> 14:29.980]  And, uh, it just says that, uh, my vote has not been recorded, or something along those lines.
[14:30.260 --> 14:34.640]  So I'm going to have to talk to a real-life person when, uh, when I have a little more free time.
[14:34.780 --> 14:36.620]  But, you know, the election has long since over.
[14:36.980 --> 14:40.860]  But I would like to raise a ruckus about this, because it's just not right.
[14:40.860 --> 14:49.060]  I had such satisfaction filling out that big, broadsheet piece of paper and checking off the right candidates and, and, uh, ballot initiatives that I wanted to vote for.
[14:49.380 --> 14:50.660]  And it was really nice.
[14:51.000 --> 14:52.720]  Just, I just, it was so satisfying.
[14:52.900 --> 14:55.380]  And then I pulled it up in the envelope and then put it in the other secret envelope.
[14:55.860 --> 14:57.440]  And, uh, then it wasn't even counted.
[14:57.560 --> 14:58.040]  So go figure.
[14:58.540 --> 15:00.820]  Well, at least now you can feel like a disenfranchised voter.
[15:00.960 --> 15:02.720]  You'll have lots of company in the years ahead, I'm sure.
[15:02.860 --> 15:02.920]  Oh, yeah.
[15:03.720 --> 15:08.480]  Um, I found a really, really amazing toy right before the show.
[15:08.860 --> 15:22.760]  Um, I've, I've complained before on the air about many things, but this particularly, uh, the voicemail system for Verizon Wireless just annoys the hell out of me because they lecture you about all the, uh, messages you have to delete before you get to listen to any of your new ones.
[15:23.220 --> 15:28.880]  And it's just, um, it's, it's very roundabout, takes forever to, uh, to actually get to what you want to do.
[15:29.440 --> 15:37.940]  Um, I found out yesterday by just looking around online that, you know what, you don't have to use Verizon voicemail, Verizon wireless voicemail if you have a Verizon wireless phone.
[15:38.040 --> 15:41.520]  In fact, you don't have to use any provider's voicemail.
[15:41.640 --> 15:42.580]  You can change it.
[15:42.620 --> 15:44.060]  You can change it to a different company.
[15:44.500 --> 15:46.380]  I found this company called YouMail.
[15:46.920 --> 15:48.760]  Kind of like YouTube, except YouMail.
[15:48.840 --> 15:50.240]  It might even be the same people for all I know.
[15:50.340 --> 15:51.600]  I already don't like the sound of this.
[15:51.760 --> 15:52.500]  You don't like the sound of this?
[15:52.620 --> 15:53.120]  Well, okay.
[15:53.200 --> 15:54.360]  Let's see if you like the sound of this.
[15:54.660 --> 15:57.960]  I'm going to call my phone from, uh, from another line here.
[15:58.020 --> 15:58.840]  And Bernie, please don't panic.
[15:58.920 --> 16:01.660]  You're going to hear a dial tone, but it doesn't mean we've necessarily hung up on you.
[16:01.820 --> 16:02.100]  Okay.
[16:02.360 --> 16:04.520]  Um, okay, there it is.
[16:04.600 --> 16:05.020]  Don't panic.
[16:05.320 --> 16:05.920]  That's the dial tone.
[16:06.200 --> 16:13.470]  Now we're going to call my cell number here and listen carefully to what happens.
[16:17.070 --> 16:18.630]  Well, my phone should ring for one thing.
[16:22.670 --> 16:24.110]  I'll just, I'll just turn the phone off.
[16:24.270 --> 16:25.630]  I mean, really, it's a radio program.
[16:25.710 --> 16:28.930]  Well, I just had to demonstrate that the phone was in fact ringing.
[16:29.010 --> 16:30.670]  It's going to ring a few times, but listen carefully.
[16:34.780 --> 16:38.260]  I can see from the display, my phone is still physically ringing, even though you can't hear it.
[16:38.380 --> 16:45.280]  So I guess I can talk until that display goes away and then we'll listen to the message that, um, we get greeted with.
[16:46.940 --> 16:50.920]  Just to give you an idea of what the flexibility of this system is that, ah, here we go.
[16:52.040 --> 16:52.760]  Hello, WBAI.
[16:52.820 --> 16:54.920]  I can see that you're calling my phone right now.
[16:54.920 --> 16:59.620]  So I'm going to give you a special customized message, specially designed for off the hook.
[17:00.080 --> 17:02.900]  And now I don't think I'm going to let you leave a message.
[17:03.880 --> 17:06.730]  This user is currently not accepting new messages.
[17:07.030 --> 17:07.360]  Goodbye.
[17:09.510 --> 17:12.770]  Now, what I did was I made a customized message.
[17:12.800 --> 17:14.100]  You can do this on this system.
[17:14.180 --> 17:22.990]  You can make customized messages for, for different phone numbers and you can have the option of not allowing certain people to leave you messages at all.
[17:23.060 --> 17:24.800]  And I'd said, you know, someone's calling me from BAI.
[17:24.880 --> 17:25.880]  I don't want them to leave me a message.
[17:26.080 --> 17:28.140]  And so I just programmed this in right before the show.
[17:28.860 --> 17:30.040]  And it's, it's really cool.
[17:30.300 --> 17:36.600]  Now what I'm going to do next, I'm going to call up the actual access number for the, um, for the system.
[17:36.750 --> 17:45.670]  It's out in, uh, California somewhere, but as long as you have a nationwide plan that doesn't charge you to forward your calls to, uh, to California.
[17:46.320 --> 17:47.430]  Um, okay.
[17:47.540 --> 17:49.300]  I got to enter the secret code.
[17:50.910 --> 17:53.410]  Then this, uh, voicemail system won't cost you anything.
[17:53.710 --> 17:55.580]  Enter your 10-digit cell phone number.
[17:55.580 --> 17:56.190]  Okay.
[17:56.290 --> 17:56.820]  I have to do that.
[17:56.950 --> 17:58.770]  And I have to do that off air.
[17:59.910 --> 18:01.290]  Don't want that information going out.
[18:02.950 --> 18:05.450]  Please enter your 10-digit cell phone number.
[18:05.490 --> 18:06.560]  I thought I just did that.
[18:06.690 --> 18:06.840]  Okay.
[18:07.410 --> 18:08.750]  That's our touchtone pad.
[18:13.140 --> 18:15.400]  Please enter your 10-digit cell phone number.
[18:15.400 --> 18:17.560]  I'm not sure why that's not... Bernie, are you hearing touchtones?
[18:18.040 --> 18:19.180]  I'm not hearing touchtones.
[18:19.760 --> 18:20.980]  Our touchtones aren't working?
[18:21.160 --> 18:21.460]  Hang on.
[18:21.540 --> 18:21.900]  Goodbye.
[18:22.340 --> 18:22.740]  Ah!
[18:24.320 --> 18:26.380]  Well, they get angry if you, if you get it wrong.
[18:26.480 --> 18:27.380]  Let me try that one more time.
[18:27.380 --> 18:29.520]  Apparently, there's something wrong with our touchtone pad.
[18:30.540 --> 18:31.160]  I'm sorry.
[18:31.660 --> 18:32.620]  This is, uh...
[18:32.620 --> 18:33.920]  It, it worked fine on the bus.
[18:39.320 --> 18:41.380]  I think that's the same number they use for all... Okay.
[18:41.400 --> 18:42.540]  Here's the, uh, secret code.
[18:44.620 --> 18:46.940]  And now, let's try entering my 10-digit number again.
[18:47.180 --> 18:48.980]  Enter your 10-digit cell phone number.
[18:49.140 --> 18:49.540]  Okay.
[18:49.740 --> 18:50.700]  Let's see if the tone works.
[18:50.960 --> 18:51.460]  Yeah, it does.
[18:52.720 --> 18:54.980]  Now you know the first digit of my, uh, cell phone.
[18:58.770 --> 19:00.710]  Please enter your 10-digit cell phone number.
[19:00.710 --> 19:02.090]  I don't know why this isn't working.
[19:02.210 --> 19:02.970]  I really don't.
[19:04.550 --> 19:04.870]  Uh...
[19:04.870 --> 19:06.090]  It worked before.
[19:06.290 --> 19:06.570]  All right.
[19:07.090 --> 19:07.670]  But, okay.
[19:07.710 --> 19:08.390]  You can go in there.
[19:08.490 --> 19:13.490]  You can, you can set up all kinds of, uh, cool things as far as, uh, different phone numbers.
[19:13.490 --> 19:16.350]  You can, uh, uh, have greetings for everybody.
[19:17.050 --> 19:17.950]  All sorts of neat things.
[19:18.190 --> 19:21.810]  And all you do to set this up is change it to that, that access number on busy or unavailable?
[19:22.030 --> 19:23.070]  Uh, every phone is different.
[19:23.370 --> 19:28.790]  You tell it the kind of phone you have, the service that you have, and it tells you to dial a particular, um, a particular number.
[19:28.790 --> 19:33.950]  Now, in my particular case, I had to dial a number that began with star 7-1-1.
[19:34.870 --> 19:37.010]  And, uh, then 10 digits after that.
[19:37.110 --> 19:39.370]  They're not the same 10-digit phone number that I just called.
[19:39.590 --> 19:41.350]  And I'm not sure exactly what that does.
[19:41.350 --> 19:43.910]  I have an LG phone for, uh, Verizon Wireless.
[19:44.650 --> 19:51.070]  And from that point on, this phone is now being answered by, um, uh, by that voicemail system instead of Verizon Wireless.
[19:51.070 --> 19:55.670]  On a lot of GSM phones, there's actually a menu option that'll do that programming for you over the air.
[19:55.850 --> 19:55.910]  Uh-huh.
[19:55.910 --> 19:56.470]  So, it's pretty neat.
[19:56.790 --> 19:58.270]  This works for, uh, Verizon Wireless.
[19:58.390 --> 19:59.170]  It works for T-Mobile.
[19:59.310 --> 20:00.390]  I'm not sure if it works for Sprint.
[20:00.430 --> 20:00.770]  Yes, Bernie?
[20:01.030 --> 20:04.430]  I was going to ask that question, but I also wanted to ask, what other customization features?
[20:04.470 --> 20:10.410]  You said you could, you could specify certain numbers that would leave, you can leave custom messages for certain callers.
[20:10.490 --> 20:10.830]  Is that right?
[20:10.930 --> 20:11.250]  That's right.
[20:11.370 --> 20:14.630]  If I know your phone number, I can say, hello, Bernie, would you like to leave me a message now?
[20:14.750 --> 20:17.410]  It might get annoying after a while, but it is a cool thing to have.
[20:17.410 --> 20:29.150]  Well, it could be pretty useful, too, if you wanted to, uh, uh, leave a message specifically just for that one person so when they call you, they get that message, that greeting message that has information that they would need, even though you might not be able to answer the phone.
[20:29.290 --> 20:30.010]  That could be very handy.
[20:30.050 --> 20:36.870]  And it's also, uh, good for those people who think they're wise guys and can, uh, spoof-caller idea, have one in there that says, hey, why is the White House calling me?
[20:37.190 --> 20:40.090]  You know, somebody must have reprogrammed the number to do that.
[20:40.910 --> 20:41.390]  Um, it's...
[20:41.390 --> 20:43.070]  What if, uh, Dick Cheney is really calling you?
[20:43.250 --> 20:45.530]  Then, hopefully he has a sense of humor when he does.
[20:46.230 --> 20:46.750]  We'll see.
[20:47.410 --> 20:48.930]  Uh, yeah, it's, it's, it's great.
[20:49.230 --> 20:52.730]  Um, you have distinctive ringing, so why not have distinctive messages?
[20:52.990 --> 20:56.950]  And it's also, like you mentioned, it's, it's good if, um, if I need to meet somebody.
[20:56.950 --> 21:02.230]  I don't want the whole world to know where I'm meeting this person, so obviously that person's going to call and get the information and nobody else will.
[21:02.370 --> 21:04.450]  Have you checked the privacy policy with the service?
[21:04.470 --> 21:05.530]  Well, it defaults.
[21:05.610 --> 21:08.930]  It defaults to, uh, as far as privacy application...
[21:08.930 --> 21:13.730]  Or their privacy policy as in what they do with the information that they obtain from you sending them as your voicemail provider.
[21:13.730 --> 21:15.010]  Well, um, I'm not sure.
[21:15.210 --> 21:17.270]  Then again, I'm not sure what Verizon Wireless is either.
[21:17.410 --> 21:18.690]  I mean, uh...
[21:18.690 --> 21:22.270]  But the key is, what, what is, how does this company make money to stay in business?
[21:22.290 --> 21:22.750]  I don't know.
[21:22.910 --> 21:23.410]  Is there ads?
[21:23.810 --> 21:24.450]  They have to listen to that.
[21:24.450 --> 21:25.510]  I haven't heard any ads yet.
[21:25.770 --> 21:27.670]  I, I, this is why I signed up to find out.
[21:27.850 --> 21:29.190]  I'm, I'm basically a guinea pig here.
[21:29.310 --> 21:31.770]  I'm setting myself up to find out what these people are up to.
[21:31.770 --> 21:36.410]  Uh, but, um, so far, no ads, uh, doesn't cost anything.
[21:36.630 --> 21:38.370]  They get tons of statistical data from this.
[21:38.470 --> 21:42.250]  And, and, and also, uh, obviously they can log all the calls that you get.
[21:42.350 --> 21:44.890]  They obviously have the caller ID information from the person calling you.
[21:45.030 --> 21:47.530]  And they could potentially even save all the voicemail messages that you get.
[21:47.630 --> 21:48.570]  So could Verizon, though.
[21:48.670 --> 21:49.650]  They can, they can also...
[21:49.650 --> 21:50.630]  For all I know, they're doing that.
[21:50.790 --> 21:51.170]  Not Kevin.
[21:51.350 --> 21:54.270]  So say I have this and I wanted to switch back to Verizon since I don't like it.
[21:54.390 --> 21:55.750]  Do I have to call Verizon and get their code?
[21:55.890 --> 21:56.910]  You know, I haven't thought about that.
[21:57.030 --> 21:58.190]  There must be a way on the website.
[21:58.190 --> 21:59.910]  The website is really easy to navigate through.
[22:00.030 --> 22:01.310]  It's, uh, umail.com.
[22:01.430 --> 22:02.690]  Y-O-U mail.com.
[22:03.330 --> 22:05.190]  And, uh, I had no trouble at all setting it up.
[22:05.270 --> 22:08.230]  I imagine I wouldn't have trouble unsetting it up if I wanted to as well.
[22:08.390 --> 22:11.530]  I can try that next week, I suppose, if I, if I get upset with this.
[22:11.710 --> 22:18.350]  But yeah, one thing I didn't like was, uh, when I, when I signed in, uh, it defaults to no password if you're calling from your own phone.
[22:18.790 --> 22:21.730]  Which a lot of companies seem to be pushing these days.
[22:21.730 --> 22:23.730]  Not a good thing, but it's easy to turn off.
[22:23.790 --> 22:24.390]  And I turned it off.
[22:24.690 --> 22:26.090]  And now it no longer has that.
[22:27.550 --> 22:28.070]  So, yeah.
[22:28.290 --> 22:29.110]  Umail.com.
[22:29.250 --> 22:30.090]  Give it a, give it a try.
[22:30.210 --> 22:32.930]  Let me know what you, uh, uh, what you come up with.
[22:33.210 --> 22:35.790]  Uh, when you can log in, it's, uh, it's a lot easier.
[22:35.830 --> 22:37.410]  I don't know why it wouldn't hear our touchdowns.
[22:37.510 --> 22:40.270]  Maybe one of our listeners can check the privacy policy and give us a call later.
[22:40.470 --> 22:41.030]  Yeah, yeah.
[22:41.070 --> 22:41.370]  Sounds good.
[22:41.990 --> 22:43.590]  And check the privacy policy of all the companies.
[22:43.670 --> 22:44.450]  I'd like to know that as well.
[22:45.130 --> 22:45.830]  Um, okay.
[22:45.970 --> 22:46.690]  So there's that.
[22:47.070 --> 22:47.330]  Um.
[22:48.350 --> 22:53.830]  Well, we have, um, kind of a, a feature tonight because it is the last show of the, uh, of the year.
[22:53.910 --> 23:08.470]  So what I've asked people to do, people here on the, on the station and also listeners, I'm asking you now, uh, is to, uh, let us know what you think the most significant development, uh, occurrence, piece of technology, piece of hardware, piece of software,
[23:08.770 --> 23:13.330]  um, uh, an incident of hacking in the last year has been government legislation.
[23:13.330 --> 23:22.610]  The most significant thing that, uh, that you think has happened in 2006 and also what you would like to see in 2007.
[23:22.610 --> 23:23.410]  Just one thing.
[23:23.530 --> 23:26.790]  One thing that you'd be happy seeing in the year 2007.
[23:27.790 --> 23:29.170]  Would anybody like to start?
[23:30.610 --> 23:31.310]  What do you mean no?
[23:31.310 --> 23:32.730]  You're going to have to do it at some point, Jim.
[23:33.690 --> 23:34.530]  I told you that.
[23:34.610 --> 23:38.630]  I, I had what I thought was an overreaching idea, so I thought I should go towards the end.
[23:39.090 --> 23:39.350]  Okay.
[23:39.830 --> 23:40.270]  All right.
[23:40.430 --> 23:41.630]  But we're not going to forget about you.
[23:42.010 --> 23:42.390]  Don't worry.
[23:42.510 --> 23:42.770]  Don't worry.
[23:42.850 --> 23:43.710]  I promise it will be.
[23:43.790 --> 23:44.630]  How about we go remote?
[23:44.730 --> 23:44.930]  Bernie.
[23:45.870 --> 23:46.190]  Okay.
[23:46.490 --> 23:50.950]  Uh, you, you wanted to know what the most significant development in the world of technology was in the past year.
[23:51.090 --> 23:54.510]  You said it could be hardware, software, legislation, and active hacking, et cetera.
[23:54.630 --> 23:55.330]  In your opinion?
[23:55.630 --> 23:56.630]  In my opinion.
[23:56.810 --> 23:57.010]  Yes.
[23:57.030 --> 23:57.670]  It's not gospel.
[23:57.830 --> 23:58.510]  You could disagree.
[23:58.790 --> 24:16.810]  One of the most significant developments, uh, in the past year is, is, uh, the, the, the revelation of large scale warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens by their own government, uh, agencies, uh, namely the NSA and others on such a large scale that,
[24:16.990 --> 24:18.530]  uh, boggles the mind.
[24:19.190 --> 24:32.890]  And, uh, we kind of knew this was going on on a smaller scale earlier, but, uh, now that it's, uh, admittedly going on, on a large scale, without a warrant, without any judicial oversight, I think it's very significant, and I still think people should be getting angrier about it.
[24:34.170 --> 24:39.750]  And, uh, I'm not going to make this too easy on you, but is that your wish for 2007, that people get more angry about this?
[24:39.950 --> 24:43.630]  Um, well, it is, but, uh, I had a, I had a different, uh, topic for that.
[24:43.630 --> 25:01.630]  But, uh, I, I would, uh, I would wish for a, uh, a widespread, uh, consumer adoption of a, a friendlier computer operating system, uh, than Microsoft Windows, because the new, uh, the new version of Windows coming down the pike, uh, right now, uh, Microsoft Vista is,
[25:01.770 --> 25:04.070]  uh, it's going to be imposed on people this year.
[25:04.070 --> 25:05.910]  If you buy a new computer, it'll have to come with that.
[25:06.130 --> 25:18.250]  It's so riddled with, uh, DRM, uh, digital rights management controls, that, uh, I hope and predict it will, uh, turn people away in droves to more friendly computer operating systems.
[25:18.450 --> 25:20.450]  Do you have any in mind, or do they not exist yet?
[25:20.610 --> 25:24.950]  Well, like Redbird said earlier, uh, there's the Mac OS, and there's, uh, various, uh, flavors of Linux.
[25:25.190 --> 25:29.110]  So there's a nice free one called Ubuntu out there, uh, based on Linux.
[25:29.350 --> 25:29.970]  It's very friendly.
[25:30.090 --> 25:30.910]  People should just try it.
[25:30.990 --> 25:31.270]  It's free.
[25:31.710 --> 25:33.370]  Um, that's what I wish.
[25:33.450 --> 25:36.330]  People would just try something and just have at least some perspective.
[25:37.030 --> 25:42.890]  And, of course, uh, going along with that, hopefully people will write major applications that work in these operating systems as well.
[25:43.110 --> 25:45.890]  As it's adopted more, more people will write applications for it.
[25:46.290 --> 25:47.350]  Many already exist.
[25:47.510 --> 25:58.710]  Almost all of the standard desktop productivity stuff you do on your Windows desktop can be easily ported over to, to Linux using OpenOffice, using any of the various other tools that are available already.
[25:59.410 --> 26:00.270]  Major things?
[26:00.710 --> 26:01.070]  Major things?
[26:01.430 --> 26:02.850]  Photoshop and, uh, GIMP.
[26:03.290 --> 26:03.770]  QuarkXPress.
[26:04.190 --> 26:04.870]  All sorts of stuff.
[26:05.430 --> 26:06.110]  Back Orifice.
[26:07.330 --> 26:07.810]  Next.
[26:08.070 --> 26:08.390]  All right.
[26:08.950 --> 26:09.890]  Uh, okay, next.
[26:09.890 --> 26:11.270]  All right, that'll be you then, Redbird.
[26:11.370 --> 26:11.750]  You're next.
[26:12.050 --> 26:12.290]  Uh, what...
[26:12.290 --> 26:16.170]  You know, I, I swear Bernie stole my idea as far as the...
[26:16.170 --> 26:16.430]  Uh-huh.
[26:16.430 --> 26:17.670]  I don't believe you for a second.
[26:18.310 --> 26:19.070]  Sorry about that.
[26:19.910 --> 26:28.170]  But, but, but for, as far as my, my hope for the future in 2007 is, is slightly different than his, although I, I do agree with Bernie's as well.
[26:28.690 --> 26:43.630]  Uh, and, and, and my hope would be that people like us, people like the HOPE attendees, like the, like the guys at CCC, will, will do more exploration of the surveillance technology, of, of the RFID that's, you know, being widespread now, in all, in all of our stuff,
[26:43.650 --> 26:55.670]  in our credit cards, in our passports, and, in, in all sorts of other devices that we're going to be carrying around, and, and all the surveillance technology, like Bernie mentioned, that's being, uh, adopted in the new operating systems in Vista, their crazy activation stuff,
[26:55.750 --> 27:01.310]  all, all the other stuff that's tracking people, all this, all this legislation that's allowing the government to do that, and whatnot.
[27:01.510 --> 27:15.590]  I, I hope that people will be more, uh, inclined to experiment with it, to, to play with it, to tinker with it, to prove its faults, to show how this can actually be very, very harmful to, to the consumers, and, you know, even to the government.
[27:15.930 --> 27:20.390]  Well, actually, it's interesting you mentioned, because today is actually the first day of the CCC Congress over in Berlin.
[27:20.490 --> 27:22.970]  In fact, this is the first time, I think, in six years I haven't been there.
[27:23.430 --> 27:25.630]  Uh, so it's kind of weird for me to be here this time of year.
[27:25.630 --> 27:29.350]  But, um, let's imagine people over there are listening right now.
[27:29.570 --> 27:32.470]  What kinds of experiments do you have in mind for something like RFID?
[27:32.590 --> 27:33.970]  What would you like to see them try and do?
[27:33.970 --> 27:38.150]  A lot, a lot of it's already been started or been done with the, with the passports over in Europe.
[27:38.290 --> 27:40.590]  A couple of the passports have already, already been cracked.
[27:40.770 --> 27:45.250]  A couple of guys at the CCC, as I, as far as I remember, have, uh, have played with that quite a bit.
[27:45.250 --> 27:47.990]  Okay, so you crack the password on, on, on a, on a passport or whatever.
[27:48.270 --> 27:49.570]  You crack the RFID technology.
[27:49.570 --> 27:50.310]  What does that get you?
[27:50.370 --> 27:51.910]  It, it, it, it shows you the flaws.
[27:52.030 --> 27:57.950]  It shows you that the, that the supposedly secure, uh, uh, techniques that they're using are, are not secure at all.
[27:58.070 --> 28:04.590]  That this information's available to anyone within a proximity, uh, a certain proximity of your passport anyway.
[28:04.770 --> 28:05.510]  They can just steal the data.
[28:05.630 --> 28:07.830]  So James Bond is walking down the, the airport aisle and...
[28:07.830 --> 28:09.270]  It's not, it's see, the thing is, it's not...
[28:09.270 --> 28:10.750]  He can see you're, you're there from your passport.
[28:10.850 --> 28:12.150]  He's able to read your passport.
[28:12.310 --> 28:13.110]  But the thing is, it's not...
[28:13.110 --> 28:14.150]  Even though you have a different face on.
[28:14.210 --> 28:20.630]  Right, but you're, but, but just by saying James Bond implies that the average person can't do this, which is false because technology already exists.
[28:20.750 --> 28:21.190]  And, uh...
[28:21.190 --> 28:22.510]  Oh, you thought I meant that James Bond.
[28:22.610 --> 28:23.530]  No, I know this guy...
[28:23.530 --> 28:24.830]  Oh, James Bond, right.
[28:24.830 --> 28:25.510]  He's kind of dumb.
[28:25.630 --> 28:26.330]  That's why I mentioned him.
[28:26.910 --> 28:28.590]  Now, you have a passport in your hands right now.
[28:28.650 --> 28:29.490]  You're gripping it very tightly.
[28:29.730 --> 28:32.450]  Now, is, is that because it has RFID technology and you don't want us to read it?
[28:32.450 --> 28:33.010]  No, it doesn't actually.
[28:33.270 --> 28:41.090]  A couple of shows ago, we, we mentioned this and somebody had asked whether or not all of the United States passports, uh, have RFID implanted in them now.
[28:41.170 --> 28:43.290]  And I just got mine in the mail today, as a matter of fact.
[28:43.670 --> 28:48.770]  And, uh, actually the authority used to say Philadelphia, but now it says United States Department of State.
[28:49.010 --> 28:49.990]  It doesn't give a city?
[28:50.170 --> 28:51.210]  It, you check it out.
[28:51.350 --> 28:51.630]  All right.
[28:51.750 --> 28:52.650]  I'm checking it out right there.
[28:53.410 --> 28:54.610]  Um, wow.
[28:54.610 --> 28:55.010]  What a picture.
[28:55.250 --> 28:59.270]  It says New Jersey, USA, but I guess that's where you live or is that the issuing authority?
[28:59.430 --> 29:00.250]  It says where I was born, right?
[29:00.710 --> 29:01.410]  Uh, yeah.
[29:01.530 --> 29:02.390]  It does say where you were born.
[29:03.010 --> 29:03.910]  That's your middle name?
[29:04.490 --> 29:05.070]  Oh, okay.
[29:05.410 --> 29:06.470]  Uh, well, okay.
[29:06.570 --> 29:12.070]  So there's no RFID technology here and they, they don't seem to have, uh, the issuing city anymore.
[29:12.130 --> 29:12.290]  Right.
[29:12.430 --> 29:21.350]  So there was supposedly one that was doing it on all the passports, but I, I would assume that mine was processed by Philadelphia and it does not have RFID as far as I can tell.
[29:21.350 --> 29:21.350]  Yeah.
[29:21.550 --> 29:23.410]  Why would it be processed by Philadelphia and not New York?
[29:24.230 --> 29:26.350]  I, I had always had mine processed by Philadelphia.
[29:26.350 --> 29:28.030]  I'm doing it out of New Jersey instead of New York.
[29:28.090 --> 29:30.710]  New Jersey doesn't go to Phil, to, uh, New York, uh, for the passport.
[29:30.930 --> 29:33.150]  As far as I know, all my previous passports have been.
[29:33.170 --> 29:34.190]  You can't send passports over rivers.
[29:35.170 --> 29:36.090]  I guess not.
[29:36.290 --> 29:39.310]  Although I think there's a river involved somewhere down in Philadelphia as well, but, uh, yeah.
[29:39.310 --> 29:39.810]  It's a different river.
[29:39.950 --> 29:40.750]  Less famous anyhow.
[29:40.970 --> 29:43.850]  Okay, Mike, uh, since you're, you're up next, uh, what, what do you have?
[29:44.010 --> 29:47.610]  Well, uh, besides of course the, the tragic death of the great Turkmenbashi.
[29:47.930 --> 29:49.670]  Um, Oh yeah, that, that was something, wasn't it?
[29:49.770 --> 29:52.190]  You think that was, uh, that was, uh, a real death?
[29:52.310 --> 29:53.830]  That wasn't, that was on purpose, I think.
[29:53.930 --> 29:55.070]  Oh, well, I don't know.
[29:55.190 --> 29:55.730]  He had many enemies.
[29:55.890 --> 29:57.390]  We're talking about the leader of Turkmenistan.
[29:57.730 --> 29:58.570]  Do we have his name?
[29:58.890 --> 29:59.510]  I forget his name.
[29:59.610 --> 30:00.030]  I can't pronounce it.
[30:00.090 --> 30:00.250]  Yeah.
[30:00.370 --> 30:03.150]  But he, he put his name, he put his picture on the money.
[30:03.470 --> 30:05.250]  He named January after himself.
[30:06.190 --> 30:09.630]  He was, he was, as far as dictators go, he was a real dictator.
[30:10.010 --> 30:10.150]  Yeah.
[30:10.230 --> 30:12.770]  And now he's gone and then nobody knows what's going to happen over in Turkmenistan.
[30:13.650 --> 30:31.530]  Uh, but closer to home, I think one of the more exciting developments at least over the past year is this sort of, uh, it's still small and, and nascent, but growing, uh, awareness of people, uh, around sort of the issues we talk about on the show and people are actually starting to do things about them.
[30:31.690 --> 30:46.510]  So I've had the opportunity in the past year to attend a couple of actual, uh, street protests, one outside Verizon, uh, over their sort of killing of, uh, public access media and another outside the Apple store over their, uh, digital rights management,
[30:46.690 --> 30:50.090]  or as the people organizing the protests called it, digital restrictions management.
[30:50.490 --> 30:57.430]  Um, and I, and I think that we've been talking on the show, uh, for a very long time about these issues.
[30:57.650 --> 31:04.550]  And I think, uh, it's very exciting that people are starting to become aware of these issues, the whole flap around net neutrality.
[31:04.550 --> 31:09.770]  Uh, even though we didn't win, uh, net neutrality is, is gone for now.
[31:10.110 --> 31:16.010]  Uh, I think a lot of people became aware of that issue and were writing their Congress people and all this stuff.
[31:16.430 --> 31:22.210]  And I hope, uh, I guess it's cheating to have the same hope, uh, for the next year that this continues and grows.
[31:22.630 --> 31:24.890]  But, uh, I really do hope that that's the case.
[31:25.050 --> 31:27.470]  Now, net neutrality, you say that, uh, we lost the battle.
[31:27.610 --> 31:35.050]  Now, is it being implemented where, where you have to pay more to have people access your website in a, in a timely manner or various other?
[31:35.590 --> 31:36.610]  Uh, no, not yet.
[31:36.910 --> 31:38.650]  So maybe, maybe never.
[31:38.850 --> 31:39.150]  We'll see.
[31:39.230 --> 31:39.690]  Well, it's interesting.
[31:39.810 --> 31:43.330]  I was talking about this on the other show yesterday, uh, how net neutrality was the default.
[31:43.530 --> 31:45.230]  It was the default setting for the net.
[31:45.490 --> 31:59.070]  And, uh, the way it's being, uh, portrayed in the media, the media that's owned by these same companies that, that want net neutrality to go away, the way they're portraying it, they're making it sound like net neutrality is some kind of new threat to their right to make money and,
[31:59.070 --> 31:59.850]  and, and things like that.
[31:59.930 --> 32:02.630]  And I think most people are buying that because where are they hearing it?
[32:02.750 --> 32:05.330]  They're hearing it on radio and TV owned by these same people.
[32:05.410 --> 32:07.990]  Some of these television ads and, and radio ads are ridiculous.
[32:07.990 --> 32:13.970]  If you've, if you've ever seen or heard any of them, I mean, it really makes net neutrality sound like it's a, it's some horrible thing.
[32:14.030 --> 32:20.210]  I mean, that's, it's, it's, that's, I mean, that's really exactly, exactly the, the, the face of the messages that they're giving.
[32:20.350 --> 32:21.130]  It's really ridiculous.
[32:21.430 --> 32:21.430]  Bernie.
[32:21.750 --> 32:36.150]  I mean, I was just going to say, people really need to, to be critical of, of, of, of these, these services, these sounding, these supposedly, pro-consumer ads you, you, you hear on the radio and television and internet and whatever.
[32:36.570 --> 32:45.390]  Most of these are, are sponsored by, by lobbying companies that are funded by the corporations who, who want you to, to do things their way.
[32:45.530 --> 32:52.450]  So these, you know, the, the term AstroTurf has used, uh, sort of a, it's a spin on, uh, a grassroots, uh, organizations.
[32:52.810 --> 32:54.130]  These are not grassroots organizations.
[32:54.430 --> 32:59.090]  These are fake grass, fake, fake, uh, grassroots organizations.
[32:59.210 --> 33:09.830]  And, uh, they sound, they sound like, they sound like a real, uh, uh, a real group that's, uh, interested in your, uh, in your rights and, uh, what would benefit you.
[33:09.830 --> 33:13.910]  In fact, they're, uh, they're, they're cleverly disguised, uh, corporate mouthpieces.
[33:14.490 --> 33:16.570]  AstroTurf Roots Movement, is that what you'd call it?
[33:16.570 --> 33:17.210]  Yes.
[33:17.590 --> 33:25.430]  And it's surprising how many people form opinions based on this information that's given to them without absolutely any backing, without any justification at all.
[33:25.430 --> 33:26.350]  Well, because it's all they hear.
[33:26.430 --> 33:28.850]  They don't hear alternative voices, which I guess is what we are.
[33:30.190 --> 33:31.850]  Okay, up next is not Kevin.
[33:32.070 --> 33:32.510]  What do you have?
[33:32.810 --> 33:38.710]  Well, in my opinion, I think the development greatest is in the ability for governments to track its own citizens.
[33:39.030 --> 33:43.070]  For instance, London is a perfect example, 300 times a day being on camera.
[33:44.290 --> 33:44.810]  Mm-hmm.
[33:45.470 --> 33:47.010]  But they're not charging you to be on camera.
[33:47.090 --> 33:47.370]  Well...
[33:47.370 --> 33:47.830]  It's free.
[33:48.730 --> 33:50.710]  Maybe in the near future, you'll be charged.
[33:50.890 --> 33:51.070]  Uh-huh.
[33:51.250 --> 33:52.830]  All taxes, you're paying for it.
[33:53.070 --> 33:55.090]  No, but do you think this is really something that new?
[33:55.250 --> 33:57.530]  I mean, London, they've been tracking people for ages.
[33:57.910 --> 34:04.070]  Well, I think in the whole world, it's become, in the last year, just that much more...
[34:06.210 --> 34:06.590]  Prevalent?
[34:06.670 --> 34:07.510]  Yeah, that's the word.
[34:08.850 --> 34:12.190]  And do you think it's just inevitable that we're moving in that direction?
[34:12.190 --> 34:14.110]  Or is there a particular event that led to this?
[34:14.970 --> 34:26.230]  Not a particular event, but it's just a culmination of everything throughout the year is really pushing in that direction of governments knowing exactly where you are and exactly who you're talking to and what you're doing and what you're thinking about.
[34:26.410 --> 34:27.090]  I mean...
[34:27.090 --> 34:28.590]  Does the government know where you are right now?
[34:28.770 --> 34:29.850]  I wouldn't be surprised.
[34:30.010 --> 34:30.230]  Yes.
[34:30.330 --> 34:31.490]  He has his cell phone sitting right there.
[34:31.530 --> 34:32.530]  He holds his cell phone up.
[34:32.590 --> 34:33.990]  Yes, I guess maybe they do.
[34:34.270 --> 34:36.010]  Okay, well, then this is a challenge to the government.
[34:36.390 --> 34:37.410]  Come and find Kevin.
[34:38.370 --> 34:39.310]  Not Kevin, that is.
[34:39.650 --> 34:43.630]  And if you show up in the next 25 minutes, we'll give you a...
[34:43.630 --> 34:44.830]  You know, please don't encourage this.
[34:44.870 --> 34:46.150]  Well, it's just a test.
[34:46.430 --> 34:49.450]  They should be proud of their technology to see if they can actually track...
[34:49.450 --> 34:52.450]  I mean, we haven't given out any identifying marks.
[34:52.830 --> 34:54.030]  Let's see how good they are.
[34:54.130 --> 34:55.390]  25 minutes and counting, government.
[34:55.990 --> 34:57.170]  And it can be any government, too.
[34:57.230 --> 34:57.890]  It doesn't have to be ours.
[34:58.190 --> 34:58.750]  You know...
[34:58.750 --> 34:59.630]  That's only fair, right?
[35:00.390 --> 35:02.270]  Well, you really look worried, though.
[35:03.550 --> 35:15.150]  That's a good point, though, because our government shares all this data with other governments to get around whatever rights we have left protecting our privacy.
[35:15.670 --> 35:17.790]  And it's sort of a quid pro quo.
[35:17.950 --> 35:23.930]  Other governments will then provide that information back to our government, so it's a loophole around any protections we have.
[35:24.590 --> 35:30.090]  It started with what's called the UK-USA Alliance, and it includes New Zealand and Australia.
[35:30.090 --> 35:36.610]  But it's spreading to other countries, too, where every country's intelligence agency is sharing data with the others to get around their own privacy policies.
[35:37.890 --> 35:40.890]  Now, Kevin, also, you have a wish for 2007?
[35:41.610 --> 35:42.410]  More snow.
[35:43.070 --> 35:48.470]  No, a wish having to do with technology, unless somehow technology is behind not having any snow.
[35:50.030 --> 35:50.770]  Not exactly.
[35:50.810 --> 35:51.410]  Well, it is.
[35:52.010 --> 35:53.090]  Okay, sort of.
[35:53.170 --> 35:54.730]  But, you know, that's a real reach there.
[35:55.890 --> 35:57.190]  I'm going to come back to you.
[35:57.610 --> 35:58.990]  You'll come up with a wish soon.
[35:59.530 --> 36:10.170]  For me, I have to say, I'm going to pick on something a little less socially significant, and just something that was a whole lot of fun, as one of the most significant developments of 2006.
[36:10.390 --> 36:11.890]  And that was the whole Project Evil thing.
[36:12.330 --> 36:13.990]  That was something that I think...
[36:13.990 --> 36:22.590]  This was the weird phone numbers that showed up on Craigslist that people were trying to figure out, just what is this strange repeating numbers...
[36:23.090 --> 36:23.490]  Numbers?
[36:23.630 --> 36:24.050]  Letters, right?
[36:24.430 --> 36:24.910]  Is it numbers?
[36:24.910 --> 36:29.770]  No, it was numbers that were read out, like number stations on Shortwave.
[36:30.290 --> 36:38.110]  They'd show up in a different city every couple of weeks, and it just kind of awakened the whole hacker spirit of, wow, this is new and mysterious.
[36:38.110 --> 36:41.650]  Let's pool our resources together and figure out what this is all about.
[36:41.730 --> 36:43.610]  And I haven't felt that in a long time.
[36:43.650 --> 36:46.410]  So to me, that sort of woke up something.
[36:46.510 --> 36:47.830]  And I think a lot of people it did as well.
[36:47.830 --> 36:56.070]  And it turned out it was people in the community, people from the Los Angeles 2600 meeting who went to DEF CON and talked about all this.
[36:56.390 --> 36:58.870]  So it's kind of cool that it came from the hacking community as well.
[36:58.930 --> 37:03.690]  We need more things like that, more weird mysteries that people can sort of pull there.
[37:03.710 --> 37:04.650]  Not fake ones, hopefully.
[37:04.930 --> 37:07.110]  Not fake ones, but just things that...
[37:07.110 --> 37:09.730]  Just the action of pooling resources and interest, yeah.
[37:09.730 --> 37:10.190]  Exactly.
[37:10.410 --> 37:18.190]  Now, as for what I'd like to see in the future, I guess if I had to phrase it in one word, it would be empowerment.
[37:18.730 --> 37:25.470]  And what I mean by that is anything from, say, YouTube, where you're able to...
[37:25.470 --> 37:33.650]  For instance, a few weeks ago, there was an instance at UCLA where some kid got tasered in the library by some university cops because he wouldn't do what they commanded him to do.
[37:34.870 --> 37:38.790]  And not only one, but at least two people captured this and posted it on YouTube.
[37:38.790 --> 37:46.930]  And, of course, you know that they would have denied such a thing ever happened, except for the fact that the evidence is out there, the video is out there, everybody can see.
[37:47.890 --> 38:02.710]  And things like YouTube, things that allow you to spread video all over the world, I think that would be a tremendous tool of empowerment for people just to be able to get evidence out wherever you happen to be.
[38:02.970 --> 38:06.590]  Other things, the TV being on, for instance, we play with that a lot this year.
[38:07.270 --> 38:17.610]  And that sort of empowers people as well to turn off something annoying if they're in a space where it's yelling at them and they don't wish for that to continue.
[38:17.870 --> 38:24.550]  Cell phone jammers, if you want to control your personal space, if you're on a train and somebody is yelling next to you, we can shut them up pretty easily.
[38:26.170 --> 38:35.770]  I like to think 2007 will be the year that legislators realize that regulating the net is a losing battle and it's just never going to work.
[38:36.570 --> 38:37.630]  That's a real reach.
[38:37.730 --> 38:41.270]  I know it's not likely that's going to happen, but hopefully it will.
[38:42.690 --> 38:43.290]  What else?
[38:43.990 --> 38:47.570]  I hope 2007 is a year more people put the word hacker in their resumes.
[38:48.510 --> 38:49.490]  That's a good word.
[38:49.710 --> 38:51.010]  I have it in mine.
[38:51.090 --> 38:51.750]  It's in your resume.
[38:52.030 --> 38:52.410]  Very good.
[38:52.530 --> 38:52.830]  Very good.
[38:53.390 --> 38:56.690]  If you're considering looking for a job, put hacker in your resume.
[38:56.830 --> 38:57.910]  See what kind of reaction you get.
[38:57.910 --> 38:58.470]  It doesn't work very well.
[38:58.550 --> 38:59.090]  I can tell you that.
[38:59.550 --> 39:01.390]  I can tell you right now it doesn't work very well.
[39:01.390 --> 39:04.430]  But are you happy with the jobs you've gotten as a result of...
[39:05.730 --> 39:07.950]  I can tell you it wasn't as a result of that term.
[39:07.950 --> 39:09.970]  I've always had to justify it with my employer.
[39:10.170 --> 39:18.550]  I maintain, though, that if you get a job you're very happy with and they like the word hacker in your resume, I think that's a really good job to have.
[39:18.550 --> 39:21.730]  But I'm telling you, they will never like it unless the employer is someone like you.
[39:22.710 --> 39:24.790]  Well, maybe that's what we need more of.
[39:24.930 --> 39:25.290]  More of you.
[39:25.550 --> 39:26.510]  I don't know about that.
[39:27.270 --> 39:32.110]  And I guess just hope people will develop the guts to stand up for what they believe is wrong.
[39:32.330 --> 39:33.530]  I always hope for that anyway.
[39:33.710 --> 39:35.030]  That's my wish for 2007.
[39:35.210 --> 39:35.570]  Now, Jim.
[39:36.010 --> 39:37.970]  See, you should have had me go ahead of you because...
[39:37.970 --> 39:40.790]  Well, you said you wanted to be towards the end, so I put you at the end.
[39:40.830 --> 39:42.470]  Well, yeah, but yours was more uplifting.
[39:42.610 --> 39:43.210]  Mine is not.
[39:43.670 --> 39:45.990]  Well, we're too high up now, so bring us down a little bit.
[39:46.130 --> 39:46.510]  All right.
[39:47.710 --> 39:56.290]  I have not only the hacker-related story or idea of the year, but of what I think will be of the decade.
[39:56.490 --> 39:57.370]  The decade...
[39:57.950 --> 39:58.890]  The decade, huh?
[39:59.030 --> 40:02.370]  The decade, beginning in 2001 as decades began.
[40:02.470 --> 40:03.730]  And what is the decade called, Jim?
[40:04.590 --> 40:05.270]  That's a good question.
[40:05.270 --> 40:06.170]  Yeah, nobody seems to know.
[40:06.250 --> 40:07.130]  Nobody knows this decade.
[40:07.250 --> 40:09.010]  It's not called the 20s or the 30s or the...
[40:09.010 --> 40:09.750]  The aughts.
[40:09.850 --> 40:10.690]  The zeros, the aughts.
[40:10.790 --> 40:11.870]  We never use the word aught.
[40:11.930 --> 40:12.670]  Why would we use it now?
[40:12.670 --> 40:15.430]  We weren't around 100 years ago, so we're not sure, are we?
[40:15.430 --> 40:17.050]  I don't think they had decades back then.
[40:17.210 --> 40:18.230]  But anyway...
[40:18.230 --> 40:18.450]  Okay.
[40:18.990 --> 40:25.030]  The story of the decade, I think, is the rise of the surveillance and control state.
[40:25.410 --> 40:28.030]  And of the year, it's a piece of that.
[40:28.030 --> 40:47.310]  It's the start of the ubiquity of the RFID chip, including there are people with serious proposals and minor implementations so far of putting RFID chips in people's hands to act as credit card swipe devices at bars.
[40:47.710 --> 40:58.190]  Trendy bars in Miami and New York have asked their patrons, their regular patrons, to have chips implanted so they can charge admission, drinks, whatever.
[40:59.690 --> 41:03.570]  Certain stores are having pilot programs for this.
[41:04.290 --> 41:16.630]  They're using it in certain high-tech laboratories to control what rooms you can go in and out of, and it clocks your time in and out of the rooms as well as on and off the job.
[41:17.070 --> 41:20.750]  And it's in the passports, or starting to be in the passports.
[41:20.750 --> 41:38.530]  I think the now start of ubiquity of the RFID chip, and it's being an intrinsic piece of the surveillance and control state, which is rising all around us, I think that's the story of the decade and of the year.
[41:38.990 --> 41:40.790]  And what is your wish for 2007?
[41:41.710 --> 41:43.050]  Did it all go away?
[41:43.770 --> 41:49.510]  Yeah, I mean, it's kind of silly to say that it would all go away.
[41:49.510 --> 41:59.350]  I was thinking about that, and about the only thing I can come up with is, you know, I was thinking, why is there the rise of the surveillance state and the control state and all this?
[41:59.770 --> 42:10.810]  And it's because people don't want to have their geopolitical fights in the old-fashioned way, where you would kill thousands of your enemies, if not millions.
[42:11.110 --> 42:15.970]  They want to do it by controlling your people and their people.
[42:16.130 --> 42:17.130]  Oh, they still want to kill.
[42:17.350 --> 42:18.350]  Not as much.
[42:18.350 --> 42:19.210]  Not as much.
[42:19.330 --> 42:19.570]  Oh, I disagree.
[42:19.870 --> 42:20.350]  I think...
[42:20.350 --> 42:28.870]  Ever since the advent of the Vietnam War in television, killing is not as popular as we saw in Somalia, as we are seeing in Iraq.
[42:29.110 --> 42:30.370]  Killing is not as popular.
[42:30.570 --> 42:32.910]  So what you do is you control your population, you control their population.
[42:32.910 --> 42:37.510]  You haven't been keeping up on world events, you know, Darfur and various other massacres and the...
[42:37.510 --> 42:39.290]  How much TV do you see of Darfur?
[42:39.610 --> 42:40.590]  Well, that's the point.
[42:40.790 --> 42:40.830]  Exactly.
[42:40.830 --> 42:43.050]  Just because you don't see it doesn't mean it's not happening, though.
[42:43.210 --> 42:44.210]  That's why it's happening.
[42:44.270 --> 42:46.270]  It's happening because you don't see it.
[42:46.850 --> 42:47.830]  But it is happening.
[42:48.010 --> 42:57.150]  The ones you see don't happen as much and therefore geopolitical entities, countries and such, have to control people through chips and cameras and such.
[42:57.250 --> 42:58.710]  But it's like I'm talking to George Orwell here.
[42:58.810 --> 43:01.350]  You do know it's really happening even though you can't see it.
[43:01.910 --> 43:02.550]  It's there.
[43:02.550 --> 43:12.150]  And my point is, if you can see it, it happens in less numbers, so they have to go to something else than killing to get their point across, to get their ends met.
[43:12.510 --> 43:14.530]  I kind of have to agree with Jim on this one.
[43:15.230 --> 43:17.110]  Although I can't necessarily explain it better.
[43:18.070 --> 43:20.450]  I was going to ask you if you could, but all right.
[43:20.590 --> 43:24.050]  Oh, and just on a tangent about net neutrality.
[43:24.330 --> 43:24.890]  Two things.
[43:25.110 --> 43:27.570]  Let's do it at our phone number, 212-209-2900.
[43:27.650 --> 43:29.130]  We'd like your input on this as well.
[43:29.130 --> 43:34.210]  I've heard that there's an excellent explanation on YouTube, search for public knowledge.
[43:34.210 --> 43:38.610]  I believe that's one word, and you find a video explaining it.
[43:38.730 --> 43:40.870]  And another quick explanation of net neutrality.
[43:40.990 --> 43:52.650]  It's like a newspaper owner saying that because we cover the Yankees, we're publishing way too many papers, it costs more, so therefore we want the Yankees to pay us for covering them.
[43:54.010 --> 43:54.610]  Interesting.
[43:54.910 --> 43:55.130]  Yeah.
[43:56.230 --> 43:59.490]  Well, I guess things like that we can look forward to in the future.
[43:59.670 --> 44:00.950]  There's all sorts of craziness out there.
[44:01.050 --> 44:01.990]  There's a lot of craziness.
[44:02.110 --> 44:07.570]  Where if somebody whistles a tune while you're filming something in the street, you have to cut it out or else pay copyright for that.
[44:08.730 --> 44:14.170]  A fun thing to do is go to a movie shoot and just start singing Happy Birthday or something and see how much trouble you can get them into.
[44:14.310 --> 44:15.050]  It's ridiculous.
[44:15.250 --> 44:20.810]  If you take a picture of a building, the building wants money for that if you're going to publish the picture someplace.
[44:21.450 --> 44:24.470]  Insanity like this we're getting used to, and I don't think we ever should.
[44:24.470 --> 44:29.070]  You wanted me to remind you of that humorous news item I came up with.
[44:29.210 --> 44:29.630]  That's right.
[44:29.750 --> 44:29.830]  Yeah.
[44:29.970 --> 44:31.610]  Actually, it's a security alert.
[44:31.610 --> 44:32.810]  A security alert, yes.
[44:32.990 --> 44:33.630]  That you've come up with.
[44:33.750 --> 44:35.150]  And I think it's something...
[44:35.150 --> 44:36.090]  Listeners, this is serious.
[44:36.390 --> 44:37.650]  Listen carefully because Jim has...
[44:37.650 --> 44:43.610]  We have found a serious flaw in the three-ounce program of the TSA.
[44:43.790 --> 44:45.230]  We found a hole around it.
[44:45.350 --> 44:48.390]  This is the rule that doesn't allow you to bring liquids onto airplanes.
[44:48.770 --> 44:48.790]  Oh, no.
[44:48.830 --> 44:50.310]  Liquid explosive, very dangerous.
[44:50.310 --> 44:50.590]  Okay.
[44:50.690 --> 44:52.750]  God forbid you bring more than three ounces of anything.
[44:52.750 --> 44:54.450]  We found a way to get around it.
[44:54.470 --> 44:54.830]  3.4 ounces.
[44:54.850 --> 44:55.430]  3.4 ounces.
[44:55.610 --> 44:57.190]  They changed it, but they're not very public about it.
[44:57.250 --> 44:57.930]  Okay, so tell us.
[44:58.010 --> 44:59.470]  What comes in a 3.4 ounce container?
[45:00.670 --> 45:01.390]  Beerbelly.com.
[45:01.870 --> 45:02.590]  Beerbelly.com?
[45:02.630 --> 45:10.470]  It is a device designed to sneak beer into your football or other athletic stadium so you don't pay outrageous prices or you get drunk.
[45:10.870 --> 45:11.310]  Uh-huh.
[45:11.410 --> 45:14.690]  And it straps to a man's belly.
[45:15.170 --> 45:17.090]  It makes him look like a fat slob.
[45:17.350 --> 45:19.270]  Which these days is quite believable, I suppose.
[45:20.030 --> 45:22.050]  No commentary on this from me.
[45:22.210 --> 45:23.850]  A lot of fat people walking around.
[45:23.950 --> 45:24.770]  There's no question about that.
[45:24.850 --> 45:26.650]  This could carry a large amount of liquid.
[45:27.410 --> 45:32.710]  Whereas you and I, true blue Americans, would have an alcoholic beverage of some sort in there, a brewski.
[45:33.690 --> 45:35.750]  Heaven knows what Al-Qaeda would have in there.
[45:35.810 --> 45:37.710]  It could be liquid explosives of some kind.
[45:38.190 --> 45:41.050]  Imagine, you know, a dozen fat Arabs on an airplane.
[45:41.190 --> 45:43.990]  Are they really fat or do they have lots of liquid explosives?
[45:44.950 --> 45:47.330]  Well, it's certainly given us a lot to think about there.
[45:47.410 --> 45:55.530]  But I guess the gist of it is that anybody who is overweight now should be subjected to a lot more scrutiny and searching to see if the belly is real.
[45:55.530 --> 45:58.510]  You take a pin to them, which adds...
[45:58.510 --> 45:59.450]  You take a pin to them?
[45:59.570 --> 46:05.430]  Right, which adds something to the old Shakespearean line of if you prick them, do they not bleed?
[46:05.670 --> 46:06.330]  I see.
[46:06.610 --> 46:07.410]  Obviously, they wouldn't.
[46:07.510 --> 46:10.430]  They would gush beer or a liquid explosive.
[46:11.070 --> 46:14.350]  Well, this is why we're on the cutting edge of security alerts.
[46:14.530 --> 46:15.190]  Thanks, Jim, for...
[46:15.190 --> 46:23.630]  This technology, of course, is usable not only by Arabs, but also by right-wing extremists who still make up the majority of terrorists caught in this country.
[46:24.030 --> 46:25.530]  Well, I'm sure we'll be hearing...
[46:25.530 --> 46:27.630]  No, I think the ones that are caught have been Arabs.
[46:27.770 --> 46:29.170]  The ones uncaught have been right-wing.
[46:29.170 --> 46:35.370]  Well, we're going to get mail from all of them being outraged at us for coming out, including all the obese Americans, too.
[46:35.490 --> 46:36.110]  That's a lot of mail.
[46:36.590 --> 46:38.250]  All right, 212-209-2900.
[46:38.390 --> 46:39.490]  Not Kevin, I did not forget you.
[46:39.490 --> 46:40.850]  Do you have a wish for 2007 yet?
[46:41.530 --> 46:43.930]  Enough with the Homeland Security scare tactics.
[46:44.670 --> 46:45.430]  That's my wish.
[46:45.510 --> 46:46.250]  What, just one day?
[46:46.410 --> 46:47.030]  You know what, guys?
[46:47.150 --> 46:47.750]  Not a good idea.
[46:47.850 --> 46:48.390]  Let's shut down.
[46:48.650 --> 46:53.570]  Well, no, I think the realization that most of this stuff they're saying is fabricated.
[46:54.330 --> 46:55.170]  That would be nice.
[46:55.210 --> 46:57.310]  It would be nice if some reality actually got into the equation.
[46:57.890 --> 47:02.390]  I always laughed at the whole term Homeland Security when it was first introduced by George W.
[47:02.630 --> 47:05.150]  And unfortunately, it seems like it's here to stay.
[47:05.370 --> 47:06.810]  What's our threat-level color now?
[47:07.010 --> 47:07.290]  Do you know?
[47:07.350 --> 47:08.410]  People don't talk about that anymore.
[47:08.950 --> 47:09.250]  Orange?
[47:09.870 --> 47:10.650]  I don't know.
[47:10.950 --> 47:11.930]  Well, New York is orange.
[47:11.930 --> 47:12.050]  New York, right?
[47:12.050 --> 47:13.870]  But I think the rest of the country is yellow.
[47:14.170 --> 47:16.450]  But international flights apparently are red.
[47:16.590 --> 47:16.990]  I don't know.
[47:17.630 --> 47:18.190]  Who knows?
[47:18.310 --> 47:19.650]  212-209-2900.
[47:19.790 --> 47:24.270]  What's your opinion on the most significant technological developments and wishes for 2007 and things like that?
[47:24.470 --> 47:25.610]  And anything else on your mind?
[47:25.670 --> 47:26.030]  Good evening.
[47:26.090 --> 47:27.270]  You're on Off the Hook.
[47:28.010 --> 47:28.890]  How do you like that?
[47:29.370 --> 47:31.570]  Well, it's also we have to sort of grab them before they hop.
[47:31.570 --> 47:32.750]  The dial tone, not a new development.
[47:32.950 --> 47:33.310]  Good evening.
[47:33.410 --> 47:33.950]  You're on Off the Hook.
[47:33.950 --> 47:36.130]  Yeah, if I'd like things to be less annoying.
[47:36.610 --> 47:37.530]  Oh, let's start.
[47:37.930 --> 47:39.450]  Let's start by going to another call.
[47:39.750 --> 47:40.010]  Yeah.
[47:40.170 --> 47:40.430]  Good evening.
[47:40.510 --> 47:41.150]  You're on Off the Hook.
[47:42.170 --> 47:42.490]  Hello?
[47:42.730 --> 47:42.990]  Yes.
[47:43.130 --> 47:43.750]  I got my wish.
[47:43.850 --> 47:44.230]  Less annoying.
[47:44.350 --> 47:44.850]  Yes, go ahead.
[47:45.510 --> 47:45.970]  Oh, hi.
[47:46.130 --> 47:46.550]  Yes.
[47:46.730 --> 47:49.790]  I'm not calling in reference to anything significant from the air.
[47:49.950 --> 47:56.050]  I wasn't sure if you heard about this, but GHI, the insurance company, had some sort of security breach.
[47:56.850 --> 48:04.710]  My mother received a bill for her husband getting some shots, but he's been dead for two years.
[48:04.830 --> 48:05.290]  Oh, dear.
[48:05.290 --> 48:16.450]  And then she received a letter from GHI saying they were using another provider for certain information that had been compromised and that don't worry about any bills that were sent.
[48:17.670 --> 48:18.110]  Wow.
[48:18.370 --> 48:20.630]  Well, I imagine this kind of thing happens quite a bit.
[48:20.870 --> 48:21.390]  I don't know.
[48:21.490 --> 48:25.190]  Was it part of something bigger that you've heard of or just an isolated instance?
[48:26.210 --> 48:28.310]  I don't know if it's happened to anyone else.
[48:28.390 --> 48:29.730]  I just found out about it from her.
[48:29.890 --> 48:30.090]  Uh-huh.
[48:30.250 --> 48:34.170]  But GHI has said, don't worry about this bill, and they're standing by that?
[48:34.810 --> 48:36.130]  Yeah, that's what they said.
[48:36.230 --> 48:42.310]  I mean, the bill said that it had been charged to GHI, not that she had to pay anything, so I'm guessing they were trying to get money from the company.
[48:42.810 --> 48:43.090]  Uh-huh.
[48:43.310 --> 48:48.150]  Yeah, there's all kinds of shenanigans going on in the insurance world, obviously, where no doubt somebody's going to get money for that.
[48:48.250 --> 48:53.050]  But, yeah, this is really nothing all that new, using fake names, fake Social Security numbers.
[48:54.570 --> 48:58.430]  The security level just has to be upped a bit so that this kind of thing isn't so easy.
[48:58.430 --> 49:08.530]  What's interesting is that this took place in the health care world, which is the one place where we have any sort of standards at all in this country, and this sort of thing is still happening, so it's kind of interesting.
[49:08.810 --> 49:09.410]  All right, next call.
[49:10.070 --> 49:10.650]  Good evening.
[49:10.770 --> 49:11.370]  You're on off the hook.
[49:12.690 --> 49:13.230]  Go ahead.
[49:13.710 --> 49:16.710]  Yeah, I think it should be less...
[49:16.710 --> 49:17.330]  Yeah, less annoying.
[49:17.410 --> 49:18.070]  We got you, Rebel.
[49:18.570 --> 49:18.930]  Okay.
[49:19.170 --> 49:26.990]  You know, my wish for 2007 is that it's 2008, and we realize, hey, we haven't heard Rebel's voice on the phone in that long.
[49:26.990 --> 49:27.450]  Good evening.
[49:27.610 --> 49:28.250]  You're on the radio.
[49:29.450 --> 49:30.050]  Go ahead.
[49:30.310 --> 49:30.750]  Yes.
[49:31.530 --> 49:32.430]  Well, two things.
[49:32.610 --> 49:42.270]  My observation for the most significance, I think, would have to be that not only are people not concerned about RFID and all these services, but they're actually willing to pay for them.
[49:42.590 --> 49:55.170]  I've seen the advertisements for this where-you-at service where you can track other people on the telephone, and, of course, to have that happen, you have to be willing to be tracked through your phone as we know they can.
[49:55.170 --> 49:59.950]  But, like I said, people are willing to pay extra for it rather than protesting it.
[50:00.330 --> 50:02.650]  Well, I mean, you see things that have happened in the news.
[50:02.770 --> 50:06.510]  There are so many stories in the last few weeks of hikers being lost.
[50:06.870 --> 50:11.470]  There is that couple that was driving to New York City that drove off the road.
[50:11.550 --> 50:15.110]  Nobody knew where they were, and if they had only had GPS technology, maybe they could have been saved.
[50:15.370 --> 50:24.150]  There is the couple that drove into the wilderness in Oregon, and nobody knew where they were for days, and they could have all been saved if they'd only had tracking technology.
[50:25.170 --> 50:28.310]  It's sort of being hammered into our heads that, yeah, this is good.
[50:28.310 --> 50:30.110]  There are no privacy issues.
[50:30.350 --> 50:32.090]  Who would be crazy enough not to want this?
[50:32.270 --> 50:35.790]  Well, not only that, but it's a value added that you should pay extra for.
[50:36.110 --> 50:41.830]  So, I mean, not only is Big Brother watching, but you're going to pay for the television rights, I guess.
[50:41.990 --> 50:42.450]  That's right.
[50:42.450 --> 50:56.150]  But in terms of a wish, and I realize how foolish this is, it'd be interesting to see if this Democratic swing that we had, where we now have new people controlling Congress, will actually do anything about some of these issues.
[50:56.150 --> 51:03.650]  Because I'd like to think that, at least in some ways, this was part of what gave them the momentum and part of what made people wake up.
[51:03.650 --> 51:08.810]  And I know a lot of Republicans who really started to look at things and say, well, this is a mess.
[51:09.530 --> 51:21.530]  But like I said, I know it's naive, because ironically, they'll probably just wind up glossing over it, because it's not a sexy issue to start campaigning on for presidential elections in 2008.
[51:21.530 --> 51:34.070]  I'm not a betting man by, you know, default, but I would like to talk to anybody who does think that the Democrats are going to do something about this and make it a really interesting bet, because I don't think they're going to do a thing.
[51:34.250 --> 51:37.610]  Now, sir, you mentioned the website, whereyouat.com or something?
[51:38.190 --> 51:40.050]  No, this is a phone service.
[51:40.070 --> 51:40.470]  Phone service.
[51:40.670 --> 51:43.630]  Where you've been advertising it everywhere.
[51:44.510 --> 51:54.630]  The whole gimmick is, supposedly, you can pay and then track your friends by looking at a GPS and, I guess, their cell phone location on a map.
[51:54.830 --> 51:58.310]  And the whole gimmick is that now you can know where your friends are.
[51:58.510 --> 52:07.910]  So not only have you given up your personal rights to the government, but now other individuals can freely know where you are if you belong to the service.
[52:08.090 --> 52:11.630]  It's the little brother effect, where we spy on each other.
[52:11.730 --> 52:13.350]  But do you know which company is offering that?
[52:13.350 --> 52:14.370]  I know we've mentioned this before.
[52:14.790 --> 52:15.930]  No, I don't remember.
[52:16.110 --> 52:21.350]  And you can tell how effective the advertising is, because it's a bunch of people who look like big dots.
[52:21.750 --> 52:27.470]  And then they show you the map, and there are the dots of those people.
[52:27.710 --> 52:31.170]  But clearly, the ad doesn't work too well, because I remember the dots.
[52:31.270 --> 52:33.570]  I don't remember who's providing the service.
[52:33.830 --> 52:36.250]  But I think it's going to become a new catchphrase.
[52:36.410 --> 52:37.890]  You'll see, where are you at?
[52:38.130 --> 52:40.710]  And that's what they're hoping, I guess.
[52:40.710 --> 52:44.010]  I believe the two companies offering this are Sprint and Boost Mobile.
[52:44.410 --> 52:45.210]  Boost Mobile?
[52:45.210 --> 52:45.810]  Boost Mobile.
[52:46.130 --> 52:47.090]  What's Boost Mobile?
[52:47.510 --> 52:48.210]  It was a...
[52:48.210 --> 52:48.850]  Exactly.
[52:49.070 --> 52:50.470]  It was a name I'd never heard of either.
[52:50.670 --> 52:50.850]  Wow.
[52:51.630 --> 52:59.810]  So somebody's thinking that, like I said, this is a plus, and people will be willing to pay for having the right of knowing exactly where they are.
[52:59.810 --> 53:02.230]  And it's funny, because you talk about Europe.
[53:02.530 --> 53:06.670]  In Europe, they're still, in some ways, more progressive about these things.
[53:06.790 --> 53:12.550]  Like, I'll never forget that a friend was telling me about the photo cameras that they have on the radars.
[53:12.730 --> 53:17.830]  And in Europe, if they catch a picture of you and your car speeding, they'll send you that picture.
[53:18.070 --> 53:26.230]  But if there's somebody next to you in the car, by law, they have to blank out that person's face in case that person is not quite supposed to be there.
[53:26.230 --> 53:26.650]  Interesting.
[53:27.150 --> 53:35.850]  I know in England, too, they also have, where they have speed cameras, there's a law that says they have to have a sign telling you that there's going to be a speed camera, which I think is kind of cool.
[53:35.990 --> 53:39.590]  I think that's, it's good to tell people this, and it sort of makes people drive safer.
[53:39.930 --> 53:46.150]  Those lost hikers, the low-tech approach would have been for them to have a 30-06 and shoot off three rounds.
[53:46.310 --> 53:49.970]  But you don't see anybody advertising that as something to...
[53:49.970 --> 53:50.890]  Shoot off three rounds?
[53:50.950 --> 53:51.690]  How does that help anybody?
[53:51.690 --> 53:52.070]  It's a signal.
[53:52.150 --> 53:53.270]  It's a signal when you're lost.
[53:53.450 --> 53:53.770]  It's a signal.
[53:53.770 --> 53:55.390]  People are there watching for it.
[53:55.390 --> 54:01.730]  But the point is, it's just as good a justification for as...
[54:01.730 --> 54:03.570]  I got lost driving to the mall the other day.
[54:03.650 --> 54:05.190]  You think I should have just fired something into the air?
[54:05.350 --> 54:06.410]  Your life wasn't at stake.
[54:07.190 --> 54:08.150]  You didn't see the mall.
[54:08.290 --> 54:09.310]  Thanks for that call.
[54:09.890 --> 54:10.750]  Let's take another one.
[54:10.870 --> 54:11.290]  Good evening.
[54:11.390 --> 54:12.270]  You're on Off the Hook.
[54:12.810 --> 54:15.770]  You know, I wish the phone calls would stay in the same location.
[54:15.910 --> 54:17.090]  They keep hopping all over the switchboard.
[54:17.170 --> 54:17.410]  Good evening.
[54:17.530 --> 54:18.070]  You're on Off the Hook.
[54:19.350 --> 54:19.670]  Hello?
[54:19.910 --> 54:20.410]  Yes, go ahead.
[54:20.970 --> 54:21.670]  Oh, sorry.
[54:21.890 --> 54:23.350]  Just a bit of a lag over the internet.
[54:23.550 --> 54:25.810]  This is S25 from Ireland to call them in.
[54:26.070 --> 54:26.490]  Oh, great.
[54:26.750 --> 54:27.070]  Welcome.
[54:27.810 --> 54:28.210]  Oh, thanks.
[54:28.450 --> 54:30.850]  I'm on the Off the Hook channel just from there.
[54:31.030 --> 54:32.550]  On the Off the Hook channel from Ireland.
[54:32.670 --> 54:32.850]  Great.
[54:33.250 --> 54:33.850]  What's on your mind?
[54:35.430 --> 54:42.750]  I just want to say that for this year, I noticed a lot of DRM and stuff implemented in music and things like that.
[54:43.530 --> 54:47.170]  And I would like to see more people use in three operating systems for the new year.
[54:48.090 --> 54:48.310]  All right.
[54:48.390 --> 54:49.330]  That's a good wish.
[54:49.390 --> 54:52.430]  And I think one that there's a lot of agreement on.
[54:53.430 --> 54:53.770]  Oh, definitely.
[54:53.870 --> 54:54.810]  And you're doing a great job.
[54:54.910 --> 54:55.430]  Thanks very much.
[54:55.610 --> 54:55.890]  Thanks.
[54:55.990 --> 54:56.430]  Thanks for your call.
[54:57.170 --> 54:57.370]  All right.
[54:57.690 --> 54:58.210]  All right.
[54:58.310 --> 55:00.450]  And I think one last quick call.
[55:00.690 --> 55:01.250]  Good evening.
[55:01.430 --> 55:02.010]  You're on Off the Hook.
[55:03.730 --> 55:06.410]  We'll be making a documentary about all the things...
[55:06.410 --> 55:07.730]  One last quicker call, Blair.
[55:08.090 --> 55:08.630]  Good evening.
[55:08.750 --> 55:09.510]  You're on Off the Hook.
[55:10.290 --> 55:10.650]  Hello?
[55:10.650 --> 55:10.690]  Hello?
[55:10.870 --> 55:11.150]  Yes.
[55:11.810 --> 55:12.170]  Yeah.
[55:12.310 --> 55:12.890]  Happy holidays.
[55:13.110 --> 55:13.850]  Happy holidays to you.
[55:13.950 --> 55:14.570]  Where are you calling from?
[55:14.930 --> 55:16.390]  I'm calling from Brooklyn, New York.
[55:16.450 --> 55:17.050]  Brooklyn, New York.
[55:17.130 --> 55:17.730]  A local listener.
[55:17.970 --> 55:18.330]  What's...
[55:18.330 --> 55:19.650]  You have the last word tonight.
[55:19.730 --> 55:20.150]  What's on your mind?
[55:20.230 --> 55:20.870]  What's the last word?
[55:20.990 --> 55:23.010]  Go to Havana, Cuba, you bunch of commies.
[55:23.590 --> 55:24.930]  Well, we already did that.
[55:25.830 --> 55:26.930]  You're a bit out of it.
[55:27.270 --> 55:28.230]  I'm the non-commie.
[55:28.290 --> 55:28.770]  I stayed home.
[55:28.890 --> 55:30.870]  I think that's a good note to end on.
[55:31.390 --> 55:31.910]  All right.
[55:32.290 --> 55:33.510]  That's Off the Hook for this week.
[55:33.730 --> 55:35.290]  We'll be back again next week.
[55:35.290 --> 55:36.970]  Oh, the time will come on.
[55:37.230 --> 55:42.130]  And until then, write to us, O-T-H at 2600.com.
[55:43.810 --> 55:46.070]  Stay awake, stay alert, stay free, all that kind of thing.
[55:46.150 --> 55:47.930]  Stay tuned for the Personal Computer Show.
[55:48.310 --> 55:48.530]  Good night.
[55:48.530 --> 56:09.750]  See how that the ship comes in And the sea will split And the ships will hit And the suns on the shoreline Will be shaking And the tide will sound And the waves will pound And the morning Will be a-breaking
[56:13.060 --> 56:45.980]  If fishes will laugh As they swim out of the path And the seagulls will be smiling And the rocks on the sand will proudly stand The hour that the ship comes in And the words that are used For to get the ship confused Will not be understood as the spoken For the chains of the sea Will have busted in the night And be buried all at the bottom of the ocean
[56:50.690 --> 57:25.210]  This song will lift as the mainsail shifts And the boat drifts onto the shoreline And the sun will respect the ever face on the deck The hour that the ship comes in And the sands will roll out a carpet of gold For your weary toes to be a-touchin' And this ship's wise men will remind you once again that the whole wide world is watching.
[58:05.760 --> 58:10.480]  Oh, the foes will rise with a sleep still in their eyes.
[58:10.480 --> 58:13.500]  And they'll jerk from their beds and think they're dreaming.
[58:14.180 --> 58:18.820]  But they'll pinch themselves and squeal and they'll know that it's for real.
[58:19.060 --> 58:21.940]  The hour that the ship comes in.
[58:21.940 --> 58:27.200]  And they'll raise their hands saying we'll meet all your demands.
[58:27.320 --> 58:30.520]  But we'll shout from the bow your days are numbered.
[58:31.180 --> 58:35.520]  And like Pharaoh's tribe they'll be drowned in the tide.
[58:35.620 --> 58:40.520]  And like Goliath they'll be conquered.
[58:45.580 --> 58:47.020]  Ah, yes.
[58:47.440 --> 58:48.820]  Some wonderful music.
[58:49.620 --> 58:51.040]  Wonderful, I tell ya.
[58:52.780 --> 58:54.180]  WBAI.