[00:00.000 --> 00:00.960]  ...of five.
[00:01.480 --> 00:07.160]  So, the prize could be great, and the world could benefit hugely from the work going on here.
[00:07.320 --> 00:11.100]  But not everyone agrees with some of the decisions along the way.
[00:11.600 --> 00:16.060]  This is Naomi Fowler in Edinburgh, Scotland, for Free Speech Radio News.
[00:18.540 --> 00:21.380]  Free Speech Radio News is a worker-run collective.
[00:21.640 --> 00:23.520]  And you heard it over WBAI New York.
[00:23.640 --> 00:25.600]  It's time now, though, for Off the Hook.
[00:33.670 --> 00:35.250]  So, I ripped it off the wall.
[00:36.270 --> 00:38.210]  I cut myself while shaving.
[00:38.790 --> 00:40.790]  Now I can't make a call.
[00:46.550 --> 00:48.990]  Diddly bump for the best, expect the worst.
[00:49.630 --> 00:51.530]  I hope that's understood.
[00:51.790 --> 00:52.510]  But diddly bump!
[00:59.710 --> 01:00.950]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[01:01.050 --> 01:01.910]  The program is Off the Hook.
[01:01.990 --> 01:04.850]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[01:05.710 --> 01:09.190]  Joined tonight by the likes of Jim.
[01:09.610 --> 01:10.150]  Greetings.
[01:10.530 --> 01:11.090]  Redbird.
[01:11.490 --> 01:11.890]  Good evening.
[01:12.190 --> 01:12.750]  Arseny.
[01:12.870 --> 01:13.010]  Hello.
[01:13.010 --> 01:13.030]  Hello.
[01:13.630 --> 01:14.050]  Mike.
[01:14.430 --> 01:14.650]  Hi.
[01:14.810 --> 01:15.730]  Is that Walter, I see?
[01:16.150 --> 01:16.590]  Hey, yeah.
[01:16.650 --> 01:18.330]  It's been a while since we've heard your voice.
[01:18.570 --> 01:18.690]  Yep.
[01:19.130 --> 01:21.350]  And down there in Philadelphia, Bernie S.
[01:21.890 --> 01:22.930]  Just back from Poland.
[01:23.250 --> 01:23.850]  You were in Poland?
[01:23.890 --> 01:24.550]  What were you doing in Poland?
[01:25.790 --> 01:29.770]  Well, I went to the Siebit Conference in Hanover, Germany.
[01:29.910 --> 01:30.790]  The Siebit?
[01:31.170 --> 01:34.130]  This is the thing that has like two million people show up every year in Germany?
[01:34.370 --> 01:35.170]  No, only about half a million.
[01:35.350 --> 01:36.090]  Oh, it's going down.
[01:36.750 --> 01:38.610]  The IT telecom conference.
[01:38.810 --> 01:42.510]  But, after that, I decided to head east to Poland.
[01:43.330 --> 01:48.210]  And, uh, spend a few days in Wrocław and, um, Krakow.
[01:48.610 --> 01:48.990]  Uh-huh.
[01:49.070 --> 01:49.970]  We'll talk about that later.
[01:50.270 --> 01:50.590]  Okay.
[01:50.650 --> 01:51.690]  Was that your first time in Poland?
[01:52.150 --> 01:53.490]  It was, and it was very interesting.
[01:54.190 --> 01:54.550]  Okay.
[01:54.650 --> 01:56.390]  Well, it's, uh, good to have you back.
[01:57.670 --> 02:01.010]  And, uh, programming note, we are not on next week.
[02:01.010 --> 02:02.330]  Yes, we're preempted yet again.
[02:02.830 --> 02:08.110]  So, uh, next edition of Off the Hook won't be coming your way until two weeks from tonight.
[02:08.530 --> 02:09.870]  But we still have tonight.
[02:10.730 --> 02:13.270]  And all sorts of things to discuss and talk about.
[02:13.430 --> 02:14.890]  Take your phone calls a little later on.
[02:15.570 --> 02:20.670]  I saw this article, uh, yesterday, um, showed up in various places.
[02:21.090 --> 02:23.110]  And there's just something in here that struck me.
[02:23.210 --> 02:26.450]  And I think, Bernie, you'll find it particularly apropos to various, uh, things.
[02:26.450 --> 02:31.870]  Um, this has nothing to do with, uh, what we usually talk about, computers, hacking, things like that.
[02:31.950 --> 02:33.690]  But it does have to do with, uh, current events.
[02:33.890 --> 02:40.250]  A federal judge dismissed a lawsuit yesterday against former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, three high-ranking U.S.
[02:40.350 --> 02:43.530]  military officials accused of ignoring allegations that U.S.
[02:43.850 --> 02:46.130]  soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan tortured prisoners.
[02:46.910 --> 02:53.950]  Um, despite the horrifying allegations, the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a declaratory judgment against the defendants, said U.S.
[02:54.010 --> 02:55.990]  District Judge Thomas Hogan.
[02:55.990 --> 02:57.530]  Now, this is the interesting part.
[02:58.190 --> 03:07.370]  Hogan said there was nothing in federal case law that would allow officials such as Rumsfeld to be held personally liable for actions related to their government service.
[03:08.090 --> 03:10.150]  Is that incredible or, or, or what?
[03:10.230 --> 03:14.350]  That you cannot hold somebody liable for anything they do in government service?
[03:14.710 --> 03:16.150]  Well, it's not incredible.
[03:16.150 --> 03:18.810]  And it's not that you can't hold them liable at all.
[03:19.030 --> 03:24.230]  It's essentially that if they're acting in good faith and do something, you can't sue them.
[03:24.230 --> 03:25.890]  Well, isn't the whole purpose of suing them?
[03:25.990 --> 03:27.790]  To say that you're not acting in good faith?
[03:28.990 --> 03:31.690]  I mean, where's the assumption they're acting in good faith?
[03:32.130 --> 03:33.430]  Bernie, are you surprised by this?
[03:33.770 --> 03:34.510]  Oh, not at all.
[03:34.610 --> 03:40.930]  It's no different than other government employees like law enforcement agents who are just, just not held accountable.
[03:41.330 --> 03:43.630]  Um, and if they're sued, good luck.
[03:43.790 --> 03:49.190]  You'll find that they're, you just can't legally, uh, um, win a case.
[03:49.750 --> 03:52.030]  And that doesn't have to do with good faith requirement either.
[03:52.190 --> 03:57.630]  It just has to show that they were, uh, they were performing duties of their job, which may or may not have been proper.
[03:58.330 --> 04:02.830]  It just sounds like a way any too-bit dictator can get away with anything, any part of the world.
[04:03.030 --> 04:03.810]  How are we any different?
[04:04.030 --> 04:05.750]  You seem to assume that we are.
[04:06.350 --> 04:13.570]  Uh, well, you know, I, I, I had held out hope that maybe somewhere along the line it would be proven that we were a little better than that, but, uh.
[04:13.570 --> 04:16.050]  There's a criminal case in Germany pending against Rumsfeld.
[04:16.290 --> 04:16.530]  Uh-huh.
[04:16.570 --> 04:17.650]  So he can't go to Germany.
[04:17.910 --> 04:21.190]  He can't, yeah, you think he's really going to, uh, be arrested if he sets foot in Germany?
[04:21.270 --> 04:21.750]  He might be.
[04:22.530 --> 04:23.750]  Well, that'd be, that'd be fun.
[04:23.850 --> 04:25.610]  I'd, I'd, you know, I'd pay money to see this.
[04:25.630 --> 04:26.110]  I really would.
[04:26.730 --> 04:30.250]  Okay, uh, on with, uh, more relevant things to us anyway.
[04:30.910 --> 04:39.230]  Um, and apparently, um, this is a story that tells how many people don't see things as important that may, maybe we see as important.
[04:39.230 --> 04:42.410]  Uh, under one-third, a little under one-third of U.S.
[04:42.950 --> 04:49.430]  households have no internet access and do not plan to get it, with most of the holdouts seeing little use for it in their lives.
[04:49.430 --> 04:52.550]  That's according to a survey that was released last Friday.
[04:53.230 --> 04:59.550]  Uh, Park Associates, a Dallas-based technology market firm, a market research firm, that is, said 29% of U.S.
[04:59.610 --> 05:07.390]  households, or 31 million homes, do not have internet access, do not intend to subscribe to an internet service over the next 12 months.
[05:08.030 --> 05:18.310]  Uh, 44% of those, uh, households say they are not interested in anything on the internet, versus just 22% who say they cannot afford a computer or the cost of internet service.
[05:19.170 --> 05:20.410]  Um, now, it's interesting.
[05:20.570 --> 05:23.250]  How do you know what you're not interested in if you can't get it?
[05:23.770 --> 05:29.370]  I was going to say, do these people know that the Bible, the Holy Word of God, is available upon the internet?
[05:29.370 --> 05:31.710]  Now, why are you assuming that those are the same people?
[05:31.950 --> 05:35.690]  Why are you assuming the people, they're Bible Belt people who aren't getting on the internet?
[05:35.690 --> 05:37.090]  I think they're all over the internet.
[05:37.770 --> 05:39.170]  I think the internet is turning internet.
[05:39.470 --> 05:43.330]  Well, I'd like to go on and say, do these people know that there are naked women available on the internet?
[05:43.710 --> 05:44.490]  Well, I don't know.
[05:45.510 --> 05:47.970]  And sometimes, naked women spouting the Word of God.
[05:48.070 --> 05:53.650]  The thing is, we do our radio show under the assumption that people out there don't have net access, because a lot of people don't.
[05:53.710 --> 05:54.750]  That's why we do radio.
[05:55.110 --> 05:59.130]  You know, the internet radio is no substitute for radio, especially if you don't have internet access.
[05:59.910 --> 06:06.310]  So, maybe some of those people listening can call us later on and say, what is it about the internet which you do not get that you don't want?
[06:06.830 --> 06:09.810]  And how do you know that that's what they have, that you don't want?
[06:09.950 --> 06:18.470]  You know, I have a slightly different approach, which is that it's not necessarily that our listeners don't have net access, but you don't have it all the time.
[06:18.470 --> 06:29.730]  And this leads into something that I was trying to bring up for a couple of weeks and never saw an opportunity, exemplified perfectly by the pet food incident, where there's poison in the generic pet food.
[06:29.730 --> 06:31.250]  Rat poison in dog and cat food.
[06:31.390 --> 06:31.550]  Right.
[06:31.890 --> 06:40.690]  And, of course, on all the news, they would report this and they'd say, to learn which lots are contaminated and to get more information, go to our website.
[06:40.830 --> 06:57.630]  And I'm saying, you could have spent less time by just giving an 800 number that this company has set up, and you could have gotten all the people watching happy who would have been affected by this, but instead, you've, as the survey says, you've turned off a third of the population.
[06:57.830 --> 07:04.510]  Well, I can't tell you how many times I've been on the phone with somebody and they say, go to our website to solve this problem.
[07:04.970 --> 07:10.290]  I'm at a pay phone or I'm in the middle of nowhere, and going to a website is not always the easiest thing to do.
[07:10.370 --> 07:11.190]  It's not always possible.
[07:11.250 --> 07:17.970]  Well, these people are taking it to the logical conclusion, which is avoid the website altogether by avoiding the net altogether.
[07:17.970 --> 07:21.890]  I mean, I feel for them, and in fact, I sort of admire them.
[07:22.450 --> 07:23.430]  Bernie, do you have anything on this?
[07:24.330 --> 07:34.030]  Well, I think a lot of people are just happy with their lives and don't feel they need access to a huge more amount of information.
[07:34.170 --> 07:35.570]  Maybe it's just how they feel.
[07:35.650 --> 07:39.510]  I'd like to meet some of these people who are happy with their lives and just take some notes.
[07:39.990 --> 07:41.910]  It's like they like to live a simple life.
[07:42.010 --> 07:48.310]  But I do agree that a lot of companies have pushed off the responsibility in informing the public to their website.
[07:48.630 --> 07:54.510]  Well, I mean, as far as leading a simple life, I mean, so many people are looking at porn and going to the Drudge Report.
[07:54.570 --> 07:55.730]  How much more simple can you get?
[07:56.170 --> 08:02.690]  The government is also guilty of this, because how many of us remember the government printing office in Pueblo, Colorado?
[08:02.830 --> 08:03.250]  Oh, yeah.
[08:03.430 --> 08:06.330]  Published so many fine publications on all sorts of things.
[08:06.470 --> 08:08.390]  All available for like a dollar or something, right?
[08:08.410 --> 08:10.010]  Or free with a lot of them.
[08:11.650 --> 08:13.610]  I remember ordering lots of publications.
[08:13.870 --> 08:18.490]  It was quite interesting back in the 70s, 80s, whatever, before the internet was commonplace.
[08:18.670 --> 08:20.770]  And now all that stuff is online.
[08:20.770 --> 08:22.890]  You can't order it from the government printing office anymore.
[08:23.110 --> 08:23.910]  You can't?
[08:24.490 --> 08:26.710]  A lot of it, they just stop printing.
[08:26.970 --> 08:27.590]  That's terrible.
[08:27.670 --> 08:29.270]  But they're the government printing office.
[08:29.410 --> 08:30.470]  How can they stop printing?
[08:31.270 --> 08:32.990]  They just stop publishing so many things.
[08:33.030 --> 08:35.910]  You know, I'm going to put out a call for action.
[08:35.910 --> 08:46.510]  I think if you're a hacker, and somebody says, go to the web for more information, there are lots of creative things you can do without sabotaging it.
[08:46.710 --> 08:54.030]  In other words, you know, like with the pet food, and ABC News, or NBC News, or whoever says, go to our website for more information.
[08:54.670 --> 09:00.230]  You know, put something up that says, we're secretly laughing at you, because here's the 800 number that we could have announced on our show.
[09:00.430 --> 09:01.490]  Change it to read that.
[09:01.910 --> 09:03.170]  See what the response is.
[09:03.330 --> 09:04.090]  You mean, hack into the website.
[09:04.150 --> 09:05.130]  Hack into the website.
[09:05.910 --> 09:08.890]  I'm sure lots of people looking for pet food information would appreciate that.
[09:09.070 --> 09:15.470]  No, leave the number as is, but, you know, put a snide comment up so these idiots with the news are punished.
[09:15.830 --> 09:17.270]  Well, I mean, I guess...
[09:17.270 --> 09:17.610]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[09:18.050 --> 09:19.430]  It's also very self-serving.
[09:19.550 --> 09:35.990]  These media outlets who are on television, radio, and so forth, that say, for more information about this critical thing that could affect your health or life or whatever, go to our website, where they have a whole bunch of ads and things you have to look at in order to get the information.
[09:35.990 --> 09:42.670]  Would it actually be just as easy for them to give out a number of the company who was making an announcement about the defective product or whatever?
[09:42.850 --> 09:48.410]  Of course, some news reports did give out an 800 number, and of course, it was clogged immediately and nobody could get through.
[09:48.630 --> 09:55.530]  So, you know, in all fairness, giving out a website does ensure more people can get through, but obviously, both bits of information should be given out.
[09:55.830 --> 09:56.070]  Yes.
[09:57.190 --> 09:57.550]  All right.
[09:58.230 --> 10:03.030]  Speaking of websites, here's one that has been having a bit of fun lately.
[10:03.330 --> 10:06.650]  Oh, he seems to be really Giuliani's website, so he seemed to attract trouble.
[10:06.990 --> 10:08.690]  But this one is a bit unusual.
[10:10.230 --> 10:10.630]  Republican...
[10:10.630 --> 10:12.630]  Did you know he was a Republican presidential frontrunner?
[10:12.810 --> 10:13.770]  Is he the frontrunner?
[10:13.950 --> 10:15.730]  Well, he's one of the frontrunners.
[10:15.870 --> 10:16.950]  Well, they say he's the frontrunner.
[10:16.990 --> 10:17.650]  God help us.
[10:17.790 --> 10:17.970]  Wow.
[10:18.110 --> 10:19.130]  How did Giuliani frontrunner...
[10:19.130 --> 10:19.350]  We're in trouble.
[10:20.830 --> 10:21.630]  His campaign...
[10:21.630 --> 10:22.170]  But you know what?
[10:22.170 --> 10:26.690]  They could elect a donkey to the office and it would still be better.
[10:26.990 --> 10:32.470]  I mean, you know, all due respect, seriously, anybody would be an improvement of what we have right now.
[10:33.110 --> 10:36.010]  I'm not going to make the obvious joke about synonyms for donkey.
[10:36.150 --> 10:41.830]  I know I'm going against what most people on the station say as far as criticizing the government, but sometimes you just have to do it.
[10:43.110 --> 10:51.810]  Anyway, yeah, so Rudy Giuliani, frontrunner, his campaign hurriedly fixed its official website late on Monday to remove a dangerous design flaw.
[10:51.810 --> 10:53.030]  A dangerous design flaw.
[10:53.110 --> 10:53.870]  People could have been hurt.
[10:54.330 --> 10:55.810]  It could have allowed hackers.
[10:56.050 --> 10:56.890]  Always hackers.
[10:57.150 --> 10:58.170]  Could have allowed hackers.
[10:58.370 --> 10:59.230]  Nobody else.
[10:59.470 --> 11:01.970]  Garbage men and doctors and philosophers.
[11:02.290 --> 11:05.810]  No, they would not be in any way tempted to do this.
[11:05.970 --> 11:08.670]  Only hackers would exploit this.
[11:09.850 --> 11:13.610]  And personal information could have been given out.
[11:13.690 --> 11:15.030]  Personal information of the volunteers.
[11:15.030 --> 11:20.510]  Now, the vulnerability affected his site, www.joinrudy2008.com.
[11:20.610 --> 11:23.290]  And yes, I know, www is not really part of the site.
[11:23.410 --> 11:24.250]  We just added that on.
[11:24.470 --> 11:26.950]  The actual site is joinrudy2008.com.
[11:27.070 --> 11:28.830]  Why are we saying his website so many times?
[11:29.210 --> 11:32.310]  In case there's any problem still, people might be able to find them and let us know.
[11:32.450 --> 11:32.670]  All right.
[11:33.530 --> 11:35.030]  Because we don't know the 800 number.
[11:35.030 --> 11:39.430]  The vulnerability could have exposed confidential information stored in the campaign's databases.
[11:39.790 --> 11:48.430]  The website failed to block commands that can instruct it to improperly display sensitive information, a popular hacking technique known as structured query language injection.
[11:48.510 --> 11:54.050]  Now, Mike, you made the point that this article that came from the Associated Press was unusually detailed.
[11:54.370 --> 11:58.970]  Yeah, usually they don't tell you what the vulnerability is.
[11:59.070 --> 12:02.750]  And then I believe the article goes on to explain what an SQL injection...
[12:02.750 --> 12:06.150]  SQL injection vulnerabilities have been implicated in large-scale web break-ins.
[12:06.250 --> 12:13.690]  The technique is among the most critical internet security vulnerabilities compiled by the SANS Institute, a cybersecurity research organization, and is a subject of warnings by the U.S.
[12:13.950 --> 12:16.190]  Computer Emergency Readiness Team, part of the Homeland Security Department.
[12:16.270 --> 12:16.710]  Is that what you meant?
[12:17.630 --> 12:18.430]  Something like that.
[12:18.490 --> 12:18.810]  All right, yeah.
[12:19.370 --> 12:22.970]  I just thought it was unusual that they would go to the trouble to explain all that.
[12:23.250 --> 12:31.430]  Well, there is one part of this story which is kind of unusual as well, if I can track this.
[12:31.430 --> 12:31.710]  Oh, yes.
[12:31.810 --> 12:36.790]  The campaign fixed the website hours after the Associated Press notified it about the problem.
[12:37.230 --> 12:39.950]  That tells me maybe somebody in the Associated Press found this.
[12:40.870 --> 12:41.610]  I don't know.
[12:41.710 --> 12:42.210]  It's possible.
[12:42.370 --> 12:45.110]  So the Associated Press has got at least one hacker in there.
[12:45.210 --> 12:48.330]  One of those hackers that might have been tempted to expose personal information.
[12:48.510 --> 12:50.530]  So it's not really hackers that are getting into it.
[12:50.530 --> 12:51.290]  It's the press.
[12:51.450 --> 12:52.870]  The press should be locked up.
[12:52.930 --> 12:59.570]  Well, it seems that a hacker, whether he works for the press or not, is who discovered the problem and helped to patch it.
[12:59.570 --> 13:00.570]  But you don't get the credit.
[13:00.810 --> 13:02.090]  You only get the blame.
[13:02.550 --> 13:03.370]  Not even the blame.
[13:03.450 --> 13:04.370]  The potential blame.
[13:04.450 --> 13:04.990]  Potential blame.
[13:06.190 --> 13:06.490]  Unbelievable.
[13:07.510 --> 13:08.150]  Okay, good news.
[13:08.250 --> 13:08.950]  Is this good news, Mike?
[13:08.950 --> 13:09.890]  I'm going to hand you the story.
[13:09.950 --> 13:10.650]  You tell us about it.
[13:12.170 --> 13:13.110]  Yes, it's good news.
[13:13.250 --> 13:14.490]  A court ruling that's good, right?
[13:14.630 --> 13:15.370]  Yes, it's good news.
[13:15.430 --> 13:15.650]  All right.
[13:15.970 --> 13:16.690]  Do you want me to explain?
[13:16.710 --> 13:17.930]  Tell us what's good news.
[13:17.930 --> 13:33.290]  The COPPA, which is the Children Online Protection Act, which is a pretty horrible name, is the successor to the Communications Decency Act, which was found, overturned, found to be unconstitutional.
[13:33.530 --> 13:37.010]  And the COPPA was also found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
[13:37.210 --> 13:41.970]  And they had to have this whole trial thing to make sure it's really unconstitutional.
[13:41.970 --> 13:48.310]  And it turns out that, yes, it's really unconstitutional for the government to block what adults can see on the internet.
[13:48.530 --> 13:51.190]  But, Mike, then who's going to protect the children online?
[13:52.130 --> 13:55.010]  Apparently filters, which is not a great solution, but...
[13:55.010 --> 13:55.590]  Filters?
[13:55.810 --> 13:57.150]  It's better than, like, you know...
[13:57.150 --> 13:59.610]  Well, what did this act mandate?
[14:00.010 --> 14:01.670]  What was unconstitutional about it?
[14:03.110 --> 14:05.090]  What the act mandated...
[14:05.090 --> 14:13.010]  It required that for certain adult sites, you needed to enter a credit card number, even if you weren't being charged, to prove that the person entering it was an adult.
[14:13.190 --> 14:15.870]  Because, gee, only adults would be entering credit card numbers.
[14:16.330 --> 14:18.810]  You'd have to enter a credit card number even if you weren't being charged.
[14:19.070 --> 14:19.230]  Right.
[14:19.410 --> 14:20.050]  It was...
[14:20.670 --> 14:21.090]  Only...
[14:21.090 --> 14:26.330]  They assumed that the thing that most adults would have, that most children would not, would be a credit card.
[14:26.990 --> 14:28.690]  Who makes these assumptions and how?
[14:28.850 --> 14:29.250]  Congress.
[14:29.590 --> 14:29.990]  I think it's Congress.
[14:30.590 --> 14:31.930]  Congress makes these assumptions.
[14:32.150 --> 14:32.870]  Oh, unbelievable.
[14:33.250 --> 14:36.150]  So a child could not possibly have a credit card number.
[14:36.170 --> 14:39.110]  Couldn't get a credit card, couldn't steal his parents' credit card.
[14:39.110 --> 14:43.670]  They couldn't find a 2600 story from years ago and how to generate fake credit card numbers.
[14:43.790 --> 14:49.030]  Can't they also make the assumption that a child could not possibly access an adult website because how would they know how to type the URL?
[14:50.070 --> 14:54.010]  They could make that, but that was stupid even for them.
[14:54.170 --> 14:54.510]  All right.
[14:55.090 --> 14:55.810]  Anything else, Mike?
[14:56.330 --> 15:00.010]  No, well, it's just good to see that this law has finally gone away.
[15:00.130 --> 15:03.690]  It's a 1998 law, and it took, I guess, nine years to go away.
[15:03.890 --> 15:06.470]  Was anyone prosecuted under this?
[15:06.470 --> 15:10.010]  Well, no, because the day after it was passed is when the court case started.
[15:10.150 --> 15:10.330]  Okay.
[15:10.970 --> 15:12.250]  And it's done.
[15:12.430 --> 15:13.210]  I think it's done.
[15:13.350 --> 15:14.090]  I hope it's done.
[15:14.530 --> 15:14.910]  Okay.
[15:14.990 --> 15:23.370]  Well, it's worth noting that the Communication Thiefs Act was sort of reincarnated as this COPA law.
[15:23.850 --> 15:29.950]  They kept trying and trying to pass a law like this that was unconstitutional.
[15:30.730 --> 15:33.210]  And there may be another revision of this in the works.
[15:33.210 --> 15:41.470]  I'm sure the people behind the Communication Thiefs Act and the COPA Act are not going to just give up and go away.
[15:42.190 --> 15:53.690]  One thing that's interesting is that the argument has been made that filters are an effective way to block children from accessing pornography and other dangerous things.
[15:53.690 --> 15:58.490]  But as we've discussed on this show many, many times, the filters don't work.
[15:58.570 --> 16:07.050]  And one of the main problems with them is that if your website gets listed in the filter, there's no way to get out.
[16:07.290 --> 16:12.890]  You know, there's no guaranteed process by which you can get yourself out of the filter.
[16:12.890 --> 16:30.170]  So it's kind of an interesting problem that in rejecting... in rightly rejecting government censorship, the courts have opened the way for this sort of private censorship, which you can't appeal is one of the main problems with it.
[16:30.170 --> 16:38.710]  And we know that pretty well because we're listed in a lot of these filters and we're blocked in a lot of places, a lot of schools, internet cafes, places like that.
[16:38.810 --> 16:40.850]  For some reason, they block 2600.com.
[16:41.010 --> 16:41.690]  I don't know why.
[16:41.810 --> 16:44.870]  I don't know what the information that they're afraid of is on there.
[16:45.170 --> 16:47.350]  As far as I know, we don't have any naked people.
[16:47.470 --> 16:48.390]  No naked people.
[16:48.530 --> 16:51.010]  And we don't have the magazine on there even.
[16:51.010 --> 16:59.810]  We just have these radio shows and some news items maybe, maybe some hope videos or hope audio transcripts, things like that.
[17:00.090 --> 17:00.650]  Nothing else.
[17:00.810 --> 17:01.290]  Pictures of pay phones.
[17:01.410 --> 17:02.150]  Pictures of pay phones.
[17:02.210 --> 17:02.910]  Maybe that's doing it.
[17:02.990 --> 17:03.310]  Who knows?
[17:03.450 --> 17:06.750]  But we have heard from several listeners who have fought this.
[17:06.910 --> 17:11.910]  They've gone to the manufacturers of the filtering software and they've contested it.
[17:11.970 --> 17:12.590]  Sometimes it works.
[17:12.670 --> 17:13.450]  Sometimes it doesn't.
[17:13.870 --> 17:19.910]  And we just encourage you, if you're blocked, if you find that you can't reach our site, then complain.
[17:19.910 --> 17:21.310]  Complain to your system administrator.
[17:21.510 --> 17:22.730]  Complain to the people who write the software.
[17:23.150 --> 17:24.010]  Enough people do that.
[17:24.130 --> 17:24.870]  It'll make a difference.
[17:25.170 --> 17:26.450]  But people have to do that.
[17:26.730 --> 17:28.290]  One would hope it will make a difference.
[17:28.470 --> 17:31.090]  But these software companies aren't really accountable.
[17:31.490 --> 17:32.030]  That's true.
[17:32.150 --> 17:33.330]  But there were a few cases where it worked.
[17:33.330 --> 17:34.090]  I was pretty impressed.
[17:34.210 --> 17:34.330]  Yeah.
[17:34.330 --> 17:36.710]  A couple of listeners emailed us and that was nice.
[17:36.830 --> 17:37.550]  Yeah, that was very nice.
[17:37.550 --> 17:38.590]  And we appreciate the effort.
[17:38.730 --> 17:39.470]  It doesn't always work.
[17:39.630 --> 17:42.850]  And of course, there are other sites too that you should be fighting for, not just us.
[17:44.350 --> 17:46.810]  So, yeah, blocking always bothers me.
[17:47.070 --> 17:48.370]  No matter who's doing it.
[17:49.530 --> 17:52.250]  Okay, this is an interesting little story that somebody sent in.
[17:52.650 --> 17:56.110]  Imagine you've gone through a multiple week process to purchase an automobile.
[17:56.390 --> 17:57.290]  You know the drill.
[17:57.430 --> 17:58.590]  You research every feature.
[17:58.770 --> 17:59.550]  You pick your color.
[17:59.950 --> 18:03.130]  And then it's negotiations for purchase, price, and for trade-in.
[18:03.670 --> 18:05.330]  Everything is done and agreed upon.
[18:05.330 --> 18:08.630]  And you're now ready to hand over the check and collect your new car.
[18:08.790 --> 18:09.710]  But wait.
[18:09.710 --> 18:14.250]  You're handed a slip of paper and told to mark your right thumbprint in a box.
[18:14.250 --> 18:20.630]  The paper says clearly that it's a request for your protection and to prevent your identity theft.
[18:21.410 --> 18:25.370]  When you politely decline, the dealership refuses to sell you the car.
[18:25.630 --> 18:27.730]  This is precisely what happened to me today.
[18:27.730 --> 18:29.750]  Not me, but the person who wrote this.
[18:29.910 --> 18:35.750]  When I tried to purchase a new X3 at the South Bay BMW dealer in Torrance, California.
[18:35.750 --> 18:37.190]  Let me restate.
[18:37.310 --> 18:44.090]  In order to buy a car with cash, you must authorize the release of your official DMV recorded thumbprint to the dealership.
[18:44.210 --> 18:45.150]  This is not a law.
[18:45.270 --> 18:46.650]  This is a dealership policy.
[18:47.290 --> 18:52.090]  Now, taken completely by surprise, my husband and I asked many questions about this process.
[18:52.090 --> 18:56.310]  We were told that the data would remain on file at the dealership for seven years.
[18:56.650 --> 18:59.790]  That this policy is in place to protect us.
[18:59.930 --> 19:03.210]  That there are many, many bad people in the world who commit fraud.
[19:03.210 --> 19:07.190]  And that by recording everybody's fingerprints, they would be deterred from committing fraud.
[19:07.790 --> 19:09.430]  We were unsatisfied with the answers.
[19:09.430 --> 19:13.130]  And we explained that we were not comfortable with this arbitrary demand for biometric data.
[19:13.250 --> 19:15.170]  And if this was required, we would not buy the car.
[19:15.570 --> 19:18.090]  The resident fat cat was phoned.
[19:18.250 --> 19:19.550]  I guess the owner of the dealership.
[19:19.850 --> 19:22.130]  Taking our call from his vacation spot in Hawaii.
[19:22.570 --> 19:26.570]  He replied that the collection and storage of biometric data is his policy.
[19:26.610 --> 19:27.750]  He would not make any exceptions.
[19:28.330 --> 19:30.510]  The sales staff was clearly paralyzed here.
[19:30.610 --> 19:32.470]  They'd spent time making this sale happen too.
[19:32.470 --> 19:34.750]  He pays our salary, and that's his rule.
[19:35.250 --> 19:40.910]  Well, customers pay his salary, and if he keeps treating them like criminals, I can't imagine he'll be able to afford many more trips to Hawaii.
[19:41.790 --> 19:43.110]  But didn't get them anywhere.
[19:43.790 --> 19:45.690]  That story coming from the...
[19:46.410 --> 19:47.190]  What is this?
[19:47.330 --> 19:51.570]  The lornamatic.com blog, I guess.
[19:53.030 --> 19:55.650]  Slash WordPress, question mark, P equals 141.
[19:55.770 --> 19:56.490]  You can see that story.
[19:57.050 --> 19:59.430]  I can't think of any situation where this would help anything.
[19:59.590 --> 19:59.850]  Can you?
[19:59.850 --> 20:03.870]  I mean, in what situation could they possibly need the fingerprint?
[20:04.830 --> 20:06.130]  I'm trying to think of that myself.
[20:06.270 --> 20:07.790]  Somebody steals a car, perhaps?
[20:08.050 --> 20:08.170]  Yeah.
[20:08.170 --> 20:10.270]  What if the criminals don't have thumbs?
[20:10.710 --> 20:11.470]  Well, okay.
[20:11.470 --> 20:12.310]  There's that possibility.
[20:12.610 --> 20:12.910]  Okay.
[20:13.070 --> 20:22.170]  When someone buys for cash, you're not really buying for cash because most dealerships will simply not accept $20,000, $30,000, or God knows how much.
[20:22.170 --> 20:25.470]  In bills, you're giving them a certified check.
[20:25.750 --> 20:26.990]  That can be forged.
[20:27.270 --> 20:39.350]  In fact, the common internet scheme is to get somebody to accept a check for something and then mail you back the money and then your bank discovers the check is fraudulent and deducts it from your account.
[20:39.350 --> 20:42.770]  Similarly, that's what this dealership appears to be fearing.
[20:42.910 --> 20:44.410]  But there are ways around that.
[20:44.550 --> 20:49.710]  They can inquire of the bank as to whether, you know, get a bank check or something.
[20:49.990 --> 20:53.770]  There's no good reason for a little more work on the dealer's part.
[20:53.950 --> 20:56.470]  And, gee, the dealer's doing an awful lot of work anyway.
[20:56.730 --> 20:59.010]  It's not like they're adding really anything to it.
[20:59.010 --> 21:05.590]  If there's no good reason for them to ask for the thumbprint, you know, it's not like it's an internet scam.
[21:05.590 --> 21:07.650]  You're actually seeing the person buying it.
[21:08.230 --> 21:14.110]  These days, it's very easy to get people's thumbprints in various software applications.
[21:14.390 --> 21:22.070]  There are laptops where you can get identification verification simply by putting your thumb onto the laptop.
[21:23.070 --> 21:30.470]  There were a lot of methods demonstrated at Hope and at CCC where you can literally get people's thumbprints very, very easily, by the way.
[21:30.530 --> 21:36.390]  It sounds like it's some complicated procedure, but off of people's glasses and cups and, you know, off tables and stuff like that.
[21:36.450 --> 21:39.030]  And it's really a lot simpler than people seem to make it out to be.
[21:39.130 --> 21:52.710]  And because it's so simple, people feel compelled to add it into something that they're doing, like just to protect themselves and maybe to intimidate people who might be thinking of doing something a bit on toward, give me your thumb and I'm going to record this.
[21:53.270 --> 21:57.530]  And I think the biggest problem is people who don't say no.
[21:57.530 --> 21:59.590]  People who just blindly accept this.
[21:59.710 --> 22:09.130]  And I think that's responsible for 90% of the problems facing us today, people who blindly accept things and don't question and don't refuse like this person did.
[22:09.430 --> 22:09.950]  Emmanuel?
[22:10.170 --> 22:10.350]  Yes.
[22:10.990 --> 22:18.510]  On my trip back a couple days ago from Eastern Europe, it was the first time I was on a flight back to the U.S.
[22:19.170 --> 22:34.870]  where the pilot made the announcement that, or someone on the flight crew made an announcement that most of the people on the plane would have to be fingerprinted and digitally photographed to enter the United States, which is a new federal law.
[22:35.430 --> 22:36.650]  This does not include U.S.
[22:36.650 --> 22:37.650]  citizens yet.
[22:37.650 --> 22:49.030]  But it sounded eerie and I looked around and saw the expressions on many of these people's faces who, or maybe this was their first trip to the United States, and they were aghast.
[22:49.170 --> 22:50.710]  They were not aware of this.
[22:51.570 --> 23:02.650]  And it was really kind of interesting sitting there and watching people from other countries react to this Orwellian policy of our own government.
[23:02.650 --> 23:04.770]  Yeah, that is something.
[23:04.830 --> 23:07.130]  And I imagine a lot more people will be aghast.
[23:07.350 --> 23:08.410]  And they can't say no.
[23:09.370 --> 23:11.350]  At that point, unless they want to turn around and go back.
[23:11.810 --> 23:12.250]  Yeah, exactly.
[23:12.410 --> 23:15.730]  I ran into something similar when I was coming back from my vacation.
[23:16.250 --> 23:18.890]  Obviously, it was just thumbprints, though, from foreigners.
[23:19.290 --> 23:24.550]  But my question is, what if you burned your hands and you can't print with your thumbs?
[23:24.590 --> 23:30.590]  Or what if you got some horrible scratch on your face where your whole face is covered and bandages?
[23:30.890 --> 23:34.550]  Are they going to ask you to remove all that or what?
[23:34.750 --> 23:37.350]  Well, I imagine that they would use a backup of some sort.
[23:37.430 --> 23:39.250]  If your thumb isn't available, they'll use a finger.
[23:39.450 --> 23:42.270]  If your whole hand isn't available, they'll use a retina scan.
[23:43.550 --> 23:48.770]  If both your eyes and your hands aren't available, then they'll just scrape some DNA or something.
[23:48.870 --> 23:49.210]  I don't know.
[23:49.310 --> 23:51.870]  There's always going to be some backup solution that they have in mind.
[23:51.870 --> 24:03.310]  What I'm getting at, though, is maybe if this does come in place, there could be some movement for people to, you know, sell, like, kits for bandaging your face up or something when you want to come into the U.S.
[24:03.430 --> 24:04.530]  Oh, that'll go over really well.
[24:05.210 --> 24:15.010]  We mentioned this on the show before where friends of ours from Europe and various other places around the world don't come here because they don't want to give up their biometric data.
[24:15.250 --> 24:19.050]  And, you know, if you think about it, I probably wouldn't want to do that either.
[24:19.050 --> 24:25.530]  If I wanted to go to one of the conferences in Europe or something, you know, I wouldn't want to be giving over my thumbprints to other countries.
[24:25.690 --> 24:28.630]  But, you know, nobody ever thinks about it that way.
[24:28.790 --> 24:32.310]  You know, it's always us imposing the restrictions on everybody else.
[24:34.070 --> 24:37.930]  Well, just another bit of bad news for people.
[24:38.390 --> 24:46.890]  You know, there's another regulation on airplanes, which I don't know if people have noticed, but they tell you now that you can't gather by the bathrooms to wait for them anymore.
[24:46.890 --> 24:55.110]  I don't know what they think you're going to do, but, and I don't know how this is even possible, but you have to wait until the bathroom is free before you get up and go to it.
[24:55.170 --> 24:56.310]  How do you know when it's free?
[24:56.650 --> 25:02.590]  It seems like you have a big advantage if you sit near it, but unless you're constantly looking at it, there's no way you're ever going to know.
[25:02.870 --> 25:05.070]  There was a big gathering on my flight, Emmanuel.
[25:05.210 --> 25:05.510]  Was there?
[25:05.670 --> 25:06.210]  What were you up to?
[25:06.290 --> 25:06.810]  The whole time.
[25:07.230 --> 25:09.730]  Nothing wasn't even up to anything, surprisingly.
[25:11.570 --> 25:21.450]  But, no, the few times I got up to the laboratory, there were four or five people gathered around the door, and there was no sign saying you couldn't hang out.
[25:21.530 --> 25:26.110]  This was an Air Austria flight, so I don't know whether this is just domestic U.S.
[25:26.250 --> 25:27.910]  flights or what.
[25:28.050 --> 25:29.630]  We were over the North Atlantic at the time.
[25:30.810 --> 25:31.110]  Interesting.
[25:31.230 --> 25:35.110]  Well, I noticed it on a domestic flight, so I don't know if overseas anything goes.
[25:35.110 --> 25:38.190]  Yeah, probably when you enter American airspace, you all have to sit down.
[25:39.230 --> 25:39.810]  Don't laugh.
[25:39.890 --> 25:41.070]  That may very well be the case.
[25:42.570 --> 25:46.470]  Okay, here's some letters from some of our listeners.
[25:46.470 --> 25:53.230]  You can write to us, OTH at 2600.com, and we'll be taking phone calls in just a couple of minutes, 212-209-2900.
[25:53.350 --> 25:56.790]  Remember, not on next week, so if you want to call in, this is your chance.
[25:58.090 --> 26:05.590]  On a recent off-the-hook, there was a discussion about residual data being stored on a photocopier hard disk, and that's a lot of fun.
[26:05.990 --> 26:07.070]  Yes, this is a fact.
[26:07.150 --> 26:09.830]  Data is still residual on a photocopier's hard drive.
[26:09.950 --> 26:12.270]  Xerox has a line of printers called...
[26:13.330 --> 26:14.590]  Sorry, that was me, I think.
[26:15.150 --> 26:22.250]  Xerox has a line of printers called the DoncuColor Series, 250, 60, 60, 7000, and 8000.
[26:23.090 --> 26:28.030]  When these machines are installed, they usually have the default Xerox password stored on them.
[26:28.190 --> 26:30.070]  I'm sure you'll be able to find it on Google.
[26:30.630 --> 26:35.470]  Any user on the network can print to this device as long as they are set up with the proper drivers.
[26:36.250 --> 26:40.050]  Xerox has an application for download on their site called Command Workstation.
[26:40.050 --> 26:44.090]  All one needs to do is have the default password for the printer.
[26:44.230 --> 26:58.030]  You install the software, you browse the network for compatible DocuColor printers, and now you can preview and print any document that has been left in the completed queue, the completed queue, all with one simple, easy-to-use application and no drivers.
[26:58.030 --> 27:00.710]  This even works when a printer is power-cycled.
[27:00.830 --> 27:02.270]  Signed, Wireless Packet.
[27:02.350 --> 27:07.310]  Thank you very much for writing in Wireless Packet with that scary bit of info that I think a lot of us knew already.
[27:07.570 --> 27:08.890]  This kind of thing is possible.
[27:09.310 --> 27:16.550]  That brand, Xerox, is not the only brand of color copier printer that uses this Command Workstation software.
[27:16.610 --> 27:25.570]  I know that the Canon color laser copier printers that are networkable, they also use the same application, Command Workstation.
[27:25.570 --> 27:28.990]  Is it something unique to color copiers?
[27:31.950 --> 27:33.030]  I think so.
[27:33.690 --> 27:41.710]  I think unless it's a really high-end black-and-white copier, it probably isn't expensive enough to warrant the type of digital...
[27:41.710 --> 27:42.270]  I don't know.
[27:42.470 --> 27:43.070]  I probably...
[27:43.070 --> 27:49.450]  I'm assuming it's much more common in color copiers than black-and-white copiers, but it may be in some higher-end black-and-white copiers.
[27:49.450 --> 27:52.090]  I also imagine a lot of fax machines also have this capability.
[27:52.090 --> 27:56.410]  When you fax a document to somebody a year ago, maybe they can call it up and find it again.
[27:57.170 --> 27:57.570]  No.
[27:57.870 --> 28:02.730]  I don't think most fax machines have hard drives in them.
[28:02.730 --> 28:21.570]  But I discovered something in Panasonic fax machines a couple of years ago, that they have a service mode by which it can be programmed to send a copy of all outgoing faxes to another number.
[28:22.630 --> 28:35.230]  And you don't even know about it, unless you, like, scrutinize the... print out the fax logs and scrutinize them and say, hey, all these faxes are also going to some other number in addition to my target number.
[28:35.290 --> 28:43.650]  And I was talking to this copier technician about this who was fixing my machine at the office, and he said, yeah, we use that feature all the time for various things.
[28:43.710 --> 28:45.450]  And I thought, wow, that's kind of scary.
[28:45.570 --> 28:46.430]  That is very scary.
[28:46.530 --> 28:48.210]  I imagine it makes another phone call, right?
[28:48.790 --> 28:49.410]  Yes, it does.
[28:49.410 --> 28:53.050]  So you could at least catch it dialing the phone again, wondering what it's up to.
[28:53.370 --> 28:59.430]  Yeah, but at a busy office, you don't really notice it because people are always sticking things in the fax machine, and it's dialing, and you hear things going out.
[28:59.710 --> 29:02.010]  It probably wouldn't raise eyebrows in a busy office.
[29:02.110 --> 29:03.530]  If it was your home fax machine, yes.
[29:03.790 --> 29:07.070]  But this is for, like, business-grade Panasonic fax machines.
[29:07.530 --> 29:09.150]  What's the purpose of that feature?
[29:09.290 --> 29:10.190]  I'm trying to figure this out.
[29:10.830 --> 29:12.930]  There's a lot of service modes, and that's one of them.
[29:13.510 --> 29:27.410]  If you're looking to see if there's a consistent print quality or scanning quality problem, I'm not really sure what the reason is, but there is that, and there's some other interesting features where you could actually call into the fax machine with a modem running special service software,
[29:27.450 --> 29:31.070]  which I didn't have access to, that would let you set that mode.
[29:31.170 --> 29:32.470]  So you could actually do this remotely.
[29:32.610 --> 29:34.510]  You didn't even have to be at the fax machine to do this.
[29:34.530 --> 29:39.130]  So you can call into the fax machine and set it up so it sends you a copy of every fax that goes out.
[29:39.170 --> 29:39.670]  That's amazing.
[29:40.010 --> 29:40.270]  Yes.
[29:40.430 --> 29:43.450]  I don't know if it's unique to Panasonic, but I know Panasonic can be made to do this.
[29:43.450 --> 29:47.670]  Do you know if it can be set up to send you a copy of the fax that's coming in as well?
[29:48.870 --> 29:51.910]  I don't know, but I'm sure the software could be hacked to do that.
[29:52.030 --> 29:53.250]  Okay, because I would appreciate that.
[29:53.270 --> 29:57.990]  I could use that for a project I'm working on, but we'll get into that later.
[29:58.570 --> 29:59.370]  Okay, here's another letter.
[29:59.450 --> 30:01.650]  I've been a Vonage customer for about four years now.
[30:01.650 --> 30:07.990]  I had some problems in the past, but my recent problems coupled with that lawsuit with Verizon scares me.
[30:07.990 --> 30:14.670]  I was wondering if you guys could point me in the right direction as far as making my own personal VoIP system, voice over IP.
[30:15.230 --> 30:24.570]  I've figured out that I can use something like Asterisk to work with the phone in my house for voicemail, et cetera, but I can't find anything on how I can put a number on the public switching system.
[30:25.050 --> 30:27.190]  Can you give me some insight?
[30:27.410 --> 30:28.350]  Signed, HypoBoxer.
[30:28.430 --> 30:31.050]  And also, HypoBoxer says, Redbird should write a book.
[30:31.170 --> 30:32.930]  This past week, he talked about flying an airplane.
[30:32.930 --> 30:33.830]  He's a ham operator.
[30:33.970 --> 30:35.550]  Is there anything else he's not telling us?
[30:36.390 --> 30:37.850]  Is there, Redbird, anything else?
[30:37.850 --> 30:38.810]  I can't tell you.
[30:39.010 --> 30:42.150]  Well, since you're the one writing the book, I think maybe you should try to answer this question.
[30:43.050 --> 30:46.110]  I'm probably the one who has the least experience with Asterisk in the room.
[30:46.490 --> 30:48.090]  Mike, didn't you set up some stuff?
[30:48.090 --> 30:48.490]  Did you just say Asterisk?
[30:48.910 --> 30:49.290]  Whatever.
[30:49.630 --> 30:49.910]  All right.
[30:50.230 --> 30:51.010]  Mike, how about you?
[30:52.190 --> 30:56.350]  Well, to become your own phone provider is very hard, very expensive.
[30:56.490 --> 31:04.850]  You don't want to do it, but there's a number of companies that will sell you a phone number and provide the connectivity to the public switch network.
[31:05.530 --> 31:07.930]  You will have to contract with one of them.
[31:08.730 --> 31:11.570]  Any examples of what these might be or how he can find them?
[31:12.630 --> 31:14.270]  I mean, Vonage is one.
[31:14.510 --> 31:15.550]  They're the best known.
[31:16.310 --> 31:20.390]  I can't think of any others off the top of my head, but there's a whole bunch.
[31:20.590 --> 31:26.110]  If you go to voip-info.org, there's a wiki and there's a whole bunch of them in there.
[31:26.510 --> 31:26.670]  Okay.
[31:26.730 --> 31:29.170]  One that we looked up at one point was VOIPJet, I think.
[31:29.450 --> 31:31.190]  They only do outgoing, not incoming.
[31:31.190 --> 31:31.870]  Oh, okay.
[31:32.650 --> 31:33.250]  All right.
[31:33.450 --> 31:34.370]  I'll put that in my book.
[31:34.890 --> 31:35.970]  Yeah, keep us updated.
[31:37.570 --> 31:37.970]  Okay.
[31:38.210 --> 31:38.690]  Hi, guys.
[31:38.750 --> 31:39.150]  Great show.
[31:39.230 --> 31:39.570]  I love it.
[31:39.610 --> 31:48.630]  I thought you might like to know for future reference that fly tipping, something we discussed last week, is a term for illegal dumping rubbish somewhere other than an authorized landfill site.
[31:48.790 --> 31:56.970]  Businesses get charged by weight for waste that they take to a landfill, so it's quite common for unscrupulous businesses to dump rubbish in quiet county lanes.
[31:56.990 --> 32:00.530]  This is, of course, in England where they use phrases like fly tipping all the time.
[32:01.190 --> 32:07.350]  We also use the term fly posting for illegally putting posters up on buildings to advertise events and clubs.
[32:07.490 --> 32:09.110]  I have no idea what we have against flies.
[32:09.750 --> 32:11.430]  That's Andy from Manchester.
[32:11.830 --> 32:13.990]  Are you going to tell him something about his own country, Jim?
[32:14.070 --> 32:17.370]  No, I'm going to tell him something about the English language, which we share in some extent.
[32:17.530 --> 32:18.650]  They invented it, though.
[32:18.730 --> 32:21.570]  Yes, but we've advanced it in a different direction.
[32:21.990 --> 32:22.730]  Yeah, backwards.
[32:23.150 --> 32:23.590]  Well, no, no.
[32:23.590 --> 32:27.110]  If he goes to the OED, he'll see that there are two roots to the word fly.
[32:27.310 --> 32:28.630]  One is the insect.
[32:29.310 --> 32:32.970]  The other is the similarity to the word flea.
[32:33.170 --> 32:39.690]  In other words, doing something on the fly, that's the root of the fly and fly tipping and fly posting.
[32:40.330 --> 32:43.270]  Tipping your garbage bins over on the fly.
[32:43.670 --> 32:46.050]  Posting your posters on a wall on the fly.
[32:46.310 --> 32:47.610]  That's the entomology of this.
[32:47.690 --> 32:48.610]  We thought it was the insect.
[32:48.750 --> 32:49.250]  We were wrong.
[32:49.870 --> 32:51.850]  You've devoted a lot of thought to this over the last week.
[32:51.850 --> 32:52.250]  I can tell.
[32:52.370 --> 32:55.590]  No, it was just 30 seconds from the time you read that till now.
[32:55.590 --> 32:56.650]  Oh, for you, that's a lot of thought.
[32:57.010 --> 32:59.030]  I have a very active brain.
[32:59.190 --> 33:00.530]  There's also flying up in the air.
[33:00.710 --> 33:02.290]  Yeah, I know, but that doesn't apply in this case.
[33:03.150 --> 33:04.170]  Entomology or etymology?
[33:04.630 --> 33:05.850]  Ah, both in this case.
[33:06.390 --> 33:06.670]  Ah.
[33:07.650 --> 33:09.190]  Okay, continuing right along here.
[33:09.210 --> 33:14.030]  I was wondering if the Hope DVDs were mailed out yet from the fundraiser show, because I still have not received mine yet.
[33:14.030 --> 33:15.830]  Well, you definitely should have by now if you paid.
[33:15.830 --> 33:17.610]  If you didn't pay, then you shouldn't have received them.
[33:17.650 --> 33:18.890]  But if you did pay, you should have.
[33:19.050 --> 33:19.790]  And let us know.
[33:19.910 --> 33:21.470]  OTH at 2600.com.
[33:22.010 --> 33:26.490]  Continuing with this letter, I received my Off the Hook t-shirt about a week ago, and it was an XL.
[33:26.490 --> 33:33.590]  I was wondering if there was any way I could maybe exchange it for a smaller medium, as I would actually like to wear it outside and support the show.
[33:34.170 --> 33:34.670]  Signed, Joey.
[33:34.790 --> 33:36.850]  Well, Joey, unfortunately, we only have XL.
[33:36.850 --> 33:38.750]  That's the only size of Off the Hook shirts we make.
[33:38.810 --> 33:41.790]  And the reason for that is it's a complete donation for us.
[33:41.970 --> 33:48.530]  And for us to start fooling around with different sizes and things like that, we just have to sort of gamble and hope that everybody can do something with an XL.
[33:49.150 --> 33:51.030]  XL, because the XLs aren't really XL.
[33:51.230 --> 33:52.070]  They're more like Ls.
[33:52.470 --> 33:53.830]  I don't know why that is.
[33:53.930 --> 34:01.050]  But they seem to fit the most people, and we get the most orders for our other shirts that we actually sell in XL size.
[34:02.970 --> 34:08.170]  So unless we start making even more shirts, then what are you shaking your head for, Mike?
[34:09.070 --> 34:11.830]  I don't know proof of this analysis, but it's okay.
[34:12.050 --> 34:13.150]  Well, we do only have one size.
[34:13.370 --> 34:13.670]  I know.
[34:13.870 --> 34:15.310]  I know we have only one size.
[34:15.450 --> 34:16.470]  I still don't have to like it.
[34:16.630 --> 34:17.530]  Well, yeah, that's true.
[34:17.710 --> 34:22.470]  But I think I could fit my entire body within that shirt, which isn't really the point of a shirt.
[34:22.490 --> 34:23.570]  Wash it in hot water.
[34:23.950 --> 34:24.310]  Yeah.
[34:24.410 --> 34:26.070]  I mean, you can always shrink the things.
[34:26.430 --> 34:34.070]  The thing is, you know, even if we made more than one size of that shirt, the odds of you getting the right size would probably be pretty slim.
[34:34.470 --> 34:38.270]  Because people have to write it down, and the handwriting is always getting misread.
[34:38.570 --> 34:40.470]  It's just one other thing to go wrong.
[34:40.730 --> 34:43.550]  So, yeah, I don't know what else we can do about that.
[34:43.610 --> 34:44.910]  We can try different sizes.
[34:45.070 --> 34:49.410]  Maybe we can send out large shirts, and then we'll get complaints from big people that don't want...
[34:49.410 --> 34:50.070]  It's true.
[34:50.110 --> 34:54.290]  We do get complaints from people who are both too small and too big for this shirt.
[34:54.370 --> 34:54.930]  At the same time.
[34:54.970 --> 34:55.470]  The same people.
[34:55.810 --> 34:56.670]  Sometimes it happens.
[34:56.890 --> 34:57.690]  Amazing how people complain.
[34:58.010 --> 35:02.050]  But thanks for your donation, and please let us know if you did not get the DVDs.
[35:02.050 --> 35:05.650]  Also, I should point out that we're having a fundraiser on the other show.
[35:05.790 --> 35:09.090]  In fact, we had one last night on Off the Wall over at WUSB.
[35:09.230 --> 35:11.470]  We have one next Tuesday night.
[35:11.470 --> 35:12.890]  That show airs from 6 to 7.
[35:13.030 --> 35:16.770]  And yes, we are offering that DVD package one more time.
[35:16.790 --> 35:18.910]  This really will be the last time next Tuesday.
[35:19.130 --> 35:25.090]  Got a lot of mail from people yesterday that wanted to pledge and missed the show and weren't able to pledge between 6 and 7 p.m.
[35:25.550 --> 35:26.130]  next week.
[35:26.310 --> 35:29.350]  Details are on the website, www.2600.com.
[35:29.350 --> 35:31.230]  You can get the full help DVD set.
[35:31.710 --> 35:33.350]  Are you going to offer those in the small size?
[35:33.710 --> 35:34.310]  What do you mean?
[35:35.530 --> 35:36.410]  DVDs in the small size?
[35:36.510 --> 35:36.950]  Are you trying to be funny?
[35:37.990 --> 35:38.950]  I'm fairly miserable.
[35:39.510 --> 35:40.190]  My goodness.
[35:40.430 --> 35:44.750]  The New York Times just published a story about NYPD spying before the RNC.
[35:44.990 --> 35:46.370]  That in itself is an interesting story.
[35:46.830 --> 35:48.390]  And you know, that story seems to be appearing everywhere.
[35:48.550 --> 35:50.490]  Can we take a poll of the people in this room?
[35:51.070 --> 35:56.610]  Is anyone shocked by the news that the New York Police Department was spying on people before the Republican Convention?
[35:56.610 --> 36:00.430]  Well, I wouldn't be shocked because it's already been reported in Newsday and in The Voice.
[36:01.090 --> 36:03.450]  So, I don't know why the Times is just getting it now.
[36:03.610 --> 36:04.790]  Well, they're a little slow.
[36:04.870 --> 36:05.650]  It's like the same story.
[36:05.790 --> 36:07.470]  It keeps appearing once a week somewhere else.
[36:07.470 --> 36:10.470]  I guess the news here is that some of the spying they did was not in New York City.
[36:10.490 --> 36:12.510]  But I thought I already knew that.
[36:12.710 --> 36:14.090]  Well, I know Washington, D.C.
[36:14.170 --> 36:16.670]  police spied on the Philadelphia protesters in 2000.
[36:16.770 --> 36:19.890]  And it's insane how they all cooperate with each other.
[36:19.890 --> 36:25.570]  But here's what this reader, Max in Swarthmore, is telling us, which is kind of interesting.
[36:25.950 --> 36:26.970]  Here's a quote from the story.
[36:27.470 --> 36:28.690]  Participants at a conference.
[36:28.690 --> 36:31.030]  It's great how they don't ever name our conference.
[36:31.390 --> 36:32.770]  Every single story.
[36:32.910 --> 36:33.690]  You're giving it away.
[36:33.890 --> 36:39.250]  Every single story that has been about this has never said Hope Conference, has never said Computer Hackers.
[36:39.330 --> 36:40.710]  They've always just said A Conference.
[36:41.010 --> 36:42.010]  And it's okay with me.
[36:42.030 --> 36:42.490]  I don't care.
[36:42.610 --> 36:43.630]  But it's just kind of funny.
[36:43.630 --> 36:53.590]  Anyway, participants at a conference were said to have discussed getting inside delegates' hotels by making hair salon appointments or dinner reservations.
[36:53.710 --> 37:07.890]  Now, that exact example came from something that I did with Shapeshifter, our layout artist, the 2600, back in 2002 at the World Economic Forum when it was...
[37:07.890 --> 37:08.950]  What hotel was that at?
[37:09.050 --> 37:09.770]  The Waldorf Astoria?
[37:10.030 --> 37:10.130]  Yeah.
[37:10.130 --> 37:16.410]  And you couldn't get anywhere near that hotel unless you had an appointment at a hair salon inside the hotel.
[37:16.490 --> 37:18.370]  And they just had to let you in then.
[37:18.490 --> 37:26.010]  So we had our eyebrows waxed or something and got to go inside the hotel where all the delegates were and even caused a little bit of a disruption.
[37:26.250 --> 37:27.190]  Not intentionally.
[37:27.510 --> 37:27.650]  Eyebrows waxed?
[37:27.830 --> 37:28.070]  Yeah.
[37:28.230 --> 37:29.870]  Well, something like that.
[37:30.230 --> 37:30.470]  Yeah.
[37:31.330 --> 37:33.150]  That wasn't the important part of the story.
[37:33.250 --> 37:36.150]  The important part was that we have to gain access to the hotel.
[37:36.150 --> 37:41.230]  And that's the kind of thing that was discussed at this conference, this mystery conference that everybody's talking about.
[37:41.450 --> 37:53.790]  At the same conference, the story goes on, people were reported to have discussed disabling charter buses and trying to confuse delegates by switching subway directional signs or by sealing off stations with crime scene tape.
[37:53.930 --> 37:56.270]  Real Al-Qaeda type tactics here.
[37:56.270 --> 37:59.750]  And I can understand now why the police responded in such force.
[38:00.570 --> 38:02.890]  Anyway, that was one of the talks at the Fifth Hope.
[38:03.170 --> 38:06.730]  Good to know the NYPD was paying attention to what we have to say, signed Max.
[38:07.150 --> 38:08.710]  Not only the Fifth Hope, but also Hope No.
[38:08.790 --> 38:08.930]  6.
[38:08.970 --> 38:09.250]  Hope No.
[38:09.370 --> 38:09.590]  6.
[38:09.770 --> 38:11.170]  Did we talk about this at all at Fifth Hope?
[38:11.290 --> 38:11.990]  I think we might have.
[38:12.190 --> 38:12.930]  How could we have?
[38:12.990 --> 38:13.710]  There was no conference.
[38:13.950 --> 38:14.690]  Yeah, but still.
[38:15.190 --> 38:19.150]  Maybe it wasn't with regards to this particular conference, but those tactics...
[38:19.150 --> 38:20.050]  I don't know.
[38:20.170 --> 38:20.570]  It's possible.
[38:22.750 --> 38:24.070]  Here's a letter from Donna.
[38:24.390 --> 38:25.110]  I love your show.
[38:25.110 --> 38:25.870]  I'm in New Jersey.
[38:25.870 --> 38:27.670]  I run a small business and have a web page.
[38:27.930 --> 38:29.410]  Recently, my page was hacked.
[38:29.610 --> 38:31.890]  Someone changed the text around and deleted some stuff.
[38:32.270 --> 38:39.810]  I'm looking for you to help because on your show, Freedom Down Time, you hacked companies' websites, and I thought you may know how these people hacked our site.
[38:41.110 --> 38:41.670]  Well, okay.
[38:41.750 --> 38:42.770]  A couple of things here.
[38:42.870 --> 38:44.110]  First of all, it was a movie.
[38:44.230 --> 38:44.710]  It wasn't a show.
[38:44.870 --> 38:45.410]  That's okay.
[38:46.390 --> 38:51.430]  I'm not sure how you got the idea that we hacked anything on that movie or show, whatever you want to call it.
[38:51.610 --> 38:57.570]  We might have showed a couple of pictures of hacked websites, but we did not hack any company websites in that film.
[38:58.710 --> 39:02.230]  As far as what you can do, what kind of advice would you give?
[39:02.230 --> 39:10.550]  I can tell you that most relatively cheap web providers don't bother to set up any form of encrypted file transfer or restrict you to that anyway.
[39:10.710 --> 39:22.470]  So people are generally using FTP connections and insecure POP connections to check their email, which uses the same password as the account in which you log in to upload your web page data.
[39:22.570 --> 39:23.850]  And that's the most common thing I've seen.
[39:23.850 --> 39:33.210]  And those passwords go flying across unencrypted networks all the time if you're associated with an access point that's not encrypted or, you know, using any other type of public wireless connection.
[39:33.490 --> 39:36.450]  Generally speaking, that's the easiest way to get login information.
[39:36.710 --> 39:41.130]  Maybe you will tell us in your book what people can do about it.
[39:41.130 --> 39:53.190]  You can check to see whether or not your provider will allow you to have, for example, SSH access, which allows you to encrypt your files and transfer them over the network.
[39:53.190 --> 39:54.970]  It's far more secure than FTP.
[39:55.210 --> 40:07.170]  And what this lady can do now is probably talk to her ISP and tell them, or not the ISP, but the hosting company and say, hey, someone, you know, did something bad to a website.
[40:07.170 --> 40:08.150]  Do you have logs?
[40:08.150 --> 40:13.530]  And I think, I mean, most do, mine probably, I mean, mine I know does, and it's like the cheapest you can get.
[40:14.430 --> 40:14.830]  Yeah.
[40:15.330 --> 40:24.370]  Usually, I mean, it'll take you a great deal more effort to look through the logs and try to figure out what happened rather than just changing your password, you know, restoring the webpage and kind of forgetting about it.
[40:24.470 --> 40:28.470]  Because to pursue that is going to be far more effort than it's worth, generally speaking.
[40:28.730 --> 40:31.250]  Restoring the website is a very important part of all this.
[40:31.350 --> 40:32.330]  That means keeping backups.
[40:32.330 --> 40:38.570]  That means not being caught ever in a vulnerable situation where somebody can destroy all your work.
[40:38.670 --> 40:39.470]  Always have a backup.
[40:39.610 --> 40:44.510]  Don't keep it in the same directory as the main page or anything like that.
[40:44.610 --> 40:47.510]  Keep it on a different computer, if at all possible.
[40:47.670 --> 40:50.190]  Keep it on a backup tape or something like that.
[40:51.210 --> 40:55.970]  Because, you know, most destructions of websites are accidental.
[40:56.170 --> 40:57.630]  People erase things by accident.
[40:58.630 --> 41:00.030]  Or hardware fails.
[41:00.350 --> 41:02.130]  All hardware fails at some point.
[41:02.590 --> 41:04.130]  Or, you know, things blow up.
[41:04.130 --> 41:04.930]  It happens.
[41:05.170 --> 41:05.690]  It really does.
[41:06.270 --> 41:07.810]  So, just be prepared for that.
[41:07.930 --> 41:10.850]  And it might be a little bit of a hassle, but it won't be a catastrophe.
[41:11.650 --> 41:12.850]  Okay, here's another letter.
[41:12.950 --> 41:13.930]  And again, we'll be taking phone calls.
[41:14.370 --> 41:17.610]  212-209-2900 is our phone number.
[41:19.750 --> 41:24.570]  I recently experienced troubles trying to use my internet connection in the UK.
[41:24.610 --> 41:28.130]  I logged onto my ISP's website to use the online help.
[41:28.130 --> 41:37.070]  And the only thing they were able to tell me was that it was a problem regarding some of BT's routers that wasn't redirecting internet traffic the way it should do.
[41:37.810 --> 41:39.550]  At this point, I was puzzled.
[41:39.710 --> 41:44.150]  Why on earth does the internet traffic have to go through BT's routers in order to get where I want to go?
[41:44.650 --> 41:46.990]  I then ran a trace route to one of Google's servers.
[41:47.170 --> 41:52.150]  The output didn't show any hit to any of BT's routers, which confirmed to me that someone didn't know their business.
[41:52.410 --> 41:53.890]  And I was slightly upset about this.
[41:53.890 --> 41:57.250]  I decided to call my ISP to find out what all this rubbish is about.
[41:57.430 --> 42:02.830]  A person with little knowledge answered my call, only to tell me that they thought the issue had been resolved.
[42:03.450 --> 42:11.530]  In the hope that they would give me some more clues on what all the confusion was about in the first place, I explained to them what I was told by the online help people, etc.
[42:11.770 --> 42:14.810]  And also that I ran a trace route to Google without any hits on BT's routers.
[42:14.930 --> 42:22.150]  The operator said that things were a lot more complicated than this, and made it clear to me that only pros will understand this stuff.
[42:23.070 --> 42:28.370]  If I hung up, a little bit of research taught me that my ISP is actually a virtual ISP.
[42:28.750 --> 42:30.750]  This is the first time I would hear about the term.
[42:31.050 --> 42:36.810]  And all they do is resell someone else's services, which also means that they don't know a thing about a thing.
[42:37.450 --> 42:38.990]  It's a bit of a generality, I suppose.
[42:39.450 --> 42:47.630]  Out of curiosity, I ran a trace route to their webpage, not only to find out that to get there, two transatlantic hops were required, one from the U.K.
[42:47.630 --> 42:48.830]  to the U.S., one from the U.S.
[42:48.850 --> 42:53.490]  to the U.K., but also that their website is hosted by a very cheap third-party internet service provider.
[42:54.150 --> 42:58.410]  I'm not going to read your name because there's all kinds of symbols in there, and I don't know how I'm supposed to pronounce it.
[42:58.430 --> 42:59.290]  How do you pronounce a pipe?
[42:59.370 --> 43:00.670]  How do you pronounce a percentage sign?
[43:00.710 --> 43:01.150]  I don't know.
[43:01.150 --> 43:04.670]  So, but any comments on this?
[43:05.050 --> 43:09.950]  I mean, they may be a third-party cheapo internet service provider, but you're the one paying them.
[43:10.170 --> 43:23.130]  Yeah, it's kind of a common practice, and it seems like a lot of the cheap providers are all in the same place and all using the same main ISP, I guess, for their access and just reselling it and offering various packages and crappy features.
[43:23.270 --> 43:29.150]  I don't use a super cheap ISP, but if I called them and asked them similar questions, they wouldn't know anything either.
[43:29.650 --> 43:34.650]  So, I mean, get a better ISP and don't expect them to know anything.
[43:35.370 --> 43:38.590]  Well, I mean, technical support is very important when something goes wrong.
[43:38.590 --> 43:42.930]  It is important to be able to find people who do know what they're talking about, so...
[43:42.930 --> 43:43.810]  There are good ones.
[43:43.910 --> 43:44.390]  There are good ones.
[43:44.390 --> 43:44.710]  There are good ones.
[43:44.850 --> 43:45.150]  They're out there.
[43:45.250 --> 43:47.850]  One of the good ones has just been bought.
[43:49.030 --> 43:51.450]  Speakeasy has been bought by Best Buy, of all things.
[43:51.470 --> 43:51.750]  What?
[43:53.130 --> 43:53.810]  Best Buy?
[43:53.890 --> 43:54.230]  The store?
[43:54.410 --> 43:54.470]  Best Buy.
[43:54.570 --> 43:55.450]  The store Best Buy.
[43:55.570 --> 43:57.070]  Why are they fooling with the internet?
[43:57.590 --> 43:58.550]  I don't know.
[43:59.270 --> 44:03.950]  So, if I had a speakeasy account, I'd be looking for new providers in a few months.
[44:04.150 --> 44:04.930]  My goodness.
[44:05.470 --> 44:05.830]  Okay.
[44:07.070 --> 44:09.670]  I wonder if Walmart's got their eye on something as well.
[44:09.810 --> 44:11.030]  They had a dial-up service.
[44:11.090 --> 44:11.950]  I don't know if they still do.
[44:13.190 --> 44:13.550]  Okay.
[44:14.770 --> 44:16.850]  And one last letter, and then we're going to get to the phones.
[44:17.550 --> 44:19.070]  Hi, I'm a visitor from Chicago.
[44:19.210 --> 44:21.590]  I came to New York City last week, and I feel sorry for you.
[44:21.710 --> 44:23.370]  I am glad I don't live in your city.
[44:23.410 --> 44:25.510]  You live in the most paranoid city I know.
[44:25.510 --> 44:27.090]  I was going on the subway.
[44:27.270 --> 44:28.470]  I had my bag searched.
[44:28.570 --> 44:29.810]  In Chicago, they don't do that.
[44:30.170 --> 44:33.990]  Nor do they have those annoying announcements every five minutes telling you to keep an eye on your bags.
[44:34.130 --> 44:35.710]  And your mayor wants to be president?
[44:36.330 --> 44:36.850]  Does he?
[44:37.530 --> 44:39.090]  Bloomberg too, or the former mayor?
[44:39.090 --> 44:39.410]  The former mayor.
[44:39.870 --> 44:42.110]  I hope people have sense and not vote for him.
[44:42.110 --> 44:43.550]  I don't want my city to be like yours.
[44:43.550 --> 44:47.190]  Every building you go to, you have to show ID, including the one we're in right now.
[44:47.190 --> 44:50.890]  I go into Chicago City Hall with baggage, and nobody cared.
[44:51.090 --> 44:53.030]  The only real security is at federal buildings.
[44:53.190 --> 44:54.870]  Otherwise, I like visiting the city.
[44:55.250 --> 44:56.590]  Signed, Mickey from Chicago.
[44:56.850 --> 44:58.290]  Why did you let them search your bags?
[44:58.450 --> 44:59.010]  Yeah, that's...
[44:59.010 --> 45:02.630]  Well, maybe people don't realize that you have the option not to have your bags searched.
[45:02.910 --> 45:06.290]  And that's something that I think we need to hammer into people's heads.
[45:06.430 --> 45:11.590]  But that could just as easily be turned around in a court ruling next week where they say, you know, you have to stay and have your bags searched.
[45:11.950 --> 45:13.290]  Thing is, people have to object.
[45:13.330 --> 45:16.010]  It's that whole theme of people just letting it happen.
[45:16.530 --> 45:21.550]  And, okay, why is it that we all have to show ID to get into any building, even a building like this one?
[45:21.790 --> 45:23.090]  Why is that important?
[45:23.330 --> 45:26.630]  I came across that in a newspaper article a couple days ago.
[45:26.870 --> 45:38.930]  Turns out that there's a law passed right after 9-11 that dictates that building management in office buildings in the city of New York has to know who's in the building for disaster recovery.
[45:39.570 --> 45:41.290]  They have to know who's in the building for...
[45:41.290 --> 45:41.910]  This is not credible.
[45:41.910 --> 45:43.450]  I work in an office building that I don't...
[45:43.450 --> 45:44.590]  I'll see if I can dig up this article.
[45:44.590 --> 45:45.890]  That I don't have to show ID.
[45:46.010 --> 45:46.630]  Uh-huh.
[45:47.070 --> 45:49.170]  But do you sign in when you get to work?
[45:49.390 --> 45:49.730]  No.
[45:51.010 --> 45:51.570]  Well, I mean...
[45:51.570 --> 45:53.190]  Well, this is what I read in an article.
[45:53.390 --> 45:54.470]  See if I can dig it up by next week.
[45:54.630 --> 45:59.130]  Well, I'd like to know if people work in office buildings in New York City that don't have to sign in.
[45:59.730 --> 46:00.970]  I mean, big buildings.
[46:01.070 --> 46:02.390]  Big buildings of at least 10 floors.
[46:03.210 --> 46:04.770]  I'd like to know if those buildings exist.
[46:05.210 --> 46:07.010]  I mean, I work in an eight-floor building.
[46:07.010 --> 46:07.490]  Oh, I see.
[46:07.590 --> 46:08.670]  You just missed by two floors.
[46:09.570 --> 46:11.310]  I just made up that qualification.
[46:11.330 --> 46:12.730]  And apparently, it's a good one.
[46:12.910 --> 46:13.230]  Okay.
[46:13.230 --> 46:15.090]  I've asked the security people before about this.
[46:15.130 --> 46:18.710]  And I got a response similar to Jim's, except that they said it was for the fire department.
[46:18.970 --> 46:23.670]  The fire department needs to know in case there's a fire or something who's remaining in the building.
[46:24.830 --> 46:25.890]  How do you argue with that?
[46:26.850 --> 46:27.590]  That's the problem.
[46:27.590 --> 46:29.210]  But when there's a fire, people will leave.
[46:29.210 --> 46:31.670]  And they probably don't all sign out as they're leaving in the fire.
[46:31.850 --> 46:32.410]  That's a good point.
[46:32.470 --> 46:33.050]  That's an excellent point.
[46:33.230 --> 46:33.430]  Yeah.
[46:34.290 --> 46:35.290]  So if you don't...
[46:35.290 --> 46:37.990]  Is it a law that you have to sign out when the building is ablaze?
[46:39.950 --> 46:40.690]  It might be.
[46:40.770 --> 46:41.170]  Don't laugh.
[46:41.370 --> 46:41.530]  All right.
[46:41.570 --> 46:42.270]  Let's take some phone calls.
[46:42.330 --> 46:43.690]  212-209-2900.
[46:44.110 --> 46:45.450]  Remember, this is our last show for two weeks.
[46:45.590 --> 46:47.610]  So call in now if you want to be on the air.
[46:47.630 --> 46:47.970]  Good evening.
[46:48.070 --> 46:48.890]  You're on Off the Hook.
[46:50.730 --> 46:51.390]  Speak up, please.
[46:51.990 --> 46:52.470]  Oh, yeah.
[46:52.530 --> 46:52.770]  Hi.
[46:53.950 --> 46:54.670]  DVD or...
[46:54.670 --> 46:56.410]  You're asking if we got the documentary you left.
[46:56.470 --> 46:58.650]  Yes, Rebel, we got the annoying documentary.
[46:58.950 --> 47:01.330]  But the annoying thing about it is that it doesn't...
[47:01.330 --> 47:04.490]  I tried to make copies so that everybody here could see.
[47:04.550 --> 47:05.170]  And it kept hanging.
[47:05.350 --> 47:07.510]  Kept not finishing copying.
[47:07.650 --> 47:09.530]  Unless you have some sort of weird copy protection on it.
[47:09.950 --> 47:11.530]  And we also tried playing it on a computer.
[47:11.670 --> 47:12.610]  And I believe it...
[47:12.610 --> 47:13.470]  30 seconds.
[47:13.630 --> 47:14.470]  30 seconds in.
[47:14.590 --> 47:15.750]  Just past the toilet flushing.
[47:16.590 --> 47:18.850]  Because I'm having trouble with my DVD recorder.
[47:19.050 --> 47:19.330]  Uh-huh.
[47:19.590 --> 47:20.650]  I'm getting a new one.
[47:20.910 --> 47:22.290]  So maybe I'll make you a better copy.
[47:22.290 --> 47:22.730]  Please do.
[47:22.730 --> 47:27.790]  And also use a DVD that goes a little faster than 1X or whatever it is that you gave us.
[47:27.830 --> 47:32.430]  It was a DVD that wasn't very fast as far as being able to read.
[47:32.510 --> 47:33.430]  But were you able to view it?
[47:33.530 --> 47:35.990]  I mean, were you playing it on a DVD player or...
[47:35.990 --> 47:37.330]  We played it on a computer.
[47:37.770 --> 47:38.490]  Oh, on a computer.
[47:38.490 --> 47:39.770]  That caused a bit of a problem.
[47:39.930 --> 47:39.990]  Yeah.
[47:40.130 --> 47:41.670]  So we'll try it on a DVD player.
[47:41.770 --> 47:44.210]  But yeah, if you can get us a better copy, we'd sure appreciate it.
[47:44.250 --> 47:46.250]  That way we can speak critically of it.
[47:46.670 --> 47:46.930]  All right.
[47:46.970 --> 47:47.910]  Let's take another phone call.
[47:48.110 --> 47:51.130]  He does give some good suggestions in the video, by the way.
[47:51.310 --> 47:52.310]  We'll come back to that in a second.
[47:52.450 --> 47:53.030]  Let's take this call.
[47:53.070 --> 47:53.350]  Good evening.
[47:53.470 --> 47:53.710]  You're on the air.
[47:53.710 --> 47:54.670]  Oh, thank you.
[47:55.610 --> 47:57.470]  Rudy Giuliani is all mobbed up.
[47:57.550 --> 47:58.610]  He's linked to the mafia.
[47:58.950 --> 47:59.770]  Oh, now, come on.
[47:59.850 --> 48:01.510]  Don't put down the mob like that.
[48:01.510 --> 48:02.390]  That's not fair to them.
[48:02.790 --> 48:04.850]  We're going to have them on the air demanding equal time.
[48:04.930 --> 48:05.470]  And that's not fair.
[48:05.810 --> 48:06.350]  Now, go ahead.
[48:06.410 --> 48:07.110]  What about the documentary?
[48:07.110 --> 48:09.690]  All I'm saying is that he gave good suggestions in that documentary.
[48:09.790 --> 48:10.950]  The first 30 seconds I saw.
[48:11.170 --> 48:11.850]  Can you give us one?
[48:12.010 --> 48:12.310]  Yes.
[48:12.430 --> 48:14.290]  You should wash your hands after you flush the toilet.
[48:14.430 --> 48:15.010]  Are you serious?
[48:15.310 --> 48:17.170]  This is the documentary he spent his time on?
[48:17.670 --> 48:18.690]  Well, that's what I saw.
[48:18.690 --> 48:19.890]  We've only seen the first 30 seconds.
[48:20.490 --> 48:21.530]  So far, it's okay.
[48:22.190 --> 48:23.950]  Didn't exactly hold my attention for that.
[48:24.190 --> 48:24.790]  Good evening.
[48:24.930 --> 48:25.510]  You're on off the hook.
[48:26.290 --> 48:26.590]  So far.
[48:26.830 --> 48:27.030]  Okay.
[48:27.410 --> 48:27.830]  Speak up.
[48:27.890 --> 48:29.030]  Didn't exactly hold my attention.
[48:29.030 --> 48:29.330]  Okay.
[48:29.410 --> 48:31.370]  You know, you've got to speak up, not play us ourselves.
[48:31.510 --> 48:31.770]  Good evening.
[48:31.870 --> 48:32.490]  You're on off the hook.
[48:33.010 --> 48:33.410]  Yes.
[48:33.530 --> 48:35.190]  Have you seen these devices?
[48:36.850 --> 48:37.410]  Which ones?
[48:37.650 --> 48:39.050]  Which devices do you mean?
[48:40.730 --> 48:41.690]  Which devices, sir?
[48:41.750 --> 48:45.090]  These devices along the highway on 78 coming into the city.
[48:47.090 --> 48:47.890]  They are...
[48:50.480 --> 48:50.880]  Okay.
[48:51.260 --> 48:52.600]  They have the...
[48:52.600 --> 48:54.100]  You've got to turn down your radio and you're going to get confused.
[48:55.700 --> 48:56.840]  ASTi written on them.
[48:58.000 --> 48:58.440]  ASTi.
[48:59.100 --> 49:03.620]  And they look like maybe some sort of easy pass reader.
[49:05.080 --> 49:05.520]  Hmm.
[49:05.640 --> 49:06.760]  Well, that could be what they are.
[49:07.300 --> 49:08.520]  They're mobile devices.
[49:08.740 --> 49:11.120]  They have solar panels on top of them.
[49:11.320 --> 49:14.500]  They've had the wheels removed in most of them, so they're semi-permanent.
[49:15.980 --> 49:20.380]  And I did a search on ASTi and all I found was some sort of...
[49:20.380 --> 49:21.640]  They make some sort of repeaters.
[49:21.880 --> 49:22.200]  Mm-hmm.
[49:23.440 --> 49:27.320]  But nothing about easy pass or that they were actual readers or collectors or anything.
[49:27.900 --> 49:30.840]  And these definitely aren't phones or anything like that, emergency phones.
[49:30.840 --> 49:33.360]  No, there's no user service.
[49:33.500 --> 49:35.620]  Well, it's got a unit on the bottom and between the wheels.
[49:35.860 --> 49:38.020]  It would look like it would be a roadside...
[49:38.720 --> 49:41.360]  In other words, it could be a roadside flasher or something like that.
[49:41.480 --> 49:43.420]  They're orange, New Jersey, DOT color.
[49:44.340 --> 49:48.100]  And then there's a very clear ASTi written on them.
[49:48.100 --> 49:49.520]  Can you tell us...
[49:49.520 --> 49:50.360]  You say it's on 78.
[49:50.540 --> 49:52.740]  Can you give us a general location as to where we can see these?
[49:52.960 --> 49:53.980]  They're all along.
[49:54.120 --> 49:55.180]  The closest ones...
[49:55.180 --> 49:59.560]  I take 78 in and then I get the Pulaski Skyway.
[49:59.760 --> 50:01.860]  There actually used to be one up on the Skyway.
[50:01.940 --> 50:03.520]  They removed it, but they're all along.
[50:04.480 --> 50:06.280]  Probably start seeing them in Scotch Plains.
[50:06.600 --> 50:07.700]  A picture would...
[50:07.700 --> 50:10.320]  A photograph would probably be useful if you could email us.
[50:10.340 --> 50:12.360]  Or any of our listeners can do this now with this information.
[50:12.500 --> 50:13.540]  Is this on the shoulder?
[50:14.000 --> 50:15.220]  Yes, they're on the shoulder.
[50:15.860 --> 50:16.800]  They're tucked in.
[50:16.860 --> 50:17.520]  They've been there a while.
[50:17.520 --> 50:18.800]  They've probably been there about a year now.
[50:20.740 --> 50:24.440]  And it's pretty inconvenient to stop and take a picture, although I've...
[50:24.440 --> 50:24.720]  Yeah.
[50:25.520 --> 50:26.000]  Strongly concerned.
[50:26.040 --> 50:26.720]  Might even be illegal.
[50:26.860 --> 50:27.860]  But now we have it.
[50:27.880 --> 50:30.300]  We'll send a team out there and take a look at it and report back.
[50:30.300 --> 50:31.360]  I take 78 every once in a while.
[50:31.420 --> 50:31.900]  You take 78?
[50:32.040 --> 50:32.180]  Okay.
[50:32.680 --> 50:33.940]  Redbird has volunteered to do this.
[50:34.140 --> 50:34.500]  Thank you.
[50:34.600 --> 50:35.680]  He'll be providing us with pictures.
[50:35.800 --> 50:36.660]  Thanks for the information, sir.
[50:36.720 --> 50:37.200]  Wait, pictures?
[50:37.880 --> 50:39.060]  Pictures and also...
[50:39.060 --> 50:39.640]  For the book, right?
[50:39.640 --> 50:39.980]  A sample.
[50:40.560 --> 50:43.440]  ...experimentation with them to see what they do under certain situations.
[50:43.560 --> 50:44.440]  We'll go out there late at night.
[50:44.540 --> 50:45.260]  Nobody will see you then.
[50:47.520 --> 50:48.120]  A couple more.
[50:49.160 --> 50:49.880]  Good evening.
[50:50.120 --> 50:50.840]  You're on Off the Hook.
[50:51.580 --> 50:52.260]  Speak up.
[50:52.840 --> 50:53.180]  Oh, hi.
[50:53.220 --> 50:53.520]  How's it going?
[50:53.700 --> 51:03.040]  I just wanted to tell you guys, last week you had a letter somebody wrote in that they had had their car searched after dogs had sniffed on them.
[51:03.340 --> 51:03.720]  Okay.
[51:04.800 --> 51:10.800]  And I was just wanting to point out that the Supreme Court actually ruled that a dog hit was probable cause.
[51:11.800 --> 51:13.340]  A dog hit is probable cause.
[51:13.560 --> 51:18.140]  Wouldn't it be easy to train a dog to just pretend like he found something when he actually didn't?
[51:18.320 --> 51:18.420]  Yeah.
[51:18.420 --> 51:19.660]  Yeah, you really would think it would be.
[51:19.800 --> 51:22.580]  My friend was trapping from El Paso.
[51:22.760 --> 51:24.720]  Yeah, they're not going to sue the dog in court.
[51:24.960 --> 51:26.780]  The dog made a mistake or something.
[51:27.460 --> 51:30.700]  He had a pizza box in his car, and the dog freaked out.
[51:30.920 --> 51:34.360]  The cop claimed that they never had these problems.
[51:34.360 --> 51:47.820]  In court, is it possible that the dog would be brought in and they would, you know, see if it's calibrated correctly, just like a, you know, like a speed gun thing?
[51:47.820 --> 51:49.080]  You have to maintain these things.
[51:49.320 --> 51:51.100]  That's an excellent idea for defense attorneys.
[51:51.800 --> 51:52.580]  You'd think so.
[51:52.660 --> 51:55.080]  You'd think that with any margin of error whatsoever, it'd be.
[51:55.280 --> 51:57.600]  But that it would actually constitute probable cause.
[51:57.720 --> 51:59.560]  It still kind of gets my gut, shocks me.
[51:59.820 --> 52:00.780]  That is amazing.
[52:00.780 --> 52:12.280]  I don't think people are being convicted on the evidence of dogs, but the police are using the dogs, as you say, as probable cause to then do a more thorough search where they can either find drugs or not.
[52:12.280 --> 52:16.120]  Right, because if you haven't committed a crime, you can't have your car searched without a warrant.
[52:16.340 --> 52:20.680]  So they have to use the, or, you know, they have to have some other probable cause.
[52:20.820 --> 52:23.180]  And they can use a dog head as a probable cause.
[52:23.300 --> 52:24.100]  I just thought you guys would like to know.
[52:24.940 --> 52:26.780]  Well, just one more reason to hate dogs, right?
[52:27.280 --> 52:28.280]  For all our listeners.
[52:28.700 --> 52:30.700]  Boy, how can they turn on us like this, man?
[52:30.700 --> 52:31.360]  Man's best friend.
[52:31.460 --> 52:32.040]  Look what they're doing.
[52:33.100 --> 52:33.700]  I don't know.
[52:33.780 --> 52:34.100]  Good evening.
[52:34.260 --> 52:34.920]  You're on Off the Hook.
[52:36.260 --> 52:36.620]  Hello.
[52:37.040 --> 52:37.240]  Hi.
[52:37.240 --> 52:37.720]  What's on your mind?
[52:38.500 --> 52:42.100]  Hey, you talked about Giuliani's website being hacked.
[52:42.260 --> 52:45.420]  Did you hear about John McCain's MySpace page?
[52:46.620 --> 52:47.020]  No.
[52:47.380 --> 52:49.880]  Why does John McCain have a MySpace page in the first place?
[52:49.880 --> 52:50.600]  I can never understand it.
[52:50.620 --> 52:51.200]  But what happened to it?
[52:51.320 --> 52:51.880]  You know, he's hip.
[52:52.080 --> 52:54.420]  He's down with the new generation.
[52:55.820 --> 53:02.480]  Well, anyway, a couple websites, including Mother Jones, reported that his MySpace page was hacked.
[53:02.800 --> 53:10.240]  And it turns out he was just using one of those MySpace layout templates that somebody puts together with images.
[53:10.240 --> 53:13.320]  And he was hot-linking the images right from their server.
[53:13.360 --> 53:14.480]  So they found out about it.
[53:14.580 --> 53:25.200]  And they changed around some of the graphics so that it said that he supported gay marriage, especially between two passionate females.
[53:25.420 --> 53:26.200]  It was...
[53:26.200 --> 53:28.200]  But I guess that happened this morning.
[53:28.380 --> 53:28.920]  And then it was...
[53:28.920 --> 53:29.720]  Oh, that happened this morning.
[53:29.960 --> 53:34.680]  He wasn't even giving credit to the MySpace editor or whatever he was using.
[53:35.500 --> 53:36.300]  He might get some more votes.
[53:36.960 --> 53:37.560]  I'm sorry?
[53:38.160 --> 53:39.300]  Yeah, he got my votes.
[53:40.940 --> 53:42.980]  The point is, you know, it wasn't really hacking.
[53:43.180 --> 53:49.620]  It's just, you know, somebody found out he was hot-linking and changed the image around, which is, you know, fun to do.
[53:51.160 --> 53:52.280]  Speaking from experience.
[53:52.520 --> 53:53.600]  Yeah, well, that's interesting.
[53:53.920 --> 53:57.040]  Hopefully nobody will get in trouble, even though there's no crime committed here.
[53:57.100 --> 53:58.780]  But thanks for that information as well.
[53:58.880 --> 53:59.700]  Let's take another one.
[53:59.980 --> 54:00.620]  Good evening.
[54:00.800 --> 54:01.340]  You're on Off The Hook.
[54:02.420 --> 54:02.820]  Hello?
[54:03.100 --> 54:03.620]  Yes, go ahead.
[54:03.960 --> 54:04.280]  Oh, yes.
[54:04.280 --> 54:05.720]  How do you subscribe to the magazine?
[54:06.440 --> 54:07.320]  How do you subscribe?
[54:07.540 --> 54:08.860]  Well, do you have access to the Internet?
[54:09.180 --> 54:09.540]  Yes.
[54:09.760 --> 54:12.760]  Okay, just go to www.2600.com.
[54:12.760 --> 54:17.900]  On the far left, you'll see a section for the magazine and information on how to subscribe.
[54:17.900 --> 54:18.500]  It's all there.
[54:18.820 --> 54:19.260]  Okay.
[54:19.540 --> 54:19.820]  All right?
[54:19.940 --> 54:20.400]  Thank you.
[54:20.540 --> 54:20.880]  Take care.
[54:21.540 --> 54:22.200]  Good evening.
[54:22.340 --> 54:22.820]  You're on Off The Hook.
[54:24.120 --> 54:24.740]  Speak up.
[54:25.420 --> 54:25.680]  Hi.
[54:25.980 --> 54:28.300]  Y'all were talking earlier about virtual ISPs?
[54:28.520 --> 54:28.820]  Yes.
[54:29.240 --> 54:29.660]  Yeah.
[54:29.860 --> 54:31.600]  I actually used to work for one.
[54:31.940 --> 54:32.440]  Oh, really?
[54:34.280 --> 54:36.100]  Well, it wasn't in the U.K., of course.
[54:36.220 --> 54:36.600]  It was...
[54:36.600 --> 54:37.640]  I'm actually in Alabama.
[54:37.980 --> 54:42.500]  But it was very much like your writer described.
[54:42.660 --> 54:48.640]  We had maybe 20 different companies that sold the same service, some of them selling the same service for different prices.
[54:50.000 --> 55:02.300]  And whenever I was doing tech support, whenever a call would come in, on the display of the phone, it would say the caller's number and the company they were calling.
[55:02.780 --> 55:09.260]  So, you know, you'd answer so-and-so tech support for 20 different companies at different times during the day.
[55:09.440 --> 55:09.640]  Uh-huh.
[55:09.900 --> 55:11.920]  You've got 20 seconds to wrap this up, unfortunately.
[55:12.280 --> 55:12.760]  Oh, okay.
[55:13.060 --> 55:16.020]  But, uh, interestingly enough, you mentioned also the Walmart Connect service.
[55:16.260 --> 55:20.840]  Uh, one of our number... one of our company's numbers was, uh, one digit off from the Walmart number.
[55:21.020 --> 55:21.560]  Oh, what fun.
[55:21.560 --> 55:22.280]  Which was a lot of fun.
[55:23.580 --> 55:24.500]  Certainly sounds that way.
[55:25.140 --> 55:25.320]  Yeah.
[55:25.380 --> 55:26.120]  But that was pretty much it.
[55:26.200 --> 55:26.580]  Thanks a lot.
[55:26.740 --> 55:27.080]  All right.
[55:27.220 --> 55:28.160]  Thanks, uh, thanks for your call.
[55:28.280 --> 55:29.980]  Thanks, everybody, for, uh, calling in and participating.
[55:30.180 --> 55:33.520]  Again, write to us, O-T-H at 2600 dot com.
[55:33.640 --> 55:35.320]  That's our email address.
[55:35.500 --> 55:37.760]  We're always happy to, um, to hear from our listeners.
[55:38.280 --> 55:41.580]  Again, programming reminder, we're not on next week.
[55:41.800 --> 55:43.560]  Well, unfortunately, we're preempted next week.
[55:43.820 --> 55:45.560]  And, uh, you guys are preempted too, right?
[55:45.680 --> 55:47.100]  Personal Computer Show, coming up next.
[55:47.260 --> 55:47.940]  Won't be on next week.
[55:48.200 --> 55:54.660]  But we'll be back in, uh, two weeks with all sorts of fun, action-packed, uh, talk of technology and things like that.
[55:54.860 --> 55:56.800]  In the meantime, stay tuned to WBAI.
[55:57.140 --> 55:59.780]  Listen to, um, Personal Computer Show coming up next.
[56:00.260 --> 56:02.080]  We'll be back in a couple of weeks.
[56:02.260 --> 56:03.480]  This is Emmanuel Goldstein for Off the Hook.
[56:03.860 --> 56:04.640]  Have a good night.
[56:17.270 --> 56:22.130]  Farewell, my friends, I'm bound for Canaanite.
[56:23.030 --> 56:27.910]  I'm traveling through the wilderness.
[56:30.610 --> 56:36.110]  Your company has been delightful.
[56:37.810 --> 56:43.490]  You who doth leave my mind distressed.
[56:45.650 --> 56:51.050]  Farewell, my friends, I'm bound for Canaanite.
[56:51.050 --> 56:52.450]  Farewell, my friends, I'm bound for Canaanite.
[56:52.690 --> 56:57.490]  I'm traveling through the wilderness.
[56:59.650 --> 57:05.610]  Your company has been delightful.
[57:07.370 --> 57:12.930]  You who doth leave my mind distressed.
[58:11.340 --> 58:16.880]  WBAI has an elected local station board comprised of staff and listeners.
[58:16.880 --> 58:33.600]  For the schedule of meetings of the board and its committees, visit the website, www.wbai.org slash lsb or call 212-209-2919.
[58:33.620 --> 58:44.380]  That's www.wbai.org slash lsb or 212-209-2919.
[58:44.800 --> 58:50.900]  Meetings are generally open with time for public comment and are wheelchair accessible.
[58:51.240 --> 58:52.240]  Get involved.
[58:52.540 --> 58:53.780]  It's our station.
[58:53.780 --> 58:53.940]  It's our station when we come to our station.
[58:53.980 --> 58:54.140]  For the receiver of the national station .oken...
[58:54.140 --> 58:54.180]  We'll come to our station for public's conversations.
[58:54.200 --> 58:54.200]  That's our station.
[58:54.200 --> 58:54.900]  We all