[00:00.000 --> 00:03.580] ...at www.fsrn.org. [00:04.020 --> 00:06.440] That's F-S-R-N dot O-R-G. [00:06.720 --> 00:09.840] We welcome your comments, questions, and story ideas. [00:09.840 --> 00:12.740] Just email us at comments at F-S-R-N dot O-R-G. [00:13.060 --> 00:15.960] From KPFK in Los Angeles, this is Our Abogado. [00:20.700 --> 00:23.900] And at WBAI New York, it's 7 o'clock. [00:24.100 --> 00:25.940] Time once again for Off the Hook. [00:33.770 --> 00:35.670] So I ripped it off the wall. [00:36.670 --> 00:38.630] I cut myself while shaving. [00:39.210 --> 00:41.190] Now I can't make a cough. [00:41.950 --> 00:43.950] We couldn't get much worse. [00:44.650 --> 00:46.510] But if they could, they would. [00:46.770 --> 00:49.410] Bum-diddly-bum for the best, expect the worst. [00:50.070 --> 00:51.910] I hope that's understood. [00:52.150 --> 00:52.930] Bum-diddly-bum! [01:48.770 --> 01:49.820] And a good evening to everybody. [01:49.960 --> 01:50.660] The program is Off the Hook. [01:50.760 --> 01:54.820] Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this, the 21st day of February. [01:56.860 --> 02:02.480] I believe it's a day of particular religious ceremony for some people. [02:02.560 --> 02:02.800] Is that right? [02:02.880 --> 02:04.520] A lot of people have really dirty heads today. [02:05.060 --> 02:05.460] Really? [02:05.600 --> 02:05.980] Is that true? [02:06.720 --> 02:08.490] Bernie joins us from down in Philadelphia. [02:08.490 --> 02:09.050] How are you doing? [02:09.700 --> 02:11.940] I am fine in Philadelphia with a clean head. [02:12.230 --> 02:12.820] Good for you. [02:13.800 --> 02:16.020] Then we have Jim over on the other side of the room. [02:16.500 --> 02:19.120] Turned him down because he's going to say something off topic. [02:20.230 --> 02:20.960] Arseny, welcome. [02:21.600 --> 02:22.400] And Redbird. [02:22.610 --> 02:22.930] Good evening. [02:23.380 --> 02:24.730] And special welcome to Mike. [02:25.050 --> 02:26.550] Now I could say something off topic. [02:26.730 --> 02:28.340] And over on the other side of the room is not Kevin. [02:28.740 --> 02:29.000] Hello. [02:29.990 --> 02:32.240] Well, we're back for another hour this week. [02:33.520 --> 02:38.940] And again, we want to continue to thank people for pledging their enormous support during our fundraiser a few weeks ago. [02:39.020 --> 02:40.230] $11,000 in a single hour. [02:40.340 --> 02:41.680] That's something. [02:41.760 --> 02:48.240] And I'm happy to announce also that the robot is halfway through the tremendous task of making all the DVDs that you people pledged for. [02:48.240 --> 02:52.380] So be sure to pay those pledges so that we have some place to send them. [02:54.460 --> 02:54.860] Yes. [02:55.640 --> 02:56.120] Let's see. [02:56.180 --> 02:57.740] We have a couple of interesting stories here. [02:58.900 --> 03:06.860] Apparently, apparently, you know, whenever some new technology comes out, there's somebody out there who's trying to figure out a way to crack the encryption or the copy restrictions. [03:07.000 --> 03:12.340] And apparently that's now happening with HD DVD and Blu-ray technologies and things like that. [03:12.340 --> 03:13.080] Do you guys hear about this? [03:13.240 --> 03:13.400] Yes. [03:13.760 --> 03:14.640] Oh, you all heard about this. [03:14.680 --> 03:17.200] Okay, well, tell us in your own words then. [03:17.220 --> 03:18.140] I won't read from the story. [03:18.340 --> 03:24.220] Well, basically, just like DVDs where there's a sort of encryption so you don't steal the movie, I guess, even though you already bought it. [03:24.520 --> 03:30.180] But what's funny is it took people like two months to crack this, and it took them years to make this. [03:30.180 --> 03:38.320] And the really sad thing is that the way this works is basically it's like every player has this, like, super top-secret code that's hidden somewhere. [03:38.540 --> 03:40.620] And people figure out how to take it out. [03:40.660 --> 03:43.480] But the thing is every single player has that code, has the same code. [03:43.600 --> 03:43.740] Oh. [03:43.940 --> 03:47.020] So, like, you know, once it's broken once, you don't have to break it anymore. [03:47.820 --> 03:49.240] Well, that's how I understand it. [03:49.280 --> 03:50.260] I may be completely wrong. [03:50.480 --> 03:53.960] But it's, like, pretty sad that, you know, it took two months. [03:53.960 --> 04:03.420] Well, according to this story, the hacker, as they're being referred to, discovered a cryptographic key that can be used to circumvent copy restrictions on HD, DVD, Blu-ray movies. [04:04.080 --> 04:08.720] And the key was published if you go to Doom9, doom9.org, discussion forum. [04:08.720 --> 04:09.380] You'll see the key. [04:09.580 --> 04:10.840] It was published on Sunday. [04:11.380 --> 04:13.760] The hacker goes by the name of Amazami. [04:14.160 --> 04:21.040] And he said he discovered the key by examining what was happening in his computer's memory while it processed an HD, DVD video. [04:21.040 --> 04:24.230] And in so doing, how many felonies do you think he committed by doing that? [04:24.710 --> 04:27.680] It's hard to say, where is Amazami located? [04:27.680 --> 04:29.180] I don't think he's going to tell us that. [04:29.180 --> 04:31.860] I can't really guess the ethnicity from the name. [04:31.980 --> 04:39.060] But in late December, a different hacker named Muzlik64 posted a software program that could decrypt high-definition movies. [04:39.210 --> 04:43.740] Users needed to first enter another type of encryption key called the volume key for the software to work. [04:43.880 --> 04:49.240] More than 100 of these volume keys have since popped up, allowing users to freely copy such films as... [04:49.240 --> 04:50.360] Well, it doesn't really matter which films. [04:50.730 --> 04:52.470] I imagine just about any of the films. [04:53.060 --> 04:59.980] But it's interesting because I've been using actually a program recently called... [04:59.980 --> 05:01.260] You know, I forget the name of it. [05:01.420 --> 05:02.230] It's DVD something. [05:02.360 --> 05:02.860] DVD shrink. [05:02.970 --> 05:03.260] Is that it? [05:03.440 --> 05:03.660] Yeah. [05:03.970 --> 05:04.620] It basically... [05:04.620 --> 05:05.260] It makes a copy. [05:05.300 --> 05:05.590] It's amazing. [05:05.680 --> 05:07.680] It makes a copy of your DVD movies. [05:07.850 --> 05:09.850] And it seems to work on just about everything I have. [05:09.970 --> 05:14.620] And the reason for that, I have two locations that I go back and forth between. [05:14.620 --> 05:20.080] And I'd like to have copies of what I have at one location at another location without having to buy the thing twice. [05:20.600 --> 05:24.980] Now, that seems like a legal way of using a program like that. [05:25.620 --> 05:28.560] Having the same person in two different places. [05:28.760 --> 05:32.080] Although I'm sure there are people in the industry who would say that you have to buy the same thing twice. [05:32.240 --> 05:34.880] Well, if you're in both places at the same time, you can't be watching the same DVD. [05:35.220 --> 05:36.620] Well, I never am watching the same DVD. [05:36.660 --> 05:40.060] I just don't want to carry my entire DVD collection with me every time I go someplace. [05:40.540 --> 05:43.520] You know, it's... I'd like to just have them in different places that I go to. [05:43.600 --> 05:44.620] What's more important to you? [05:45.300 --> 05:48.380] Convenience or the rights of the Big Motion Picture Corporation? [05:48.700 --> 05:50.120] Gosh, you know, it's a real toss-up there. [05:50.300 --> 05:51.060] I don't know. [05:51.420 --> 05:58.180] But what's amazing about this DVD shrink program is that it does everything that we were accused of doing back in 2000 with the ECSS. [05:58.440 --> 05:59.720] And that's why we were put on trial. [05:59.900 --> 06:02.560] And now this program is out there doing exactly that. [06:02.740 --> 06:04.580] And the industry is surviving. [06:05.460 --> 06:09.780] Civilization appears to be continuing, limping forward in whatever pathetic manner it does. [06:10.610 --> 06:12.660] And I just wonder, what was all the fuss about? [06:13.100 --> 06:15.080] Obviously, this kind of thing is commonplace. [06:15.200 --> 06:16.880] It's just like the Boston Strangler, you know? [06:17.260 --> 06:17.600] What? [06:17.760 --> 06:19.240] How in God's name is it like that? [06:19.240 --> 06:22.400] The VCR is like the Boston Strangler, according to Jack Valenti. [06:22.540 --> 06:23.340] So is this software. [06:23.440 --> 06:25.080] Just because other people weren't dying. [06:25.480 --> 06:27.960] The victims of the Boston Strangler were dying. [06:28.780 --> 06:29.180] What? [06:29.360 --> 06:31.820] You have one heck of a brain. [06:32.980 --> 06:34.520] You turned off my microphone? [06:35.950 --> 06:37.060] All right, I'll rethink that. [06:37.160 --> 06:38.400] One more thing about this. [06:38.400 --> 06:40.680] It's actually... I was thinking about this before. [06:40.940 --> 06:47.860] And it's interesting because now HD DVD movies or even Blu-ray are popping up on like the torrent sites. [06:48.060 --> 06:51.120] So now you can download this like 30 gigabyte movie. [06:51.420 --> 06:54.660] But it takes you, you know, like a week or something or maybe less. [06:54.840 --> 07:00.400] But I remember back in the day when everyone had dial-up and you would want to download, you know, like a song and it took you a week. [07:00.400 --> 07:03.840] So now it's like, everything's going backwards in time. [07:04.080 --> 07:06.040] Now it takes us a week to download a movie. [07:06.680 --> 07:07.440] Things like that. [07:07.540 --> 07:07.720] Yeah. [07:07.920 --> 07:08.660] Even though we have broadband. [07:10.560 --> 07:10.920] Interesting. [07:11.380 --> 07:13.120] Does anyone even have one of these? [07:13.580 --> 07:15.000] Blu-ray HD DVDs? [07:15.100 --> 07:16.860] I've never even seen one in real life. [07:16.920 --> 07:19.280] I heard of somebody in, I think Wisconsin, who had one. [07:20.600 --> 07:21.380] I'm just saying... [07:21.380 --> 07:22.020] Secondhand I heard of this. [07:22.020 --> 07:25.420] I'm just saying the system has been broken before anyone we know even has one. [07:25.520 --> 07:27.920] I'm sure we're going to get email from all our listeners who have them, but... [07:27.920 --> 07:32.160] It's amazing to me how many people are going out spending huge amounts of money just to sort of keep up. [07:32.780 --> 07:33.560] Isn't that right, Arseny? [07:33.680 --> 07:33.960] Yes. [07:34.240 --> 07:44.060] I should comment that I recently bought an up-converting DVD player thinking that, oh, because I have one of those new fancy HD TVs, and it didn't actually do much. [07:44.480 --> 07:49.600] So as a consumer suggestion, those up-converting DVD players don't really do that much. [07:50.400 --> 07:51.460] And I bought a nice one. [07:52.820 --> 07:58.260] Okay, and also on the subject of figuring things out, this guy went... [07:58.260 --> 08:01.440] A few weeks ago we talked about an auction of voting machines. [08:01.620 --> 08:06.560] And apparently somebody went and bought some voting machines at a similar type of auction over the internet. [08:07.840 --> 08:14.220] An electronic voting critic has managed to purchase five Sequoia electronic voting machines, each worth $5,000. [08:15.100 --> 08:17.320] And he bought them for... how much do you think he bought them for? [08:17.500 --> 08:19.220] Well, if you read the story, don't answer. [08:19.340 --> 08:19.580] Oh. [08:19.800 --> 08:20.520] Come on, Jim. [08:20.580 --> 08:21.580] Is that how you play Jeopardy? [08:21.720 --> 08:24.000] You read the story and look at the answers first? [08:24.500 --> 08:24.740] No. [08:24.900 --> 08:25.120] No. [08:25.780 --> 08:26.380] All right, then. [08:26.680 --> 08:27.540] Anyone else care to guess? [08:27.840 --> 08:28.200] Mike? [08:28.380 --> 08:29.740] I could guess, but I know the answer. [08:30.620 --> 08:31.480] I don't know the answer. [08:31.620 --> 08:31.900] $200. [08:32.460 --> 08:32.830] $82. [08:33.220 --> 08:33.480] $82. [08:33.640 --> 08:33.810] Okay. [08:33.810 --> 08:34.050] Yes. [08:34.180 --> 08:35.240] You were so wrong. [08:36.020 --> 08:45.840] A Princeton computer science professor, Andrew Appel, said his students have begun reverse engineering the software embedded in the machine's ROM chips to determine if it has any security holes. [08:45.840 --> 08:54.620] But Appel says the case with which he and his students opened the machines and removed the chips already demonstrates that the voting machines are vulnerable to unauthorized modification. [08:54.620 --> 09:03.290] Their analysis appears to mark the first time that someone who hasn't signed a non-disclosure agreement with Sequoia Voting Systems has examined one of its machine's internals. [09:03.290 --> 09:13.260] Now, he bought the machines from election officials in Buncombe County, North Carolina, who offered them for sale at GovDeals.com. [09:13.360 --> 09:15.340] G-O-V-D-E-A-L-S.com. [09:15.340 --> 09:16.460] I suggest we all visit there. [09:16.840 --> 09:20.680] That's a site for government agencies to buy and sell surplus and confiscated equipment. [09:21.020 --> 09:25.880] The county sold 144 machines in lots of varying amounts. [09:26.570 --> 09:29.830] It paid $5,200 for each machine in 1997. [09:30.310 --> 09:35.840] And to buy the machines, Appel had to pay $82 and only needed to provide a name, address, phone number, and email address. [09:36.660 --> 09:37.070] Incredible. [09:37.360 --> 09:39.980] And that's not a very long lifespan either for voting machines. [09:40.100 --> 09:42.010] No, I mean, why wouldn't they last a lot longer than that? [09:42.080 --> 09:43.790] They don't really have to be upgraded. [09:43.830 --> 09:45.070] I think they lasted. [09:45.220 --> 09:48.600] I think just that Buncombe County decided that they didn't like the machine. [09:48.720 --> 09:49.440] They had second thoughts. [09:50.960 --> 09:53.080] So yeah, this is from Wired actually. [09:53.340 --> 09:57.960] And it's an incredible story of how somebody can figure things out pretty simply. [09:58.180 --> 09:59.640] And we call on our listeners to do the same thing. [09:59.720 --> 10:01.270] And I think we should be looking into this as well. [10:01.380 --> 10:01.530] Mike? [10:01.700 --> 10:09.120] What will be really interesting to see is if Sequoia sues this county for disclosing its machines to someone who hasn't signed the non-disclosure agreement. [10:09.290 --> 10:09.860] That would be interesting. [10:10.080 --> 10:11.070] But it's out now. [10:11.270 --> 10:11.570] It's out now. [10:11.880 --> 10:13.440] Don't they own the machines at that point though? [10:13.640 --> 10:14.310] I don't know. [10:14.310 --> 10:20.360] I think you still have to sign something even though it seems ridiculous that you would have to sign something to keep it all secret. [10:20.940 --> 10:23.360] But eventually, eventually these things get out of the bag. [10:23.530 --> 10:28.420] Whether it's Blu-ray DVDs or, you know, or voting machines. [10:28.620 --> 10:29.720] You can't keep these things secret. [10:29.940 --> 10:38.270] Did we talk about that thing where Debalt put up their, like, master keys on the internet and then someone took the image and made a copy of it? [10:38.460 --> 10:40.200] It's like a similar thing. [10:40.340 --> 10:40.550] Mm-hmm. [10:40.980 --> 10:41.860] Yeah, that was years ago. [10:41.920 --> 10:42.310] Bernie, yes? [10:42.310 --> 10:54.580] No, this was the master keys of the, actually, a photograph image on their site where you could buy a set of keys to open the machine if you were an authorized buyer. [10:54.920 --> 11:06.920] But a user or someone, a good hacker and a lock picker, saw the pictures of the keys and it was such a good picture that they were able to cut duplicate keys based on the photo on the website. [11:07.060 --> 11:09.820] And they opened up the voting machines. [11:11.040 --> 11:11.400] Wow. [11:12.620 --> 11:12.980] Incredible. [11:14.300 --> 11:15.660] Okay, what else do we have here? [11:15.860 --> 11:18.160] Some good news, actually, out of New York City. [11:18.400 --> 11:18.420] No. [11:18.420 --> 11:19.320] Yeah, it happens occasionally. [11:20.290 --> 11:25.770] A rebuke of a surveillance practice greatly expanded by the NYPD after the September 11th attacks. [11:25.900 --> 11:26.980] You know what we're all talking about here. [11:27.990 --> 11:35.100] Videotaping of people as they stand in streets or protest or participate in a demonstration or whatever. [11:35.120 --> 11:39.510] We've seen this many, many times if we walk down the streets of New York during any of these demonstrations. [11:39.510 --> 11:47.400] Federal judge has ruled that police must stop the routine videotaping of these people unless there's an indication that unlawful activity may occur. [11:49.640 --> 11:52.320] So, basically, what do you think, Mike? [11:52.400 --> 11:54.010] This is something, a good step forward? [11:54.420 --> 11:58.080] If the police actually follow the law, which, who knows? [11:58.220 --> 12:00.180] They don't have a great track record on that. [12:00.600 --> 12:06.200] But if the police actually stop videotaping innocent people at demonstrations, that will be a good step forward. [12:06.200 --> 12:13.840] Yeah, it's really kind of disconcerting when you're standing there and this guy just has a video camera in your face. [12:13.920 --> 12:14.960] Well, what are they going to do with the videotape? [12:15.040 --> 12:18.200] Are they matching faces and keeping logs of everybody? [12:18.900 --> 12:22.820] And maybe, like, three or four cops per block were just videotaping the crowds. [12:22.860 --> 12:28.960] And this was at web demonstrations or anti-WTO things or even the Republican convention. [12:29.540 --> 12:31.560] All over the place, cops with cameras. [12:31.840 --> 12:35.480] Well, isn't this the excuse they used to actually start videotaping in the first place? [12:35.480 --> 12:38.010] So wouldn't this not do anything at all? [12:38.140 --> 12:38.720] What was the excuse? [12:39.180 --> 12:46.440] Well, I read the article and it said something about they only videotape if they think there's some violent crimes going to happen. [12:47.340 --> 12:54.510] Well, apparently, they've been doing this without any such evidence that a violent crime was anywhere anticipated. [12:55.900 --> 13:00.440] I mean, these are the two cases that started this whole thing. [13:00.620 --> 13:05.060] One was a march in Harlem and a demonstration by homeless people in front of Bloomberg's house. [13:05.060 --> 13:10.320] And the judge said the city offered scant justification for videotaping the people involved. [13:10.460 --> 13:13.860] So, apparently, they may have said so, but they didn't offer any evidence. [13:14.040 --> 13:29.360] There's no reason to suspect or anticipate that unlawful or terrorist activity might occur, the judge said, or that pertinent information about or evidence of such activity might be obtained by filming the earnest faces of those concerned citizens and the signs by which they hope to convey their message to a public official. [13:29.540 --> 13:36.440] What's really amazing is that the police have procedures for deciding whether or not it's appropriate to tape a demonstration. [13:36.620 --> 13:38.040] They don't follow their own procedures. [13:38.290 --> 13:47.960] So even in cases where the judge agrees with the police department that it was justified to tape the people, they didn't follow their own procedures to make that determination. [13:47.960 --> 13:51.660] They just sort of brought out the video cameras and started filming. [13:52.030 --> 13:52.180] Mm-hmm. [13:52.420 --> 13:55.900] It seems kind of weird, too, that they even need to do this today. [13:56.030 --> 13:58.040] Aren't we always on camera anyway from somewhere? [13:58.460 --> 14:04.680] Wouldn't they just have to set up a permanent camera on all the streets in front of various buildings and it would capture everybody's face anyway? [14:04.940 --> 14:07.320] I mean, if this were England, they wouldn't have to do that. [14:07.320 --> 14:11.220] Well, we're moving in that direction, but apparently the police feel we're not there yet. [14:11.660 --> 14:13.340] We need to move a little faster in that direction. [14:14.030 --> 14:14.540] Emmanuel? [14:14.720 --> 14:15.200] Yes, go ahead, Bernie. [14:15.790 --> 14:38.640] I wonder, since there seems to be no repercussions for police doing this, what it would take for people to carry around some fairly powerful magnetic tape bulk erasers hooked up to some fairly sizable portable power supply that would generate enough current that they could just... while the policeman was videotaping, [14:38.940 --> 14:44.660] someone could just hold up the bulk eraser to where the tape is and just erase the tape. [14:45.100 --> 14:46.840] I'm sure that that would be illegal. [14:47.400 --> 14:47.860] Why? [14:48.160 --> 14:51.010] Well, because you probably... the policemen have metal on them. [14:51.080 --> 14:53.580] You'd probably pull the policemen towards you and that would be assault. [14:53.920 --> 15:00.140] No, this is something you just use to erase videotapes in the consumer area. [15:00.140 --> 15:04.720] This isn't something to be strong enough to attract... [15:05.340 --> 15:10.920] It wouldn't be moving the police officer or the camcorder, but it would be enough to corrupt the tape. [15:11.120 --> 15:12.720] Wouldn't that be destroying police property? [15:12.790 --> 15:13.160] Yes. [15:13.300 --> 15:15.220] No, because the tape is intact. [15:16.160 --> 15:17.800] Well, you're destroying evidence. [15:17.980 --> 15:21.510] This is further reasons, Bernie, why I'm never going to hire you as my lawyer. [15:21.510 --> 15:21.560] Yeah. [15:23.840 --> 15:24.480] Wow. [15:25.270 --> 15:25.790] Okay. [15:25.840 --> 15:35.530] Speaking of tracking people down, we go again to our friends over in the UK where they're trying a new tack. [15:35.700 --> 15:39.160] They're actually looking at people's footprints. [15:39.580 --> 15:40.440] Yeah, that's right. [15:40.980 --> 15:54.100] Apparently, the brand of shoe you're wearing, the scuffs and damage your shoes have suffered, the way you've worn them down in particular places, it all makes that particular footprint identifiable as yours and can place you at the scene of a crime. [15:54.100 --> 15:55.060] That's according to experts. [15:55.320 --> 16:03.530] And that's why for years detectives have sought footwear imprints, the second most common evidence type left at crime scenes that can be analyzed against the shoe of a suspect. [16:03.770 --> 16:10.160] Under new laws, those prints can be taken from suspects who pass through custody even if they have not been charged. [16:12.060 --> 16:16.880] So, I imagine it's a lot easier to get somebody's footprint than it is to get their fingerprint without their knowledge. [16:17.080 --> 16:21.560] This is why, after every crime, I take my ill-gotten gains and buy a new pair of shoes. [16:22.040 --> 16:25.530] Well, yeah, but they still have your old pair of shoes in their database. [16:25.820 --> 16:26.160] Right. [16:26.440 --> 16:26.980] They know it matches to you. [16:27.080 --> 16:28.290] But I've thrown them out. [16:28.750 --> 16:30.740] Maybe you should commit all your crimes barefoot. [16:30.920 --> 16:31.740] Ah, that's a good idea. [16:31.860 --> 16:34.770] Also clear the room and you have a lot easier way to get away. [16:34.770 --> 16:37.340] But then they'll start taking my toe prints. [16:37.980 --> 16:40.340] Couldn't you go to a second-hand store and just buy a pair of shoes? [16:40.840 --> 16:44.140] I would imagine so, but then you're logged for doing that. [16:44.240 --> 16:46.010] And that's suspicious purchase right there. [16:46.300 --> 16:48.770] What if two people have the same brand of shoes? [16:49.010 --> 16:52.160] Ah, well, we just mentioned that scuffs, damage, everybody's unique. [16:52.980 --> 16:53.440] Everybody's unique. [16:53.440 --> 16:57.010] What if two people both have brand new copies of the same brand of shoes? [16:57.030 --> 17:01.030] As soon as you start walking, you're getting unique bits of damage. [17:01.620 --> 17:02.380] I guess. [17:03.080 --> 17:10.340] Anyway, the launch by the Forensic Science Service of its new Footwear Intelligence Technology, FIT system. [17:10.990 --> 17:13.580] The data will be accessible to all police forces online. [17:13.580 --> 17:18.480] One part will contain about 13,000 images of the shoe print types most commonly found at crime scenes. [17:19.100 --> 17:19.980] Lots of... [17:19.980 --> 17:24.100] Isn't that kind of unfair to particular shoes to say that they're commonly seen at crime sites? [17:24.100 --> 17:24.980] I want that list. [17:24.980 --> 17:25.290] Yeah. [17:26.010 --> 17:28.360] Lots of training shoes, but not many stilettos. [17:28.860 --> 17:29.040] Yeah. [17:29.770 --> 17:34.060] Officers can then use those as an online reference library to match it to the type they have found. [17:34.540 --> 17:43.040] Secondly, police can enter footwear prints and other details from the particular crime scene they are investigating to help with the linking of different offenses by the same person. [17:43.180 --> 17:44.920] Many criminals will commit different burglaries. [17:44.980 --> 17:46.720] They say, for example, wearing the same shoes. [17:46.880 --> 17:49.880] They might have a specific pair of shoes they burgle in. [17:50.840 --> 17:51.240] What... [17:51.240 --> 17:52.580] How dumb do you have to be? [17:52.880 --> 17:54.660] To say, oh, I've got to commit a crime. [17:54.740 --> 17:55.880] Let me put on my crime shoes. [17:56.140 --> 17:57.700] Well, this is obviously a conspiracy. [17:58.060 --> 17:59.340] Can't you see right through it? [17:59.800 --> 18:01.980] FIT, fashion industry tracking. [18:02.400 --> 18:07.080] Obviously, this is just some big research thing, you know, and they're trying to figure out what shoes to sell to who. [18:08.560 --> 18:13.660] Anyway, after the imprint is collected by a crime scene investigator, a forensic process is followed. [18:13.660 --> 18:25.380] Looking at the pattern, size, wear, and damage features, investigators can detect prints invisible to the naked eye by using similar methods to those employed to discover fingerprints, such as using powder and special lighting. [18:25.580 --> 18:30.700] It's not straightforward, they say, at least because the print from a particular shoe can change over time. [18:30.800 --> 18:36.300] And that's why examination of prints at crime scenes against someone's shoe is a complex subject because there are so many factors. [18:36.420 --> 18:38.840] A fingerprint won't change, but a shoe can. [18:39.060 --> 18:43.100] What you need are enough features, such as damage features, to satisfy a scientist. [18:43.100 --> 18:54.660] Now, of course, civil liberty campaigners have long objected to the taking and holding of data beyond the immediate aim of detecting crime, saying they have concerns over how such information is held and potentially used by other agencies. [18:54.820 --> 19:01.600] But the FSS's footwear team say the arguments deployed against ID cards do not apply to this new database. [19:01.740 --> 19:05.600] What we have here is, on the one hand, a reference collection of shoe types. [19:05.600 --> 19:07.380] It's not every single person's shoe print. [19:07.540 --> 19:11.520] For the scene of crime and suspect database, we would enter data from people's actual shoes. [19:11.940 --> 19:14.460] It's not a national database in the way we have one for DNA. [19:14.800 --> 19:16.120] And they do have one for DNA. [19:16.740 --> 19:19.820] It's up to individual forces that they want to use a system. [19:20.720 --> 19:24.500] But what if an innocent person happens to have a similar shoe to a serial burglar? [19:25.180 --> 19:27.800] FIT is not something that is to be put before a jury. [19:27.800 --> 19:31.220] It is a place to store data about crime scenes. [19:31.940 --> 19:40.000] To get that evidence, we would need to seize the shoe, do a detailed examination of it, comparing it with the crime scene mark, and then present the evidence to the court. [19:40.200 --> 19:43.020] And that examination will be done by a forensic expert. [19:44.900 --> 19:47.460] No system that relies on expert analysis is perfect. [19:47.460 --> 19:56.280] However, just one example, get this, was the freeing from prison in 2004 of a man convicted of murder on the basis of his blank. [19:57.920 --> 19:58.840] Fill in the words. [19:59.640 --> 20:00.100] Skull. [20:00.340 --> 20:00.680] No. [20:00.920 --> 20:01.480] Close though. [20:02.240 --> 20:02.560] Socks. [20:03.140 --> 20:04.100] Sorry, go ahead, Bernie. [20:04.760 --> 20:05.280] Shoesize. [20:05.340 --> 20:05.540] No. [20:06.300 --> 20:06.560] You ready? [20:06.740 --> 20:07.920] Skull is close, huh? [20:08.060 --> 20:08.560] Earprint. [20:08.920 --> 20:09.440] Earprint? [20:09.620 --> 20:10.460] Yeah, earprint. [20:11.300 --> 20:20.440] Experts claim Mark Dallager had left his unique earprint on the window of his victim's house, but later a DNA profile obtained from the print proved that it was not his. [20:21.400 --> 20:22.420] Somebody else's ear. [20:22.600 --> 20:25.500] So we see the flaws that are inherent in the systems like this. [20:25.780 --> 20:27.480] He just said it was his and then said it wasn't his. [20:27.740 --> 20:27.760] It's unique. [20:28.800 --> 20:31.440] It's why the Bertillion system isn't used anymore. [20:31.440 --> 20:48.480] That was a system of the roughly 1870s to 1900s where you would take measurements of the criminal's height, weight, distance of his, you know, his elbow to his middle finger, his distance between his eyes and such. [20:48.480 --> 20:52.020] And supposedly this was a unique identifier, except it wasn't. [20:52.300 --> 20:54.040] And photographs proved that after a while. [20:54.420 --> 20:56.580] Why was I handed this note saying people are calling the pledge line? [20:56.800 --> 21:02.360] I think we're supposed to thank them for their support, but advise them that calling the pledge line won't accomplish very much this week. [21:02.360 --> 21:03.160] Did I ask them to call the pledge line? [21:03.380 --> 21:03.680] No. [21:03.680 --> 21:04.960] Did I imply that you called the pledge line? [21:05.040 --> 21:05.800] The pledge drive is over. [21:06.080 --> 21:06.160] No, yes. [21:06.160 --> 21:09.600] I mean, you can still donate to the radio station online at WBAI.org. [21:09.700 --> 21:13.940] But no, call us on the on-air studio and talk to us. [21:14.000 --> 21:16.760] We'll be taking phone calls in just a few minutes, 212-209-2900. [21:16.760 --> 21:19.300] I'd like to have more phone calls this week because we didn't have very many last week. [21:19.620 --> 21:21.320] And the ones we had were kind of crazy. [21:22.080 --> 21:22.400] So... [21:22.400 --> 21:22.840] That's not nice. [21:22.840 --> 21:24.060] That's not nice. [21:24.060 --> 21:26.820] Well, no, I'm saying we had people who didn't say anything. [21:26.820 --> 21:27.900] We had dial tones. [21:28.000 --> 21:28.700] We had silence. [21:29.040 --> 21:29.340] All right. [21:29.400 --> 21:30.560] The calls were peculiar, but not crazy. [21:30.560 --> 21:31.800] We had people who were completely off topic. [21:32.100 --> 21:32.980] Yeah, you're right about that. [21:33.160 --> 21:34.100] Kind of... [21:34.100 --> 21:35.000] It's not the same as crazy. [21:35.480 --> 21:35.880] It's... [21:35.880 --> 21:36.480] Well, it depends. [21:36.580 --> 21:38.160] Crazy is a word you can define in many different ways. [21:38.340 --> 21:38.980] Okay, that's true. [21:39.220 --> 21:39.380] Yeah. [21:39.440 --> 21:40.260] It's a crazy kind of word. [21:40.400 --> 21:41.040] I have an update. [21:41.280 --> 21:41.840] Go ahead. [21:42.360 --> 21:44.760] We discussed this around November of last year. [21:44.900 --> 21:50.780] Belgium was suing Google because Google was just linking to articles in Belgian newspapers. [21:51.900 --> 21:52.300] Well... [21:52.300 --> 21:52.740] Not Belgium. [21:52.740 --> 21:54.020] Belgium wasn't suing Google. [21:54.200 --> 21:55.360] Belgian corporations were suing them. [21:55.360 --> 21:55.780] I'm sorry. [21:55.960 --> 21:56.200] You're right. [21:56.980 --> 21:57.660] You are... [21:57.660 --> 21:58.460] Thank you for correcting me. [21:59.240 --> 22:01.180] It turns out Google has lost. [22:01.180 --> 22:05.700] It will not be allowed to just link to articles in Belgium. [22:06.320 --> 22:13.580] And as long as it does, it will be fined $32,000 a day or 25,000 euros actually. [22:14.340 --> 22:18.260] This is less than the supposed fine of 1 million euros a day. [22:18.500 --> 22:21.860] But it will change the way that Google operates in Belgium. [22:21.860 --> 22:23.800] It kind of defeats the purpose of search engines too. [22:23.900 --> 22:24.200] Yeah. [22:24.420 --> 22:28.220] Is Google.be the same one that had the pages and pages of legal text? [22:28.400 --> 22:28.700] Right. [22:29.080 --> 22:29.920] That was this case. [22:30.080 --> 22:31.720] But the legal text has gone away. [22:31.880 --> 22:32.240] Has it? [22:32.320 --> 22:32.460] Okay. [22:32.520 --> 22:32.680] Yeah. [22:33.120 --> 22:34.400] Well, that was fun while it lasted. [22:35.880 --> 22:36.420] All right. [22:36.540 --> 22:40.700] A couple other news items here and then maybe we'll go to the phones. [22:41.560 --> 22:42.540] How do you think of this story? [22:42.640 --> 22:43.160] Did you hear about this? [22:43.560 --> 22:48.280] This guy was fired by IBM for visiting an adult chat room during the work day. [22:48.280 --> 22:57.660] He's suing the company for $5 million, claiming he is an internet addict who deserves treatment and sympathy rather than dismissal. [23:00.020 --> 23:00.900] He visits... [23:00.900 --> 23:01.000] He visits... [23:01.000 --> 23:11.520] This guy, James Passenza, upstate Montgomery, New York, says he visits chat rooms as treatment for traumatic stress incurred in 1969 when he saw his best friend killed during an army patrol in Vietnam. [23:11.660 --> 23:13.600] You know, whenever you're in doubt, always bring up Vietnam. [23:13.780 --> 23:15.540] That gets you a free pass just about anything. [23:16.240 --> 23:25.680] In papers filed in federal court in White Plains, Passenza said the stress caused him to become a sex addict and with the development of the internet, an internet addict. [23:25.780 --> 23:28.000] Can you imagine what the people in Iraq are going to become when they come back? [23:28.160 --> 23:29.460] You know, what kind of addicts are they going to be? [23:29.740 --> 23:33.260] Anyway, he claimed protection under the American with Disabilities Act. [23:34.980 --> 23:42.300] His lawyer says he never visited pornographic sites at work, violated no written IBM rule, and did not surf the internet any more or any differently than any other employees. [23:42.300 --> 23:46.480] He also says age discrimination contributed to IBM's actions. [23:46.920 --> 23:48.400] He was 55 at the time. [23:48.540 --> 23:51.940] He had 19 years of IBM service and said he could have retired in one more year. [23:52.700 --> 23:59.260] IBM has asked Judge Steven Robinson for a summary judgment, saying its policy against surfing to sexual sites is clear. [23:59.820 --> 24:05.860] It also claims that Passenza was told he could lose his job after an incident four months earlier, which he denies. [24:06.520 --> 24:15.060] They say he was discharged by IBM because he visited an internet chat room for a sexual experience during work after he had been previously warned. [24:15.320 --> 24:16.560] All right, what's the verdict, guys? [24:16.880 --> 24:21.180] What did he do between 1969 and the rise of the internet? [24:21.480 --> 24:24.960] Did this not manifest itself until chat rooms were prevalent? [24:25.320 --> 24:28.020] I mean, that's the question that needs to be raised here. [24:28.240 --> 24:29.440] I would have fired him too. [24:29.820 --> 24:30.040] Fired? [24:30.260 --> 24:30.680] Yes. [24:31.180 --> 24:32.900] Well, there's an interesting question. [24:33.180 --> 24:38.900] I mean, these corporations do tend to find ways of firing people a year before they can take retirement. [24:41.540 --> 24:42.680] It's not possible that he was targeted. [24:42.980 --> 24:48.180] However, from all the other information we have, it sounds like he was not quite behaving appropriately. [24:48.520 --> 24:51.660] I'm not what you would call somebody who's comfortable in an office environment. [24:51.900 --> 24:52.280] All right. [24:52.420 --> 24:53.740] And that's a mutual feeling. [24:54.080 --> 25:01.820] But one thing I do know is that when you are in such an environment as somebody's employee, you really should be focused on what you're doing. [25:02.180 --> 25:13.920] And, I mean, not sending emails that could come back to haunt you, not having chats with people all over the world for any purpose, really, because that's not what work is all about anyway. [25:14.120 --> 25:21.340] And certainly not relieving your sexual desires by visiting either websites or chat rooms. [25:23.040 --> 25:24.240] You know, it just seems like... [25:24.240 --> 25:26.140] Why is everybody so surprised by this? [25:26.240 --> 25:29.220] Yeah, if somebody does something like that, you find... [25:29.220 --> 25:31.160] I mean, what I'm sort of not... [25:31.160 --> 25:36.900] What I am also surprised at is that they're not trying to sentence him to jail for 60 years for doing something like that. [25:37.040 --> 25:41.480] In this country these days, it seems like there's that kind of penalty attached to these sort of things. [25:41.500 --> 25:42.520] Well, he didn't do anything illegal. [25:42.520 --> 25:43.060] Oh, it's true. [25:43.540 --> 25:46.540] I didn't say you had to do anything illegal to be sentenced to jail these days. [25:46.920 --> 25:47.280] But... [25:47.280 --> 25:48.380] Excuse me. [25:48.500 --> 25:54.060] Wouldn't this be a matter of what's in the employee handbook and what the employee agreed... [25:54.060 --> 25:58.860] what policies the employee agreed to follow? [25:59.060 --> 26:11.460] I mean, if it says in the employee handbook they shouldn't be using their computers for non-business purposes, and they did, then it's a simple matter of contract law, not whether he's an addict for, you know, sexy chat rooms or anything. [26:11.460 --> 26:12.940] How about this as a compromise? [26:13.160 --> 26:14.340] You bring your laptop, right? [26:14.440 --> 26:24.460] You tie into the wireless network, and you use an encrypted session to log on to any chat rooms you want, and they'll never see what you're doing unless they look over your shoulders. [26:25.220 --> 26:28.960] And that's for the people who really feel that they have the time to goof off at work. [26:29.160 --> 26:30.780] Yeah, but there's still policies against that kind of stuff. [26:30.780 --> 26:33.240] No, there's policies against it, but at least there won't be records of it. [26:33.420 --> 26:33.640] Yeah. [26:34.360 --> 26:36.360] I don't know, I'm just trying to help these people out. [26:36.360 --> 26:38.560] There's a common sense factor involved too, but... [26:40.720 --> 26:42.960] Anyway, that's a story from there. [26:43.040 --> 26:44.680] See how that particular case goes. [26:45.180 --> 26:48.660] Something a little bit more interesting. [26:49.000 --> 26:55.340] No charges will be filed against an eight-year-old Wisconsin girl who made more than 100 prank calls to emergency operators last week. [26:55.800 --> 26:56.880] Eight years old. [26:57.320 --> 27:08.820] Lieutenant Jim Risseau of the Sheboygan County Wisconsin Sheriff's Department said the unidentified girl was traced with the help of AT&T and TrackPhone, which identified the phone's owner as the girl's mother. [27:09.120 --> 27:15.900] The woman had stopped using the phone, but all cell phones can call 911 even if they don't have active service. [27:16.240 --> 27:16.540] It's true. [27:17.580 --> 27:24.440] Risseau said the third grader identified herself to dispatchers as Matthew when she made the calls. [27:24.640 --> 27:25.180] Pretty clever. [27:25.440 --> 27:28.100] Some of which contain profanities, the report said. [27:28.600 --> 27:30.540] Wow, profanities from a third grader. [27:30.540 --> 27:34.100] However, he said because of her age, she won't be charged. [27:34.240 --> 27:35.740] At this point, the matter was corrected. [27:36.140 --> 27:38.040] We'll leave it for the parents to deal with. [27:38.100 --> 27:38.720] I'm shocked. [27:38.900 --> 27:45.120] I'm shocked that this hasn't turned into a big major issue with, well, newspaper stories, but okay, we have those. [27:45.240 --> 27:48.460] But no trials, no prison terms, nothing like that. [27:48.580 --> 27:50.920] This is why I like the great American Midwest. [27:51.240 --> 27:56.940] There are people who are actually responsible and sane out there, namely the police. [27:57.140 --> 27:58.200] You think that wouldn't have happened here? [27:58.740 --> 28:01.620] Oh, no, this kid would have been taken away from the parents. [28:01.620 --> 28:03.980] The parents would have been called as unfit. [28:04.080 --> 28:05.240] The kid would have been incorrigible. [28:05.400 --> 28:06.780] I could see disaster left and right. [28:06.880 --> 28:07.440] I'm not sure. [28:07.600 --> 28:08.760] But, you know, there's one way to find out. [28:08.840 --> 28:10.320] We do have a sizable eight-year-old audience. [28:11.660 --> 28:12.600] And I'm just saying... [28:12.600 --> 28:14.380] This is what got soupy sales off the air. [28:14.380 --> 28:21.260] I'm just saying you're not going to do any hard time, you know, because seriously, under 18, let alone under eight. [28:22.180 --> 28:23.360] Try it out a couple of times. [28:23.640 --> 28:25.040] See how the press treats it here. [28:25.120 --> 28:26.820] I'm just, you know, we'd like to know. [28:26.980 --> 28:28.760] You're going to be no longer the host of this show. [28:28.880 --> 28:29.660] I can see it now. [28:30.020 --> 28:34.240] What, for encouraging eight-year-olds to use obscenities and change their sex on calls to 911? [28:34.240 --> 28:34.740] And call 911. [28:35.100 --> 28:37.140] I'm not really, you know, encouraging people to do that. [28:37.220 --> 28:40.980] As long as they don't call us and use obscenities, because that would cause all kinds of problems. [28:41.000 --> 28:42.080] Yeah, that's all sorts of other issues right there. [28:42.080 --> 28:45.160] Could anybody possibly be confused by an eight-year-old female voice? [28:45.380 --> 28:46.160] I mean... [28:46.160 --> 28:46.660] Well, yeah. [28:46.780 --> 28:49.280] I imagine eight-year-old male voices haven't changed yet either. [28:49.380 --> 28:50.220] They kind of sound the same. [28:50.640 --> 28:51.000] Well... [28:52.160 --> 28:54.580] I'm sure we'll find out when the court papers come in. [28:56.420 --> 28:59.300] Also, this is an interesting case that I just heard about too. [28:59.320 --> 29:01.560] A Bartow County couple. [29:01.900 --> 29:03.080] Where's Bartow County? [29:03.710 --> 29:04.880] Well, I guess it's California. [29:05.500 --> 29:06.380] No, there's a map. [29:06.440 --> 29:06.920] Oh, Georgia. [29:07.100 --> 29:07.780] Okay, there it is. [29:07.880 --> 29:08.320] There's a map. [29:08.480 --> 29:13.520] People send us stories and they don't always say where they are, because they're stories for the people who already live there. [29:14.260 --> 29:27.440] A Bartow County couple will go before a magistrate judge to see if they will be arrested for allegedly stalking a Kennesaw police officer by installing cameras to track neighborhood speeders. [29:27.680 --> 29:33.900] Lee and Teresa Sipel spent $1,200 mounting three video cameras and a radar speed unit outside their home. [29:33.960 --> 29:35.080] I didn't know you could even do this. [29:35.280 --> 29:40.420] They can do this outside their own home, mounting speed tracking equipment and video cameras. [29:41.080 --> 29:42.300] They're at the bottom of a hill. [29:42.440 --> 29:49.120] They said they did this in hopes of convincing neighbors to slow down to create a safe environment for their son. [29:49.340 --> 29:51.020] Not quite sure I understand though. [29:51.400 --> 29:55.620] Okay, you're speeding down the hill and the Sipels catch you. [29:55.760 --> 29:56.480] What happens then? [29:56.480 --> 29:58.140] They can't give you a ticket, can they? [29:58.240 --> 29:59.200] They can shame you. [29:59.580 --> 29:59.940] Maybe. [30:00.120 --> 30:01.860] They can post your name on a neon sign or something. [30:01.860 --> 30:11.320] Anyway, the Sipels allegedly caught Kennesaw police officer Richard Perrone, that's P-E-R-R-O-N-E, speeding up to 17 miles per hour over the speed limit. [30:11.600 --> 30:20.820] Perrone alerted Bartow authorities who in turn visited the Sipels home to tell them Perrone, that's again with two R's, intended to press charges against them for stalking. [30:21.000 --> 30:22.140] Oh, this is insane. [30:22.300 --> 30:22.460] Yeah. [30:22.740 --> 30:27.220] So apparently police officers are above the law as far as speeding down hills go. [30:27.220 --> 30:30.360] And if you try to call them on it, they will come after you. [30:30.640 --> 30:31.920] There is an update to this story. [30:32.020 --> 30:32.580] Okay, what's the update? [30:32.720 --> 30:40.760] The update is that apparently after being shamed in the local and national press, Officer Perrone decided not to press the stalking charges. [30:41.020 --> 30:47.520] Well, gee, this shows what the power of persuasion can do in the court of public opinion. [30:47.660 --> 30:49.860] Could you imagine being that family getting a ticket in that town? [30:50.340 --> 30:54.040] Well, I mean, now they're gonna have dirty looks from cops all the time. [30:54.040 --> 30:59.560] And, you know, they're the ones being stalked, I think, you know, when someone comes after them for that. [30:59.640 --> 31:00.780] But I think it's a clever idea. [31:00.980 --> 31:01.780] I appreciate it. [31:02.900 --> 31:05.560] It's basically the same thing as the authorities doing it. [31:05.640 --> 31:08.560] I mean, if they can do it, then yeah, I guess citizens can do it as well. [31:08.780 --> 31:13.480] I'm not too crazy about being on camera and being monitored all the time, but it's no worse, that's for sure. [31:15.100 --> 31:19.760] Okay, we have something else which is sort of scary as well. [31:20.740 --> 31:22.560] And where does this actually come from? [31:22.560 --> 31:23.780] You know, someone sent this to us. [31:23.880 --> 31:24.800] I think it's... [31:24.800 --> 31:25.880] Yeah, it's the UK again. [31:25.880 --> 31:26.620] Of course, it's the UK. [31:26.940 --> 31:29.080] It's called Pay As You Drive Insurance. [31:29.240 --> 31:29.900] You hear about this? [31:30.480 --> 31:40.440] Pay As You Drive Insurance is a revolutionary new type of car insurance, which enables us, reading from their webpage, to provide cover that's as individual as you are. [31:40.440 --> 31:53.160] Using the latest GPS, that's Global Positioning System technology, we are able to calculate monthly insurance premiums based on how often, when, and where you drive. [31:53.340 --> 31:59.060] Which means, your monthly premiums are based on your individual driving habits, and not everyone else's. [31:59.200 --> 32:05.440] So, Pay As You Drive insurance could offer you a fairer deal, and give you increased control of your premiums. [32:05.440 --> 32:12.400] With Pay As You Drive insurance, not only do you have increased control of your premiums, you also benefit from a range of other in-car features. [32:12.400 --> 32:13.220] Who wants to guess? [32:13.580 --> 32:27.380] This includes round-the-clock access to a personal assistant via your in-car assistance button, who can provide you with help and support in the event of an accident or breakdown, a free 30-day trial of satellite navigation, and a free 30-day trial of speed camera detection. [32:27.980 --> 32:29.080] Speed camera detection. [32:35.440 --> 32:42.500] If you're ever on the run from the police, good luck getting away from them, or if you're being tracked by undercover agents or anything like that. [32:42.940 --> 32:44.680] Bernie, is this as scary as it sounds? [32:45.360 --> 32:48.700] It is, but I think there's a solution to this. [32:48.880 --> 32:57.180] If someone were a clever enough programmer, they could write some code for a GPS spoofer. [32:57.180 --> 33:08.760] It would spoof the GPS receiver in your car into reporting inaccurate speeds and locations and all that sort of thing. [33:08.840 --> 33:16.440] This is commonly done in military countermeasures, but I think it should be applied down to the consumer level now. [33:16.600 --> 33:22.940] If we're going to be spied on, we should be able to tell our own GPS receivers whatever we want to tell them. [33:22.940 --> 33:30.400] That's actually probably pretty easy to do because it's most likely just a standard NMEA serial feed, and intercepting that probably isn't so good. [33:30.400 --> 33:31.000] A standard what? [33:31.280 --> 33:36.100] Well, the standard GPS data is usually in NMEA format. [33:36.320 --> 33:37.040] Which means what? [33:37.220 --> 33:42.700] It's just a standard that's used for the GPS data that's generally sent to whatever computer. [33:42.880 --> 33:45.340] And it's just a very common standard that's almost always used. [33:45.340 --> 33:53.000] And it would probably be easy if you had access to the device, which, presuming it's your own car, you do, to do exactly what Bernie just said. [33:53.160 --> 34:00.700] And it's probably as illegal as messing with Blu-ray technology and figuring out how to copy things, but it doesn't mean people shouldn't try anyway. [34:00.840 --> 34:01.800] I disagree slightly. [34:01.900 --> 34:03.440] You're volunteering for this. [34:03.540 --> 34:06.440] It's not quite like the police or the government is watching you. [34:06.620 --> 34:10.500] And in fact, I can see an expansion of this that could be quite useful. [34:10.500 --> 34:10.580] Wonderful. [34:10.760 --> 34:15.980] Suppose you're the little old lady from Pasadena and you drive your car around Pasadena, never go above 30. [34:16.580 --> 34:17.020] Wonderful. [34:17.220 --> 34:17.980] Your rates are low. [34:18.000 --> 34:35.280] But when your grandson grabs the car and decides to go into Compton to get some blow and ghost ride the whip, okay, all of a sudden, not only could the insurance go up, but they might be smart enough to, you know, have insurance, life insurance for the kid who's obviously going to get off by the Crips or the Bloods. [34:36.180 --> 34:38.260] I could see a lot of possibilities with this. [34:39.460 --> 34:41.390] Yeah, you certainly welcome me up to them. [34:42.660 --> 34:42.980] Incredible. [34:44.430 --> 34:46.660] Yeah, well, I think this is going to become a lot more common. [34:47.350 --> 34:53.390] We laugh about it now, but the day is going to come, mark my words, where we're being tracked at all times in our cars and it'll be for our own good. [34:53.640 --> 34:56.870] And we won't think twice about having it any other way. [34:57.620 --> 34:58.140] Think I'm wrong? [34:58.680 --> 34:59.000] No. [34:59.300 --> 35:00.000] Want to make it interesting? [35:00.140 --> 35:00.740] Put some money on this? [35:00.890 --> 35:01.660] I agree with you. [35:01.760 --> 35:02.060] All right. [35:02.220 --> 35:02.580] All right. [35:04.080 --> 35:04.580] All right. [35:06.290 --> 35:08.180] Announcement and then we'll take a couple of phone calls. [35:08.260 --> 35:10.020] Well, then Kevin has a little item. [35:10.240 --> 35:10.640] Oh, okay. [35:10.780 --> 35:11.200] What's the item? [35:11.380 --> 35:11.540] Go ahead. [35:11.940 --> 35:14.680] Robert Elder died today, inventor of the TV remote. [35:15.260 --> 35:15.880] Inventor of the TV? [35:16.000 --> 35:17.120] I thought he already died. [35:17.280 --> 35:18.340] Well, he actually already died. [35:18.480 --> 35:20.040] It's a few days late, but he's reading it. [35:20.320 --> 35:20.660] Okay. [35:21.060 --> 35:22.320] So he died a few days ago. [35:22.460 --> 35:23.100] A few days ago. [35:23.180 --> 35:23.450] All right. [35:24.450 --> 35:24.740] All right. [35:25.160 --> 35:26.700] Maybe there could be two remote inventors. [35:26.760 --> 35:27.080] Who knows? [35:27.360 --> 35:27.800] So what? [35:27.800 --> 35:29.140] He invented the TV remote. [35:29.360 --> 35:30.100] I heard about this guy. [35:30.220 --> 35:31.600] He kept inventing things up till the end, right? [35:32.200 --> 35:32.540] Apparently. [35:32.540 --> 35:32.620] Certainly. [35:32.880 --> 35:37.120] He also was a bigwig in touch screen technology, which I found fascinating. [35:37.260 --> 35:38.800] That's what he was working on towards the end. [35:39.480 --> 35:39.920] Wow. [35:41.200 --> 35:42.360] Including voting machines. [35:42.760 --> 35:44.700] Voting machines and other things like that. [35:45.480 --> 35:46.800] Any other words about him? [35:46.920 --> 35:47.180] No. [35:47.260 --> 35:48.260] I actually haven't read the article. [35:48.450 --> 35:48.660] Okay. [35:49.580 --> 35:54.120] He was actually the co-inventor of the TV remote. [35:54.360 --> 35:57.000] And it was unlike the TV remotes that we know of today. [35:57.280 --> 35:59.280] His actually consumed no power. [35:59.520 --> 36:00.380] It didn't need any batteries. [36:00.720 --> 36:06.520] You press the button and a mechanical arm hit a tuning fork inside the remote. [36:06.520 --> 36:22.220] So, it would send an ultrasonic signal that could be picked up by an ultrasonic transducer in your TV set, which would then turn on a relay, which would then physically turn the knob on your TV set with a solenoid. [36:22.320 --> 36:22.860] It would go ka-chunk. [36:22.950 --> 36:24.580] I actually had one of these back in the 60s. [36:24.720 --> 36:25.480] It was pretty cool. [36:26.480 --> 36:29.160] And it was a very clever, elegant device. [36:29.450 --> 36:36.060] Except if you dropped a set of keys or something, it would spoof the receiver and would make the TV go crazy. [36:36.420 --> 36:41.950] Mitch Altman, the inventor of the TV Begun, and I were discussing this via email the other day. [36:42.020 --> 36:50.080] And he said that a friend of his, when they were kids, were trying to fool with a TV set that had an ultrasonic remote receiver built into it. [36:50.180 --> 36:57.640] And they played with the keys enough that it jammed the TV's solenoid somehow that the TV repairman had to come out and fix it. [36:58.120 --> 37:02.020] Mitch has been successful at jamming TVs since a little kid. [37:03.220 --> 37:03.660] Unbelievable. [37:03.660 --> 37:04.980] Okay, this announcement. [37:05.340 --> 37:17.160] The movie that a couple of hackers starred in, namely Fiber Optic, remember him, and myself, and a few other people, is out. [37:17.360 --> 37:18.680] It's premiering in New York City. [37:18.740 --> 37:19.500] It's called Urchin. [37:20.140 --> 37:21.700] We talked about this a couple of times. [37:21.740 --> 37:24.360] Basically, we premiered it at the Hope Conference. [37:24.360 --> 37:31.060] It's this movie about the underground of New York City, the true underground of New York City, subway system and tunnels and all sorts of things like that. [37:32.380 --> 37:33.840] And it was all filmed. [37:33.950 --> 37:34.720] This is kind of cool. [37:34.880 --> 37:37.460] It was all filmed without anyone's permission. [37:37.700 --> 37:41.780] You know how films at the end always say, filmed with the kind permission of New York City, blah, blah, blah. [37:42.200 --> 37:53.640] Well, you know, I kind of agree with the stand that you don't need permission to turn on a camera, whether you're inside a subway or on a street, as long as you're not interfering with other people, as long as you're not interfering with the system itself. [37:54.280 --> 37:58.080] And what came out of all this was a pretty interesting story. [37:59.000 --> 38:01.280] And it looks very genuine because it is genuine. [38:01.560 --> 38:07.540] Rides on subway trains and confrontations on subway platforms and other things in tunnels. [38:07.720 --> 38:10.780] So, yeah, it's being touted as a film that was filmed illegally. [38:11.520 --> 38:15.320] And these days, I guess that's not too hard to do. [38:15.460 --> 38:19.020] Anyway, it's playing for a period of time right here in New York City. [38:19.140 --> 38:21.920] In fact, a showing starts in about 22 minutes. [38:21.920 --> 38:34.180] If you can make your way down to 85 East 4th Street, that's between 2nd Avenue and the Bowery, it's playing at Horse Trades Red Room Theater at 8 o'clock. [38:34.180 --> 38:35.500] It's in the KGB bar. [38:35.620 --> 38:36.980] The KGB bar, yeah. [38:37.200 --> 38:38.560] And there's some history behind that place. [38:38.620 --> 38:40.360] I know we do some BAI things there as well. [38:40.460 --> 38:42.160] So it should be pretty familiar to BAI listeners. [38:42.420 --> 38:47.820] Anyway, it's playing tonight through Saturday, the 3rd of March. [38:48.160 --> 38:51.100] And there's one showing per night. [38:51.140 --> 38:58.200] And if you go to www.urchinthemovie.com, you'll get all kinds of other information about that as well. [38:58.540 --> 39:01.080] Or just look at our announcement on 2600.com. [39:01.080 --> 39:04.340] But Urchin, it's quite a film, quite an interesting event. [39:04.340 --> 39:05.800] I imagine all you guys have seen it, right? [39:06.200 --> 39:07.160] None of you have seen it. [39:07.320 --> 39:07.780] I saw it. [39:07.800 --> 39:08.480] You saw it, Arsene. [39:08.660 --> 39:09.120] Yeah, it was good. [39:09.280 --> 39:11.000] It gives you nightmares. [39:11.180 --> 39:12.580] You know, the New York Times hated it. [39:14.960 --> 39:17.140] Apparently, it struck them a little too... [39:17.520 --> 39:20.060] I don't know if it was too realistic or just too scary. [39:21.420 --> 39:22.700] Let's put our cards on the table. [39:22.860 --> 39:24.880] You will probably go to hell for seeing this film. [39:25.140 --> 39:25.620] You will. [39:26.840 --> 39:29.960] It contains all sorts of imagery and disturbing things. [39:30.600 --> 39:33.080] But it's for those people who don't care about that so much. [39:33.680 --> 39:36.880] And the New York Times reporter, I know, was a little worried about that. [39:37.460 --> 39:38.040] It's okay. [39:38.060 --> 39:38.480] It's all good. [39:38.700 --> 39:42.240] I know there's going to be a review in the Village Voice as well, which... when does that come out? [39:42.300 --> 39:42.920] Tonight or tomorrow? [39:43.120 --> 39:43.800] It should be out tonight. [39:43.900 --> 39:44.180] Yesterday. [39:44.540 --> 39:44.860] Yesterday. [39:45.180 --> 39:45.360] Okay. [39:45.360 --> 39:47.420] Well, then there's a review out of the film there. [39:47.580 --> 39:55.080] But again, Urchin playing tonight, 8 o'clock, and every night until March 3rd, www.urchinthemovie.com. [39:55.220 --> 39:56.460] And see me die. [39:57.060 --> 39:58.480] You'll see me get killed. [39:59.260 --> 40:01.620] I don't want to ruin the story too much, but I do get killed in the film. [40:02.380 --> 40:03.400] And it's kind of cool. [40:03.540 --> 40:04.040] It's kind of cool. [40:04.100 --> 40:08.020] I never actually was in a movie before, and I never actually had a death scene before. [40:08.200 --> 40:10.900] And I got to fire a gun inside a bathroom, which was kind of cool. [40:11.000 --> 40:11.800] Have you ever died before? [40:12.300 --> 40:13.220] No, I never have. [40:13.360 --> 40:13.980] That's the first time. [40:14.950 --> 40:15.220] But... [40:16.400 --> 40:17.480] But firing the gun... [40:17.480 --> 40:19.220] I mean, this is something, Redbird, I think you would appreciate this. [40:19.300 --> 40:20.420] Firing a gun inside a bathroom. [40:20.580 --> 40:20.820] That's... [40:20.820 --> 40:22.140] Now, explain that one. [40:22.140 --> 40:24.120] Well, it just makes you feel rather manly, doesn't it? [40:24.200 --> 40:25.260] I mean, come on. [40:25.380 --> 40:26.420] You've done this, haven't you? [40:28.080 --> 40:28.400] Thanks. [40:28.680 --> 40:30.960] It had blanks, but still, it was loud. [40:30.960 --> 40:35.020] And I was wearing things in my ear, and wow, my ears were ringing for quite a period of time. [40:35.340 --> 40:36.200] But it was a good scene. [40:36.220 --> 40:36.960] I got the scene. [40:37.280 --> 40:37.600] You know? [40:38.140 --> 40:42.640] And I even drew blood, real blood in the scene, because I fell on something and I cut myself, but they didn't use that. [40:43.400 --> 40:45.180] But, you know, I put everything I had into it. [40:45.900 --> 40:46.980] No, acting is kind of cool. [40:47.060 --> 40:52.480] I mean, I'm no actor, but I saw real actors there, and there are some really good performances, really, really good performances, so it's worth seeing. [40:53.020 --> 40:53.900] All right, enough about that. [40:56.020 --> 40:56.860] Here's a phone number. [40:56.960 --> 41:03.950] I'm not sure if this works, because someone gave this to us a couple of weeks ago, but apparently there's a way that you can make free international calls. [41:04.020 --> 41:04.760] You guys seen this? [41:05.040 --> 41:05.320] No. [41:05.520 --> 41:06.180] No one's seen this? [41:06.280 --> 41:07.020] Okay, so nobody knows. [41:07.100 --> 41:08.300] Have you seen this, Kevin? [41:08.980 --> 41:09.300] No? [41:09.480 --> 41:09.660] Okay. [41:10.020 --> 41:10.820] We're gonna try it. [41:10.920 --> 41:11.720] We're gonna see if it works. [41:12.000 --> 41:13.820] Maybe it works, maybe it doesn't. [41:13.980 --> 41:20.420] If it works, then we'll tell you exactly how to do it, and if it doesn't work, well, then we'll just add this to the long list of things that we try on the air that don't work. [41:21.020 --> 41:21.960] All right, let's get a dial tone. [41:22.420 --> 41:23.800] You do have someone to call, right? [41:24.280 --> 41:27.450] Well, I'm gonna call the test number they gave us, which actually is an embassy. [41:27.660 --> 41:28.420] That's kind of suspicious. [41:28.600 --> 41:28.740] Yeah. [41:29.440 --> 41:32.000] Oh, you know, it's kind of late there, but you know what? [41:32.020 --> 41:32.420] They're an embassy. [41:32.520 --> 41:33.340] They should be used to this kind of thing. [41:34.100 --> 41:35.160] All right, dialing the number. [41:36.060 --> 41:38.560] Anybody know where the 712 area code is? [41:39.700 --> 41:40.020] Nobody? [41:41.060 --> 41:42.340] You're supposed to be the expert. [41:42.450 --> 41:43.060] Yeah, I used to. [41:43.220 --> 41:44.800] I accidentally wiped my memory. [41:45.220 --> 41:45.450] Okay. [41:47.920 --> 41:48.880] That was portable. [41:51.320 --> 41:53.860] And let's see, we should get instructions. [41:54.100 --> 41:55.480] The number you're calling has changed. [41:55.600 --> 41:55.800] Oh. [41:55.960 --> 41:56.950] The new number is... [41:56.950 --> 41:57.300] Oh, boy. [42:00.200 --> 42:03.820] 218-936-6410. [42:04.840 --> 42:06.180] Can somebody write that down? [42:06.380 --> 42:06.600] No. [42:06.950 --> 42:08.860] I can't believe nobody has a pen. [42:08.860 --> 42:10.380] The number you're calling has changed. [42:10.660 --> 42:10.740] Come on. [42:10.800 --> 42:11.060] Last chance. [42:11.460 --> 42:12.280] The new number is... [42:13.280 --> 42:13.640] 218... [42:13.640 --> 42:14.580] I can remember that part. [42:18.040 --> 42:18.760] 936-6410. [42:19.400 --> 42:19.540] Okay. [42:19.780 --> 42:20.120] All right. [42:21.440 --> 42:22.160] Let's, uh... [42:22.160 --> 42:23.140] Let's call that one. [42:23.360 --> 42:23.960] Hang on, hang on. [42:24.160 --> 42:24.320] The number... [42:24.810 --> 42:25.580] Oops, I lost Bernie. [42:27.260 --> 42:27.620] Uh... [42:27.620 --> 42:28.860] Our phone system strikes again. [42:29.100 --> 42:29.300] Okay. [42:30.420 --> 42:31.140] Let's call... [42:31.140 --> 42:32.200] Oh, thank you for the pen. [42:32.380 --> 42:32.660] Thank you. [42:32.760 --> 42:34.280] The next show has come in with a pen to the verse. [42:34.780 --> 42:35.580] Someone read the number to me. [42:35.640 --> 42:36.680] 936, what's the rest of it? [42:37.480 --> 42:37.840] 6410. [42:37.840 --> 42:38.460] Okay. [42:39.680 --> 42:41.360] And I'm gonna enter the, uh, secret code. [42:41.700 --> 42:43.820] And we'll call Bernie back in, uh, just a minute. [42:45.320 --> 42:47.320] Let's hope that, uh, it still goes to the same thing. [42:48.140 --> 42:50.450] Should get instructions in Mandarin, Spanish, or English. [42:51.920 --> 42:54.240] Your call cannot be completed as entered. [42:54.240 --> 42:54.580] Oh, this is great. [42:54.800 --> 42:56.560] Please check the number and try again. [42:56.680 --> 42:58.860] Or call customer service for assistance. [42:59.800 --> 43:01.780] 44-6-4-0. [43:02.280 --> 43:03.560] 44-6-4-0. [43:04.540 --> 43:05.860] Oh, that's, that's a problem. [43:06.400 --> 43:07.540] I see why it didn't come through. [43:07.540 --> 43:09.200] That means we can never call that number again. [43:10.180 --> 43:10.680] All right. [43:10.740 --> 43:11.460] Well, what this was... [43:12.080 --> 43:13.460] You want to, uh, get Bernie back on the line? [43:13.460 --> 43:15.820] And convey my apologies for hitting the wrong button. [43:16.320 --> 43:19.360] Uh, this was something called allfreecalls.net. [43:19.800 --> 43:24.500] And apparently allfreecalls.net is not the most stable service in the world, but still, it sounded kind of cool at the time. [43:24.500 --> 43:29.080] Uh, you tried it out by, uh, calling a number, if you can find the right number. [43:29.300 --> 43:31.900] Uh, listen to the instructions in Mandarin, Spanish, or Chinese. [43:32.740 --> 43:34.320] I mean, Mandarin, Spanish, or English, I'm sorry. [43:34.800 --> 43:39.160] At the prompt, you enter 011, the country code you're calling, and the number you wish to call. [43:39.400 --> 43:41.300] And then you simply enjoy your free call. [43:41.900 --> 43:42.580] It's that easy. [43:43.260 --> 43:44.800] Uh, maybe if you can... [43:44.800 --> 43:46.460] Unfortunately, I can't get this computer to work next to me. [43:46.540 --> 43:50.820] But if you go to allfreecalls.net, maybe the right number is on there. [43:51.160 --> 43:51.580] And, uh... [43:51.580 --> 43:52.920] Apparently, it wasn't very sustainable. [43:53.140 --> 43:53.260] Yeah. [43:53.260 --> 43:55.620] Uh, Mike, as long as you're standing up, do you think you can get this mouse to work? [43:55.760 --> 43:58.940] Because I've been trying to, like, move it, and the little point, it just doesn't go anywhere. [43:59.140 --> 44:00.080] It's very advanced. [44:00.220 --> 44:00.800] It's advanced, yeah. [44:00.820 --> 44:03.820] But if you can go to this website, maybe we can actually test this thing out after all. [44:04.320 --> 44:08.420] It was moving before, using the keyboard and not the mouse. [44:08.460 --> 44:08.920] There you go. [44:08.980 --> 44:09.540] What a concept. [44:09.740 --> 44:11.960] It takes two hands, and I need one hand to do... [44:12.360 --> 44:13.540] Uh, that's the number we just called. [44:13.780 --> 44:14.860] And that number does not work. [44:15.140 --> 44:15.520] Oh, well. [44:16.600 --> 44:18.100] 212-209-2900 is our number. [44:18.160 --> 44:18.800] It does work. [44:18.800 --> 44:26.740] And we'd like to hear from you, our listeners, with your input, your feedback, contributions, comments, criticisms, threats, whatnot. [44:26.980 --> 44:27.600] Bernie, are you back? [44:28.160 --> 44:28.420] Yes. [44:28.500 --> 44:30.360] I tried this service a couple of weeks ago. [44:30.480 --> 44:32.680] I called a number in London, and it worked. [44:32.680 --> 44:34.680] And I was trying to figure out what the catch was. [44:34.680 --> 44:38.660] Like, you know, how this company plans to make money from this service? [44:38.660 --> 44:41.760] It might be another introductory thing, but I was surprised it worked. [44:42.260 --> 44:43.040] I think... [44:43.040 --> 44:44.200] The catch is not that it doesn't work in two weeks. [44:44.300 --> 44:54.900] Well, I think part of the catch might be that the termination fee is rather high, and they make money from the local phone companies, but that is not passed on to the consumer. [44:54.900 --> 45:02.300] So the consumer is making a regular phone call, and the local phone companies are paying extra for the call to be terminated, I think. [45:02.300 --> 45:03.820] That's the explanation I heard from somebody. [45:04.680 --> 45:06.880] And that could also be why the number keeps changing. [45:07.060 --> 45:07.420] Who knows? [45:07.640 --> 45:09.740] If somebody has more information on this, please let us know. [45:09.820 --> 45:12.000] OTH at 2600.com is our email address. [45:12.100 --> 45:14.040] 212-209-2900 is our phone number. [45:14.780 --> 45:16.940] Shall we take a sampling of phone calls? [45:17.900 --> 45:18.100] Yes. [45:18.100 --> 45:18.520] Oh, let's. [45:18.620 --> 45:18.860] Okay. [45:18.880 --> 45:19.740] Let's take this first one here. [45:20.220 --> 45:20.800] Good evening. [45:20.980 --> 45:21.540] You're on off... [45:22.900 --> 45:27.180] It's my wish that someday we have a phone system where the numbers don't jump all over the place. [45:27.180 --> 45:28.200] But you should be able to predict. [45:28.200 --> 45:29.600] We found the sequence. [45:29.820 --> 45:29.900] Yeah. [45:29.960 --> 45:31.360] And it's not one, two, three, four, five. [45:31.540 --> 45:33.280] It's like five, nine, one. [45:33.580 --> 45:34.440] Yeah, it wasn't... [45:34.440 --> 45:34.780] Ridiculous. [45:35.000 --> 45:36.120] I don't know who programmed this thing. [45:36.220 --> 45:36.680] Let's try this one. [45:36.720 --> 45:37.000] Good evening. [45:37.200 --> 45:38.160] You're on off the hook. [45:38.600 --> 45:39.520] Hey, how you doing? [45:39.740 --> 45:40.680] Entertaining as always. [45:40.860 --> 45:41.100] Thank you. [45:41.640 --> 45:47.600] I was wondering, I just heard a tail end of this, and it defies belief. [45:47.600 --> 45:55.540] And of course, it was on National Accommodationist Radio, so they didn't question it at all. [45:55.540 --> 46:08.500] But what they were saying was they were going to set up a mobile phone slash web-based system to auction off public parking spots. [46:09.400 --> 46:13.500] You're on the street in a parking spot open to anyone. [46:13.500 --> 46:25.680] You're part of this system that you've paid to join, and you will alert a fellow subscriber when you're leaving, so only a fellow subscriber can get the public parking spot. [46:25.680 --> 46:30.640] A company is raising money to do this, and it sounds like self-parody. [46:30.880 --> 46:34.240] And I'm just wondering if it surfaced on your radar at all. [46:34.240 --> 46:41.460] Yeah, we've seen a couple articles on it and TV coverage locally here in New York, and it seems to be there. [46:41.840 --> 46:43.520] It's technically illegal. [46:44.540 --> 46:57.380] You call the system, and it calls somebody who wants to park just as you're about to get out, and ideally they will be the person there when you pull out, but you can't legally stop someone else from parking there. [46:57.380 --> 47:01.920] Well, it sounds like a large fist or something is in order. [47:02.100 --> 47:05.520] I mean, this is just... when's it gonna stop? [47:05.760 --> 47:08.420] It seems almost more inconvenient than circling the block a few times. [47:08.620 --> 47:09.100] I'm sorry? [47:09.280 --> 47:12.420] It seems almost more inconvenient than circling the block a few times. [47:13.320 --> 47:14.100] I don't know. [47:14.320 --> 47:16.040] I'm sorry to hear that it's real. [47:16.220 --> 47:19.400] I was hoping I was brushing my teeth and misheard it or something. [47:19.520 --> 47:22.260] Well, it sounds like one of those ideas doomed to failure for various reasons. [47:22.260 --> 47:29.980] It's a remarkably poor idea at attempting an actual problem, which is that the parking, street parking, is too cheap. [47:30.400 --> 47:44.540] There's a very famous paper called The High Price of Free Parking, where basically, you know, people expect that they can park for free, and it creates all these silly market inefficiencies that capitalists should love to hate. [47:44.760 --> 47:51.320] But this way of solving the problem seems like a remarkably silly one. [47:51.820 --> 47:57.140] Well, you guys carry on with more serious matters, but I do enjoy your stuff. [47:57.520 --> 47:58.180] Okay, thanks for calling. [47:58.760 --> 48:01.520] 212-209-2900 is our telephone number. [48:01.640 --> 48:02.820] Let's go over here. [48:02.940 --> 48:03.300] Good evening. [48:03.460 --> 48:04.100] You're on Off the Hook. [48:05.340 --> 48:05.800] Hello. [48:06.020 --> 48:06.720] Hi, what's on your mind? [48:07.340 --> 48:08.780] Yeah, I was kind of curious. [48:08.900 --> 48:13.780] I work at a school, and I've had other high schoolers ask me this question. [48:14.460 --> 48:18.940] Why is there so much restriction on the school's Internet? [48:18.940 --> 48:23.860] Because, like, one girl was trying to do a research paper, and half the papers that she... [48:23.860 --> 48:27.920] Half the sites she came up with to do research on were blocked. [48:28.100 --> 48:28.360] Mm-hmm. [48:29.140 --> 48:41.640] And it's just... I could understand for, like, elementary kids, but high schoolers who are trying to do research papers, and then teachers who are trying to get stuff for kids to work on, and half these sites are blocked. [48:41.820 --> 48:43.660] Yeah, I mean, I hear this complaint all the time. [48:43.660 --> 48:48.300] A lot of our readers write in with various ways to get around it, and it's just... [48:48.920 --> 48:50.580] It's the software that's being used. [48:50.720 --> 48:57.640] It's the net nannies and all sorts of other things that districts buy to allegedly protect the kids from inappropriate sites. [48:57.660 --> 49:02.220] What they wind up doing is protecting them from all sorts of sites that are useful to them as well. [49:02.480 --> 49:16.740] The reason that there's this filtering software, even in high schools in sensible districts, is that there's a federal law that requires it, that any school which receives federal money, which is pretty much any school, has to install this filtering software, [49:16.740 --> 49:19.140] or they'll lose their grants, their internet grants. [49:19.760 --> 49:25.340] So even when you get IT administrators who know better and don't want this software, they're forced to install it. [49:25.720 --> 49:27.360] And yeah, you're right. [49:27.420 --> 49:27.880] It doesn't work. [49:27.960 --> 49:31.360] But are they forced to maintain them in the same way, to block the same sites? [49:31.520 --> 49:37.300] Can something that is relevant to a student's research be unblocked if it's determined that there's no reason to block it? [49:37.480 --> 49:41.220] Sure, but that's a huge management problem that most school districts don't have the staff to solve. [49:41.300 --> 49:43.000] I think the students will do this for them. [49:43.300 --> 49:44.280] Well, that would be nice. [49:44.280 --> 49:47.140] I think the students will figure it out and maintain the thing much better. [49:47.580 --> 49:50.180] Well, see, what drives me nuts is I know all this. [49:50.280 --> 49:52.120] I know how to do all this. [49:52.180 --> 49:54.380] And it's like, dude, I can't do it. [49:55.460 --> 50:01.680] And it's like, I've got a student, an autistic student, who sees, if he sees me do something on the computer, he picks it up right like that. [50:01.680 --> 50:02.100] Uh-huh. [50:02.280 --> 50:14.240] So I've got to be extremely careful on what I do, because he's learned all those back doors into his game programs, you know, going in through my computer and doing all this stuff. [50:14.680 --> 50:18.160] Isn't that a part of education, is learning how to get around the system? [50:18.680 --> 50:19.000] Yeah. [50:19.180 --> 50:21.740] And everyone's like, well, why are you teaching this? [50:21.760 --> 50:22.700] I'm not teaching this. [50:22.760 --> 50:23.700] He's just watching. [50:23.980 --> 50:24.140] Mm-hmm. [50:26.600 --> 50:33.740] Do your bosses, your administrators, do they have strict rules about how flexible you can be? [50:33.960 --> 50:36.960] Can you turn the configuration around a bit? [50:37.820 --> 50:39.640] There, it's district set. [50:40.420 --> 50:42.600] It's set downtown in the district. [50:42.920 --> 50:55.980] So, like, for instance, they've got a non-secure wireless router in the building, and I actually connected to it on my PSP, and just for giggles, I went to the 2600 website. [50:56.180 --> 50:56.380] Uh-huh. [50:56.400 --> 50:58.780] Well, of course, it's blocked, but it's like... [50:58.780 --> 51:00.400] You know, and I can't figure that out. [51:00.460 --> 51:01.420] Why are they blocking us? [51:01.500 --> 51:04.840] What is on our website that would harm people? [51:05.260 --> 51:07.280] The contents of the magazine are not on the website. [51:07.480 --> 51:08.920] The radio shows are on the website. [51:09.200 --> 51:10.620] News stories are on the website. [51:10.800 --> 51:18.760] But I can't think of anything that is on the website that kids in a school wouldn't be able to look at and get through the day. [51:19.200 --> 51:23.600] Yeah, the exact block message it said was hacker content. [51:24.080 --> 51:24.520] Uh-huh. [51:25.040 --> 51:29.760] So, apparently, just because we're affiliated with it, that's good enough right there. [51:29.980 --> 51:35.180] I can never figure that out, and I'm always trying to get an answer, and these people just have nothing to say about it. [51:35.240 --> 51:45.440] And this is one of the insidious things about the way it is, is that the government requires that filter software be installed, but they do not themselves make any filtering software. [51:45.440 --> 51:53.100] So, it's left to these private corporations to create the software, create the list of sites that aren't allowed. [51:53.460 --> 51:56.460] And they have no incentive to do a particularly good job. [51:56.600 --> 52:01.680] It would cost them a lot of money to review these sites constantly and figure out what should be in there and what shouldn't. [52:01.880 --> 52:04.080] And that would really cut into their profit margins. [52:04.080 --> 52:11.000] So, their incentive is really to create a product that's just good enough that it meets the requirements of the law, not one that actually works. [52:11.420 --> 52:12.860] One question, then we're going to move on. [52:13.660 --> 52:30.700] Is there perhaps a group of people or a company that has done a good job, that has done a fairly decent presentation insofar as blocking software, where it can be easily modified, where it's not blocking things that shouldn't be blocked, anything positive in this community? [52:31.160 --> 52:31.640] No. [52:31.640 --> 52:32.420] Nothing at all. [52:32.640 --> 52:32.780] All right. [52:32.820 --> 52:34.120] Well, maybe our listeners have something. [52:34.360 --> 52:34.960] Please let us know. [52:35.140 --> 52:35.740] Thanks for your call. [52:35.860 --> 52:36.180] Good luck. [52:36.420 --> 52:36.680] Thanks. [52:37.120 --> 52:39.300] OTH at 2600.com, of course, our email address. [52:39.400 --> 52:39.980] Let's go over here. [52:40.200 --> 52:40.560] Good evening. [52:40.700 --> 52:41.260] You're on Off the Hook. [52:42.940 --> 52:43.660] Speak up, please. [52:44.420 --> 52:44.780] Hey. [52:45.180 --> 52:45.420] Hi. [52:45.420 --> 52:45.920] What's on your mind? [52:46.700 --> 52:59.080] I just wanted to say that it has nothing to do with your show, but the critical mass that's coming up is the last one before arrests, again, become probable, because this law goes into effect really soon. [52:59.140 --> 53:00.060] So, I just wanted to call out. [53:00.060 --> 53:00.280] Wait. [53:00.860 --> 53:02.640] What is it that happens after this one? [53:03.280 --> 53:13.260] Two days after this critical mass coming up, this law goes into effect saying 50 or more pedestrians and cyclists and vehicles need to have a permit or can be arrested for providing without a permit. [53:13.320 --> 53:16.600] Well, I know they've been trying to do things like that, but I didn't think it was anywhere near reality. [53:16.600 --> 53:21.580] No, it totally passed on the 26th, and it goes into effect on the 25th. [53:21.940 --> 53:24.680] So, what's our critical mass's plans for the next month? [53:25.320 --> 53:27.100] Well, just to have a really awesome ride. [53:27.860 --> 53:28.180] Okay. [53:28.300 --> 53:31.440] And like, you know, so I just wanted to call everybody up and, you know. [53:31.720 --> 53:31.880] All right. [53:31.940 --> 53:32.300] Well, definitely. [53:32.320 --> 53:33.780] We'll be following that on this radio station. [53:33.800 --> 53:34.500] You can be sure of that. [53:34.600 --> 53:37.280] And I'm sure there'll be a lot of people watching that ride. [53:38.160 --> 53:38.580] All right. [53:38.800 --> 53:41.720] So, but like last month's ride had 15 people on it. [53:42.340 --> 53:43.880] So, I thought maybe it would be cool. [53:43.980 --> 53:46.740] Well, it's because it's the middle of winter, I think, more than anything else. [53:47.160 --> 53:51.420] Well, also, people have been holding down the fort because of all the harassment and intimidation. [53:51.660 --> 53:58.060] And so far, really, this is the last chance that people get to ride with just getting a ticket, you know. [53:58.240 --> 54:00.040] And next month, they can get arrested. [54:00.880 --> 54:04.220] Well, that'll be a whole lot of fun for them to try and enforce that. [54:04.420 --> 54:04.940] I don't understand. [54:05.080 --> 54:05.340] In two days. [54:05.340 --> 54:07.660] Yeah, it's pretty nutty. [54:07.820 --> 54:11.700] But, okay, so the last ride that's supposedly safe is on the 26th, you say? [54:12.640 --> 54:13.000] Friday. [54:13.420 --> 54:14.300] That's Friday coming up? [54:14.580 --> 54:15.680] Mm-hmm, the 23rd. [54:15.860 --> 54:16.080] Okay. [54:16.160 --> 54:16.820] And where do they meet? [54:17.700 --> 54:18.940] 7 o'clock, Union Square. [54:19.280 --> 54:19.700] All right. [54:19.880 --> 54:21.520] And next month will be the really interesting one. [54:21.940 --> 54:22.160] Yeah. [54:22.160 --> 54:24.960] And the weather's starting to get better next month, so it should be better intended. [54:25.180 --> 54:25.540] Let's hope so. [54:25.620 --> 54:28.700] Yeah, well, and tonight, tonight, I mean, you know, Friday, it'll be really good weather. [54:28.920 --> 54:30.440] This is Firefly, by the way. [54:30.620 --> 54:32.080] I used to work with New York Indy Media. [54:32.380 --> 54:33.020] Oh, welcome. [54:33.020 --> 54:35.600] And I want to thank you immensely for your space. [54:35.680 --> 54:36.500] It was great. [54:36.820 --> 54:37.240] Well, thanks. [54:38.580 --> 54:42.900] Glad Indy Media was able to be launched here in New York, and now it's a permanent force. [54:43.260 --> 54:43.740] I know. [54:43.800 --> 54:44.340] I love it. [54:44.480 --> 54:44.800] All right. [54:44.800 --> 54:45.980] Thanks for your call. [54:46.520 --> 54:48.040] We're going to try and squeeze in one or two more. [54:49.420 --> 54:50.380] And good evening. [54:50.520 --> 54:51.040] You're on Off the Hook. [54:52.580 --> 54:53.220] Speak up. [54:53.860 --> 54:54.280] Yes, hello? [54:54.500 --> 54:54.720] Yes. [54:54.760 --> 54:55.260] What's on your mind? [54:55.740 --> 54:57.000] Not too much, guys. [54:57.220 --> 54:59.920] Just trying to find out where I should think. [55:00.080 --> 55:03.660] I worked as a poll worker, not in any recent elections. [55:03.660 --> 55:07.440] This was probably about six, eight months ago. [55:08.720 --> 55:09.620] In what state? [55:10.040 --> 55:10.680] In Ohio. [55:10.980 --> 55:11.180] Okay. [55:11.880 --> 55:19.640] But I have like a training manual and like a DVD that I'd like to, you know, I'd like to share with you guys. [55:19.740 --> 55:21.380] Well, we'd love for you to share that with us, too. [55:21.880 --> 55:22.200] Absolutely. [55:22.380 --> 55:24.740] You going to send it on in, or do you want us to come pick it up? [55:25.780 --> 55:27.420] No, I can't send it in. [55:27.660 --> 55:27.760] Okay. [55:27.860 --> 55:28.940] I just need the... [55:28.940 --> 55:29.860] Where should I send it? [55:30.140 --> 55:31.120] Obviously, the OTH. [55:31.440 --> 55:40.320] Yeah, send it to our mailing address, which is PO Box 848, and that's Middle Island, New York, 11953. [55:40.460 --> 55:43.800] And you can just say, Off the Hook, 2600, and that'll get right to us. [55:44.180 --> 55:44.860] Right on. [55:45.360 --> 55:50.800] And don't send UPS, because for some reason, post office... PO Boxes don't accept UPS or FedEx or things like that. [55:51.240 --> 55:52.100] Okay, okay. [55:52.200 --> 55:52.700] No problem. [55:52.700 --> 56:06.620] You know, another thing, I played around with that DVD shrink, and it seems a lot of Sony movies... Sony's got, like, this encryption program that they use, ARCCOS, it's called. [56:07.180 --> 56:14.700] It's some kind of, like, software that they've incorporated into their movies, so it doesn't allow DVD shrink to copy them. [56:15.520 --> 56:15.800] Uh-huh. [56:17.040 --> 56:20.300] So, it's just, you can get around it. [56:20.300 --> 56:25.960] There's a few other programs that kind of, like, piggyback onto DVD shrink that'll get around it or whatever. [56:25.960 --> 56:35.520] But, I mean, I agree, you know, you should be able to copy, I mean, if you paid the full price for something, you know, mature, you should be able to make it. [56:35.560 --> 56:35.600] Yes. [56:35.620 --> 56:35.900] Absolutely. [56:35.980 --> 56:36.700] Listen, sir, we're out of time. [56:36.820 --> 56:37.760] Thanks for your call. [56:37.840 --> 56:39.600] Thanks, everybody else, for calling in as well. [56:40.060 --> 56:41.880] And, of course, we always want to hear from you. [56:41.880 --> 56:45.460] O-T-H at 2600.com is our telephone number. [56:45.840 --> 56:47.980] I mean, I'm sorry, I did this last week, too. [56:48.540 --> 56:51.140] O-T-H at 2600.com is our email address. [56:51.560 --> 56:51.920] Yeah. [56:58.540 --> 57:01.100] We'll see you next week, same time, same place. [57:01.980 --> 57:04.080] Stay tuned for the Personal Computer Show here on WBAI. [57:05.480 --> 57:06.500] And go see your chin. [57:06.700 --> 57:07.220] Be a lot of fun. [57:07.280 --> 57:07.460] Good night. [01:00:36.440 --> 01:00:42.020] You're listening to WBAI New York 99.5 FM. [01:00:42.020 --> 01:00:46.940] Also streaming on the web at WBAI.org. [01:00:47.520 --> 01:00:52.760] Also streaming on the web at PCRadioShow.org. [01:00:53.260 --> 01:00:56.580] And today is February 21st, 2007.