[00:09.510 --> 00:17.730]  This is Evelyn Andino-Rosa, Subscriptions Director for WBAI, with an important announcement for people making donations to the station.
[00:17.950 --> 00:21.770]  Please make sure to use the enclosed envelopes received with your invoices.
[00:21.970 --> 00:24.330]  These envelopes contain our current banking address.
[00:24.330 --> 00:30.930]  That address is Pacifica Foundation WBAI Radio, General Post Office, P.O.
[00:31.010 --> 00:37.590]  Box 30540, New York, New York, 10087-0540.
[00:37.830 --> 00:43.670]  Again, for those who are fulfilling your pledges through the mail, make sure to use the enclosed envelopes provided.
[00:43.870 --> 00:48.330]  For those who wish to mail in their donations without an invoice, please use the same address.
[00:48.330 --> 00:53.430]  If you need more information, please call us at 212-209-2800.
[00:53.430 --> 00:56.730]  That's 212-209-2800.
[00:57.090 --> 01:00.970]  Another reminder from WBAI, your peace and justice station.
[01:02.010 --> 01:04.410]  And this is radio station WBAI in New York.
[01:04.530 --> 01:05.750]  The time is 7 o'clock.
[01:05.950 --> 01:07.450]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[01:12.620 --> 01:14.600]  The telephone keeps ringing.
[01:14.880 --> 01:17.140]  So I ripped it off the wall.
[01:18.060 --> 01:20.120]  I cut myself while shaving.
[01:20.720 --> 01:22.660]  Now I can't make a call.
[01:23.240 --> 01:25.440]  It couldn't get much worse.
[01:26.020 --> 01:28.020]  But if they could, they would.
[01:28.260 --> 01:30.920]  Bun-dilly-bong for the best, expect the worst.
[01:31.460 --> 01:33.420]  I hope that's understood.
[01:33.620 --> 01:34.520]  Bun-dilly-bong!
[02:05.920 --> 02:07.100]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:07.240 --> 02:08.180]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:08.760 --> 02:11.260]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:12.580 --> 02:17.440]  First of two fundraising additions here in the summer season.
[02:18.660 --> 02:21.420]  Joined today by Jim over there.
[02:21.720 --> 02:22.140]  Hello.
[02:22.860 --> 02:24.340]  Mike over in the center of the room.
[02:24.600 --> 02:25.060]  Hi.
[02:25.480 --> 02:27.000]  And on the far right is not Kevin.
[02:27.340 --> 02:27.840]  Hello.
[02:28.100 --> 02:29.520]  Down in Philadelphia, Bernie S.
[02:30.220 --> 02:32.740]  Greetings from inside a Philadelphia taxi cab.
[02:32.740 --> 02:34.100]  You're inside a taxi cab.
[02:34.140 --> 02:34.700]  That's pretty exciting.
[02:35.380 --> 02:38.080]  Well, not really, but that's where I am.
[02:38.620 --> 02:42.500]  We're just very bored up here, so anything is exciting to us.
[02:43.700 --> 02:44.560]  We'll live in it up.
[02:44.780 --> 02:49.320]  Yeah, it's raining outside, so that means I guess a lot of people are stranded or something.
[02:49.680 --> 02:49.960]  Not Kevin.
[02:50.020 --> 02:52.080]  You actually got stranded on a broken train on the way in here, didn't you?
[02:52.160 --> 02:52.600]  It's true.
[02:52.720 --> 02:54.460]  The MTA tried to stop me getting here again.
[02:54.480 --> 02:55.000]  They tried to stop you.
[02:55.080 --> 03:05.080]  The MTA is always trying to stop us from getting here somehow, whether it's searching our bags or stopping our trains or any number of things that they think of.
[03:05.980 --> 03:06.680]  But you made it.
[03:06.760 --> 03:07.140]  That's the important thing.
[03:07.140 --> 03:08.400]  They're soaking wet, but you made it.
[03:09.000 --> 03:10.720]  Unfortunately, I didn't think ahead and bring an umbrella.
[03:11.680 --> 03:12.040]  Wow.
[03:12.100 --> 03:13.780]  So the train just can't handle the rain.
[03:13.780 --> 03:14.360]  Is that the deal?
[03:14.520 --> 03:15.040]  I'm not sure.
[03:15.040 --> 03:19.040]  It seemed to have just stopped randomly and skid, and then they would...
[03:19.040 --> 03:19.580]  It skidded?
[03:19.720 --> 03:19.980]  Yeah.
[03:20.180 --> 03:20.880]  The train skidded.
[03:20.980 --> 03:23.940]  And then it would start again, and then after every stop, it would do this.
[03:23.940 --> 03:24.640]  Okay.
[03:25.100 --> 03:27.060]  Maybe the brake was stuck or something.
[03:27.700 --> 03:28.100]  A wet.
[03:28.420 --> 03:28.780]  Yeah.
[03:29.140 --> 03:29.780]  Wet leaves.
[03:30.200 --> 03:37.460]  Well, speaking of mass transit, I saw this story in the Times earlier in the week, or actually last week.
[03:37.520 --> 03:42.680]  It's all about how the subway searches are continuing, just like the police...
[03:42.680 --> 03:45.320]  Just how the police liked them is how the story went in the New York Times.
[03:45.940 --> 03:56.640]  As you recall, two years ago, after bombings and bombing attempts in London's transit system, the New York City Police Department began randomly inspecting backpacks and packages of subway riders every day.
[03:57.080 --> 03:59.540]  And back then, the measure was front page news.
[04:00.560 --> 04:01.900]  Now, not so much so.
[04:01.980 --> 04:02.840]  It's still going on.
[04:03.020 --> 04:05.180]  They still have searches all over the place.
[04:05.840 --> 04:10.080]  I think they hit every station, how many times a year?
[04:10.440 --> 04:13.820]  It says in there some amount of times, but I don't find it credible.
[04:14.160 --> 04:16.480]  What amount of times does it estimate?
[04:16.700 --> 04:17.780]  You're the one with the article.
[04:18.000 --> 04:18.180]  Yeah, I know.
[04:18.320 --> 04:18.500]  I'm looking.
[04:18.600 --> 04:19.840]  There's a whole lot of words in this article.
[04:19.920 --> 04:21.260]  I'm looking for that one particular part.
[04:22.220 --> 04:28.900]  They make 5,462 checks of the system's 1,000 entrances from August of last year.
[04:29.120 --> 04:30.940]  August or September of last year.
[04:31.640 --> 04:34.540]  And six checkpoints per 1,000.
[04:34.620 --> 04:34.900]  I don't know.
[04:35.000 --> 04:35.760]  There's all kinds of numbers here.
[04:35.900 --> 04:36.880]  I believe it was 35.
[04:37.240 --> 04:37.520]  35.
[04:37.520 --> 04:38.340]  Per station.
[04:38.500 --> 04:39.040]  35 times.
[04:39.040 --> 04:40.980]  See, I don't find that number credible.
[04:41.220 --> 04:41.480]  Why?
[04:41.760 --> 04:46.200]  Because 35 times per station is at least once every 10 days, more or less.
[04:46.560 --> 04:52.300]  And I take the subway to work every day, and I do not see the police more than like once a year.
[04:52.320 --> 04:53.700]  Maybe they just do it at night or something.
[04:54.000 --> 04:55.420]  We're misunderstanding the numbers.
[04:55.580 --> 04:58.160]  Maybe it's when they go there, they get 35 bags.
[04:58.300 --> 05:00.120]  They make 35 searches per station.
[05:00.260 --> 05:04.800]  It does say that they check every station, you know, at least so many times a year.
[05:04.960 --> 05:11.420]  But I think they really discriminate and search some stations a lot more than others.
[05:12.100 --> 05:16.540]  Well, of course, the American Civil Liberties Union is still up in arms about this.
[05:16.640 --> 05:23.680]  But I guess they're not yelling quite as loudly because I haven't heard them in a while objecting to this, at least not in the media.
[05:25.380 --> 05:33.560]  Basically, Christopher Dunn, a lawyer with the Civil Liberties Group, said the question remained, what is the likelihood of someone with a bomb encountering a checkpoint at a subway entrance?
[05:34.080 --> 05:45.220]  Understanding that checkpoints only last for three or four hours and are concentrated during the rush hours, the department's own figures reveal that as few as two or three percent of the 1,000 subway entrances may have checkpoints at any given time.
[05:46.300 --> 05:50.220]  Now, they go on to say, we fully support subway security measures.
[05:50.480 --> 05:51.540]  Not quite sure what that means.
[05:51.660 --> 06:02.500]  But a bag search program that leaves 97 percent of subway entrances with no checkpoint on an average day cannot be effective enough to justify suspicionless police searches of law-abiding New Yorkers.
[06:02.780 --> 06:03.860]  Now, it's interesting about that.
[06:04.000 --> 06:18.020]  He kind of like waltzed right into a trap set by the NYPD and Homeland Security people who responded to that by saying, yes, having officers checking bags at every station all the time would certainly be more effective.
[06:18.160 --> 06:19.900]  As if that's what the ACLU is pushing.
[06:20.080 --> 06:20.740]  Yes, we agree.
[06:20.780 --> 06:21.600]  That would be more effective.
[06:21.760 --> 06:23.180]  But it's difficult to do.
[06:23.320 --> 06:25.000]  That would require a tremendous commitment.
[06:25.240 --> 06:27.140]  It's cost prohibitive in terms of cops and money.
[06:27.300 --> 06:29.220]  But if we have to do it, we can do it.
[06:30.120 --> 06:31.280]  Nice work, ACLU.
[06:31.320 --> 06:33.760]  You got us into even more surveillance now with that little remark.
[06:34.680 --> 06:36.260]  So... Well, they lost their lawsuit.
[06:36.720 --> 06:40.900]  There was a lawsuit that the ACLU filed to try and stop these and they lost.
[06:41.180 --> 06:44.980]  Yeah, well, that doesn't mean you don't stop trying to... and having demonstrations.
[06:45.260 --> 06:45.360]  It does for the ACLU.
[06:45.360 --> 06:53.760]  The thing that this article does not mention, this article came out on the 6th of July, does not mention anywhere in it, it's three pages long, that you don't have to submit to a search.
[06:54.140 --> 06:55.660]  And you had this happen to you, Mike, right?
[06:55.840 --> 07:00.140]  Yeah, like the day after it happened was one of like the three times I've ever seen them.
[07:00.420 --> 07:07.480]  They stopped me and said they wished to look in my bag and I requested their search warrant, which of course they didn't have.
[07:07.940 --> 07:11.040]  And at that point, I left and just walked to the next station.
[07:12.200 --> 07:19.620]  Yeah, you can get on a bus, go on to the next... sometimes you can even go on a different entrance to the same station and then sort of wave at them from the subway platform.
[07:19.800 --> 07:22.620]  Well, my station has only one entrance, so that wasn't an option.
[07:22.700 --> 07:23.060]  What's that, Bernie?
[07:23.580 --> 07:25.140]  The terrorists would never do that.
[07:25.420 --> 07:25.820]  No.
[07:26.000 --> 07:30.780]  Well, the terrorists would see this and simply not take part in it.
[07:30.880 --> 07:34.280]  They'd go on a bus or something or just blow something else up.
[07:34.560 --> 07:40.160]  The point is if you really want to blow things up, you're going to blow things up, unless you're in London and don't know how to blow things up.
[07:40.300 --> 07:40.880]  And you know what?
[07:40.960 --> 07:52.940]  When that story came out, was it almost two weeks ago, when the failed bombings in London came out, did I not say the day after that's going to have ramifications here, they're going to start pushing this surveillance thing on us like never before?
[07:53.260 --> 07:54.280]  And look what they're doing.
[07:54.420 --> 07:56.440]  They're pushing the surveillance thing on us like never before.
[07:56.680 --> 07:58.960]  New York plans surveillance veil for downtown.
[07:59.140 --> 08:00.200]  Now, that's kind of old news.
[08:00.260 --> 08:12.440]  We knew they were doing it, but they're really, they're shifting gears By the end of this year, more than 100 cameras will have begun monitoring cars moving through lower Manhattan, the beginning phase of a London-style surveillance system.
[08:12.440 --> 08:14.540]  That would be the first in the United States.
[08:14.900 --> 08:17.620]  So we're looking at London as a model.
[08:17.920 --> 08:27.580]  And the fact that they succeeded in, I guess, catching the people that were going to blow something up, it doesn't do anything to keep things from blowing up.
[08:27.660 --> 08:31.920]  It's good for catching the people after they blow something up or after they fail on blowing something up.
[08:33.640 --> 08:39.180]  They caught them mostly by pulling them out of a car that they had driven into an airport, like, with explosives in it.
[08:39.220 --> 08:41.040]  It doesn't take a whole lot of cameras to do that.
[08:41.040 --> 08:42.160]  Well, that was a good clue, yes.
[08:42.280 --> 08:44.380]  They did provide that clue of the flaming car.
[08:44.800 --> 08:45.160]  True.
[08:45.560 --> 08:51.780]  But the other two cases where they parked the cars in London and then ran away, that was something you needed the cameras for.
[08:51.880 --> 08:55.080]  Okay, it was the same people I know, the same people that did it in Scotland.
[08:55.400 --> 08:56.500]  But what if it wasn't?
[08:56.560 --> 08:57.220]  What if it wasn't, Jim?
[08:57.220 --> 09:03.340]  Well, the people running away from the cars, they didn't find those cars by camera.
[09:03.340 --> 09:13.360]  They found them because there was an ambulance crew nearby on something totally unrelated and saw a car parked in a weird place and somebody driving a car in a weird way and then leaving it.
[09:14.820 --> 09:16.780]  But there was also smoke inside the car.
[09:16.780 --> 09:19.020]  It was kind of an unusual sight.
[09:19.020 --> 09:32.080]  That was the one that the cops, in their infinite wisdom, or the bobbies, had towed because it was parked illegally and towed right next to a police station because that's where the impound lot was and waited until it started smoking.
[09:32.460 --> 09:34.560]  I thought it was smoking before they towed it.
[09:35.000 --> 09:35.320]  No.
[09:36.160 --> 09:37.140]  Which was it, Bernie?
[09:38.360 --> 09:42.960]  One of the news reports I read indicated that that was one of the causes of suspicion.
[09:42.960 --> 09:48.660]  It looked like there was smoke inside the car before they towed it.
[09:48.660 --> 09:49.900]  Yeah, that's what I heard, too.
[09:49.980 --> 09:51.260]  Although these stories do tend to change.
[09:51.500 --> 09:55.240]  Even better, they saw smoke inside the car and decided to tow it.
[09:55.660 --> 10:01.240]  Why couldn't these guys have used nitroglycerin and illustrated why the cops should be more careful?
[10:01.340 --> 10:06.720]  The thing is, they tended to catch people doing this kind of thing in the past without surveillance cameras.
[10:06.860 --> 10:13.440]  They caught Timothy McVeigh, even when he didn't have any license plates on his car, and they caught the original World Trade Center bombers.
[10:13.700 --> 10:17.040]  You don't need the cameras for every little detail.
[10:17.040 --> 10:22.280]  And it's just, I'm very worried about what else we're giving up by being watched constantly everywhere.
[10:22.480 --> 10:25.480]  There's a local story here in New York, a very serious story.
[10:25.700 --> 10:29.560]  A couple of police officers making a routine traffic stop were shot.
[10:29.560 --> 10:32.560]  One of them is in tremendously awful condition.
[10:33.100 --> 10:38.340]  And they're saying that it's the surveillance cameras that enabled us to get these guys.
[10:38.560 --> 10:39.920]  No, they've shown the film.
[10:40.040 --> 10:40.860]  The film is horrible.
[10:40.860 --> 10:46.860]  What enabled them to get these guys is the fact that they ate fried chicken and left their greasy fingerprints on the inside of the stolen car.
[10:47.700 --> 10:49.360]  Well, there's that too, I guess.
[10:49.400 --> 10:55.680]  But they're using this to, once again, drive surveillance cameras as an idea throughout the city.
[10:56.040 --> 10:58.820]  So you're advising thieves not to eat fried chicken?
[10:59.000 --> 11:02.560]  I would think that any thief with a brain should not eat fried chicken anyway.
[11:02.760 --> 11:05.380]  Or just have fingerprints being left all over the place.
[11:05.380 --> 11:10.980]  The thing is, there's plenty of ways of catching people, and you don't need to turn your country into a surveillance state, which is what we're doing.
[11:11.160 --> 11:14.520]  The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative, that's what the plan is called.
[11:14.660 --> 11:25.220]  It doesn't spell anything cool, just L-M-S-I, will resemble London's so-called Ring of Steel, an extensive web of cameras and roadblocks designed to detect, track, and deter terrorists.
[11:25.740 --> 11:33.400]  British officials said images captured by the cameras helped track suspects after the London subway bombings in 2005 and the car bomb plots last month.
[11:33.400 --> 11:47.120]  If the program is fully financed, it will include not only license plate readers, but also 3,000 public and private security cameras below Canal Street, as well as a center staffed by the police and private security officers and movable roadblocks.
[11:48.080 --> 11:50.920]  It's really kind of scary.
[11:51.240 --> 11:54.220]  For a while, it appeared New York could not afford this system.
[11:54.520 --> 12:01.000]  Last summer, the program was in peril after the city's share of Homeland Security urban grant money was cut by nearly 40%.
[12:01.000 --> 12:08.360]  But apparently, the department has since obtained $25 million towards the estimated $90 million cost of the plan.
[12:08.600 --> 12:13.860]  And $15 million more came from Homeland Security grants, while another $10 million came from the city.
[12:14.100 --> 12:21.800]  More than enough to install 116 license plate readers in fixed and mobile locations, including cars and helicopters, in the coming months.
[12:21.800 --> 12:23.980]  They're going to have license plate readers in helicopters?
[12:25.140 --> 12:27.240]  This is James Bond material.
[12:27.520 --> 12:29.060]  You can't even see license plates from a helicopter.
[12:29.060 --> 12:30.100]  Well, apparently you can.
[12:30.260 --> 12:31.480]  And this is not a James Bond movie.
[12:31.540 --> 12:32.100]  This is real life.
[12:32.360 --> 12:37.060]  The license plate readers would check the plate's numbers and send out alerts if suspect vehicles were detected.
[12:37.420 --> 12:38.700]  Now, what's a suspect vehicle?
[12:38.700 --> 12:43.900]  It could be anything from someone who doesn't pay their parking tickets to somebody who's overdue in a library book.
[12:45.200 --> 12:47.620]  Now, here's the other interesting part of this whole story.
[12:47.720 --> 12:56.260]  This is being paired along with another initiative in the city, something also modeled on London and Singapore, two great surveillance states.
[12:57.180 --> 13:01.600]  The city is seeking state approval to charge drivers a fee to enter Manhattan below 86th Street.
[13:01.820 --> 13:05.240]  And that, of course, would require the use of license plate readers.
[13:05.620 --> 13:06.900]  Now, I think it's a great idea.
[13:06.960 --> 13:08.340]  And I know, Mike, you're in favor of this idea.
[13:08.500 --> 13:11.880]  But I'm actually... I'm not in favor of this idea for kind of a strange reason.
[13:11.920 --> 13:13.020]  I don't think it goes far enough.
[13:13.220 --> 13:14.480]  I don't think they're charging enough.
[13:14.480 --> 13:21.700]  I think the people who already pay tolls, they're not going to be paying anything extra because that gets deducted from the $8 fee that anybody would have to pay.
[13:22.520 --> 13:29.660]  But the thing that really puts me over the edge on this is the surveillance and the fact that you don't ever unplug that once you plug it in.
[13:30.320 --> 13:31.580]  We put this into effect.
[13:31.580 --> 13:32.800]  The city has changed forever.
[13:33.680 --> 13:35.660]  And we're all being monitored constantly.
[13:35.860 --> 13:36.180]  I don't know.
[13:36.460 --> 13:39.300]  What do you mean us all, those of us who drive?
[13:39.480 --> 13:41.360]  Well, yeah, but you're going to be on the cameras too, you know.
[13:41.560 --> 13:45.480]  You're going to be on the cameras even if you're walking or riding a bike or, you know, on a scooter.
[13:46.320 --> 13:50.540]  Okay, there's no license plate, but eventually there'll be something that they'll use to track you.
[13:51.520 --> 14:01.780]  It's creating this incredible paranoid state where it's completely unnecessary and very unconstructive and unhealthy.
[14:02.380 --> 14:03.400]  But I could be wrong.
[14:03.480 --> 14:04.260]  Maybe this is what we need.
[14:05.060 --> 14:17.560]  I certainly don't want to speak up in favor of the license plate scanning, but I think it's important to note that the congestion charging can be implemented in such a way as to not impede people's privacy.
[14:18.840 --> 14:19.960]  And I hope they do that.
[14:20.080 --> 14:20.560]  And how?
[14:20.680 --> 14:28.560]  How do we guarantee that the police do not hold on to all this tracking information and pictures of where everybody is at a certain time?
[14:28.560 --> 14:30.520]  How do we know they don't hold on to that forever?
[14:31.020 --> 14:38.640]  How do you know you have separate people run the system and you, you know, you don't have them give the information to the police?
[14:38.640 --> 14:39.580]  Private enterprise, perhaps.
[14:40.340 --> 14:46.600]  I would suggest a, you know, a state authority of some sort.
[14:46.640 --> 14:58.560]  What happens, whether it's a governmental agency, whether it's some private company, we always are reading these stories about how all this private data was just left on a website or on a laptop that was left in a restaurant or something.
[14:58.960 --> 15:02.080]  They always mess it up somehow and we're always the victims.
[15:02.520 --> 15:06.220]  Well, you can create legal frameworks for holding people responsible.
[15:06.220 --> 15:08.080]  And this is not done in the United States.
[15:08.080 --> 15:09.220]  It happens in Europe.
[15:09.220 --> 15:13.980]  And I'm sure that our European listeners will be more than happy to tell me that it's not perfect.
[15:14.340 --> 15:21.920]  But you can set up systems to protect people's privacy, legal systems, and they can have an effect.
[15:21.960 --> 15:26.220]  And I don't know why in the United States we don't do so.
[15:26.580 --> 15:27.780]  Bernie, maybe you have a theory.
[15:28.920 --> 15:38.220]  Well, I mean, obviously the system tracking who's coming and going from the city and has to pay the fees, that data has to be stored a certain amount of time.
[15:38.540 --> 15:44.480]  And even if it's not available to the police, they can just subpoena it anytime they want.
[15:45.560 --> 15:47.060]  And they'll have to fork it over.
[15:48.000 --> 15:58.540]  I think that database is entirely too valuable to law enforcement in their eyes for this data to ever go away or be made private.
[15:58.640 --> 16:02.640]  It's just too rich a database for the police to mine, in my opinion.
[16:02.860 --> 16:03.440]  I agree.
[16:03.840 --> 16:18.920]  And we're looking at a situation now in our country and in our world where technology has advanced to a stage where basically the wish list of every government everywhere as far as what they can capture and how long they can hold on to it and what they can see about their citizens,
[16:19.440 --> 16:20.680]  that's all now possible.
[16:21.240 --> 16:23.260]  And it doesn't matter if it's needed.
[16:23.760 --> 16:29.760]  They're going to do everything they possibly can to get their hands on this and to implement it and to make us believe that we actually do need it.
[16:30.560 --> 16:31.580]  And it's interesting.
[16:31.720 --> 16:33.080]  We're going to play this in a little while.
[16:33.700 --> 16:37.960]  We have the archive set of Off the Hook.
[16:38.000 --> 16:41.660]  In fact, this is not as good a time as any to mention that we are raising funds tonight.
[16:42.260 --> 16:45.940]  In fact, that's what makes discussions like this one possible.
[16:46.300 --> 16:52.360]  The fact that this radio station is here, that we don't have commercials, that we're not told what to say and what to do.
[16:54.020 --> 17:02.500]  The value of a place like this should be pretty obvious if you just tune around on the FM dial and you'll see everybody else is just playing pop music and maybe a ball game or something like that.
[17:02.740 --> 17:05.360]  But we can talk about these controversial issues.
[17:05.440 --> 17:11.620]  We can solicit your input, read letters, and find all kinds of alternate viewpoints.
[17:12.100 --> 17:15.000]  But we can only do that if we have support from our listeners.
[17:15.000 --> 17:23.760]  By calling 212-209-2950 and pledging your support to the station, you ensure that we continue to talk about things like this.
[17:23.840 --> 17:26.980]  Now, what we have for a pledge of, what is it, $125, $125?
[17:27.560 --> 17:27.800]  Yeah.
[17:27.800 --> 17:37.100]  We have a full archive going back to 1988, 1988 to the end of 2006, of every single edition of Off the Hook.
[17:37.540 --> 17:39.740]  And why that is interesting?
[17:39.740 --> 17:48.020]  Well, I don't think there's a single topic that has changed so much in the past 20 years as technology, telephony, and surveillance.
[17:48.240 --> 17:55.240]  And all of that, all of that is focused on very thoroughly on this program over the years.
[17:55.240 --> 18:02.100]  So, you'll hear all sorts of premonitions and discussions and arguments and listeners like you calling in.
[18:02.320 --> 18:05.480]  You'll see how the country has changed, how technology has changed.
[18:05.940 --> 18:10.300]  It's all yours for a pledge of $125, 212-209-2950.
[18:10.520 --> 18:16.220]  And every listener who calls in and pledges 25 or more will get an Off the Hook t-shirt.
[18:16.320 --> 18:19.040]  So, if you just want an Off the Hook t-shirt, pledge of $25, that'll work.
[18:20.020 --> 18:20.500]  But...
[18:20.500 --> 18:21.240]  You could pledge more.
[18:21.420 --> 18:23.700]  You could pledge as much as you possibly can.
[18:23.700 --> 18:24.840]  But, you know, if you...
[18:24.840 --> 18:27.280]  You could pledge $50 and still get the t-shirt.
[18:27.380 --> 18:27.900]  Yeah, you could.
[18:28.000 --> 18:28.360]  You could.
[18:28.480 --> 18:31.300]  And if you get the Off the Hook archive, you'll get the t-shirt as well.
[18:31.440 --> 18:31.700]  Wow.
[18:31.920 --> 18:33.060]  So, it's a pretty good deal.
[18:33.900 --> 18:40.260]  This is obviously something that detracts from our normal programming where we have to ask for money.
[18:40.380 --> 18:43.140]  But if we didn't do this, we'd have commercials.
[18:43.320 --> 18:45.020]  And if we had commercials, we couldn't do this.
[18:45.200 --> 18:45.840]  Simple as that.
[18:45.980 --> 18:54.820]  And unlike the state government, the city government, the federal government, or many other private entities, we only keep your information for a limited time.
[18:55.980 --> 19:01.520]  Once you've paid your pledge and we've sent you out the premium, we shred them.
[19:02.340 --> 19:03.520]  Or burn them or something.
[19:03.640 --> 19:05.440]  I'm not sure exactly what they do with it.
[19:05.560 --> 19:08.900]  But it doesn't wind up in the hands of the authorities, that's for sure.
[19:08.900 --> 19:10.560]  It doesn't even wind up in the hands of the hackers.
[19:10.600 --> 19:11.920]  Unless they're bugging the phones.
[19:12.300 --> 19:13.220]  But you know what?
[19:13.340 --> 19:20.440]  At this stage, it's time that we just stand up and be counted as somebody who pledges to WBAI.
[19:20.560 --> 19:21.480]  You should be proud to do that.
[19:21.660 --> 19:25.960]  Proud to be listed as a subversive person who supports Alternative Radio.
[19:26.200 --> 19:29.740]  Well, we can safely say there won't be a printed record after a couple of weeks or so.
[19:29.900 --> 19:31.700]  Well, except for the bill that we send out.
[19:31.800 --> 19:32.180]  Except for the bill.
[19:32.220 --> 19:32.980]  The receipt that you get.
[19:33.200 --> 19:33.340]  And the receipt.
[19:33.520 --> 19:37.160]  And the actual merchandise that we send you away as a thank you.
[19:37.360 --> 19:37.460]  Right.
[19:37.640 --> 19:39.080]  212-209-2950.
[19:39.240 --> 19:40.080]  We have a caller on the line.
[19:40.180 --> 19:44.800]  Let's have more people join that caller and pledge support to the radio station.
[19:44.960 --> 19:50.420]  We should also point out that if you're interested in coming down and helping to answer the phones, you can do that too.
[19:50.500 --> 19:54.060]  But you have to call in advance because of this crazy system we've been talking about.
[19:54.100 --> 19:59.200]  A part of our surveillance system here in this building requires that you be on a list before you let into the building.
[19:59.700 --> 20:01.180]  We're not exempt from this ourselves.
[20:01.960 --> 20:05.460]  So if you want to come down and volunteer, it's a great way to get involved with the station.
[20:05.580 --> 20:06.640]  That's how I got involved with the station.
[20:06.740 --> 20:08.220]  I came down and volunteered to answer some phones.
[20:09.260 --> 20:12.480]  But in this day and age, you have to be on the list first.
[20:12.600 --> 20:13.060]  It's very easy.
[20:13.200 --> 20:14.860]  We have the computer screen right here.
[20:14.960 --> 20:17.500]  We can type your name in and you're on the list and you can get in.
[20:18.200 --> 20:25.920]  So what you need to do is call that same number and get on the list if you want to come in and volunteer to help out during this next couple of weeks when we're doing this fundraiser.
[20:26.440 --> 20:27.380]  Two calls on the line.
[20:27.380 --> 20:29.280]  212-209-2950.
[20:29.820 --> 20:31.560]  Again, pledge of $125.
[20:31.800 --> 20:36.000]  You'll get every single edition of Off the Hook from 1988, the very first one, to 2006.
[20:36.720 --> 20:38.800]  And wow, there is a lot of history in there.
[20:38.980 --> 20:40.920]  There is just so much that has changed and is going on.
[20:41.000 --> 20:42.820]  Did we ever compute how many shows that is?
[20:42.960 --> 20:45.300]  We did and we said it and I forget what it was.
[20:45.380 --> 20:47.520]  It was something like, what, 700 or something?
[20:47.840 --> 20:48.500]  I don't remember.
[20:48.500 --> 20:48.760]  I don't know.
[20:48.820 --> 20:49.440]  It could be way off.
[20:49.440 --> 20:50.700]  Nearly 6 million shows.
[20:50.840 --> 20:51.980]  I don't think it's that many, no.
[20:52.200 --> 20:53.000]  But it's a lot.
[20:53.140 --> 20:57.060]  It'll keep you busy for a very, very long time if you're looking for something to do.
[20:57.480 --> 21:03.100]  And if you're just one of these people that likes to jog and listen to us, well, imagine listening to some history at the same time.
[21:03.400 --> 21:04.600]  You know, we're only on once a week.
[21:04.720 --> 21:05.480]  People complain.
[21:05.620 --> 21:06.380]  They gnash their teeth.
[21:06.580 --> 21:08.540]  They say, why aren't you on more than once a week?
[21:08.660 --> 21:09.680]  You should be on every day.
[21:09.680 --> 21:10.220]  I agree.
[21:10.380 --> 21:10.840]  I agree.
[21:10.880 --> 21:11.920]  We should be on more stations.
[21:12.060 --> 21:15.560]  We should be on Clear Channel or whatever that's called, XM.
[21:15.760 --> 21:17.060]  We should be on all these things.
[21:17.300 --> 21:17.940]  They won't have us.
[21:18.520 --> 21:20.280]  You know, they said they were going to have us at one point.
[21:20.400 --> 21:21.120]  Then they changed their mind.
[21:21.240 --> 21:21.760]  They said they were going to have us.
[21:21.760 --> 21:22.600]  Somebody got to them.
[21:22.960 --> 21:23.660]  Somebody got to them.
[21:23.660 --> 21:23.960]  It's true.
[21:24.380 --> 21:25.340]  We're not making this up.
[21:25.780 --> 21:30.880]  XM was interested in having us as a program, maybe a separate program or maybe simulcasting this one.
[21:31.320 --> 21:33.680]  And it was almost to the stage.
[21:33.860 --> 21:36.620]  It can be said now, it was almost to the stage of actually having it happen.
[21:36.660 --> 21:40.800]  And all of a sudden, we just stopped getting calls from them and they wouldn't take our calls anymore.
[21:40.880 --> 21:44.480]  And I guess somebody higher up got nervous or somebody talked to them.
[21:44.700 --> 21:46.800]  This is what you encounter in commercial radio.
[21:47.300 --> 21:50.000]  Not that that would have been a commercial endeavor on our part.
[21:50.120 --> 21:52.740]  They have non-commercial channels on the commercial system.
[21:52.740 --> 21:57.020]  But it just goes to show the danger of having one entity in charge of it all.
[21:57.700 --> 21:59.760]  Alternative voices tend to get silenced.
[22:00.000 --> 22:01.740]  So help us stay going.
[22:01.980 --> 22:02.660]  Stay on the air.
[22:02.860 --> 22:03.840]  Stay alternative.
[22:04.000 --> 22:05.620]  212-209-2950.
[22:05.920 --> 22:07.560]  And you get some pretty nifty things as well.
[22:07.680 --> 22:08.660]  That's not all we have.
[22:08.720 --> 22:12.980]  We have all kinds of BAI merchandise, tote bags and coffee cups, whatever it is you're into.
[22:13.260 --> 22:22.500]  But as far as off-the-hook material, the DVD set... And by DVD set, it's something that you put in your computer and you have MP3 files that are not...
[22:23.040 --> 22:24.200]  Not controlled in any way.
[22:24.280 --> 22:24.880]  You can copy them.
[22:24.940 --> 22:25.540]  You can post them.
[22:25.600 --> 22:26.220]  You can do whatever you want.
[22:26.280 --> 22:26.860]  You can share them.
[22:27.640 --> 22:29.300]  That's what you get on those DVDs.
[22:29.480 --> 22:32.100]  Some people jog every day and we're only on once a week.
[22:32.240 --> 22:35.480]  So this will give them something to listen to for the other six days.
[22:35.480 --> 22:39.020]  Copy it to your iPod or your iPhone or whatever i-thing you have.
[22:40.480 --> 22:42.560]  And just listen to your heart's content.
[22:42.980 --> 22:44.660]  Send it to your relatives in Antarctica.
[22:44.900 --> 22:45.800]  You could email it to them.
[22:45.940 --> 22:49.180]  You could attach an MP3 as an attachment to the email.
[22:49.460 --> 22:49.980]  Look at this.
[22:50.060 --> 22:50.760]  Four calls on the line.
[22:50.820 --> 22:51.160]  This is good.
[22:51.160 --> 22:52.700]  212-209-2950.
[22:53.120 --> 22:57.920]  I think you'll be especially interested once we start playing our little clip from the past because it's an example.
[22:58.060 --> 23:01.060]  An example of just how many interesting things are down there.
[23:01.460 --> 23:02.140]  I'm worried.
[23:02.440 --> 23:04.860]  We don't have enough volunteers down there and those phones are ringing.
[23:05.840 --> 23:10.500]  Not Kevin, I hate to do this to you, but could you just wander down there and then see the situation if they need help?
[23:10.640 --> 23:13.900]  That way we can at least say they need help and you can help them too.
[23:14.040 --> 23:14.680]  But come back.
[23:15.020 --> 23:16.640]  Come back in five minutes max.
[23:17.340 --> 23:19.960]  If the phone is ringing and not picking up, don't give up, folks.
[23:20.080 --> 23:27.240]  Please don't give up because we are short-staffed as a direct result of the surveillance system we have in the building that doesn't allow people in unless they're pre-approved.
[23:27.440 --> 23:30.220]  Yeah, that's very suspicious that they just put that in.
[23:31.580 --> 23:35.920]  Not to buy into any conspiracy theories here, but yeah, it is kind of wacky.
[23:36.340 --> 23:37.920]  212-209-2950.
[23:38.160 --> 23:39.040]  That's the pledge line.
[23:39.400 --> 23:41.760]  Again, $25 and above gets you an off-the-hook t-shirt.
[23:41.760 --> 23:46.280]  1-25 gets you all the off-the-hooks from 1988 to 2006.
[23:48.340 --> 23:51.320]  In more surveillance news, this is kind of an interesting story.
[23:51.460 --> 24:00.960]  Federal agents do not need a search warrant to monitor a suspect's computer use and determine the email addresses and web pages the suspect is contacting.
[24:01.300 --> 24:05.420]  That's according to a ruling by the Federal Appeals Court last Friday.
[24:05.420 --> 24:11.880]  There is a drug case from Diego County that's out in California.
[24:12.060 --> 24:12.620]  The 9th U.S.
[24:12.720 --> 24:21.940]  Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco likened computer surveillance to the pen-registered devices that officers use to pinpoint the phone numbers of suspect dials without listening to the phone calls themselves.
[24:22.060 --> 24:28.000]  Basically, you dial a number and it shows up on a printout someplace or on a computer screen.
[24:28.140 --> 24:29.380]  You don't hear the conversation.
[24:29.380 --> 24:31.500]  You just see the numbers that are called.
[24:32.440 --> 24:33.540]  Very, very common.
[24:33.820 --> 24:34.420]  The U.S.
[24:34.700 --> 24:43.940]  Supreme Court upheld the use of pen-registers in 1979, saying callers have no right to conceal from the government the numbers they communicate electronically to the phone companies that carry their calls.
[24:43.940 --> 24:46.100]  Also, these numbers, they show up in the phone bill.
[24:46.400 --> 24:50.060]  So I guess they pretty much thought that it's out there anyway.
[24:50.580 --> 24:57.700]  Now, federal law requires court approval for a pen-register, but because it is not considered a search, authorities do not need a search warrant.
[24:57.840 --> 25:01.500]  And that would require them to show that the surveillance is likely to produce evidence of a crime.
[25:01.660 --> 25:02.860]  I don't understand the difference.
[25:03.020 --> 25:07.240]  They need to go to a court, but they don't need to go to a court.
[25:07.380 --> 25:08.300]  It doesn't make any sense.
[25:08.300 --> 25:11.980]  Getting a search warrant is a lot more difficult than getting approval for a pen-register.
[25:12.120 --> 25:12.640]  But why?
[25:13.080 --> 25:15.120]  A pen-register is kind of like a phishing expedition.
[25:15.120 --> 25:16.200]  You're looking for something.
[25:16.400 --> 25:25.340]  And if you see something that matches, say you see a drug dealer talking to somebody who else is a known drug dealer, then you know there's probable cause and you get a search warrant.
[25:25.480 --> 25:35.640]  I learned all of this watching The Wire, which I recommend to everybody, all hackers out there, into surveillance and into phone taps and cell phones and things like that.
[25:35.680 --> 25:41.300]  It's probably the best representation on either the big screen or the small screen of how it all works.
[25:42.960 --> 25:46.460]  And I'm just amazed that they actually haven't gotten more attention.
[25:47.540 --> 25:51.300]  Anyway, federal law requires court approval for a pen-register, as we said.
[25:51.720 --> 25:59.120]  Now, they also do not need a wiretap order, which would require them to show that less intrusive methods of surveillance have failed or would be futile.
[25:59.300 --> 26:11.660]  Now, in Friday's ruling, the court said computer users should know that they lose privacy protections with email and website addresses when they are communicated to the company whose equipment carries the messages, your provider.
[26:12.820 --> 26:23.080]  Likewise, the court said, although the government learns what computer sites someone visited, it does not find out the contents of the messages or the particular pages on the websites the person viewed.
[26:23.320 --> 26:31.820]  The search is no more intrusive than officer's examination of a list of phone numbers or the outside of a mailed package, neither of which requires a warrant.
[26:32.020 --> 26:33.980]  The ruling was 3-0.
[26:34.760 --> 26:36.020]  That's a unanimous ruling.
[26:36.940 --> 26:39.520]  Defense lawyer Michael Crowley, of course, disagreed.
[26:39.660 --> 26:46.800]  His client was sentenced to 30 years in prison after being convicted of operating a laboratory in Escondido that manufactured the drug Ecstasy.
[26:47.200 --> 26:54.320]  Some of the evidence against him came from agents tracking of his computer use and the court upheld his conviction and sentence.
[26:56.000 --> 26:59.040]  Basically, according to the attorney, the ruling further erodes our privacy.
[26:59.180 --> 27:04.060]  The great political marketplace of ideas is the internet and the government has unbridled access to it.
[27:05.260 --> 27:06.220]  Bernie, what do you think about this?
[27:06.300 --> 27:07.660]  Is this the same thing as a pen register?
[27:08.500 --> 27:18.980]  Well, I think it's more serious than a pen register because it's, I believe, all the header information, not that they can get without a search warrant now, at least in the Ninth Circuit, anyway.
[27:19.640 --> 27:25.540]  And the header information has a lot of stuff other than just the email address you're sending messages to.
[27:25.540 --> 27:34.520]  It contains a subject line and a whole bunch of other stuff that could really provide a great window into your personal life.
[27:34.860 --> 27:42.420]  And that would not be quite as, nearly as intrusive just if it were just a pen register just showing dialed numbers.
[27:42.420 --> 27:51.120]  So I think that police could argue they have probable cause simply based on the contents of the subject line in your email header.
[27:51.300 --> 27:59.860]  So it's just more of a foot in the door, more of a wedge in to your personal privacy.
[27:59.860 --> 28:12.300]  And it's a disturbing trend and I hope this doesn't reach the Supreme Court and get ruled the same way because then the whole country would be subject to the same privacy invasions without a search warrant.
[28:12.420 --> 28:19.920]  Now, of course, anybody who works at your provider is also privy to this information if they just happen to be watching your line.
[28:19.920 --> 28:21.960]  They can see who you're sending mail back and forth to.
[28:22.100 --> 28:23.480]  However, the contents, that's something else.
[28:23.480 --> 28:26.260]  If you send encrypted mail, obviously that won't be seen.
[28:26.280 --> 28:30.700]  If you use an anonymous re-mailer, then even who you're sending mail to won't be seen.
[28:30.760 --> 28:36.620]  The question is how many people are going to go to that kind of a step and actually try to protect themselves that way.
[28:36.620 --> 28:54.080]  And I'd like to mention that more recently there was a case, I believe, also in California where someone was, in fact, using encrypted email and primarily a service called Hushmail.
[28:54.080 --> 28:58.200]  It's an encrypted web-based email service.
[28:58.880 --> 29:09.420]  And the DEA, who was investigating a target who was using the service, applied for a search warrant to get the password.
[29:09.440 --> 29:28.020]  And the way they did that is they broke into his home using a sneak and peek warrant and planted a keylogger software on the computer and got his password and then they were able to read all his email and then that gave him a probable cause to arrest him and lock him up.
[29:28.460 --> 29:32.660]  So, even that, you know, it's really hard to avoid these snoops.
[29:34.600 --> 29:38.760]  And just the idea of somebody being able to see the webpages you visit.
[29:39.040 --> 29:51.720]  I mean, I get directed to webpages all the time that I really have no intention of visiting and somebody says, hey, you've got to check out this link and before you know it, you're just, you're connected to something that never in your wildest dreams would you want to connect to.
[29:51.720 --> 29:53.940]  But you don't see that.
[29:53.940 --> 29:59.040]  You don't see that if you just get a collection of URLs that you've attached your browser to.
[30:00.020 --> 30:01.860]  So, it's something to really be worried about.
[30:03.600 --> 30:07.320]  Unfortunately, in this day and age, it's something that I think they'll get away with.
[30:07.420 --> 30:09.740]  They'll continue to get away with and that's very sad.
[30:10.660 --> 30:13.520]  Okay, 2-1-2-2-0-9-2-9-5-0 is our pledge line.
[30:13.680 --> 30:18.460]  Again, pledge of 1-25 will get you the full off-the-hook archive from 1988 to 2006.
[30:18.680 --> 30:20.780]  $25 and above gets you an off-the-hook t-shirt.
[30:21.220 --> 30:23.600]  I guess they need help down there because Kevin has not returned.
[30:23.980 --> 30:26.660]  Hopefully, he'll be back soon and can tell us what the situation is.
[30:26.880 --> 30:37.320]  You know, we have only about a half hour left in today's program and we always get emails after the fact from people who are, you know, listening in a delayed manner.
[30:37.840 --> 30:46.400]  So, if you're listening and it's not Wednesday evening when you're listening, then next Wednesday evening you should listen live and call us then.
[30:46.540 --> 30:52.760]  Between 1900 and 20 hundred hours Eastern Time, New York.
[30:53.000 --> 30:53.920]  7 p.m.
[30:53.940 --> 30:54.560]  and 8 p.m.
[30:54.720 --> 30:55.040]  Okay.
[30:55.560 --> 31:09.620]  And it's worth I'm sorry, it's worth mentioning even if you cannot listen to us live, if you know that you want to pledge and you're listening to the show sometime, you know, ask between now and next week whenever that date is.
[31:10.260 --> 31:20.340]  You can call during the same time window next week and pledge even if you're not listening to the show live because you know we'll be receiving pledges at that time.
[31:20.500 --> 31:26.700]  Yeah, let's say you're on a ship in the Dry Tortugas or something and you set an alarm clock 7 o'clock p.m.
[31:26.880 --> 31:35.780]  Eastern Time, make the ship to shore connection and just call 212-209-2950 and make that pledge because you'll really be making a difference.
[31:36.100 --> 31:36.680]  Wait a minute.
[31:36.760 --> 31:41.120]  Let's straighten this out for the people who are listening on a delayed basis in our archives.
[31:41.260 --> 31:41.400]  Okay.
[31:41.680 --> 31:47.940]  It's currently in real life for those of us doing this show Wednesday, July 11th, 2007.
[31:48.900 --> 32:02.460]  If you want to pledge, get to us at 212-209-2950 on Wednesday, July 18th, 2007 between 7 and 8 p.m.
[32:03.000 --> 32:04.160]  Eastern Daylight Time.
[32:04.580 --> 32:07.320]  I guess that makes sense but you neglected to mention the year.
[32:07.820 --> 32:08.260]  2007.
[32:08.260 --> 32:09.080]  I said it twice.
[32:09.460 --> 32:09.720]  I didn't.
[32:09.880 --> 32:10.780]  I tuned it out.
[32:11.360 --> 32:11.620]  All right.
[32:12.220 --> 32:29.420]  Conversely, if you are listening live, which I think a lot of people are and it's July 11th for you also or I guess if you're overseas and it's already the early morning on the 12th, then you can call right now 212-209-2950 country code 1 and the people there will be glad to take your pledge.
[32:29.600 --> 32:29.820]  Absolutely.
[32:30.140 --> 32:31.820]  I see people calling the wrong line.
[32:31.920 --> 32:33.800]  I see people calling the on-air line.
[32:34.640 --> 32:35.960]  That's not the right line to call.
[32:36.060 --> 32:37.100]  We're not picking that line up.
[32:37.320 --> 32:41.060]  So you're wasting your time and you're wasting the ring voltage of the phone here.
[32:41.480 --> 32:44.580]  212-209-2950 That's the number you should be calling.
[32:44.760 --> 32:54.680]  Whether you want to volunteer to help out with the fundraiser and get on the list so you can get in the building or whether you want to pledge to the station and really help us out.
[32:54.900 --> 32:57.720]  212-209-2950 That's the phone number.
[32:57.860 --> 33:03.560]  Now here's a mail from a listener who says I was listening to the July 26, 1995 show.
[33:03.820 --> 33:11.560]  You guys were testing each other with area codes and ultimately trying to figure out what area code 710 is used for.
[33:12.340 --> 33:13.960]  See a lot of blank stares in the room.
[33:14.080 --> 33:14.520]  710.
[33:14.820 --> 33:19.060]  Since I haven't yet listened to subsequent shows, I don't know whether you investigated it further.
[33:19.740 --> 33:22.680]  But in any case, Wikipedia yielded an interesting hit.
[33:23.240 --> 33:29.780]  Area code 710 is the United States area code reserved for the federal government of the United States.
[33:29.960 --> 33:36.140]  As of December 2006, it has only one working phone number which requires a special access code to use.
[33:36.760 --> 33:37.520]  Signed, Mark.
[33:37.700 --> 33:45.180]  Mark, thanks for memories of that show and for sending in the one phone number that works, which we are now going to try and dial.
[33:45.380 --> 33:48.680]  But I want to ask you guys, have you ever played with the 710 area code?
[33:48.800 --> 33:48.880]  Ever?
[33:49.400 --> 33:49.820]  I have.
[33:50.000 --> 33:50.480]  You have, Bernie?
[33:50.680 --> 33:51.720]  Ah, what happened?
[33:52.620 --> 34:11.300]  Well, actually, what I tried to do was see if a friend of mine who at the time worked for the American Rick Cross in an emergency capacity, he was a disaster relief volunteer coordinator, and tried to see if he could get one of these special cards called GETS,
[34:11.940 --> 34:15.620]  Governmental, what, Emergency Telecommunication System or something.
[34:16.260 --> 34:22.980]  And basically, it's a card with a toll, with a, you can call, it's not a, it's not a tariff number.
[34:23.120 --> 34:25.540]  You can call numbers in this area code.
[34:25.780 --> 34:28.320]  You can call this, you know, what is it?
[34:28.520 --> 34:30.880]  1-800, 1, what's the area code again?
[34:31.060 --> 34:32.020]  7- 7-1-0.
[34:32.140 --> 34:35.300]  But let's not give out the phone number until we actually dial it so everybody doesn't call it at the same time.
[34:36.500 --> 34:42.460]  And then it prompts you for a password or a key code, and then it prompts you for the number you want to call.
[34:42.660 --> 34:47.400]  And then the call is switched with priority over all other switched calls.
[34:47.620 --> 34:55.460]  So it's sort of like let you jump in in front of the line in an emergency situation when everybody's calling and everybody's saying, hey, did you hear what happened?
[34:55.940 --> 35:03.960]  And he was unable to get one of these GETS cards because he said after 9-11 they were very, he was told that after 9-11 they were very, very tightly controlled.
[35:04.140 --> 35:06.960]  They used to be given out to Red Cross volunteers but not anymore.
[35:07.280 --> 35:10.820]  So if you have one of these GETS cards you're very fortunate.
[35:10.980 --> 35:14.620]  It's the ultimate, the ultimate calling card because it always works.
[35:14.780 --> 35:18.000]  But my question is if you can't get a dial tone, what good is it?
[35:18.860 --> 35:19.740]  That's a good point.
[35:20.400 --> 35:21.560]  Did they not think of this?
[35:21.660 --> 35:26.220]  I mean, during 9-11 that was the big problem was getting dial tones and connecting calls.
[35:26.220 --> 35:38.860]  Well, there's also a system, you can read about it on their website, these people's website, that makes cell phones have priority in the wireless portion of the call and you dial a star code to have that happen.
[35:39.020 --> 35:44.380]  Now, are we sure that they're actually doing anything or just charging you for dialing a star code that you think is doing something?
[35:44.560 --> 35:46.160]  There's no real way to test it, is there?
[35:46.620 --> 35:48.000]  You could cause a disaster.
[35:48.100 --> 35:49.400]  Oh, well, I guess that's the only way.
[35:49.460 --> 35:49.920]  We'll have to.
[35:50.180 --> 35:51.160]  Let's try this number.
[35:51.400 --> 35:53.200]  Let's try the 710 number.
[35:55.200 --> 35:57.040]  Now, this is non-tariff.
[35:57.100 --> 35:58.760]  Does that mean there's no long distance charge?
[35:59.240 --> 35:59.440]  Yes.
[35:59.880 --> 36:01.500]  All right, so we shouldn't be asked for a code then.
[36:02.140 --> 36:03.940]  Well, I don't know if our code...
[36:03.940 --> 36:04.680]  You can call the first number.
[36:04.940 --> 36:06.160]  Okay, well, let's try it.
[36:08.620 --> 36:10.220]  See if the BAI system knows this.
[36:12.000 --> 36:12.920]  Oh, it does not.
[36:13.340 --> 36:14.300]  It's asking for a code.
[36:14.420 --> 36:15.220]  No, we have a code.
[36:15.340 --> 36:16.060]  We're going to enter our code.
[36:17.840 --> 36:18.560]  And here we go.
[36:24.200 --> 36:26.240]  Please re-enter your PIN now.
[36:26.360 --> 36:27.400]  Oh, boy, it didn't even work.
[36:27.420 --> 36:27.740]  Hold on.
[36:31.910 --> 36:32.230]  Okay.
[36:37.020 --> 36:39.140]  Please re-enter your PIN now.
[36:39.280 --> 36:40.040]  We're not getting past...
[36:40.040 --> 36:41.180]  That's the BAI lady, isn't it?
[36:41.480 --> 36:42.000]  I don't know.
[36:42.080 --> 36:43.200]  I've never heard that lady before.
[36:43.300 --> 36:43.460]  Really?
[36:44.180 --> 36:44.580]  I don't...
[36:44.580 --> 36:46.160]  I didn't know BAI had an automated...
[36:46.160 --> 36:46.900]  I think...
[36:47.240 --> 36:48.780]  I think that's our person.
[36:48.900 --> 36:49.220]  Hold on.
[36:49.340 --> 36:50.460]  Let's get rid of her.
[36:51.540 --> 36:52.200]  Actually, hang on.
[36:52.220 --> 36:53.000]  We don't want to get rid of Bernie.
[36:55.060 --> 36:56.440]  Let's get another line down there.
[36:56.940 --> 36:58.120]  All right, we're going to try this one more time.
[37:11.030 --> 37:16.970]  Now, I'm going to enter the wrong number just to get that lady again to prove that it's BAI.
[37:20.480 --> 37:22.580]  Please re-enter your PIN now.
[37:22.760 --> 37:24.740]  That's our local lady saying that, I think.
[37:25.260 --> 37:26.360]  You're trying it on your cell phone?
[37:26.500 --> 37:29.680]  Yeah, but I can't talk to you and my cell phone at the same time.
[37:29.980 --> 37:30.560]  Yeah, probably not.
[37:30.700 --> 37:31.260]  It's a little difficult.
[37:31.600 --> 37:33.180]  Well, okay, we need to...
[37:33.180 --> 37:34.180]  Am I entering the right code?
[37:35.040 --> 37:36.880]  I'll point with my finger what I'm entering.
[37:37.300 --> 37:37.720]  See that?
[37:38.100 --> 37:40.160]  That, that, this, that, and then that.
[37:40.440 --> 37:41.060]  That's what I think.
[37:41.140 --> 37:42.320]  Yeah, I think that's the right code.
[37:42.780 --> 37:45.020]  All right, why don't you try your cell phone so you can get through to that number?
[37:45.180 --> 37:52.700]  We're getting into federal trouble here on the air because I don't know if we're supposed to be calling this phone number, but we do want to find out what it is that this particular number does.
[37:53.660 --> 37:59.160]  So, this number should be callable from anything, a pay phone, a cell phone?
[37:59.300 --> 38:00.640]  We can't even reach it from here, but yeah.
[38:00.640 --> 38:01.140]  Well, theoretically.
[38:01.480 --> 38:01.740]  It should be.
[38:01.920 --> 38:06.260]  So, and how many digits is in the code that you're supposed to enter once you get through?
[38:06.360 --> 38:06.380]  No, no, no.
[38:06.400 --> 38:06.720]  You know what?
[38:06.780 --> 38:11.760]  It says, it plays a tone and that same woman comes up and asks me to please re-enter my PIN now.
[38:12.200 --> 38:13.240]  You got the same woman.
[38:13.380 --> 38:14.300]  Okay, so you know what?
[38:14.360 --> 38:16.180]  I guess I was wrong on all counts.
[38:16.340 --> 38:21.880]  BAI phone system does know about this and we didn't get asked for a code on our end.
[38:22.400 --> 38:22.800]  Okay.
[38:22.900 --> 38:26.400]  That was the government operator saying please re-enter your PIN now.
[38:26.620 --> 38:27.440]  Government operator.
[38:27.680 --> 38:28.580]  Let's try this then.
[38:28.660 --> 38:33.200]  It's strange that you have to re-enter your PIN, when you've never been asked to enter it the first place, but...
[38:33.200 --> 38:34.320]  Well, did you not enter anything?
[38:34.600 --> 38:35.440]  What would I enter?
[38:35.480 --> 38:36.060]  I don't have a PIN.
[38:36.100 --> 38:39.100]  Okay, so if you do nothing, it eventually hangs up on you is what I'm asking.
[38:39.320 --> 38:41.460]  Oh, I hung up on it because I don't have a PIN.
[38:41.800 --> 38:43.640]  Okay, what I want to prove here...
[38:43.640 --> 38:44.540]  Let's get a dial tone.
[38:45.800 --> 38:46.300]  All right.
[38:46.800 --> 38:55.660]  And dial the number which is 1710 NCS GETS or 627 4387.
[38:56.340 --> 38:59.320]  And the NCS to enter National Communication System.
[38:59.560 --> 39:00.060]  All right.
[39:00.520 --> 39:01.760]  And we have...
[39:01.760 --> 39:03.360]  Okay, that's their tone then.
[39:03.480 --> 39:05.860]  And we have a rotary phone, so we can't enter the touch tones.
[39:06.300 --> 39:07.060]  What do we do?
[39:07.160 --> 39:07.720]  It's an emergency.
[39:08.020 --> 39:10.060]  Please re-enter your PIN now.
[39:10.200 --> 39:10.760]  But that's the problem.
[39:10.880 --> 39:11.500]  I don't have...
[39:11.500 --> 39:12.760]  I don't have a means of doing this.
[39:12.800 --> 39:13.600]  I can speak my PIN.
[39:13.760 --> 39:14.640]  Can you recognize voice?
[39:16.660 --> 39:18.760]  Please re-enter your PIN now.
[39:18.760 --> 39:19.900]  I would take that as a no.
[39:20.360 --> 39:23.820]  Well, now what happens if my touch tone phone doesn't work in an emergency?
[39:24.320 --> 39:25.000]  What are you going to do?
[39:25.260 --> 39:26.080]  That's what you're going to do.
[39:26.580 --> 39:28.600]  See, I think that's wrong.
[39:28.880 --> 39:29.800]  I think that's wrong.
[39:30.140 --> 39:30.360]  You get two people...
[39:30.360 --> 39:34.280]  You get two different people to whistle a DTMF pair of tones.
[39:34.480 --> 39:43.740]  If I can call Sprint or Verizon or somebody like that and have to deal with their stupid automated voice recognition system, I don't understand why these guys can't do it.
[39:43.740 --> 39:53.460]  But anybody who knows more about 710-NCS-GETS or maybe any other phone number in the 710 area code, isn't it kind of a waste to take a whole area code just for one phone number?
[39:54.580 --> 39:56.380]  Well, please let us know if you know anything about this.
[39:56.480 --> 39:58.060]  OTH at 2600.com.
[39:58.180 --> 40:05.820]  As I was saying before we got discovered that wasn't the BAI lady, how long is the PIN number supposed to be?
[40:05.900 --> 40:06.700]  Do we have any idea?
[40:06.820 --> 40:07.880]  Do you think they're going to tell us that?
[40:08.760 --> 40:11.740]  Somebody out there has a GETS card and is willing to tell us, I'm sure.
[40:11.900 --> 40:13.080]  We just don't know them yet.
[40:13.200 --> 40:13.380]  Yeah.
[40:13.380 --> 40:15.040]  Well, I don't think it's three or four digits.
[40:15.180 --> 40:16.820]  Hopefully, it's a lot longer than that.
[40:16.980 --> 40:17.080]  Right.
[40:17.300 --> 40:19.340]  So I'm thinking there are many people here.
[40:19.420 --> 40:20.480]  There are many pay phones.
[40:20.500 --> 40:23.340]  And we could organize like a human computer.
[40:23.840 --> 40:26.980]  Give everyone a list of numbers to start dialing in there.
[40:27.240 --> 40:28.280]  Sooner or later, we'll hit.
[40:28.600 --> 40:31.300]  It's very hot and muggy in Guantanamo Bay this time of year.
[40:31.300 --> 40:32.660]  So maybe later.
[40:33.720 --> 40:34.240]  All right.
[40:34.240 --> 40:37.200]  We have something else which is also pretty exciting.
[40:38.000 --> 40:41.160]  And that's another show from the past.
[40:41.160 --> 40:42.100]  Also from 1995.
[40:42.100 --> 40:52.880]  And this is for those of you wondering whether or not you should call in and pledge $125 for the Off the Hook archive DVD set.
[40:53.020 --> 40:54.560]  212-209-2950.
[40:54.560 --> 40:55.520]  We think you should.
[40:55.520 --> 40:57.160]  They will not ask you for a pin.
[40:57.320 --> 40:58.400]  They won't ask you for a pin.
[40:58.540 --> 40:58.760]  No.
[40:58.940 --> 40:59.740]  I don't think so.
[41:00.240 --> 41:08.420]  212-209-2950 or $25 for an Off the Hook t-shirt or any other amount for all kinds of other untold objects that we have down here.
[41:08.980 --> 41:11.080]  But listen to what this letter writer writes.
[41:11.320 --> 41:24.960]  I found it frighteningly curious about the caller on the November 7, 1995 show which talked at length about how easy it would be for AT&T to listen in on thousands of phone calls via computers and voice recognition.
[41:25.660 --> 41:29.480]  Perhaps he sounded a little over the top at the time but what do we have today?
[41:29.920 --> 41:34.780]  Lawsuits against AT&T for helping the NSA provide massive domestic spying for Big Brother.
[41:35.180 --> 41:42.220]  I must say that the new perspective on today's world gained from listening to some of these older shows is shocking and a must for anybody.
[41:42.980 --> 41:51.380]  With that, let's take a listen to that particular phone call from November 7, 1995 and see how it applies to today's world.
[41:51.480 --> 41:57.060]  And remember that phone number is a call to get a full archive of off-the-hook 212-209-2950.
[41:59.700 --> 42:03.940]  Number one, they've been able to recognize the image of a voice for over 10 years.
[42:04.640 --> 42:07.600]  I'm in this industry for a long time so let me tell you how it would work.
[42:08.600 --> 42:12.860]  Most, for every single digital line the word is broken down into an 8-bit word.
[42:13.360 --> 42:21.840]  So if the FBI wanted to monitor a thousand lines or a hundred thousand lines they would simply have to identify what the digital code of that 8-bit word was.
[42:21.840 --> 42:26.700]  Back to the matter is they would have to be doing it on the digital side of a connection.
[42:27.400 --> 42:39.900]  Nobody could listen to 174 million human voices but they sure as hell could have a computer look for the digital image of the word dope or the word bomb over what's called a DAX, digital cross-connect system.
[42:40.340 --> 42:44.660]  It is profoundly easy and AT&T has had that capacity since 1975.
[42:47.660 --> 42:48.100]  Interesting.
[42:48.500 --> 42:51.060]  So you think this won't be much of a problem to implement?
[42:51.640 --> 43:00.000]  Well, do you remember some time ago you had you had somebody call you and tell you about a line where you gave a phone number and gave back an address?
[43:00.700 --> 43:01.140]  Yes.
[43:01.820 --> 43:05.060]  That system is known as a conversant information system.
[43:05.400 --> 43:05.540]  Okay.
[43:05.900 --> 43:18.400]  Every single conversant information system in this country everyone that says you can either press a button or say the number everyone that says you can say the number has voice recognition.
[43:18.660 --> 43:19.960]  You can have one in your own house.
[43:21.100 --> 43:23.160]  Every single one can do it.
[43:23.360 --> 43:32.100]  Well, there are a lot of a lot of new systems out that say they used to say press one to get this now they say press or say one.
[43:32.380 --> 43:32.840]  That's right.
[43:33.080 --> 43:34.340]  Well, that's right.
[43:34.480 --> 43:40.420]  And those that say say have voice recognition built into them and they use the thing which is known as an SP card.
[43:40.640 --> 43:43.320]  An SP card is a card that goes into a computer.
[43:43.620 --> 43:50.500]  And by the way, the computer can handle 96 simultaneous phone calls for an individual customer over an 800 T1 lines.
[43:51.100 --> 43:53.340]  It is phenomenally easy, Emmanuel.
[43:54.020 --> 44:00.900]  It is... if you can imagine that a single word... when I say the word post office, I say it with my own voice.
[44:01.560 --> 44:15.220]  But when it goes through a digital system in a telephone company, it kind of becomes a pattern for the word with very slight deviations which would give the timbre of my voice.
[44:15.720 --> 44:20.800]  But you take those deviations out for the timbre of my voice, you are kind of left with the word.
[44:21.160 --> 44:36.180]  So if you wanted to sit and monitor a digital signal which is so carefully timed by a cesium clock out in the Midwest, you could put a computer across that line and you could set it up to look for any individual word or phrase you wanted.
[44:36.180 --> 44:42.540]  And as it passed through, it would be captured and it would be so quick that you could not only...
[44:42.540 --> 44:48.340]  Once you captured the word, you could then key on it and capture the entirety of the rest of the conversation.
[44:48.560 --> 44:56.720]  Okay, we have a couple of people here that are proposing a solution to this or maybe a way of fighting back.
[44:56.920 --> 44:58.020]  What do you guys have?
[44:58.200 --> 44:58.560]  Okay.
[44:58.960 --> 45:00.760]  Hi, this is Blake speaking here.
[45:00.760 --> 45:08.480]  And you might remember Zimmerman who developed the PGP standard of encryption that's widely available on the internet.
[45:08.680 --> 45:24.280]  Well, they've taken that encryption standard one step further and developed a PGP phone product that actually allows you to perform point-to-point telephone calls just like you're dialing a regular phone number.
[45:24.440 --> 45:39.540]  But you go through your modem, your voice is encrypted with a code that is later decrypted on the other end so that the phone message, the entire contents of the voice call are completely encrypted from point A to point B.
[45:39.740 --> 45:48.100]  There's absolutely no way at any point to tap your phone line in between the caller and the recipient of that call.
[45:48.620 --> 45:52.480]  And it's called PGP phone available at MIT's website.
[45:53.080 --> 45:57.560]  Downloaded it about three days ago and installed it on my Macintosh and the thing is working great.
[45:58.160 --> 46:01.280]  A regular voice line or are they using a T1 pipe?
[46:01.440 --> 46:02.680]  No, it's a regular voice line.
[46:02.760 --> 46:07.420]  Yeah, I'm using a 28-8 modem and a 14-4 actually.
[46:07.420 --> 46:18.840]  We experimented the other day, a 28-8 to a 14-4 and we got a completely audible, full duplex telephone conversation going fully encrypted.
[46:19.060 --> 46:27.640]  Okay, so what you're suggesting is that for Americans to feel even a little bit secure, they're all going to have to have a $200 US Robotics modem on their telephone.
[46:28.200 --> 46:36.260]  Most people already have a modem on their phone and if they're worried about any sort of security and they're involved in the net, then hopefully they already have that step.
[46:36.260 --> 46:38.420]  And then within five years, everybody's going to have one anyway.
[46:38.480 --> 46:39.200]  It's going to be a standard.
[46:39.260 --> 46:44.480]  If that's the only price you have to pay to keep FBI wiretaps from affecting you, then that's...
[46:44.480 --> 46:46.940]  I think it's not that high a price.
[46:47.200 --> 46:50.920]  During the phone conversation, we had a joint $200 a head per American.
[46:51.180 --> 46:56.140]  I think there's more than enough money for the ACLU to fight the FBI in court and not let them do it in the first place.
[46:56.280 --> 47:00.420]  That's certainly true, but will people give $200 a head to the ACLU to do this?
[47:00.420 --> 47:01.800]  Take it from me, guys.
[47:02.320 --> 47:14.620]  Digital telephony is now so... I am sitting in a room now with 156 computers, every one of which can recognize virtually any voice, any word in 11 languages.
[47:14.880 --> 47:16.460]  You hear this noise behind me?
[47:16.960 --> 47:22.840]  That's the sound of 18 fans from each of these computers, keeping them cool because they're listening to so many words.
[47:24.380 --> 47:25.800]  Where exactly do you work?
[47:26.140 --> 47:28.060]  In New York City, on the west side of Manhattan.
[47:28.400 --> 47:29.380]  Wow, and this is...
[47:29.380 --> 47:36.800]  And you know what, Emmanuel, if you give me a way to reach you privately, I'll give you... I'll teach you about telephony like you never heard.
[47:37.100 --> 47:39.260]  Well, that sounds... that sounds tempting.
[47:39.780 --> 47:43.240]  I have tried to reach you at 2600, but nobody ever calls me back.
[47:43.380 --> 47:47.220]  You ought to come to a 2600 meeting, because we do get swamped a lot of times.
[47:47.460 --> 47:50.340]  But you'll definitely find lots of people interested in that, including me.
[47:50.340 --> 47:56.640]  Well, if you can leave a message with somebody where I can get it to reach you directly, I will show you things or teach you.
[47:56.720 --> 47:57.900]  You won't believe what you're saying.
[47:58.420 --> 48:02.520]  Well, give us a call at the office, 516-751-2600.
[48:03.100 --> 48:03.960]  Fiber, you have something.
[48:04.100 --> 48:16.280]  Yeah, if I may interject momentarily with the voice of reason, I don't think we should be spreading fear and paranoia by saying that law enforcement agents have been using voice recognition since 1975, effectively.
[48:17.260 --> 48:18.640]  Fiber, you didn't listen.
[48:18.640 --> 48:30.700]  I said that AT&T has had the capacity, if they wish to, to select an individual 8-bit word coming down a data stream and exam every part of it.
[48:30.720 --> 48:32.640]  Have you ever heard of a piece of equipment called a T-bird?
[48:33.180 --> 48:34.500]  Yes, I am.
[48:34.640 --> 48:35.740]  I'm familiar with it.
[48:35.940 --> 48:36.160]  Okay.
[48:36.460 --> 48:42.140]  So tell me, if you put a T-bird on a T1 line, can it first break down to an individual voice channel?
[48:42.180 --> 48:42.740]  It sure can.
[48:43.020 --> 48:46.720]  And once it breaks down to an individual voice channel, can you sample everything on it?
[48:46.720 --> 48:47.260]  Sure.
[48:47.500 --> 48:53.780]  And so if you had a breakdown code and a DA, a digital analog converter, could you then convert it into normal speech?
[48:53.960 --> 48:54.200]  Sure.
[48:54.640 --> 48:56.000]  So, who's right and who's wrong?
[48:57.120 --> 49:08.180]  My beef with what you're saying is that just because you can take a sample of a particular word and take the best average doesn't mean that it's going to be right 100% of the time, all the time.
[49:08.460 --> 49:25.620]  But if I sample every single carrier feed coming out of the 9566 exchange in Manhattan, and I key it to look for the digital image of the word revolution, there's a good bet that I will be able to find any time that word has been said.
[49:25.740 --> 49:29.580]  Oh, sure, you'll get hits, but you're not going to get 100% of the people saying that word.
[49:29.700 --> 49:30.300]  Of course not.
[49:30.300 --> 49:32.160]  Sir, do you have the ability to do that?
[49:33.620 --> 49:34.340]  Me personally?
[49:34.540 --> 49:35.980]  Yeah, are you able to do things like that?
[49:36.060 --> 49:37.280]  I'm sure you can, absolutely.
[49:37.460 --> 49:39.840]  No, I'm saying are you able to from where you're working now?
[49:40.020 --> 49:40.240]  No.
[49:40.480 --> 49:40.700]  Okay.
[49:41.100 --> 49:44.040]  Only because I don't have the right test equipment to break it down.
[49:44.200 --> 49:46.340]  I break down with a T-bird to the voice level.
[49:46.460 --> 49:46.760]  Uh-huh.
[49:46.960 --> 49:50.880]  But I can't set it up to look at an individual word out of everything there.
[49:50.880 --> 49:55.100]  But I can assure you that it would be easy as anything for a person.
[49:57.100 --> 49:57.460]  Um...
[49:57.460 --> 50:01.540]  You know this stuff 9X uses where you can call without dialing?
[50:01.680 --> 50:02.440]  Yeah, voice dialing.
[50:02.940 --> 50:04.300]  I forget what you call that.
[50:04.420 --> 50:05.520]  Voice dialing is what they call it.
[50:05.580 --> 50:10.640]  But the way you use it is you pick up the phone, right, and you say the name of the person you want to call, then you put the number in, right?
[50:10.820 --> 50:13.340]  Right, I have the service myself, and it works fairly well.
[50:13.340 --> 50:16.120]  It recognizes one person's voice and not another person's voice.
[50:16.280 --> 50:16.560]  Right.
[50:16.560 --> 50:22.620]  Well, how tough you think it would be to make it so that it was not so species-specific but word-specific?
[50:23.160 --> 50:23.440]  Uh-huh.
[50:23.520 --> 50:24.980]  It would be called expensive.
[50:25.860 --> 50:28.600]  Expensive now, but 10 years down the road would it be expensive?
[50:28.720 --> 50:29.820]  No, certainly not.
[50:30.380 --> 50:31.020]  Of course not.
[50:31.280 --> 50:34.960]  I think what you have to look at, you have to look at what they want to do.
[50:35.120 --> 50:42.740]  You know, if they had all their wishes granted, what would the FBI, what would all these other organizations want, you know, out of technology?
[50:42.920 --> 50:46.720]  Would they want the ability to be able to search for words, like the caller is saying?
[50:46.860 --> 50:50.180]  1% of all the calls in America, and then 100% of all the calls?
[50:51.420 --> 50:57.600]  Remember, once they learn how to do it one hundredth of a time, they just need 10 more machines, not 10 more people.
[50:59.780 --> 51:00.180]  Interesting.
[51:00.640 --> 51:01.520]  Thanks for the info.
[51:02.040 --> 51:02.980]  Have a pleasant evening.
[51:03.160 --> 51:03.380]  All right.
[51:03.500 --> 51:04.040]  Give us a call.
[51:04.160 --> 51:04.760]  We'd like to hear from you.
[51:05.040 --> 51:05.360]  All right.
[51:05.520 --> 51:05.820]  Take care.
[51:06.920 --> 51:07.320]  Wow.
[51:07.620 --> 51:11.180]  Well, that was a time capsule from 1995.
[51:11.180 --> 51:15.020]  We got that call on November 7th from a listener.
[51:15.580 --> 51:21.220]  And I don't know if we ever heard from him again, but certainly brought up some interesting topics.
[51:21.700 --> 51:26.060]  How do you guys think it's aged over the last 12 years, Jim?
[51:26.060 --> 51:41.000]  I remember being in the studio that evening and thinking that this is enough to make you paranoid, and nothing I've learned since along these lines has turned me away from that idea.
[51:41.240 --> 51:43.660]  The man was right and ahead of his time.
[51:44.220 --> 51:45.400]  Bernie, do you agree with that?
[51:45.940 --> 51:46.460]  Yes.
[51:46.580 --> 52:00.120]  And like most of these predictions that I hear with electronic surveillance, the predictions are short of the mark as far as when it will be possible to do it cheaply and on a widespread basis.
[52:00.360 --> 52:07.300]  So I think, you know, we were guessing 10 years from then, which had been 2005, just two years ago.
[52:08.780 --> 52:15.080]  That's exactly about when the NSA supposedly was actually after the NSA.
[52:15.360 --> 52:21.940]  That was actually before the NSA was doing their widespread telephone system surveillance.
[52:22.180 --> 52:28.400]  So I think this guy was actually underestimating the capabilities of what was to come.
[52:28.760 --> 52:30.420]  Hard as that might be to believe.
[52:30.420 --> 52:35.340]  That's just a sample of the kinds of things you'll find in the archives.
[52:35.700 --> 52:42.780]  And the person who sent that in to us no doubt has a copy of the archives and found that particular bit of information that way.
[52:42.960 --> 52:49.280]  You too can get the full archive from 1988 to 2006, 212-209-2950.
[52:49.280 --> 52:56.180]  We have such amazing history here just from this one program since we began back in the late 80s.
[52:56.180 --> 53:13.200]  So I think it's such an important topic today, the issue of surveillance and privacy and technology, that we really have a responsibility to try and learn from the past, to see what people were talking about back then and see how it's developed and where we've gone wrong,
[53:13.220 --> 53:14.700]  if we've done anything right.
[53:15.460 --> 53:18.060]  And studying history is one major part of that.
[53:18.180 --> 53:23.140]  So I'd like to encourage people to at least listen to the shows online.
[53:23.140 --> 53:33.580]  But if you can manage to support the radio station and get the high quality version that sounds pretty much as it did over the air, 212-209-2950 is our phone number.
[53:33.720 --> 53:35.300]  We're in the middle of a pledge drive.
[53:35.520 --> 53:39.600]  We have to do this in order to keep the station going so we can continue to talk about these things.
[53:40.020 --> 53:50.320]  Had we not been able to do this over the past, what is it, 40 or so years, you never would have heard that discussion in the first place, let alone this one describing that one.
[53:50.320 --> 53:53.040]  So, yeah, it's very important.
[53:53.420 --> 53:54.200]  40 years?
[53:54.780 --> 53:55.760]  More than that, right?
[53:55.880 --> 53:57.760]  1960 was when the station went on the air.
[53:57.880 --> 53:59.060]  Oh, you're talking about the station.
[53:59.120 --> 54:00.080]  The station itself, yeah.
[54:00.740 --> 54:06.760]  And we've been chugging along since then completely 100% because of listener support.
[54:06.940 --> 54:10.180]  That's why it's so important that we see the phone lines light up.
[54:10.280 --> 54:12.460]  We're in the last few minutes of the show for today.
[54:12.740 --> 54:14.500]  We'll be on again next week as well.
[54:14.500 --> 54:18.980]  But that's it for the summer fundraiser, 212-209-2950.
[54:20.080 --> 54:23.900]  I hear a lot of complaints from people that say, wow, you know, asking for money.
[54:24.020 --> 54:26.580]  Yet again, you know, it's not us asking for money.
[54:26.720 --> 54:41.220]  It's all the people that we have to pay to keep the lights on, to keep the phones working, to keep the transmitter transmitting, and all sorts of other things that you need to do with a radio station like ours that pumps out signal all throughout the New York metro area and beyond.
[54:41.600 --> 54:43.680]  212-209-2950.
[54:44.000 --> 54:52.700]  The price of supporting us is so minimal compared to the price that you already pay to support the commercial stations, and they don't ask you.
[54:52.780 --> 54:55.980]  They just take it out of advertising budgets for the things that you buy.
[54:56.720 --> 54:58.540]  212-209-2950.
[54:58.680 --> 55:03.560]  Never had an ad on this radio station, and we never will, as long as we keep free discussions coming.
[55:03.560 --> 55:06.180]  Well, we might have to if we can't afford to stay in business.
[55:06.200 --> 55:11.140]  Well, I'll tell you, Mike, if we have to have commercials, we can't talk about things that we talk about.
[55:11.300 --> 55:18.260]  We can't talk about how much Microsoft sucks or how much a rip-off horizon is or what the federal government is after.
[55:18.680 --> 55:22.200]  We can't talk about things like that because that's going to make the sponsors nervous.
[55:22.580 --> 55:25.320]  If the sponsors are nervous, they're not going to give us their precious money.
[55:25.480 --> 55:27.680]  And why would we want that?
[55:27.900 --> 55:29.420]  Let's go back to playing the pop music.
[55:29.420 --> 55:34.820]  It's actually not well known that WBI is actually licensed as a commercial station.
[55:35.400 --> 55:37.720]  So we could play ads tomorrow if we wanted to.
[55:38.020 --> 55:39.560]  Yeah, because we're 99.5.
[55:39.700 --> 55:43.520]  We're in the middle of the commercial ban, so I guess we could.
[55:43.540 --> 55:45.600]  But it would be a violation of the Pacifica Charter.
[55:46.140 --> 55:51.140]  And to us here at the radio station, that's far more important than any other law in the world.
[55:52.120 --> 55:54.100]  So we're not going to do that.
[55:54.240 --> 55:58.060]  We're not going to betray our listeners like that.
[55:58.180 --> 56:01.480]  But in order for us to continue, it's the reality of the situation.
[56:01.620 --> 56:04.840]  Things cost so much more now than they did even five years ago.
[56:05.360 --> 56:06.800]  But yet we're able to continue.
[56:06.980 --> 56:07.980]  It's a bit of a miracle.
[56:08.140 --> 56:10.120]  It's a bit of a miracle this place continues to survive.
[56:10.120 --> 56:10.940]  But it does.
[56:11.120 --> 56:12.720]  And it's because of you that it does.
[56:13.640 --> 56:14.940]  So think about that.
[56:15.240 --> 56:16.760]  If you're considering making the phone call.
[56:17.120 --> 56:19.860]  Screeching over to the side of the road and calling on your cell phone.
[56:20.240 --> 56:23.400]  212-209-2950 or from the comfort of your own home.
[56:23.960 --> 56:24.840]  Think about that.
[56:25.060 --> 56:26.980]  It's not much of a sacrifice.
[56:27.200 --> 56:29.020]  And the payoff is simply incredible.
[56:29.560 --> 56:30.540]  Things you can learn.
[56:30.780 --> 56:31.540]  Things you can express.
[56:32.020 --> 56:35.560]  And while we're not taking phone calls tonight, there are so many days where we do take phone calls.
[56:35.560 --> 56:38.980]  And we hear from people like the person we just listened to from 1995.
[56:39.420 --> 56:42.340]  He must really be freaked out if he's driving around now and he hurt himself.
[56:42.340 --> 56:43.380]  Can you imagine that?
[56:43.620 --> 56:44.480]  I'd be freaked out.
[56:44.540 --> 56:44.680]  Yeah.
[56:44.860 --> 56:47.240]  A lot of people don't realize that we archive things here.
[56:47.540 --> 56:49.860]  And that's so important to archive your history.
[56:50.180 --> 56:54.860]  Because if you don't remember it, then you're not going to learn anything.
[56:55.180 --> 56:56.980]  And you're going to make a lot of mistakes.
[56:58.020 --> 57:01.180]  And I'm just very happy that we have these old shows to draw upon.
[57:01.180 --> 57:02.840]  Because things really were different then.
[57:03.040 --> 57:03.800]  They really were different.
[57:04.020 --> 57:05.360]  The country was a different place.
[57:06.140 --> 57:10.240]  And there's so much that we can learn just from taking a listen to that.
[57:11.280 --> 57:13.860]  212-209-2950 is the number.
[57:14.440 --> 57:14.740]  That's right.
[57:14.900 --> 57:16.720]  212-209-2950.
[57:16.940 --> 57:18.540]  Join the people on the phone right now.
[57:19.200 --> 57:21.220]  Show you support for WBAI.
[57:21.360 --> 57:22.400]  Show you support for Off The Hook.
[57:22.980 --> 57:24.100]  Pledge of $125.
[57:24.100 --> 57:31.880]  You'll get every single copy of Off The Hook in full stereo sound from 1988 to 2006.
[57:33.120 --> 57:37.420]  And for a pledge of $25 and above, you'll get an exclusive Off The Hook t-shirt.
[57:37.640 --> 57:42.900]  The kind you can only get if you pledge to WBAI via Off The Hook.
[57:43.120 --> 57:43.940]  It's the only way.
[57:44.320 --> 57:45.760]  212-209-2950.
[57:45.760 --> 57:46.640]  But we're out of here for tonight.
[57:47.280 --> 57:48.660]  The personal commuter show is up next.
[57:48.740 --> 57:49.900]  We'll be back again next week.
[57:50.120 --> 57:51.620]  I want to thank everybody who called in.
[57:52.300 --> 57:56.680]  And thank everybody for calling in over the years to keep us going, to keep us thinking.
[57:56.980 --> 57:59.080]  Once again, 212-209-2950.
[57:59.280 --> 58:00.000]  We'll see you next week.
[01:00:02.760 --> 01:00:04.040]  Ah, the human mind.
[01:00:04.480 --> 01:00:05.800]  What a fascinating thing.
[01:00:05.860 --> 01:00:07.780]  And it's not as confusing as you think.
[01:00:08.480 --> 01:00:12.840]  Tune into The Positive Mind, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays at 1pm.
[01:00:12.980 --> 01:00:16.060]  And learn about why we do the things we do.
[01:00:16.660 --> 01:00:20.060]  This is Armand DeMille, The Positive Mind, WBAI.
[01:00:20.260 --> 01:00:25.020]  99.5, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays at 1pm.