[00:00.000 --> 00:05.240]  But it doesn't appear that you're successful in breaking up gangs and stopping violence.
[00:05.480 --> 00:15.060]  Despite that sentiment, Ms. Waters will go on to beseech Mr. Mueller to come to California and help with gang violence there and to firm up the FBI gang task force already in place.
[00:15.960 --> 00:33.680]  Khaled Samad of the National Council for Urban Peace, Justice and Empowerment says an increased police presence, FBI or otherwise, is a flawed strategy and advocates for what he calls an urban policy initiative that would, among other things, increase job availability and preparedness.
[00:34.380 --> 00:38.700]  And that was Free Speech Radio News, as heard here on WBAI New York.
[00:38.860 --> 00:42.020]  It's 7 o'clock time, once again, for Off the Hook.
[00:47.400 --> 01:00.260]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a cough We couldn't get much worse,
[01:03.420 --> 01:09.180]  come for the best, expect the worst I hope that's understood, but make me move!
[01:42.730 --> 01:43.710]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[01:43.790 --> 01:44.890]  The program is Off the Hook.
[01:45.130 --> 01:47.550]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[01:48.370 --> 01:50.930]  Wow, we've got a studio packed full of people tonight.
[01:50.930 --> 01:55.690]  I don't know what the occasion is, but let's see if we can try and say hi to everybody.
[01:56.270 --> 01:58.970]  Well, first down in Philadelphia, let's get this over with, is Bernie S.
[01:59.810 --> 02:00.770]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:01.270 --> 02:02.230]  I'm sorry, but it came out right.
[02:02.350 --> 02:08.390]  I didn't mean to phrase it like it was an ordeal to introduce you or anything like that, but it's just less complicated now that you're out of the way.
[02:08.830 --> 02:09.210]  It's fine.
[02:09.450 --> 02:11.430]  And over on this side of the room is Mike.
[02:11.810 --> 02:12.070]  Hi.
[02:12.770 --> 02:14.370]  We have, is that Redbird?
[02:14.590 --> 02:15.030]  Good evening.
[02:15.130 --> 02:16.130]  And you're sitting next to Red Hat.
[02:16.450 --> 02:16.670]  Hey.
[02:16.830 --> 02:17.570]  Has that ever happened before?
[02:17.850 --> 02:19.410]  Redbird and Red Hat sitting next to each other?
[02:20.290 --> 02:21.050]  I don't think so.
[02:21.170 --> 02:21.610]  Oh, interesting.
[02:22.090 --> 02:23.030]  We have an attraction.
[02:23.270 --> 02:23.890]  Yeah, it seems that way.
[02:23.970 --> 02:25.290]  On the other side of the room is not Kevin.
[02:25.550 --> 02:25.870]  Hello.
[02:25.870 --> 02:28.730]  And, okay, we have a bunch of guests tonight.
[02:28.970 --> 02:30.730]  A bunch of people stopping in.
[02:31.330 --> 02:32.290]  Lexicon is here again.
[02:32.570 --> 02:32.870]  Hello.
[02:33.390 --> 02:36.770]  And it looks like the friendly face of Mojo from California.
[02:37.950 --> 02:38.390]  Hi.
[02:40.490 --> 02:43.570]  And apparently you know about dramatic pauses and things like that.
[02:43.950 --> 02:47.490]  And we also have Al and Zach here from North Carolina.
[02:47.590 --> 02:47.990]  Can I say that?
[02:48.270 --> 02:48.770]  North Carolina?
[02:48.910 --> 02:50.210]  Okay, good, because I did and there's no delay.
[02:51.450 --> 02:52.510]  Have I left anybody out?
[02:52.550 --> 02:54.350]  No, I think that's everybody in the studio so far.
[02:54.350 --> 02:57.290]  We could go out into the hall and maybe recruit some more people.
[02:57.470 --> 02:58.490]  Yeah, let's drag some more people in here.
[02:58.810 --> 03:00.170]  So we've got a lot of things to talk about.
[03:00.230 --> 03:05.350]  First of all, people can stop emailing us asking us to post last week's show because there wasn't a show last week.
[03:05.350 --> 03:07.390]  We were preempted and we forgot to mention it two weeks ago.
[03:08.770 --> 03:09.870]  So it's not going to happen.
[03:09.930 --> 03:11.530]  You'll never hear that show because it doesn't exist.
[03:12.030 --> 03:13.490]  Also, I have some bad news.
[03:14.090 --> 03:16.650]  Next week, I'm told we're also going to be preempted.
[03:17.050 --> 03:25.250]  Yeah, this really kind of sucks for us because, you know, we're getting preempted twice in the month of April and the next month is a fundraiser.
[03:25.330 --> 03:27.210]  And I know we're going to get preempted at least for one of those weeks too.
[03:28.170 --> 03:30.750]  So next week we're being preempted for a report to the listener.
[03:30.750 --> 03:36.690]  So I guess there's a section there where you can call in and voice your opinions on various things.
[03:36.870 --> 03:40.430]  I'm not going to say what you should voice your opinions on or how you should voice them, but voice them however you wish.
[03:41.410 --> 03:44.570]  Just keep in mind, a lot of people have a lot of things to do here at the radio station.
[03:44.850 --> 03:46.210]  Listen to that program next week.
[03:46.250 --> 03:46.970]  It's a two-hour program.
[03:47.070 --> 03:47.870]  It goes from 7 to 9.
[03:48.250 --> 03:51.090]  And you'll get a sense as to what it takes to run a radio station.
[03:51.310 --> 03:53.770]  So it's complicated.
[03:53.770 --> 03:54.330]  It's hard.
[03:54.490 --> 03:55.590]  It's a thankless job.
[03:55.770 --> 03:59.530]  So I guess remember that if you call in.
[04:00.750 --> 04:02.190]  But, yeah, we won't be on next week.
[04:02.830 --> 04:03.950]  But this week we are on.
[04:04.010 --> 04:05.250]  This week we have a lot of things to talk about.
[04:06.130 --> 04:09.790]  And, Bernie, I know that you had some late-breaking news out of...
[04:09.790 --> 04:10.910]  Well, it's not out of Philadelphia.
[04:10.910 --> 04:11.610]  You're in Philadelphia.
[04:11.670 --> 04:13.810]  But something to do with...
[04:13.810 --> 04:15.930]  This is not good news legally, right?
[04:16.030 --> 04:16.310]  Is that right?
[04:17.010 --> 04:17.850]  Oh, yes.
[04:18.490 --> 04:22.570]  The Supreme Court of the United States made a really surprising...
[04:22.570 --> 04:25.230]  Well, maybe not just surprising, but a very unfortunate decision.
[04:26.250 --> 04:28.950]  And it hasn't been getting a lot of media coverage, but I thought I'd mention it.
[04:31.390 --> 04:55.570]  They ruled on a case from Virginia and found that if a police officer stops you driving a vehicle or on the street, for that matter, and they charge you with a summary offense, that is something that we just normally issue a ticket, like you didn't have your turn signal on or you spat on the sidewalk or something like that,
[04:56.190 --> 04:57.430]  if they can...
[04:57.430 --> 05:09.330]  And if they arrest you for an offense that the state says you should only issue a ticket for and not physically arrest and detain someone, if they still decide...
[05:09.330 --> 05:28.410]  If the cop still decides to arrest you and physically detain you, which would be illegal under that state's law, they can then search you and use anything that they find in that search against you and file new charges if they find anything that they say is illegal.
[05:28.650 --> 05:36.850]  So in this particular case in Virginia, someone was stopped for a traffic citation that just normally would just have a ticket issued.
[05:36.850 --> 05:48.110]  But instead, instead of just issuing a ticket, they arrested the person who detained him and pursuant to that arrest and detainment, they searched the vehicle, found some drugs, and then charged him with possession of drugs.
[05:48.190 --> 05:52.450]  So the guy appealed that, and the state found that, no, that was illegal.
[05:52.590 --> 05:54.990]  They can't use that evidence because it was illegally obtained.
[05:55.130 --> 06:10.430]  The Supreme Court said that, well, it's legal after all, even though it's illegal under state law, under federal, it is constitutional for police to arrest you illegally and then use anything they find in your possession against you, and it's admissible,
[06:10.570 --> 06:12.150]  which is really strange.
[06:12.270 --> 06:17.950]  And this falls on the heels of another law, another rule that was determined earlier this week, I think, where the U.S.
[06:18.470 --> 06:31.870]  Customs can search the entire contents of your hard drive, your laptop, your PDA, your cell phone, whenever you enter the United States, without having any scintilla of suspicion that you've done anything wrong.
[06:31.870 --> 06:33.670]  Yeah, this happened on Monday.
[06:33.810 --> 06:38.290]  Federal appeals court ruled that way on Monday, that customs agents at U.S.
[06:38.630 --> 06:42.010]  airports can simply look through, rifle through your entire laptop.
[06:42.990 --> 06:45.370]  And of course, the reason, why do we want this?
[06:45.410 --> 06:46.450]  Because of child pornography.
[06:46.630 --> 06:56.150]  Somebody apparently was crossing a border once, and they had a laptop, and the customs agent could tell, I guess by the person's expression, that he had child pornography on his laptop, went into the laptop, found it.
[06:56.470 --> 06:59.950]  And so isn't it great we have this law now to protect us against that kind of a thing?
[07:00.590 --> 07:02.130]  Well, they don't have to suspect you.
[07:02.210 --> 07:08.310]  They don't have to suspect you of anything when you come into the border to search your hard drive, your PDA, your cell phone.
[07:08.530 --> 07:08.610]  No, they don't.
[07:08.610 --> 07:09.530]  That's just a mere formality.
[07:09.970 --> 07:12.430]  They don't have to have a scintilla of suspicion.
[07:12.730 --> 07:13.950]  There's no probable cause.
[07:14.230 --> 07:15.270]  There's not even a reasonable suspicion.
[07:15.270 --> 07:18.850]  Bernie, I think you know as well as I do, probable cause is a real pain in the ass for law enforcement.
[07:19.050 --> 07:23.110]  So they're skipping over that stage now and simply just launching in and investigating everybody.
[07:23.250 --> 07:29.170]  Now, what I thought was interesting is that he got charged ultimately with traveling to Thailand to have sex with the miners.
[07:29.610 --> 07:31.190]  But he didn't even do that, right?
[07:31.290 --> 07:37.830]  I mean, he got charged for attempting to do something that he didn't even do, that he wasn't able to do.
[07:37.890 --> 07:38.890]  He wasn't able to actually travel.
[07:39.110 --> 07:46.490]  According to his lawyer, he was singled out apparently at random for a luggage search in July 2005 after a flight from the Philippines.
[07:46.710 --> 07:48.970]  A customs agent told him to turn on his computer.
[07:49.110 --> 07:53.850]  Agents then searched the desktop folders and computer equipment, found images they believed to be child pornography.
[07:54.250 --> 07:55.570]  I don't know what that means exactly.
[07:56.250 --> 08:00.670]  He was charged with transporting child pornography and with traveling to the Philippines to have sex with a minor.
[08:00.930 --> 08:01.150]  Okay, Philippines.
[08:01.350 --> 08:02.290]  So he was coming back?
[08:03.090 --> 08:03.490]  Yeah.
[08:03.610 --> 08:04.750]  He was coming back apparently.
[08:04.990 --> 08:09.210]  That's where they, that's where customs can search you is on your way back, not on your way out.
[08:10.630 --> 08:14.090]  This really interesting case, it presents some questions.
[08:14.510 --> 08:26.170]  There have been people who have their hard drives encrypted who've had their heart, you know, their laptops taken by customs and refused to divulge the encryption keys, which apparently is okay, but then they take your laptop and keep it.
[08:27.410 --> 08:29.010]  So let them try that with me.
[08:29.290 --> 08:37.330]  I will make a scene like, like one of those millionaire models in England when they get frisked a little bit too aggressively.
[08:37.330 --> 08:38.530]  Just smash it to the ground.
[08:38.550 --> 08:45.550]  I will, I will do what is, I mean, this is, this is beyond anything that we should be tolerating and by, by any stretch of the imagination.
[08:45.770 --> 08:47.890]  What is on your computer, it's not like searching your luggage.
[08:48.130 --> 08:49.790]  It's searching your brain practically.
[08:50.010 --> 08:54.930]  There is so much on a computer that can be, uh, uh, that can, that can be a great personal value.
[08:55.170 --> 08:57.870]  And, uh, no, no, I'm just, I can't accept this.
[08:57.970 --> 08:58.310]  Mojo.
[08:58.530 --> 09:03.830]  I'm curious if they, uh, if customs at an airport searches you and find something, whose laws do they charge you with?
[09:04.070 --> 09:07.230]  Could an airport, isn't there a gray area about what laws apply from what...
[09:07.230 --> 09:07.650]  U.S.
[09:07.730 --> 09:07.970]  laws.
[09:08.510 --> 09:11.710]  If you're flying into the U.S., they're searching you under U.S.
[09:11.810 --> 09:13.610]  law while you're trying to enter the U.S.
[09:13.670 --> 09:14.610]  So U.S.
[09:14.630 --> 09:18.630]  law is just starting to apply to you and what a way to be welcome to that jurisdiction.
[09:19.030 --> 09:19.030]  Yeah.
[09:20.110 --> 09:26.450]  Well, uh, yeah, this is something that I really think is, um, is going to result in a lot of, uh, bad scenes in airports.
[09:26.690 --> 09:34.550]  And again, as we mentioned, every time something like this comes up, it's really important for people to start educating themselves with respect to encrypting their hard drives and keeping their data safe.
[09:34.690 --> 09:35.810]  But you'd be amazed how many people don't care.
[09:35.890 --> 09:37.170]  How many people say, well, I've got nothing to hide.
[09:37.310 --> 09:37.710]  It doesn't matter.
[09:38.010 --> 09:38.670]  Well, that's the problem.
[09:38.770 --> 09:40.850]  That's why this stuff is, you know, they're getting away with it.
[09:40.850 --> 09:46.030]  We're living in this generation where people post everything about their lives on the internet, you know, so what, they've got nothing to hide.
[09:46.030 --> 09:53.430]  I mean, and if you do have something to hide and you really want to hide it, it's not like it's too difficult to convince a customs agent that you've shown them everything.
[09:53.630 --> 09:58.510]  I mean, you could have two separate, a separate partition that when you put in the right encryption key opens that one instead.
[09:58.710 --> 09:59.690]  They can tell when you're lying now.
[09:59.750 --> 10:02.230]  They have the facial recognition customs agents that are able to tell.
[10:02.350 --> 10:04.130]  I don't think they'd be able to figure it out too quickly.
[10:04.570 --> 10:06.230]  I don't think they're computer experts, so.
[10:06.610 --> 10:09.910]  But if, I'm curious, I've never known, what are the laws about encryption?
[10:09.910 --> 10:15.610]  If they know there's data there, if they know there's data and it's encrypted, what laws do they have to force you to give it up.
[10:15.690 --> 10:18.530]  What can they charge you with if you refuse to divulge what's on the hard drive?
[10:18.630 --> 10:20.270]  Well, if they don't have a law, they're going to make one.
[10:20.370 --> 10:22.270]  They don't have to charge you with anything.
[10:22.390 --> 10:25.830]  They can just take your laptop and then you've lost the data and that's quite unfortunate.
[10:25.970 --> 10:28.650]  So there's no laws that force you to divulge what's on there?
[10:29.490 --> 10:29.850]  Right.
[10:29.850 --> 10:32.290]  I think the bigger issue is the precedence that it sets.
[10:32.630 --> 10:37.950]  I mean, it's just another nail in the probable cause coffin.
[10:38.470 --> 10:40.810]  You know, now it's not even exigent circumstances.
[10:40.830 --> 10:45.550]  It's not like there's a dead hooker in the back of your car so the cop wants to look in it.
[10:45.630 --> 10:48.590]  This is just I suspect you of doing something so I get to search you.
[10:48.770 --> 11:01.210]  Well, this law absolutely would be coming because if everyone's going to start encrypting their data, I'm surprised there isn't a law where if they see, well, your data's encrypted, if you don't unencrypt it, then you're going to be charged with this.
[11:01.350 --> 11:01.970]  It's got to be coming.
[11:02.130 --> 11:03.030]  Or they'll just keep your laptop.
[11:03.170 --> 11:04.310]  Maybe we haven't made the point clearly.
[11:04.630 --> 11:06.870]  They don't even need to suspect you.
[11:07.070 --> 11:08.190]  This is a special case.
[11:08.310 --> 11:13.350]  This is at the border where the laws of probable cause do not apply.
[11:13.470 --> 11:15.590]  They don't even have to have an improbable cause.
[11:15.670 --> 11:16.790]  They need no reason at all.
[11:16.890 --> 11:17.810]  They can do it randomly.
[11:18.490 --> 11:22.250]  And that's what's unique about the border is they can just search people for no good reason.
[11:23.870 --> 11:29.830]  So the laws about encryption are, as far as I know, still untested in this specific weird circumstance.
[11:30.190 --> 11:30.650]  You're a customs agent.
[11:30.750 --> 11:31.910]  You see Bill Gates coming across.
[11:32.050 --> 11:33.970]  You say, boy, I'd like to have the contents of his laptop.
[11:33.970 --> 11:34.870]  You're a customs agent.
[11:34.910 --> 11:35.650]  You can just do it now.
[11:35.810 --> 11:36.170]  Yeah.
[11:36.450 --> 11:36.590]  Yeah.
[11:36.730 --> 11:37.250]  It's incredible.
[11:37.530 --> 11:42.190]  Well, Bill Gates probably doesn't keep any data on his personal laptop, but other people do.
[11:42.190 --> 11:43.450]  You can't overestimate the intel.
[11:43.750 --> 11:46.050]  I'm not going to get into that, but it's...
[11:46.230 --> 11:46.390]  Yes.
[11:46.890 --> 11:51.030]  I just wanted to interject also that this does not just apply at the border now.
[11:51.570 --> 11:56.310]  Police can now arrest you illegally under state law.
[11:56.490 --> 11:57.490]  They can arrest you...
[11:57.490 --> 11:58.510]  Wait a minute, Bernie.
[11:58.770 --> 11:59.690]  You're contradicting yourself.
[11:59.790 --> 12:01.590]  It's not illegal if they make a law making it legal.
[12:01.590 --> 12:02.750]  No, it is.
[12:02.870 --> 12:13.670]  The Supreme Court has ruled it's constitutional for a police officer to illegally arrest you in any state where it's illegal to arrest someone for a...
[12:13.670 --> 12:14.590]  Wait, hold on.
[12:14.930 --> 12:17.630]  My mind is bending here.
[12:17.770 --> 12:19.930]  How can it be illegal if they're making it legal?
[12:20.510 --> 12:21.470]  I think you mean unconstitutional.
[12:21.470 --> 12:24.330]  There's state law, and then there's federal law, and there's the...
[12:24.330 --> 12:24.770]  Uh-huh.
[12:24.770 --> 12:25.630]  Based on the Constitution.
[12:26.050 --> 12:33.150]  What I'm saying is that in states where it is illegal for a police officer to arrest you for a summary offense...
[12:33.150 --> 12:34.170]  A summary offense is one word.
[12:34.270 --> 12:39.270]  There's just a citation, a ticket issued, like spitting on the sidewalk or not using your turn signal like that.
[12:39.270 --> 12:53.750]  In those states, if the officer still arrests you, which is illegal under state law, which is what happened in this Virginia case, if they arrest you and then search all your stuff, like the laptop, hard drive, and all your other stuff in your possession,
[12:54.830 --> 13:09.250]  they can... even though they arrested you illegally, under federal law, they can use anything they find against you, and you can't suppress that because it was an illegal search or seek you, which is really disturbing.
[13:09.530 --> 13:11.190]  This is two cases, two decisions.
[13:11.690 --> 13:19.330]  One, this today, by the Supreme Court, and it was a federal circuit court, appeals court, who made the ruling earlier this week that U.S.
[13:19.430 --> 13:23.990]  border police can search you without having any probable cause as well.
[13:24.150 --> 13:31.650]  Again, in this Virginia case, there was no probable cause even elicited that this guy had drugs in his car.
[13:31.650 --> 13:38.130]  He was arrested for a traffic citation where the state law says it's just a ticket for that sort of thing.
[13:38.270 --> 13:39.150]  You have to let him go after the ticket.
[13:39.270 --> 13:45.070]  They arrested him anyway, and pursuant to that arrest and detainment, they did an inventory search of his car.
[13:45.350 --> 13:47.050]  They're also allowed to search your person.
[13:47.230 --> 13:49.330]  It's called a Terry Stop to see if you have any weapons.
[13:49.490 --> 13:52.950]  And during that search, they found drugs, or they could have found anything.
[13:53.090 --> 13:55.510]  They could have found a hard drive and information on it, for that matter.
[13:55.510 --> 14:01.610]  All I can say is that I am shocked that the Supreme Court, appointed by George W.
[14:01.790 --> 14:04.070]  Bush, would do something like this.
[14:04.330 --> 14:04.730]  Shocked.
[14:04.790 --> 14:05.290]  I am shocked.
[14:05.290 --> 14:06.330]  It's not just George W.
[14:06.470 --> 14:06.870]  Bush, though.
[14:07.030 --> 14:08.270]  Well, yeah, but he helped.
[14:08.270 --> 14:09.210]  I mean, it's the U.S.
[14:09.330 --> 14:09.570]  government.
[14:09.570 --> 14:09.810]  Of course.
[14:09.810 --> 14:12.250]  It's been heading this direction for a very long time.
[14:12.370 --> 14:12.630]  But, wow.
[14:13.030 --> 14:17.210]  Okay, well, this is definitely bad news, and, you know, of course, it's not getting media attention, is it?
[14:17.350 --> 14:17.910]  Not enough?
[14:18.170 --> 14:22.010]  Well, this is a story from the San Francisco Chronicle that I'm holding.
[14:22.170 --> 14:22.530]  Tell us.
[14:22.830 --> 14:23.810]  You already read it.
[14:23.810 --> 14:25.730]  Oh, okay, no, I mean more, apart from this.
[14:26.810 --> 14:28.790]  There's one story that I've seen so far.
[14:28.930 --> 14:30.650]  It's, okay, will there be a story tomorrow?
[14:30.770 --> 14:31.910]  Will this be a continuing debate?
[14:31.910 --> 14:32.490]  I doubt it.
[14:32.810 --> 14:33.670]  I think it's over.
[14:33.870 --> 14:35.350]  I think this is now the new reality.
[14:35.430 --> 14:39.570]  I doubt it will get Hillary Clinton aging in front of our eyes coverage, right?
[14:39.670 --> 14:44.130]  Because we won't have a CNN sweeps graphic package about it.
[14:44.190 --> 14:44.890]  I would like to hear...
[14:44.890 --> 14:46.170]  I'm sure it won't wake you up in the morning.
[14:46.190 --> 14:48.350]  I would like to hear all the candidates' opinions on this.
[14:48.470 --> 14:51.470]  They should all be issuing a statement, and I have heard no statement from any of them.
[14:51.470 --> 14:56.510]  Well, I'm curious, if they can search you at a traffic stop, does that include, like, a laptop or a cell phone?
[14:57.370 --> 14:59.970]  Can they search the contents of data at a traffic stop?
[15:00.530 --> 15:01.630]  I don't think any of us know.
[15:01.830 --> 15:02.030]  Yes.
[15:02.210 --> 15:03.570]  It would be a very long traffic stop.
[15:03.650 --> 15:05.330]  Bernie, you say with authority, yes.
[15:05.330 --> 15:17.850]  According to the Supreme Court ruling today, which is the highest court in the land, they can do any kind of search, whatever, of your person or property if you're arrested on your property, even in a summary offense.
[15:17.850 --> 15:30.630]  Even if it's just... if they're under the state law, if they're only supposed to issue a ticket, they can still arrest you, and then, pursuant to that arrest and detainment, search your person and your property for anything, period.
[15:32.910 --> 15:39.970]  Now, Rach, now, to get back to your question earlier, are you prohibited from withholding your encryption key?
[15:39.970 --> 15:51.170]  Hey, Kevin Mitnick actually faced that same situation, and he was prohibited from getting discovery information in his case that he said had...
[15:51.170 --> 16:02.530]  you know, there was exculpatory information on his hard drive that could have shown his innocence, and because he would not give them his encryption key, they would not allow him to have that discovery evidence.
[16:02.530 --> 16:04.570]  It was called Brady, under the Brady law.
[16:05.090 --> 16:07.270]  So that's, you know, that's a bad thing.
[16:07.270 --> 16:17.950]  And in other cases, if you're just stopped in a traffic citation case and they take your laptop away from you and do a search of it, you can refuse to provide that information.
[16:17.950 --> 16:31.470]  However, if you're brought before a grand jury and refuse to give up your key during your grand jury questioning, you can... that in itself is a federal felony, and you can be locked up for the better part of a year simply for not answering questions before a grand jury.
[16:32.130 --> 16:35.450]  All right, so pretty sobering news coming out today.
[16:35.770 --> 16:36.910]  Of course, we'll be following this.
[16:37.510 --> 16:42.590]  Unfortunately, we won't be able to follow it next week, but in two weeks, maybe things will get even worse, and we'll be there to follow that.
[16:43.190 --> 16:47.170]  All right, when I get depressed like this, I like to go overseas and look at how enlightened people are in other countries.
[16:47.470 --> 16:52.410]  So let's take a look at some new laws that Australia is proposing for email access.
[16:52.870 --> 16:58.630]  Now, according to the Attorney General's office over there, the threat of cybercrime is rising in Australia.
[16:58.870 --> 17:05.430]  So the Australian government is considering new national security laws that would allow employers to read their employees' email without prior consent.
[17:05.430 --> 17:13.870]  The new laws are intended to give companies extra powers to monitor their computer networks in an effort to prevent cyberattacks, because we all live in fear of cyberattacks.
[17:13.950 --> 17:17.250]  Now, I don't know what this has to do with cyberattacks exactly, but this is something that U.S.
[17:17.370 --> 17:18.530]  companies can already do.
[17:31.030 --> 17:31.830]  Mm-hmm.
[17:32.510 --> 17:36.530]  She said the proposed changes would improve the security of Australia's computer networks.
[17:36.670 --> 17:39.810]  Quote, we want to make sure that they are safe from terrorist attack.
[17:40.010 --> 17:41.510]  This has nothing to do with terrorists.
[17:41.810 --> 17:42.690]  I know that.
[17:42.830 --> 17:49.990]  I mean, it may have something to do with employees stealing from their employers or even some, you know, conventional crimes like that.
[17:50.110 --> 17:52.850]  But terrorists can buy a computer and use it at home.
[17:52.850 --> 17:55.690]  Let's follow this logic down the Crooked Mountain Pass here.
[17:55.850 --> 18:02.770]  Part of doing that is making sure we've got the right powers to ensure that we can tell if there's something unusual going on in the system.
[18:02.910 --> 18:07.110]  So it's a national security move, not a move about an unseemly interest in people's private emails.
[18:07.330 --> 18:09.630]  We're monitoring risk when risk is heightened.
[18:09.630 --> 18:14.050]  So all of you concerned about privacy, you can just forget it because it's got nothing to do with that.
[18:14.170 --> 18:15.150]  It's all about terrorism.
[18:15.230 --> 18:16.850]  And if you don't support it, you support terrorism.
[18:17.430 --> 18:26.050]  Now, obviously, there will be greater security, but it really is focused on national security for the IT and electronic infrastructure, the systems that are vital for making our society run.
[18:26.310 --> 18:27.350]  Is this mandatory?
[18:27.670 --> 18:30.590]  I mean, can employers not spy on their employees' emails?
[18:30.750 --> 18:32.710]  It's really poorly worded.
[18:32.810 --> 18:33.150]  I don't know.
[18:33.210 --> 18:37.430]  Any employer that doesn't get all excited about spying on their employees.
[18:37.430 --> 18:40.010]  Because that's the employer where the terrorists are going to work.
[18:40.610 --> 18:41.050]  Absolutely.
[18:41.710 --> 18:47.110]  Now, okay, if that wasn't cheerful enough for you, let's go over to England, where things are always so enlightened and fun.
[18:47.310 --> 18:48.210]  Back of good news today.
[18:48.250 --> 18:49.330]  Oh, yeah, definitely.
[18:49.910 --> 18:58.630]  A council has admitted spying on a family using laws to track criminals and terrorists to find out if they were really living in a school district.
[18:58.830 --> 18:59.270]  Yes.
[18:59.510 --> 19:05.710]  A couple and their three children were put under surveillance without their knowledge by Pool Borough Council for more than two weeks.
[19:05.710 --> 19:13.550]  The council admitted using powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act on six occasions in total.
[19:13.770 --> 19:17.830]  Three of those were for suspected fraudulent school place applications.
[19:18.810 --> 19:25.290]  Now, basically, this law, RIPA, was put into place to watch for terrorists.
[19:25.390 --> 19:29.310]  But you can see now it's being used for anything they damn well feel like using it for.
[19:29.370 --> 19:31.250]  Maybe I just don't understand what terrorism is.
[19:31.610 --> 19:35.390]  Well, I imagine placing your child in the wrong school district is the first step.
[19:36.270 --> 19:36.630]  Okay.
[19:36.770 --> 19:40.590]  So, because you're confusing the authorities and you don't know what's going to happen next.
[19:40.630 --> 19:41.930]  And before you know it, you're blowing things up.
[19:42.010 --> 19:44.670]  Well, if I ever have a child, I'll try this and report back.
[19:44.770 --> 19:47.370]  Well, this is just something to keep in mind when you see the cameras going off.
[19:47.530 --> 19:48.850]  That, yeah, they might be there.
[19:49.010 --> 19:50.590]  They might be saying they're there for your security.
[19:50.590 --> 19:55.630]  But they're really there to keep an eye on you in any circumstance they feel like using it for.
[19:55.630 --> 20:04.370]  And this is really a glimpse into the future as far as where we're going to be headed in this country and especially in New York City because so many cameras and surveillance equipment and other things are going up around here.
[20:04.550 --> 20:04.810]  I know.
[20:04.810 --> 20:05.870]  You see it every day.
[20:05.990 --> 20:09.490]  There's more and more cameras in places where you never saw them before.
[20:09.730 --> 20:14.090]  Well, if you travel around the U.K., you're no stranger to cameras being at every corner.
[20:14.310 --> 20:14.930]  Well, exactly.
[20:15.130 --> 20:15.570]  Yeah, the U.K.
[20:15.570 --> 20:16.650]  is ahead of us in that.
[20:16.790 --> 20:17.190]  Right.
[20:17.370 --> 20:19.770]  I mean, that's the Orwellian nightmare there.
[20:19.950 --> 20:25.010]  I mean, there's not a square inch, I think, of London that you can hide in that isn't covered by a camera somewhere.
[20:25.010 --> 20:27.270]  Keep in mind, 1984 took place in England.
[20:27.510 --> 20:27.670]  Right.
[20:28.010 --> 20:29.370]  So I think they took notes.
[20:29.850 --> 20:31.530]  No, I seriously think they do.
[20:31.630 --> 20:32.370]  They say, yeah, you know what?
[20:32.370 --> 20:32.730]  He's right.
[20:32.810 --> 20:33.350]  We can do this.
[20:33.490 --> 20:35.510]  We can improve the technology a little bit and monitor everybody.
[20:35.510 --> 20:38.230]  We don't have to throw things into memory holes or whatever.
[20:38.610 --> 20:38.810]  Right.
[20:38.890 --> 20:41.950]  So, I mean, it's not like there isn't already a model in place for that.
[20:42.330 --> 20:42.670]  Right.
[20:42.670 --> 20:46.130]  And that's exactly what we've been talking about under the pretenses of preventing terrorism.
[20:46.130 --> 20:57.310]  All of these laws and surveillance technologies that are being put into place are being used to spy on, you know, law-abiding citizens, even if they're suspected of doing something wrong.
[20:57.450 --> 20:58.950]  Not just law-abiding citizens.
[20:59.130 --> 20:59.910]  Police officers, too.
[21:00.050 --> 21:07.370]  Every single metropolitan police officer will be microchipped so top brass can monitor their movements on a Big Brother-style tracking scheme.
[21:07.510 --> 21:11.590]  That was just revealed according to a respected industry magazine, Police Review.
[21:11.870 --> 21:13.570]  We all respect that magazine here, don't we?
[21:13.570 --> 21:27.450]  The plan, which affects all 31,000 serving officers in the Metropolitan Police District of London, they're set to replace the unreliable airwave radio system currently used to help monitor officers' movements.
[21:27.630 --> 21:36.830]  The new electronic tracking device called the Automated Personal Location System, APLS, means that officers will never be out of range of supervising officers.
[21:36.830 --> 21:44.410]  But many serving officers fear being turned into RoboCops, controlled by bosses who have not been out on the beat in years.
[21:45.390 --> 21:47.350]  Are they actually going to inject these microchips?
[21:47.470 --> 21:51.730]  You know, it's scary thinking about this, but I wouldn't doubt it.
[21:52.010 --> 21:55.690]  So how do they monitor the top brass, and who monitors them?
[21:55.850 --> 21:57.290]  Who watches the watchers?
[21:57.370 --> 21:58.130]  That's what I want to know.
[21:58.130 --> 21:59.790]  So I think that's our job.
[22:00.170 --> 22:03.870]  Was this story released on April 1st, by any chance?
[22:03.970 --> 22:04.130]  No.
[22:04.130 --> 22:06.670]  I can't believe that... I don't believe police would stand for this.
[22:06.770 --> 22:12.650]  This was released on April 10th, and it was in the Daily Mail of the UK, dailymail.co.uk.
[22:14.210 --> 22:16.570]  And, yeah, it's crazy.
[22:17.190 --> 22:21.650]  I'm looking for any kind of technical information as to how they're going to do this.
[22:21.650 --> 22:26.390]  But I'm the least uncomfortable with this, because at least it's on the police now, as opposed to everyone else.
[22:26.430 --> 22:27.610]  Yeah, but you know it's going to be on everyone else after that.
[22:27.610 --> 22:28.970]  Well, of course, of course, but...
[22:28.970 --> 22:34.890]  They test things on prisoners, then they test things on soldiers, then they test them on cops, then they implement them on us.
[22:35.010 --> 22:35.770]  That's how it always works.
[22:35.870 --> 22:36.950]  Can we use them at the conference?
[22:38.510 --> 22:40.150]  Yeah, maybe we'll do that for Hope attendees.
[22:40.270 --> 22:43.530]  Wasn't there something similar, or is something similar, with taxi drivers in New York?
[22:43.650 --> 22:44.430]  I read about them...
[22:44.430 --> 22:45.830]  Injecting them with Michael Chips?
[22:45.830 --> 22:50.690]  No, not the drivers, but putting GPS units in all the taxi cabs so dispatch can see where everybody is at any time.
[22:50.690 --> 22:53.970]  But that's a vehicle, that's a vehicle, that's not a human, that's...
[22:53.970 --> 22:58.630]  Right, you can get out of your vehicle and leave it, and then be off the radar.
[22:58.790 --> 23:00.710]  You can't leave your colon behind, at least not easily.
[23:01.510 --> 23:03.690]  So, I don't know where they're putting that ship, but...
[23:04.430 --> 23:07.050]  Yeah, okay, well that's kind of scary right there, I guess.
[23:07.490 --> 23:09.530]  All right, well, no cheer out of England.
[23:09.610 --> 23:10.550]  How about Israel, then?
[23:11.610 --> 23:16.030]  Israeli defense officials say they have identified an unlikely new threat to national security.
[23:17.490 --> 23:17.850]  Facebook.
[23:17.910 --> 23:18.650]  Israeli spies.
[23:18.830 --> 23:20.210]  No, no, no, no, no.
[23:21.010 --> 23:21.650]  Facebook.
[23:21.950 --> 23:29.710]  A new list of rules announced Thursday aims to prevent soldiers and defense ministry employees from revealing classified information on social networking sites.
[23:29.930 --> 23:37.090]  The officials say some soldiers have uploaded pictures of themselves with classified equipment, inadvertently releasing sensitive information.
[23:37.310 --> 23:45.170]  The rules allow soldiers to create pages on networking sites as long as they do not identify themselves as soldiers or reveal information about what they do.
[23:45.170 --> 23:46.090]  Wait, wait.
[23:46.490 --> 23:50.390]  Everyone in Israel between the ages of, like, 18 and 21 is a soldier.
[23:50.510 --> 23:52.370]  There's no need to identify or not identify.
[23:53.410 --> 24:00.870]  Well, in any event, the people releasing this information spoke on condition of anonymity themselves because the rules have not yet been officially published.
[24:01.350 --> 24:07.250]  But, you know, for me, that speaks to just the amount of information people give out on Facebook to start with, whether you're in the military or not.
[24:07.390 --> 24:08.670]  It's simply incredible.
[24:08.670 --> 24:14.270]  Don't you think, though, I mean, if you're playing with big weapons that you want to show them off or equipment for that matter?
[24:14.610 --> 24:14.810]  You did.
[24:15.050 --> 24:15.190]  Right.
[24:15.430 --> 24:15.450]  Yeah.
[24:15.730 --> 24:17.410]  Well, now, you were in the Finnish Army.
[24:17.490 --> 24:17.690]  Right.
[24:17.730 --> 24:21.530]  I believe your Facebook profile kept changing to show you shooting various things.
[24:21.690 --> 24:21.830]  Right.
[24:22.150 --> 24:22.590]  So, uh...
[24:22.590 --> 24:27.390]  So, I can understand the mentality of why they would be taking pictures and putting them off.
[24:27.390 --> 24:29.450]  Well, was there any ramifications?
[24:29.550 --> 24:30.790]  Did anybody reprimand you for doing this?
[24:31.250 --> 24:31.770]  Not yet.
[24:31.910 --> 24:32.630]  It's Finland.
[24:32.950 --> 24:33.750]  Well, did they know?
[24:33.910 --> 24:34.390]  Did they care?
[24:35.430 --> 24:37.590]  Well, most of the pictures were taken with a cell phone camera.
[24:37.590 --> 24:38.970]  I don't know how much they knew.
[24:39.170 --> 24:41.230]  I mean, I think sometimes it was obvious.
[24:41.410 --> 24:42.130]  Nobody really said anything.
[24:42.430 --> 24:42.590]  Uh-huh.
[24:43.310 --> 24:43.530]  Yeah.
[24:43.690 --> 24:45.710]  Well, Facebook is something that...
[24:45.710 --> 24:47.350]  Mojo, you have something to say about Facebook, don't you?
[24:47.550 --> 24:48.350]  No, I don't even want to get started.
[24:48.510 --> 24:51.350]  It's interesting to hear everyone talking about Facebook now and not MySpace.
[24:51.710 --> 24:54.530]  It's just everybody just keeps revolving the same thing over and over.
[24:54.650 --> 24:57.210]  Five years ago, a friend said, oh, you got to join Friendster.
[24:57.290 --> 24:58.290]  Friendster's a new cool thing.
[24:58.430 --> 24:59.730]  Then a few years ago, it's MySpace.
[24:59.810 --> 25:00.650]  Everyone has to join MySpace.
[25:00.770 --> 25:01.150]  Join MySpace.
[25:01.310 --> 25:02.270]  And now it's Facebook.
[25:02.410 --> 25:03.810]  Everyone go get a profile on Facebook.
[25:04.010 --> 25:06.610]  It's the same thing over and over.
[25:06.610 --> 25:09.550]  It's just interesting how one site becomes cool and hip.
[25:09.650 --> 25:10.650]  So now everyone's on Facebook.
[25:10.810 --> 25:11.890]  They're all the same thing.
[25:12.010 --> 25:15.170]  I am not going to get a profile on Facebook because now that's hip and popular.
[25:15.270 --> 25:17.230]  When the exact same information is on MySpace.
[25:17.370 --> 25:18.590]  What is it going to be three or four years from now?
[25:18.690 --> 25:19.630]  Weren't you on Friendster?
[25:20.090 --> 25:20.810]  I was on Friendster.
[25:20.830 --> 25:21.910]  What happened to Friendster?
[25:21.950 --> 25:23.890]  Nobody cares anymore because it wasn't cool anymore.
[25:24.170 --> 25:25.030]  MySpace became cool.
[25:25.150 --> 25:26.590]  And now there's the MySpace backlash.
[25:26.770 --> 25:28.190]  So everyone's going over to Facebook if you're cool.
[25:28.290 --> 25:30.750]  What I find amazing is that it doesn't matter what the site is.
[25:30.890 --> 25:34.250]  If I were to randomly go up to someone in the subway and say, What's your favorite color?
[25:34.390 --> 25:35.030]  When were you born?
[25:35.330 --> 25:36.130]  What's your mother's name?
[25:36.610 --> 25:37.590]  I would be stabbed.
[25:37.670 --> 25:38.310]  I'd be shot.
[25:38.710 --> 25:39.050]  That's true.
[25:39.330 --> 25:39.510]  Right.
[25:39.630 --> 25:39.790]  Exactly.
[25:39.890 --> 25:40.650]  You would never tell me.
[25:40.750 --> 25:41.990]  You'd be like, Oh, this creepy man wants...
[25:41.990 --> 25:43.270]  But I'm going to put it on a webpage.
[25:43.530 --> 25:43.850]  Yeah, of course.
[25:43.910 --> 25:44.590]  Everybody can see it.
[25:44.710 --> 25:44.950]  Right.
[25:45.130 --> 25:50.390]  It's amazing the amount of information that people will give away when they're not directly asked for it.
[25:50.450 --> 25:53.190]  And really, it doesn't matter what the site is.
[25:53.470 --> 25:58.430]  Anything where you consolidate all of that information about yourself, you're just making it easier for people to invade your privacy.
[25:58.430 --> 26:00.590]  At least why don't people come up with fake information?
[26:00.810 --> 26:02.010]  Places they didn't go to school.
[26:02.170 --> 26:02.930]  Things they hate.
[26:03.090 --> 26:04.170]  People they're not friends with.
[26:04.270 --> 26:04.830]  That kind of stuff.
[26:04.990 --> 26:06.470]  You know, at least then it would be a little bit of fun.
[26:06.610 --> 26:10.970]  And that the marketers would get all the wrong information and their jobs would become useless.
[26:11.210 --> 26:13.050]  I think we're vastly underestimating this technology.
[26:13.250 --> 26:15.970]  I mean, anything that weakens militaries, I'm all for it.
[26:15.990 --> 26:18.050]  And I think we should stop criticizing it.
[26:18.750 --> 26:19.570]  Well, okay, fine.
[26:19.570 --> 26:21.610]  If it actually accomplishes that.
[26:21.710 --> 26:24.310]  But it's going to accomplish so much more to our detriment, I think.
[26:25.330 --> 26:30.210]  Okay, on that subject, to our detriment, more about personal information being stolen.
[26:30.470 --> 26:42.030]  An employee of New York Presbyterian Hospital, Weill Cornell Medical Center in Manhattan, Stole information from the records of as many as 40,000 patients, according to a hospital spokeswoman on Friday.
[26:42.210 --> 26:50.010]  The theft, which occurred over the past several years, included patients' names, phone numbers, and Social Security numbers, was discovered during a federal investigation.
[26:50.290 --> 26:52.690]  And the hospital was notified in January.
[26:53.190 --> 26:56.030]  The hospital does not believe that any medical information was stolen.
[26:56.410 --> 27:01.630]  Adding, the spokesperson added that there is no evidence that any stolen information has been used.
[27:02.130 --> 27:05.330]  We obviously deeply regret that this has happened, the spokeswoman said.
[27:06.130 --> 27:08.310]  And they're trying to contact all the patients involved.
[27:08.430 --> 27:10.050]  Yet another instance of this kind of thing happened.
[27:10.050 --> 27:13.590]  Wait, if the information hadn't been used, how would they figure out that it was all coming from one place?
[27:13.650 --> 27:17.910]  I mean, obviously, it had to show up somewhere for the investigators to bring it back to this hospital.
[27:18.150 --> 27:21.570]  Yeah, they never really go into detail as to how they discover that kind of thing in the first place.
[27:21.750 --> 27:23.310]  I mean, somebody was selling it somewhere.
[27:23.430 --> 27:25.210]  I'm sure that's how it came up in the first place.
[27:25.250 --> 27:26.850]  And then it gets traced back to the hospital.
[27:36.830 --> 27:41.730]  Because in the United States, we actually have privacy protections for medical data, and we don't for any other sort of data.
[27:41.770 --> 27:44.250]  But in terms of actually being sold on the black market, what value...
[27:44.250 --> 27:44.950]  Because it's illegal.
[27:44.950 --> 27:47.870]  There's a law called HIPAA that makes it illegal to sell medical data.
[27:47.910 --> 27:51.990]  And there's not a law that makes it illegal to sell people's names, addresses, and social security numbers.
[27:52.170 --> 27:54.850]  And yet the medical data, I mean, it has less value overall.
[27:54.870 --> 27:55.850]  Right, that's what I'm trying to say.
[27:55.990 --> 27:59.510]  But there's a law preventing medical data from being...
[27:59.510 --> 28:02.530]  What this story just reminds me of is what we're always seeing.
[28:02.530 --> 28:07.630]  And no matter how technology marches on or doesn't march on, the crimes are always committed by people.
[28:07.670 --> 28:09.310]  But now people like to blame technology.
[28:09.410 --> 28:11.350]  They blame Facebook or MySpace for these problems.
[28:11.490 --> 28:13.230]  It's the people who are posting this.
[28:13.310 --> 28:14.670]  The people who are stealing the information.
[28:14.790 --> 28:18.290]  But now people like to try and blame the technology or blame the website for it.
[28:18.390 --> 28:19.570]  And it's always going to be the same.
[28:19.690 --> 28:21.190]  It's always going to be the people committing the crimes.
[28:21.190 --> 28:22.190]  It's not the technology.
[28:22.370 --> 28:23.770]  It is the people committing the crimes.
[28:23.910 --> 28:28.290]  But, I mean, nowadays, it's just a lot easier to steal 40,000 records than walk out with 40,000 folders.
[28:28.510 --> 28:29.530]  Yeah, that's true.
[28:29.870 --> 28:31.890]  A lot easier on you physically as well.
[28:32.530 --> 28:43.110]  Okay, speaking of criminals, four Bulgarians are accused of rigging bank ATMs to capture users' account numbers and pins and steal $2 million in cash and clothes.
[28:43.170 --> 28:44.650]  Now, why is this significant?
[28:44.790 --> 28:55.890]  Because the reports that are reporting this particular story say that they were found when they, I guess, searched their apartment.
[28:57.750 --> 29:03.010]  They found copies of 2600, the hacker quarterly, among other things.
[29:03.310 --> 29:11.270]  And I guess this is secrets of a back alley ID man and various other suspicious sounding titles.
[29:12.230 --> 29:13.030]  So, yeah.
[29:13.270 --> 29:14.290]  Is this our audience?
[29:14.610 --> 29:16.030]  Any press is good press?
[29:16.250 --> 29:18.470]  Isn't that the old Hollywood line?
[29:18.510 --> 29:19.370]  That's how we found it.
[29:19.470 --> 29:20.130]  It showed up.
[29:20.230 --> 29:22.090]  You know, hey, we got mentioned in this news story.
[29:22.610 --> 29:25.710]  Not exactly the kind of news story we want to be mentioned in, but...
[29:25.710 --> 29:26.890]  We're available in Bulgaria?
[29:27.690 --> 29:30.530]  Well, I... well, send to Bulgaria if somebody wants to subscribe to us.
[29:30.570 --> 29:33.390]  But I don't think we printed any articles on how to steal from ATMs.
[29:34.170 --> 29:34.690]  I mean...
[29:34.690 --> 29:35.510]  None that I ever read.
[29:35.610 --> 29:40.610]  If there was a technical way of doing it, we would print an article like that because we believe the information should be out there.
[29:40.650 --> 29:43.770]  I know recently you printed articles about ATMs but not stealing.
[29:43.990 --> 29:45.250]  No, we've mentioned ATMs.
[29:45.590 --> 29:51.870]  For most people, or the media certainly, that would mean that we're, you know, we're supporting theft and all sorts of other things like that.
[29:52.010 --> 29:53.410]  I mean, the information is out there.
[29:53.410 --> 29:56.370]  I actually saw, when I was in Finland, I was watching TV.
[29:56.430 --> 30:01.710]  There's a BBC show called The Real Hustle where they show how these cons are pulled.
[30:01.810 --> 30:03.390]  So they basically teach you how to pull cons.
[30:03.510 --> 30:03.690]  Nice.
[30:03.690 --> 30:07.710]  But one of the things that they did go over was how to, you know, use ATM skimmers and, like, cameras.
[30:08.330 --> 30:12.130]  It's to... the idea is to protect you so you know what the cons are.
[30:12.630 --> 30:15.150]  But at the same time, it is, you know, it puts the information out there.
[30:15.230 --> 30:17.410]  See, we put the information out there to put the information out there.
[30:17.410 --> 30:21.490]  No intent whatsoever to either commit the crimes or prevent the crimes.
[30:21.650 --> 30:22.070]  It's information.
[30:22.070 --> 30:23.510]  It deserves to be spread around.
[30:23.650 --> 30:38.470]  Well, the information is definitely out there because a few months ago, a technical manual for one of the major ATMs that we see around in the city was released, which gave exact instructions on how to answer the administrative passwords and take all the money out.
[30:38.670 --> 30:39.110]  Wow.
[30:39.110 --> 30:41.430]  So I'm not surprised that people are starting to get caught for this.
[30:42.010 --> 30:47.630]  Well, this was using just ATM skimmers and cameras to catch the card information and then the pin.
[30:47.730 --> 30:49.750]  Now, an ATM skimmer is something you just attach to the ATM.
[30:49.870 --> 30:55.410]  Yeah, well, you can... you put basically something over the card slot that looks like it should be there.
[30:55.490 --> 30:56.850]  You know, it just sticks out a little more.
[30:56.970 --> 30:57.150]  Right.
[30:57.490 --> 30:58.550]  It's a small circuit.
[30:58.750 --> 30:59.190]  Reads your card.
[30:59.270 --> 31:00.930]  So when somebody puts the card in, it reads the card.
[31:01.050 --> 31:07.330]  And then if you have a camera set up above the pin pad somewhere, some small camera, then you record what the pins are.
[31:07.330 --> 31:13.050]  So now you have the card, you can make a copy onto any mag stripe, and then go to any ATM, and you have the pin also.
[31:13.450 --> 31:13.850]  Right.
[31:13.850 --> 31:15.670]  It's the cutting edge of 1920s thievery.
[31:15.670 --> 31:15.930]  Exactly.
[31:15.990 --> 31:16.970]  I mean, it's very old school.
[31:17.130 --> 31:17.950]  Now we're at fault.
[31:18.030 --> 31:19.110]  Now everyone's going to blame this shit.
[31:19.110 --> 31:19.590]  Oh, I know.
[31:21.130 --> 31:22.530]  It wouldn't be the first time.
[31:23.650 --> 31:24.050]  Okay.
[31:24.430 --> 31:24.830]  Media.
[31:25.050 --> 31:26.370]  Media is kind of fun.
[31:26.910 --> 31:30.850]  CNN was targeted on Thursday by attempts to interrupt its news website.
[31:30.950 --> 31:32.390]  This is according to CNN, by the way.
[31:32.970 --> 31:38.110]  Resulting in countermeasures that caused the bombing of a house in suburban...
[31:38.110 --> 31:39.830]  No, but they will one day.
[31:39.970 --> 31:41.410]  One day they'll be able to defend themselves that way.
[31:42.070 --> 31:46.910]  Caused the services to be slow or unavailable to some users in limited areas of Asia.
[31:48.150 --> 31:48.950]  Yes, that's true.
[31:49.370 --> 31:50.510]  So you might not have noticed it yourself.
[31:50.670 --> 31:55.130]  CNN took preventative measures to filter traffic in response to attempts to disrupt our website.
[31:55.330 --> 31:58.810]  A small percentage of CNN.com users in Asia are impacted.
[31:59.150 --> 32:02.850]  We do not know who is responsible, nor can we confirm where it came from.
[32:03.550 --> 32:07.970]  You know, could you please stop going into such detail and just give us the overview here?
[32:08.130 --> 32:08.570]  I mean...
[32:08.570 --> 32:11.390]  This is such a, like, a Proud-ish type of news story.
[32:11.390 --> 32:17.610]  Just saying something so vague that, yeah, it was the target of some kind of disruption and we had to limit service.
[32:17.630 --> 32:18.630]  And that's all we can tell you.
[32:18.710 --> 32:24.630]  I'm sure there were scads of Asians that were broken up inside because they couldn't see Anderson Cooper's brand new pictures on CNN.
[32:24.810 --> 32:31.790]  Well, I can tell you, angry Chinese bloggers have, I guess, the worst group to ever come up against angry Chinese bloggers.
[32:31.910 --> 32:32.770]  I'm not kidding.
[32:33.410 --> 32:44.690]  Angry Chinese bloggers have accused CNN and several other Western news organizations of being unfair and covering recent pro-independence protests in Tibet, which, as you may know, is controlled by China.
[32:45.090 --> 32:47.250]  So is this the work of the Chinese hacker army?
[32:47.670 --> 32:48.890]  On that secret island?
[32:49.010 --> 32:49.370]  I don't know.
[32:49.510 --> 32:49.910]  It might be.
[32:50.090 --> 32:50.570]  It might be.
[32:51.350 --> 33:04.310]  Anyway, the network released a statement noting that CNN's reputation is based on reporting global news accurately and impartially, while our coverage through the use of words, images, or video always reflects a wide range of opinions and points of view on every story.
[33:04.770 --> 33:16.390]  In a denial of service attack, hackers used automated programs to try to jam a site with bogus requests for service to the point that service is slowed or interrupted for legitimate users.
[33:16.550 --> 33:20.670]  My question is, if it's an automated program, why do you have to be a hacker to run it?
[33:20.890 --> 33:22.030]  You just type a command.
[33:22.230 --> 33:23.190]  Does that make you a hacker?
[33:23.190 --> 33:26.550]  Well, you need to get control of enough machines to run the attack.
[33:26.550 --> 33:27.910]  You can't just have one machine.
[33:28.110 --> 33:29.770]  You wouldn't have enough bandwidth behind it.
[33:29.850 --> 33:33.730]  So generally, they use like a botnet where you'll have 10,000 machines that are...
[33:33.730 --> 33:35.370]  Are you saying skills involved?
[33:35.530 --> 33:35.690]  Right.
[33:35.690 --> 33:37.730]  But even my grandmother can own a botnet now.
[33:38.310 --> 33:39.510]  You can buy and sell them.
[33:39.510 --> 33:40.350]  I want to meet your grandmother.
[33:41.230 --> 33:43.250]  You can buy and sell them on the black market.
[33:43.350 --> 33:47.230]  But I mean, you need to have some knowledge of what's going on.
[33:47.230 --> 33:49.210]  Did you say you can buy and sell botnets on the black market?
[33:49.210 --> 33:49.890]  You can actually.
[33:50.070 --> 33:51.010]  I want in on this.
[33:51.010 --> 33:55.010]  No, I just want to go to a black market meeting where botnets are being exchanged.
[33:55.010 --> 33:56.250]  I just would like to see that.
[33:56.730 --> 33:58.690]  Can you work that out with your Finnish contacts?
[33:59.550 --> 34:00.130]  All right.
[34:02.010 --> 34:06.210]  Now, here's something that I believe, Redbird, you discovered this yesterday.
[34:06.470 --> 34:07.310]  This is unbelievable.
[34:07.630 --> 34:08.910]  You remember April 1st, what we did?
[34:09.030 --> 34:09.470]  Yeah, yeah.
[34:09.470 --> 34:15.610]  They redirected hope.net to Barack Obama's website and then pretended it got hacked to Hillary Clinton's.
[34:15.930 --> 34:20.730]  Well, apparently that was a preface to what actually happened.
[34:20.850 --> 34:21.810]  Someone really did that.
[34:21.970 --> 34:27.250]  They actually were able to get Barack Obama's website to redirect Hillary Clinton's website.
[34:27.410 --> 34:33.490]  A security weakness in Obama's website was exploited to redirect visitors to Hillary Clinton's website.
[34:33.490 --> 34:42.530]  Visitors who viewed the community blogs section of the site were instead presented with Clinton's website as a result of a cross-site scripting vulnerability.
[34:42.970 --> 34:44.850]  What in God's name did I just say?
[34:45.370 --> 34:46.130]  Does anybody know?
[34:46.130 --> 34:46.570]  Yes.
[34:46.770 --> 35:00.230]  I don't really want to go into all the technical details of a cross-site scripting attack, but it's basically using the trusted generation engine of the site to give you back code or inject code into web pages that other people are viewing.
[35:00.830 --> 35:02.430]  That didn't make it any easier.
[35:02.430 --> 35:03.210]  I know, I know.
[35:03.290 --> 35:04.850]  It's very technically complicated.
[35:04.910 --> 35:05.990]  What would a user have seen?
[35:06.090 --> 35:06.770]  What would a user actually...
[35:06.770 --> 35:09.570]  Is the site actually redirected or just a portion of the site redirected?
[35:09.750 --> 35:12.090]  They could have actually repainted the whole page in the browser.
[35:12.090 --> 35:16.130]  Because once you own the DOM, the document object model, you could pretty much do whatever you want.
[35:16.310 --> 35:19.450]  So I just hope that we didn't inspire that.
[35:20.350 --> 35:23.570]  Well, you know, as long as we inspire education in the end.
[35:23.570 --> 35:24.950]  I don't think anybody was really hurt by this.
[35:25.050 --> 35:25.830]  A lot of people confused.
[35:25.970 --> 35:27.490]  And confusion is one of our goals, usually.
[35:27.650 --> 35:30.190]  In this article, do they refer to the people as hackers?
[35:30.910 --> 35:32.030]  Well, a user named...
[35:32.030 --> 35:32.490]  Or pranksters.
[35:32.630 --> 35:35.470]  A user named Mox, M-O-X, from Liverpool, Illinois.
[35:35.870 --> 35:37.170]  Did you know there was a Liverpool, Illinois?
[35:37.510 --> 35:38.190]  It's in England.
[35:38.570 --> 35:39.870]  And they have the strangest accents.
[35:40.550 --> 35:46.030]  He posted an apparent confession in the community blogs section on the Barack Obama website.
[35:46.030 --> 35:50.530]  The subject of the post was, I am the one who hacked Obama's site.
[35:50.530 --> 35:52.070]  So he's defining it as hacking.
[35:52.310 --> 36:00.350]  He plays down the matter by saying all he did was exploit some poorly written HTML code before suggesting that it was a cross-site scripting vulnerability that had been exploited.
[36:00.470 --> 36:12.970]  By allowing users to enter characters such as the greater than sign and the equals symbol into their blog URLs, JavaScript could be injected into pages in the community blogs section and would be executed by subsequent visitors.
[36:13.210 --> 36:13.330]  Right.
[36:13.430 --> 36:25.370]  The whole cornerstone of cross-site scripting is that the engine that is allowing users to input data into the system isn't doing proper validation to comb out all of the possible attack vectors.
[36:25.970 --> 36:29.770]  And there's actually all kinds of automated ways to discover cross-site scripting attack.
[36:30.010 --> 36:32.050]  There's fuzzing, URL fuzzing.
[36:33.090 --> 36:40.270]  But there are so many ways to prevent that, to sanitize data inputs and stuff these days that it's just, it is unforgivable that this sort of thing still exists.
[36:40.590 --> 36:41.010]  Shameful.
[36:41.010 --> 36:44.410]  Especially after, after the warning of April 1st that we issued them.
[36:44.490 --> 36:45.190]  They didn't even look.
[36:45.430 --> 36:46.270]  They didn't even look.
[36:46.750 --> 36:47.150]  Unreal.
[36:47.370 --> 36:52.870]  For anyone writing any kind of user-driven web page, this should be, I can't believe it.
[36:53.270 --> 36:53.350]  Uh-huh.
[36:53.630 --> 37:00.070]  So maybe, maybe there is no security in Barack Obama's foreign policy if there's no security in his website, like, like we said on April 1st.
[37:00.150 --> 37:03.710]  Maybe we should start referring to these things as what they really are, pranks.
[37:03.970 --> 37:04.070]  Uh-huh.
[37:04.250 --> 37:06.890]  You know, if something like this happened outside of a computer, it would be called a prank.
[37:07.070 --> 37:07.210]  Prank.
[37:07.210 --> 37:08.130]  Now it's hacker, hacker.
[37:08.370 --> 37:10.650]  Maybe we should just start calling things pranks.
[37:10.650 --> 37:10.890]  Prank.
[37:11.010 --> 37:11.330]  Is that a prank?
[37:11.490 --> 37:12.250]  You just make up that word?
[37:13.370 --> 37:13.690]  Prank.
[37:13.870 --> 37:15.710]  All I know is terrorism and good.
[37:15.930 --> 37:18.570]  Well, on April 1st, it would be a prank.
[37:18.570 --> 37:19.730]  He's a man of false dichotomy.
[37:19.890 --> 37:20.090]  The other day, it's a hack.
[37:20.550 --> 37:22.570]  So we just start calling these things pranks.
[37:22.750 --> 37:23.390]  An internet prank.
[37:23.550 --> 37:26.990]  Then maybe it takes away some of the stigmatism of being a hacker.
[37:27.250 --> 37:27.470]  Okay.
[37:27.510 --> 37:29.150]  How about the Bulgarians robbing the ATM?
[37:29.290 --> 37:30.170]  Is that a prank or is that...
[37:30.170 --> 37:31.170]  That's a...
[37:31.170 --> 37:31.870]  That's a crime.
[37:32.030 --> 37:32.290]  It's a crime.
[37:32.630 --> 37:33.270]  It's a terrorist crime.
[37:33.450 --> 37:33.850]  Another word.
[37:33.990 --> 37:34.690]  Okay, so we have a crime.
[37:34.690 --> 37:37.070]  Pretty soon hacker and terrorist are just going to be synonymous.
[37:37.490 --> 37:41.430]  I'd rather interchange prankster with hacker rather than terrorist and hacker.
[37:42.170 --> 37:42.250]  Okay.
[37:42.630 --> 37:44.790]  Well, interesting idea there, Mojo.
[37:44.970 --> 37:46.950]  And let's see if that actually catches on.
[37:47.890 --> 37:55.930]  Lex, you're here to talk about one of the projects that we're going to be running at the Last Hope Conference taking place July 18, 19, and 20.
[37:56.050 --> 37:59.750]  Let me say that we have all kinds of things going on in the planning stages.
[38:00.130 --> 38:04.790]  You may not know it by looking at our website, which hopefully we'll be updating that and getting more information there.
[38:04.850 --> 38:06.770]  But we have all kinds of things going on in the background.
[38:07.390 --> 38:09.570]  So go to www.hope.net.
[38:09.570 --> 38:10.930]  There's information about how to register there.
[38:11.290 --> 38:21.630]  Also, on our forums, www.talk.hope.net, you can ask questions about cheap airfares, places to stay, what's going on at the conference, and somebody will answer you at some point.
[38:21.830 --> 38:22.930]  And it's a great way to meet other people.
[38:24.050 --> 38:24.850]  The Last Hope.
[38:24.950 --> 38:25.690]  The Last Hope.
[38:25.870 --> 38:26.010]  Yes.
[38:26.130 --> 38:26.630]  Last Hope.
[38:26.710 --> 38:27.410]  L-A-S-T.
[38:28.010 --> 38:28.990]  That's what it is.
[38:29.050 --> 38:29.990]  What rock do you live under?
[38:30.110 --> 38:30.190]  Yeah.
[38:30.310 --> 38:32.110]  It's been the Last Hope for months now.
[38:32.270 --> 38:32.310]  Yeah.
[38:33.770 --> 38:35.810]  The word gets out all the way to Los Angeles, too, I think.
[38:35.870 --> 38:37.830]  But we have all kinds of people coming from all over the world.
[38:37.830 --> 38:39.230]  We'll be announcing some speakers pretty soon.
[38:39.510 --> 38:44.650]  But, Lex, there's a project that you're involved in, which is something that we've never done before.
[38:44.730 --> 38:45.690]  You want to tell us what that's all about?
[38:45.850 --> 38:47.510]  Actually, there's two projects that I'm involved in.
[38:47.650 --> 38:49.490]  There's about 50 projects you're involved in.
[38:49.650 --> 38:49.890]  Yes.
[38:50.070 --> 38:51.370]  Let's talk about one for now.
[38:51.370 --> 38:52.310]  I'm infecting hope.
[38:53.830 --> 38:57.770]  The first one that I'm working on is the Knock Knock project, which is...
[38:57.770 --> 39:03.090]  We have our network operations center normally, which people can't just walk into because it's a secure area.
[39:03.230 --> 39:04.850]  Network operations center, NOC.
[39:04.950 --> 39:05.330]  NOC.
[39:05.450 --> 39:05.830]  That's NOC.
[39:05.930 --> 39:12.630]  So what we're going to have this time around is the Knock Knock, which is the not-our-concern network operations center.
[39:12.890 --> 39:18.730]  And we're going to let you lock up a live server connected to a switch in a little cage.
[39:19.530 --> 39:31.390]  So it's basically a code check for live servers, so people can bring in BBS machines, they can bring in their Asterix servers, and plug it into the hope network, which is going to have a giant pipe out to the rest of the internet.
[39:31.590 --> 39:32.390]  Can they bring a botnet?
[39:32.630 --> 39:33.030]  Yes.
[39:33.030 --> 39:35.090]  They can bring an ARP cache poisoning device.
[39:35.350 --> 39:37.510]  Maybe that's where I can see the botnet black market deal.
[39:37.690 --> 39:46.170]  So you can basically bring all sorts of toys to plug into the network, and we're probably going to have to work out a reservation system for that a bit of time.
[39:46.190 --> 39:47.990]  Unless this is infinitely expandable.
[39:47.990 --> 39:54.510]  Yeah, I think this is going to be about a six-foot by five-foot by three-foot cage with three shelves in it.
[39:54.650 --> 40:03.150]  So that's a limited number of servers, and probably we have to raise a little bit of cash to get this done, so we'll probably give priority to people who donate to get the cage.
[40:03.150 --> 40:06.710]  I've never seen anybody so excited over a six-foot by five-foot cage before, but...
[40:06.710 --> 40:07.450]  Well, actually, I have.
[40:07.450 --> 40:07.830]  I just love them.
[40:08.010 --> 40:09.370]  It's going to be so fun.
[40:10.850 --> 40:12.050]  Okay, that's cool.
[40:12.170 --> 40:13.650]  Is there a way people can...
[40:13.650 --> 40:16.570]  Well, we'll probably set that up on hope.net in a couple days.
[40:16.570 --> 40:22.110]  But also, we're doing the Hope Radio Project, which we're calling Radio Statler.
[40:22.450 --> 40:23.510]  Radio Statler.
[40:23.590 --> 40:26.550]  Now, if I'm not mistaken, Statler was the old name for the hotel.
[40:26.790 --> 40:27.050]  Yes.
[40:27.150 --> 40:35.010]  The original Hotel Pennsylvania had a radio room on the top floor, and we're kind of shouting back to the ancient times.
[40:35.010 --> 40:36.870]  They had a radio room for what?
[40:37.030 --> 40:37.790]  For their employees?
[40:38.030 --> 40:40.790]  No, they had a broadcast station on top of the hotel.
[40:41.410 --> 40:42.090]  What station?
[40:42.530 --> 40:43.450]  I'm not sure.
[40:43.670 --> 40:45.790]  We haven't been able to find out much information about that.
[40:45.850 --> 40:47.470]  Maybe some of the listeners can dig around.
[40:47.590 --> 40:53.350]  But I think by the time it was the Hotel Pennsylvania, that room had been retasked, and they weren't broadcasting anymore.
[40:54.190 --> 40:56.490]  So we're going back to the old name.
[40:56.590 --> 40:59.150]  Was this just a studio, or did they have the transmitter there?
[40:59.710 --> 41:00.530]  I'm not sure.
[41:00.850 --> 41:04.670]  We've seen on the blueprints that it says radio room, and it's a pretty big room.
[41:04.670 --> 41:06.350]  I think it's about 10 by 20.
[41:06.570 --> 41:10.190]  So that's not a small radio room.
[41:10.350 --> 41:10.490]  Yeah.
[41:10.530 --> 41:14.510]  In fact, you can see the blueprints for the old hotel on SaveTheHotel.org.
[41:14.650 --> 41:15.430]  And it's incredible.
[41:15.430 --> 41:27.850]  If you look at those blueprints for Hotel Pennsylvania, you'll just see all this detail for all the different floors and various things that no longer exist, you know, a wine cellar and all kinds of weird establishments and secret passageways.
[41:28.290 --> 41:29.030]  It's unreal.
[41:29.150 --> 41:30.590]  It's unreal, the history of that place.
[41:30.690 --> 41:34.190]  And we also linked to that from our wiki, which is wiki.hope.net.
[41:34.330 --> 41:37.970]  And there's a lot of information on there right now, and we're adding more and more.
[41:38.110 --> 41:39.310]  So tell us about Radio Stetler.
[41:39.550 --> 41:41.170]  Radio Stetler is going to be...
[41:41.170 --> 41:48.390]  It's a streaming audio station, and we're going to run three days of around-the-clock content that...
[41:48.390 --> 41:57.330]  Well, we don't have the content yet, and we're actually hoping some of the hackers coming to the conference will be wanting to put on their own shows, because we've got three days to fill.
[41:57.330 --> 42:03.450]  Well, there are a lot of hackers out there doing various internet radio projects, and hopefully they'll all show up and do a bit on the station.
[42:03.570 --> 42:03.870]  Absolutely.
[42:04.070 --> 42:11.710]  So we have a website set up for them to contact us, which is radio.hope.net or radio.thelasthope.org.
[42:12.470 --> 42:16.650]  And you can actually volunteer there to be an engineer for the station.
[42:16.930 --> 42:29.210]  We're looking for experienced broadcasters to come in and help people who have never done a show before and take over kind of a content block and babysit for the people who haven't done it before to help them get rolling.
[42:29.490 --> 42:33.210]  Now, Al here from North Carolina, I believe he is going to be serving as the program director.
[42:33.270 --> 42:33.570]  Absolutely.
[42:33.830 --> 42:33.910]  Is that correct?
[42:34.310 --> 42:35.090]  That's right, sir.
[42:35.230 --> 42:35.550]  That's right.
[42:41.710 --> 42:48.690]  And make sure that the minutes get filled, keep the dead air, and ensure that we're meeting all of our content goals for the station.
[42:49.550 --> 42:51.070]  But we are looking forward to...
[42:51.070 --> 42:53.550]  It's a BYOC radio station, so bring your own content.
[42:53.930 --> 42:55.310]  And make sure you get in touch with us.
[42:55.390 --> 42:57.110]  That's radio.hope.net.
[42:57.410 --> 42:58.330]  So we need your help.
[42:58.450 --> 43:00.110]  Now, you have experience in commercial radio, correct?
[43:00.310 --> 43:02.270]  I do have a slight experience.
[43:02.270 --> 43:03.230]  You know I'm going to bring this up.
[43:03.330 --> 43:04.070]  I know, I know, yeah.
[43:04.070 --> 43:05.410]  We love to talk about commercial radio.
[43:05.410 --> 43:10.070]  But I didn't do so well in commercial radio because I like to say the seven deadly sins.
[43:10.710 --> 43:12.090]  Well, don't say those here.
[43:13.230 --> 43:14.850]  My air gets dumped all the time.
[43:16.650 --> 43:18.470]  That's about as far in that direction as you can go.
[43:18.470 --> 43:18.890]  I know.
[43:19.090 --> 43:21.490]  We're also looking for sponsors for the station.
[43:21.490 --> 43:26.510]  We want to build this rather large isolation booth right in the middle of the conference floor.
[43:26.970 --> 43:28.110]  That sounds scary.
[43:28.350 --> 43:28.850]  Yeah, yeah.
[43:28.990 --> 43:33.730]  But we're looking for promotional sponsors to help us out with funding that.
[43:33.870 --> 43:43.990]  And you can also go to radio.hope.net and find links to a sponsorship page, support page there, that you can sign up with us to promote your products.
[43:44.210 --> 43:44.750]  And we'll...
[43:45.430 --> 43:46.970]  Well, this conference is looking to be...
[43:46.970 --> 43:47.370]  We will share.
[43:47.370 --> 43:48.190]  Really interesting.
[43:48.410 --> 43:50.910]  Every day I read about another project that's being started.
[43:51.430 --> 43:53.690]  And we're going to fill all the space we have.
[43:53.770 --> 43:55.050]  And we have a tremendous amount of space.
[43:55.490 --> 43:55.790]  Yeah.
[43:55.790 --> 43:56.250]  So...
[43:56.250 --> 43:57.970]  I'm interested in the Lego table myself.
[43:58.170 --> 43:58.330]  Oh, wow.
[43:58.330 --> 44:06.070]  Someone has suggested this, that anyone who comes to the conference bring all your old Legos and dump them on this central table where people can build stuff.
[44:06.290 --> 44:06.450]  Yeah.
[44:06.830 --> 44:07.570]  That sounds fun.
[44:07.570 --> 44:14.830]  Every week I'd like to focus on another project that we're working on because there's enough to fill every single week from here until the conference in July.
[44:15.350 --> 44:18.050]  And there's still time for people to get involved in other projects as well.
[44:18.190 --> 44:19.810]  So you can write to us.
[44:20.670 --> 44:22.310]  Actually, there are several things you can do.
[44:22.390 --> 44:24.470]  If you want to be a speaker at the conference, there's still time.
[44:24.990 --> 44:26.110]  Speakers at Hope.net.
[44:26.310 --> 44:28.570]  If you have an idea for a talk or a panel, let us know.
[44:28.990 --> 44:32.090]  If you want to volunteer to help out with the conference, volunteers at Hope.net.
[44:32.250 --> 44:37.730]  And if you want to be a vendor, somebody who sells something, a company, whatever, we have all kinds of space for that as well.
[44:37.950 --> 44:40.330]  Vendors at Hope.net, rather.
[44:40.510 --> 44:56.270]  So also, I just want to point out that if you're a speaker and you feel like the hour or the two hours or the 45 minutes that you're going to get speaking isn't enough time to go into detail about something that you want to talk about, make sure that you submit a show idea to us at the Hope Radio Project because,
[44:56.530 --> 44:57.650]  you know, we've got air to fill.
[44:57.890 --> 45:00.810]  So we're definitely looking for talk-related material.
[45:01.070 --> 45:08.230]  And if you're a speaker and you want to, you know, go into more detail about something that you're presenting on, we'd be more than happy to feature that.
[45:08.710 --> 45:09.030]  Absolutely.
[45:09.250 --> 45:09.450]  Mojo.
[45:09.610 --> 45:13.450]  Now, Radio Statler, are you looking to do everything live or can people bring pre-recorded programs?
[45:13.750 --> 45:16.170]  We're definitely looking for live and pre-recorded content.
[45:16.550 --> 45:17.910]  Our goal is to have it all original.
[45:18.130 --> 45:20.230]  It can be original yet pre-recorded.
[45:20.650 --> 45:21.090]  Right.
[45:21.090 --> 45:29.250]  So if somebody coming from another country wants to do a show with friends of his who aren't coming to the conference, they can record their own show for Radio Statler pre-recorded.
[45:29.450 --> 45:29.770]  Absolutely.
[45:29.950 --> 45:34.690]  In fact, they can send it to us before they even get there and we can queue it up and get it ready and get it into a slot.
[45:35.070 --> 45:35.390]  So...
[45:35.390 --> 45:37.470]  Will you be able to do live remotes during the conference?
[45:37.830 --> 45:38.450]  Oh, boy.
[45:38.590 --> 45:39.170]  I hope so.
[45:39.310 --> 45:40.390]  I hope so.
[45:40.430 --> 45:42.150]  To be on the floor interviewing people during the show.
[45:51.250 --> 45:52.310]  Hackers is a good word.
[45:52.470 --> 45:53.250]  We're not giving it up.
[45:53.470 --> 45:58.990]  Unfortunately, our engineer isn't here right now and he's been working very hard on setting up all of that stuff.
[45:59.230 --> 46:02.270]  But we are looking into remotes from the conference.
[46:02.430 --> 46:07.510]  We're also looking for doing kind of man-on-the-street interviews during the conference, throughout the conference.
[46:08.710 --> 46:11.110]  Hopefully, the odd passerby who's scared of us.
[46:11.110 --> 46:12.290]  Well, at the very least, with cell phones, we could do it.
[46:12.430 --> 46:12.650]  Right.
[46:12.650 --> 46:14.330]  Lex, this is going to be archived, I assume, right?
[46:14.410 --> 46:14.670]  Absolutely.
[46:14.730 --> 46:19.470]  So, what you guys will have is pretty much like a documentary as to what happened that whole weekend.
[46:19.590 --> 46:27.450]  We're going to have a three-hour show, or three-day show, basically, that's all just going to be rolling one over the other.
[46:27.610 --> 46:29.150]  People are going to slide into the book one after the other.
[46:29.150 --> 46:33.890]  I think you should start the day before with the setup and just sort of walk around annoying everybody who's trying to get the thing built.
[46:34.050 --> 46:36.290]  We may do some pre-recorded stuff from the first day.
[46:36.390 --> 46:37.970]  Yeah, that'd be a lot of fun.
[46:38.150 --> 46:41.530]  Now, I should warn people, this is not a replacement for coming to the conference.
[46:41.670 --> 46:41.950]  Absolutely.
[46:42.070 --> 46:42.290]  No.
[46:42.290 --> 46:43.410]  No, don't think of that.
[46:43.550 --> 46:44.470]  This is a whole separate thing.
[46:44.630 --> 46:45.670]  This isn't the talks.
[46:45.830 --> 46:48.090]  This is people running their own shows.
[46:48.270 --> 46:48.450]  So, yeah.
[46:48.750 --> 46:53.950]  More importantly, if you've never been to a con like this before, you just can't experience it.
[46:54.590 --> 47:00.950]  The feeling, the environment, the networking, you just cannot experience that over an internet radio stream.
[47:01.110 --> 47:02.290]  You've just got to come to hope.
[47:02.290 --> 47:04.810]  It's like a year at a good university all in one weekend.
[47:05.230 --> 47:05.630]  Yeah.
[47:05.970 --> 47:08.570]  The one thing that's great about conference is not just the talks.
[47:08.690 --> 47:09.590]  I mean, the talks are great, too.
[47:09.590 --> 47:16.310]  But the best part, I think, is meeting people and just getting to talk to people and see new viewpoints.
[47:16.470 --> 47:16.810]  Yeah.
[47:16.990 --> 47:22.270]  I think many of us may have even met at the conferences or met other people at the conferences we're still in touch with.
[47:22.470 --> 47:26.130]  And ever since 1994, it's just been incredible and historic.
[47:26.710 --> 47:27.870]  So, yeah, be a part of it.
[47:27.970 --> 47:29.370]  www.hope.net.
[47:29.370 --> 47:32.850]  Take place July 18, 19, and 20, New York City, the Hotel Pennsylvania.
[47:33.350 --> 47:34.230]  You can get involved.
[47:34.350 --> 47:34.810]  You can attend.
[47:34.910 --> 47:35.990]  You can do all sorts of things.
[47:36.110 --> 47:37.710]  It'll be a real blast.
[47:37.790 --> 47:38.790]  It'll be a ton of fun.
[47:39.670 --> 47:41.170]  Now, we only have a few minutes left.
[47:41.290 --> 47:43.530]  So, and again, we're not on next week, unfortunately.
[47:44.570 --> 47:50.470]  Mojo, I know you had a question that you wanted to pose to our listeners because you've been wandering around New York City for the past few days.
[47:50.470 --> 47:53.550]  And you've been in search of something that you can't seem to find.
[47:53.770 --> 47:54.210]  You know, there are...
[47:54.210 --> 47:57.250]  I live in Los Angeles now where you have to drive to see things.
[47:57.310 --> 48:04.530]  I've been walking around Manhattan Island for the last week nonstop, and there are so many cellular phone stores, but they're not really...
[48:04.530 --> 48:09.090]  To me, a phone store should be a store jam-packed with all kinds of GSM phones and accessories.
[48:09.350 --> 48:12.570]  They're all like giant stores with a dozen phones, little boutique shops.
[48:12.590 --> 48:13.630]  They don't have anything in them.
[48:13.890 --> 48:14.530]  But I can't...
[48:14.530 --> 48:20.830]  Aside from one store, I think Phone Exchange on Broadway, I have not found any store that's selling all kinds of unlocked GSM goodies.
[48:20.990 --> 48:22.230]  And there's got to be some in Manhattan.
[48:22.430 --> 48:24.550]  So if you know of any, please call and let us know.
[48:24.770 --> 48:26.890]  Well, don't call because I don't think we're going to be taking phone calls.
[48:27.010 --> 48:28.330]  We only have three minutes left.
[48:29.030 --> 48:30.150]  Well, we could try, I guess.
[48:30.270 --> 48:30.870]  Let's see who's out there.
[48:30.950 --> 48:32.550]  212-209-2900.
[48:32.770 --> 48:34.870]  Maybe we can take some phone calls since we're not going to be on next week.
[48:35.010 --> 48:35.910]  A little more than three minutes.
[48:36.870 --> 48:41.510]  But yeah, if people know a place where Mojo can find what he's looking for, I agree with you.
[48:41.550 --> 48:44.850]  There should be a place like that where you can get all kinds of unlocked phones and things like that.
[48:44.910 --> 48:45.270]  The internet.
[48:45.450 --> 48:46.530]  Do you travel internationally a lot?
[48:47.830 --> 48:48.150]  No.
[48:48.150 --> 48:50.490]  Oh, so I was going to say, you probably want something tri-band.
[48:50.670 --> 48:51.090]  Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[48:51.170 --> 48:52.410]  Yeah, very, very sexy.
[48:52.590 --> 48:52.750]  Yeah.
[48:53.290 --> 48:53.610]  Unlocked.
[48:53.890 --> 48:54.210]  Unlocked.
[48:54.250 --> 48:54.410]  Right.
[48:54.710 --> 48:57.350]  Mojo, tell the folks what you do, because it is of interest to our listeners, I think.
[48:57.470 --> 48:58.450]  As little as possible.
[48:58.490 --> 48:59.970]  No, what you do for a living.
[49:00.170 --> 49:01.490]  You work for a very interesting place.
[49:01.490 --> 49:04.630]  I am a visual effects designer on Battlestar Galactica.
[49:05.010 --> 49:06.810]  I almost said Babylon 5, but yeah, Battlestar Galactica.
[49:06.810 --> 49:07.890]  Well, you did Babylon 5, too.
[49:07.890 --> 49:08.490]  I did Babylon 5.
[49:08.490 --> 49:09.410]  You created Zaha Doom.
[49:09.870 --> 49:12.310]  I did, you could say, technically create Zaha Doom.
[49:12.450 --> 49:13.310]  One red ball.
[49:13.470 --> 49:13.990]  I made it.
[49:14.150 --> 49:15.330]  Well, it was a good red ball.
[49:15.330 --> 49:17.170]  It was the best one I've seen on TV in a long time.
[49:17.310 --> 49:17.610]  It was the whole space.
[49:17.730 --> 49:18.810]  Actually, that was the first time.
[49:18.970 --> 49:19.930]  It was purely out of laziness.
[49:20.150 --> 49:23.790]  We wanted to make this area of space that the shadows come from look dangerous.
[49:24.330 --> 49:25.850]  And they said, Mojo, go make a nebula.
[49:26.110 --> 49:27.310]  I can't draw a nebula.
[49:27.610 --> 49:32.090]  I remember at JPL, we're big fans of the show, they used to send us slides of all the latest Hubble imagery.
[49:32.210 --> 49:32.710]  And I said, wait a minute.
[49:32.890 --> 49:34.510]  We have these pictures of real nebulas.
[49:34.610 --> 49:36.270]  So I just scanned it in and stuck it in the background.
[49:36.590 --> 49:36.870]  Wow.
[49:37.110 --> 49:38.350]  That was the first time anyone had done it.
[49:38.390 --> 49:39.870]  Now that's the way everyone does their backgrounds.
[49:39.970 --> 49:41.630]  But I did it purely out of laziness.
[49:42.750 --> 49:47.770]  And is there anything you can tell us about Battlestar Galactica, things that you've done there, maybe a particular shot you're most proud of or anything?
[49:48.190 --> 49:48.530]  Yes.
[49:48.790 --> 49:49.410]  Tell us.
[49:49.790 --> 49:49.950]  Oh.
[49:52.490 --> 49:55.750]  You know, whatever the latest thing I've done is cool.
[49:55.770 --> 49:59.670]  I can't really talk about too much what's coming up because of spoilers for season four.
[49:59.890 --> 50:00.110]  Right.
[50:00.230 --> 50:11.450]  But I think the show we won the Emmy for last year, Exodus Part 2 in The Escape of New Capricorn, is probably certainly the whole sequence where the Pegasus rams the base ship is something I personally did and I'm very, very proud of it.
[50:11.910 --> 50:12.210]  Oh, good.
[50:12.310 --> 50:12.950]  You should be.
[50:13.030 --> 50:14.150]  That was an amazing piece of work.
[50:14.150 --> 50:14.990]  I've ruined my pants.
[50:15.130 --> 50:15.550]  I love watching that.
[50:15.850 --> 50:17.390]  So, thank you so much.
[50:17.530 --> 50:18.250]  And thank you for that.
[50:18.490 --> 50:20.570]  Bernie, you have a question.
[50:20.970 --> 50:23.870]  Yeah, I wanted to ask him, how was it working with Lorne Green?
[50:25.330 --> 50:25.690]  No.
[50:26.510 --> 50:28.190]  Bernie, you got the wrong Battlestar Galactica.
[50:28.270 --> 50:29.470]  That's the one from the 1970s.
[50:30.150 --> 50:31.230]  Oh, I'm sorry.
[50:31.750 --> 50:32.730]  Mojo's not that old.
[50:32.930 --> 50:37.830]  Well, he should know that I am that old and I watched the original show and loved it.
[50:37.830 --> 50:40.570]  If you didn't work with Lorne Green, you were probably like eight years old at the time.
[50:40.570 --> 50:47.870]  I will say here, this is the first time I've said this publicly, that if you really look carefully at some of the visual effects on the show, we do sneak the Daggett into the background.
[50:48.550 --> 50:51.090]  Muffet the Daggett has appeared on the show, but you just have to find him.
[50:51.170 --> 50:52.530]  Now, the Daggett is the dog, right?
[50:52.530 --> 50:55.330]  The Daggett is the robot dog that everyone hates, but you hate to love him.
[50:55.430 --> 50:55.670]  Really?
[50:55.990 --> 50:56.630]  He's in the show.
[50:56.890 --> 50:59.530]  He's in a couple of shots in the background of some of the effects shots.
[50:59.530 --> 51:00.210]  Is he a Cylon?
[51:00.910 --> 51:02.030]  Well, I can't really reveal that.
[51:02.030 --> 51:02.710]  Oh, no, you can't reveal that.
[51:02.710 --> 51:03.710]  What are you talking about?
[51:05.710 --> 51:09.310]  Yes, there's a significant amount of our audience being represented there.
[51:09.810 --> 51:10.730]  Okay, let's take some phone calls.
[51:10.810 --> 51:12.250]  212-209-2900.
[51:12.450 --> 51:13.410]  Let's jump over here.
[51:14.010 --> 51:14.710]  And good evening.
[51:14.730 --> 51:15.690]  You're on Off the Hook.
[51:15.930 --> 51:16.590]  Hi there.
[51:16.990 --> 51:26.270]  A couple of months ago, I had called regarding getting charged for each time I'm timed out on the network after 20 rings, so when I try to call WBAI.
[51:26.270 --> 51:30.790]  Well, I finally got tired of it, and I filed a complaint with the Public Service Commission.
[51:30.790 --> 51:31.230]  Oh, boy.
[51:31.510 --> 51:43.430]  And the Public Service Commission seems to agree with me, but Verizon is claiming that as soon as you dial the last digit, that they have a right to charge you, that you don't have to get an answer.
[51:43.610 --> 51:52.010]  So if you call up a phone number and the person isn't there to answer, and you get timed out, you've been charged the basic rate.
[51:52.770 --> 51:55.270]  Well, Sprint has been doing this for years.
[51:55.270 --> 52:03.590]  Just basically, when you make the call, they start charging you, and if they write that into the contract, they can charge you if you look at your phone, you know, if you agree to it.
[52:03.830 --> 52:05.110]  Well, I never did.
[52:05.110 --> 52:10.410]  I've had my account ever since it was common that, you know, what used to be called supervision in the good old days.
[52:10.470 --> 52:10.750]  Right.
[52:10.950 --> 52:19.850]  So the Public Service Commission says that they've never actually, that they can't find that they've allowed this, and so it's a PSE complaint now.
[52:20.070 --> 52:20.450]  All right.
[52:20.530 --> 52:20.930]  See what happens.
[52:21.010 --> 52:21.390]  Good work.
[52:21.550 --> 52:22.990]  Thanks for letting us know about that.
[52:22.990 --> 52:24.350]  Let's take a...
[52:24.850 --> 52:25.290]  Verizon?
[52:26.910 --> 52:27.850]  That just hit me.
[52:28.030 --> 52:28.910]  Verizon is what...
[52:28.910 --> 52:29.030]  Okay.
[52:30.450 --> 52:32.230]  212-209-2900.
[52:32.230 --> 52:33.150]  That's our phone number.
[52:33.570 --> 52:34.350]  And good evening.
[52:34.550 --> 52:35.230]  You're on Off the Hook.
[52:36.030 --> 52:36.470]  Hi.
[52:36.570 --> 52:37.190]  Great show tonight.
[52:37.370 --> 52:37.650]  Thank you.
[52:38.930 --> 52:47.570]  When you're talking about crimes and what they can check, theoretically, is there a main objective to get rid of all paper money?
[52:47.930 --> 52:53.790]  Because if everything was electronically done, you wouldn't be able to hide anything.
[52:53.950 --> 52:55.370]  This was the thing about Spitzer.
[52:55.610 --> 53:01.090]  Did they get him because he was an enemy and he was, you know, doing money transfers?
[53:01.970 --> 53:04.450]  And also, doesn't that come under identity theft?
[53:04.450 --> 53:11.050]  If he gets a hotel room under a different name, I mean, this is a stretch of the law, but was that ever mentioned?
[53:11.510 --> 53:13.850]  Is identity theft only for a...
[53:13.850 --> 53:16.490]  Is that a criminal use or is that just...
[53:16.490 --> 53:24.770]  Is there a law that says, well, if you're doing something like that, it's not so bad if both people are compliant, but yet it's still against the law, even if both people are compliant.
[53:24.770 --> 53:25.490]  Well, let's...
[53:25.490 --> 53:27.490]  We'll pass this around to the panel.
[53:27.650 --> 53:28.530]  Thanks for calling.
[53:28.650 --> 53:30.210]  I think, Red Hack, you have a response for this.
[53:30.710 --> 53:32.890]  You just seem very enthusiastic about saying something.
[53:33.770 --> 53:34.650]  Well, I don't know.
[53:34.930 --> 53:36.830]  That question was sort of all over the place, wasn't it?
[53:38.290 --> 53:39.070]  But, Mike, no?
[53:39.770 --> 53:41.570]  Everyone seems very cheerful all of a sudden.
[53:42.650 --> 53:45.350]  It's unclear whether it's identity theft or not.
[53:45.470 --> 53:48.430]  Probably if it was, they would have charged him by now, so it must not be.
[53:48.650 --> 53:48.870]  Wait.
[53:49.090 --> 53:50.950]  My counselor just advised me not to answer.
[53:51.190 --> 53:51.590]  All right.
[53:51.790 --> 53:52.150]  Spitzer.
[53:52.330 --> 53:53.130]  Spitzer, that's who.
[53:53.330 --> 53:53.690]  Spitzer?
[53:54.390 --> 53:55.950]  The question was about Spitzer.
[53:56.090 --> 53:57.830]  Yeah, but he was the one conducting identity theft.
[53:57.830 --> 53:59.090]  That was the claim of the caller.
[53:59.190 --> 53:59.530]  All right.
[53:59.990 --> 54:00.350]  Yeah, all right.
[54:00.390 --> 54:01.050]  Let's move on.
[54:01.610 --> 54:02.230]  Good evening.
[54:02.510 --> 54:03.270]  You're on Off the Hook.
[54:03.730 --> 54:04.690]  Hey, how you doing?
[54:04.770 --> 54:06.110]  Let me just turn down my radio.
[54:06.150 --> 54:06.550]  Yes, please.
[54:07.790 --> 54:09.110]  Your neighbors will complain otherwise.
[54:09.330 --> 54:20.910]  First of all, I'm going to just tell you, I've heard that there's a radio event that's going to be happening in June at the Ambrose Light Tower ship that's going to be harbored at South Street Seaport.
[54:20.910 --> 54:23.010]  I think it's the first Saturday in June.
[54:23.010 --> 54:31.770]  And they're going to be having the radio room open for people to see, and radio operators are going to be operating it.
[54:31.890 --> 54:34.110]  And so I guess if you look at the...
[54:34.110 --> 54:39.810]  If people look at the website for the Kings County Radio...
[54:40.490 --> 54:46.610]  Sorry, Kings County Repeater Association, they can look that up on the web and find out information.
[54:46.610 --> 54:49.530]  But, Emmanuel, I have a quick question for you.
[54:49.930 --> 54:59.030]  And that is, when you were in China, you had that incident that happened where you were on the radio, and then there was a knock at your door.
[54:59.230 --> 54:59.370]  Knock at the door.
[54:59.470 --> 54:59.990]  Yeah, you know...
[54:59.990 --> 55:01.830]  And you never told, what happened?
[55:01.930 --> 55:04.730]  Was it really the police, or what happened?
[55:04.770 --> 55:09.010]  It's just, you know, I Googled something, you know, it's very painful to talk about.
[55:09.090 --> 55:09.790]  Let's just move on.
[55:10.570 --> 55:16.110]  I Googled something, there was a knock on the door, and then I stopped Googling, and we're all friends now.
[55:16.810 --> 55:17.970]  Let's not talk about Tibet.
[55:17.970 --> 55:19.150]  You talked about it during the show.
[55:19.190 --> 55:20.650]  I don't understand why people didn't hear it.
[55:20.730 --> 55:22.010]  Yeah, let's listen to the show.
[55:22.530 --> 55:23.910]  Let's not drag this out forever.
[55:24.690 --> 55:25.850]  And let's get through the Olympics.
[55:25.850 --> 55:26.490]  It's like the archives, people.
[55:26.610 --> 55:27.970]  Let's get through the Olympics without starting a war.
[55:29.470 --> 55:33.190]  Okay, we're out of time, it seems, and unfortunately, we're not on next week.
[55:33.650 --> 55:42.010]  Again, Report to the Listener is on next week, so if you have something to say about us not being on all the time, that might be the place to air it, but say whatever is on your mind.
[55:42.090 --> 55:43.230]  That's what the program is for.
[55:43.350 --> 55:44.010]  That's what the station is for.
[55:44.070 --> 55:45.310]  Now, Mojo, I think you have one more thing you want to hear.
[55:45.330 --> 55:51.190]  If anyone out there does know where I can find GSM Goodies in Manhattan, I don't want to give out my email, but you can...
[55:51.190 --> 55:54.270]  No, our email, OTH at 2600.com, and we will let you know.
[55:54.410 --> 55:54.530]  Oh, great.
[55:54.610 --> 55:54.870]  Sounds good.
[55:55.010 --> 55:57.010]  OTH at 2600.com, that's how you reach off the hook.
[55:57.010 --> 56:00.790]  We're usually on every Wednesday night from 7 to 8 o'clock here on WBAI.
[56:01.530 --> 56:04.850]  Stay tuned for the personal computer show coming up next.
[56:05.430 --> 56:13.310]  We'll be back in two weeks with all sorts of fun things, and we'll see you at the 2600 meetings on May 2nd.
[56:13.930 --> 56:14.250]  All right.
[56:14.530 --> 56:15.090]  Have a good night.
[56:17.850 --> 56:20.490]  Have you heard the latest news?
[56:20.630 --> 56:23.790]  Don't you know you will never win?
[56:24.170 --> 56:30.050]  You got your family running around trying to stop you from going down.
[56:30.130 --> 56:33.870]  It's you that I'm talking to.
[56:35.710 --> 56:40.010]  It's you that I'm talking to.
[56:42.570 --> 56:45.330]  How do you prove the latest news?
[56:45.610 --> 56:48.430]  About the boy who was shot and abused?
[56:48.930 --> 56:51.510]  The funny thing is, that's not all.
[56:51.930 --> 56:54.690]  It was your name that was called...
[56:54.690 --> 56:58.310]  It's you that I'm talking to.
[57:00.370 --> 57:04.430]  It's you that I'm talking to.
[57:06.970 --> 57:10.110]  Now you're cute of being a good man.
[57:10.530 --> 57:12.910]  Take your punch with just a lot of the band.
[57:13.610 --> 57:16.510]  Now let this be a lesson to you.
[57:16.850 --> 57:19.190]  Rootie, I'm talking to you.
[57:19.370 --> 57:22.990]  It's you that I'm talking to.
[57:25.030 --> 57:29.130]  It's you that I'm talking to.
[58:01.460 --> 58:06.180]  Yes, it's you that I'm talking to.
[58:08.080 --> 58:12.320]  It's you that I'm talking to.
[58:13.280 --> 58:14.400]  Pick it up, pick it up.
[58:14.400 --> 58:17.680]  You're going around causing disturbances.
[58:18.220 --> 58:20.700]  Now did you know you could never win?
[58:20.860 --> 58:21.480]  But I tried.
[58:21.660 --> 58:23.740]  You had your family, they were running around.
[58:24.040 --> 58:26.840]  Trying to stop you from going down.
[58:26.940 --> 58:30.680]  It's you that I'm talking to.
[58:32.740 --> 58:36.800]  It's you that I'm talking to.
[58:38.220 --> 58:42.980]  Yes, it's you that I'm talking to.
[58:50.120 --> 58:55.180]  Yes, it's you that I'm talking to.
[58:57.480 --> 59:01.380]  It's you that I'm talking to.
[59:08.940 --> 59:09.640]  Aha!
[59:10.020 --> 59:13.700]  Man, oh man, I love the music they play on Off The Hook.
[59:13.700 --> 59:13.800]  Okay.
[59:13.960 --> 59:14.160]  Okay.