[00:32.990 --> 00:35.010]  And you're listening to Radio Station WBAI New York.
[00:35.150 --> 00:38.810]  The time is 7 o'clock on a Wednesday night time for Off the Hook.
[00:43.940 --> 00:45.940]  The telephone keeps ringing.
[00:46.200 --> 00:48.480]  So I ripped it off the wall.
[00:49.380 --> 00:51.480]  I cut myself while shaving.
[00:52.060 --> 00:53.960]  Now I can't make a call.
[00:54.680 --> 00:56.820]  We couldn't get much worse.
[00:59.600 --> 01:02.260]  Bum-diddly-bum for the best expect the worst.
[01:02.840 --> 01:04.760]  I hope that's understood.
[01:04.980 --> 01:05.760]  Bum-diddly-bum!
[02:01.660 --> 02:02.480]  And good evening to everybody.
[02:02.600 --> 02:03.680]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:03.780 --> 02:05.940]  Emmanuel Gultzkin here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:07.120 --> 02:08.840]  Joined tonight by Dotret.
[02:09.140 --> 02:09.500]  Hello.
[02:09.700 --> 02:10.060]  Redhack.
[02:10.300 --> 02:10.560]  Hello.
[02:10.740 --> 02:11.040]  Rob T.
[02:11.220 --> 02:11.580]  Firefly.
[02:11.800 --> 02:12.100]  Good evening.
[02:12.320 --> 02:12.580]  Mike.
[02:13.060 --> 02:13.260]  Hi.
[02:13.380 --> 02:14.240]  Bernie down in Philadelphia.
[02:14.900 --> 02:15.920]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:16.680 --> 02:18.520]  And it looks like Mitch Altman on the other side of the room.
[02:18.760 --> 02:19.120]  Hello.
[02:19.540 --> 02:20.420]  And Fred from Montreal.
[02:20.700 --> 02:20.940]  Hey.
[02:21.120 --> 02:21.460]  How you doing?
[02:21.680 --> 02:21.860]  Good.
[02:22.280 --> 02:24.760]  Well, we got to... leave anybody out there.
[02:24.760 --> 02:25.500]  There's a lot of people here tonight.
[02:25.680 --> 02:26.520]  I think I got everybody.
[02:26.860 --> 02:27.220]  Okay, good.
[02:27.220 --> 02:27.220]  Good.
[02:27.680 --> 02:30.580]  Well, anything exciting going on in the world of hacking?
[02:30.720 --> 02:33.840]  We have some new reports that just came out that are kind of disturbing.
[02:34.320 --> 02:38.180]  Do you know the hackers grabbed more than 285 million records in 2008?
[02:38.840 --> 02:40.200]  I don't mean the vinyl kind.
[02:40.200 --> 02:42.440]  I don't mean compact discs or anything like that.
[02:42.500 --> 02:49.900]  They made off with at least 285 million electronic records, more than in the four previous years combined.
[02:50.280 --> 02:51.640]  What are these people up to?
[02:51.640 --> 02:51.820]  That's it.
[02:52.040 --> 02:53.120]  That's really not a lot.
[02:53.200 --> 02:54.340]  Well, they made off with them.
[02:54.460 --> 02:56.100]  Considering a record can be almost nothing.
[02:57.220 --> 02:57.880]  Well, I don't know.
[02:58.060 --> 02:58.700]  That's one thing.
[02:58.800 --> 03:02.520]  And you have to think, from another case, you can also find these things on Google, right?
[03:02.540 --> 03:06.380]  If you do the right Google search, anybody can find, like, things that are just sitting on the internet.
[03:06.580 --> 03:08.940]  So does that count as making away with records?
[03:09.060 --> 03:15.520]  I mean, if a company comes out and says, oh, whoops, we accidentally left, you know, all of your records sitting on this public share.
[03:15.520 --> 03:19.240]  And then we noticed that it was in, you know, in a Google search.
[03:19.620 --> 03:21.540]  Does that count as people making away with the records?
[03:21.560 --> 03:22.200]  Apparently it does.
[03:22.380 --> 03:24.700]  Because, and they're saying this has something to do with identity thieves.
[03:24.800 --> 03:30.020]  Identity thieves are getting better at exploiting careless mistakes that leave companies vulnerable to attack.
[03:30.220 --> 03:32.680]  But I just love the way that it's hackers doing this.
[03:32.920 --> 03:34.400]  Nobody else could possibly be doing this.
[03:34.400 --> 03:36.400]  No victims are identified in the report.
[03:36.860 --> 03:38.660]  Many of the breaches aren't even public.
[03:38.740 --> 03:48.280]  And that can happen if law enforcement insists on secrecy because of an ongoing criminal investigation or if personally identifiable information wasn't lost in the hack.
[03:49.100 --> 03:49.580]  Oh, yeah.
[03:49.800 --> 03:55.020]  And many breaches, especially involving loss of stolen laptops, the records aren't used for anything at all.
[03:56.340 --> 03:56.860]  Yeah.
[03:57.020 --> 03:59.700]  So this story comes from the Associated Press.
[04:00.120 --> 04:00.620]  And yes.
[04:00.760 --> 04:04.020]  You know, it's interesting because you really don't hear about these things when they happen.
[04:04.400 --> 04:08.260]  I had a credit card where I got a new card in the mail.
[04:09.360 --> 04:11.720]  Actually, they didn't send me a notification.
[04:11.920 --> 04:19.520]  The first piece of mail I got regarding the fact that supposedly some vendor's database has been compromised and my credit card had been in it was when I got a new credit card.
[04:20.860 --> 04:21.260]  Rob?
[04:21.540 --> 04:25.040]  What exactly constitutes a record in this case?
[04:25.180 --> 04:25.700]  That's a good question.
[04:25.700 --> 04:29.140]  Are they counting like a phone number off some White Pages site or your address off of Google?
[04:29.700 --> 04:31.180]  I think it's more than that.
[04:31.320 --> 04:32.300]  Social security number?
[04:32.400 --> 04:33.120]  It's got to be, yeah.
[04:33.120 --> 04:33.140]  Yeah.
[04:33.420 --> 04:35.080]  It's got to have a few components to it.
[04:35.100 --> 04:37.360]  Name, address, SSN maybe.
[04:37.760 --> 04:40.680]  But they're kind of vague as far as what they consider to be a record.
[04:40.760 --> 04:41.900]  But 285 million.
[04:42.100 --> 04:42.260]  Wow.
[04:42.340 --> 04:44.340]  That's almost the entire population of the United States.
[04:44.920 --> 04:45.320]  Yeah.
[04:45.420 --> 04:45.860]  Think about it.
[04:45.940 --> 04:47.540]  We've all had our identities stolen by hackers.
[04:47.880 --> 04:48.420]  Several times over.
[04:48.580 --> 04:55.060]  But there's so many records about me that if they only got one or an average of less than one, then I'm doing pretty okay.
[04:55.280 --> 04:56.140]  I guess so.
[04:56.440 --> 04:58.840]  How many records do we have for each of us?
[04:59.020 --> 04:59.600]  Good question.
[04:59.880 --> 05:01.640]  Probably 285 million almost.
[05:01.800 --> 05:03.640]  I want to get back to what we can find on Google in a second.
[05:03.680 --> 05:06.340]  But first, let's blame hackers for some more things.
[05:07.240 --> 05:13.320]  This story, which ran on CNN, is entitled, Hackers Stole Data on Pentagon's Newest Fighter Jet.
[05:15.420 --> 05:18.840]  And none of us brought that information in with us tonight, did they?
[05:19.040 --> 05:19.220]  Okay.
[05:19.340 --> 05:20.920]  So we're going to have to wait for somebody to send it to us.
[05:21.060 --> 05:23.600]  I mean, a fighter does probably hundreds of millions of records alone.
[05:23.800 --> 05:24.160]  Yeah.
[05:24.340 --> 05:25.020]  But that's not a person.
[05:25.700 --> 05:27.280]  Thousands of confidential files in the U.S.
[05:27.380 --> 05:33.980]  military's most technologically advanced fighter aircraft have been compromised by unknown computer hackers over the past two years.
[05:33.980 --> 05:36.100]  That's according to senior defense officials.
[05:36.600 --> 05:49.540]  The internet intruders were able to gain access to data related to the design and electronic systems of the Joint Strike Fighter through computers of Pentagon contractors in charge of designing and building the aircraft.
[05:49.760 --> 05:54.380]  And that's according to the officials who did not want to be identified because their identities have been stolen.
[05:54.960 --> 05:57.580]  No, because of the sensitivity of the issue.
[05:57.720 --> 05:59.280]  But it could very well be that, too.
[05:59.400 --> 06:00.200]  You know, they might be afraid.
[06:00.920 --> 06:07.820]  So anyway, the Joint Strike Fighter, they call it Joint Strike Fighter in one place and Joint Striker Fighter in another.
[06:07.900 --> 06:08.500]  I don't know which it is.
[06:09.020 --> 06:11.580]  It's the military's new F-35 Lightning II.
[06:12.160 --> 06:13.000]  We know about this?
[06:13.720 --> 06:17.780]  Rob, you were able to identify an old airplane on the mailing list.
[06:18.000 --> 06:19.140]  How did you do that exactly?
[06:19.300 --> 06:22.740]  Somebody sent us a picture of an airplane that appeared to say 2600 on it.
[06:22.880 --> 06:25.420]  Yeah, that appeared to be an airplane that said 2600.
[06:25.560 --> 06:26.540]  But it was really the...
[06:26.540 --> 06:28.160]  I think it's the SAM 26000.
[06:28.320 --> 06:32.060]  And I only knew what it was because it's one of the planes that used to be used as Air Force One.
[06:32.220 --> 06:37.480]  And I had just been looking at Air Force One stuff because of what recently happened in lower Manhattan.
[06:37.480 --> 06:38.560]  Yeah, that was fun, wasn't it?
[06:38.640 --> 06:39.420]  Yeah, that was a lot of fun.
[06:39.480 --> 06:40.500]  Got buzzed by the government.
[06:41.000 --> 06:41.800]  Oh, that was something.
[06:42.140 --> 06:43.840]  So you don't know anything about the Joint Strike Fighter?
[06:44.020 --> 06:44.780]  Not off the top of my head.
[06:44.880 --> 06:45.100]  Okay.
[06:45.300 --> 06:45.600]  All right.
[06:46.100 --> 06:47.240]  Well then, the U.S.
[06:47.340 --> 06:48.980]  government doesn't talk a whole lot about this.
[06:49.200 --> 06:51.860]  And neither do we, said Bruce Tanner of Lockheed Martin.
[06:52.040 --> 06:56.080]  But in response to the Wall Street Journal report, we think it's incorrect.
[06:56.080 --> 06:57.920]  There's never been any effective attack.
[06:57.920 --> 06:59.020]  We have measures in place.
[06:59.120 --> 07:00.720]  And there's never been a successful attack.
[07:00.980 --> 07:04.000]  Of course, if you didn't know about it, I guess you wouldn't know that there was an attack at all.
[07:05.480 --> 07:07.740]  They say there's never been any classified information breached.
[07:07.840 --> 07:12.700]  Like the government, we have attacks on our systems continually and have stringent measures in place to detect and stop attacks.
[07:13.280 --> 07:14.500]  So, with that, Red?
[07:14.500 --> 07:20.460]  This seems like, basically, you know, the concept of a chain being as strong as its weakest link.
[07:21.160 --> 07:25.380]  They're not necessarily breaking into the Pentagon, but instead computers have contractors.
[07:26.580 --> 07:27.020]  So...
[07:27.020 --> 07:29.160]  And they might have sensitive information relating to this.
[07:29.160 --> 07:29.580]  Exactly.
[07:29.620 --> 07:35.920]  It seems like what we need to do is the government should actually care more about the security procedures of who they contract.
[07:35.920 --> 07:40.500]  So, what exactly do you get from having a fighter jet design plan?
[07:40.600 --> 07:45.000]  Is there, like, one weak spot that if you shoot there, it's going to just fall apart?
[07:45.220 --> 07:45.660]  I don't...
[07:45.660 --> 07:47.240]  Haven't you ever played a video game?
[07:47.480 --> 07:48.320]  Or seen Star Wars?
[07:48.500 --> 07:51.840]  If you're the Chinese or something, you could build your own.
[07:52.100 --> 07:52.400]  Yeah.
[07:52.860 --> 07:55.500]  And then, you know, do one up on us.
[07:55.500 --> 07:56.860]  I'm building one in my basement.
[07:57.020 --> 07:58.220]  I don't want it if it's made in China.
[07:58.840 --> 07:59.380]  All right.
[07:59.500 --> 08:00.980]  Well, speaking of China, though...
[08:00.980 --> 08:01.520]  Oh, France.
[08:01.820 --> 08:07.680]  Apparently, 70,000 attempts a day to break into the NYPD's computer system are being made by Chinese hackers.
[08:08.160 --> 08:09.820]  That's according to the city's top cop.
[08:09.900 --> 08:11.720]  They revealed that, yes, last week, actually.
[08:12.180 --> 08:20.440]  Commissioner Raymond Kelly said the perpetrators have yet to succeed, but their relentless activities have prompted the force to raise its guard against high-tech crimes.
[08:20.480 --> 08:23.380]  So, the guard was low before, and now it's been raised a little bit.
[08:23.680 --> 08:25.280]  Emmanuel, can we just skip this story?
[08:25.400 --> 08:25.980]  It's really stupid.
[08:26.460 --> 08:27.660]  Why do you think I'm reading it?
[08:28.220 --> 08:32.960]  It's a threat we must continue to pay close attention to every day, Kelly said in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations.
[08:33.000 --> 08:38.840]  I don't know why he's telling them that, but I guess the evil Chinese are out to get the NYPD.
[08:39.200 --> 08:44.020]  The threat is similar to a shocking cyber espionage plot recently uncovered at the Pentagon.
[08:44.940 --> 08:53.360]  China-based hackers successfully cracked the Pentagon's computers and gleaned design features of the same mentioned F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jet program.
[08:53.580 --> 08:55.600]  So, I guess, a little more specifics.
[08:55.720 --> 08:57.700]  We know it's the Chinese that are doing it, after all.
[08:58.260 --> 09:02.820]  In a 60 Minutes story that aired last Sunday, Defense Secretary Robert Gates contends the U.S.
[09:02.900 --> 09:05.920]  is under cyber attack virtually all the time, every day.
[09:06.160 --> 09:09.340]  We're going to more than quadruple the number of experts that we have in this area.
[09:09.600 --> 09:11.080]  Bring it all the way up to six, maybe?
[09:11.240 --> 09:13.640]  We're devoting a lot more money to it.
[09:14.740 --> 09:21.060]  They say internet protocol addresses of computers attempting to breach the NYPD's files have been tracked to China, the Netherlands, and the Ukraine.
[09:21.560 --> 09:23.140]  Well, all right.
[09:23.680 --> 09:26.520]  Kelly said the unauthorized scanning of NYPD computers...
[09:26.520 --> 09:27.580]  Did I just say this?
[09:27.720 --> 09:29.160]  Happens at the rate of 70,000 attempts a day.
[09:29.680 --> 09:39.040]  The hackers have devised an automated system in which computers around the world make up to 5,000 attempts a day at pinpointing unsecured portals into the NYPD's files.
[09:39.660 --> 09:46.680]  Is this any different than what happens to any of our computers, where basically we get spammed or we get all kinds of crazy attacks?
[09:46.680 --> 09:46.860]  Thanks, Rob.
[09:47.060 --> 09:52.500]  Yeah, no one's gotten around to telling Ray Kelly that this is what happens if you have an internet-facing system, online and operational.
[09:52.500 --> 09:57.200]  You get pinged, you get scanned, you get random botnets looking for weaknesses.
[09:57.320 --> 09:58.340]  That's just what happens.
[09:58.480 --> 10:04.160]  But I guess he's a special snowflake because he's in charge of the NYPD and he can invoke all sorts of nasty things.
[10:04.160 --> 10:05.160]  So these random botnets...
[10:05.740 --> 10:06.500]  You okay over there?
[10:06.720 --> 10:07.080]  Yeah.
[10:07.360 --> 10:08.200]  These random botnets...
[10:08.860 --> 10:09.640]  You're having a fight with the phone.
[10:09.800 --> 10:10.340]  I'm winning.
[10:10.660 --> 10:10.960]  All right.
[10:12.080 --> 10:15.960]  These random botnets, they're all considered hackers, each one of them.
[10:16.280 --> 10:18.620]  Or each attempt that each one makes is considered a hacker.
[10:18.880 --> 10:20.360]  Well, it's not like they can really tell the difference.
[10:20.460 --> 10:21.620]  All they see are IP addresses.
[10:22.480 --> 10:23.440]  And they might even be fake.
[10:23.560 --> 10:23.680]  Yes.
[10:23.860 --> 10:26.920]  Are we sure it's not just New Yorkers trying to get the information from...
[10:26.920 --> 10:30.260]  Because, you know, I've gone to the police station and they pretty much ignore you.
[10:30.280 --> 10:32.300]  So if I could get it electronically...
[10:32.300 --> 10:35.180]  Well, what kind of information is it that you can get on the internet from the NYPD?
[10:35.260 --> 10:36.400]  I mean, I can't even get any information from them in real life.
[10:36.400 --> 10:38.820]  No, nothing I'm saying, but if I could, I would probably try to get it.
[10:39.060 --> 10:40.920]  Because I'm not going to get it from their police station.
[10:40.980 --> 10:41.820]  I mean, what...
[10:42.500 --> 10:43.940]  How sensitive are they?
[10:43.940 --> 10:47.140]  I mean, how sensitive information is stored that's accessible on the internet?
[10:47.460 --> 10:50.160]  That's a question that haunts me, really.
[10:50.740 --> 10:51.660]  It's the NYPD.
[10:51.960 --> 10:52.540]  Yeah, I know.
[10:52.760 --> 10:53.180]  That's why it haunts me.
[10:53.180 --> 10:55.200]  They don't even know how to use computers at the NYPD.
[10:55.400 --> 10:56.140]  No, they have typewriters.
[10:56.140 --> 10:57.720]  Like, I got a letter from them the other day.
[10:57.720 --> 11:01.180]  It's handwritten on a form and, like, cross-outs and all this stuff.
[11:01.320 --> 11:02.420]  Like, they don't know what they're doing.
[11:03.260 --> 11:03.860]  Apparently not.
[11:03.860 --> 11:07.000]  But apparently they know that they're under attack.
[11:08.100 --> 11:08.600]  All right.
[11:08.680 --> 11:10.940]  Well, speaking of the NYPD, interesting news.
[11:11.240 --> 11:18.220]  The subway systems now, apparently, you're going to be seeing TSA people down there asking to search your bags.
[11:18.500 --> 11:19.160]  Isn't this fun?
[11:20.320 --> 11:21.720]  Am I going to have to pour my drink out?
[11:21.780 --> 11:22.460]  Because I don't want to do that.
[11:22.460 --> 11:33.760]  I don't know if you can get away with a drink inside the subway system anymore, but all those cops that are in there, not that many cops in there, but I have seen them a few times, they are in the process of being replaced.
[11:33.760 --> 11:35.860]  This is according to Fox 5 News.
[11:36.040 --> 11:42.120]  They say that police officers in the subway will be replaced within the next two months.
[11:42.700 --> 11:46.420]  Bag screeners from Kennedy, LaGuardia, and Newark Liberty Airports will be coming in to replace...
[11:46.420 --> 11:47.500]  Who's going to be replacing them?
[11:47.660 --> 11:48.420]  That's what I have to know.
[11:48.940 --> 11:49.380]  Girl Scouts.
[11:49.720 --> 11:50.020]  Yeah.
[11:51.020 --> 11:57.400]  Because of the police officer shortage, the NYPD needs to take these police officers and put them on the street to fight crime.
[11:58.020 --> 12:04.120]  TSA would not confirm the program was taking place, but did say that a program like this would not affect safety at area airports.
[12:04.720 --> 12:11.120]  About 30 TSA screeners a day will be pulled from the three area airports Monday through Friday to inspect bags at various subway locations throughout the city.
[12:11.340 --> 12:13.280]  I guess on the weekends, it's a free-for-all.
[12:13.340 --> 12:14.180]  Anybody can do whatever they want.
[12:14.760 --> 12:20.880]  At each location, they'll be teamed up with one police officer instead of the two or three that you might currently see at inspection sites.
[12:20.980 --> 12:26.620]  Now, what I'm curious about, will they have the same understanding that you don't have to submit to this search and you can walk away?
[12:27.040 --> 12:28.580]  Will they be told this?
[12:29.040 --> 12:29.820]  They better be.
[12:29.960 --> 12:30.400]  You can try.
[12:30.760 --> 12:31.080]  All right.
[12:31.140 --> 12:33.420]  Well, we've all dealt with TSA agents in the airports.
[12:33.420 --> 12:36.680]  And, you know, how much can you really say you've seen them understand?
[12:37.000 --> 12:37.280]  Yeah.
[12:37.580 --> 12:39.180]  Well, they'll be teamed up with policemen.
[12:39.400 --> 12:43.320]  And as much as I hate to rely on a policeman for defending your rights here, it might work.
[12:43.860 --> 12:45.080]  Uh, yeah.
[12:45.520 --> 12:53.320]  The TSA workers have had three hours of classroom training regarding legal issues and subway safety and three hours of training on the equipment used to screen bags.
[12:54.340 --> 12:55.320]  So, uh, there you go.
[12:55.640 --> 12:57.360]  That's, uh, that's what we're looking forward to.
[12:57.440 --> 12:57.760]  What equipment?
[12:57.820 --> 12:58.400]  They have equipment?
[12:58.920 --> 13:00.080]  Uh, yeah.
[13:00.340 --> 13:00.720]  X-rays.
[13:01.300 --> 13:01.520]  Gloves?
[13:02.020 --> 13:04.000]  No, but I thought they just looked through the bag.
[13:04.300 --> 13:04.980]  Don't they have gloves?
[13:05.240 --> 13:06.540]  Oh, they have gloves.
[13:06.680 --> 13:07.860]  Is that what they had three hours of training?
[13:08.100 --> 13:09.040]  They had to use?
[13:09.180 --> 13:10.140]  This is the left one.
[13:10.900 --> 13:14.840]  Okay, um, now, um, moving on to, uh, to what we can find in, in Google.
[13:14.980 --> 13:34.840]  If you were to type this into Google, uh, 5F4DCC3B5AA765D61D8327DEB882CF99, uh, that apparently, um, is, uh, a magical string.
[13:34.840 --> 13:40.400]  Uh, actually, uh, a reader writes to us, or a listener writes to us, uh, who goes by the name of The Scientist is Dead.
[13:40.880 --> 13:45.720]  Um, wants to know if anybody knows anything about thatparticularstring.com.
[13:45.880 --> 13:53.720]  Uh, that particular string happens to be the MD5 hash for password, the word password, as it would appear in a Linux shadow file.
[13:53.900 --> 14:03.840]  Uh, the only way anyone would come across it is if they did a Google search for that particular string, which would result in insecure servers for whom the shadow files are indexed by Google and for whom the password is clearly password.
[14:04.700 --> 14:12.060]  It's ironic because only a hacker would ever wind up at such a crazy domain, but I feel like I found this badass Easter egg, but I can't find out anything about it.
[14:12.480 --> 14:14.320]  Uh, first of all, folks, is it that simple?
[14:14.480 --> 14:15.700]  Is it really that simple?
[14:16.240 --> 14:20.360]  The MD5 hash is the same if you type in a particular word?
[14:20.540 --> 14:22.440]  No, well, it depends if they use salts or not.
[14:22.540 --> 14:33.800]  So basically, um, when you're doing the MD5 to do the hash of the password, if it's a smartly designed system, you'll actually add a salt to the, to, you'll concatenate it with the password before you hash it.
[14:33.920 --> 14:36.400]  And then in the password file, you record the salt and the hash.
[14:36.480 --> 14:40.100]  You want to maybe, like, tone this down a little bit for people to have no idea what you just said?
[14:40.340 --> 14:44.060]  Basically, uh, when you, so a hash is a one-way function.
[14:44.300 --> 14:45.540]  The idea is you can't reverse it.
[14:45.640 --> 14:55.920]  But if you were to have a, um, a table of hashes that you had already generated by, for example, hashing the word password, you could compare that in a lookup.
[14:56.020 --> 15:04.240]  A way to kind of combat that is when you're hashing the password, you also generate a random string of, of characters that you add to the end of the password.
[15:04.360 --> 15:05.340]  Right, which makes it completely...
[15:05.340 --> 15:09.240]  Before you hash, which makes it so that you can't just do a table lookup of the hashes.
[15:09.380 --> 15:10.540]  And that seems to be common sense.
[15:10.620 --> 15:11.820]  Yeah, and that's in most systems.
[15:12.060 --> 15:13.540]  It's not in Windows systems, actually.
[15:14.460 --> 15:14.820]  Unbelievable.
[15:15.260 --> 15:18.740]  The key is that, um, the key phrase is insecure systems.
[15:18.940 --> 15:19.880]  That's what you're finding.
[15:20.160 --> 15:21.740]  So, obviously...
[15:21.740 --> 15:24.400]  Well, that's what we're looking for, it's insecure systems.
[15:24.540 --> 15:26.520]  And apparently, it's that easy to find.
[15:26.680 --> 15:28.540]  But, uh, yeah, there is a, there is a site there.
[15:28.620 --> 15:32.760]  And if you go to that site, uh, you see that string and it says admin slash how are you?
[15:33.100 --> 15:34.660]  Do you know it keeps hackers awake at night?
[15:34.820 --> 15:36.240]  If you're here now, it's too soon.
[15:36.500 --> 15:40.360]  Come back on December 1st, 2K8, meaning 2008, if you can.
[15:41.040 --> 15:43.180]  And, uh, slash admin is how it ends.
[15:43.280 --> 15:44.700]  But, of course, that date has already passed.
[15:44.880 --> 15:46.280]  So, uh, I don't know.
[15:46.400 --> 15:47.280]  I don't know what that's all about.
[15:47.780 --> 15:48.280]  Interesting, though.
[15:49.040 --> 15:51.460]  Um, okay, here's, uh, here's a fun story.
[15:51.740 --> 16:03.400]  About a, uh, a 10-year-old playing school who cracked the tight security surrounding Pennsylvania's standardized assessment tests by obtaining the codes to place an online order for a box of the closely guarded exams.
[16:03.960 --> 16:12.920]  State Education Department officials were shocked by the events involving the student, the fifth grader, at Bovard Elementary School in the Hempfield area school district.
[16:12.920 --> 16:15.460]  We've never had a security breach of that nature.
[16:15.880 --> 16:18.680]  Only the school district's test coordinator can order tests.
[16:18.860 --> 16:19.860]  It's a very secure system.
[16:19.980 --> 16:23.460]  Bernie, I believe you're somewhat familiar with this story, seeing it happen in Pennsylvania.
[16:24.280 --> 16:24.620]  Yes.
[16:24.720 --> 16:25.680]  Can you hear me okay, Emmanuel?
[16:25.860 --> 16:26.540]  I hear you just fine.
[16:26.960 --> 16:28.580]  Okay, there's a lot of scratchiness in the line.
[16:28.660 --> 16:29.980]  I hope it's not, uh, hearable.
[16:29.980 --> 16:31.680]  We hear no scratchiness on this end.
[16:31.840 --> 16:32.180]  Well, good.
[16:32.380 --> 16:32.480]  Good.
[16:32.980 --> 16:37.900]  Um, well, I read this story, and it's sort of ambiguous as to how big a problem it was.
[16:38.060 --> 16:51.020]  Apparently, this, uh, this fifth grader, who's like 10 years old or whatever, um, went on, wanted to play teacher and went online and ordered a whole bunch of these, uh, special standardized tests, which are kind of part of the New Child Left Behind program,
[16:51.020 --> 16:59.580]  where all Pennsylvania students have to take this test so they can move on to the next grade, or the school, uh, school gets demerited in less federal money or something.
[16:59.760 --> 17:14.580]  He ordered just a whole box of these, these, these, these, these secure tests, and had them, uh, he put in his home address, and he looked up on the company's website some order codes, um, apparently were necessary for him to order these.
[17:14.880 --> 17:27.160]  And I don't know if that constitutes hacking, but in any case, he, uh, he ordered them and put his own home address in his school, in his, uh, homeroom teacher's, uh, name on the order form, and, uh, the company shipped the box of tests, but they shipped them to,
[17:27.160 --> 17:28.540]  uh, his school district.
[17:29.060 --> 17:39.260]  Now, if he had had made, made arrangements with somebody at the school district to, like, sort of intercept this box when this stuff comes in on a loading dock, he would have had access to the standardized tests, could have posted them online, whatever.
[17:39.660 --> 17:50.660]  It's just kind of funny that the standardized test company is saying it's a very secure system, when obviously it's not, and any student can order a box of them being shipped to the school, which is, uh, unbeknownst to the school itself, so they weren't expecting them.
[17:50.900 --> 17:53.460]  It's just kind of funny that a, uh, a 10-year-old did this.
[17:53.600 --> 17:54.720]  What, what happened to the 10-year-old?
[17:55.520 --> 17:57.060]  Uh, he wasn't, he wasn't punished.
[17:57.060 --> 18:03.960]  He actually showed his teachers with his parents how he did it, and they're all scratching their heads as to, um, what's going on.
[18:04.040 --> 18:06.120]  But they didn't, they didn't punish him, fortunately.
[18:06.400 --> 18:08.620]  Well, they said he wasn't trying to cheat or something like that.
[18:08.820 --> 18:21.160]  No, he said he wanted to, apparently he wanted to play teacher, and he said he specifically ordered them so they wouldn't arrive to the school, uh, any earlier than the day that the tests were administered.
[18:21.480 --> 18:23.060]  So, I mean, he could have ordered them earlier.
[18:23.300 --> 18:32.480]  It's kind of strange, but, but apparently they didn't believe he was up to shadiness, but they're very concerned that the testing company doesn't have better security with this test they're shipping out.
[18:32.640 --> 18:38.580]  It just doesn't bode well for the whole standardized test testing system, which I have dubious belief in anyway.
[18:39.280 --> 18:46.580]  Uh, without taking, uh, a disagreement with your position on standardized testing, I'm gonna say that this seems to be that the security system worked.
[18:46.660 --> 18:49.240]  I mean, he tried to get the test to go to his house, and he failed.
[18:49.340 --> 18:53.440]  They went to the school department, uh, and then where they got caught.
[18:53.600 --> 18:58.840]  I mean, it's maybe not ideal, but it seems that there are a lot worse failure modes available.
[18:59.700 --> 19:00.580]  Oh, yeah, for sure.
[19:00.740 --> 19:03.840]  I mean, if they were shipped to his house, that would have been a bigger, a bigger fail.
[19:03.840 --> 19:09.300]  But, you know, apparently the test with the, the school district was not expecting this additional box of tests.
[19:09.580 --> 19:18.420]  So they probably not have known what to do with them, or if he'd had a confederate in the, at the, at the shipping, you know, with the mail room, they could have easily disappeared.
[19:18.660 --> 19:21.820]  It obviously is not good security that it happened, but yes, it could have been worse.
[19:22.780 --> 19:23.200]  Todd Redd.
[19:23.420 --> 19:30.680]  Uh, speaking of the security of the system, if I remember correctly, he said he found all the information he needed to order these things on the actual website.
[19:30.680 --> 19:40.060]  So, I'm assuming that means whatever codes are needed in order to, um, verify that you are a legitimate party, you can actually find on the website.
[19:40.900 --> 19:41.300]  Interesting.
[19:41.700 --> 19:43.280]  So we can start ordering these things ourselves.
[19:44.340 --> 19:45.920]  I would hope to change by now.
[19:46.120 --> 19:52.840]  Uh, there's a mystery going on as to, uh, why all these people are very interested in a, in a telephone known as the Nokia 1100.
[19:53.680 --> 19:58.100]  Uh, basically, um, and again, hackers are doing this, according to the, uh, to the media.
[19:58.320 --> 19:59.460]  This is from Computer World.
[19:59.460 --> 20:06.560]  Hackers have been offering up to, uh, $32,000 and, uh, $32,413.
[20:07.540 --> 20:09.220]  I don't know why such an exact figure.
[20:09.440 --> 20:11.980]  $32,413 in underground forums.
[20:12.180 --> 20:14.660]  They're probably offering like 20,000 euros or something.
[20:14.900 --> 20:17.020]  And they added too much precision.
[20:17.460 --> 20:17.760]  Yeah.
[20:18.220 --> 20:25.580]  Uh, they're offering that in underground forums for Nokia 1100 phones made in the company's former factory in Bochum, Germany.
[20:25.580 --> 20:36.000]  The phone can allegedly be hacked so as to facilitate illegal online banking transfers, according to the, uh, to a Dutch company, UltraScan Advanced Global Investigations.
[20:36.600 --> 20:44.480]  Nokia said last Tuesday it is not aware that resale prices for a phone that retailed for less than $17 when it debuted in 2003 have risen so high.
[20:44.560 --> 20:45.580]  Do any of us have one of these?
[20:45.580 --> 20:47.340]  It would be really cool if we did.
[20:47.780 --> 20:51.620]  Uh, further, Nokia maintains the phone software is not flawed.
[20:51.820 --> 20:55.980]  We have not identified any phone software problem that would allow alleged use cases.
[20:56.280 --> 21:03.240]  Uh, the 1100 can apparently be reprogrammed to use someone else's phone number, which would also let the device receive text messages.
[21:03.240 --> 21:08.400]  And that capability opens up an opportunity for online banking fraud, as well as all kinds of things.
[21:08.400 --> 21:10.500]  I mean, you could just intercept people's messages.
[21:10.500 --> 21:12.420]  You can, you can message as them.
[21:12.680 --> 21:14.660]  Uh, you can, you can do all kinds of cool things.
[21:14.740 --> 21:15.660]  You could Twitter as them.
[21:15.960 --> 21:16.520]  You could.
[21:16.940 --> 21:17.840]  Nothing would stop you.
[21:18.000 --> 21:20.800]  But, but is all this worth $34,000 whatever dollars?
[21:21.040 --> 21:22.340]  Uh, $32,413.
[21:22.800 --> 21:22.980]  Um.
[21:23.620 --> 21:26.640]  Well, if it allows you to hack a bank, yeah, I guess it's worth the investment, right?
[21:26.800 --> 21:30.820]  Keep in mind, you're not, you're not, uh, you're not confined to one phone number.
[21:30.900 --> 21:32.060]  You could, you could be anybody.
[21:32.540 --> 21:33.680]  You just need the phone number.
[21:33.880 --> 21:37.440]  Uh, in countries such as Germany, banks send an M10.
[21:37.440 --> 21:38.880]  Anybody know what an M10 is?
[21:39.440 --> 21:39.820]  Mobile?
[21:39.960 --> 21:42.080]  Mobile transaction authentication number.
[21:42.580 --> 21:43.280]  All right, wise guy.
[21:43.320 --> 21:44.420]  You want to read the rest of the story, too?
[21:46.260 --> 21:46.700]  Okay.
[21:47.200 --> 21:50.480]  Yeah, they send the M10 to a person's mobile phone.
[21:50.480 --> 21:54.720]  It must be entered into a web-based form in order to, for example, transfer money to another account.
[21:55.440 --> 21:58.540]  A, um, a 10 can only be used once.
[21:58.540 --> 22:00.780]  A security feature known as a one-time passcode.
[22:01.200 --> 22:02.580]  Now, criminals have proven adept.
[22:02.840 --> 22:04.020]  Oh, they say criminals, not hackers.
[22:04.120 --> 22:04.460]  How about that?
[22:04.700 --> 22:16.840]  Criminals have proven adept at obtaining people's usernames and logins for online bank accounts, either through tricking people into visiting lookalike bank websites through clever email messages or simply by hacking PCs.
[22:17.860 --> 22:32.120]  And European banks typically issue customers a list of 10s, but phishers, P-H-I-S-H-E-R-S, tricked people into revealing those particular lists or the numbers on that list.
[22:32.700 --> 22:36.500]  Deutsche Postbank used to accept any 10 from the list to complete a transaction.
[22:36.680 --> 22:38.940]  Then the bank moved to requesting specific TANs from the list.
[22:39.280 --> 22:44.320]  After continuing fraud, it decided to expand the use of M-TANs.
[22:44.400 --> 22:47.480]  The M-TAN is valid only for the requested transfer and only for a short period.
[22:47.740 --> 22:50.180]  It thus has no value for a fraudster.
[22:50.740 --> 22:57.000]  That is, unless the hacker could also receive the M-TAN, which Nokia 1100, the Nokia 1100 hack allegedly allows.
[22:57.640 --> 22:59.640]  So, wow, this is interesting stuff.
[22:59.640 --> 23:02.520]  Yeah, when I had a bank account in Europe, I had the list.
[23:02.540 --> 23:04.960]  I didn't have it done with the text messaging.
[23:05.160 --> 23:10.400]  And I guess at the time, maybe there was not that much fraud in Finland or they just haven't had this problem.
[23:10.400 --> 23:12.080]  But that worked pretty well for me.
[23:12.420 --> 23:16.740]  But I could see how someone, I guess, would be tricked into it if they got an email saying, give us your next code.
[23:17.540 --> 23:19.080]  Do we need it to verify you or something?
[23:19.100 --> 23:22.780]  The interesting thing here is that they still don't know how exactly the 1100 is being modified.
[23:23.580 --> 23:24.720]  They're trying to figure that out.
[23:24.840 --> 23:25.380]  But apparently...
[23:25.380 --> 23:28.600]  And this could just be somebody making fake offers online.
[23:28.760 --> 23:30.240]  And maybe there's nothing to this story at all.
[23:30.560 --> 23:33.040]  But 200 million of these devices were produced.
[23:34.180 --> 23:38.660]  So you would think it would be easier to get one than having to spend $32,000 on it.
[23:38.660 --> 23:38.920]  You'd think.
[23:39.080 --> 23:39.460]  You'd think.
[23:39.560 --> 23:42.720]  I've been rummaging through my closets looking for one of these.
[23:42.860 --> 23:44.460]  Maybe I had one at one point, but I don't.
[23:44.800 --> 23:45.140]  Sad.
[23:45.600 --> 23:46.920]  This is interesting, though.
[23:47.040 --> 23:51.500]  If I ever come into possession of a crate of old phones nobody wants, I know just the sort of rumor to start about it.
[23:51.660 --> 23:52.700]  You should look around Dayton.
[23:52.960 --> 23:53.120]  Yeah.
[23:54.220 --> 23:59.280]  Come to the 2600 meeting on Friday, people, and bring your Nokia 1100 phones.
[23:59.420 --> 24:01.700]  And we'll give you something in exchange for it.
[24:01.760 --> 24:03.620]  And then we'll have something to talk about next week.
[24:04.980 --> 24:05.580]  All right.
[24:06.340 --> 24:07.840]  More federal mischief here.
[24:08.320 --> 24:16.080]  Two FBI workers accused of using surveillance equipment to spy on teenage girls as they undressed and tried on prom gowns at a charity event at a West Virginia mall.
[24:16.340 --> 24:18.020]  Oh, it doesn't get any better than this, folks.
[24:18.300 --> 24:22.980]  The FBI employees have been charged with conspiracy and committing criminal invasion of privacy.
[24:22.980 --> 24:26.920]  They were working in an FBI satellite control room at the mall.
[24:27.880 --> 24:29.760]  A satellite control room at the mall.
[24:30.320 --> 24:32.780]  What's your actual control in satellites at the mall?
[24:32.780 --> 24:36.320]  This is like something straight out of a cartoon someplace.
[24:38.160 --> 24:47.820]  They positioned the camera on temporary changing rooms and zoomed in for at least 90 minutes on girls dressing for the Cinderella Project fashion show.
[24:48.340 --> 24:49.400]  Oh, boy.
[24:51.320 --> 24:53.380]  I can't even put into words...
[24:53.380 --> 25:00.240]  I can't begin to put words around what I consider so unspeakable an act, said the organizer of the event.
[25:01.260 --> 25:02.300]  Participants are rather angry.
[25:02.620 --> 25:04.860]  Never in a million years would we have thought something like this would happen.
[25:05.020 --> 25:05.640]  We're in shock.
[25:06.600 --> 25:10.460]  Misuse of surveillance by a branch of our government in a place we felt so secure.
[25:11.500 --> 25:11.860]  Wow.
[25:12.240 --> 25:16.900]  So, yeah, that's what happens when you give people this kind of power, even if they are FBI agents or cops.
[25:16.940 --> 25:17.920]  It happens all the time.
[25:18.000 --> 25:18.460]  Wait, wait.
[25:18.760 --> 25:19.600]  They were...
[25:19.600 --> 25:22.340]  Were these changing rooms outside and they were using satellites?
[25:22.580 --> 25:24.540]  I didn't think we had satellites.
[25:26.760 --> 25:27.300]  Hang on.
[25:27.300 --> 25:28.560]  Let me read this a little closer.
[25:29.340 --> 25:30.820]  They did say they were temporary.
[25:31.280 --> 25:32.460]  No, it's at the mall.
[25:32.640 --> 25:33.420]  It's at least a...
[25:33.420 --> 25:34.500]  It's not satellites.
[25:34.760 --> 25:37.540]  It's just there's a main control room and the secondary control room.
[25:37.580 --> 25:38.400]  Oh, it's a satellite...
[25:38.400 --> 25:41.640]  It's a control room and there's simply a satellite control room that has nothing to do with satellites in space.
[25:41.820 --> 25:42.240]  Oh, okay.
[25:42.340 --> 25:43.380]  I just wanted to clear up that.
[25:43.380 --> 25:45.000]  You see how these stories get misread.
[25:45.140 --> 25:46.260]  It's not nearly as exciting now.
[25:46.720 --> 25:49.940]  But still, that's a threat, you know, to have something outdoors like that.
[25:50.020 --> 25:50.900]  The satellites can watch you.
[25:51.020 --> 25:57.340]  I think the ultimate irony would be that since they were using recording equipment, if they get charged for child pornography.
[25:58.060 --> 26:00.680]  Because, well, you know, all of what's been going on lately.
[26:01.240 --> 26:01.600]  Yeah.
[26:01.740 --> 26:07.520]  You know, I saw coming attractions of a TV show last night, Law & Order SVU, where basically...
[26:07.520 --> 26:13.160]  It's exactly what we were talking about two weeks ago, where somebody was sexting and now she's charged with a crime.
[26:13.340 --> 26:14.760]  How did they get the story so fast?
[26:14.820 --> 26:15.860]  It only happened two weeks ago.
[26:15.980 --> 26:17.900]  But apparently, they're onto this.
[26:18.000 --> 26:19.960]  Because they can produce a show in like five...
[26:19.960 --> 26:21.200]  I mean, have you ever seen the show?
[26:21.200 --> 26:22.720]  I mean, you could write it in like...
[26:22.720 --> 26:24.120]  They still have to edit it.
[26:24.200 --> 26:25.720]  They still have to edit it and distribute it.
[26:25.800 --> 26:26.840]  It takes more than two weeks.
[26:27.020 --> 26:27.480]  I don't know.
[26:27.760 --> 26:28.120]  So you say.
[26:28.120 --> 26:29.600]  But this isn't a new thing either.
[26:29.780 --> 26:32.880]  I mean, maybe you heard that story two weeks ago, but this is something...
[26:32.880 --> 26:36.040]  I don't think anyone's ever charged with a crime for sending a...
[26:36.040 --> 26:37.700]  Right, but they can make up a story where someone's...
[26:37.700 --> 26:40.340]  Sending a nude picture of themselves charged for child pornography.
[26:40.340 --> 26:40.500]  Oh, it has happened.
[26:40.840 --> 26:41.540]  Has that happened?
[26:41.760 --> 26:42.400]  It has happened.
[26:42.600 --> 26:43.660]  When did it happen earlier?
[26:44.060 --> 26:46.580]  Just within the past year, the past few months, actually.
[26:46.760 --> 26:52.160]  Some school students, the reminders themselves, were charged.
[26:52.400 --> 26:53.820]  Well, this is the one we were talking about, right?
[26:53.860 --> 26:54.560]  A couple of weeks ago.
[26:54.700 --> 26:56.060]  You mean that there's something before that?
[26:56.520 --> 27:07.400]  Worse than that, a school principal or administrator was recently charged with possession of child pornography after he was investigating a case.
[27:07.420 --> 27:17.640]  You heard a rumor that some students had sent sort of a naked picture of one student to another student, of themselves to another student.
[27:17.640 --> 27:19.480]  And he investigated that and one of the...
[27:19.480 --> 27:23.180]  By then, the picture had gotten passed around the school via cell phones.
[27:23.760 --> 27:26.900]  And one student said, Well, here, I have a copy of it here.
[27:28.200 --> 27:32.520]  And the administrator said, Well, how do I get a copy of this?
[27:32.660 --> 27:33.800]  Because I want to look at it.
[27:34.360 --> 27:34.860]  Or whatever.
[27:35.140 --> 27:36.360]  I want to investigate it.
[27:36.460 --> 27:39.040]  And the student just said, Well, I will send it to your...
[27:39.040 --> 27:42.520]  I can have it sent to your computer, to your email address.
[27:42.600 --> 27:43.460]  So he forwarded that.
[27:43.680 --> 27:45.040]  And then he contacted the police.
[27:45.180 --> 27:49.920]  He contacted the principal himself, which is what the local statute said he had to do.
[27:50.020 --> 27:51.500]  The rules said he had to contact his superior.
[27:51.720 --> 27:52.360]  And he did.
[27:52.560 --> 27:53.760]  Then he contacted the police.
[27:54.040 --> 27:59.900]  And the police charged the school's administrator with possession of pornography.
[28:00.120 --> 28:00.940]  And the judge looked at it.
[28:00.980 --> 28:01.680]  The judge threw it out.
[28:01.760 --> 28:02.360]  It was ridiculous.
[28:02.360 --> 28:08.640]  He was investigating this stupid case where kids were sending lewd pictures of themselves to each other.
[28:08.840 --> 28:19.420]  But it just goes to show that police and law enforcement are just totally out of control and don't use really sane judgment when filing charges against people with this silly stuff.
[28:19.600 --> 28:20.060]  You know what?
[28:20.120 --> 28:20.980]  They probably have...
[28:20.980 --> 28:21.760]  They have nothing better to do.
[28:21.860 --> 28:23.100]  They figure, we'll charge them.
[28:23.220 --> 28:26.280]  And then, you know, if it's not actually a legitimate charge, it'll get thrown out in the court.
[28:26.880 --> 28:27.600]  But, I mean, that's not really...
[28:27.600 --> 28:29.280]  Then they're wasting our time and our money.
[28:29.420 --> 28:30.720]  And it's stupid.
[28:32.040 --> 28:32.640]  Okay, yeah.
[28:32.760 --> 28:34.340]  It's a weird story.
[28:34.620 --> 28:37.700]  And certainly something we'll be probably seeing more of in the future.
[28:38.340 --> 28:40.320]  But now, it's time for something else.
[28:44.780 --> 28:49.260]  Yes, the return of our popular feature, .gov of the week.
[28:49.680 --> 28:55.040]  And this week, in particular, we have a special site sent in by a listener.
[28:55.420 --> 29:13.140]  I want to thank BuzzBros 2002, kind of weird name, from Beaumont, California, who sends us a site which I think can be very, very helpful helpful to many people, many people out there who are seeking to cause, well, how do I say it?
[29:13.780 --> 29:14.220]  Explosions.
[29:14.400 --> 29:14.500]  Yeah.
[29:14.960 --> 29:18.480]  Things that you wish to, or maybe wishing to prevent explosions as well.
[29:19.060 --> 29:24.320]  This is a site called cameochemicals.noaa.gov.
[29:24.820 --> 29:27.260]  Now, who knows anything about chemicals here?
[29:27.820 --> 29:28.900]  Does anybody know anything about it?
[29:28.980 --> 29:30.280]  Bernie, I know you know something about chemicals.
[29:30.760 --> 29:32.620]  The Secret Service accused you of all sorts of things.
[29:32.800 --> 29:36.840]  I do know from an old TV commercial that without chemicals, life itself would be impossible.
[29:37.320 --> 29:37.880]  All right.
[29:38.580 --> 29:41.580]  That kind of dangerous knowledge I know would get you in hot water.
[29:42.200 --> 29:47.120]  But, okay, basically what you do here, they have a database of hazardous materials.
[29:47.820 --> 29:50.140]  And what you can do is you can build a list of chemicals.
[29:50.240 --> 29:55.980]  For example, substances involved in an incident response such as a train derailment or chemicals stored in your community.
[29:56.360 --> 30:00.680]  But more importantly, they have this section known as reactivity.
[30:01.580 --> 30:08.560]  You see what hazards might occur if chemicals in your My Chemicals collection, which we're going to build, are mixed together.
[30:09.000 --> 30:10.780]  Now, here's something interesting.
[30:10.960 --> 30:14.580]  There's a bit of a problem with the site.
[30:15.460 --> 30:18.280]  It can tell you about two chemicals and how they react together.
[30:19.200 --> 30:24.000]  For instance, if you mix glycerin and nitric acid, we all know nothing's really going to happen.
[30:24.400 --> 30:27.920]  However, if you throw in sulfuric acid, yeah, you better watch out.
[30:28.300 --> 30:34.260]  Problem is, if you mix sulfuric acid with nitric acid, nothing really happens either or sulfuric acid with glycerin, nothing really happens.
[30:35.200 --> 30:37.700]  This system can't mix three things together.
[30:37.920 --> 30:40.780]  So if you were to add those three things, it wouldn't get it.
[30:40.920 --> 30:43.120]  It wouldn't get the fact that those three things are dangerous together.
[30:43.640 --> 30:44.880]  It would just pair them.
[30:45.000 --> 30:50.940]  So what we need, we need some chemicals that will react, you know, two chemicals that will react.
[30:51.300 --> 30:52.020]  Now, do we have anything?
[30:52.180 --> 30:52.840]  Yeah, Mike, you have something.
[30:52.900 --> 30:53.060]  Go ahead.
[30:53.200 --> 30:54.260]  Baking soda and vinegar.
[30:54.540 --> 30:55.560]  Baking soda and vinegar.
[30:55.700 --> 30:57.020]  Let's see if that That even qualifies.
[30:57.900 --> 30:59.220]  Okay, let's see.
[30:59.260 --> 31:01.360]  That's the only chemicals I know of, so they're better.
[31:03.360 --> 31:08.100]  Okay, you know, this is more complicated than it has to be, but let's see.
[31:08.200 --> 31:10.980]  We have to add items to our My Chemicals collection.
[31:11.140 --> 31:16.940]  To add a specific chemical, run a search, and then click Add to My Chemicals on the chemical data sheet.
[31:17.580 --> 31:18.900]  It's a good thing this isn't an emergency.
[31:19.100 --> 31:20.320]  But, okay, name.
[31:20.480 --> 31:21.620]  Case-sensitive?
[31:21.820 --> 31:21.960]  Really?
[31:22.160 --> 31:22.960]  Oh, not case-sensitive.
[31:23.120 --> 31:23.280]  Okay.
[31:24.140 --> 31:25.180]  Baking soda, you said.
[31:25.360 --> 31:25.820]  I'm typing in it.
[31:26.040 --> 31:26.820]  Sodium bicarbonate.
[31:27.020 --> 31:27.500]  Yeah, that's what I was gonna say.
[31:27.680 --> 31:28.960]  Sodium bicar- you want to do it that way?
[31:29.120 --> 31:31.340]  But I don't know what the chemical from vinegar is.
[31:31.540 --> 31:32.140]  What's the chemical?
[31:32.280 --> 31:33.940]  Let's say baking soda, see what happens.
[31:35.780 --> 31:41.360]  Baking soda, and I'm going to search the name, and see what comes up.
[31:43.260 --> 31:44.780]  Yeah, sodium bicarbonate came up.
[31:44.980 --> 31:48.920]  Okay, so we want to add that to My Chemicals, and that has been added.
[31:49.860 --> 31:51.400]  Now, Mike, you had something else?
[31:51.600 --> 31:51.960]  Vinegar.
[31:52.320 --> 31:53.040]  Vinegar, okay.
[31:53.140 --> 31:56.080]  Yeah, you can put it in a papier-mâché volcano, and it explodes.
[31:56.080 --> 31:56.680]  It's very cool.
[31:57.080 --> 31:58.580]  Also known as acetic acid.
[31:58.760 --> 32:00.200]  Okay, I don't know if this is actually added.
[32:00.860 --> 32:02.460]  Okay, let's see.
[32:02.560 --> 32:03.720]  View My Chemicals.
[32:04.360 --> 32:05.820]  Okay, it has already been added.
[32:06.540 --> 32:07.620]  Now a new search.
[32:09.480 --> 32:10.320]  And what was it again?
[32:10.460 --> 32:10.740]  I'm sorry.
[32:10.760 --> 32:10.960]  Vinegar.
[32:11.200 --> 32:11.700]  Just vinegar.
[32:12.000 --> 32:12.400]  Vinegar.
[32:12.660 --> 32:13.200]  V-I-N.
[32:13.360 --> 32:15.020]  Oops, I hit a bad key there.
[32:15.780 --> 32:19.720]  This keyboard is in a very awkward place, so forgive me.
[32:20.360 --> 32:20.600]  Vinegar.
[32:21.120 --> 32:24.180]  Acetic acid, glacial, or ethyl acetate?
[32:24.580 --> 32:25.620]  How am I supposed to know?
[32:25.740 --> 32:26.120]  Just vinegar.
[32:26.320 --> 32:29.200]  Vinegar acid or vinegar naphtha?
[32:29.820 --> 32:30.900]  I think we want the acid.
[32:30.980 --> 32:31.940]  I think we need Jim in here.
[32:32.020 --> 32:33.460]  He's a bit of a chemist.
[32:33.480 --> 32:35.940]  Let's go with the one we can pronounce, but... Vinegar acid?
[32:36.120 --> 32:37.300]  It's kind of not a good strategy.
[32:37.520 --> 32:38.100]  Add to both, Emmanuel.
[32:38.320 --> 32:39.180]  Add to My Chemicals.
[32:39.180 --> 32:40.140]  That's what we're going to do, Bernie.
[32:40.460 --> 32:40.820]  Patience.
[32:41.580 --> 32:44.180]  Now we're going to click on predict reactivity.
[32:44.480 --> 32:45.220]  Is everybody ready for this?
[32:45.500 --> 32:46.780]  All right, predict reactivity.
[32:46.780 --> 32:46.880]  We're back.
[32:48.100 --> 32:49.240]  Let's see.
[32:50.040 --> 32:51.340]  Hazard predictions.
[32:52.360 --> 32:56.320]  Exothermic reaction may generate heat and or cause pressurization.
[32:56.560 --> 33:02.320]  Combination liberates non-flammable, non-toxic gas may cause pressurization.
[33:03.040 --> 33:10.980]  Exothermic generation of toxic and corrosive fumes may produce the following gases, carbon dioxide or corrosive fumes.
[33:11.500 --> 33:16.060]  Wait, they said first that it's safe fumes and then that it's corrosive fumes?
[33:16.740 --> 33:19.760]  It's going to cause all kinds of different things, I suppose.
[33:20.560 --> 33:22.320]  And you can get documentation on this as well.
[33:22.780 --> 33:24.740]  But, you know, it's... I mean, I did this in like third grade.
[33:24.920 --> 33:25.740]  It can't be that dangerous.
[33:26.320 --> 33:28.160]  Well, I mean, but did you ever stick your face in it?
[33:28.300 --> 33:30.980]  Because I... It's a good suggestion right now.
[33:30.980 --> 33:37.480]  Although, because I vaguely remember having done that and it... Vaguely, huh?
[33:38.540 --> 33:40.420]  I remember it like burning my nostrils.
[33:40.640 --> 33:40.660]  When you woke up.
[33:40.660 --> 33:42.240]  So that would probably be the corrosive fumes.
[33:42.340 --> 33:43.140]  No, it's the heat.
[33:44.100 --> 33:44.420]  All right.
[33:44.460 --> 33:45.560]  Well, we can bicker about this later.
[33:45.660 --> 34:00.560]  But the point is, if you go to this website, cameochemicals.noaa.gov, and you wish to build some kind of explosive device or just not build some kind of explosive device, this is probably the way to find out if two chemicals will react badly.
[34:00.860 --> 34:03.160]  I don't know what happens if you need to build something a bit more complex than that.
[34:03.280 --> 34:03.820]  Most things are.
[34:04.420 --> 34:06.080]  But you know, it's... This is... Yeah.
[34:06.380 --> 34:07.500]  This is as good as we're going to get.
[34:08.000 --> 34:08.820]  But hang on, Bernie.
[34:08.920 --> 34:09.500]  We have to do the outro.
[34:10.940 --> 34:13.420]  Cameochemicals.noaa.gov is the website.
[34:13.620 --> 34:18.220]  Thank you very much for sending that in to us, BuzzBros 2002.
[34:18.660 --> 34:26.520]  Anyone else who wishes to send us an entry for .gov of the week, our email address, O-T-H at 2600.com.
[34:26.660 --> 34:31.200]  There's a lot of .gov sites out there, and we've only just scratched the surface.
[34:35.560 --> 34:36.400]  Yes, Bernie.
[34:36.840 --> 34:38.380]  I just wanted to ask for clarification.
[34:38.680 --> 34:41.540]  Which federal agency has that domain name?
[34:42.740 --> 34:43.260]  NOAA?
[34:43.500 --> 34:44.400]  Isn't that the...
[34:44.400 --> 34:47.120]  The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
[34:47.300 --> 34:47.600]  Yeah.
[34:48.060 --> 34:48.580]  Wow.
[34:48.680 --> 34:49.780]  Why are they blowing things up?
[34:50.000 --> 34:51.400]  That's a very good question.
[34:51.400 --> 34:57.440]  But it's a useful tool, especially if somebody can reverse engineer it and just easily see what the reactions are.
[34:57.560 --> 34:59.020]  But that would require a hacker.
[34:59.640 --> 34:59.980]  Maybe.
[35:00.280 --> 35:02.120]  And they're all out busy grabbing files.
[35:02.680 --> 35:02.920]  Yes.
[35:02.920 --> 35:03.480]  Red Hacked.
[35:03.620 --> 35:04.080]  Two comments.
[35:04.200 --> 35:04.320]  Yes.
[35:04.380 --> 35:12.540]  One, they probably host it because this has to do with environmental disasters, and I'd assume that they deal with environmental problems like chemical spills and things like that.
[35:12.800 --> 35:12.920]  Yeah.
[35:12.920 --> 35:17.900]  And number two, what do you think happens if you start adding all the chemicals that are required for a meth lab to my chemicals?
[35:18.100 --> 35:18.760]  Do you think they...
[35:18.760 --> 35:19.460]  I don't know.
[35:19.780 --> 35:20.540]  ...they track that or...
[35:20.540 --> 35:23.480]  You see, I'm confused by the fact you can only handle two at once.
[35:23.540 --> 35:27.660]  Well, that would be bad, too, because I'm pretty sure that if you put all of the things together, it'll explode, but...
[35:27.660 --> 35:27.960]  Uh-huh.
[35:28.400 --> 35:33.560]  Well, most things will wind up in a violent explosion of some sort, so it's important to...
[35:33.560 --> 35:39.140]  It's a good idea to look at the site first, so that way you don't do something really bad.
[35:39.140 --> 35:46.660]  Okay, this is a very disappointing story, and I think it's someone that we knew was coming.
[35:46.660 --> 35:57.520]  We talked about this a couple of years ago, but remember this case of the Staten Island businessman who was basically providing satellite television services to various customers?
[35:57.880 --> 36:05.620]  He was accused of providing Hezbollah's television station, Al-Manar, with an audience in the United States.
[36:06.700 --> 36:19.260]  The businessman, Yaved Iqbal, said in a statement read by his lawyer in federal district court in Manhattan that he was deeply sorry for what he called a mistake that hurt him financially, emotionally, and physically.
[36:19.500 --> 36:23.440]  I have not harmed anyone in my whole life, he said in the statement to Judge Richard Berman.
[36:24.000 --> 36:31.680]  And basically what happened was he was providing this channel to people who wanted to see it.
[36:32.000 --> 36:41.680]  I wasn't aware that this channel was forbidden in this country that you could actually be put in prison for transmitting it, for retransmitting or anything like that.
[36:42.100 --> 36:52.660]  This guy was sentenced to nearly six years in prison, and the charge was assisting terrorists by providing the satellite television channel to various people in the United States.
[36:53.200 --> 36:55.660]  Simply unbelievable something like this could happen.
[36:56.300 --> 37:08.900]  A federal prosecutor, Eric Snyder, called Hezbollah a sophisticated terrorist organization in all respects, which had used its 24-hour channel to recruit members and suicide bombers and to raise money for weapons and operations.
[37:09.800 --> 37:14.160]  And get this, he said he was in a very real sense Hezbollah's man in New York City.
[37:14.560 --> 37:18.240]  You know, anybody can go to the website and watch this live.
[37:18.240 --> 37:19.240]  Anybody can do this.
[37:19.320 --> 37:20.040]  It's not hard.
[37:20.160 --> 37:21.520]  We did it on the air once.
[37:22.140 --> 37:23.740]  Maybe I shouldn't tell people that, but we did.
[37:23.740 --> 37:28.560]  I have to say, if this is Hezbollah's man in New York City, then we in New York City are safe from Hezbollah.
[37:28.700 --> 37:31.200]  Well, that's what these federal prosecutors would have you believe.
[37:32.140 --> 37:39.700]  And they continue saying, he did all this to bring the Hezbollah operations to our shores, to allow Hezbollah to have their operations here in New York City.
[37:39.740 --> 37:40.720]  That's a very dangerous thing.
[37:40.820 --> 37:41.900]  That's what this crime is all about.
[37:42.100 --> 37:50.400]  You know, if he actually was doing that, I think he would have brought their operations to our shores and started doing bad things like going to that website and blowing things up.
[37:50.960 --> 37:51.940]  Might have done that.
[37:52.440 --> 37:55.620]  Looking at a TV station, is that really as bad?
[37:55.800 --> 37:59.540]  Maybe that would allow us to see what they're up to, to learn something about them.
[37:59.700 --> 38:03.160]  I didn't know that the government even had the authority to ban any channels.
[38:03.320 --> 38:04.980]  Yeah, that's where I was a couple of years ago.
[38:05.020 --> 38:06.160]  I didn't think that was even the case.
[38:06.180 --> 38:07.420]  This is a free-to-air station?
[38:07.740 --> 38:08.880]  As far as I know, it was.
[38:09.000 --> 38:11.780]  He didn't really bring it in, kind of radio waves.
[38:12.020 --> 38:17.360]  He just received it off a satellite and then passed it on to other people that paid a particular fee.
[38:17.360 --> 38:19.440]  And it's worth noting that... I'm sorry, Bernie.
[38:19.580 --> 38:22.180]  It's worth noting that this guy ran a satellite TV business.
[38:22.220 --> 38:22.700]  It's what he did.
[38:22.800 --> 38:24.800]  He wasn't just bringing Hezbollah over with his equipment.
[38:25.080 --> 38:27.460]  This was one channel among... he brought in Christian channels.
[38:27.560 --> 38:31.700]  He brought in regular channels, pornography channels, every kind of channel his customers would run.
[38:31.720 --> 38:32.460]  I'm sure they'll charge him for that, too.
[38:32.620 --> 38:33.120]  Yeah, but...
[38:33.120 --> 38:35.960]  It wasn't like he just existed to bring in Hezbollah.
[38:35.960 --> 38:38.900]  He just saw one more channel that he could feed to his customers and figured, okay.
[38:39.220 --> 38:41.940]  And it strikes me as insane that nobody sees that.
[38:42.040 --> 38:43.200]  Nobody sees that that's what this is about.
[38:43.200 --> 38:57.960]  Unless there is something else in this case, and I have seen nothing brought up that would indicate this guy was somehow tied with a terrorist organization or had some other agenda other than making a buck, sending some channel that nobody else could get to people that wanted to receive it.
[38:58.100 --> 39:02.600]  Now, have the people who received that channel, have they also been investigated for watching a forbidden channel?
[39:02.780 --> 39:03.540]  You have to wonder.
[39:03.880 --> 39:04.180]  Bernie.
[39:04.900 --> 39:13.820]  Yeah, what's interesting is that the term of art here, the legal term of art, seems to be providing material support.
[39:14.120 --> 39:15.720]  And the U.S.
[39:15.860 --> 39:40.500]  government seems to feel, in this case, that simply providing programming of Hezbollah, which is the channel called Almanar, which you provided the audio on this very station on several months ago, in an act of defiance, I admire you, that alone constitutes providing material support to a terrorist organization.
[39:40.500 --> 39:41.760]  And now the U.S.
[39:41.820 --> 39:59.660]  government had declared a few years ago Hezbollah to be a terrorist organization, and that therefore any TV channel or anything else from them, which is recruiting people or encouraging people to support Almanar, just providing that or simulcasting that to another person,
[39:59.880 --> 40:04.480]  our government now considers that providing material support to a terrorist organization.
[40:04.480 --> 40:06.080]  I have a real problem with that.
[40:06.200 --> 40:12.760]  I think it's a direct violation against the First Amendment, even though it wasn't this guy's own speech.
[40:12.760 --> 40:14.620]  He was providing somebody else's speech.
[40:14.620 --> 40:17.880]  But it's just ludicrous that that's considered providing material support.
[40:17.900 --> 40:22.060]  He provided no money directly himself to Hezbollah.
[40:22.160 --> 40:24.840]  Now, whether some of his viewers did or not, shouldn't be his problem.
[40:24.840 --> 40:25.320]  Wait a minute.
[40:25.400 --> 40:25.780]  Wait, wait, wait.
[40:25.860 --> 40:27.180]  You mean he got the signal?
[40:27.180 --> 40:29.760]  He got the satellite signal and he didn't compensate Hezbollah?
[40:29.900 --> 40:31.500]  It sounds like he's stealing from Hezbollah.
[40:31.560 --> 40:32.060]  It's a free signal.
[40:32.220 --> 40:33.260]  And they don't charge for this.
[40:33.400 --> 40:36.160]  Well, shouldn't they be compensated for the work that they're putting into the channel?
[40:36.640 --> 40:39.060]  Not like HBO, where they charge the cable.
[40:39.060 --> 40:40.280]  Oh, I think it is a lot like HBO.
[40:40.280 --> 40:45.200]  They blow people up on that channel all the time, and it looks kind of, you know, not the kind of thing you'd see on commercial television.
[40:45.360 --> 40:47.160]  I just, you know, I'm not trying to get the guy in more trouble.
[40:47.220 --> 40:51.240]  I just think that there's a case here for clear infringement against Hezbollah's rights.
[40:51.700 --> 40:53.060]  No, they don't copyright it.
[40:53.660 --> 40:55.260]  Hezbollah did not copyright Almanar.
[40:55.440 --> 40:56.140]  How do you know that?
[40:56.240 --> 40:57.240]  How do you know they don't copyright it?
[40:57.360 --> 40:58.420]  It's free to air.
[40:58.640 --> 40:59.560]  Anybody can receive it.
[40:59.600 --> 41:01.660]  I was at a radio conference a couple, three years ago.
[41:02.240 --> 41:04.740]  In fact, I was there with Redbird and Jones.
[41:06.180 --> 41:14.920]  And we were watching some guy set up something on the roof of the hotel, and we were watching free to air stuff, and we stumbled across Almanar.
[41:15.220 --> 41:27.660]  And coincidentally, there was a guy from Voice of America setting up a demo at the next table, and he saw it, and he turned a very pale shade of white, his face, when he saw that, realizing that, oh, I don't want to be around this programming.
[41:27.860 --> 41:30.440]  But I'm just trying to show how easy this is to receive.
[41:30.800 --> 41:34.000]  And that this guy got, what, six years in federal prison?
[41:34.120 --> 41:34.820]  Could have gotten 15.
[41:34.900 --> 41:36.660]  He could have gotten 15 years for this.
[41:36.760 --> 41:37.320]  Can you believe that?
[41:37.380 --> 41:38.120]  Oh, it's much better.
[41:38.180 --> 41:38.740]  Only six.
[41:38.860 --> 41:40.040]  And this is ludicrous.
[41:40.040 --> 41:52.940]  I mean, I hope this is appealed, because this really is dangerous, that our government can criminalize with such severe penalties simply providing a TV channel, regardless of content, to third parties.
[41:53.200 --> 41:54.700]  That's just insane.
[41:54.880 --> 41:56.520]  But this guy has already been humbled quite a bit.
[41:56.640 --> 42:02.220]  He had to say that it was a mistake, it hurt me financially, emotionally, physically, all that kind of thing.
[42:03.160 --> 42:10.100]  And, you know, I prefer the Pirate Bay attitude, where this is insane, we're going to fight this, you're not getting a penny from me, that kind of thing.
[42:10.320 --> 42:16.520]  And I know it's hard for regular people to do that, but sometimes you have to when such an insane case like this.
[42:16.840 --> 42:28.400]  Emmanuel, when you're before a federal judge, and I speak from experience, when you're before a federal judge, and the rules of the game are, you have to show contrition, regardless of what it was you did.
[42:28.500 --> 42:28.600]  Right.
[42:28.780 --> 42:30.320]  Because that's all the judge wants to hear.
[42:30.560 --> 42:31.720]  They want to hear contrition.
[42:31.720 --> 42:37.080]  If you're not, if the judge doesn't think you're, believe you're contrite, your sentence is going to be more severe.
[42:37.320 --> 42:41.560]  He knew that he was going to get sentenced more years if he didn't say that.
[42:41.740 --> 42:46.460]  You know, it's very easy for us to say on the outside, yeah, well, he should have said this is insane.
[42:46.960 --> 42:51.060]  I didn't hurt anybody, and this is crazy, this federal case.
[42:51.520 --> 42:53.500]  You know, if he said that, he would have got 15 years.
[42:53.660 --> 42:55.440]  So you've got to put yourself in that guy's shoes.
[42:55.500 --> 42:59.540]  I know, but you get 69 months, and you have to act contrite.
[42:59.640 --> 43:00.820]  I don't know if I could pull that off.
[43:00.820 --> 43:02.420]  I don't know how contrite I could be.
[43:02.540 --> 43:04.280]  I mean, yeah, I understand exactly what you're saying.
[43:04.340 --> 43:12.760]  I just went through it myself with the customs people where I was, you know, shaking and feeling guilty, but when I wasn't doing anything wrong, just because they kept questioning me over and over again.
[43:12.840 --> 43:14.640]  That pales in comparison to something like this.
[43:16.080 --> 43:22.260]  But maybe more people should just be speaking out and saying this is wrong, and this guy should not have to go through this, and neither should his family.
[43:23.280 --> 43:23.780]  So, I don't know.
[43:23.820 --> 43:31.380]  I hope it's appealed, and it's a very interesting case, and it really does not bode well for freedom of speech in this country.
[43:31.620 --> 43:41.900]  Well, if those people are interested in pursuing this a little bit more and maybe looking something up about it, the guy's name is, I'm probably pronouncing it wrong, Javed, J-A-V-E-D, Iqbal, I-Q-B-A-L.
[43:42.020 --> 43:45.580]  So, if you plug that into Google, I'm sure you'll get some more information about it.
[43:45.640 --> 43:53.400]  He came to the United States from Pakistan as a teenager and ran his business from a Brooklyn storefront in the garage of his home in Mariner's Harbor, Staten Island.
[43:53.800 --> 43:55.680]  And he had satellite dishes in the backyard.
[43:57.320 --> 44:03.660]  And, yeah, that basically started the long descent into trouble with the federal authorities.
[44:05.060 --> 44:07.200]  Okay, let's read a couple of letters and take some phone calls.
[44:07.300 --> 44:09.420]  212-209-2900.
[44:09.600 --> 44:14.800]  Speaking of my fun at the border, we got a number of pieces of mail from people with all sorts of tips.
[44:15.540 --> 44:18.160]  And, Fred, in fact, you were on Off the Wall last night.
[44:18.580 --> 44:21.760]  We aired that part where we went across the U.S.
[44:21.860 --> 44:23.000]  border last Monday.
[44:23.000 --> 44:24.160]  And we tried.
[44:24.360 --> 44:27.080]  We tried to get across without meeting a border guard.
[44:27.180 --> 44:29.460]  We tried to go down a back road, but we took a wrong turn.
[44:29.720 --> 44:31.080]  No, actually, we missed the turn.
[44:31.260 --> 44:35.000]  We went straight ahead and stumbled accidentally onto the...
[44:35.780 --> 44:37.260]  It fell right into their laps.
[44:37.720 --> 44:38.920]  It wasn't so bad this time.
[44:39.000 --> 44:39.960]  They did search the car.
[44:40.200 --> 44:42.000]  They didn't find what you were smuggling into.
[44:42.000 --> 44:42.580]  No, they didn't.
[44:42.800 --> 44:43.820]  We're not going to talk about that.
[44:44.640 --> 44:53.660]  But, dear Manuel, listening to you complaining justly about your treatment at the border, and this was the previous crossing where I got held up for over an hour, it seems to me that you have the makings of a new movie on the subject of the U.S.
[44:53.720 --> 44:59.460]  Canada and the border and the proto-fascists who work there, signed Tom, who defines himself as a generalist.
[44:59.980 --> 45:00.740]  A generalist.
[45:00.800 --> 45:02.320]  Sounds like a journalist, but a generalist.
[45:02.400 --> 45:02.720]  I like that.
[45:03.380 --> 45:05.980]  Dear Manuel, just been catching up on the recent podcasts.
[45:06.260 --> 45:08.080]  Yes, we're a podcast as well as a broadcast.
[45:08.740 --> 45:18.600]  After having come back from my holiday in the sunnier climate of Portugal, I noted with some interest your recent comments regarding all the hassle you got at the border crossing when coming back into the U.S.
[45:18.600 --> 45:23.580]  I encountered something similar at border-slash-passport control when coming back into the U.K.
[45:24.040 --> 45:25.520]  after the aforementioned holiday.
[45:26.180 --> 45:30.160]  Whilst on my way off the flight, I sent a text message to a friend.
[45:30.380 --> 45:35.640]  At this point, I hadn't gone back into the airport building, John Lennon Airport in Liverpool, by the way.
[45:35.700 --> 45:36.320]  That is so cool.
[45:37.060 --> 45:40.380]  While in the passport hall, my phone rang, so I answered it.
[45:40.440 --> 45:43.900]  Within minutes, a guy was standing at my side shouting at me to switch my phone off.
[45:43.900 --> 45:45.360]  I think probably within seconds, not minutes.
[45:45.520 --> 45:46.560]  Minutes are taking a long time.
[45:47.100 --> 45:49.980]  I don't travel much, so I wasn't aware that this was normal practice.
[45:50.180 --> 45:52.580]  And where were the signs to tell me to switch my phone off?
[45:53.160 --> 45:59.900]  By the border-controlled passport desk, they were about as big as an A4 sheet, which is about as big as an 8.5x11 sheet.
[46:00.000 --> 46:00.780]  Not very big at all.
[46:01.340 --> 46:06.780]  I kind of guess my point here is, what can I do in a passport hall that could potentially put people at risk?
[46:06.900 --> 46:09.500]  Surely I'm in a queue and my phone rings, so I'll answer it.
[46:09.640 --> 46:11.600]  In what way does this make me some sort of threat?
[46:11.660 --> 46:13.620]  Or is it a reason for me to have my phone switched off?
[46:13.620 --> 46:16.960]  The world has gone a tad crazy, signed Mark.
[46:17.740 --> 46:19.800]  Well, does anybody have any answer for Mark here?
[46:19.860 --> 46:22.360]  Is it that same Nokia phone that we were talking about earlier?
[46:22.380 --> 46:25.020]  It was not the 1100 as far as I know, but it could have been.
[46:25.140 --> 46:26.160]  Maybe that's what they're concerned about?
[46:27.520 --> 46:33.600]  It is possible to rig explosives to be set off by phone calls, and they might use that as an excuse to...
[46:33.600 --> 46:36.180]  How do you get the explosives onto the plane in the first place?
[46:36.260 --> 46:37.180]  You're just getting off of the plane.
[46:37.180 --> 46:38.980]  I didn't say it made sense, but...
[46:38.980 --> 46:39.960]  Why don't you just bring a detonator?
[46:40.200 --> 46:44.140]  These are one of the arguments against being allowed to use cell phones in the New York subway.
[46:44.880 --> 46:46.360]  Well, yeah, it's a stupid argument.
[46:46.640 --> 46:47.400]  Wait a minute, though.
[46:47.460 --> 46:50.640]  But if you put the explosives to be...
[46:50.640 --> 46:54.920]  that you could call them from a cell phone, then why would you have to stay in the airport to call?
[46:55.000 --> 46:55.680]  Exactly, yeah.
[46:56.220 --> 46:58.760]  You can run all kinds of holes through that logic.
[46:59.700 --> 47:01.300]  Okay, you're off the hook.
[47:01.540 --> 47:04.000]  I was listening to the podcast from the April 15th show.
[47:04.000 --> 47:06.720]  It reminded me of my own border crossing experience back in March.
[47:06.780 --> 47:12.920]  I was going down to Michigan from Ontario, that's exactly what I was doing, to do some shopping at the outlet malls in Birch Run.
[47:13.260 --> 47:15.620]  We came to the border and got into one of the lines.
[47:15.740 --> 47:21.200]  It was interesting to see two border guards walking in between all the cars with a dog sniffing all around, searching for narcotics.
[47:21.620 --> 47:24.800]  Upon finally reaching customs, we handed over our passports and we waited.
[47:25.120 --> 47:28.220]  I've been across the border several times and have never had an issue crossing.
[47:28.420 --> 47:34.860]  The wait was far longer than I'd ever remembered it, and I glimpsed four border guards tossing looks at my car and conversing amongst one another.
[47:35.340 --> 47:39.720]  Eventually, the guard in the booth asked me to follow one of the guards to a separate lane and to park my car.
[47:39.960 --> 47:43.500]  My girlfriend and I were nervous as we had no idea what could possibly be going on.
[47:43.700 --> 47:55.980]  We waited for about a half hour before someone came by and said that when we were passing through the border, the scanner had picked up something, but that they weren't sure if it was from our car or from one of the other vehicles that was parked alongside ours.
[47:56.520 --> 47:59.380]  The guard apologized for the wait and then went off about his business.
[47:59.500 --> 48:04.040]  I grabbed my cell phone and called some people that we were meeting down in Michigan to let them know that I would be a little late.
[48:04.160 --> 48:05.720]  Apparently, it was okay to do it then.
[48:06.400 --> 48:09.580]  At this point, another guard came by and gave us a third degree.
[48:09.720 --> 48:11.940]  He asked the same questions over and over in different words.
[48:11.940 --> 48:13.320]  How much cash are you carrying with you?
[48:13.380 --> 48:13.960]  Where are you going?
[48:14.160 --> 48:15.540]  What hotel are you staying at?
[48:15.600 --> 48:16.340]  Where are you coming from?
[48:16.840 --> 48:19.740]  And I answered each question quickly and concisely.
[48:19.940 --> 48:21.780]  The guard finally gave up and went away.
[48:22.160 --> 48:26.640]  Then another guard, by far the nicest we had encountered thus far, asked us to drive through another scanner.
[48:26.640 --> 48:34.520]  We obliged, and upon exiting the scanner, the guard asked if either of us had been subject to any medical procedures in the past little while.
[48:34.860 --> 48:41.540]  I had, in fact, had a wound that was packed daily with a compound called Idoform, which contains a form of iodine.
[48:41.860 --> 48:48.960]  The officer said that they had picked up the iodine on the scanner and then asked me to drive through it one more time with the iodine filter turned off.
[48:49.140 --> 48:51.380]  I did so, and the scanner didn't go off this time, apparently.
[48:51.600 --> 48:54.100]  And at this point, the guards sent me on my way.
[48:54.580 --> 48:56.060]  Going back to Canada was a breeze.
[48:56.220 --> 48:59.840]  They asked the total price of items we had purchased on our trip and thanked us and sent us on our way.
[49:00.000 --> 49:01.380]  Canada's always great like that.
[49:01.900 --> 49:08.160]  Your story, though, has me worried about the next time I have to go across the border and whether my experience this time will hinder all my future crossings.
[49:08.860 --> 49:10.160]  Signed, Aaron from Hamilton.
[49:10.640 --> 49:12.000]  You guys ever hear of anything like this?
[49:12.160 --> 49:12.600]  Iodine?
[49:12.780 --> 49:13.540]  Setting it off?
[49:13.980 --> 49:23.480]  I just would love to know what exactly about iodine is worth having in a dangerous material detection system.
[49:23.480 --> 49:23.640]  Mike?
[49:23.740 --> 49:26.220]  You can plug it into that website and find out what it...
[49:26.220 --> 49:27.820]  You know, I'm done with that website.
[49:28.000 --> 49:28.500]  It's too...
[49:28.500 --> 49:29.200]  Not today.
[49:29.380 --> 49:29.500]  Yeah.
[49:29.760 --> 49:30.260]  At your leisure.
[49:30.420 --> 49:31.020]  Bernie, you had something?
[49:31.540 --> 49:44.180]  I was going to say, I mean, anybody who was up to mischief could just sort of like pour iodine out the window or dump it out of their car on their way to the custom station in border crossing.
[49:44.180 --> 49:49.960]  And it would get on all the tires of all the cars and then it would just cause mass chaos there whenever any car went through there.
[49:49.960 --> 49:51.900]  But nobody like us would do that.
[49:52.060 --> 49:52.240]  Mitch?
[49:53.300 --> 50:04.560]  Well, at a Maker Faire, I learned that you cannot sell iodine in chemistry sets because the DEA thinks that you can make some kind of drug with it.
[50:04.800 --> 50:06.600]  So maybe it's something to do with that.
[50:06.760 --> 50:09.460]  So you used to be able to buy iodine in little bottles at a drugstore.
[50:09.460 --> 50:10.360]  You can't do that anymore.
[50:10.400 --> 50:10.980]  I bet I don't understand.
[50:11.420 --> 50:13.380]  You can't buy iodine in a drugstore?
[50:13.660 --> 50:16.280]  Yeah, like the liquid iodine, the brown stuff.
[50:16.300 --> 50:18.860]  Yeah, evidently you can't buy that in a drugstore anymore.
[50:18.860 --> 50:19.240]  Really?
[50:19.340 --> 50:20.140]  So where do you have to buy it?
[50:20.420 --> 50:21.520]  Oh, you have to make your own.
[50:22.540 --> 50:33.220]  That kind of worries me because there's actually an application of iodine that can help protect, I think, your thyroid from certain radiation poisonings.
[50:35.120 --> 50:37.420]  So if you can't buy iodine and...
[50:38.720 --> 50:44.980]  Well, yeah, except that if you needed it for a medical or some sort of serious situation, I'm sure you could acquire it somehow.
[50:45.120 --> 50:46.540]  It's not like iodine is non-existent.
[50:46.540 --> 50:50.360]  I mean, they use it, don't they, that's what they put on my arm when they take blood, right?
[50:50.420 --> 50:51.060]  That's iodine.
[50:51.300 --> 50:52.620]  So it's not like it's inaccessible.
[50:52.940 --> 50:54.940]  It's just, you can't go to a drugstore and buy it.
[50:55.080 --> 50:55.440]  Bernie, go ahead.
[50:56.060 --> 51:13.860]  Yeah, the, some federal agency just, I think it was a nuclear regulatory agency or something like that, just recently released a whole bunch of iodine tablets to folks at a, an Indian reservation that was near a nuclear power plant saying that, you know,
[51:13.940 --> 51:17.620]  you're going to need these tablets if this power plant, if a nuclear power plant has a leak.
[51:17.780 --> 51:21.900]  So the federal government is itself distributing iodine tablets to U.S.
[51:21.940 --> 51:25.600]  citizens, albeit those on a, on a Native American reservation.
[51:25.600 --> 51:38.760]  So, you know, it's, it's, it's, it's, there's, there's legitimate reasons to have iodine tablets should you want to protect yourself against, you know, whether there's a nuclear holocaust or a nuclear power plant that goes awry.
[51:39.020 --> 51:43.160]  Okay, well, I want to move to the phone, so I'll, if I don't write the last word on this and I'll take some phone calls.
[51:43.380 --> 51:52.860]  I was going to say that I originally lived in a similar situation where I was within a 10-mile radius of some nuclear facility and the government said, in such a case, you need to have iodine.
[51:52.860 --> 51:57.820]  And they didn't give it to us, but they said, you know, if you're drinking water, put iodine in it, all sorts of stuff like that.
[51:57.820 --> 52:00.720]  I'm sure we'll get all kinds of tips on how to get iodine to our heart's content from our listeners.
[52:00.980 --> 52:02.360]  Okay, let's hear from some of them now.
[52:03.520 --> 52:04.800]  That was one that went away.
[52:05.060 --> 52:06.080]  Let's hear from one over here.
[52:06.140 --> 52:06.500]  Good evening.
[52:06.880 --> 52:09.520]  You're, oh boy, you see, you've got to move fast with this stupid phone system.
[52:10.220 --> 52:10.820]  Good evening.
[52:11.420 --> 52:12.140]  You're on off the hook.
[52:13.240 --> 52:13.660]  Speak up.
[52:13.720 --> 52:13.840]  Hi.
[52:14.320 --> 52:14.820]  Good afternoon.
[52:15.120 --> 52:15.300]  Hi.
[52:16.200 --> 52:20.540]  Hi, um, question, I've been in Mexico City for the last month.
[52:20.760 --> 52:22.680]  I'm sorry, what about Mexico City for the last month?
[52:22.860 --> 52:24.280]  I've been working down there.
[52:24.560 --> 52:26.260]  Okay, but you're not down there right now, right?
[52:26.940 --> 52:28.080]  I just came back yesterday.
[52:28.080 --> 52:29.320]  I'm going back again soon.
[52:29.520 --> 52:29.820]  Oh boy.
[52:30.180 --> 52:31.500]  Well, you're brave, aren't you?
[52:32.000 --> 52:33.840]  I just did a border crossing yesterday.
[52:34.020 --> 52:34.220]  Uh-huh.
[52:34.480 --> 52:38.500]  Yeah, now, okay, what's the border crossing like now with the swine flu thing going on down there?
[52:38.500 --> 52:43.080]  Um, actually, I've flown into LAX a few times and usually they pull you right up to the border.
[52:43.220 --> 52:52.120]  This particular time, we landed out in the middle of the tarmac and we unloaded onto a bus and we came into a back door of the building.
[52:52.120 --> 52:58.080]  So, we weren't hooked up to the, uh, main terminal at all.
[52:58.260 --> 52:58.640]  Uh-huh.
[52:58.840 --> 53:03.560]  And there was, you know, likewise on the flight, they're not, obviously not distributing pillows and blankets.
[53:03.900 --> 53:06.520]  And did they ask you questions through a bullhorn or something?
[53:06.720 --> 53:09.060]  It seemed like they wanted to keep as far away from you as possible.
[53:09.620 --> 53:19.120]  No, the, um, you know, going, Mexico City Airport was pretty busy yesterday because there's a lot of people that are worried about, uh, the who level going up and not being able to get out.
[53:19.380 --> 53:19.580]  Uh-huh.
[53:19.800 --> 53:24.580]  So, they just had to fill out a paper indicating if you have these symptoms.
[53:24.800 --> 53:26.400]  There was probably about 10 symptoms on there.
[53:26.740 --> 53:33.340]  And if you have the symptoms, they recommend you not go on your flight and, uh, go see a doctor immediately.
[53:33.920 --> 53:35.060]  But that was about it.
[53:35.140 --> 53:38.320]  I mean, there's no real scanning process to get in.
[53:38.320 --> 53:41.980]  And then once we got into the border, you know, pretty much business as usual.
[53:43.200 --> 53:46.380]  Can I say something about this whole swine flu, hullabaloo?
[53:47.220 --> 53:48.560]  Nobody's died from swine flu.
[53:49.160 --> 53:51.900]  And, but 36,000 people a year die from the regular flu.
[53:51.900 --> 53:52.940]  What do you mean nobody's died from swine flu?
[53:52.960 --> 53:53.880]  Not in the U.S.
[53:53.880 --> 53:54.180]  I'm sorry.
[53:54.420 --> 53:54.940]  Excuse me.
[53:55.000 --> 53:56.360]  Somebody did die today in the U.S.
[53:56.360 --> 53:56.980]  So, there you go.
[53:57.100 --> 53:57.280]  Well, I missed that.
[53:57.280 --> 53:57.440]  Yeah.
[53:57.580 --> 54:01.220]  But even so, 36,000 people, Americans a year die from the normal flu.
[54:01.440 --> 54:01.680]  Oh, yeah.
[54:01.680 --> 54:05.080]  So, you know, what's, what's the big fuss about?
[54:05.500 --> 54:08.180]  Well, I'm sure, uh, I have to see that it's a hype machine.
[54:08.180 --> 54:15.260]  It's a hype machine in overdrive because being in Mexico City is a bit surreal from Friday until, you know, just, uh, yesterday.
[54:15.640 --> 54:23.240]  The, the fear factor and the tension and everything being closed, all the movie theaters, all the churches, um, all the football stadiums.
[54:23.260 --> 54:23.440]  Right.
[54:24.040 --> 54:24.980]  Everything is closed.
[54:25.220 --> 54:27.780]  So, it's, uh, this weekend was a literal ghost town.
[54:28.160 --> 54:35.500]  People are just afraid of the rare but, like, I don't know, tragic death, I guess, but not of the common things that happen all the time.
[54:35.500 --> 54:39.080]  People, it's the World Health Organization, uh, issuing, issuing...
[54:39.080 --> 54:40.220]  The whole thing is ridiculous.
[54:40.480 --> 54:44.580]  Okay, well, the thing is, it's a, it's a pandemic, uh, fear, which is different than...
[54:44.580 --> 54:45.820]  Fear, but it's not an actual...
[54:45.820 --> 54:47.180]  ...domestic influenza that happens every year.
[54:47.180 --> 54:47.540]  It's not an actual epidemic.
[54:47.540 --> 54:48.400]  It's just a fear.
[54:48.600 --> 54:52.400]  The hype machine that we're all talking about is, uh, the pandemic fear.
[54:52.480 --> 54:55.580]  They have, people have been waiting for a pandemic for the past, uh, few years.
[54:55.700 --> 54:57.740]  I've been seeing news reports constantly going out about it.
[54:57.880 --> 54:58.020]  Right.
[54:58.020 --> 55:03.540]  So, now that there's this, uh, disease that's been spreading pretty fast, everyone's saying, is this the pandemic we've been talking about?
[55:04.020 --> 55:04.560]  Right, right.
[55:05.020 --> 55:06.460]  All right, let's take, uh, another phone call.
[55:06.740 --> 55:08.480]  Good evening, you're on Off the Hook.
[55:09.620 --> 55:10.120]  Speak up.
[55:10.160 --> 55:10.280]  Yes, hello?
[55:10.500 --> 55:10.960]  Yes, go ahead.
[55:11.500 --> 55:14.460]  Yeah, um, am I on the air?
[55:14.460 --> 55:15.120]  Yes, you're on the air.
[55:15.220 --> 55:15.540]  Hurry up.
[55:15.740 --> 55:23.900]  Okay, I wanted to weigh in, um, on the, uh, the, the fellow that was, um, just in federal court.
[55:24.440 --> 55:26.360]  Okay, the, the, wait, which, which one?
[55:26.880 --> 55:27.480]  There's a few.
[55:27.660 --> 55:29.780]  The guy who was broadcasting Al Minar?
[55:29.880 --> 55:30.500]  Right, Al Minar.
[55:30.600 --> 55:31.020]  Okay, go ahead.
[55:31.360 --> 55:34.520]  Okay, um, here's my comment on this.
[55:34.780 --> 55:38.960]  Uh, Al Minar used to be broadcast on satellite in the U.S.
[55:39.020 --> 55:48.220]  for quite a while, um, on DirecTV, on the station, uh, World Link, on the Mosaic News Network, which is a...
[55:48.220 --> 55:49.120]  I'm familiar with them, yes.
[55:49.320 --> 55:49.540]  Okay.
[55:49.540 --> 55:51.820]  You're saying they used to rebroadcast Al Minar on that channel?
[55:52.080 --> 55:53.060]  They used to, right.
[55:53.060 --> 56:08.480]  They had an English version of Al Minar, and, uh, right around the time is, uh, uh, I didn't have time to double-check this, so please bear with me, um, right around the time that Israel invaded Lebanon...
[56:08.480 --> 56:08.880]  Which time?
[56:09.380 --> 56:10.160]  ...2006, right?
[56:10.320 --> 56:10.700]  Which time?
[56:11.580 --> 56:21.060]  In 2006 is when Al Minar was, uh, declared a terrorist network and operation, et cetera, et cetera.
[56:21.200 --> 56:41.260]  But I can tell you, as a long-time viewer of it, um, there was absolutely nothing about it, except for, in a very perverted interpretation, uh, would they, uh, try to, uh, to, uh, apply the phrase terrorist to it, because they really told the story from an Arab perspective,
[56:41.980 --> 56:49.820]  uh, i.e., just for starters, they always referred to the Israeli army as the Israeli occupation force rather than defense force.
[56:50.180 --> 57:06.180]  And, uh, apparently a lot of people found that abrasive, uh, and, and kind of coincidentally, uh, not long after Al Minar was removed, uh, the Israeli news station was given a lot more airtime on the mosaic.
[57:06.440 --> 57:07.280]  Thanks, thanks for the info.
[57:07.420 --> 57:09.800]  We're going to have to leave it there, though, because we are out of time.
[57:09.940 --> 57:11.760]  I want to thank people for listening and for, uh, writing in.
[57:11.860 --> 57:14.380]  OTH at 2600.com is our email address.
[57:14.600 --> 57:17.760]  Hope to see you all at the 2600 meetings around the world this Friday coming up.
[57:18.500 --> 57:23.320]  And we're going out with, uh, another phone-related piece from a band called Plaid.
[57:23.800 --> 57:24.380]  Have a good night.
[57:42.340 --> 57:43.080]  Hello.
[57:43.080 --> 57:43.820]  Hello.
[57:44.600 --> 57:45.340]  Hello.
[57:46.520 --> 57:46.980]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.180 --> 57:47.180]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.200]  Hello.
[57:47.200 --> 57:47.400]  Hello.
[57:47.400 --> 57:47.400]  Hello.
[57:47.400 --> 57:47.400]  Hello.
[57:47.660 --> 57:48.400]  Hello.
[57:54.160 --> 57:54.160]  Hello.
[57:54.160 --> 57:54.160]  Hello.
[57:54.160 --> 57:54.160]  Hello.
[57:54.160 --> 57:54.160]  Hello.
[57:54.160 --> 57:54.160]  Hello.
[57:54.160 --> 57:54.160]  Hello.
[57:54.160 --> 57:54.160]  Hello.
[57:54.160 --> 57:54.160]  Hello.
[57:54.160 --> 57:54.180]  Hello.
[57:54.240 --> 57:54.240]  Hello.
[57:54.240 --> 57:54.240]  Hello.
[57:54.240 --> 57:54.240]  Hello.
[57:54.240 --> 57:54.240]  Hello.
[57:54.240 --> 57:54.240]  Hello.
[57:54.240 --> 57:54.240]  Hello.
[57:54.240 --> 57:54.240]  Hello.
[57:54.240 --> 57:54.240]  Hello.
[57:54.240 --> 57:54.240]  Hello.
[57:54.320 --> 57:54.320]  Hello.
[57:54.320 --> 57:54.320]  Hello.
[57:54.320 --> 57:54.320]  Hello.
[57:54.320 --> 57:54.320]  Hello.
[57:54.360 --> 57:54.360]  Hello.
[57:54.360 --> 57:54.640]  Hello.
[57:54.640 --> 57:54.640]  Hello.
[57:54.640 --> 57:54.880]  Hello.
[57:54.880 --> 57:54.880]  Hello.
[57:54.880 --> 57:54.880]  Hello.
[57:55.140 --> 57:55.140]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.260 --> 57:55.260]  Hello.
[57:55.640 --> 57:56.380]  Hello.
[57:58.420 --> 57:59.160]  Hello.
[58:02.700 --> 58:03.440]  Hello
[59:14.250 --> 59:16.990]  And this is the second one.
[01:00:14.700 --> 01:00:19.480]  Man, these guys are off the hook with this stuff.