[00:00.000 --> 00:00.640]  F-S-R-N dot O-R-G.
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[00:26.100 --> 00:27.520]  editor is Leanne Caldwell.
[00:27.520 --> 00:30.640]  From KPFK in L.A., I'm Laura Bogado.
[00:33.970 --> 00:36.650]  And here at WBAI New York, it's time for Off the Hook.
[01:30.830 --> 01:31.890]  And good evening to everybody.
[01:31.970 --> 01:32.950]  The program is Off the Hook.
[01:33.030 --> 01:35.650]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[01:36.290 --> 01:38.790]  Joining me tonight over there is Jim.
[01:39.130 --> 01:39.490]  Hello.
[01:40.470 --> 01:42.450]  What are we, barking like a dog today, Jim?
[01:42.550 --> 01:43.070]  I said hello.
[01:43.310 --> 01:45.550]  You barked at the whole listening audience.
[01:45.670 --> 01:46.310]  I'm sorry.
[01:46.690 --> 01:48.570]  If anyone took that personally, I apologize.
[01:48.890 --> 01:50.330]  Redbird, hopefully you're more civilized.
[01:51.250 --> 01:51.710]  Good evening.
[01:51.710 --> 01:52.290]  Did you say anything at all?
[01:52.410 --> 01:52.710]  There you go.
[01:52.850 --> 01:53.170]  Okay, good.
[01:53.790 --> 01:54.190]  Arseny.
[01:54.470 --> 01:54.850]  Hello.
[01:56.070 --> 01:57.330]  And Mike over there.
[01:57.470 --> 01:57.790]  Hi.
[01:58.090 --> 01:59.230]  Other side of the room is not Kevin.
[01:59.450 --> 01:59.770]  Yeah, hello.
[01:59.930 --> 02:01.610]  And down in Philadelphia is Bernie S.
[02:02.090 --> 02:03.190]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:03.970 --> 02:05.490]  Well, guys, we made it in tonight.
[02:05.990 --> 02:10.370]  I don't know if we're supposed to talk about this, but basically we have a brand new system in the building.
[02:10.810 --> 02:16.490]  I don't know where people come up with these ideas, but to get into the building now, you have to be on the computer.
[02:16.950 --> 02:20.510]  There's a computer that stores the name of everybody who comes into the station.
[02:20.970 --> 02:30.010]  And whether you're a guest or a host or I don't know who else, you have to be already entered into the computer and...
[02:30.010 --> 02:30.790]  On the list.
[02:30.910 --> 02:31.350]  On the list.
[02:31.430 --> 02:32.250]  So that's the hard part.
[02:32.830 --> 02:35.070]  The problem is not that you have to go in the computer.
[02:35.170 --> 02:37.010]  The problem is you have to go in the computer in advance.
[02:37.330 --> 02:45.350]  Yeah, so you log into this computer and basically you have to put your name in or have somebody at the station put your name in.
[02:45.450 --> 02:49.450]  But the thing that strikes me about that, the old system basically, you showed ID and you said where you were going.
[02:49.450 --> 02:51.290]  And it's like most other buildings in New York.
[02:51.390 --> 02:58.830]  I don't know if this is something that's happening all over the city, but we have some kind of computerized system where your name then gets entered into the computer.
[02:58.910 --> 03:00.170]  It's called a request.
[03:00.350 --> 03:01.890]  I guess it could be denied.
[03:02.310 --> 03:07.270]  And then when you show up, you just give the name and they let you in because your name is already in the computer.
[03:07.470 --> 03:07.930]  Did you show ID?
[03:08.430 --> 03:10.750]  I showed ID because I didn't know I wasn't supposed to show ID.
[03:10.930 --> 03:12.010]  Because we're trained to do it.
[03:12.090 --> 03:12.750]  No, I did show ID.
[03:12.850 --> 03:13.030]  You did.
[03:13.170 --> 03:14.210]  Okay, well, Mike, you didn't show ID.
[03:14.310 --> 03:14.750]  No, I didn't show ID.
[03:14.750 --> 03:16.650]  You just spelled your name and they let you right in.
[03:16.730 --> 03:17.750]  There's a new guy down there, too.
[03:17.750 --> 03:18.570]  There's a new guy down there.
[03:18.750 --> 03:20.770]  They've purged the old people, the old system.
[03:20.910 --> 03:21.690]  Everything is different.
[03:21.910 --> 03:22.730]  I like the old people.
[03:22.870 --> 03:23.390]  Me, too.
[03:23.490 --> 03:31.750]  But the thing that bothers me about this, the thing that worries me, is what's going to happen if someone gains access to this system or maybe somebody already does have access to this system.
[03:31.870 --> 03:34.710]  We have all kinds of shady people coming in and out of the station.
[03:34.850 --> 03:35.870]  Most of them are us.
[03:36.050 --> 03:43.950]  But all sorts of people that, well, let's just say the folks over at DHS, Department of Homeland Security, might be very interested to know who's coming into the station and who's not.
[03:43.950 --> 03:46.450]  I mean, maybe they don't care.
[03:46.450 --> 03:50.690]  But the point is, it's a bit of information that's out there now that wasn't out there before.
[03:50.930 --> 04:06.310]  So if someone comes in to talk about government policy, to complain for an hour about something that's not fair, or to reveal something, reveal a story that nobody knows about, they would know this person's name.
[04:06.310 --> 04:07.590]  And maybe some more information, too.
[04:07.950 --> 04:09.310]  And when they came into the station.
[04:09.610 --> 04:10.730]  And who authorized them.
[04:11.290 --> 04:13.730]  Yeah, that is a very big danger.
[04:13.730 --> 04:18.090]  But I also see a way around that, which is a, in itself, a security flaw.
[04:18.650 --> 04:21.370]  Mike, when you came up, you said you spelled your name, correct?
[04:22.150 --> 04:23.170]  Yes, I spelled it correctly.
[04:23.230 --> 04:23.810]  You spelled it correctly.
[04:24.250 --> 04:25.070]  No, no, no, no, no.
[04:25.250 --> 04:26.350]  I know the difference between...
[04:26.350 --> 04:27.230]  Adverbs, Jim, adverbs.
[04:27.350 --> 04:33.010]  I know the difference between the phrase, you spelled your name, comma, correct, and you spelled your name correctly.
[04:33.010 --> 04:33.990]  Well, you didn't say comma.
[04:34.150 --> 04:35.210]  How are we supposed to know there's a comma there?
[04:36.730 --> 04:39.590]  You have to speak the word comma if you expect that to be conveyed, Jim.
[04:39.730 --> 04:41.050]  Anyway, back to this.
[04:41.650 --> 04:42.650]  Correct me if I'm wrong.
[04:42.730 --> 04:49.870]  We have now access to the generation of the list that will be used in the future when we come upstairs?
[04:50.110 --> 04:50.590]  Question mark.
[04:50.790 --> 04:51.250]  Question mark.
[04:51.410 --> 04:51.930]  Thank you.
[04:52.850 --> 04:54.050]  Yes, I think so.
[04:54.190 --> 04:57.310]  I don't really understand your sentence, but assuming I interpret it correctly...
[04:57.310 --> 05:00.990]  In other words, you could enter anyone's name who might be coming up here.
[05:01.090 --> 05:02.830]  Like, for example, Kevin Mitnick, correct?
[05:02.830 --> 05:02.830]  Correct?
[05:03.530 --> 05:05.430]  If he's coming, which I don't think he is.
[05:05.530 --> 05:07.050]  He was in Columbia last I heard.
[05:07.070 --> 05:08.890]  You could put his name on the list.
[05:08.890 --> 05:10.270]  But you raised an interesting point.
[05:10.450 --> 05:11.930]  What if we have the...
[05:11.930 --> 05:13.210]  What if he's been suborned?
[05:14.650 --> 05:16.090]  You just had to use that word, didn't you?
[05:16.210 --> 05:16.810]  I like it.
[05:16.890 --> 05:17.190]  All right.
[05:17.890 --> 05:23.310]  What if we have the dark demon coming up here or something who's going to show us the latest tricks in phone technology?
[05:23.310 --> 05:29.790]  And he doesn't want to be known as actually coming here to the station to reveal this interesting bit of information.
[05:29.930 --> 05:30.450]  In other words...
[05:30.450 --> 05:33.870]  Now he has to give his real name, be in a computer, which is accessible by God knows who.
[05:35.150 --> 05:36.810]  And there's no secrecy anymore.
[05:36.810 --> 05:38.850]  Well, I have an experiment that we can try.
[05:39.570 --> 05:40.010]  Go ahead.
[05:40.270 --> 05:42.230]  I have a piece of ID that says Jeopardy!
[05:42.330 --> 05:42.570]  on it.
[05:42.770 --> 05:43.010]  Uh-huh.
[05:43.190 --> 05:44.090]  Put that down.
[05:44.250 --> 05:45.930]  Put that down as the name.
[05:46.010 --> 05:48.230]  Let's see if I can get in next week with that ID.
[05:48.270 --> 05:49.930]  I should point out, this is not station policy.
[05:49.930 --> 05:51.390]  This is building policy.
[05:51.390 --> 05:53.810]  And who knows who dictates what the building policy is.
[05:53.810 --> 05:56.070]  Could have come down from our new independent mayor.
[05:56.070 --> 05:56.510]  Who knows?
[05:56.670 --> 05:57.950]  Could have come down from anybody.
[05:58.670 --> 05:59.190]  Not Kevin.
[05:59.370 --> 06:01.110]  Well, I was just going to say, you don't have to put down your real name.
[06:01.270 --> 06:01.690]  You can put down anything.
[06:01.870 --> 06:02.150]  Maybe.
[06:02.810 --> 06:04.050]  Maybe they check a database.
[06:04.510 --> 06:05.090]  What database?
[06:05.230 --> 06:05.610]  I don't know.
[06:05.730 --> 06:06.850]  A database of real names.
[06:07.010 --> 06:08.650]  I guess we'll try some other names.
[06:08.750 --> 06:12.870]  We shouldn't be conspiring on the air as to how we're going to get around their own security.
[06:13.030 --> 06:13.930]  But it's just interesting.
[06:14.190 --> 06:14.650]  I'd like to know.
[06:14.730 --> 06:15.030]  Yes, Bernie.
[06:15.030 --> 06:16.410]  I just want to interject.
[06:17.570 --> 06:25.330]  Whoever, whatever government authorities that might have an interest in who is a guest on this show anonymously, they wouldn't have to have access to the system.
[06:25.490 --> 06:30.870]  All they would have to do is get a subpoena to get access to the entire database.
[06:31.050 --> 06:39.130]  Yes, but as the Bush administration has shown us many, many times, getting access by subpoenas, it's a real pain in the ass.
[06:39.170 --> 06:40.630]  And they'd rather skip that stage.
[06:40.910 --> 06:43.630]  They'd rather just go and get the access without even telling anybody.
[06:43.630 --> 06:46.450]  And I think we've made it a lot easier for them to do that.
[06:46.610 --> 06:48.590]  Is that a segue into this story that I'm holding?
[06:48.810 --> 06:49.470]  It could be.
[06:49.650 --> 06:50.230]  What story is that?
[06:50.330 --> 06:53.210]  I think this is a story many people want to know about.
[06:53.310 --> 06:55.730]  This is from last Thursday's Washington Post.
[06:55.870 --> 07:00.630]  And the title is, FBI finds it frequently overstepped in collecting data.
[07:00.830 --> 07:04.410]  And you mentioned when that story came out that all the news always seems to happen on Thursday.
[07:04.750 --> 07:04.990]  Yeah.
[07:05.430 --> 07:06.570]  That's kind of odd, isn't it?
[07:06.570 --> 07:07.570]  It's a conspiracy, I think.
[07:07.650 --> 07:22.790]  But last Thursday, they did an audit, an internal FBI audit, found that the Bureau potentially violated the law or agency rules more than 1,000 times while collecting data about domestic phone calls, emails, and financial transactions in recent years.
[07:23.050 --> 07:32.210]  And what's interesting is that they found 1,000, let's be generous and call them errors, when they just audited 10% of the total request.
[07:32.210 --> 07:38.950]  Yeah, but Mike, if they're auditing a billion attempts, 1,000 isn't that many.
[07:39.070 --> 07:42.210]  How many actual times did they do this?
[07:42.370 --> 07:47.770]  There were 19,000 letters seeking 47,000 pieces of information.
[07:47.910 --> 07:53.210]  So this is a 10% sample of 19,000 would be 1,900 letters.
[07:53.430 --> 07:56.770]  What, you're saying out of 1,900 letters, 1,000 of them overreached?
[07:57.070 --> 07:57.510]  Overreached.
[07:57.610 --> 07:59.190]  Some could overreach more than once.
[07:59.270 --> 08:00.130]  That's more than half.
[08:01.070 --> 08:12.810]  Well, not necessarily, but it, you know, sometimes it was a mistake of the, like, if they said, hey, Verizon, give us the, this guy's calls for April, and Verizon was like, you know what, take the whole year while you're at it.
[08:13.330 --> 08:17.370]  So that one's not the FBI's fault, but many of them are the FBI's fault.
[08:17.490 --> 08:19.030]  And this is an internal investigation.
[08:19.270 --> 08:19.470]  Yes.
[08:19.650 --> 08:22.190]  So imagine if you had, like, the ACLU or somebody do this.
[08:22.350 --> 08:23.190]  It's kind of amazing.
[08:23.310 --> 08:24.610]  Or EFF or somebody like that.
[08:25.150 --> 08:25.510]  Wow.
[08:25.530 --> 08:26.630]  And you know why this happens?
[08:26.630 --> 08:28.270]  Because there's absolutely no oversight.
[08:29.550 --> 08:32.130]  It's almost too obvious to say.
[08:32.810 --> 08:35.210]  Something else that happened, I believe this happened on Thursday, too.
[08:35.350 --> 08:41.290]  AT&T announced their new attempt to battle internet piracy.
[08:41.850 --> 08:45.310]  I almost said privacy, which is basically the same thing as far as they're concerned.
[08:45.310 --> 08:50.810]  Yeah, they're going to work with Hollywood studios and recording labels to devise technology.
[08:50.810 --> 08:52.550]  They haven't yet made it up, but they're going to.
[08:52.750 --> 09:00.170]  That identifies offshore content pirates who use its network to upload illegal copies of movies and music.
[09:00.390 --> 09:07.170]  Details remain sketchy, but the effort obviously worries privacy advocates who fear the San Antonio-based company.
[09:07.430 --> 09:09.090]  Yes, AT&T is San Antonio-based.
[09:09.090 --> 09:09.570]  Did you know that?
[09:10.350 --> 09:16.350]  They could become a beat cop, monitoring which websites customers visit and what computer files they share.
[09:17.410 --> 09:18.990]  Well, it's battling piracy.
[09:19.150 --> 09:21.470]  Should we be concerned and worried about this?
[09:22.610 --> 09:23.750]  It's to protect us, isn't it?
[09:23.810 --> 09:25.270]  AT&T is just going to lose half their customers.
[09:25.490 --> 09:25.810]  You think?
[09:26.210 --> 09:27.370]  They're just going to go someplace else?
[09:27.370 --> 09:34.430]  Well, if they start blocking all sorts of websites, if they have a choice, you're just not going to use AT&T.
[09:34.430 --> 09:35.850]  I think not all...
[09:35.850 --> 09:36.250]  Do you?
[09:36.590 --> 09:37.610]  Occasionally through my cell phone.
[09:37.690 --> 09:38.390]  Through your cell phone, yeah.
[09:38.510 --> 09:40.290]  But, I mean, do you use it from...
[09:40.290 --> 09:47.890]  Well, you have to remember, AT&T is the company formerly known as PacBell, which is the CELAC in large parts of the country.
[09:47.910 --> 09:49.610]  I thought they were the company formerly known as Bell South.
[09:50.610 --> 09:51.490]  Whatever they're called.
[09:51.870 --> 09:59.770]  So, in large parts of the country, AT&T is like Verizon, and the people who don't know any better just got their DSL from them, which is a lot of people.
[09:59.770 --> 10:06.570]  Now, another story that happened this week concerns DSL, what AT&T is offering known as Naked DSL.
[10:06.690 --> 10:12.850]  And I believe that it was as low as $10 a month to have AT&T DSL.
[10:12.970 --> 10:17.630]  If you're in certain states, and this is because of some kind of a takeover, I think this had to do with the Bell South thing.
[10:18.250 --> 10:22.730]  I've looked into this a little bit more since then, and apparently it's not really that much of a savings.
[10:22.810 --> 10:28.350]  In fact, there was one site I looked at where they said the savings is about only $1 a month from some other company.
[10:30.110 --> 10:32.630]  But does anybody understand what this is all about?
[10:32.870 --> 10:36.890]  They're offering it only to certain states as a result of merging with another company.
[10:37.110 --> 10:39.110]  Well, again, this is the states where they're...
[10:39.110 --> 10:39.970]  I'm sorry, I said C-like.
[10:40.030 --> 10:44.390]  I meant I-like, the incumbent carrier, which is like Verizon in New York.
[10:45.270 --> 10:47.490]  And in some states, it's AT&T.
[10:47.690 --> 10:50.670]  And if you're in one of those states, apparently...
[10:50.670 --> 10:57.910]  If you're in one of those states, and you have a phone line from them, and I think if you don't already have DSL from them, there's a whole host of conditions.
[10:58.770 --> 11:00.910]  Then you can get DSL for $10 a month.
[11:01.610 --> 11:02.370]  I called them.
[11:02.510 --> 11:03.290]  Yeah, you called them, Bernie.
[11:03.730 --> 11:04.830]  I called them because I was curious.
[11:05.070 --> 11:12.410]  I wanted to see what kind of conniptions the customer service rep would go through if I called to request this $10 a month naked DSL service.
[11:12.650 --> 11:14.750]  Did you call it naked DSL when you were on the phone with her?
[11:14.950 --> 11:18.250]  I did refer that to her, and that sent her to another tizzy.
[11:19.590 --> 11:21.810]  But it's not a naked DSL service.
[11:22.010 --> 11:24.670]  No, it's not, because you have to have phone service, too, with it.
[11:24.890 --> 11:25.770]  Ah, okay.
[11:26.550 --> 11:31.290]  But in any case, I referred to it as I read it in an article that I read online.
[11:31.750 --> 11:44.370]  And it took about 20 minutes for her to research it and get back to me after several times being put on hold, that it had to meet the certain conditions that you described already.
[11:44.490 --> 11:51.790]  It only applied to 22 states where Bell South was the incumbent local exchange carrier, and a whole host of other requirements.
[11:51.950 --> 11:55.230]  You already had to have a phone line through them, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
[11:55.510 --> 11:59.250]  But I was disappointed at that point and thanked her and hung up.
[11:59.370 --> 12:02.230]  But it took 20 minutes to find this out from AT&T itself.
[12:02.430 --> 12:04.190]  And you won't really find it on their website either.
[12:04.510 --> 12:05.610]  No, you hide it.
[12:06.530 --> 12:06.930]  Amazing.
[12:07.950 --> 12:08.530]  All right.
[12:08.630 --> 12:10.590]  So AT&T, bad guys of the week, I think.
[12:12.530 --> 12:14.510]  About the century on this show.
[12:15.470 --> 12:18.830]  Well, the state of Ohio is trying for that honor.
[12:19.510 --> 12:20.770]  This is an incredible story.
[12:20.870 --> 12:28.970]  A backup computer storage device with the names and social security numbers of 64,000 state employees was stolen from a state worker's car last Sunday.
[12:30.770 --> 12:39.190]  And basically, they say they don't believe worker privacy is in jeopardy because you need special equipment to access the information.
[12:40.090 --> 12:43.390]  What kind of special equipment do you need to access a database exactly?
[12:43.650 --> 12:44.270]  A computer.
[12:44.450 --> 12:44.770]  A computer.
[12:44.890 --> 12:45.250]  A computer.
[12:45.510 --> 12:45.730]  Okay.
[12:46.530 --> 12:47.730]  It's already on a computer.
[12:47.930 --> 12:49.030]  You clear that hurdle.
[12:49.210 --> 12:50.170]  And then what?
[12:51.370 --> 13:07.650]  But then they go on to mention that the employee, who was an intern, mistakenly left a device in a vehicle parked outside, a device that was supposed to be taken into his home as part of a protocol, a backup protocol in place since 2002.
[13:07.970 --> 13:09.770]  Why does an intern have access to this?
[13:09.850 --> 13:16.970]  Well, the way they're supposed to do it, they're supposed to take the information about 64,000 state employees and keep it at their houses.
[13:16.970 --> 13:18.310]  That's their backup scheme.
[13:19.210 --> 13:20.750]  Does anybody see something wrong with this?
[13:21.010 --> 13:25.070]  Can't the state of Ohio afford like a safe deposit box somewhere or something?
[13:25.650 --> 13:27.750]  I just read this and I was blown away.
[13:27.870 --> 13:35.850]  I mean, every week, somebody loses 10,000 or 100,000 or a million data files with private information in it.
[13:35.970 --> 13:49.810]  But to admit that this is your plan, to give everybody these devices and have them keep them at their homes, do you think maybe they might make copies with special equipment at their homes of this data, that all kinds of identity problems could result?
[13:50.050 --> 13:52.450]  I could just imagine the conversations at the office.
[13:52.610 --> 13:56.230]  Hey, Dave, it's your turn to take the backup copy home this week.
[13:56.350 --> 13:57.310]  I mean, how does this work?
[13:57.390 --> 13:57.950]  This is insane.
[13:58.170 --> 14:02.670]  If we did this, if anybody did this, we'd be labeled as completely incompetent.
[14:02.730 --> 14:03.470]  But they keep it secret.
[14:03.790 --> 14:06.670]  We don't find out about their schemes until something like this happens.
[14:07.070 --> 14:07.470]  Emmanuel?
[14:07.650 --> 14:07.790]  Yes.
[14:07.790 --> 14:17.190]  It seems almost like the state of Ohio's only concern is that they would completely lose this data, that they wouldn't have access to it anymore because they lost all copies of it.
[14:17.310 --> 14:17.450]  Right.
[14:17.570 --> 14:24.630]  We seem to be only concerned about that and not about the privacy and integrity of the data so that, you know, it wouldn't get into the hands of ne'er-de-wells.
[14:24.830 --> 14:25.110]  Mm-hmm.
[14:25.530 --> 14:25.790]  Right.
[14:25.850 --> 14:27.690]  They do not have faith in their own system.
[14:27.830 --> 14:29.370]  They imagine they're going to delete the whole thing.
[14:29.710 --> 14:30.930]  So, oh, thank God.
[14:31.270 --> 14:33.630]  Charlie has a copy in his garage someplace.
[14:34.210 --> 14:35.890]  And we can call on him to bring it in.
[14:35.890 --> 14:39.770]  And, you know, true, we fired him three years ago, but I'm sure he'll cooperate and give us that information.
[14:39.950 --> 14:42.450]  Even if you think this is a good system, why an intern?
[14:42.790 --> 14:44.830]  Like, why not at least the head of the department?
[14:45.270 --> 14:47.270]  Because an intern probably won't ask questions.
[14:48.550 --> 14:50.990]  I won't say this is a ridiculously stupid idea.
[14:51.790 --> 14:52.030]  All right.
[14:52.110 --> 14:52.510]  State of Ohio.
[14:52.630 --> 14:56.670]  If you're a state employee in Ohio, I guess you have something to worry about now, right?
[14:56.890 --> 14:58.870]  Probably we're picking on Ohio.
[14:58.870 --> 15:00.230]  It's only because they got caught.
[15:00.390 --> 15:02.750]  But probably every single state does something like this.
[15:02.830 --> 15:04.190]  And probably a lot of companies do, too.
[15:04.190 --> 15:06.210]  And probably a whole mess of universities.
[15:07.310 --> 15:07.910]  It's sad.
[15:08.810 --> 15:09.090]  Okay.
[15:09.230 --> 15:11.110]  We found out this as well.
[15:11.290 --> 15:14.130]  If you're in Sydney, Australia, guess what?
[15:14.210 --> 15:16.450]  You're going to be getting a visit from President George W.
[15:16.450 --> 15:16.750]  Bush.
[15:16.850 --> 15:17.650]  He's not going to be coming to your house.
[15:17.690 --> 15:18.290]  Don't worry about that.
[15:18.390 --> 15:19.950]  But he is going to be coming to your city.
[15:20.270 --> 15:25.670]  And when he does that, you will have a lot of trouble making cellular phone calls.
[15:25.670 --> 15:33.890]  Because mobile phone calls will be blocked by a sophisticated counterterrorism measure to prevent bomb attacks.
[15:33.890 --> 15:39.610]  Because we all know bomb attacks are done by cellular phones.
[15:39.810 --> 15:40.590]  There's no other way.
[15:41.110 --> 15:45.590]  The President's motorcade will be shadowed by a helicopter equipped with signal jamming equipment.
[15:46.070 --> 15:51.910]  Terrorists have used mobile phones to detonate remote-controlled bombs in Iraq and in the second Bali bomb attacks.
[15:52.590 --> 15:53.770]  It is expected...
[15:53.770 --> 15:56.110]  What if they just use matches, you know?
[15:56.470 --> 16:02.770]  It is expected mobile phone calls will drop out in an area the size of a football field as the helicopter passes overhead.
[16:03.850 --> 16:05.810]  The technology was first used by the U.S.
[16:05.910 --> 16:10.490]  President when Bush attended the APEC Summit in Pusan, South Korea, back in 2005.
[16:11.230 --> 16:13.410]  I got to say, you know, this thing is...
[16:13.410 --> 16:18.650]  They seem to be just using this as a matter of habit, that this is how people are going to be protected.
[16:18.650 --> 16:24.650]  But what's interesting is that with, you know, with a skilled electrical engineer, you can probably design...
[16:24.650 --> 16:30.290]  Or not probably, you can design circuitry that can detect the jamming equipment and set off a bomb that way.
[16:30.410 --> 16:35.410]  I mean, you could actually use their jammers to, you know, determine when the President is in range.
[16:35.630 --> 16:40.850]  Or you can use any number of ways to detonate bombs that people have used over the centuries.
[16:40.930 --> 16:41.210]  Of course.
[16:41.290 --> 16:43.050]  You don't need cellular phones to do this.
[16:43.250 --> 16:47.930]  Do you think there's some other agenda here that they're not telling us as to why they want to cut off communications?
[16:48.670 --> 16:51.890]  I mean, it just seems so silly to do it this way.
[16:52.050 --> 16:56.630]  I mean, I find it credible that they are stupid enough to think this will somehow protect the President.
[16:57.730 --> 16:59.050]  It's not just the manual.
[16:59.270 --> 16:59.470]  Yes.
[16:59.810 --> 17:10.130]  I don't think it's just to prevent the possibility of someone using a cellular phone connection to remotely trigger a bomb.
[17:10.130 --> 17:11.770]  But I don't think they want...
[17:11.770 --> 17:24.810]  The White House Communications Agency in the United States is responsible for monitoring and disrupting communications in the area of the President's physical presence.
[17:25.150 --> 17:31.890]  And they don't want anybody communicating on cell phones around the President in a hostile environment like another country.
[17:32.030 --> 17:33.490]  Passing messages back and forth, you mean.
[17:33.490 --> 17:34.030]  Exactly.
[17:34.110 --> 17:34.850]  That sort of thing.
[17:34.930 --> 17:37.910]  They don't want to say, hey, he's over here or he's on his way.
[17:38.070 --> 17:38.770]  He's coming.
[17:39.230 --> 17:39.970]  Like, get ready.
[17:40.170 --> 17:41.010]  That kind of stuff.
[17:41.570 --> 17:43.350]  I think they're trying to jam that as well.
[17:43.490 --> 17:44.410]  But, I mean, I agree.
[17:44.430 --> 17:48.330]  It's really stupid to think that this is going to prevent setting off a bomb remotely.
[17:48.330 --> 17:52.310]  There's so many other methods that could be used that this is ludicrous.
[17:52.310 --> 17:56.090]  Well, the thing is, it's not just going to be used when the President is in town.
[17:56.230 --> 17:58.330]  It's going to be used every time there's a demonstration.
[17:58.610 --> 18:01.530]  Anytime you want crowd control, this is a test.
[18:01.630 --> 18:10.790]  This is a test of the system to see whether or not they can control the cellular phone calls in a region the size of a football field or maybe one day the size of a city.
[18:11.410 --> 18:18.050]  And I just think it's absurd when you think of a situation where all sorts of unrest might be happening.
[18:18.050 --> 18:21.590]  That's when you need to make phone calls, where you need to get help to certain people, perhaps.
[18:22.130 --> 18:29.310]  Or, I mean, I just think it would be amazingly ironic if the cops and law enforcement weren't able to communicate because of this very thing.
[18:30.090 --> 18:31.110]  Or civil protest.
[18:31.330 --> 18:42.770]  What about a civil protest where people are legally protesting, say, in the United States or another country, yet the protesters can't communicate with each other to coordinate their legal protest and exercise of free speech?
[18:43.050 --> 18:47.970]  This could be used to stifle or to stomp on a free speech race.
[18:48.050 --> 18:53.370]  Well, remember when our layout artist, Shapeshifter, was arrested during the Republican Convention in 2000?
[18:54.150 --> 19:01.010]  They based the entire case against him on the fact that they saw him talking on a cellular phone while he was walking the streets of Philadelphia.
[19:01.410 --> 19:05.090]  Thereby, he was one of the organizers because he was talking to somebody else.
[19:05.150 --> 19:06.910]  Actually, he was talking to me because I had just come into town.
[19:07.050 --> 19:07.930]  I wanted to know where he was.
[19:08.770 --> 19:15.270]  And we were basically apparently plotting the destruction of God knows what with a cellular phone.
[19:15.270 --> 19:16.670]  So they're very scared of communication.
[19:16.690 --> 19:31.270]  This should tell you the importance of communication and why it's so essential that we figure out ways to stay in touch with each other that are backups for the existing systems because they will try to turn those off when things hit the fan.
[19:32.310 --> 19:39.330]  Speaking of blocking communications, here's a company I never heard of before, Cell Antenna Corp.
[19:39.410 --> 19:39.950]  You ever hear of them?
[19:40.410 --> 19:40.790]  Cell Antenna.
[19:40.790 --> 19:43.810]  Apparently, they make antennas and they make repeaters.
[19:44.430 --> 19:55.290]  They have asked the FCC to permit first responders to use jamming equipment to prevent terrorists from using cell phones, again, to detonate bombs known as improvised explosive devices.
[19:56.210 --> 19:56.730]  Now...
[19:56.730 --> 19:57.050]  What?
[19:57.290 --> 19:58.190]  Yeah, this is incredible.
[19:58.430 --> 20:00.650]  Now a private company wants the ability to do this.
[20:00.730 --> 20:01.290]  It was inevitable.
[20:01.550 --> 20:04.330]  If they're first responders, wouldn't that mean the explosion already happened?
[20:04.430 --> 20:05.370]  That's a good point.
[20:05.370 --> 20:11.550]  I guess you can tell by the look in somebody's eyes that they're about to detonate something, so that's when you want to turn off the cellular phones.
[20:11.850 --> 20:14.190]  I don't know how they expect to be able to have this knowledge.
[20:14.450 --> 20:26.490]  Just to elucidate for not Kevin, no, generally after you have the first explosion, which isn't always necessarily detonated by cell phone, you have another guy watching and waiting for the first responders.
[20:26.710 --> 20:31.170]  So when they go past the second bomb site, that's when they set off the second bomb.
[20:31.170 --> 20:36.350]  Don't you also have the person trapped under rubble who wants to alert people that, hey, I'm here, please rescue me, and he has a cell phone?
[20:36.410 --> 20:37.090]  Right, right, right.
[20:37.270 --> 20:37.490]  Uh-huh.
[20:37.530 --> 20:38.270]  So what do you do about him?
[20:38.670 --> 20:40.570]  Maybe only friendly cell phone calls will get through.
[20:41.070 --> 20:44.330]  Seems like a company who's trying to find a way to get more business.
[20:44.510 --> 20:47.590]  Well, they're in Carl Sprint, uh, Carl Sprints, Florida?
[20:47.770 --> 20:48.290]  Is that a town?
[20:48.450 --> 20:49.250]  Carl Springs?
[20:49.470 --> 20:49.570]  Yeah.
[20:49.670 --> 20:50.950]  No, it says Carl Sprints here.
[20:51.270 --> 20:51.590]  Sprints.
[20:51.950 --> 20:53.030]  That's what it says, I'm sorry.
[20:54.210 --> 20:58.270]  They said they decided to petition the agency for the rule change after the 11th U.S.
[20:58.270 --> 21:06.390]  Circuit of Appeals rejected on jurisdictional grounds is challenged to a law allowing only the federal government to interfere with wireless communications.
[21:06.590 --> 21:09.810]  So they're annoyed that only the federal government can interfere with wireless communications.
[21:09.810 --> 21:11.130]  They want to be able to do it too.
[21:11.870 --> 21:14.570]  I mean, I can sort of understand, but come on.
[21:14.570 --> 21:20.690]  It's another product that they're going to be able to sell because it'll become legal if that's the case, and right now it's not.
[21:20.790 --> 21:33.650]  Well, Howard Melamed, Cell Antennas CEO, says the following, although regulating the airwaves is the primary purpose of the FCC, these regulations must necessarily be consistent with the public interest and serve legitimate governmental purposes.
[21:33.930 --> 21:41.330]  The denial of counterterrorism technology to emergency first responders certainly runs afoul of national goals and the will of Congress.
[21:41.610 --> 21:51.970]  Our first responders, especially the bomb squads, need jamming technology to cope with the methods of terrorists who commonly use radiofrequency devices to trigger bombs that kill people.
[21:51.970 --> 21:56.130]  Well, protecting the airwaves should hold second place to protecting lives.
[21:56.510 --> 21:57.470]  Oh my God.
[21:58.210 --> 22:00.470]  This guy really believes this too.
[22:00.570 --> 22:01.730]  That's the amazing part.
[22:01.910 --> 22:08.410]  So these guys are going to be carrying around these cell phone jammers and showing them to their friends and having fun in restaurants and on, you know, buses and...
[22:08.410 --> 22:09.070]  Hey, I resent that.
[22:09.070 --> 22:09.730]  It kind of sounds familiar, you know?
[22:09.730 --> 22:10.330]  I resent that.
[22:10.450 --> 22:14.410]  First of all, my cell phone jammer only works in a very small area, okay?
[22:14.590 --> 22:18.310]  These guys, who knows what kind of jamming possibilities they'll have.
[22:19.110 --> 22:20.150]  But yeah, you're right.
[22:20.730 --> 22:22.110]  One person is going to have it.
[22:22.250 --> 22:24.990]  I mean, one fireman will say, hey, we got to turn this off.
[22:25.050 --> 22:25.810]  This guy looks suspicious.
[22:26.010 --> 22:27.850]  And then somebody else will say, well, no, not really.
[22:27.890 --> 22:28.950]  I need to make a phone call now.
[22:29.250 --> 22:30.130]  It's going to be mayhem.
[22:30.270 --> 22:31.110]  It's going to be mayhem.
[22:31.270 --> 22:32.290]  We should accept the...
[22:32.290 --> 22:40.210]  I mean, somebody could explode a bomb by waving at somebody else who then has the detonator in his hand and you're communicating in that way.
[22:40.350 --> 22:41.370]  How do you prevent that?
[22:41.670 --> 22:43.450]  There's always going to be a way to detonate something.
[22:43.550 --> 22:44.350]  I'll tell you how to prevent that.
[22:44.410 --> 22:49.010]  You just increase the amount of pollution in the air so that they can't see the guy waving his hand from far away.
[22:49.630 --> 22:49.830]  Okay.
[22:50.130 --> 22:54.030]  You thought that was the most annoying bit of technology to rear its ugly head this week.
[22:54.110 --> 22:54.930]  No, you'd be wrong.
[22:56.170 --> 23:01.650]  Statistics show that driving while talking on the cell phone increases the chance of an accident by 400%.
[23:02.310 --> 23:02.750]  Wow.
[23:02.930 --> 23:03.910]  Those are statistics, all right.
[23:04.570 --> 23:13.210]  Though speaking on the cell phone while driving is not a crime in many states as of yet, taking into consideration the statistics, it will eventually be banned in all of the states.
[23:13.210 --> 23:22.030]  A new company known as Highway and Safety Control is releasing a device to automatically detect drivers talking on their cell phones.
[23:22.270 --> 23:31.190]  And instead of police officers needing to observe a cell phone in use, the system automatically detects a cell phone call and records which car was making the call.
[23:31.670 --> 23:32.490]  Oh, it gets better.
[23:32.790 --> 23:36.050]  Already in use in a few European countries, the system will make it to the U.S.
[23:36.090 --> 23:36.590]  this fall.
[23:36.590 --> 23:42.390]  It's designed to detect, identify, and sight drivers who break cell phone laws.
[23:43.130 --> 23:44.170]  And, ready?
[23:44.350 --> 23:47.610]  The company attaches a paint gun to mark the car.
[23:47.830 --> 23:48.150]  Oh.
[23:49.570 --> 23:53.150]  Or even an EMP gun that can disable the offending cell phone.
[23:53.290 --> 23:54.910]  Everybody wants to disable cell phones.
[23:55.050 --> 24:00.550]  I can understand wanting to disable cell phones, but a paint gun on your car, my God, can you imagine the reaction to that?
[24:00.750 --> 24:04.730]  Isn't it still legal to make hands-free cell phone calls in most states?
[24:04.730 --> 24:06.630]  Apparently, but I don't know if this...
[24:06.630 --> 24:08.690]  Can this detect the difference between the two?
[24:08.890 --> 24:11.750]  Well, here's another difference it can't detect.
[24:11.910 --> 24:13.350]  What if you're riding with someone?
[24:13.590 --> 24:19.790]  How's it going to tell the difference between the driver making a cell phone call and the passenger making a cell phone call?
[24:19.790 --> 24:20.930]  Are you serious about the EMP?
[24:21.070 --> 24:21.590]  That's what it says.
[24:21.630 --> 24:22.110]  Oh, come on.
[24:22.210 --> 24:22.810]  That's what it says.
[24:22.850 --> 24:24.570]  Look, I'll hand you the story.
[24:24.570 --> 24:25.830]  I think this is an excellent...
[24:25.830 --> 24:27.250]  It seems like a fake site.
[24:27.350 --> 24:28.070]  Is it a fake site?
[24:28.150 --> 24:33.130]  Well, if so, then I'm happy to alert people to something that could happen one day.
[24:33.410 --> 24:34.550]  But it looks real to me.
[24:34.550 --> 24:35.250]  Hey, guys, Bernie, go ahead.
[24:35.410 --> 24:43.910]  What if you're in a convertible and you shoot the paintball and it hits you in the eye and it causes a huge accident and people get killed?
[24:44.070 --> 24:45.690]  It's for your own safety, Bernie.
[24:45.890 --> 24:51.730]  But I think whether or not this is a joke, it's not something that is beyond the realm of possibility.
[24:51.870 --> 24:53.590]  People want to disable these things.
[24:53.590 --> 24:57.090]  They want to become increasingly obnoxious in doing so.
[24:57.510 --> 25:02.590]  I mean, we've seen cars with the big stickers on the windshield because they parked illegally and it's impossible to get the stickers off.
[25:02.690 --> 25:04.210]  And they certainly cause a...
[25:04.210 --> 25:06.610]  I've seen people trying to drive with stickers on their windshield.
[25:06.890 --> 25:09.910]  This sounds like the UK cops that crush your cars, right?
[25:10.070 --> 25:10.990]  The car crushers, yes.
[25:11.210 --> 25:15.830]  They're destroying your cell phone with the EMP and they're destroying your paint job with the paintball gun.
[25:15.830 --> 25:17.330]  I think this is a brilliant plan.
[25:18.370 --> 25:20.230]  Mike doesn't get a vote in these issues.
[25:20.950 --> 25:21.390]  Oh, I do.
[25:21.610 --> 25:22.170]  Well, we'll see.
[25:22.310 --> 25:26.690]  Only one person gets a vote and that's Sheldon Silver, but moving on.
[25:26.850 --> 25:32.890]  Well, when people start firing back with other paint guns, that'll certainly cause commotion.
[25:33.710 --> 25:35.030]  Not Kevin's into paint guns.
[25:35.330 --> 25:35.870]  Are you?
[25:36.390 --> 25:36.790]  Okay.
[25:37.550 --> 25:38.010]  Let's see.
[25:38.010 --> 25:40.790]  I've always wondered, Emmanuel, why people don't...
[25:40.790 --> 25:53.030]  I would never do this myself, but all these red light cameras and surveillance cameras, could be easily taken out of commission with a paintball gun just by, you know, covering the lens with paint from a good distance if you're a good shot.
[25:53.370 --> 25:59.410]  I'm curious how often this happens and why more people aren't taking advantage of this opportunity, not that I ever would.
[25:59.610 --> 26:01.770]  Well, wouldn't they catch you doing that?
[26:02.630 --> 26:07.710]  Well, the red light cameras only trigger when they detect that you're going through the red light.
[26:08.790 --> 26:14.910]  So that would be an opportunity for people to cover the lenses with paint while the light is green.
[26:15.470 --> 26:17.330]  And there's other situations, too, I guess.
[26:17.350 --> 26:18.730]  You could wear a mask or whatever.
[26:18.870 --> 26:20.370]  But I'm not suggesting this by any means.
[26:20.490 --> 26:24.730]  I'm sure Google Maps will somehow catch you and you'll be reported in that way.
[26:24.950 --> 26:29.930]  Oh, and by the way, speaking of Google Maps, we did have somebody who wrote in to us.
[26:31.630 --> 26:34.050]  Zachary, somewhere in the States.
[26:34.370 --> 26:35.450]  He's 14 years old.
[26:35.530 --> 26:39.990]  He wrote to us listening to the show on the 13th and heard about Google Street Views.
[26:39.990 --> 26:43.730]  So I played around while listening to the show and found some very creepy, interesting, and slightly perverted images.
[26:44.210 --> 26:46.970]  And by the way, I also found a picture of a dog and its owner.
[26:47.650 --> 26:48.990]  And he sent us the picture.
[26:49.090 --> 26:51.910]  We asked somebody to send in a picture of a large dog.
[26:52.050 --> 26:55.270]  And Zachary sent us a picture of two large dogs.
[26:55.350 --> 26:57.790]  In fact, they're both standing on two feet fighting with each other.
[26:57.830 --> 26:58.530]  It's an amazing picture.
[26:58.890 --> 27:00.870]  Apparently, it's some kind of a dog run in Berkeley.
[27:01.010 --> 27:07.770]  If you go to 1826 Hearst Avenue, H-E-A-R-S-T, in Berkeley and zoom in, you'll see those two dogs in the park.
[27:07.970 --> 27:10.210]  And we got other people riding in with dogs, too.
[27:10.370 --> 27:11.510]  It was simply incredible.
[27:11.690 --> 27:16.210]  I can't believe people are finding things so fast on Street View.
[27:16.590 --> 27:20.030]  Emmanuel, there was a Jennifer wrote in also.
[27:20.590 --> 27:21.470]  She had...
[27:21.470 --> 27:32.270]  I had just coincidentally emailed her from an inquiry she'd made like a month ago about devices that would keep her phone from ringing if it was a number that she'd blocked into a device or something.
[27:32.350 --> 27:34.710]  So I emailed her response to that when I finally found the information.
[27:34.830 --> 27:35.550]  It took me a long time.
[27:35.550 --> 27:42.830]  But anyway, right after I emailed her, she emailed back saying, were you folks asking about looking for a big dog using Google Streets?
[27:42.910 --> 27:43.590]  And we said yes.
[27:43.770 --> 27:45.650]  I said yes, even though I wasn't on the show last week.
[27:45.770 --> 27:46.170]  It had to work.
[27:47.110 --> 27:53.630]  And then she just, as a lark, she punched in her home address, or where she used to live, and there was a big dog in the intersection.
[27:53.970 --> 27:55.690]  And she just totally freaked out.
[27:56.130 --> 28:01.050]  And it's like, you know, that it was like more than a coincidence or something.
[28:01.290 --> 28:02.310]  He was in the intersection?
[28:02.310 --> 28:03.470]  He was in the middle of the street, you mean?
[28:03.470 --> 28:05.090]  Well, it was actually crossing the street.
[28:05.190 --> 28:05.450]  Oh, okay.
[28:06.130 --> 28:08.090]  And I was still shocked of that, obviously.
[28:08.270 --> 28:14.490]  But she was so freaked out that I said, yes, we were looking for anyone who could find a big dog using Google Streets.
[28:14.670 --> 28:19.410]  So she, like right after she got that email from me, she punched in her former address.
[28:19.650 --> 28:22.650]  And sure enough, there was a big dog walking across the street.
[28:22.730 --> 28:29.570]  And she just sort of had this strange mental experience that, you know, suddenly there's a big dog there.
[28:29.570 --> 28:39.930]  We didn't tell you, Bernie, but we went out after the show to a lot of correspondents' houses with a big stuffed dog and put it there waiting for the Google Maps van to come by.
[28:40.030 --> 28:41.390]  Actually, you know, it's not a Google van.
[28:41.390 --> 28:41.990]  It's a car.
[28:42.170 --> 28:42.670]  A car.
[28:42.710 --> 28:43.130]  I'm sorry.
[28:43.250 --> 28:49.270]  What I want to do is I want to make a fake Google car and just imitate the camera and drive around.
[28:49.390 --> 28:51.450]  Just see what people do, all right?
[28:51.450 --> 28:54.470]  They've already done that for a commercial in the 1960s.
[28:54.530 --> 28:55.470]  Show us your larks.
[28:57.670 --> 28:58.070]  Okay.
[28:58.270 --> 29:00.370]  Well, that's fascinating stuff.
[29:00.430 --> 29:03.050]  But I have a new challenge for people out there with Street View.
[29:03.070 --> 29:12.950]  And by the way, if you don't know what we're talking about, maps.google.com, they've taken pictures of entire cities, every single block, every single building it seems, and a lot of people walking around.
[29:13.090 --> 29:14.570]  It raises all sorts of privacy issues.
[29:14.910 --> 29:26.150]  If you're, say, walking with somebody that you're not supposed to be talking to or someplace you're not supposed to be, it's very possible you could get busted because the Google car with the camera comes by and takes a picture of you, and anybody in the world can look at it.
[29:26.490 --> 29:31.390]  Last week, we asked people to send us intersections or streets that had dogs walking down the street.
[29:32.590 --> 29:33.810]  I imagine there's all sorts.
[29:33.890 --> 29:36.590]  When you photograph all of New York City, what other cities are there?
[29:36.770 --> 29:37.570]  The Bay Area?
[29:37.990 --> 29:38.650]  The Bay Area.
[29:38.930 --> 29:40.090]  I think they did Las Vegas.
[29:40.610 --> 29:41.890]  Eventually, they're going to do everything.
[29:42.190 --> 29:42.710]  That's scary.
[29:42.750 --> 29:44.490]  Because that's Google's motto.
[29:44.670 --> 29:45.790]  Eventually, we'll do everything.
[29:46.010 --> 29:49.310]  But walk down the street in New York, you see a million cameras anyway all over the place.
[29:49.310 --> 29:52.790]  That's true, but can you access them from your home and see what they see?
[29:52.930 --> 29:53.430]  Does it matter?
[29:53.750 --> 29:54.450]  Well, I don't know.
[29:54.550 --> 29:55.310]  That's the question.
[29:55.510 --> 29:57.790]  I think a caller last week hit it on the head.
[29:57.950 --> 29:59.410]  They're doing this for commercial purposes.
[29:59.590 --> 30:05.150]  And when you take pictures of people for commercial purposes, it's different than taking a tourist picture and showing it to people.
[30:05.530 --> 30:06.350]  They're selling...
[30:06.350 --> 30:10.170]  Well, they're not selling a product, but they actually are because they are somehow going to make money at this.
[30:10.950 --> 30:18.270]  And yeah, they are using your image, using your license plates on your car, using the way your home looks.
[30:18.270 --> 30:18.830]  I don't know.
[30:19.150 --> 30:21.730]  I find it fascinating, but I also find it a little bit troubling.
[30:22.090 --> 30:31.630]  But anyway, my challenge for this next coming week, since people are able to find just about everything, and it's not nearly as nice, I want someone to find a dead animal.
[30:31.790 --> 30:34.450]  That picture is a roadkill or something like that.
[30:34.510 --> 30:40.710]  Because if you're driving around, you see it enough, a squirrel, a raccoon, maybe even a dog, or certainly a human would qualify.
[30:40.710 --> 30:42.050]  But I don't know.
[30:42.090 --> 30:44.230]  I don't know how good Google is as far as finding things like that.
[30:44.230 --> 30:48.190]  If you work for Google, and you kill an animal just for this, you don't qualify.
[30:48.410 --> 30:48.570]  Yeah.
[30:48.830 --> 30:50.890]  However, if you kill a co-worker for this...
[30:50.890 --> 30:53.610]  Well, I don't think they're that up to date.
[30:53.610 --> 30:58.810]  I don't think they're out there right now uploading, and we'll see images from yesterday on this thing.
[30:59.290 --> 31:01.490]  It's probably like a year old, a couple of years old.
[31:01.490 --> 31:03.130]  No, it's like a few months old.
[31:03.430 --> 31:03.570]  Is it a few months?
[31:04.430 --> 31:12.010]  Because the place I work now, there used to be a parking garage or something, and now it's not there anymore, but on Google it is.
[31:12.150 --> 31:12.530]  Oh, really?
[31:12.550 --> 31:15.190]  And they only did that like eight months or six months ago.
[31:15.330 --> 31:19.750]  I should be able to tell how old it is for my street, because they've been building a couple of buildings.
[31:20.430 --> 31:28.230]  What if people, everybody just unites and puts up signs that says, Google sucks, and everybody will see...
[31:28.230 --> 31:31.350]  But of course, that sort of changes the way our cities look.
[31:31.490 --> 31:34.430]  Everyone's going to have Google sucks on their front building.
[31:35.030 --> 31:36.770]  But it could be some fun.
[31:36.990 --> 31:38.330]  It's all about having fun.
[31:38.650 --> 31:41.910]  Okay, another person wrote to us about...
[31:41.910 --> 31:44.250]  We were talking about GPS last week and cars.
[31:44.750 --> 31:49.310]  The first generation does use radio direction finding techniques.
[31:49.470 --> 31:57.550]  In my area, four antennas are mounted on the police vehicle, and by using different antenna combinations, the relative direction can be determined.
[31:58.190 --> 32:02.070]  Currently, a GPS receiver is combined with the low jack transmitter.
[32:02.490 --> 32:04.910]  It sends the location of the vehicle to the cops.
[32:05.250 --> 32:11.090]  The amusing part about this is the amount of effort the local cops use when they get a low jack hit.
[32:11.190 --> 32:15.270]  I've never actually seen this, but I wonder if the officers would find a stolen car and get some kind of reward.
[32:15.370 --> 32:17.350]  They don't put this amount of effort into the usual calls.
[32:18.590 --> 32:20.370]  That's Gary who wrote in with that.
[32:20.370 --> 32:24.050]  They're startled when they see the low jack detector go off in their car.
[32:24.530 --> 32:28.670]  I did see a low jack hit on cops once, which was fascinating.
[32:29.590 --> 32:29.750]  Because...
[32:29.750 --> 32:31.510]  And Emmanuel, I should interject.
[32:31.750 --> 32:32.650]  I'm sorry to interrupt you.
[32:33.010 --> 32:33.230]  Go ahead.
[32:34.590 --> 32:35.550]  There's a...
[32:35.550 --> 32:41.990]  Most of these low jack transmitters you pay for and then also pay a monthly fee for to have installed in your car.
[32:42.590 --> 32:44.790]  Don't send your GPS coordinates.
[32:45.070 --> 33:02.110]  They just send a beacon signal that will trigger a receiver in a police car, which are given away free to police departments around the country by the low jack corporation so they can sell more of these little transmitter things to people like you and me as part of,
[33:02.210 --> 33:03.390]  you know, keep your car from getting stolen.
[33:03.530 --> 33:12.810]  When your car gets stolen, you call low jack and then they turn on a powerful transmitter that triggers your thing in your car to transmit a beacon signal.
[33:12.950 --> 33:23.650]  And the police who happen to be driving by you will hear a beep, beep, beep and they see on a display on a dash and you're above their dashboard in the rear view mirror like a directional display showing which direction the stolen car is.
[33:23.690 --> 33:24.850]  And you've got to be pretty close to it.
[33:24.970 --> 33:29.110]  The newer models that just came out recently also transmit GPS coordinates.
[33:29.390 --> 33:32.150]  They have a GPS receiver and it transmits that back to the system.
[33:32.470 --> 33:37.710]  And then low jack corporation can actually tell the police the car is at this intersection or near this intersection.
[33:38.010 --> 33:44.690]  But most of them just transmit a beacon signal that will just send a beeping signal to the cops near you.
[33:44.810 --> 33:51.170]  Now, that signal is broadcast, I believe, on 173.0750 megahertz.
[33:51.490 --> 33:52.670]  Does that sound familiar to you, Bernie?
[33:52.930 --> 33:54.230]  I believe that's the frequency.
[33:54.370 --> 33:54.910]  I don't have it handy.
[33:55.150 --> 33:56.330]  Yeah, that was it, yeah.
[33:56.470 --> 33:56.650]  Okay.
[33:56.850 --> 33:58.350]  173.0750.
[33:58.450 --> 34:02.890]  And if you have a police scanner at home, it's a fun experiment just to tune into one.
[34:03.010 --> 34:04.210]  In fact, I was at...
[34:04.210 --> 34:11.710]  I was at Redbird's place just last weekend and we tuned into that frequency and we were actually listening to low jack transmission.
[34:11.910 --> 34:14.410]  And might it have sounded something like this?
[34:21.440 --> 34:22.400]  Sound familiar, Bernie?
[34:22.880 --> 34:23.500]  Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[34:24.240 --> 34:29.770]  If you take the antenna off your scanner and drive around, you could actually pick up...
[34:31.600 --> 34:36.680]  If you pass by a stolen car, you'll know when you pass by a stolen car.
[34:36.680 --> 34:41.200]  If you have the antenna on, it's going to pick up stuff from far away and you won't know that you're that close to it.
[34:41.200 --> 34:46.820]  But if you take off the antenna, you'll only be able to hear that if you turn the squelch all the way down on your scanner receiver.
[34:47.000 --> 34:51.800]  Now, what we just heard, is that what's transmitted when the car is stolen or is that just transmitted all the time?
[34:52.140 --> 34:53.500]  No, only when the car is stolen.
[34:53.720 --> 34:54.280]  It's kind of like...
[34:54.280 --> 34:56.800]  It's kind of like in your car, it's like a paging receiver.
[34:56.920 --> 35:01.920]  People remember those pocket pagers back in the days, early days of cell phones and earlier it would just beep.
[35:01.920 --> 35:04.800]  So it's kind of like a pager without a display on it.
[35:04.880 --> 35:12.420]  And when you call and report your car stolen from LoJack, they send a unique code to this special kind of receiver that's in your car, which is akin to a pager.
[35:12.700 --> 35:15.500]  It's key just to your car only, your car receiver only.
[35:15.700 --> 35:23.420]  And then it tells that car receiver remotely through the transmission to activate a radio transmitter in your car that transmits the beacon signal.
[35:23.580 --> 35:24.840]  So it's not transmitting all the time.
[35:24.840 --> 35:27.740]  It's only transmitting when LoJack tells it to transmit.
[35:27.740 --> 35:38.960]  But if you happen to be going by a car that's being told to transmit, and you have your radio scanner tuned to 173.075 MHz, you can tell when you're on top of a stolen car.
[35:39.040 --> 35:42.580]  But I don't recommend you, like, stare at the people or whatever, because they could have guns or whatever.
[35:42.860 --> 35:45.120]  So just keep on going and watch the fun.
[35:45.300 --> 35:50.760]  So what you were hearing in that clip was actually the tower transmitting a paging signal to all of the LoJack units.
[35:50.860 --> 35:54.840]  And what you would hear if the car was actually stolen would be more of a continuous transmission.
[35:55.220 --> 35:55.560]  Yes.
[35:55.980 --> 35:56.380]  Okay.
[35:56.840 --> 36:02.040]  Now, is it possible for people to translate what we played and give back some kind of data?
[36:02.040 --> 36:04.920]  Or is that just something that LoJack understands and nobody else?
[36:05.140 --> 36:06.000]  That's a good question.
[36:06.200 --> 36:15.920]  If you do a Google search, and there's Google again, or LoJack, you can find some interesting experiments people have done with trying to decode those transmissions.
[36:15.980 --> 36:16.980]  I'm sure someone has done it.
[36:17.040 --> 36:18.440]  I haven't researched it thoroughly myself.
[36:18.680 --> 36:20.180]  But it's probably doable.
[36:20.180 --> 36:30.820]  And ultimately, you could find out if you figured out their encoding scheme, which is probably not encrypted, the GPS coordinates of stolen cars in your fair city.
[36:30.820 --> 36:32.160]  So that might be kind of fun.
[36:32.320 --> 36:33.980]  A lot of opportunities for organized crime here.
[36:34.020 --> 36:36.300]  So we're happy to provide tips and ideas.
[36:37.120 --> 36:38.300]  You mentioned Google again.
[36:38.540 --> 36:39.660]  This just came to me now.
[36:40.060 --> 36:44.200]  Wouldn't it be a kind of an interesting thing if Google just decided to go on strike for a day?
[36:44.340 --> 36:47.080]  How would that affect our everyday lives?
[36:47.320 --> 36:49.000]  Nobody would be able to look up anything.
[36:49.140 --> 36:50.020]  They wouldn't know where to go.
[36:50.560 --> 36:52.560]  The mapping system would stop working.
[36:53.620 --> 36:55.060]  People wouldn't know how to read news.
[36:55.320 --> 36:59.080]  You'd have to learn how to go to the alternate sites.
[36:59.120 --> 36:59.760]  And they do exist.
[36:59.760 --> 37:00.500]  They're out there.
[37:00.820 --> 37:03.880]  But they just have such a stranglehold, it seems.
[37:04.100 --> 37:05.200]  Everybody uses them all the time.
[37:05.320 --> 37:08.600]  And there are dozens of other sites that provide the exact same services.
[37:08.800 --> 37:09.120]  Name one.
[37:09.300 --> 37:09.680]  Yahoo.
[37:10.180 --> 37:10.820]  Yahoo, okay.
[37:11.100 --> 37:12.180]  Ask.com.
[37:12.300 --> 37:12.880]  Ask.com.
[37:13.140 --> 37:13.460]  All right.
[37:13.600 --> 37:14.040]  Oh, man.
[37:14.180 --> 37:19.600]  When Google starts taking them over, though, and one day they just demonstrate our power by turning everything off.
[37:20.120 --> 37:20.880]  Our power?
[37:20.880 --> 37:22.300]  Remember Alta Vista?
[37:22.440 --> 37:23.200]  Remember Alta Vista?
[37:23.340 --> 37:24.020]  They own BAI.
[37:24.120 --> 37:24.600]  You didn't know that?
[37:24.700 --> 37:26.100]  They bought us last year.
[37:26.240 --> 37:27.600]  I guess I wasn't supposed to talk about that.
[37:27.920 --> 37:29.200]  Yes, we're a Google station.
[37:29.620 --> 37:31.440]  They'll have stations at some point.
[37:31.640 --> 37:32.240]  Google radio.
[37:32.780 --> 37:33.300]  Yeah.
[37:33.660 --> 37:34.580]  You laugh now.
[37:35.500 --> 37:36.020]  Okay.
[37:36.220 --> 37:39.280]  Our email address, OTH at 2600.com.
[37:39.440 --> 37:49.940]  We got this piece of mail from Thought Freaker, who sends us an interesting phone number, an intercept concentrator that puts an operator on the line and asks for the number you're calling.
[37:49.940 --> 37:53.660]  And he'd like us to give that number a try, which I think I'm going to do.
[37:53.760 --> 37:54.780]  But a warning.
[37:55.080 --> 37:55.600]  Yes, Mike?
[37:55.740 --> 37:58.060]  What does that mean, an intercept concentrator?
[37:58.240 --> 38:01.940]  Well, basically what happens is you call... This used to happen a lot in the old days.
[38:01.940 --> 38:06.140]  You would call a number, and the operator would ask you what number you called.
[38:06.320 --> 38:10.600]  And then you tell her, and she plugged the number into a computer, and it would play a recording.
[38:10.720 --> 38:18.560]  In fact, I remember you would tell her certain numbers, and the number would repeat back, say, 212-209-2900 is a working number.
[38:19.300 --> 38:22.920]  And that's a recording you would never get, obviously, because it was a working number.
[38:23.240 --> 38:25.460]  But it's just, I guess, to report that somehow.
[38:25.900 --> 38:29.600]  Now, this number happens to be in Hawaii, so I'm not sure if they'll believe that phone number.
[38:29.820 --> 38:35.740]  He says, you can tell her any number that's 10 digits long, and no matter how ridiculous it might be, they'll send it to the announcement machine.
[38:35.840 --> 38:39.060]  But it doesn't always work, since operators aren't trained to deal with this.
[38:39.280 --> 38:43.720]  Some of them insist that their equipment doesn't allow them to send the number to the announcement machine.
[38:44.040 --> 38:46.240]  Others will simply pick up the call and stay silent.
[38:46.240 --> 38:49.280]  And on a rare occasion, they'll ask their supervisor how to do it, too.
[38:49.440 --> 38:55.340]  But again, most of them don't feel it's worth the trouble, so they'll just do one of their two elaborate evasion techniques.
[38:55.800 --> 38:57.640]  So let's give it a try.
[38:58.040 --> 38:59.840]  I'm going to get a magical dial tone here.
[39:01.780 --> 39:11.560]  And dial this number, which hopefully is actually going to this nice little recording or operator.
[39:11.960 --> 39:15.160]  Okay, we have to enter our secret code now, which we don't want going over the air.
[39:16.240 --> 39:17.060]  And let's see what happens.
[39:17.900 --> 39:18.660]  We'll give our phone number.
[39:20.520 --> 39:21.980]  Aloha, what number you're calling from, please?
[39:22.920 --> 39:24.820]  Yes, I'm trying to reach 212.
[39:25.440 --> 39:26.760]  No, what is the number you're calling from?
[39:26.940 --> 39:32.900]  Oh, I'm calling from 212-209-2900.
[39:42.420 --> 39:43.880]  And you're dialing the same number?
[39:44.080 --> 39:46.180]  I mean, the same air code, 212-209?
[39:46.560 --> 39:46.920]  Yes.
[39:47.660 --> 39:48.660]  Try calling it again.
[39:49.060 --> 39:52.240]  It's saying that it's coming up on an intercept, but it's not recognizing the intercept.
[39:52.240 --> 39:53.240]  What does that mean?
[39:53.280 --> 39:54.180]  It's not recognizing the intercept?
[39:54.660 --> 39:55.840]  It's not coming up.
[39:56.120 --> 39:57.460]  Like, there's no information for the intercept.
[39:57.760 --> 39:58.520]  I see.
[39:58.760 --> 39:59.240]  Okay.
[39:59.380 --> 40:01.140]  Is there some kind of recording I'm supposed to get?
[40:01.560 --> 40:02.040]  No.
[40:02.440 --> 40:03.720]  It's not even giving me that.
[40:03.960 --> 40:04.340]  Really?
[40:04.660 --> 40:05.060]  Yeah.
[40:05.280 --> 40:05.620]  Interesting.
[40:05.980 --> 40:08.020]  Okay, so you suggest I try calling again?
[40:08.560 --> 40:08.940]  Yes.
[40:08.940 --> 40:10.080]  Okay, I'll do that.
[40:10.880 --> 40:11.440]  Bye.
[40:12.600 --> 40:24.540]  The number you have dialed, area code 212-209-2900, is not in service.
[40:24.720 --> 40:26.820]  Please try your call again later.
[40:26.880 --> 40:27.440]  You're lying.
[40:27.580 --> 40:28.220]  For further information.
[40:28.500 --> 40:29.320]  Lying to us.
[40:29.600 --> 40:31.140]  Okay, all right, fine.
[40:31.580 --> 40:38.900]  The number you have dialed, area code 212-209-2900.
[40:38.900 --> 40:43.220]  2-9-0-0 is not in service.
[40:43.620 --> 40:47.040]  Please try your call again later for further information.
[40:48.800 --> 40:50.220]  Okay, I guess we won't get a human.
[40:51.120 --> 40:51.640]  Emmanuel?
[40:51.840 --> 40:52.640]  Yes, that's very interesting.
[40:53.040 --> 41:04.980]  This would be a great way to get a recording of a telephone company operator kind of voice saying that your own number is not in service and putting that on your own answering machine or voicemail greeting.
[41:04.980 --> 41:09.720]  Yeah, if you can't just simply edit it together yourself, yeah, that would be a bit of fun.
[41:10.140 --> 41:12.900]  All right, thanks Thought Freaker for sending in that number.
[41:13.020 --> 41:18.360]  I'm always interested in fun phone numbers to play around with.
[41:19.740 --> 41:21.900]  Wow, she didn't think a recording was going to come on.
[41:22.080 --> 41:23.320]  She said that's it.
[41:23.460 --> 41:25.140]  Then good thing I stayed on for an extra second.
[41:25.260 --> 41:26.680]  So what did we just learn there exactly?
[41:26.880 --> 41:28.040]  I don't really know, to be honest.
[41:28.200 --> 41:30.040]  Because our number is in fact in service.
[41:30.280 --> 41:31.900]  Well, I'd like to think that, Mike.
[41:32.100 --> 41:32.960]  I would like to think that.
[41:33.740 --> 41:35.920]  But I guess our listeners will tell us that for sure.
[41:36.100 --> 41:38.960]  Our phone number is 2-2, as you heard, 209-2900.
[41:39.880 --> 41:41.100]  And call us...
[41:41.100 --> 41:42.160]  All those calls right there.
[41:42.220 --> 41:42.400]  Yeah.
[41:42.520 --> 41:43.700]  In fact, I have to get rid of that one.
[41:43.780 --> 41:46.480]  Bernie, I'm going to put you on hold for a second while I get rid of that other call.
[41:47.080 --> 41:48.260]  Hang on, I've got to hit that button.
[41:48.580 --> 41:49.700]  Then I've got to hit this button.
[41:50.140 --> 41:50.920]  Hang that up.
[41:51.300 --> 41:52.140]  Hit this button.
[41:52.460 --> 41:53.580]  And then hit you.
[41:53.660 --> 41:54.240]  And you're back, right?
[41:55.440 --> 41:55.760]  Bernie?
[41:56.180 --> 41:56.900]  Yes, I'm back.
[41:57.000 --> 41:57.480]  Okay, good.
[41:58.760 --> 41:59.740]  Scared me there for a second.
[41:59.740 --> 42:01.760]  Okay, here's another letter.
[42:01.880 --> 42:04.040]  OTH at 2600.com is our email address.
[42:04.700 --> 42:07.360]  This is about Emmanuel's rant on iTunes.
[42:07.760 --> 42:22.760]  Emmanuel, while I fully understand about buying the CD rather than downloading from an online store, less quality, plus no physical copy, it is fairly well known that Apple allows users of the iTunes store to re-download all their purchases if their computer crashes.
[42:22.780 --> 42:25.200]  This is allowed about once every 12 months.
[42:25.200 --> 42:26.580]  Some begging may be required.
[42:27.140 --> 42:33.360]  Also, when you download a song, you're immediately asked by a prompt if you would like to back up your purchase by burning a CD, etc., etc.
[42:33.480 --> 42:34.680]  By all means, buy CDs.
[42:34.700 --> 42:39.400]  They are usually less money when they are first released, have the best sound quality, and are already a physical backup.
[42:40.580 --> 42:41.240]  Signed, Andrew.
[42:41.440 --> 42:44.540]  Well, Andrew, I have to disagree unless they have changed their policy.
[42:44.640 --> 42:48.200]  This is a quote from docs.info.apple.com.
[42:48.540 --> 42:49.340]  iTunes store.
[42:49.500 --> 42:52.120]  Purchased content can be downloaded only once.
[42:52.120 --> 42:56.700]  Once, when you buy a song or album from the iTunes store, you are entitled to download it only once.
[42:56.840 --> 43:02.240]  When you buy a song, video, game, or album from the iTunes store, you are entitled to download it a single time.
[43:02.300 --> 43:03.860]  They say the same thing three times in a row.
[43:03.960 --> 43:05.260]  I guess that makes it pretty clear.
[43:05.400 --> 43:08.280]  If you want to download it again, you must purchase it again.
[43:08.320 --> 43:11.560]  You can copy downloaded content between authorized computers.
[43:11.920 --> 43:13.020]  Now, the little lecture here.
[43:13.400 --> 43:13.800]  Important.
[43:14.000 --> 43:15.860]  Make a backup of the content you purchase.
[43:15.860 --> 43:22.540]  In case of data loss, including hard drive failure or replacement, accidental deletion, and so forth, you'll be able to restore it from the backup.
[43:22.800 --> 43:34.560]  My point was I had lost a hard drive, and I was able to simply re-encode the CDs that I owned, but I wasn't able to re-encode what I had downloaded between the last backup I made and the time of the crash.
[43:34.680 --> 43:38.680]  So unless you immediately make a backup every time you download something, you're kind of screwed.
[43:38.680 --> 43:42.080]  Now, maybe iTunes changed their policy.
[43:42.280 --> 43:49.700]  This document can be found, docs.info.apple.com slash article.html question mark art num equals 93050.
[43:49.920 --> 43:50.860]  So there you go.
[43:51.060 --> 44:00.700]  I was playing with this about a year ago with a friend of mine, and I absolutely remember the ability to add another computer or add multiple computers to your account.
[44:00.700 --> 44:10.700]  And I believe it was a maximum of three, but it might have been more, where you can actually re-download content that you've purchased for, you know, a maximum number of times.
[44:10.800 --> 44:16.140]  And there was a number of times, and then you could unregister that computer from your account, and you would no longer be able to play that content and whatever.
[44:16.340 --> 44:22.320]  But there was the... they absolutely had the ability at one point in time to download more than one copy of the music you purchased.
[44:22.320 --> 44:25.360]  Yeah, I think I remember that too, vaguely.
[44:25.600 --> 44:32.040]  But what I wanted to say was that this kind of goes back into what AT&T wants to do with banning the pirated stuff.
[44:32.200 --> 44:45.600]  But it's like, hey, if you bought a copy of, you know, a Beatles song on Apple through Apple's store, and you lose it, you could, you know, you legally should be able to just download, like, an MP3 of it, because you bought it already.
[44:45.740 --> 44:46.020]  Absolutely.
[44:46.020 --> 44:49.600]  But now, AT&T would probably think that's wrong.
[44:49.760 --> 44:50.280]  That's not good.
[44:50.440 --> 44:54.760]  I think if you own it in vinyl, you should be able to get an MP3 of it, because you've already bought the damn thing.
[44:54.820 --> 44:55.940]  Why do you have to buy it a second time?
[44:55.940 --> 44:57.320]  Because their standards have changed.
[44:57.640 --> 44:59.320]  Can't get the Beatles from iTunes at all.
[44:59.380 --> 45:00.160]  That's another point.
[45:01.580 --> 45:06.580]  My original point here was that when you download music, it's not the same thing as buying the CD.
[45:06.900 --> 45:07.420]  It's just not.
[45:07.560 --> 45:08.880]  So it shouldn't be treated the same way.
[45:09.520 --> 45:11.220]  They shouldn't charge the same amount.
[45:11.460 --> 45:12.340]  It is different.
[45:13.760 --> 45:16.240]  Okay, 212-209-2900 is our phone number.
[45:16.480 --> 45:19.020]  And, well, we have a couple of calls coming in.
[45:19.100 --> 45:22.660]  Let's get a whole bunch of calls, and we'll go to the phones and take a whole lot of calls, hopefully.
[45:22.820 --> 45:32.300]  Oh, Emmanuel, real quick, I wanted to mention that a sad, sad passing of Mr. Wizard, who probably many of our listeners enjoyed watching back in the day.
[45:32.300 --> 45:35.640]  He was really the first hacker I was ever exposed to.
[45:36.240 --> 45:42.380]  I think his show was on for, like, 13 years and ended in 64, but reruns continued many years after.
[45:42.520 --> 45:49.220]  And he just was so enthusiastic, and he encouraged people to ask why and figure out how things worked in the physical world.
[45:49.480 --> 45:55.640]  And he made a big impression on me and a lot of other people, and I just wanted to shout out for Mr. Wizard, Don Herbert.
[45:55.900 --> 46:00.520]  He died at 89, and he was an amazing guy, and he had a lot of influence on a lot of people.
[46:00.980 --> 46:05.100]  I saw him, they used to repeat those shows on Nickelodeon back when they had good stuff on.
[46:05.480 --> 46:06.880]  And, yeah, it was interesting.
[46:07.100 --> 46:07.940]  I used to watch that, too.
[46:08.020 --> 46:09.200]  I used to wake up at 6 a.m.
[46:09.240 --> 46:09.720]  to watch it.
[46:10.280 --> 46:12.180]  You planned your whole day around Mr. Wizard, huh?
[46:12.360 --> 46:12.620]  Yeah.
[46:13.320 --> 46:13.780]  That's good.
[46:14.780 --> 46:22.440]  Okay, this story, which I find to be pretty incredible, has to do with yet another scandal in the Bush administration.
[46:22.840 --> 46:26.960]  But this has to do with, the report is entitled, and this comes from the U.S.
[46:27.060 --> 46:36.520]  House Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, which I think the Bush administration is keeping in business, Investigation of Possible Presidential Records Act Violations.
[46:36.740 --> 46:48.680]  Now, basically, what happened here, it's illegal for people in a presidential administration to send email on a system that's not the White House system.
[46:49.700 --> 46:55.060]  They can't send email through Hotmail or through Gmail that has to do with policy.
[46:55.240 --> 47:00.740]  They have to send it through particular systems that are archived for historical purposes.
[47:00.960 --> 47:06.840]  Now, what's been happening is that the Republican National Committee has been giving out what's known as RNC email accounts.
[47:07.340 --> 47:14.740]  And what they're concluding here is that the number of White House officials given RNC email accounts is higher than previously disclosed.
[47:14.740 --> 47:21.500]  In March 2007, White House spokesperson Dana Perino said that only a handful of officials had RNC email accounts.
[47:21.660 --> 47:25.140]  In later statements, her estimate rose to 50 over the course of the administration.
[47:25.500 --> 47:31.480]  In fact, the committee has learned from the RNC that at least 88 White House officials had RNC email accounts.
[47:31.480 --> 47:44.680]  The officials with RNC email accounts include Karl Rove, the president's senior advisor, Andrew Card, the former White House chief of staff, Ken Melman, the former White House director of political affairs, and many other officials.
[47:45.060 --> 47:48.420]  White House officials made extensive use of their RNC email accounts.
[47:49.060 --> 47:54.800]  The RNC has preserved 140,216 emails sent or received by Karl Rove.
[47:54.920 --> 47:55.340]  Good Lord.
[47:55.340 --> 48:02.280]  Over half of these emails were sent to or received from individuals using official.gov email accounts.
[48:03.040 --> 48:10.440]  These email accounts were used by White House officials for official purposes, such as communicating with federal agencies about federal appointments and policies.
[48:10.860 --> 48:16.060]  There has been extensive destruction of the emails of White House officials by the RNC.
[48:16.220 --> 48:23.180]  Of the 88 White House officials who received RNC email accounts, the RNC has preserved no emails for 51 of them.
[48:23.180 --> 48:38.060]  In a deposition, Susan Ralston, Mr. Rove's former executive assistant, testified that many of the White House officials, for whom the RNC has no email records, were regular users of their RNC email accounts, using the system frequently or daily.
[48:39.360 --> 48:39.880]  And...
[48:39.880 --> 48:41.140]  Wait, I don't understand this.
[48:41.740 --> 48:46.300]  So, some of the people, the RNC lost their records, but not other people?
[48:46.500 --> 48:50.020]  It just seems very strange sort of system administrator who do that.
[48:50.020 --> 48:53.300]  Yeah, it depends what is meant by lost the record.
[48:53.380 --> 48:58.560]  I mean, they could have deleted the mail themselves, and there's no background... there's no backup system to it.
[48:58.920 --> 48:59.060]  Right.
[48:59.260 --> 48:59.600]  There is.
[48:59.740 --> 49:00.680]  They're just not devolving it.
[49:00.800 --> 49:02.780]  It's probably in some intern's house.
[49:04.060 --> 49:05.380]  Yeah, it's entirely possible.
[49:05.420 --> 49:14.360]  But there's really no difference between this, using their RNC email account, and using any other email account that they would have had access to, you know, any free email account, Gmail, Hotmail, whatever.
[49:14.360 --> 49:15.940]  Which they're not supposed to use for official business.
[49:15.940 --> 49:17.020]  Right, which you're not supposed to use.
[49:17.140 --> 49:24.020]  However, it's very convenient to be running your own servers and being able to delete any backups or archives of email that you don't want people to see.
[49:24.180 --> 49:29.560]  And a lot of this was sent in the opening days of the Iraq invasion or the days leading up to that.
[49:29.920 --> 49:32.940]  There's all kinds of history here that is being erased, that has been erased.
[49:33.420 --> 49:35.400]  And this is turning into a huge, huge scandal.
[49:35.400 --> 49:39.920]  I don't know if it's ever going to go anywhere, because we don't seem to care about huge scandals anymore.
[49:40.500 --> 49:45.460]  But there's a, this is all over the net if you look for it.
[49:45.680 --> 49:51.280]  Just look for the investigation of possible presidential records, act violations, and you'll see the entire report here.
[49:51.360 --> 49:52.780]  And hopefully there'll be more information on this.
[49:52.920 --> 49:56.060]  What I'd like to know, though, what is the domain that they were using?
[49:56.380 --> 49:58.460]  I'd like to see if I got any mail from these jokers.
[49:59.000 --> 50:01.320]  The RNC email account that they were using.
[50:01.480 --> 50:03.580]  They don't say that anywhere, what it actually is.
[50:04.020 --> 50:04.380]  Email?
[50:04.600 --> 50:05.100]  Yes, Bernie.
[50:05.400 --> 50:06.960]  I just wanted to interject.
[50:07.160 --> 50:18.520]  It might be worth comparing this story to the Vice President Al Gore's use of the White House telephone to make fundraising calls back when the Clinton-Gore administration was in power.
[50:18.860 --> 50:34.480]  Now, even though Al Gore used a Democratic National Committee, DNC, phone card to ensure that all tolls were billed to the Democratic National Committee and not to taxpayers, the Republicans, they raised hell about this for months.
[50:34.480 --> 50:41.160]  Then the White House had a separate telephone installed in the White House at DNC expense, not taxpayers.
[50:41.480 --> 50:43.180]  The Republicans still made noise about it.
[50:43.260 --> 51:01.160]  But I'd say it's probably safe to assume that the 88-plus Bush-Cheney White House officials, who used this RNC email account for official government business, did not have separate RNC-owned computers on their desks, connected this to a separate RNC-owned network,
[51:01.420 --> 51:17.340]  to communicate with primarily .gov accounts, which this report from the Henry Waxman Committee on Oversight and Government Reform said most of these emails were to and from government agencies.
[51:18.120 --> 51:20.880]  There's two controlling legal authorities in this case.
[51:21.020 --> 51:26.700]  One is the Presidential Records Act, which requires a White House registration to preserve all official documents, including email.
[51:26.940 --> 51:28.480]  And the second one is called the Hatch Act.
[51:28.600 --> 51:34.400]  It penalizes government workers to use government offices, equipment, or time for partisan politics.
[51:34.400 --> 51:42.300]  And it reminded me, because I'm an older person, that of the famous or infamous 18-minute audit tape gap.
[51:42.520 --> 51:47.280]  Remember, Richard Nixon actually had his own Oval Office intentionally bugged.
[51:47.360 --> 51:50.020]  He was such an egomaniac.
[51:50.020 --> 51:55.800]  He wanted to have everything he said recorded for prosperity in the future, to show how great a president he was.
[51:55.920 --> 51:56.540]  And there was a...
[51:56.540 --> 52:03.620]  You know, after the whole Watergate break-in and the cover-up, there was a mysterious erasure of 18 minutes on one of these tapes.
[52:03.980 --> 52:16.320]  And it speculated this proof was of his attempt to cover up the committee to reelect the president's burglary of the Democratic National Committee's Watergate headquarters.
[52:16.640 --> 52:23.220]  Now, you know, this whole thing with the current White House administration seems to make that look like a minor ethics infraction, in my opinion.
[52:23.380 --> 52:27.340]  And that brought down a sitting second-term president.
[52:27.340 --> 52:29.900]  I don't know if anything's going to happen these days.
[52:29.900 --> 52:31.880]  Like you pointed out, people don't seem to care anymore.
[52:32.040 --> 52:33.560]  But this is a really important story.
[52:33.760 --> 52:49.680]  People deserve to know what their elected officials are doing, especially when the law says that they must, under law, preserve all of their communications that affect policy, that sort of thing.
[52:49.960 --> 52:52.060]  And this is outrageous.
[52:52.060 --> 52:56.180]  And people should be paying attention to this story, because it's got legs.
[52:56.180 --> 53:01.580]  I think people should, if they pay attention to it, inquire, this could go somewhere.
[53:01.820 --> 53:02.760]  It's very interesting.
[53:03.140 --> 53:03.900]  Very, very good point.
[53:04.020 --> 53:05.320]  Now, let's try and take some phone calls.
[53:05.420 --> 53:07.440]  We have a few on the line, 212-209-2900.
[53:07.540 --> 53:08.860]  Let's try and get through as many as we can.
[53:09.340 --> 53:09.920]  And good evening.
[53:10.060 --> 53:10.600]  You're on Off the Hook.
[53:12.540 --> 53:15.820]  Yes, well, you know, the Bushes, they're professional CIA people.
[53:15.960 --> 53:17.460]  They're trying to bring down Hugo Chavez.
[53:17.720 --> 53:19.480]  So, I mean, why are you all upset?
[53:19.700 --> 53:20.820]  You want to bring him down.
[53:21.020 --> 53:22.420]  You were talking today about him.
[53:22.520 --> 53:23.140]  Oh, please.
[53:23.300 --> 53:23.780]  Good God.
[53:24.060 --> 53:24.600]  This is a fact.
[53:24.880 --> 53:26.740]  Ah, talking down about Hugo Chavez.
[53:26.960 --> 53:27.480]  Good evening.
[53:28.020 --> 53:29.000]  You're on Off the Hook.
[53:29.040 --> 53:30.640]  People just like dogs with bones, really.
[53:31.160 --> 53:31.600]  Go ahead.
[53:32.460 --> 53:33.740]  Hey, I have two quick comments.
[53:33.900 --> 53:40.140]  First off, I don't know if you saw in the news, but the United Airlines computer system at LAX went down today.
[53:40.280 --> 53:44.160]  Yeah, and I can account for my whereabouts, so we all can, right?
[53:44.420 --> 53:49.660]  Isn't this the second time this month that a computer failure has caused massive delays in a major airport?
[53:49.760 --> 53:53.140]  There was an air traffic control computer problem earlier, and yeah, now there's this.
[53:53.420 --> 53:56.980]  Computers, yeah, if you rely on computers, totally, you're going to have problems like this, absolutely.
[53:57.360 --> 53:59.400]  Well, how are we to know that this isn't malicious?
[53:59.640 --> 54:04.420]  I mean, if someone did manage to break into an airline computer system, they would never tell us.
[54:04.560 --> 54:04.940]  You know what I mean?
[54:05.040 --> 54:05.240]  True.
[54:05.460 --> 54:06.480]  They may never know.
[54:07.560 --> 54:09.160]  I mean, there could be all kinds of things.
[54:09.240 --> 54:10.860]  It could be a spam attack.
[54:10.860 --> 54:12.720]  It could be somebody kicking out a cord.
[54:13.180 --> 54:14.720]  It could be someone getting access.
[54:15.100 --> 54:16.940]  That's why accountability is so important.
[54:17.060 --> 54:17.800]  But Jim's right.
[54:17.860 --> 54:18.400]  We may never know.
[54:19.140 --> 54:20.320]  It's scary to think it's so vulnerable.
[54:20.520 --> 54:21.700]  And another quick comment.
[54:22.400 --> 54:26.460]  The backing of my spring issue of 2600 fell apart today.
[54:26.660 --> 54:26.980]  Oh, no.
[54:27.660 --> 54:27.920]  Yeah.
[54:28.120 --> 54:29.080]  What do you mean the backing?
[54:29.360 --> 54:31.240]  Like the glues come undone.
[54:31.520 --> 54:33.040]  The glues come undone?
[54:33.040 --> 54:36.800]  You mean the pages, like, fell out because the glue is no longer gluey?
[54:37.160 --> 54:37.520]  Yeah.
[54:37.740 --> 54:41.560]  If you can send that back to us, we'll replace it and send you something else for your trouble.
[54:41.720 --> 54:43.300]  But that should definitely not be happening.
[54:43.640 --> 54:44.500]  Definitely not be happening.
[54:44.660 --> 54:46.720]  I'd like to know if that's happened to anybody else.
[54:47.140 --> 54:48.460]  But that's the first I've heard of this.
[54:49.000 --> 54:49.100]  Okay.
[54:49.140 --> 54:49.760]  Well, thank you very much.
[54:49.840 --> 54:50.020]  All right.
[54:50.080 --> 54:50.360]  Take care.
[54:51.380 --> 54:52.380]  That's not what you want to hear.
[54:53.260 --> 54:54.360]  212-209-2900.
[54:54.900 --> 54:55.680]  And good evening.
[54:55.800 --> 54:56.300]  You're on Off the Hook.
[54:56.780 --> 54:57.220]  Oh, dear.
[54:58.620 --> 54:59.280]  Don't give up.
[54:59.680 --> 55:00.480]  We'll get to you eventually.
[55:00.620 --> 55:00.900]  Good evening.
[55:01.060 --> 55:01.660]  You're on Off the Hook.
[55:02.580 --> 55:02.860]  Hello.
[55:03.080 --> 55:03.260]  Yes.
[55:03.300 --> 55:03.540]  Go ahead.
[55:03.540 --> 55:20.580]  If anyone out there wants to read a book of Chuang Tzu, C-H-U-A-N-G, as it's often spelled, T-Z-U, so-called Disciples of Lao Tzu...
[55:20.580 --> 55:22.020]  What's this got to do with what we're talking about?
[55:22.360 --> 55:46.220]  Well, he wrote a book about, you know, some guy in some canton, some county, some state, who decided to make his whole system, his whole county, his whole area so tight and so secure, you know, which in those days meant, you know, guards and roadblocks and stuff like that,
[55:46.300 --> 55:46.960]  and spears.
[55:47.940 --> 56:08.740]  And so he got it so tight and so secure that the next-door guy, the next-door feudal lord, said, okay, you've got this wrapped up so tight and so secure, this other lord came over and stole the whole thing.
[56:10.320 --> 56:10.840]  Okay.
[56:11.100 --> 56:13.600]  That's 45 seconds of my life I'll never get back.
[56:14.060 --> 56:15.260]  And one more last call.
[56:15.340 --> 56:15.620]  Good evening.
[56:15.720 --> 56:16.220]  You're on the air.
[56:17.180 --> 56:17.420]  Yes.
[56:17.520 --> 56:17.780]  Hi.
[56:17.980 --> 56:19.380]  Thank you for the program.
[56:19.700 --> 56:20.000]  Thank you.
[56:20.140 --> 56:21.480]  I'm a blind person.
[56:21.720 --> 56:24.100]  I heard you talking earlier about GPS devices.
[56:24.100 --> 56:28.560]  I'm wondering if anybody out there knows of something available.
[56:28.840 --> 56:34.420]  So if I'm walking, say, crossing Lexington Avenue, it will say Lexington Avenue to me.
[56:34.940 --> 56:35.920]  I'll listen off the air.
[56:36.060 --> 56:36.280]  Okay.
[56:36.400 --> 56:36.620]  Thanks.
[56:36.700 --> 56:37.140]  Thanks for your call.
[56:37.220 --> 56:38.520]  Does anybody have an answer for that really quickly?
[56:38.680 --> 56:47.940]  If you look up the car ones, some you can get for the car you can carry, they sometimes have a vocal, like the thing will tell you turn right, turn left, you're walking on the street.
[56:48.060 --> 56:48.360]  Okay.
[56:48.460 --> 56:48.860]  Things like that.
[56:48.860 --> 56:49.600]  We're going to have to leave it at that.
[56:49.700 --> 56:52.060]  Hopefully we can follow up with this in weeks ahead.
[56:52.060 --> 56:53.580]  I want to thank people for calling.
[56:53.800 --> 56:59.800]  Very quickly, one person wrote in asking us what song was played at the end of the June 18th, 2003 show.
[57:00.240 --> 57:01.580]  This is from Rudy.
[57:02.060 --> 57:05.580]  Well, we have the very same song right now.
[57:05.820 --> 57:07.680]  This is from Sparks.
[57:07.840 --> 57:08.740]  Talent is an asset.
[57:08.940 --> 57:13.500]  And thanks for listening to our old shows and listening to the music we play on the old shows and asking questions.
[57:14.400 --> 57:15.460]  We'll be back again next week.
[57:15.480 --> 57:16.620]  Another exciting edition of Off the Hook.
[57:16.980 --> 57:17.520]  Emmanuel Goldstein.
[57:17.720 --> 57:18.100]  Have a good night.
[57:39.630 --> 57:41.250]  Albert is smart.
[57:41.570 --> 57:42.390]  He's a genius.
[57:43.930 --> 57:45.810]  Watch Albert Potter.
[57:46.210 --> 57:47.850]  An obvious genius.
[57:48.610 --> 57:51.170]  Soon day he will reassess the world.
[57:51.430 --> 57:52.510]  At least in our time.
[57:54.320 --> 57:57.780]  When he grows up, he'll remember us.
[57:58.640 --> 58:03.140]  When he grows up, we are sure that he'll remember us.
[58:03.300 --> 58:05.840]  He'll make sure the doubt that war has made.
[58:06.080 --> 58:08.600]  We can call the strangers off his back.
[58:08.600 --> 58:10.060]  Go away.
[58:10.360 --> 58:10.880]  Everything's left.
[58:11.280 --> 58:11.920]  Go away.
[58:12.380 --> 58:12.800]  I'll be out.
[58:12.800 --> 58:16.720]  There's no reason I need you to have with me.
[58:18.040 --> 58:20.000]  Talent is an asset.
[58:20.340 --> 58:22.480]  You've got to understand that.
[58:24.500 --> 58:26.620]  Talent is an asset.
[58:27.020 --> 58:29.080]  And little Albert has it.
[58:31.140 --> 58:33.220]  Talent is an asset.
[58:33.540 --> 58:35.680]  And Albert surely has it.
[58:52.150 --> 58:55.710]  One day he'll suffer his eight home streets.
[58:56.650 --> 59:01.110]  All of the while he'll be scribbling things, genius things.
[59:01.350 --> 59:03.450]  Look at all the decent days.
[59:04.050 --> 59:06.750]  Going, going at the speed of light.
[59:06.750 --> 59:09.030]  The world is relative.
[59:09.270 --> 59:12.390]  We are his relative to science.
[59:13.110 --> 59:15.490]  The world is relative.
[59:16.250 --> 59:20.150]  Childhood is an asset, and there's a love of acid.
[59:20.550 --> 59:22.470]  The child is relative.
[59:22.690 --> 59:24.490]  What's hypothetical?
[59:24.890 --> 59:26.890]  We are his relative.
[59:27.110 --> 59:28.750]  The heart is very relative.
[59:29.230 --> 59:31.130]  The man is a relative.
[59:31.130 --> 59:32.630]  The woman is relative.
[59:33.550 --> 59:35.190]  The woman is relative.
[59:35.190 --> 59:35.370]  The woman is relative.
[01:00:10.010 --> 01:00:10.570]  Woo!
[01:00:11.290 --> 01:00:12.250]  Hey, I like that.
[01:00:12.370 --> 01:00:13.250]  That's Sparks, right?
[01:00:13.890 --> 01:00:15.130]  Yeah, that's Sparks.
[01:00:15.510 --> 01:00:16.530]  Man, that's pretty good.
[01:00:17.130 --> 01:00:18.990]  Alright, this is WBAI.
[01:00:19.250 --> 01:00:20.390]  Let's see here.