[00:00.000 --> 00:08.060]  For Antonio Ortiz, Eric Klein, Leanne Caldwell, Shannon Young, Monica Lopez, and Turner Gousset, I'm Katherine Kopp.
[00:08.200 --> 00:09.620]  Sitting in for Adobogado.
[00:19.710 --> 00:24.810]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York, where the time is just about 7 o'clock.
[00:25.150 --> 00:27.430]  Time, once again, for Off the Hook.
[01:26.800 --> 01:27.900]  And a good evening to everybody.
[01:27.980 --> 01:29.520]  The program is Off the Hook.
[01:29.700 --> 01:39.620]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening, where we spend an hour talking about high technology, computer hackers, phone freaks, and the various declining state of our civilization.
[01:40.120 --> 01:43.540]  Joining me live tonight from Philadelphia, Bernie S.
[01:44.160 --> 01:45.220]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[01:45.740 --> 01:50.280]  And here in our New York studios, we have, from left to right, Jim.
[01:51.780 --> 01:52.220]  Hello.
[01:52.620 --> 01:53.500]  And Redbird.
[01:53.720 --> 01:54.160]  Good evening.
[01:55.600 --> 01:56.480]  And Mike.
[01:56.900 --> 01:57.140]  Hi.
[01:57.360 --> 01:59.580]  And rounding out the right-hand side of the room is not Kevin.
[01:59.840 --> 02:00.240]  Yeah, hello.
[02:00.440 --> 02:02.320]  See, it's backwards for us, though.
[02:02.640 --> 02:03.200]  Well, yeah.
[02:03.340 --> 02:07.560]  From our perspective, and there's more of us than of you, not Kevin is on the left.
[02:07.560 --> 02:09.820]  But I'm behind the console, and that's how the listeners hear it.
[02:09.880 --> 02:11.880]  But Jim should be on the right, because he's...
[02:11.880 --> 02:13.100]  It doesn't really matter.
[02:13.400 --> 02:15.700]  Is that Kevin really further to the left than Mike?
[02:16.580 --> 02:18.140]  He's all the way on the right, as far as I can see.
[02:19.620 --> 02:24.340]  Let's just be glad we're not playing with the left and right channels anymore, like we were last year.
[02:24.980 --> 02:26.060]  First show of 2007.
[02:26.380 --> 02:27.180]  Isn't this exciting?
[02:27.320 --> 02:28.120]  We made it.
[02:28.480 --> 02:28.980]  It's true.
[02:29.100 --> 02:29.780]  It's a pivotal year.
[02:29.980 --> 02:31.160]  It's a two-syllable year.
[02:31.720 --> 02:34.200]  Well, it's more than that if you add in the whole, the seven, you know, 2007.
[02:34.600 --> 02:35.300]  Don't forget the thousand.
[02:35.300 --> 02:38.660]  Trying to think of something significant for this year, and I can't.
[02:39.200 --> 02:40.500]  2006 wasn't a two-syllable...
[02:40.500 --> 02:41.300]  Oh, it's the last...
[02:41.300 --> 02:41.800]  Six, seven.
[02:41.880 --> 02:42.760]  It's kind of the last digit.
[02:42.940 --> 02:44.560]  It's a multiple of nine, the year.
[02:45.420 --> 02:46.400]  Is it a prime number?
[02:47.120 --> 02:48.540]  No, it's a multiple of nine.
[02:48.880 --> 02:50.160]  2007 is a multiple of nine?
[02:50.280 --> 02:50.440]  Yeah.
[02:50.540 --> 02:50.720]  Yes.
[02:50.800 --> 02:51.060]  It is.
[02:51.140 --> 02:51.740]  You've checked this.
[02:51.880 --> 02:52.520]  Therefore, it's a multiple of three.
[02:52.520 --> 02:53.260]  It's easy to check.
[02:53.540 --> 02:55.740]  Yeah, you have a big calculator the size you get.
[02:55.820 --> 02:57.680]  Without using a calculator, it's easy to check.
[02:58.020 --> 02:58.360]  All right.
[02:59.460 --> 03:01.060]  Bernie, any predictions on this year?
[03:01.160 --> 03:02.120]  What's going to be significant?
[03:02.120 --> 03:02.580]  What's not?
[03:02.580 --> 03:15.640]  Well, numerology considerations aside, I hope things start going in a better direction this year than they have over the past year.
[03:15.640 --> 03:23.680]  I'm cautiously optimistic, but only if enough people get outraged and actually speak their mind about what they don't like about what's going on.
[03:23.680 --> 03:35.860]  Well, would you consider a positive step what has happened in the last week with, you falling apart over there, with AT&T taking over Bell South and becoming the biggest phone company again?
[03:36.300 --> 03:38.740]  You know, it took 22 years, Emanuel.
[03:38.920 --> 03:39.220]  Uh-huh.
[03:39.380 --> 03:45.100]  It was what I would describe as an elaborate show game lasting 22 years.
[03:45.500 --> 03:51.100]  AT&T is once again a dominant North American local exchange carrier.
[03:51.320 --> 03:52.340]  It's very odd.
[03:52.340 --> 04:03.560]  They, uh, completed their $86 billion purchase of Bell South, which, uh, for those who have been paying attention, uh, was a company that was formed from the breakup of AT&T back in, what was it, 1983?
[04:04.800 --> 04:05.520]  84, I think.
[04:05.700 --> 04:07.940]  84 is when it actually happened, I think, but the ruling came before that.
[04:08.340 --> 04:10.560]  After, uh, federal regulators cleared the way for the U.S.
[04:10.880 --> 04:12.600]  telephone industry's biggest takeover ever.
[04:13.220 --> 04:14.660]  Uh, so, okay.
[04:14.780 --> 04:16.000]  So now, you know, I've lost track.
[04:16.160 --> 04:17.940]  I've lost track of who owns which company.
[04:17.940 --> 04:20.800]  It seems like they're all just turning into one all over again.
[04:21.080 --> 04:22.060]  That's pretty much it.
[04:22.300 --> 04:22.500]  Mm-hmm.
[04:22.520 --> 04:24.460]  I mean, there's not a whole lot to keep track of anymore.
[04:25.040 --> 04:26.920]  Well, no, not, not exactly.
[04:27.100 --> 04:33.500]  I mean, Bell Labs went to Lucent, which joined up with that French company, Alcatel, so they're not quite in it anymore.
[04:34.560 --> 04:34.780]  Mm-hmm.
[04:34.940 --> 04:36.080]  So what's, your point is what?
[04:36.140 --> 04:37.160]  There's more companies?
[04:37.400 --> 04:38.460]  There actually is, yes.
[04:38.460 --> 04:50.280]  My aunt owned a lot of AT&T stock, and, uh, when it divested, she had, I think, uh, eight different, uh, or nine different companies, the seven operating and, and two others, or one other.
[04:50.700 --> 04:55.040]  And now she's got, well, a lot more value of the stock, but...
[04:55.040 --> 04:56.000]  Well, I'm happy to hear that.
[04:56.180 --> 04:56.500]  I am too.
[04:56.500 --> 04:57.480]  But how does that affect us?
[04:58.100 --> 05:00.560]  It's just conversation, as is all of us.
[05:00.680 --> 05:01.020]  I see.
[05:01.700 --> 05:02.280]  All right.
[05:02.540 --> 05:03.960]  Well, um, I don't know.
[05:04.140 --> 05:05.000]  AT&T is back.
[05:05.120 --> 05:06.260]  The Death Star gets bigger.
[05:06.920 --> 05:07.300]  Right?
[05:07.300 --> 05:07.340]  Right?
[05:08.180 --> 05:11.300]  It looks like a kid drew it now, the way they redesigned their logo.
[05:12.260 --> 05:12.640]  Well, you know...
[05:12.640 --> 05:14.040]  Oh, there's a new, there's a new logo again.
[05:14.640 --> 05:16.660]  What, another one since last year's?
[05:17.120 --> 05:23.320]  I was going to say, you know, the old one, the one that was, uh, more recent, which is this weird striped circle kind of thing.
[05:23.520 --> 05:23.640]  Right, right.
[05:23.780 --> 05:24.300]  Striped sphere.
[05:24.420 --> 05:25.680]  Are you saying there's a new logo now?
[05:25.700 --> 05:27.560]  Well, they, they redid that logo.
[05:27.720 --> 05:29.440]  That, that's the Death Star logo from years ago.
[05:29.560 --> 05:31.320]  They redid it in the last year or two, and it looks like...
[05:31.320 --> 05:31.420]  Oh, right.
[05:31.520 --> 05:32.560]  It looks cartoonish.
[05:32.580 --> 05:35.200]  Yeah, cartoonish, and, uh, I don't think they're...
[05:35.200 --> 05:35.360]  It's modern.
[05:35.600 --> 05:36.360]  Maybe, maybe they should.
[05:36.360 --> 05:37.340]  They should, they should make another one now.
[05:37.620 --> 05:38.500]  Yeah, why not?
[05:39.360 --> 05:39.980]  They just made one.
[05:39.980 --> 05:40.680]  Keep everybody on their toes.
[05:41.060 --> 05:48.120]  All right, so let's just, very quickly, and then we'll move on, uh, the, the seven, it was seven Arboks that were formed from the AT&T breakup, correct?
[05:48.380 --> 05:49.520]  Regional Bell Operating Companies?
[05:49.760 --> 05:50.700]  Or Baby Bells.
[05:50.760 --> 05:51.400]  It was seven.
[05:51.520 --> 05:52.160]  Do I have the number right?
[05:53.040 --> 05:55.900]  Yeah, I believe there were seven, and they were also nicknamed Baby Bells.
[05:56.000 --> 06:05.000]  Okay, so 9X, we had 9X, we had Bell Atlantic, we had Bell South, uh, Ameritech, Pacific, uh, Telesis, or Telesis, however you want to pronounce that.
[06:05.260 --> 06:05.500]  Right.
[06:05.500 --> 06:07.120]  Um, Quest?
[06:07.580 --> 06:08.700]  No, Quest was not one of them.
[06:08.800 --> 06:09.100]  Oh, okay.
[06:09.100 --> 06:09.720]  What am I leaving out?
[06:10.980 --> 06:11.300]  Um...
[06:11.300 --> 06:11.720]  The others.
[06:12.600 --> 06:13.620]  Southwestern Bell, was that one of them?
[06:14.820 --> 06:15.740]  I think it was, yeah.
[06:16.380 --> 06:17.360]  And U.S.
[06:17.480 --> 06:17.980]  West, U.S.
[06:18.040 --> 06:18.620]  West was the other one.
[06:18.760 --> 06:19.060]  Yeah, yeah.
[06:19.240 --> 06:21.340]  Okay, so of those, who is still around?
[06:21.660 --> 06:23.260]  9X isn't around, Bell Atlantic isn't around.
[06:23.540 --> 06:26.420]  You have this company called Verizon now, which sort of formed out of both of them.
[06:27.160 --> 06:30.120]  Um, Bell South is now part of AT&T.
[06:31.700 --> 06:34.120]  Ameritech is, I don't know, you know, we need a chart to figure it out.
[06:34.120 --> 06:36.060]  None of them are still around, I think, is the answer.
[06:36.240 --> 06:37.640]  And you can get charts on the internet.
[06:37.880 --> 06:38.200]  All right.
[06:39.160 --> 06:41.620]  So, how many companies exist out of those?
[06:41.820 --> 06:45.520]  Uh, it was, it was actually eight companies, because AT&T was a long-distance company.
[06:45.700 --> 06:48.400]  Yeah, now there's, what, AT&T, Verizon, Quest?
[06:48.660 --> 06:49.420]  I think that's it.
[06:49.700 --> 06:49.920]  Mm-hmm.
[06:50.260 --> 06:58.360]  Of course, you also have other long-distance companies that, you have things like Skype, you have, uh, Vonage, you have companies like that, that didn't exist.
[06:58.480 --> 06:59.260]  That's true.
[07:00.280 --> 07:00.940]  Two decades ago.
[07:01.080 --> 07:02.840]  And now, um, do you think they're the future?
[07:04.260 --> 07:05.220]  Who could say?
[07:05.420 --> 07:07.660]  There's one bit of interesting news from this merger.
[07:07.860 --> 07:08.060]  Okay.
[07:08.320 --> 07:31.120]  And that is, there's a, uh, very weak requirement for some form of net neutrality in the, uh, approval process, uh, which says that, uh, I think it's for 30 months or some time period, which I can't right now find in front of me, uh, AT&T agrees not to provide or to sell to internet content,
[07:31.400 --> 07:47.300]  application, or service providers, including those affiliated with AT&T, BellSouth, any service that privileges, degrades, or prioritizes any packet transmitted over AT&T's wireline broadband internet access service, based on its source, ownership, or destination.
[07:47.640 --> 08:04.300]  Now, for those, uh, this is somewhat new to, net neutrality is a concept that pretty much has been around since the founding of the net, where all traffic is treated equally, uh, what opponents of that way of doing things want is for some traffic to be prioritized if a company,
[08:04.340 --> 08:09.700]  say, pays more money, uh, to have their, their traffic, uh, uh, treated as more important.
[08:10.220 --> 08:14.800]  Now, what you read here, okay, that sounds good, but you also said for how long?
[08:14.960 --> 08:21.280]  Yeah, it's for, I can't, for some reason it's not in this article that I'm looking at from, uh, news.com.com.com.com.
[08:21.700 --> 08:22.100]  Uh...
[08:22.100 --> 08:23.920]  I heard that it was, uh, 30 months, I heard.
[08:24.120 --> 08:26.420]  Yeah, that's what I heard, which is not a very long time.
[08:26.440 --> 08:27.440]  That's like three years.
[08:28.120 --> 08:28.520]  Not even.
[08:28.640 --> 08:29.380]  Less than three years.
[08:29.500 --> 08:30.020]  Two and a half.
[08:30.640 --> 08:30.880]  Yeah.
[08:31.460 --> 08:34.120]  Well, uh, that's, that doesn't sound like a victory to me.
[08:34.220 --> 08:37.560]  That sounds like, uh, uh, just signing away your rights a little bit later.
[08:38.080 --> 08:47.580]  And of, and the, uh, FCC, uh, the Republican commissioners said that they didn't even care for this concession from AT&T.
[08:47.980 --> 08:49.840]  They don't like net neutrality.
[08:49.960 --> 08:51.680]  They don't know why AT&T is offering it.
[08:52.640 --> 09:01.340]  It's to get other people who are opposed to it ordinarily to, uh, close their eyes for a second and have the wool pull over them and, uh, see where it goes from there.
[09:01.380 --> 09:02.720]  But it's a, it's a bad thing, I think.
[09:02.920 --> 09:04.880]  There was another, uh, concession, Emmanuel.
[09:05.160 --> 09:13.860]  AT&T had to surrender, um, or offered to surrender, uh, uh, a big chunk of wireless spectrum in the 2.5 gigahertz range.
[09:14.560 --> 09:23.280]  Um, because, uh, it was felt that that would just give them too much, uh, too much control over the various, uh, telecom mediums.
[09:23.560 --> 09:33.560]  Uh, Sprint is, uh, probably going to try to buy up that, uh, microwave, uh, wireless spectrum because they're planning on rolling out a huge WiMAX network.
[09:33.560 --> 09:39.580]  They're investing tens of billions of dollars in, in a nationwide WiMAX network.
[09:39.780 --> 09:41.840]  So it'll be interesting to see how this turns out.
[09:41.980 --> 09:45.540]  That's a frequency range that you don't really want, uh, transmitted too close to you, huh?
[09:46.360 --> 09:48.180]  Oh, it's very close to microwave ovens.
[09:48.240 --> 09:49.620]  Really close to microwave ovens.
[09:49.660 --> 09:50.460]  It's, yeah, exactly.
[09:50.500 --> 09:54.060]  It's very, very close to the, uh, what, resonant frequency of H2O.
[09:55.120 --> 09:56.180]  Um, okay.
[09:56.240 --> 09:59.300]  Well, that's, uh, that's our first bit of distressing news for 2007.
[09:59.840 --> 10:06.020]  Uh, this was an interesting article that appeared, um, a couple of Tuesdays ago, uh, in the, uh, Wall Street Journal.
[10:06.240 --> 10:07.240]  Actually, no, the Washington Post.
[10:07.440 --> 10:09.240]  Uh, it just sounds so scary.
[10:09.340 --> 10:20.080]  The Justice Department is building a massive database that allows state and local police officers around the country to search millions of case files from the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, and other federal law enforcement agencies.
[10:20.280 --> 10:22.000]  That's according to justice officials.
[10:22.140 --> 10:24.440]  It's called 1DLJ.
[10:25.800 --> 10:26.280]  1DLJ.
[10:26.300 --> 10:31.880]  It already holds approximately 1 million case records, and it's projected to triple in size over the next three years.
[10:32.080 --> 10:40.200]  The files include investigative reports, criminal history information, details of offenses, names, addresses, and other information of criminal suspects or targets.
[10:40.600 --> 10:50.300]  Now, uh, supporters say it's a much needed step towards better information sharing with local law enforcement agencies, uh, which have long complained about a lack of cooperation from the federal government.
[10:50.380 --> 11:05.020]  But civil liberties and privacy advocates say the scale and contents of such a database raise immediate privacy and civil rights concerns, in part because tens of thousands of local cops could gain access to personal details about people who have not been arrested or charged with crimes.
[11:05.080 --> 11:12.160]  I can just see this being abused in an unbelievable way with all that information being privy to.
[11:12.280 --> 11:12.760]  Yes, Bernie.
[11:13.280 --> 11:31.120]  This, uh, would allow your, your local beat cop or some, some, you know, there's some good police officers and some I would refer to as knuckle draggers who just, who would just, who would just love to get their hands on this massive database and just peruse it to their heart's content.
[11:31.320 --> 11:39.120]  Well, how about, how about your, uh, drunken off-duty cop at a bar who, uh, sees somebody that he doesn't like and wants to harass them or find out all their personal details?
[11:39.460 --> 11:44.440]  It's begging for abuse and it's already, uh, it's already proven that this kind of stuff is going to be abused.
[11:44.600 --> 12:01.740]  There was another story that came out this week at the city of Columbia, South Carolina, was banned from using a, uh, uh, a smaller national database, uh, after it used it to check the names of, uh, of homeless people at city shelters to find out who had outstanding arrest warrants for,
[12:01.780 --> 12:06.220]  for such major crimes as, uh, panhandling and, uh, public intoxication.
[12:06.860 --> 12:10.880]  And, uh, it's just, uh, really a violation of people's constitutional rights.
[12:11.300 --> 12:20.920]  Um, but... I mean, they, they, they pulled names, social security numbers from, from homeless people, and, uh, they just sort of cross-referenced it against, uh, a list of outstanding warrants.
[12:21.020 --> 12:23.480]  But, but Columbia, South Carolina has apologized.
[12:24.640 --> 12:28.800]  City officials have apologized for doing that illegal, unethical behavior there.
[12:29.640 --> 12:33.720]  And, um, but they, they have, yeah, they have been blocked from using that, uh, that database.
[12:33.960 --> 12:35.840]  But yeah, this is just an example of the kind of thing.
[12:35.940 --> 12:38.500]  But databases that are already available are being abused.
[12:38.600 --> 12:44.640]  I had a, an acquaintance that was upset about a fight he had gotten into, and his brother or someone in his family was a cop.
[12:44.720 --> 12:51.400]  And he was like, oh, you know, I'm going to have my brother run the kid's plates and find out where he lives and yada, and, and go and, you know, do something to his house.
[12:51.560 --> 12:54.420]  And, you know, these are, these are cops that are, that are doing this sort of thing.
[12:54.500 --> 12:55.680]  And I'm, you know, I'm sure it happened.
[12:55.820 --> 12:56.720]  Cops do this kind of thing.
[12:56.820 --> 12:57.500]  They're human beings.
[12:57.780 --> 12:59.300]  It's... They're not superhumans.
[12:59.460 --> 12:59.820]  So yeah.
[13:00.280 --> 13:04.560]  And any, anytime you make this kind of thing available to human beings, they're going to abuse it in some way.
[13:04.620 --> 13:07.940]  That's why it's a It's a very tricky thing to venture into.
[13:08.200 --> 13:09.680]  Spoken like one who...
[13:09.680 --> 13:10.100]  Sorry?
[13:10.320 --> 13:13.480]  I said spoken like one who's abused a database before.
[13:13.760 --> 13:16.220]  Well, I mean, you have to know what you're speaking about.
[13:16.220 --> 13:20.280]  You have to sort of tread into the water to know how cold it is.
[13:20.480 --> 13:20.940]  Yes, Bernie?
[13:21.620 --> 13:23.860]  It's not just police officers as well.
[13:24.000 --> 13:39.200]  I mean, there's a whole law enforcement community, including a massive administrative overhead staff that supports the law enforcement community that will ostensibly also have access to this one DOJ database of all of us.
[13:39.840 --> 13:40.980]  And this isn't just...
[13:40.980 --> 13:44.960]  These aren't just conviction or arrest records.
[13:45.140 --> 13:50.720]  This is all kinds of information, just sort of, you know...
[13:51.340 --> 13:55.900]  Basically, it comes down to even a level of gossip in this database.
[13:56.100 --> 14:00.940]  It doesn't have to be any proven criminal activity for information to wind up in this database.
[14:00.940 --> 14:02.880]  So it kind of reminds me of J.
[14:02.980 --> 14:10.220]  Edgar Hoover's three-by-five, index cards, where he, you know, where he would just put out enemies lists or whatever.
[14:10.440 --> 14:12.420]  It seems like a high-tech version of that.
[14:13.480 --> 14:23.500]  Okay, this just happened today, I believe, after months of outrage over a ban on cell phones here in New York City, in the nation's largest school system.
[14:23.980 --> 14:26.880]  Officials are now signaling there may be room for compromise.
[14:27.100 --> 14:33.660]  Get this, they're exploring whether to install special lockers outside schools to store the devices.
[14:34.300 --> 14:35.160]  Could not make this up.
[14:35.640 --> 14:38.220]  A development that delayed recent court arguments on the ban.
[14:38.780 --> 14:44.920]  Questions remain, of course, about the logistics of such a system in a school district with so many students and so many students who use cell phones.
[14:45.540 --> 14:47.620]  You know, I honestly don't know what the big deal is.
[14:49.280 --> 14:53.140]  The administrators of the school don't want kids to have cell phones inside the school.
[14:53.140 --> 14:55.700]  So, first, they just said, no cell phones at all.
[14:55.740 --> 14:56.820]  You can't bring them into the school.
[14:57.240 --> 14:58.620]  Which I think, you know, that's...
[14:58.620 --> 15:03.680]  In this day and age, if you're going to use that phrase, it's kind of a safety issue.
[15:03.800 --> 15:08.620]  Let's say something happens and a kid wants to get in touch with his parents or there's an emergency at home or something like that.
[15:09.680 --> 15:10.640]  You have these devices.
[15:10.760 --> 15:12.800]  Everyone's on the road talking on phones these days.
[15:12.800 --> 15:16.220]  Is it right to cut everybody off once they go inside the school room?
[15:17.820 --> 15:21.780]  This, making lockers outside the school, that just seems to me to be...
[15:21.780 --> 15:29.000]  The question is, there's a difference between cutting people's access off inside the school room versus inside the school building.
[15:29.120 --> 15:30.800]  And I think the former makes sense.
[15:30.920 --> 15:34.560]  You don't necessarily want people talking on their phones during class.
[15:34.700 --> 15:36.560]  But the school building is a separate question.
[15:36.560 --> 15:43.520]  Yeah, and on that note, is it really impossible to get people not to use cell phones in a classroom?
[15:43.740 --> 15:51.020]  I mean, is it really that difficult to establish rules and expect people to follow them or to see if people are breaking them?
[15:51.120 --> 15:51.460]  Jim?
[15:51.660 --> 15:56.640]  Because the people who would break this are people who would intrinsically be cheating anyway, okay?
[15:56.800 --> 15:58.640]  It's not like you're suddenly making...
[15:58.640 --> 15:59.480]  Well, actually, it might be.
[15:59.600 --> 16:03.260]  It might be an easier way to cheat so your number of cheaters will go up.
[16:03.260 --> 16:07.060]  But the point is, it's not like the cell phone itself is the problem.
[16:07.200 --> 16:10.060]  The problem is the student with the bad attitude.
[16:10.500 --> 16:10.760]  Exactly.
[16:10.920 --> 16:14.620]  But it's just an instrument, you know, to use for that.
[16:15.040 --> 16:16.400]  The punishment should be the same.
[16:16.580 --> 16:19.580]  If you're caught cheating, deal with it the way you would normally deal with cheaters.
[16:19.580 --> 16:22.980]  The same way you would deal with someone who wrote the equation on their hand or something like that.
[16:23.740 --> 16:28.700]  How do you deal with people then who are just constantly sending SMSs back and forth during class when they should be paying attention?
[16:28.940 --> 16:30.360]  That's the same as being disruptive.
[16:30.540 --> 16:32.820]  That's the same as, you know, shouting across the room to a friend.
[16:33.260 --> 16:33.900]  They don't know they're doing it.
[16:33.980 --> 16:35.680]  They're in silent mode and they're doing it under the desk.
[16:35.820 --> 16:38.620]  If it's not actually being disruptive, then I don't really care.
[16:38.760 --> 16:39.340]  But, I mean, if you...
[16:39.340 --> 16:40.500]  Not being overtly disruptive?
[16:40.500 --> 16:41.860]  I mean, the person's not learning anything.
[16:41.920 --> 16:42.720]  They're not paying any attention.
[16:42.840 --> 16:43.580]  They're doing something else.
[16:43.760 --> 16:48.940]  But the mentality that goes behind that isn't going to help them learn if they put the cell phone down.
[16:49.060 --> 16:52.040]  In the old days, when I was a student, you could daydream.
[16:52.140 --> 16:54.560]  You could read a novel or a comic book or whatever.
[16:54.700 --> 16:56.960]  Yeah, but, Jim, you couldn't communicate with the entire outside world.
[16:57.140 --> 17:00.080]  But the point is, you could distract yourself one way or another.
[17:00.080 --> 17:05.240]  If you're such an idiot that you're going to throw away your education, I say, goody for you.
[17:05.380 --> 17:08.200]  Well, there are many people, aspiring idiots out there, who will do just that.
[17:08.320 --> 17:11.440]  Because they're not being guided into a better path.
[17:11.460 --> 17:12.580]  That's exactly it.
[17:12.700 --> 17:16.740]  If we think they should be guided, then keep the cell phones out of the school.
[17:16.880 --> 17:22.800]  But is that really the only way to deal with this, is to keep the cell phones out completely so that you don't have them even if you need them?
[17:22.800 --> 17:25.240]  A locker in the school, a locker right outside.
[17:25.240 --> 17:28.080]  I don't quite understand the outside theory.
[17:28.920 --> 17:37.300]  But, yeah, if you're going to say that, yes, kids will be weak, they will either daydream or text message or cheat with them.
[17:37.800 --> 17:47.400]  Yes, if you go with that argument, you have to put lockers in so the kid isn't totally screwed by being unable to communicate with anybody.
[17:47.560 --> 17:49.140]  How are you going to even know that they locked it up?
[17:49.200 --> 17:50.460]  How do you know that they don't have it in their pocket?
[17:50.460 --> 17:50.760]  That's right.
[17:50.840 --> 17:51.220]  There's no way.
[17:51.260 --> 17:52.200]  They could have plastic ones.
[17:52.340 --> 17:54.040]  You can't even detect them in the metal detectors anymore.
[17:54.280 --> 17:55.100]  There is a solution.
[17:55.520 --> 17:56.360]  There's a solution, Bernie?
[17:56.460 --> 17:56.840]  What is it?
[17:57.260 --> 17:59.480]  There are technological solutions.
[17:59.760 --> 18:05.480]  You could RF shield the classrooms, effectively making each classroom a Faraday cage.
[18:05.700 --> 18:07.120]  I mean, it wouldn't look like a cage with bars.
[18:07.180 --> 18:10.980]  It would just have a fine conductive mesh.
[18:11.120 --> 18:14.260]  I can just see the Daily News getting a hold of that proposal, that Bernie S.
[18:14.520 --> 18:16.820]  is proposing putting a cage around all the classrooms.
[18:16.860 --> 18:20.260]  The New York City School District cannot, in general, afford textbooks.
[18:20.460 --> 18:22.800]  I don't know where they're going to get the money for RF shielding.
[18:23.020 --> 18:23.120]  Okay.
[18:23.200 --> 18:26.340]  Look, I think you're on the right path, Bernie, but I wouldn't go that far.
[18:26.640 --> 18:32.780]  How about just a simple jammer for every classroom that can be turned on and off by the teacher at will?
[18:32.940 --> 18:34.100]  For instance, you're taking a test.
[18:34.360 --> 18:37.260]  Definitely no possibility for anybody to be using these devices.
[18:38.880 --> 18:40.700]  Somebody, some terrorist group takes over the school.
[18:40.820 --> 18:40.980]  Okay.
[18:41.040 --> 18:41.300]  You know what?
[18:41.300 --> 18:44.680]  I'm going to allow cell phone calls now and texting because maybe you want to say goodbye to your loved ones.
[18:44.680 --> 18:47.700]  Well, that's not the first thing that goes to their mind, I'm sure, is to turn on cell phones.
[18:47.780 --> 18:56.480]  But it does sort of make sense in that environment in the sense that if somebody actually had to get a hold of the kid, you could call the school up and have them page them on the PA system.
[18:56.600 --> 19:09.760]  It just seems to me, I rarely hear of a better use for such technology in a situation like that, where you want to have some control, but not such a blanket ban that nobody can ever use things that might turn out to be very important.
[19:10.220 --> 19:14.900]  What if the terrorists, they get a hold of cell phone jammer and they prevent anybody from calling for help?
[19:15.520 --> 19:16.920]  Well, then you forbid that.
[19:18.240 --> 19:18.880]  I don't know.
[19:18.880 --> 19:19.280]  That'll work.
[19:20.340 --> 19:25.580]  Yeah, well, I think the terrorist would want to be able to communicate to the outside world to, you know, send their demands.
[19:25.680 --> 19:28.040]  But yeah, of course, anybody can jam cell phone calls.
[19:28.200 --> 19:32.580]  The terrorist cannot cause terror if the outside world never learns what's going on inside.
[19:33.420 --> 19:37.120]  Plus, the cell phone jammers are kind of tricky.
[19:37.380 --> 19:39.460]  I mean, you got to be in a particular area.
[19:39.900 --> 19:42.460]  You have to get a really, really big one to cover an entire building.
[19:42.560 --> 19:45.160]  So you're saying basically that the terrorists aren't smart enough.
[19:45.300 --> 19:49.280]  No, I just don't think they're going to waste time carrying something that heavy when they should be carrying weapons.
[19:49.380 --> 19:53.660]  Well, I'm not going to get into what terrorists should be doing in schools, but you know what I'm trying to get at here.
[19:54.280 --> 19:57.820]  It just seems like a silly thing, a silly thing to be wasting time on.
[19:58.640 --> 20:00.260]  So let's not waste any more time on it.
[20:01.960 --> 20:04.260]  Okay, we will be taking phone calls in just a little bit.
[20:04.360 --> 20:08.040]  But I wanted to finish something that I did last week.
[20:08.220 --> 20:09.620]  I started to do last week.
[20:09.840 --> 20:11.520]  And unfortunately, it got all messed up.
[20:11.580 --> 20:13.520]  And I think, Bernie, I think it was because of you.
[20:14.080 --> 20:14.540]  My fault.
[20:14.660 --> 20:18.500]  It was your fault because, not because of anything you did, but because you're on the phone right now.
[20:18.700 --> 20:29.060]  And apparently, if we have two different phones on the same line, on the same phone, two different phone calls at the same time, the touchstones don't go out quite as well.
[20:29.140 --> 20:31.640]  So what I'm going to do is, I'm going to put you on hold.
[20:32.140 --> 20:34.860]  I'm going to put you on hold during this discussion, and we're going to come back to you.
[20:35.860 --> 20:36.520]  Are you going to be okay?
[20:37.620 --> 20:38.360]  I'll try to be.
[20:38.440 --> 20:38.740]  All right.
[20:38.840 --> 20:39.020]  All right.
[20:39.040 --> 20:39.380]  I'm sorry.
[20:39.600 --> 20:41.020]  It's the only way I can think of to do this.
[20:41.320 --> 20:42.800]  Is this these voicemail people?
[20:42.960 --> 20:44.280]  Yes, this is these voicemail people.
[20:44.300 --> 20:48.200]  You know, I signed up for this service, and they called me in the middle of the day to ask me how it was.
[20:48.340 --> 20:52.440]  Now, okay, it's interesting you should say that because we got a number of pieces of mail from people.
[20:52.660 --> 20:55.240]  Actually, let me read you one of them before we do the demonstration.
[20:56.200 --> 20:59.820]  The service is called YouMail, something I discovered last week.
[20:59.960 --> 21:05.800]  And apparently, a lot of other people have discovered it before that, because I looked on the net and saw interesting reviews of it.
[21:06.760 --> 21:12.500]  But yeah, people said that they do call you up to see how the service is.
[21:12.620 --> 21:14.320]  I'm trying to find the letter here.
[21:14.420 --> 21:14.720]  Hold on.
[21:16.080 --> 21:19.720]  Yes, I signed up for YouMail after hearing the December 27th show.
[21:20.400 --> 21:23.240]  Today, I got a call from them following up to ask questions, etc.
[21:23.440 --> 21:27.940]  They're very friendly and willing to talk about the details of their operation, off the record, at least.
[21:28.300 --> 21:31.740]  I suggested they call you to answer your questions regarding privacy.
[21:31.840 --> 21:32.900]  Maybe we'll have them on sometime.
[21:34.260 --> 21:37.760]  Anyway, keep up the good show, perhaps feature more tech news, etc., etc.
[21:37.940 --> 21:40.480]  Thank you, Cy, for sending that in.
[21:41.280 --> 21:42.440]  Now, Mike, they called you.
[21:42.560 --> 21:44.240]  What kinds of questions did they ask you?
[21:44.400 --> 21:44.740]  I don't know.
[21:44.880 --> 21:46.500]  I got rid of them as quickly as I could.
[21:46.500 --> 21:46.920]  Okay.
[21:47.400 --> 21:51.220]  You know, I don't have time to talk to my voicemail provider in the middle of the day.
[21:51.340 --> 21:52.480]  Well, maybe they thought you were confused.
[21:52.600 --> 21:55.640]  Maybe they were noticing that you were hitting the wrong buttons or something.
[21:56.500 --> 22:00.300]  I don't know if they tried to call me because I generally don't have my phone on most of the time.
[22:00.940 --> 22:05.800]  Jordan writes in saying, I was listening to your show the other day and decided to check out that service called YouMail.
[22:06.160 --> 22:06.860]  It's great.
[22:07.060 --> 22:10.060]  I did a little basic research on YouMail's privacy policy.
[22:10.760 --> 22:27.640]  YouMail collects and processes or has third-party service providers who collect and process on YouMail's behalf personal data relating to you to convey the communications you make by means of the YouMail software and carry out YouMail marketing activities.
[22:28.040 --> 22:36.200]  We will not provide the names, email addresses, or phone numbers to any other party except our service providers who may use it in connection with providing the services on our site.
[22:36.260 --> 22:41.520]  Now, I know, Redbird, you had expressed some concern about the privacy implications.
[22:41.520 --> 22:42.760]  Does this sound normal to you?
[22:43.260 --> 22:55.460]  You know, it sounds typical, but you got to also know what the service providers are going to do with the information and what the policy between YouMail and the service provider is to really ensure that your data isn't going where you don't want it to go.
[22:55.580 --> 22:56.300]  So it's hard to say.
[22:56.400 --> 22:59.200]  It's kind of a vague thing that they presented there, but...
[22:59.200 --> 23:05.440]  But again, I don't see it as being any different than what I already hear from Sprint or Verizon or any of those other companies.
[23:05.620 --> 23:08.240]  No, I don't think there's anything to worry about in terms of that.
[23:08.400 --> 23:11.980]  I mean, all companies are pretty grimy in that regard, but...
[23:12.800 --> 23:18.420]  So anyway, apparently they give all of our information to companies that help run their service.
[23:18.660 --> 23:20.860]  I'm hoping the government doesn't run our voicemail services.
[23:21.000 --> 23:23.420]  The day after I signed up, I got a call from an unknown 1-800 number.
[23:23.620 --> 23:24.620]  Of course, I answered it.
[23:24.700 --> 23:27.720]  It was actually a customer service rep asking me if I had any questions about the service.
[23:27.800 --> 23:28.380]  I was shocked.
[23:28.520 --> 23:29.760]  How's that for customer service?
[23:29.920 --> 23:38.500]  I was really happy after that, wondering if some revolution had occurred almost overnight in the big business world, or maybe that's just a perk of a blooming young service that hasn't sold out yet.
[23:38.840 --> 23:40.120]  Perhaps this isn't all that good.
[23:40.280 --> 23:41.800]  Were they calling my phone to see if I answered?
[23:41.920 --> 23:42.580]  If so, why?
[23:43.180 --> 23:45.340]  Thanks, Jordan, for your comments there.
[23:45.620 --> 23:49.720]  Okay, so basically, the email system works as follows.
[23:49.920 --> 23:56.740]  You change your phone's forwarding on no answer to go to them instead of your provider's voicemail service.
[23:56.800 --> 24:00.540]  And I'm sorry, Bernie, to say that Sprint is not one of the companies that supports this.
[24:00.540 --> 24:02.500]  And we found out that they give you a unique number.
[24:02.680 --> 24:08.700]  Yeah, you wind up forwarding to a number in my case, it was in 213, which is Los Angeles.
[24:09.520 --> 24:11.400]  And I now have a number out there.
[24:11.500 --> 24:13.840]  If you call that number, you'll hear my greeting.
[24:14.020 --> 24:15.840]  And my greeting will be based on your caller ID.
[24:16.120 --> 24:18.600]  So if I... this is one of the cool things about the system.
[24:18.800 --> 24:22.340]  You can have different greetings for different people based on their caller ID.
[24:22.700 --> 24:27.120]  So if I call, say, from BAI, I call that 213 number, it won't ring or anything like that.
[24:27.220 --> 24:31.860]  It will go straight to voicemail, and it will give the BAI greeting because it sees my caller ID.
[24:33.100 --> 24:41.500]  Now, the actual number that I have to forward, that I have to call to check my voicemail is in the 949 area code, which is also in California.
[24:42.220 --> 24:43.720]  And that's what I'm going to try to do right now.
[24:43.840 --> 24:48.420]  I'm going to try and call into that, dialing the 949 number.
[24:48.460 --> 24:49.640]  I think it's a unique number, too.
[24:50.700 --> 24:51.060]  So...
[24:51.060 --> 24:52.440]  Why would they give you two unique numbers?
[24:52.460 --> 24:53.060]  I don't know.
[24:53.260 --> 24:54.440]  No, no, I think it isn't.
[24:54.560 --> 24:55.900]  Yeah, that one's probably not.
[24:55.900 --> 24:59.080]  Okay, well, in that case, I'll let the last couple of digits go through.
[25:00.120 --> 25:04.420]  Now we have to enter our secret code, and it's going to ask for my 10-digit number.
[25:06.360 --> 25:08.520]  Enter your 10-digit cell phone number.
[25:08.640 --> 25:12.680]  Okay, this is where we got hung up last time, so let's see if we can get past this this time.
[25:14.120 --> 25:16.140]  Entering all the digits and hitting the pound sign.
[25:19.560 --> 25:21.320]  Please enter your security code.
[25:21.440 --> 25:21.680]  Okay.
[25:21.680 --> 25:22.720]  Followed by the pound key.
[25:22.740 --> 25:27.720]  That is an annoying sound to be greeted with every time you access your voicemail, but that, so far, is the worst thing I've found about this.
[25:27.800 --> 25:28.060]  Here we are.
[25:28.780 --> 25:30.040]  One skipped message.
[25:30.580 --> 25:32.200]  First skipped message.
[25:32.240 --> 25:32.780]  This is interesting.
[25:33.280 --> 25:34.380]  Welcome to U-Mail.
[25:34.820 --> 25:39.980]  Recording custom greetings is as easy as pressing 8-8 from your cell phone.
[25:40.440 --> 25:46.880]  Listen to a voicemail, press 8-8, and record a custom greeting for only that caller.
[25:47.100 --> 25:48.120]  It's that easy.
[25:48.900 --> 26:00.140]  Other cool stuff is available online, such as checking your voicemail via the web, forwarding voicemail to any email address, and saving favorite voicemail forever.
[26:00.480 --> 26:02.200]  You want to 86 your ex?
[26:02.740 --> 26:11.780]  Next time you receive a voicemail from anyone you don't want to hear from, press 86 after listening to their message to leave them a ditch mail.
[26:12.000 --> 26:13.660]  You'll never hear from them again.
[26:15.040 --> 26:19.300]  Remember to log into your U-Mail account at U-Mail.com.
[26:19.700 --> 26:27.800]  If you have any questions, give us a ring at 1-800-374-0013.
[26:28.160 --> 26:30.360]  Record a personal greeting for this caller.
[26:30.360 --> 26:32.460]  Okay, I just think their tone is cool.
[26:32.620 --> 26:33.620]  And we have a new verb.
[26:33.940 --> 26:35.200]  Do you want to 86 your ex?
[26:35.320 --> 26:35.520]  Yeah.
[26:36.820 --> 26:37.480]  It's not?
[26:37.840 --> 26:39.520]  No, 86 somebody is very old.
[26:39.520 --> 26:41.340]  Well, okay, but it's new in the voicemail.
[26:41.520 --> 26:43.940]  Okay, we have to play something of interest here.
[26:44.240 --> 26:45.740]  Now, I'm going to go to administrative options.
[26:45.900 --> 26:49.100]  To change your name, greeting, or pin, press 1.
[26:49.260 --> 26:51.600]  To manage your contacts, press 2.
[26:51.760 --> 26:53.980]  For other mailbox settings, press 3.
[26:54.060 --> 26:56.660]  To return to your messages, press star key.
[26:57.080 --> 27:00.160]  To disable automatic login from 9.
[27:00.180 --> 27:03.540]  Okay, I'm going to turn that down while it plays out my entire phone number.
[27:03.880 --> 27:07.180]  And then I'm going to hit a button to tell it to enable or disable.
[27:07.180 --> 27:11.200]  One, to prevent callers from leaving new messages, press 2.
[27:11.540 --> 27:12.800]  And you're going to hear a funny recording.
[27:13.620 --> 27:15.720]  Automatic login is now off.
[27:16.100 --> 27:21.340]  For other automatic login options, go to blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, dot com.
[27:21.820 --> 27:22.640]  To enable...
[27:22.640 --> 27:33.320]  I think they might have forgotten to record a prompt on their voicemail system, but I thought that was just hilarious, and it's not the kind of thing you generally hear.
[27:33.480 --> 27:35.120]  You can tell it's a new startup company.
[27:35.120 --> 27:36.000]  Yeah, I like them.
[27:36.080 --> 27:36.500]  I really do.
[27:36.500 --> 27:41.020]  I don't usually say that about companies, but in this particular case, I think they're off to a good start.
[27:41.120 --> 27:42.620]  I believe they're from New Zealand.
[27:42.900 --> 27:45.000]  I think the company actually originates from New Zealand.
[27:45.660 --> 27:46.920]  Bernie, you're rejoining us now.
[27:47.080 --> 27:47.740]  Did you survive okay?
[27:48.120 --> 27:51.760]  Yes, and I was fortunate to be able to listen while I was on hold.
[27:51.900 --> 27:52.740]  And I agree.
[27:52.880 --> 27:57.780]  I haven't tried it yet, but it sounds like a pretty interesting, you know, service.
[27:57.960 --> 28:01.940]  Well, Bernie, you won't be able to try it because you have Sprint, and Sprint is not one of the companies that this works with.
[28:02.340 --> 28:04.260]  Maybe it's another reason for me to drop Sprint.
[28:05.140 --> 28:08.500]  You've had more reasons to drop Sprint than, I think, almost anybody on the planet.
[28:08.680 --> 28:11.940]  Does it actually not work with Sprint, or do they just not support it working with Sprint?
[28:11.940 --> 28:13.740]  I didn't see them listed on their website.
[28:13.880 --> 28:14.420]  I saw T-Mobile.
[28:14.560 --> 28:18.060]  I saw Verizon Wireless and a couple other companies, but I did not see Sprint.
[28:18.180 --> 28:21.100]  The question is, what makes it not work with Sprint?
[28:21.180 --> 28:25.100]  Well, Bernie, you'd have to find out if you can change the forwarding number for when you're not available.
[28:25.100 --> 28:26.260]  So, just...
[28:26.260 --> 28:26.900]  I'm going to do that.
[28:27.460 --> 28:27.940]  All right.
[28:28.020 --> 28:28.500]  So you can figure it out.
[28:28.580 --> 28:30.720]  I did discover a bug in their service.
[28:30.740 --> 28:31.220]  Oh, what's the bug?
[28:31.760 --> 28:38.380]  What I wanted to do was to have it default so that people can't leave me a message because most people I don't want to hear from.
[28:38.660 --> 28:44.500]  But there's a few people who I did want to hear from, so I tried setting it so that they could leave me a message.
[28:44.680 --> 28:48.800]  But it turned out that the global setting overrode that, and they still couldn't leave me a message.
[28:48.900 --> 28:49.360]  Oh, really?
[28:49.540 --> 28:49.700]  Yeah.
[28:50.020 --> 28:50.340]  Interesting.
[28:55.280 --> 29:03.920]  I would like to be able to have sort of a wild card, like everybody in, say, Seattle who calls me from 206 Area Code or something, they get a particular greeting.
[29:04.720 --> 29:06.400]  Regionalize your greetings, not just by number.
[29:06.500 --> 29:08.480]  Or let's say somebody is calling you from a company.
[29:08.620 --> 29:13.780]  Do you want to have a different greeting for every single possible phone number they'd be calling you from from that company?
[29:13.940 --> 29:17.920]  Or maybe just get the entire exchange and say, hey, Dave, I see you're still at work.
[29:18.000 --> 29:20.080]  I want you to leave me a message, and we'll do whatever.
[29:20.600 --> 29:21.160]  I don't know.
[29:21.280 --> 29:23.940]  If it's possible to do these kinds of things, and I think it is these days.
[29:24.500 --> 29:24.840]  Definitely.
[29:24.840 --> 29:27.020]  I mean, you know, that's just some programming stuff.
[29:27.200 --> 29:33.160]  But I think that's what they're looking for when they're calling everyone who's using their services, some feedback as to what features they'd like.
[29:33.200 --> 29:39.720]  Because when you're sitting in an office thinking of, you know, some cool product, like a new voicemail service or whatever, you don't necessarily think of all these things.
[29:39.900 --> 29:48.780]  One rather ominous tone that I've heard, though, comment is that the service is free now, but it's scheduled not to be free sometime in 2007.
[29:48.780 --> 29:50.220]  So who knows what that means?
[29:50.840 --> 29:51.640]  Hopefully affordable.
[29:52.000 --> 29:52.420]  Hopefully.
[29:52.420 --> 29:58.760]  You know, if you're going to have to pay for that, then the company that you're not using their voicemail for should be refunding you something.
[29:58.940 --> 30:03.840]  I don't use Verizon voicemail anymore, so I should not have to pay for that, which obviously I'm paying for in my belt.
[30:04.060 --> 30:04.160]  Good luck with that.
[30:04.240 --> 30:04.780]  Yeah, good luck.
[30:04.840 --> 30:05.120]  Exactly.
[30:05.900 --> 30:09.540]  You can have it removed from your account if you really don't like it.
[30:09.640 --> 30:09.840]  Really?
[30:10.020 --> 30:11.520]  But you won't get any money off.
[30:11.720 --> 30:13.460]  So their voicemail is free then.
[30:13.720 --> 30:17.460]  If I don't have a cell phone, I should be able to get their voicemail for free because it doesn't cost anything.
[30:17.460 --> 30:21.620]  You can call up one of their reps and take this up with them, but I don't think you'll get very far.
[30:21.700 --> 30:25.820]  Considering that they can't even, you know, deal with units.
[30:26.400 --> 30:26.580]  Yeah.
[30:26.940 --> 30:29.000]  Or figure out a fraction of a penny.
[30:29.780 --> 30:33.920]  They can't understand the difference between 0.02 cents and...
[30:33.920 --> 30:34.840]  0.02 dollars.
[30:35.600 --> 30:35.800]  Yeah.
[30:36.260 --> 30:42.540]  Now, Bernie, there was a big earthquake near Taiwan last week, and it disrupted quite a bit of telecommunications traffic.
[30:42.540 --> 30:43.340]  Do you know anything about that?
[30:43.980 --> 30:50.840]  Yeah, just off the southern coast of Taiwan, there was a pretty major quake, 7 point something on the Richter scale.
[30:50.840 --> 30:51.960]  6.7, I believe.
[30:52.460 --> 31:00.260]  And it severed a whole bunch of undersea fiber optic cables and really wreaked havoc in that part of Asia.
[31:02.360 --> 31:04.660]  Most people just didn't have any connectivity for a while.
[31:05.160 --> 31:08.160]  It really affected voice and data traffic for several days.
[31:08.160 --> 31:13.640]  It's probably not going to be all fixed for a couple of weeks at least until everything gets rerouted.
[31:13.820 --> 31:15.700]  But it was a major, major outage.
[31:15.840 --> 31:18.040]  It didn't really get a lot of coverage in this country.
[31:19.240 --> 31:28.640]  If it happened up the coast of California or something and severed a lot of their fibers, then, you know, the whole world would have heard about that.
[31:28.640 --> 31:37.420]  So, it just goes to show that we're really very dependent on these cables still.
[31:38.100 --> 31:44.620]  And if they go down, you're left without communicating unless you have a ham radio or something to fall back on.
[31:46.000 --> 31:49.460]  Was it a surprise to you to see how quickly communications went down?
[31:50.940 --> 31:51.380]  No.
[31:51.580 --> 31:55.180]  I mean, this is going to happen wherever there are cables that carry communications.
[31:55.460 --> 31:58.700]  And cables are carrying more and more communications every day.
[31:58.840 --> 32:01.580]  The capacity of these fibers is just astounding.
[32:02.440 --> 32:07.980]  I mean, it boggles the mind how much voice and data channels can be carried on one of these fiber bundles.
[32:09.460 --> 32:11.620]  And I think it's consolidating, too.
[32:11.620 --> 32:18.220]  I think more and more traffic is being consolidated onto fewer cables because it's just cheaper to do it that way.
[32:18.520 --> 32:20.680]  All your eggs in one basket, so to speak.
[32:20.900 --> 32:29.800]  So, when one of these things gets disrupted, either by an act of God like this or intentionally, you know, havoc can ensue.
[32:29.860 --> 32:32.320]  And that's just what happened in that part of Asia.
[32:33.700 --> 32:34.200]  Okay.
[32:34.400 --> 32:46.420]  Well, that's something I'll certainly be keeping an eye on in future weeks, other earthquakes and possible cutting off of communications to massive amounts of people far away from where the actual event happened.
[32:46.940 --> 32:50.400]  Our email address is OTH at 2600.com.
[32:50.520 --> 32:56.160]  Of course, we welcome your emails and people sending in all kinds of interesting links like this one.
[32:56.160 --> 32:59.680]  Someone sent us rinkworks.com slash stupid.
[33:00.020 --> 33:03.160]  And what this is, this is something I think everybody can participate in.
[33:03.240 --> 33:10.920]  But this particular website put together a bunch of the best, I guess, stupid happenings of people trying to deal with this thing called the internet.
[33:11.120 --> 33:17.400]  Now, some of these, actually, I could see a lot of people falling into the trap and misinterpreting things.
[33:17.520 --> 33:19.060]  Some of them are just unbelievable, though.
[33:19.980 --> 33:23.080]  Here's an email that was sent to the owner of a web page.
[33:23.240 --> 33:24.040]  This really happened.
[33:24.040 --> 33:26.980]  I got here by some nefarious route.
[33:27.280 --> 33:31.260]  I was trying to get to an email address or some other similar sites.
[33:31.420 --> 33:36.040]  I distinctly dislike being hijacked in cyberspace to see something I did not ask to see.
[33:36.220 --> 33:39.920]  If this happens again, I will make a formal complaint to my local federal district attorney.
[33:40.120 --> 33:40.460]  Thank you.
[33:40.560 --> 33:41.340]  Do not do this again.
[33:42.980 --> 33:46.800]  This is somebody who found himself redirected from one site to another.
[33:48.480 --> 33:52.100]  And here's another interesting little occurrence.
[33:52.100 --> 33:59.400]  Two students, who had spent the better part of their class hour bragging about their computer skills, were becoming increasingly frustrated while browsing the internet.
[33:59.400 --> 34:04.560]  They were trying to access a site that didn't exist, but they were absolutely convinced the trouble was something else.
[34:05.000 --> 34:07.600]  Student number one, the damn keyboard locked up again.
[34:07.800 --> 34:10.140]  And actually, a page was loading during that.
[34:10.340 --> 34:12.860]  Student number two, here, you have to pull the wires out.
[34:13.020 --> 34:14.740]  Yanks the network wires out of the back.
[34:15.040 --> 34:17.580]  When that happens, just pull those wires out and shove them back in.
[34:17.700 --> 34:18.340]  Does it work now?
[34:18.540 --> 34:19.500]  Student number one, no.
[34:19.500 --> 34:20.960]  Oh, it says, reading file done.
[34:21.560 --> 34:22.320]  Student number two.
[34:22.460 --> 34:24.060]  Okay, that means your keyboard server is down.
[34:24.200 --> 34:25.120]  There's nothing you can do about it.
[34:25.320 --> 34:26.880]  This reminds me of bash.org.
[34:27.080 --> 34:27.500]  Uh-huh.
[34:27.720 --> 34:28.800]  I don't know anything about that.
[34:28.920 --> 34:31.220]  Oh, it's a funny site.
[34:32.500 --> 34:38.540]  Basically, you submit comments that you find in chat rooms or instant messages or whatever, and they all get posted.
[34:38.540 --> 34:43.460]  And I don't know if there's been much activity lately, but there's some classic quotes on there.
[34:43.800 --> 34:48.420]  Well, these are some classic quotes that you don't have to go to the internet to hear because they're coming over your radio speaker.
[34:50.640 --> 34:53.180]  And here's something I could see somebody actually making this mistake.
[34:53.180 --> 35:00.560]  I recently visited the site of a company, which shall remain unnamed, and was frustrated by the extremely slow screen refresh as I scrolled through the page.
[35:00.660 --> 35:10.840]  I investigated and discovered that instead of declaring a plain green background color for the page, they had created a one-pixel GIF image, which was tiled as a background.
[35:10.840 --> 35:18.320]  Now, for some of our less technical listeners, which I would like to explain just what exactly that person did, none of us know?
[35:18.640 --> 35:20.060]  Well, it's pretty simple, actually.
[35:20.220 --> 35:20.360]  We know.
[35:20.440 --> 35:21.340]  I kind of...
[35:21.340 --> 35:23.420]  You're loading thousands and thousands of pictures.
[35:23.600 --> 35:23.960]  That's right.
[35:24.440 --> 35:24.940]  Every time.
[35:25.300 --> 35:25.500]  Yeah.
[35:25.740 --> 35:26.800]  And it takes forever.
[35:27.000 --> 35:31.500]  Imagine you just say the background color is green, or how many pixels are in a screen?
[35:31.820 --> 35:32.660]  How many pixels?
[35:32.800 --> 35:33.180]  Does anybody know?
[35:33.480 --> 35:35.200]  10, 80...
[35:35.200 --> 35:36.400]  It depends on your resolution.
[35:36.420 --> 35:39.100]  It depends on the size of your browser's window and whatever.
[35:39.360 --> 35:39.620]  Obviously.
[35:39.900 --> 35:40.360]  Millions and millions.
[35:40.360 --> 35:40.920]  Millions and millions.
[35:41.060 --> 35:41.220]  Okay.
[35:41.280 --> 35:42.220]  That's the answer I was looking for.
[35:42.500 --> 35:46.360]  You have to draw each and every single one of those, hence the slowness.
[35:46.560 --> 35:51.760]  And I could see a lot of people not knowing that, not knowing that, and just blithely moving ahead.
[35:51.860 --> 35:53.720]  People have absolutely no conception of computers.
[35:54.580 --> 36:00.060]  So, yeah, that's something that I think people should continue to send in.
[36:00.200 --> 36:03.160]  And if you know of anything particularly stupid that happens, or just funny.
[36:03.360 --> 36:07.940]  I mean, there's this tendency, though, to always say that the users are stupid.
[36:08.100 --> 36:08.780]  And a lot of them are.
[36:08.780 --> 36:11.260]  But a lot of them, you know, just don't know.
[36:11.460 --> 36:15.480]  And a lot of the time, the software that they're using is very poorly designed.
[36:15.480 --> 36:20.620]  And it's a tendency to blame the user who can't figure out this very poorly designed software.
[36:20.840 --> 36:25.220]  So it's something that the technically minded of us have to be aware of.
[36:25.220 --> 36:32.840]  And oftentimes, oftentimes, it's the companies you call to complain about something, they're the ones who don't get it.
[36:32.900 --> 36:34.640]  And here's one more example of this.
[36:34.720 --> 36:39.060]  And then we're going to move on to some listener mail and phone calls, 212-209-2900.
[36:39.660 --> 36:46.060]  One evening around midnight, I decided to book a flight for the weekend using Northwest Airlines' Cyber Saver deals.
[36:46.560 --> 36:48.920]  On their site, they provide a link to National Car Rental.
[36:49.080 --> 36:55.320]  The URL was nationalcar.com slash cgi-bin slash cyber1 underscore res dot pl.
[36:55.840 --> 37:00.480]  Well, upon completing the form for a car reservation, I received a message saying, your request has been sent.
[37:00.620 --> 37:02.120]  I never received a confirmation.
[37:02.740 --> 37:09.920]  After trying three more times, I called tech support and said the following, I tried reserving a car on your website, but I did not get a response.
[37:10.360 --> 37:11.600]  Let me get your reservation number.
[37:11.600 --> 37:12.340]  I can look it up.
[37:12.480 --> 37:13.860]  I didn't get a reservation number.
[37:13.980 --> 37:15.880]  Well, let's go to the website and check it out.
[37:16.380 --> 37:18.440]  Go to nationalcar.com.
[37:18.720 --> 37:22.040]  Well, actually, I'm on a promotional part of your website for Northwest Airlines.
[37:22.500 --> 37:23.400]  That's not our website.
[37:23.400 --> 37:25.800]  Our website is at nationalcar.com.
[37:25.960 --> 37:26.880]  That's where I'm at.
[37:27.020 --> 37:27.660]  No, it's not.
[37:27.860 --> 37:31.420]  Yes, I'm at nationalcar.com slash cgi-bi.
[37:31.560 --> 37:34.260]  Sir, anything after the slash is not our website.
[37:34.780 --> 37:36.800]  You are on someone else's website.
[37:37.500 --> 37:38.940]  No, that is your URL.
[37:38.940 --> 37:40.460]  The link points to your servers.
[37:40.640 --> 37:42.420]  The system is on your server.
[37:42.840 --> 37:43.860]  No, sir, it is not.
[37:43.940 --> 37:45.120]  You are on someone else's server.
[37:45.220 --> 37:46.100]  That went on for a while.
[37:46.320 --> 37:49.540]  I hung up, and upon arriving at the airport, I found I had three cars in my name.
[37:49.720 --> 37:52.760]  Apparently, the system simply sends an email to the regional office.
[37:52.760 --> 37:55.220]  Then they manually reserve a car, some system.
[37:55.600 --> 37:57.520]  Actually, he should have had four if he did it three more times.
[37:58.480 --> 37:59.800]  Maybe one caught last.
[38:00.800 --> 38:01.080]  Unreal.
[38:01.460 --> 38:06.340]  So, yeah, if you know anything like that, that particular compilation was on rinkworks.com slash stupid.
[38:06.420 --> 38:09.260]  But if you know of other things that are going on, please let us know.
[38:09.340 --> 38:09.860]  I know our listeners.
[38:09.860 --> 38:15.700]  The system sends an email to someone in the office, and the person in the office didn't notice they got four identical emails?
[38:15.960 --> 38:17.180]  They don't talk to each other.
[38:17.340 --> 38:17.980]  They don't communicate.
[38:18.560 --> 38:20.080]  That's often the problem.
[38:20.280 --> 38:20.980]  Must be a big office.
[38:21.300 --> 38:28.240]  A flaw in the no-liquid rule on airlines was mentioned in the last off the hook, beerbelly.com or something like that.
[38:28.380 --> 38:29.620]  And that got me thinking.
[38:29.620 --> 38:41.760]  I don't know if anyone has made this relatively easy, logical leap yet, but it wouldn't be difficult for a group of terrorists, each carrying three ounces worth of liquid explosives onto the plane to combine their liquids to what the TSA considers a dangerous amount.
[38:42.120 --> 38:44.420]  I'm not sure how the TSA will eliminate that threat.
[38:44.620 --> 38:53.700]  I think what they should be focusing on is researching new technology to detect explosives rather than trying to limit damage based on the volume of explosives that people can carry onto a plane.
[38:53.980 --> 39:01.520]  I realize that people expect the government to react to recent events, but all they're really doing is making air travel a bit more inconvenient and not much else.
[39:01.640 --> 39:02.020]  Sign anonymous.
[39:02.020 --> 39:04.020]  Well, anonymous, a very important point here.
[39:04.140 --> 39:05.160]  There was no recent event.
[39:05.560 --> 39:06.400]  Nothing happened.
[39:06.600 --> 39:10.620]  Nothing happened to indicate that liquid explosives were about to be used, right?
[39:10.720 --> 39:13.600]  It was just somebody's wild idea that, hey, maybe this could happen?
[39:13.760 --> 39:14.980]  The whole thing is...
[39:14.980 --> 39:16.200]  I mean, we've discussed this before.
[39:16.280 --> 39:17.300]  The whole thing is really stupid.
[39:17.460 --> 39:22.460]  Yes, of course, you could combine all your three-ounce containers into one big container once you get on the plane.
[39:23.160 --> 39:30.940]  I mean, I'm sure the TSA even knows this because there must be someone there who is at least half as smart as, you know, our listeners.
[39:31.880 --> 39:32.860]  But I don't know.
[39:33.140 --> 39:34.100]  I don't know what's going on.
[39:34.320 --> 39:39.640]  Don't you think it'd be quite obvious that something is happening if 10 people are combining three ounces into one large tub?
[39:39.800 --> 39:41.380]  Well, I would think...
[39:41.380 --> 39:45.440]  Again, I don't want to make this Tips for Terrorist Hour because we seem to fall into that a lot.
[39:45.600 --> 39:50.960]  But if I was going to do something like this, I would set up the tub somewhere, maybe in the bathroom in a place where it looks like it might belong.
[39:51.380 --> 39:53.500]  And then one by one, Terrorist A goes to the bathroom.
[39:53.680 --> 39:55.400]  Then maybe a passenger goes to the bathroom.
[39:55.500 --> 39:56.920]  Terrorist B goes to the bathroom.
[39:57.040 --> 40:01.060]  Then Terrorist D goes to the bathroom because, you know, it's out of order and they weren't expecting that.
[40:01.260 --> 40:02.020]  Then Terrorist C.
[40:02.080 --> 40:03.960]  And they sort of combine everything together.
[40:04.140 --> 40:09.260]  And then you have your liquid in the tub and do whatever you have to do at that point.
[40:09.380 --> 40:09.900]  I don't know.
[40:10.080 --> 40:13.000]  Wouldn't the passenger see that there's a tub full of liquid in the bathroom?
[40:13.000 --> 40:15.440]  No, but that's... if you put it in a... it doesn't have to be a bathroom.
[40:15.520 --> 40:18.340]  It can be underneath... it can be inside a baggage compartment.
[40:18.500 --> 40:18.860]  It could be there.
[40:19.000 --> 40:20.540]  I've been in airplane bathrooms.
[40:20.820 --> 40:23.800]  There are plenty of panels you could pry open and hide things in.
[40:24.640 --> 40:30.540]  Or get a job as an airline steward or something and get some of your cohorts together and do it that way.
[40:30.680 --> 40:38.220]  You're forgetting the secret weapon of the anti-terrorist forces, which is simply to arrest everyone who looks like they might be Muslim.
[40:38.960 --> 40:39.800]  Yeah, that's...
[40:39.800 --> 40:40.900]  Which they do.
[40:41.080 --> 40:41.760]  A lot.
[40:42.020 --> 40:44.820]  And it doesn't seem to catch very many terrorists, but they enjoy it.
[40:45.440 --> 40:58.480]  John from Queens writes to us to alert us to the fact that the Queens Library is installing RFID self-checkout in Forest Hills and College Point and two other branches now have it.
[40:59.820 --> 41:02.000]  So I guess if we want to play with that...
[41:02.000 --> 41:03.500]  Microwave your books when you get home.
[41:03.700 --> 41:03.900]  Yeah.
[41:04.840 --> 41:07.640]  And this from our friend The Clone up in Canada.
[41:07.640 --> 41:14.980]  As many of the 2600 Magazine readers and off-the-hook listeners know, K-Line Magazine is a freely available hacker and freaker magazine.
[41:14.980 --> 41:18.240]  That's www.networked.net.net.
[41:18.240 --> 41:18.880]  And I've got to spell that.
[41:19.020 --> 41:23.820]  N-E-T-T-W-E-R-K-E-D.net slash files.html.
[41:23.980 --> 41:24.720]  Pound sign.
[41:25.260 --> 41:26.180]  K-Line.
[41:26.180 --> 41:27.480]  But the L is a 1.
[41:27.600 --> 41:30.600]  This is why people have difficulty finding things, because people spell things with numbers.
[41:30.800 --> 41:31.940]  K-1-I-N-E.
[41:32.940 --> 41:38.360]  Dedicated to not only Canadian hacking slash freaking, but technology for all people across the globe.
[41:38.460 --> 41:41.380]  We're coming up to issue number 50 after eight years of publishing.
[41:41.580 --> 41:45.260]  And although we've had a lot of support from the community, submissions are slowing down.
[41:45.260 --> 41:50.520]  And it looks like this might be the final issue that we, Hack Canada, and Networked publish.
[41:50.840 --> 41:56.460]  We're looking for the help from the community who might be interested in offering a helping hand to make this final issue a special one.
[41:57.020 --> 42:01.480]  Submissions can be sent to The Clone, T-H-E-C-L-O-N-E, at hackcanada.com.
[42:02.220 --> 42:06.080]  Please don't submit anything to K-Line that you will otherwise want published in 2600.
[42:06.160 --> 42:07.860]  We want you to support both magazines.
[42:08.000 --> 42:08.940]  We want to keep things fresh.
[42:10.640 --> 42:12.460]  And let's see if we can keep that magazine going.
[42:12.560 --> 42:14.220]  There should be a lot of online publications going.
[42:14.220 --> 42:15.740]  Thanks, The Clone, for sending that to us.
[42:15.800 --> 42:17.540]  And hopefully it won't be the last issue.
[42:19.180 --> 42:19.860]  Let's see.
[42:20.720 --> 42:23.420]  Here's a letter from someone who just signed at C.
[42:23.700 --> 42:25.980]  After listening to your last show, I had to write an email.
[42:26.200 --> 42:31.200]  I own a company outside of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania that installs security cameras for the local government.
[42:31.400 --> 42:37.220]  And while I agree with you on your views of video cameras, your theory of what is going on behind those cameras is totally false.
[42:37.300 --> 42:39.380]  You guys couldn't be more wrong about what is going on.
[42:39.460 --> 42:40.000]  What was our theory?
[42:40.620 --> 42:41.100]  I don't know.
[42:41.100 --> 42:44.780]  I think we were just reading news articles about all the crazy stuff that they've been doing.
[42:44.880 --> 42:46.960]  Well, we've also talked about it, but I don't remember...
[42:46.960 --> 42:48.500]  The rise of the surveillance state?
[42:48.600 --> 42:49.800]  But that wasn't really a theory.
[42:49.940 --> 42:52.440]  That was more a general trend of civilization.
[42:52.640 --> 42:53.460]  Yeah, that's going on.
[42:53.620 --> 42:59.960]  I think we maybe theorize that there's a room of people yelling into cameras at other people that they're watching or something like that.
[42:59.960 --> 43:00.580]  All right.
[43:01.160 --> 43:07.540]  I train people from the local police level up to the FBI, most of the people that are scared to death when they sit in front of a computer.
[43:07.640 --> 43:11.020]  Probably some of the people that are responsible for some of the little anecdotes we were reading.
[43:11.460 --> 43:18.100]  I have had people walk out of an eight-hour training on how to use our software and call me the next day asking where they put the VCR in.
[43:18.600 --> 43:20.780]  Your theory of Big Brother is far from the truth.
[43:20.860 --> 43:23.520]  Actually, I don't think I ever really believe...
[43:23.520 --> 43:27.800]  I don't think anybody here believes that Big Brother is 100% technically competent.
[43:28.080 --> 43:28.760]  Or monolithic.
[43:28.760 --> 43:30.220]  Yeah, definitely not.
[43:30.360 --> 43:33.980]  But overall, overall is what you got to look at and the potential for the future.
[43:34.380 --> 43:37.760]  Anyway, government is counting on two things to make the video security work.
[43:38.120 --> 43:42.780]  The first, the mere presence of a camera will reduce crime in front of the camera by 40%.
[43:42.780 --> 43:43.660]  So this is the thing.
[43:43.740 --> 43:46.200]  This is the argument that camera installers always make.
[43:46.240 --> 43:49.460]  And then they never explain to me why they have to hide the camera.
[43:51.380 --> 43:59.120]  If the theory is that the existence of a camera is itself a deterrent, why are there existing hidden security cameras?
[43:59.820 --> 44:00.180]  Interesting.
[44:00.500 --> 44:00.560]  Yeah.
[44:01.280 --> 44:03.580]  So you don't have a problem with cameras being out there as long as you can see them.
[44:03.760 --> 44:04.900]  Well, I don't like it.
[44:05.080 --> 44:09.200]  But at least it is consistent with the explanation put forth.
[44:10.220 --> 44:10.580]  Okay.
[44:12.000 --> 44:16.580]  And the second thing, if you're stupid enough to be caught on video, they will hang you by a particular part of your anatomy.
[44:17.700 --> 44:18.820]  I'd love to continue the discussion.
[44:18.820 --> 44:22.580]  If you're interested, I'll give you the hack, the backside, rather, information to the systems.
[44:24.040 --> 44:25.720]  Assuming my identity will be kept quiet.
[44:25.840 --> 44:27.020]  Well, assuming your full name is not C.
[44:27.180 --> 44:28.760]  And I think we've succeeded in doing that.
[44:28.840 --> 44:31.780]  But yeah, we'd like to hear how it works on the inside.
[44:32.960 --> 44:34.380]  Definitely of interest to us.
[44:34.900 --> 44:41.980]  But I don't understand how any of his explanation as to the training has to do with what they do afterwards.
[44:41.980 --> 44:49.180]  I mean, once they become competent enough to be able to, you know, pan, tilt, zoom with the camera, what more is there?
[44:49.280 --> 45:00.940]  I think the point is that if you're technologically incompetent, you're still human and you're not evil somehow because you're kind of blundering still and you're just trying to do the best you can.
[45:00.940 --> 45:04.320]  And that's sort of what we have to look at these people as doing is trying to do the best they can.
[45:04.760 --> 45:07.660]  But I see it a little bit more darkly.
[45:07.860 --> 45:10.920]  And I think we're going down some very bad steps here.
[45:11.460 --> 45:13.960]  A privacy tip from Wired Magazine.
[45:14.100 --> 45:14.360]  Oh, dear.
[45:14.460 --> 45:17.980]  They did some research on how to disable your passport's RFID chip.
[45:18.140 --> 45:24.100]  If you get a new passport and it's got a little symbol on the front, that means it's got an RFID chip in the back.
[45:24.440 --> 45:30.500]  And they do not advise a microwave because the chip could catch fire, I guess.
[45:30.680 --> 45:33.140]  They decided that a hammer is the best way.
[45:33.260 --> 45:33.620]  A hammer.
[45:33.700 --> 45:36.760]  Just take a hammer and hit the chip with a blunt hard object.
[45:36.960 --> 45:39.480]  And is that even illegal to hit it with a hammer?
[45:39.480 --> 45:40.320]  It might be.
[45:40.400 --> 45:40.840]  Who could say?
[45:40.980 --> 45:41.160]  Okay.
[45:41.380 --> 45:42.560]  I don't like their explanation, though.
[45:42.960 --> 45:43.440]  Which is what?
[45:43.440 --> 45:46.860]  It just says it has an always-on radio frequency identification chip.
[45:46.980 --> 45:47.600]  What would you say?
[45:47.600 --> 45:47.920]  Which isn't...
[45:48.660 --> 45:50.840]  It's activatable any time, but it's not always on.
[45:50.980 --> 45:52.780]  It's not, you know, it's not always doing something.
[45:52.980 --> 45:53.740]  It's never off.
[45:53.820 --> 45:54.680]  It's ready to be on.
[45:54.780 --> 45:55.980]  All right, Jim, you have something interesting.
[45:55.980 --> 46:10.840]  The voting, the Board of Elections, once again, the public demonstrations of the voting machines, the optical scan and the touchscreen, tomorrow night, next Thursday and Monday, January 22nd.
[46:11.060 --> 46:16.580]  Tomorrow night in Staten Island, the Richmond County Clerk's Office, the Grand Jury Room.
[46:16.780 --> 46:20.080]  That's 126 Stuyvesant Place, Staten Island, New York.
[46:20.080 --> 46:22.600]  All of these are between 5 and 9 p.m.
[46:23.740 --> 46:34.180]  Thursday, January 11th, Fordham University, Lincoln Center Campus, the Generoso Pope Hall, 113 West 60th Street, New York, New York.
[46:34.300 --> 46:38.840]  That's about two blocks west of the Columbus Circle subway station.
[46:39.320 --> 46:42.140]  These are, excuse me, these are demonstrations or hearings?
[46:42.260 --> 46:43.360]  These are the demonstrations.
[46:43.600 --> 46:43.740]  Okay.
[46:43.740 --> 46:49.440]  Remember we told you a couple weeks ago after we went to the one in the Bronx that they said there'd be more?
[46:49.440 --> 46:50.400]  Well, these are the more.
[46:50.760 --> 46:55.640]  And Monday, January 22nd, at Medgar Evers College Auditorium.
[46:56.800 --> 46:58.500]  Let me see if I get this address right.
[47:00.200 --> 47:02.760]  1650 Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn, New York.
[47:03.120 --> 47:05.280]  All these are between 5 and 9 p.m.
[47:05.500 --> 47:13.680]  And then on Tuesday, January 23rd, at the Board of Elections Hearing Room, 42 Broadway, 6th Floor, New York, New York.
[47:13.680 --> 47:16.960]  They will have another hearing on these.
[47:17.140 --> 47:23.100]  But the next demonstration is tomorrow, 126 Stuyvesant Place, Richmond County Clerk's Office, 5 p.m.
[47:23.620 --> 47:26.240]  And next Thursday, well, we'll announce it next Wednesday.
[47:26.400 --> 47:26.560]  Okay.
[47:26.640 --> 47:28.960]  It's very well worth going to these things.
[47:29.100 --> 47:29.660]  It's a lot of fun.
[47:29.780 --> 47:37.260]  You can ask them all sorts of embarrassing questions and play with the machines and see what you can notice that maybe other normal people would not notice.
[47:37.540 --> 47:40.680]  Our listeners definitely have a propensity for that kind of thing.
[47:41.360 --> 47:41.600]  Okay.
[47:41.600 --> 47:44.460]  212-209-2900 is our telephone number.
[47:44.660 --> 47:47.420]  Let's take some listener phone calls, see who's out there.
[47:48.460 --> 47:50.980]  Wait, when I bet I hit this, I'm going to get a dial tone because it always happens to me.
[47:51.660 --> 47:51.820]  No.
[47:52.060 --> 47:52.600]  See, it happened.
[47:52.680 --> 47:53.020]  It happened.
[47:53.180 --> 47:53.340]  Okay.
[47:54.740 --> 47:56.860]  That's because our phone lines keep moving all over the place.
[47:57.000 --> 47:57.600]  I'm going to hit this one now.
[47:57.600 --> 47:57.920]  Good evening.
[47:58.080 --> 47:58.900]  You're on Off the Hook.
[47:59.580 --> 48:00.560]  Well, it's not a dial tone.
[48:01.400 --> 48:01.720]  Okay.
[48:01.740 --> 48:03.540]  We're getting calls from all sorts of phone noises.
[48:03.980 --> 48:04.760]  Let's go over here.
[48:05.640 --> 48:06.220]  Good evening.
[48:06.500 --> 48:07.320]  You're on the radio.
[48:08.080 --> 48:08.400]  Hello?
[48:08.680 --> 48:08.920]  Yes.
[48:09.000 --> 48:09.240]  Go ahead.
[48:10.020 --> 48:10.240]  Yeah.
[48:10.340 --> 48:11.520]  So am I on the air?
[48:11.600 --> 48:12.500]  You're on the air right now.
[48:13.060 --> 48:13.240]  Yeah.
[48:13.380 --> 48:14.340]  Thanks for taking my call.
[48:14.480 --> 48:15.820]  You guys are doing an excellent job.
[48:16.060 --> 48:16.380]  Thank you.
[48:16.520 --> 48:19.440]  And I really enjoy your show, so you're very clever.
[48:20.980 --> 48:22.320]  So I have one question.
[48:22.460 --> 48:25.400]  I want to know if it's possible, like if I...
[48:25.960 --> 48:48.320]  Let's say that I had a problem with, you know, if a person who is very knowledgeable in technology and then the person decides to be spiteful towards me, and then if I have a business where I have a cell phone for my customers to contact me, is it possible that you think this person could jam my phone call so that my customers don't get to me?
[48:49.160 --> 48:51.480]  You're receiving calls from your customer on a cell phone.
[48:51.980 --> 48:52.380]  Right.
[48:52.500 --> 48:57.980]  Like I have a cell phone, which I, you know, I bought specifically for my business so that my customers will get in touch with me.
[48:58.540 --> 49:02.140]  However, I have not received not even one single phone call.
[49:02.260 --> 49:04.480]  I used to receive phone calls, and then all of a sudden...
[49:04.480 --> 49:06.900]  Well, first of all, is this vengeful person, is he nearby?
[49:07.680 --> 49:08.280]  I'm sorry?
[49:08.460 --> 49:11.160]  Is this person near you, or is he far away?
[49:12.360 --> 49:13.180]  The person you're worried about?
[49:13.180 --> 49:15.780]  Well, no, the person will be in the same community where I live.
[49:16.000 --> 49:16.320]  Okay.
[49:16.540 --> 49:21.920]  Because, I mean, a cell phone jammer could prevent you from getting phone calls to your phone.
[49:22.000 --> 49:22.820]  They'd go to voicemail.
[49:22.960 --> 49:24.740]  But you would notice that you didn't have a signal.
[49:24.740 --> 49:29.920]  So, if you have a signal on your cell phone, and it's not ringing, I don't think it's anything like that.
[49:30.280 --> 49:31.060]  I mean, one thing you...
[49:31.060 --> 49:34.780]  If I do have signals...
[49:34.780 --> 49:35.840]  If you're able to...
[49:35.840 --> 49:43.300]  If I'm able to receive any other call, any other personal call, except for the business calls, all of a sudden, I have not received any business calls.
[49:43.300 --> 49:45.960]  Are they coming to the same phone number, or is it being forwarded somehow?
[49:46.400 --> 49:47.560]  No, the same phone number.
[49:47.980 --> 49:56.540]  Well, then there's no way I can think of where somebody can isolate phone calls that are meant for business, and personal ones that are coming to the same phone number.
[49:56.640 --> 49:57.420]  How would they even know?
[49:58.700 --> 49:59.020]  Okay.
[49:59.120 --> 50:01.480]  So, they will only be listening to whatever, whatever.
[50:01.820 --> 50:02.560]  You know, I don't know.
[50:02.720 --> 50:03.640]  I don't know how they do it.
[50:04.460 --> 50:07.760]  My feeling is that's not where the problem lies, if there is a problem.
[50:07.880 --> 50:08.500]  Mike, do you have a...
[50:08.500 --> 50:18.840]  I was just going to suggest that you try calling the phone from some other number, or having someone you know call, and see if you can receive the call, so that you know that the phone is working.
[50:19.940 --> 50:20.740]  Ah, okay.
[50:20.940 --> 50:21.380]  All right.
[50:21.660 --> 50:28.660]  Yeah, have somebody else try it from a different location, and have them think in their heads that they're making a business call as they make it.
[50:28.740 --> 50:31.580]  And if he catches that, then he's really, really good.
[50:31.700 --> 50:34.480]  But hopefully, you'll find the cause of the problem.
[50:35.240 --> 50:37.140]  Maybe you just need to get the phone number out more.
[50:37.260 --> 50:38.720]  Maybe people need to do that, like we do.
[50:38.820 --> 50:40.360]  212-209-2900.
[50:40.500 --> 50:42.200]  If people don't call, it's because we're not telling them.
[50:43.600 --> 50:44.380]  You're on off the hook.
[50:45.080 --> 50:45.460]  See?
[50:45.700 --> 50:46.820]  That's my fault somehow.
[50:47.520 --> 50:47.880]  Good evening.
[50:48.060 --> 50:48.620]  You're on off the hook.
[50:50.040 --> 50:50.620]  Go ahead.
[50:51.680 --> 50:52.360]  I'm on the air?
[50:52.440 --> 50:52.980]  Yes, right now.
[50:53.960 --> 50:54.240]  Wow.
[50:55.340 --> 50:57.100]  First of all, I just want to say I like your show.
[50:58.280 --> 51:00.580]  I just wanted to comment on Bernie S.
[51:01.500 --> 51:03.900]  He's always talking about the Faraday cage.
[51:04.160 --> 51:05.660]  It seems he's always talking about that.
[51:07.240 --> 51:09.460]  Yeah, he does seem to be talking about that occasionally.
[51:10.800 --> 51:12.460]  Is there a theory you have as to why?
[51:14.600 --> 51:15.120]  No?
[51:15.800 --> 51:18.180]  Bernie, okay, do you have anything to say in response to that?
[51:18.400 --> 51:21.380]  Well, it doesn't have to be a screen mesh.
[51:21.540 --> 51:25.300]  I mean, there's actually a spray-on Bernie S.
[51:25.300 --> 51:25.600]  Okay.
[51:26.260 --> 51:28.740]  You can spray it from a hose, from a tank.
[51:28.940 --> 51:36.020]  It's like you can spray like an hydro-seed dirt with seeds and nutrients.
[51:36.020 --> 51:49.240]  You can spray the interior of a room, or an exterior of a room, with this foamy substance that has metal carbon particles in it, and it becomes a shielded room that the radio waves will not come or go out of.
[51:49.680 --> 51:50.600]  So, I don't know.
[51:50.700 --> 51:54.960]  I don't know what his concern is, but, you know, this technology has been around for decades.
[51:55.260 --> 51:57.480]  Now, Bernie, I get the sense you're saying that in all seriousness.
[51:58.420 --> 51:58.820]  Yes!
[51:58.840 --> 52:02.060]  But people are laughing and pounding the floor with their fists here.
[52:02.060 --> 52:04.760]  So, maybe, Redbird, you could explain why you're laughing so hard.
[52:05.460 --> 52:06.160]  No, no reason.
[52:06.220 --> 52:08.740]  It was a good explanation of current technology.
[52:09.020 --> 52:10.040]  Are you saying it's not true?
[52:10.200 --> 52:11.100]  No, I'm not saying it's not true.
[52:11.100 --> 52:11.800]  Then what's so funny?
[52:12.500 --> 52:13.180]  Spraying rooms.
[52:13.180 --> 52:13.780]  Next call.
[52:14.540 --> 52:18.580]  You see, this is not sharing the information, which is why people get confused.
[52:18.760 --> 52:19.760]  Jim, you look very confused.
[52:19.920 --> 52:20.840]  I'm not confused at all.
[52:20.840 --> 52:21.460]  I agree with Bernie.
[52:21.620 --> 52:23.060]  Faraday cages are really cool.
[52:23.160 --> 52:23.740]  But you're not laughing.
[52:24.240 --> 52:25.240]  That's why I'm not laughing.
[52:25.240 --> 52:26.140]  I agree with Bernie.
[52:26.480 --> 52:27.300]  These guys...
[52:27.300 --> 52:28.260]  Oh, so they don't think it's cool.
[52:28.300 --> 52:29.560]  No, I think they're awesome.
[52:29.600 --> 52:31.980]  That's why they're laughing, because they think it's, what, nerdy?
[52:32.060 --> 52:32.440]  Or something?
[52:32.600 --> 52:35.460]  Faraday cages are 200 years old, but they're still practical.
[52:35.660 --> 52:38.080]  In fact, they're even more practical now than they were 200 years ago.
[52:38.140 --> 52:40.040]  Things that are 200 years old are to be laughed at.
[52:40.060 --> 52:40.800]  That's exactly it.
[52:40.820 --> 52:41.720]  They mock me...
[52:41.720 --> 52:43.000]  They mock you for our ages.
[52:43.260 --> 52:44.560]  Well, I'm not 200 years old.
[52:44.620 --> 52:45.260]  Well, neither am I.
[52:45.760 --> 52:46.120]  All right.
[52:46.160 --> 52:47.900]  I can imagine, though, what kind of treatment I'm going to get then.
[52:48.100 --> 52:48.560]  All right.
[52:48.580 --> 52:49.420]  Let's take another phone call.
[52:49.800 --> 52:50.260]  Good evening.
[52:50.420 --> 52:51.080]  You're on Off the Hook.
[52:52.920 --> 52:53.700]  Speak up, please.
[52:54.040 --> 52:54.400]  Yes.
[52:54.540 --> 52:56.000]  I'm going to be making a documentary.
[52:56.000 --> 53:01.580]  I'm currently doing it now about how life, the things, some aspects of society are annoying and how...
[53:01.580 --> 53:02.300]  Ten seconds, Rebel.
[53:03.000 --> 53:03.080]  Yeah.
[53:03.320 --> 53:06.640]  People are, like, taking advantage of technology and things like that.
[53:06.680 --> 53:10.580]  I'm just putting together a video about how things are annoying and how...
[53:10.580 --> 53:10.880]  What things...
[53:10.880 --> 53:11.260]  Three seconds.
[53:11.940 --> 53:12.240]  Okay.
[53:12.520 --> 53:13.100]  What things...
[53:13.100 --> 53:13.200]  All right.
[53:13.340 --> 53:14.620]  Well, you made your point.
[53:14.740 --> 53:15.440]  Definitely annoying.
[53:15.620 --> 53:16.840]  Definitely something to look out for.
[53:16.940 --> 53:17.980]  Rebel's making a documentary.
[53:17.980 --> 53:18.580]  Oh, my God.
[53:18.700 --> 53:20.920]  So this is going to be just shots in a mirror.
[53:21.900 --> 53:23.100]  Let's not be cruel here.
[53:23.940 --> 53:25.560]  212-209-2900.
[53:25.800 --> 53:28.700]  Unless you're Rebel, in which case, please don't call us ten times at the same time.
[53:28.700 --> 53:31.760]  It can be really annoying, and maybe you should make a documentary about that.
[53:31.860 --> 53:32.160]  Good evening.
[53:32.420 --> 53:33.060]  You're on Off the Hook.
[53:33.360 --> 53:33.540]  Yes.
[53:33.600 --> 53:34.260]  How are you doing?
[53:34.920 --> 53:40.180]  When an old hippie calls your show and doesn't turn his radio down, you know what that's called?
[53:41.420 --> 53:44.560]  Typical sound of somebody calling our show and being confused.
[53:44.920 --> 53:45.560]  Speed fact.
[53:46.560 --> 53:47.360]  Oh, that's good.
[53:47.460 --> 53:48.660]  That's very rich.
[53:48.920 --> 53:49.100]  It's original.
[53:49.380 --> 53:49.540]  Yeah.
[53:50.680 --> 53:52.660]  Is that the only thing you called to tell us?
[53:53.620 --> 53:54.180]  I'm sorry?
[53:54.260 --> 53:55.600]  Is that the only thing you called to tell us?
[53:55.780 --> 53:56.000]  No.
[53:56.180 --> 53:56.400]  Okay.
[53:56.600 --> 53:59.200]  There's an industry standard in the criminal justice system.
[53:59.340 --> 54:00.460]  It's called DCJS.
[54:00.480 --> 54:03.480]  That's the file that they all would send to.
[54:03.660 --> 54:04.840]  It's like the central file.
[54:04.980 --> 54:06.660]  It's been around forever.
[54:06.860 --> 54:07.120]  Mm-hmm.
[54:08.860 --> 54:10.780]  And I don't know why they're changing anything.
[54:10.780 --> 54:15.240]  I don't care, but they always had to send away for DCJS.
[54:15.360 --> 54:22.140]  And if you know someone that has been locked up, that's one of the first stalls that they tell you, oh, we're waiting for your DCJS file to come back.
[54:22.160 --> 54:24.080]  Well, first of all, how long did it take to get that information?
[54:24.240 --> 54:24.700]  I think...
[54:24.700 --> 54:26.260]  Back in the day, in the 80s, they...
[54:26.260 --> 54:32.200]  Well, how long it took and how long they told you it took probably were, most of the time, two different things.
[54:33.380 --> 54:43.220]  The other thing I was thinking, if teachers have the ability to turn that switch on and off with the phone access, you know, often teachers might tend to abuse that also.
[54:43.480 --> 54:43.620]  Mm-hmm.
[54:43.620 --> 54:44.900]  Not all of them, but...
[54:44.900 --> 54:45.960]  How would they abuse it?
[54:46.000 --> 54:47.060]  Yeah, in which way would they abuse it?
[54:47.300 --> 54:51.380]  Well, you know, just playing with your head or have a control issue or...
[54:51.380 --> 54:53.240]  Well, presumably...
[54:53.240 --> 54:55.740]  You don't like the way you acted yesterday, so, you know...
[54:55.740 --> 55:03.080]  Well, I don't think any kid is going in there with the assumption that he's going to have the right to talk on the phone during his whole class, so I don't know if it will be playing with his head.
[55:03.340 --> 55:13.760]  Right, presumably this would be just a button in the classroom and it would be a permanently installed jammer that would only block, you know, for a radius of... that encompasses only the classroom.
[55:13.960 --> 55:14.180]  Right.
[55:14.300 --> 55:16.920]  I don't think it would be something portable like we've mentioned.
[55:16.980 --> 55:24.560]  The only question I think people might raise is, is this a harmful bit of radio waves that are being transmitted to our children?
[55:24.700 --> 55:24.880]  No.
[55:24.880 --> 55:26.220]  Well, how do you know that?
[55:26.720 --> 55:28.500]  You're very certain about these things, but how do you know?
[55:28.940 --> 55:37.520]  I think we've had this discussion about ionizing radiation and how RF at that level isn't considered ionizing and yada, yada, yada.
[55:37.600 --> 55:41.540]  You have to get up into UV and all this other stuff to start becoming harmful.
[55:41.720 --> 55:47.140]  If anyone has any real questions about it, I'm sure they can write to us, OTH at 2600.com and you'll provide a thorough explanation.
[55:47.300 --> 55:53.720]  Redbird has done a study where he gave cell phones to a group of people 50 years ago and had them carry it around with them.
[55:53.720 --> 55:54.360]  That's the thing.
[55:54.660 --> 55:56.260]  This technology has not been around that long.
[55:56.260 --> 55:58.280]  So how in God's name can you possibly say for sure?
[55:58.580 --> 55:58.840]  All right.
[55:58.900 --> 55:59.600]  One more phone call.
[55:59.720 --> 56:00.060]  Good evening.
[56:00.200 --> 56:00.880]  You're on off the hook.
[56:02.500 --> 56:03.020]  Go ahead.
[56:04.040 --> 56:04.360]  Yeah.
[56:04.420 --> 56:04.600]  Hi.
[56:04.700 --> 56:05.100]  Am I...
[56:05.100 --> 56:05.900]  Is this off the hook?
[56:05.980 --> 56:06.600]  You're on the air.
[56:06.680 --> 56:06.880]  Yes.
[56:06.880 --> 56:10.000]  I have a comment and a couple of questions.
[56:10.340 --> 56:11.220]  You're going to have to make it very fast.
[56:11.400 --> 56:20.960]  I was reading USA Today this past week and they had an article about passports and how you're going to need them to go to Canada in the near future.
[56:21.340 --> 56:29.760]  And one of the things... or a couple of things they mentioned was that... one was that having the... if the RFID chip was broken, that your passport was still valid.
[56:31.580 --> 56:34.460]  So, you know, I guess smashing it with a hammer is okay.
[56:34.960 --> 56:43.380]  And the other thing was that they were saying that, you know, they had installed some kind of metal shield in them to prevent, I guess, what they called skimming.
[56:45.580 --> 56:57.340]  And so, you know, I was kind of curious about how that would work if they're going to be using an RFID reader on it and they put a metal shield inside, you know, what the effect of that would be.
[56:57.580 --> 56:59.000]  Can I answer that really quickly?
[56:59.000 --> 57:06.420]  I've heard this theory and it's just so... it's a claim that they can read it only when your passport is open, but then I don't see the difference between just reading the magnetic ink.
[57:06.600 --> 57:09.960]  It would be a very small Faraday cage on the outside cover of the passport.
[57:10.380 --> 57:10.520]  Great.
[57:10.540 --> 57:12.920]  And then when it's open, you read the RFID chip.
[57:12.980 --> 57:13.240]  Thank you.
[57:13.320 --> 57:13.680]  Thank you.
[57:13.760 --> 57:16.440]  Thank you so much, Jim, for contributing that bit of information.
[57:17.060 --> 57:18.200]  That's our program for tonight.
[57:18.340 --> 57:19.800]  I want to thank everybody for listening, for calling in.
[57:19.940 --> 57:22.700]  Write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[57:23.160 --> 57:23.780]  Tune in next week.
[57:23.860 --> 57:25.620]  See you at the 2600 meeting on Friday.
[57:26.340 --> 57:27.640]  Stay tuned for The Personal Computer Show.
[57:27.720 --> 57:28.800]  I'm Manuel Goldstein for Off the Hook.
[57:29.000 --> 57:29.760]  Have a good night.
[01:00:12.720 --> 01:00:15.340]  I love the talking heads.
[01:00:15.800 --> 01:00:18.520]  Man, Eric, you always have great music.
[01:00:18.660 --> 01:00:19.740]  Great music.
[01:00:19.940 --> 01:00:21.240]  That was fantastic.
[01:00:21.240 --> 01:00:23.720]  All right, it's Wednesday.
[01:00:24.200 --> 01:00:26.820]  Stay tuned for The Personal Computer Show.