[00:03.200 --> 00:06.620]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:06.840 --> 00:07.900]  It's 7 o'clock.
[00:08.020 --> 00:10.880]  Time once again for another exciting edition of Off the Hook.
[00:16.020 --> 00:18.000]  The telephone keeps ringing.
[00:18.400 --> 00:20.540]  So I ripped it off the wall.
[00:21.460 --> 00:23.500]  I cut myself while shaving.
[00:24.060 --> 00:26.040]  Now I can't make a call.
[00:26.860 --> 00:28.860]  We couldn't get much worse.
[00:31.640 --> 00:34.320]  Bum-diddly-bum for the best, expect the worst.
[00:34.860 --> 00:36.800]  I hope that's understood.
[00:37.020 --> 00:37.800]  Bum-diddly-bum!
[01:53.950 --> 01:54.750]  And good evening to everybody.
[01:54.870 --> 01:55.650]  The program is Off the Hook.
[01:55.730 --> 01:58.630]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:00.030 --> 02:01.590]  First week of June.
[02:02.010 --> 02:04.990]  And welcome tonight to Bernie S.
[02:05.090 --> 02:05.550]  down in Philadelphia.
[02:06.470 --> 02:07.470]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:07.770 --> 02:08.750]  Mike here in New York.
[02:09.050 --> 02:09.390]  Hi.
[02:09.610 --> 02:10.570]  Joined by Gus.
[02:10.710 --> 02:11.210]  Oh, hi.
[02:11.330 --> 02:11.610]  Red Hack.
[02:11.750 --> 02:11.930]  Hello.
[02:12.090 --> 02:12.350]  Rob T.
[02:12.550 --> 02:12.890]  Firefly.
[02:13.050 --> 02:13.310]  Good evening.
[02:13.430 --> 02:13.690]  Matt Kevin.
[02:13.930 --> 02:14.110]  Hello.
[02:14.230 --> 02:14.870]  And Voltaire.
[02:14.990 --> 02:15.190]  Hello.
[02:15.850 --> 02:18.470]  Yeah, we have a lot of people to thank.
[02:18.470 --> 02:18.930]  We really do.
[02:19.050 --> 02:20.250]  And let's get right to this.
[02:20.250 --> 02:23.030]  Because we had an amazing fun drive over the last four weeks.
[02:23.270 --> 02:24.990]  Not just us, but the entire station.
[02:24.990 --> 02:25.830]  We did very well.
[02:26.570 --> 02:29.250]  We actually went over our goals.
[02:29.830 --> 02:32.590]  And it's a good sign of things to come.
[02:32.610 --> 02:38.990]  That we're going to be strong and have all kinds of improvements and good programming ahead.
[02:39.250 --> 02:41.590]  And it's only because of our listeners that this is possible.
[02:41.730 --> 02:45.270]  So what in God's name is going on down there, Bernie?
[02:45.510 --> 02:46.270]  You have a theme now?
[02:46.310 --> 02:46.550]  Oh, I'm sorry.
[02:47.730 --> 02:48.730]  That won't happen again.
[02:48.770 --> 02:49.110]  My fault.
[02:49.110 --> 02:50.090]  Well, I kind of liked it.
[02:50.130 --> 02:50.470]  What was it?
[02:50.530 --> 02:51.610]  Sort of like your musical theme?
[02:52.670 --> 02:53.270]  No, it's not.
[02:53.370 --> 02:55.210]  It was just computer sounds.
[02:55.430 --> 02:58.230]  But yeah, I think that's Bill Gates' musical theme.
[02:58.350 --> 02:59.870]  There's some proprietary software there.
[02:59.910 --> 03:01.210]  Yeah, we might have to pay a fee for that.
[03:01.310 --> 03:02.110]  That's for the next show.
[03:02.210 --> 03:04.530]  Okay, we divided this up into four weeks.
[03:04.570 --> 03:06.070]  And basically, we're thanking everybody right now.
[03:07.770 --> 03:10.090]  So let's just go quickly through the list.
[03:10.090 --> 03:11.390]  This is for week number one.
[03:11.490 --> 03:13.210]  We want to thank Stanislau from Pelham.
[03:14.710 --> 03:15.090]  Oh, sorry.
[03:15.190 --> 03:16.390]  Brian from St. James, New York.
[03:16.450 --> 03:17.290]  We practiced this, Gus.
[03:17.610 --> 03:20.950]  I thought it was going to be piece of list by piece of list, not name my name.
[03:21.130 --> 03:22.530]  You know, I wrote it down and everything.
[03:22.630 --> 03:23.330]  Okay, go ahead, Rob.
[03:23.750 --> 03:24.970]  Joe from Mountainville, New York.
[03:25.090 --> 03:25.230]  Thank you.
[03:25.270 --> 03:26.890]  Owen from St. Cloud, Minnesota.
[03:27.410 --> 03:29.350]  Eric from Caledon, Ontario, Canada.
[03:29.910 --> 03:30.930]  Kathy from New Rochelle.
[03:31.690 --> 03:32.050]  Marius.
[03:32.050 --> 03:33.290]  I'm sorry if I pronounced this wrong.
[03:34.250 --> 03:34.610]  Marius.
[03:35.370 --> 03:36.570]  M-A-R-I-U-S.
[03:36.670 --> 03:37.210]  How would you pronounce that?
[03:37.330 --> 03:37.530]  That's fine.
[03:37.990 --> 03:38.350]  I think.
[03:38.590 --> 03:40.130]  It's not fine if that's not how you pronounce it.
[03:40.130 --> 03:40.730]  I know Marius.
[03:40.810 --> 03:41.650]  He pronounces it Marius.
[03:41.810 --> 03:41.970]  Really?
[03:42.090 --> 03:42.870]  He's from Oslo, Norway?
[03:43.410 --> 03:44.710]  Adam from Holmdale, New Jersey.
[03:45.130 --> 03:46.370]  Susan from New York, New York.
[03:46.630 --> 03:47.990]  Michael from Darien, Connecticut.
[03:48.290 --> 03:49.750]  Also Michael from Queens, New York.
[03:49.950 --> 03:51.370]  Another Michael from Westbury, New York.
[03:51.550 --> 03:52.390]  Three Michaels in a row.
[03:52.470 --> 03:52.850]  What are the odds?
[03:53.190 --> 03:54.870]  Kevin from Southport, Connecticut.
[03:55.510 --> 03:56.930]  Bernice from Plainfield, New Jersey.
[03:57.250 --> 03:58.530]  William from New York, New York.
[03:58.850 --> 04:00.590]  And John from Patterson, New Jersey.
[04:00.590 --> 04:01.650]  That's the first week.
[04:02.050 --> 04:03.130]  The second week.
[04:03.470 --> 04:04.390]  Why don't you start, Gus?
[04:05.130 --> 04:06.430]  Patrick from Brooklyn, New York.
[04:07.110 --> 04:08.390]  Rondell from New York, New York.
[04:08.630 --> 04:10.310]  Gail from Roselle, New Jersey.
[04:10.390 --> 04:11.930]  I've never heard of Roselle, New Jersey.
[04:12.130 --> 04:13.350]  Craig from the Boogie Down Bronx.
[04:14.330 --> 04:15.630]  John from Norwalk, Connecticut.
[04:15.810 --> 04:16.610]  Well, that's really...
[04:16.610 --> 04:18.550]  It's J-A-A-N.
[04:18.690 --> 04:19.370]  J-A-A-N.
[04:19.470 --> 04:20.470]  Is that John or...
[04:20.470 --> 04:22.990]  And if it's not, then we've misspelled your name.
[04:23.150 --> 04:24.570]  So you might want to let us know that.
[04:24.710 --> 04:28.990]  By the way, if you hear your name on this and you had no intention of donating to the show...
[04:28.990 --> 04:30.130]  Actually, I guess you wouldn't be listening either.
[04:30.690 --> 04:31.730]  Just let us know that.
[04:31.830 --> 04:35.430]  And if you don't hear your name and you donated during the show, let us know that too.
[04:35.510 --> 04:38.450]  But in all likelihood, we got your name.
[04:38.530 --> 04:38.970]  We should have.
[04:39.370 --> 04:41.950]  If you donated after the show, you're on a whole different list.
[04:42.390 --> 04:44.990]  I want to thank Adam for the second time from Holmdale, New York.
[04:44.990 --> 04:46.670]  He pledged during the first show as well.
[04:46.910 --> 04:49.910]  And McNeil from Jefferson Valley, New York, who appears to have pledged twice.
[04:50.450 --> 04:51.890]  And Jimmy from New York, New York.
[04:52.590 --> 05:01.970]  On the subject of McNeil from Jefferson Valley, I believe, Rob, you took that pledge and he did pledge twice in a row for the same thing, which is going to confuse people no end, but we're going to try our best to duplicate that.
[05:01.970 --> 05:02.730]  Thanks for keeping us on our toes.
[05:02.930 --> 05:03.170]  Yeah.
[05:03.550 --> 05:05.250]  And Michael from Teaneck, New Jersey.
[05:05.370 --> 05:06.870]  And Jim from Paramus, New Jersey.
[05:07.230 --> 05:07.590]  All right.
[05:07.710 --> 05:09.550]  Rob, why don't you start week number three?
[05:09.830 --> 05:11.810]  We would like to thank Thomas from Helsinki, Finland.
[05:12.170 --> 05:12.810]  Helsinki, Finland.
[05:12.890 --> 05:13.250]  How about that?
[05:13.350 --> 05:15.310]  Paul from Boynton Beach, Florida.
[05:16.250 --> 05:17.530]  Odbjorn from Bergen, Norway.
[05:17.990 --> 05:18.390]  Odbjorn.
[05:18.430 --> 05:19.150]  That's a great name.
[05:19.310 --> 05:19.730]  That's awesome.
[05:20.250 --> 05:21.430]  Mark from Union, New Jersey.
[05:21.710 --> 05:24.350]  I want to thank Adam a third time from Holmdale, New York.
[05:24.630 --> 05:25.850]  I'm sorry, Holmdale, New Jersey.
[05:26.250 --> 05:28.190]  Wait, here it says Holmdale, New Jersey.
[05:29.010 --> 05:31.130]  And is it Holmdale, New Jersey or Holmdale, New York?
[05:31.130 --> 05:32.390]  That's a floating township.
[05:32.410 --> 05:34.470]  I typed this myself and I got it wrong.
[05:34.610 --> 05:36.950]  It shows up in a couple of cities, all depending on the day.
[05:37.090 --> 05:42.130]  Adam, we promise we'll figure out what state you're in and get your premiums to you in the right state.
[05:43.670 --> 05:45.050]  Daniel from Albany, New York.
[05:45.410 --> 05:47.990]  Susan from Railway Northwest, Washington.
[05:47.990 --> 05:50.090]  Is there really a town called Railway Northwest?
[05:50.430 --> 05:52.190]  Are you saying that our donors are liars?
[05:52.550 --> 05:54.750]  No, I'm just asking for more information.
[05:54.750 --> 05:55.650]  I'm fascinated.
[05:55.930 --> 05:58.930]  It's probably some sort of originally railroad town.
[05:59.090 --> 06:01.530]  Or maybe our donors are a free man and they have their own towns.
[06:02.050 --> 06:02.890]  Yeah, maybe that's it.
[06:03.390 --> 06:05.590]  Gary from Springfield Gardens, New York.
[06:05.730 --> 06:06.930]  I didn't know about that place either.
[06:07.570 --> 06:09.030]  Anheb from Jersey City, New Jersey.
[06:09.390 --> 06:10.730]  Jimmy from New York, New York.
[06:10.930 --> 06:12.830]  Margaret from Bronxville, New York.
[06:13.410 --> 06:14.910]  Joseph from Garnett, Connecticut.
[06:15.490 --> 06:17.190]  And Patricia from Bedford Hills, New York.
[06:17.190 --> 06:21.250]  And in our final week, last week, we want to thank people who donated to the show.
[06:21.450 --> 06:23.310]  Michael from Suffern, New York.
[06:23.530 --> 06:24.890]  Terrence from Highland Park, New Jersey.
[06:25.450 --> 06:26.970]  Ramona from Brooklyn, New York.
[06:27.630 --> 06:29.570]  Robert from Youngstown, Ohio.
[06:29.930 --> 06:31.190]  John from Edison, New Jersey.
[06:31.590 --> 06:32.030]  Jeff...
[06:32.030 --> 06:32.410]  Oh, I'm sorry.
[06:32.890 --> 06:34.170]  I wanted to thank Jeff.
[06:34.310 --> 06:34.650]  Yeah, go ahead.
[06:34.970 --> 06:36.550]  Thank you, Jeff, from Scarlesdale, New York.
[06:36.690 --> 06:39.090]  John is what I meant to say from Minneapolis, Minnesota.
[06:39.430 --> 06:40.590]  Cynthia from Brooklyn, New York.
[06:40.910 --> 06:42.370]  Alfred from Boca Raton, Florida.
[06:42.870 --> 06:45.270]  Christian from Cambridge in the United Kingdom.
[06:45.890 --> 06:47.110]  Cyril from Brooklyn, New York.
[06:47.170 --> 06:47.650]  That's my buddy.
[06:47.690 --> 06:48.250]  Hi, Cyril.
[06:48.310 --> 06:48.710]  How you doing?
[06:49.410 --> 06:50.810]  Marcus from Bloomington, Minnesota.
[06:51.090 --> 06:53.470]  You know, it makes everybody else feel bad if one person gets special treatment.
[06:53.610 --> 06:54.450]  I have a friend.
[06:54.810 --> 06:56.050]  Oh, I thought you meant in the studio.
[06:57.410 --> 06:59.270]  Sean from Astoria, New York.
[07:00.150 --> 07:01.490]  Bernard from New York, New York.
[07:02.050 --> 07:03.550]  Sydney from Montclair, New Jersey.
[07:03.930 --> 07:05.030]  Michael from Chicago.
[07:05.810 --> 07:07.050]  Jamie from Ann Arbor, Michigan.
[07:07.870 --> 07:09.450]  Adam, again, from Homedale, New Jersey.
[07:09.570 --> 07:11.030]  Adam, you pledged all four weeks.
[07:11.030 --> 07:11.670]  That's amazing.
[07:11.850 --> 07:12.430]  Dude is dedicated.
[07:12.430 --> 07:13.730]  Can you imagine if everybody did that?
[07:13.950 --> 07:15.110]  We'd be in such good shape.
[07:15.110 --> 07:16.070]  We'd be on every day.
[07:16.190 --> 07:19.250]  We'd be on for two hours every day if we got that kind of response.
[07:19.490 --> 07:22.390]  And I think this pretty much verifies that he is in New Jersey and not in New York.
[07:22.430 --> 07:23.150]  I made one typo.
[07:23.270 --> 07:23.570]  I'm sorry.
[07:25.330 --> 07:26.570]  John, is that me or you?
[07:26.610 --> 07:27.310]  Who said Adam?
[07:27.630 --> 07:29.050]  Did you say Adam or did I say Adam?
[07:29.050 --> 07:30.170]  Let's just all say them together.
[07:30.450 --> 07:33.910]  Okay, so I say John from New York, New York and you say Robert from Lindenhurst.
[07:34.110 --> 07:35.970]  Robert from Lindenhurst.
[07:36.090 --> 07:37.370]  My fire has been stolen now.
[07:37.510 --> 07:38.290]  Sorry for the spoilers.
[07:38.690 --> 07:39.450]  What say is that in?
[07:39.970 --> 07:40.470]  Thank you, David.
[07:40.850 --> 07:41.810]  Yeah, Lindenhurst is in New York.
[07:42.210 --> 07:43.350]  Assume New York is a default.
[07:43.550 --> 07:43.750]  Yes.
[07:44.070 --> 07:45.830]  Thank you, David from Cliffside Park, New Jersey.
[07:46.630 --> 07:48.310]  Keef, and is Keef spelled the cool way?
[07:48.430 --> 07:49.270]  K-E-I-F.
[07:49.810 --> 07:52.450]  Sort of like Keefer Sutherland, I guess, but cooler.
[07:53.110 --> 07:54.430]  From Maspeth, New York.
[07:54.550 --> 07:55.810]  Michael from Astoria, New York.
[07:56.050 --> 07:57.410]  Robert from Manchester, New Hampshire.
[07:57.410 --> 07:59.670]  John from Bogota, New Jersey.
[07:59.810 --> 08:02.010]  Now, is there really a Bogota, New Jersey?
[08:02.010 --> 08:04.150]  I think it's actually pronounced Bogota, as I've heard.
[08:04.390 --> 08:04.610]  Really?
[08:04.750 --> 08:04.910]  Yeah.
[08:04.970 --> 08:06.210]  On Columbia, they say...
[08:06.210 --> 08:07.610]  Bogota, but this is not Bogota.
[08:07.790 --> 08:08.650]  This is Bogota.
[08:08.910 --> 08:09.130]  Hmm.
[08:09.690 --> 08:12.390]  I always pronounce it wrong no matter where it is.
[08:12.510 --> 08:13.970]  But okay, you get the last word.
[08:14.350 --> 08:15.950]  Arthur from Glendale, New York.
[08:16.090 --> 08:22.090]  Thank you, everybody, for your generous pledges for making this the most successful fundraiser in a long time.
[08:22.310 --> 08:24.450]  And bodes well for the future, I think.
[08:25.130 --> 08:27.390]  So, we have an action-packed show tonight.
[08:27.390 --> 08:28.610]  We have all kinds of things to discuss.
[08:28.750 --> 08:29.370]  We're going to be getting into that.
[08:29.470 --> 08:32.510]  We have a couple of special guests who'll be joining us in just a little bit.
[08:32.650 --> 08:36.890]  But first, let's go over some things that have been happening in the world.
[08:38.190 --> 08:41.030]  Bernie, I know this was a story that you were particularly interested in.
[08:41.470 --> 08:47.170]  This is a story about a 62-year-old man in Carrollton.
[08:48.590 --> 08:49.690]  That's in Pennsylvania, right?
[08:50.610 --> 08:51.010]  Ohio.
[08:51.390 --> 08:52.110]  Carrollton's in Ohio?
[08:52.110 --> 08:54.490]  This came from a Pennsylvania newspaper.
[08:54.510 --> 08:55.610]  Oh, I just assumed.
[08:55.750 --> 08:56.050]  Oh, you're right.
[08:56.150 --> 08:56.490]  It is in Ohio.
[08:57.530 --> 09:04.050]  He was found unconscious and unresponsive Thursday morning during an intense search.
[09:05.030 --> 09:06.670]  And why are we talking about this?
[09:06.810 --> 09:13.250]  Well, apparently, the cops attempted to use the man's cell phone signal to locate him.
[09:14.290 --> 09:17.190]  But the man was behind on his phone bill.
[09:18.070 --> 09:19.990]  And because of that...
[09:19.990 --> 09:21.050]  You want to tell us what happened after that?
[09:21.050 --> 09:24.290]  Yeah, well, actually, I originally thought they were...
[09:24.290 --> 09:26.050]  Police were trying to...
[09:26.050 --> 09:28.050]  Well, there was a domestic disturbance dispute.
[09:28.310 --> 09:29.610]  It was a 911 call.
[09:29.830 --> 09:32.370]  So the sheriff's deputies rushed to the house.
[09:32.690 --> 09:37.470]  And the guy had taken several bottles of pills and then fled the scene.
[09:37.630 --> 09:39.070]  So they knew he was going to die.
[09:39.250 --> 09:40.070]  And they needed to...
[09:40.070 --> 09:46.890]  And there was a huge rescue effort out with all these sheriffs and the helicopter and police dogs trying to find him before he overdosed.
[09:46.890 --> 09:54.290]  And the sheriff thought, why don't I call his cell phone and our deputies might hear the phone ringing.
[09:55.730 --> 10:02.190]  But it was disconnected and he called Verizon and said, hey, this is an emergency and the law enforcement please ring this phone.
[10:02.390 --> 10:03.250]  And Verizon wouldn't do it.
[10:03.310 --> 10:06.030]  They said, well, you've got to pay his phone bill before we're going to ring it.
[10:06.290 --> 10:07.730]  And the guy was out there dying.
[10:08.610 --> 10:14.290]  So Verizon finally got the sheriff to pay $20 to the bill.
[10:15.110 --> 10:15.750]  Okay, wait.
[10:15.970 --> 10:18.450]  First of all, there's a number of things wrong with this story here.
[10:19.030 --> 10:27.950]  That Verizon can act like such jerks and get away with it but a sheriff actually paid the guy's phone bill so that he could get the information from the phone company?
[10:28.150 --> 10:35.370]  Well, the sheriff was actually in the process of making the payment when his deputies found the guy.
[10:35.870 --> 10:36.670]  So, but...
[10:36.670 --> 10:39.970]  And then the sheriff was incredulous about this later.
[10:40.150 --> 10:53.670]  He said, you know, he said he was really concerned for the person's life and it would have been nice if Verizon had turned on his phone for five or ten minutes just long enough to find him and save his life but he would only turn it on if we agreed to pay at least $20 of the phone bill.
[10:53.830 --> 10:54.730]  He thought it was ridiculous.
[10:55.570 --> 11:07.770]  So, you know, obviously he reached the wrong person of Verizon who wasn't thinking but, you know, this is the kind of thing that can happen when you rely on technology to save someone's life or you rely on a big phone company to help save somebody's life.
[11:08.890 --> 11:18.770]  If this man was a quote-unquote terrorist and it had been a question of not saving his life but ending his life, I'm sure Verizon wouldn't have minded about him not paying the bill.
[11:18.930 --> 11:23.550]  Well, I mean, I think Bernie brings up an interesting point that they reached the wrong person at Verizon.
[11:23.670 --> 11:29.330]  How much power does a single person have if you call them on the phone at a big company like that?
[11:29.430 --> 11:30.890]  Can they dictate policy?
[11:32.350 --> 11:40.330]  Apparently you have to go through several levels of bureaucracy to get somebody to do something at Verizon or any other big carriers.
[11:40.570 --> 11:42.830]  And he just obviously wasn't speaking to the right person.
[11:42.910 --> 11:46.890]  But it's hard to get the right person when you're in a hurry and it's a life or death situation.
[11:47.630 --> 11:48.430]  It's unfortunate.
[11:48.650 --> 11:50.710]  You know, it could have been tragic as the sheriff said.
[11:51.590 --> 11:56.790]  It looked like it was a very serious medical condition and they found him before he overdosed.
[11:56.930 --> 11:57.630]  But he was unconscious.
[11:57.870 --> 12:00.010]  You know, if they hadn't found him for a few more hours that would have been it.
[12:00.450 --> 12:06.730]  Didn't we once call on this very radio program the special telephone line if you are law enforcement and you can actually reach someone?
[12:06.790 --> 12:08.010]  That was for Sprint I think, wasn't it?
[12:08.170 --> 12:09.790]  Verizon is Pound Door.
[12:10.130 --> 12:10.670]  Pound what?
[12:11.370 --> 12:12.450]  D-O-O-R.
[12:12.710 --> 12:13.470]  Pound Door?
[12:13.630 --> 12:13.750]  Yeah.
[12:13.770 --> 12:14.830]  On the Verizon phone?
[12:15.150 --> 12:15.290]  Yeah.
[12:15.390 --> 12:15.910]  Is that true, buddy?
[12:16.070 --> 12:16.670]  It was Verizon.
[12:16.810 --> 12:17.330]  That was Verizon.
[12:17.650 --> 12:17.770]  That was Verizon.
[12:18.650 --> 12:39.530]  What somebody else is referring to was on the show several months ago we called a Sprint hotline for law enforcement so they could you just go through sort of a surveillance menu a Sprint surveillance menu where you could choose to set up a wiretap you can choose to have the phone pinged and get the location instantly over the phone that sort of thing.
[12:39.670 --> 12:42.390]  It was kind of scary hearing this menu of surveillance options.
[12:42.870 --> 12:43.890]  But this was not it.
[12:43.990 --> 12:54.730]  This was just a sheriff calling regular Verizon customer service saying, look, this is a law enforcement official it's a life-or-dent situation please ring his phone and they wouldn't do it unless the sheriff paid.
[12:55.930 --> 13:02.850]  I just tried on a Verizon phone to dial pound door D-O-O-R and I get a recording saying that number does not exist.
[13:03.450 --> 13:05.130]  Now how is the sheriff actually going to pay?
[13:05.270 --> 13:06.770]  Are you going to mail a check for $20?
[13:07.130 --> 13:09.950]  Yeah, maybe it was PayPal or something or credit card or something?
[13:09.950 --> 13:10.410]  Credit card probably.
[13:10.490 --> 13:12.290]  Yeah, we should get that guy on the show and see.
[13:12.970 --> 13:15.170]  I wonder what happened to the person at Verizon.
[13:15.510 --> 13:16.610]  I mean, I'm sure they got fired.
[13:18.410 --> 13:19.670]  I mean, there's no excuse.
[13:19.930 --> 13:23.610]  I mean, even if they're following policy that's kind of like use some common sense.
[13:23.610 --> 13:28.510]  Well, I mean, things get very annoying with phone companies sometimes when you owe them money.
[13:28.710 --> 13:32.290]  Sprint, for instance, I think they have the worst record as far as harassing people.
[13:32.450 --> 13:39.230]  When the bill hasn't even arrived yet, they call you to remind you to pay the bill sometimes when it hasn't even been delivered if it's a particularly large bill.
[13:39.370 --> 13:41.470]  I have it on my phone if you want to hear it.
[13:41.690 --> 13:42.590]  Oh, you have...
[13:42.590 --> 13:43.270]  The pound door.
[13:43.350 --> 13:45.530]  Are you saying you were able to get through the pound door and I wasn't?
[13:45.770 --> 13:47.890]  So I'm doing something wrong when I use my Verizon phone.
[13:47.930 --> 13:48.130]  Yes.
[13:48.250 --> 13:49.470]  You're not a Verizon fan.
[13:49.890 --> 13:52.370]  Okay, go ahead, play it if it actually goes through.
[13:52.590 --> 13:53.810]  Do you have a speaker on that thing?
[13:54.250 --> 13:54.930]  Here we go.
[13:55.810 --> 13:56.870]  I don't hear anything.
[13:57.830 --> 13:58.270]  It's Eileen.
[13:58.750 --> 14:01.570]  Welcome to the Verizon Wireless NOC IPR.
[14:01.750 --> 14:01.970]  Yeah.
[14:02.350 --> 14:02.570]  I'll play it.
[14:02.570 --> 14:04.910]  For the intrusion system, select zero.
[14:05.450 --> 14:08.270]  For Bedminster NOC, select one.
[14:08.570 --> 14:11.270]  For Southlake NOC, select two.
[14:11.910 --> 14:14.310]  For ATAC, select three.
[14:14.570 --> 14:17.330]  For vendor access, select five.
[14:17.570 --> 14:20.830]  For subpoena and court order, select nine.
[14:21.230 --> 14:23.370]  To disconnect, select star.
[14:23.590 --> 14:26.650]  You know, I doubt star door instead of pound door.
[14:26.830 --> 14:31.550]  But you see, if this was an emergency, I might very well mix up star and pound then too.
[14:31.710 --> 14:33.530]  So it's something to consider.
[14:33.710 --> 14:34.530]  It's a weird thing.
[14:34.870 --> 14:36.370]  But okay, thanks for sharing that with us.
[14:37.470 --> 14:41.430]  Oh, for our English listeners, this is not the dollar sign, it's the hash mark.
[14:42.170 --> 14:43.950]  Yeah, the tic-tac-toe board or whatever.
[14:45.090 --> 14:49.630]  Okay, so that's an interesting story and kind of ominous as well.
[14:49.790 --> 15:00.510]  Also kind of ominous, I don't know if you guys saw this, but that guy Ashton Kutcher, one of my favorite people, the Twitter idiot who got a million people, apparently he has two million people now on his Twitter thing.
[15:00.850 --> 15:03.410]  He's warning he may pull the plug.
[15:03.410 --> 15:05.210]  This is what it's all about.
[15:05.210 --> 15:08.430]  This is what it's all about as far as like, you know, getting publicity.
[15:08.650 --> 15:09.470]  Now he can threaten people.
[15:09.910 --> 15:11.450]  He may pull the plug in his tweeting.
[15:11.470 --> 15:16.770]  If the micro-blogging service partners on a reality TV show, here's what he says.
[15:16.830 --> 15:19.070]  It's all fun and games until somebody gets stalked.
[15:19.390 --> 15:21.110]  Now, explain something to me.
[15:21.510 --> 15:27.790]  Why is it famous people object to a reality show about Twitter when they're on Twitter in the first place?
[15:27.790 --> 15:29.190]  It's a stalker's dream.
[15:29.630 --> 15:31.230]  Obviously, they want attention for themselves.
[15:31.230 --> 15:35.470]  They're telling people when they're out to lunch and when they're like on a particular street and things like that.
[15:35.590 --> 15:39.310]  But all of a sudden, someone does a TV show about it and oh, it's an invasion of my privacy.
[15:39.450 --> 15:40.630]  These people are doing it to themselves.
[15:41.010 --> 15:44.530]  and since it was already on Oprah, it's not like it doesn't have publicity to the masses.
[15:44.890 --> 15:45.070]  Yeah.
[15:45.270 --> 15:49.610]  And for those unfamiliar with Ashton Kutcher, he's the guy who got famous doing a hidden camera show on MTV.
[15:49.830 --> 15:50.070]  Really?
[15:50.570 --> 15:51.470]  I didn't know that.
[15:51.890 --> 15:52.150]  Wow.
[15:53.710 --> 15:57.550]  Oh, I think that we should maybe pull the plug on it for him.
[15:58.070 --> 16:07.110]  Recently, there was P. Diddy tried to get a lot of followers and he tried asking his followers to ask for more followers.
[16:07.450 --> 16:12.170]  Then there became a Twitter trend where it's called unfollow Diddy where it's basically people...
[16:12.170 --> 16:12.510]  Unfollow Diddy.
[16:12.550 --> 16:13.870]  Yeah, and everybody would post...
[16:13.870 --> 16:17.790]  Everybody that followed him stopped following him and they'd post things telling their friends to unfollow him.
[16:17.850 --> 16:23.130]  I mean, it's all exhibitionism but I don't get what people complain about it after they voluntarily enter into it.
[16:23.170 --> 16:24.290]  So we should do this for Ashton.
[16:24.390 --> 16:26.170]  We should start a tag.
[16:26.290 --> 16:28.510]  Everybody do a hashtag that says unfollow...
[16:28.510 --> 16:29.110]  A plus K.
[16:29.290 --> 16:29.970]  Yes, A plus K.
[16:29.970 --> 16:31.310]  Well, that'd be nice if people were intelligent.
[16:31.570 --> 16:36.510]  I continue to contend that this just simply doesn't matter because I have people coming to my blog saying...
[16:36.510 --> 16:40.450]  Because I mentioned Ashton Kutcher's name once they say, Dear Ashton Kutcher, we think you're so hot.
[16:40.590 --> 16:42.710]  Here is our home address in Tennessee.
[16:42.810 --> 16:43.650]  We're 12.
[16:43.990 --> 16:48.350]  So ultimately, people who are fans of Ashton Kutcher think that he appears at random all over the internet anyway.
[16:48.490 --> 16:49.050]  So I don't think it matters.
[16:49.050 --> 16:49.610]  Here's something else.
[16:49.750 --> 17:00.910]  I heard this story too on the news somewhere this week that this family, I think it was a family, had their home burglarized because they posted on Twitter they were away on vacation.
[17:01.250 --> 17:03.130]  And they think maybe that has something to do with it.
[17:03.170 --> 17:04.730]  And they have like something like 10,000 followers.
[17:04.870 --> 17:05.670]  I don't know why exactly.
[17:05.950 --> 17:10.710]  This is what Steve Rambam has been warning us at Hope for the past X number of years.
[17:10.730 --> 17:13.510]  I just don't get why people weren't able to figure this out from the start.
[17:13.510 --> 17:20.070]  If you tell the world that you're not going to be home, yeah, you're telling the world that your house is empty and that's something that could possibly be a problem.
[17:20.370 --> 17:22.050]  It's like we're reinventing the wheel.
[17:22.490 --> 17:25.350]  So it's just kind of kind of wacky right there.
[17:25.850 --> 17:28.390]  And one final Twitter story and then I promise I'm done.
[17:28.670 --> 17:40.290]  Apparently there was a security nightmare involving Twitter and they say and this is one of those quote unquote hacker stories marks the first time hackers have taken to using the microblogging site for profit.
[17:40.850 --> 17:43.310]  All right, who in the room was using Twitter for profit?
[17:44.030 --> 17:44.530]  Yeah.
[17:45.170 --> 17:53.330]  This, it wasn't a worm said a senior antivirus researcher with Kaspersky Labs in Moscow for some reason they were consulted on this story.
[17:53.910 --> 17:57.170]  It's the first instance of hackers serving up scareware.
[17:57.810 --> 17:58.290]  Scareware.
[17:58.430 --> 17:59.910]  I can't believe we've never used that word before.
[18:01.670 --> 18:10.710]  Fake, fake security software that once installed nags users with so many alerts that some fork over $50 or more just to register the program and get rid of the warnings.
[18:11.170 --> 18:15.290]  Now apparently over the weekend and let me know if anybody here who's on Twitter got this.
[18:15.390 --> 18:30.190]  Twitter users began receiving tweets with the phrase best video and a link to a Russian domain and among those who clicked on the link were directed to a site with a video but they were also served with a malicious PDF document via an iframe on that site.
[18:30.490 --> 18:48.690]  The PDF contains a number of exploits and tries each in turn and if it's able to compromise the computer using one of those exploits the malware then installs phony security software and basically they say Saturday Twitter warned users of the tweets with the best video link and noted that it suspended compromised accounts.
[18:48.750 --> 19:06.730]  Now I happen to have a Twitter account yes I'll admit it I do I never got any warning but I'm told that the only way to get the warning is to follow Twitter and you know I'm not going to follow them because I don't want to get all their commercial notifications and things like that and I think wouldn't it have been nice if they put the warning on their page.
[19:06.850 --> 19:14.230]  They have a nice little thing there for buy a Twitter t-shirt but they don't have a thing saying oh by the way our system has been compromised and you might get infected if you click on something.
[19:14.390 --> 19:23.270]  Yeah and the fact of the matter being that also since it's sort of a personal thing or at least you know or know of the people that you're following if somebody tweets something like that you might click on it.
[19:23.330 --> 19:34.570]  I actually saw one of my friends got infected with that malware but I looked at it and I said that's kind of I mean I saw the domain and I was like I don't think that's something I should follow.
[19:34.770 --> 19:36.290]  So what would you advise to people?
[19:36.590 --> 19:41.070]  I mean a PDF you can click on a PDF and get infected and a lot of people don't know that.
[19:41.310 --> 19:44.090]  Never ever click on anything from a .ru domain.
[19:44.410 --> 19:45.150]  Just don't.
[19:45.390 --> 19:49.550]  You know that's a bit nationalistic there there's plenty of good Russian sites.
[19:49.670 --> 19:58.730]  But here's the problem too because you can well I guess they probably just posted this straight domain but I mean in theory it could also be wrapped in something like a tiny URL which is made it shorter and then you can't tell.
[19:58.950 --> 20:00.970]  And there's plenty of people in the states that will do this thing too.
[20:02.070 --> 20:03.770]  You can't not click on anything.
[20:03.850 --> 20:06.170]  You can't just not click on anything you don't recognize.
[20:06.410 --> 20:08.530]  I mean you know I look at PDFs all the time.
[20:08.850 --> 20:10.350]  You have to learn to read a certain way.
[20:10.470 --> 20:17.230]  There are ways that people will sort of talk about it where it's like check out this grade or just anything and it's stuff that just never quite sounds like your friends.
[20:17.310 --> 20:21.390]  One of these days I'll do a linguistic analysis and come up with actual rules but there's ways to read.
[20:21.530 --> 20:25.470]  You're saying if the request is phrased badly that's a suspicious thing.
[20:25.490 --> 20:28.010]  Yeah or phrased just really simply and it doesn't give any more explanation.
[20:28.010 --> 20:29.830]  Your friends ought to give more explanation.
[20:29.970 --> 20:35.430]  Because I got an email from the head of the treasury this week saying that he had several million dollars for me and I figured it probably wasn't...
[20:35.430 --> 20:35.610]  I did too.
[20:35.750 --> 20:36.610]  I got that email too.
[20:36.710 --> 20:37.570]  Ten and a half million, right?
[20:37.670 --> 20:46.750]  Yeah, I don't know the exact amount but I was immediately suspicious because of the large amount and the fact that of course the head of the treasury was emailing me directly.
[20:47.110 --> 20:48.070]  It just didn't seem right.
[20:48.550 --> 20:50.210]  You know, I'm sort of wondering about this.
[20:50.290 --> 20:55.670]  I can't help but wonder whether it's also a matter of people who have public Twitter accounts where I think people can just follow them automatically.
[20:56.330 --> 21:01.350]  I would think that might make you more vulnerable although I suppose it's not...
[21:01.350 --> 21:02.870]  It's who you're following, right?
[21:02.870 --> 21:05.610]  So it's basically you see somebody and somebody post on that.
[21:05.770 --> 21:11.970]  This goes beyond beyond Twitter though because to what sites you visit you know and what you click on.
[21:12.170 --> 21:13.870]  Don't we have anything else to talk about than Twitter?
[21:14.190 --> 21:16.010]  Yeah, I said I didn't want to spend too much time on this.
[21:16.090 --> 21:22.010]  I'm going to abort this conversation and move on to something a lot more important than this.
[21:22.530 --> 21:49.850]  And namely something that happened last Friday Obama gave an interesting talk I guess he's basically what he's doing right now he's appointing a cyber security chief or actually they call it a cyber security czar and that always makes me worry a little bit and we're going to talk about this in depth but I just wanted to focus on a couple of things he said in his remarks on cyber security He
[21:49.850 --> 21:52.770]  mentioned hackers a couple of times.
[21:52.910 --> 21:57.470]  Now, the 40-page document did not mention hackers once, to its credit.
[21:57.790 --> 22:03.750]  And that's a good thing, because whenever you mention hackers in this context, you're going to say something like, you know, hackers did this and did that.
[22:03.870 --> 22:08.650]  And, you know, it really could be anybody that has a criminal mentality using a computer doesn't make them a hacker.
[22:09.130 --> 22:11.770]  Now, here's what Obama said in his spoken remarks.
[22:11.770 --> 22:15.970]  I know how it feels to have privacy violated because it has happened to me and the people around me.
[22:16.110 --> 22:20.990]  It's no secret that my presidential campaign harnessed the internet and technology to transform our politics.
[22:21.290 --> 22:27.730]  What isn't widely known is that during the general election, hackers managed to penetrate our computer systems.
[22:27.930 --> 22:33.570]  To all of you who donated to our campaign, I want you to all rest assured our fundraising website was untouched.
[22:33.790 --> 22:34.190]  Laughter.
[22:34.610 --> 22:35.230]  Lots of laughter.
[22:35.770 --> 22:38.650]  So your confidential personal and financial information was protected.
[22:38.650 --> 22:47.070]  But between August and October, hackers gained access to emails and a range of campaign files from policy position papers to travel plans.
[22:47.170 --> 22:55.050]  And we work closely with the CIA, with the FBI and the Secret Service and hire security consultants to restore the security of our systems.
[22:56.250 --> 23:07.870]  So basically, he seems to have this view sort of similar to what Clinton had in a famous quote of his where he says that hackers break in and do all kinds of evil things.
[23:08.670 --> 23:12.470]  Here's one other disturbing thing that Obama said in that talk there.
[23:12.930 --> 23:16.610]  Every day we see waves of cyber thieves trolling for sensitive information.
[23:17.110 --> 23:18.110]  And that's fair enough.
[23:18.190 --> 23:19.390]  But listen to how he describes them.
[23:19.490 --> 23:21.410]  The disgruntled employee on the inside.
[23:21.830 --> 23:24.670]  The lone hacker a thousand miles away.
[23:25.370 --> 23:26.290]  Organized crime.
[23:26.510 --> 23:28.790]  The industrial spy and increasingly foreign intelligence services.
[23:28.910 --> 23:31.370]  Now, all of those, yeah, all of those I can see the evil.
[23:31.470 --> 23:32.950]  But a lone hacker a thousand miles away.
[23:32.970 --> 23:34.950]  Why is that by default something that's bad?
[23:34.950 --> 23:35.730]  You know?
[23:35.930 --> 23:36.790]  Am I being overly assertive?
[23:36.850 --> 23:40.010]  I think the problem is just the use of the word hacker, right?
[23:40.170 --> 23:43.150]  I mean, we disagree on the meaning of the word hacker.
[23:43.330 --> 23:51.050]  I mean, there's definitely people out on the internet, even individuals who have malicious intent and use tools or exploits or whatever to get what they want.
[23:51.050 --> 23:52.190]  And we have words for those people already.
[23:52.350 --> 23:53.270]  We do have words for that.
[23:53.370 --> 23:56.650]  And unfortunately, the media has publicized hacker as that word.
[23:56.650 --> 23:56.810]  Right.
[23:56.890 --> 23:57.730]  And the media does this.
[23:57.770 --> 23:58.850]  The president doesn't have to do this.
[23:58.950 --> 24:00.090]  And it was not done in the report.
[24:00.090 --> 24:06.590]  So I'm just saying, you know, he needs to read the report and describe these people as the way they describe it.
[24:06.590 --> 24:07.850]  It's our job to do publicity, too.
[24:07.970 --> 24:18.850]  I mean, I think the sort of definition of hacking that comes up in Stephen Levy's book, where it's more like, you know, being curious and looking into things and knowing how things around you work, is not something that most people really know.
[24:18.990 --> 24:20.030]  I mean, mostly what they know is on TV.
[24:20.030 --> 24:20.930]  Okay.
[24:21.030 --> 24:26.650]  Joining us on the telephone is Senior Staff Attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Lee Tien.
[24:26.750 --> 24:27.350]  Lee, are you with us?
[24:27.950 --> 24:28.910]  I still am.
[24:29.070 --> 24:29.350]  Wow.
[24:30.190 --> 24:30.750]  Welcome.
[24:31.010 --> 24:35.790]  And I know you played a part in this statement, in the report.
[24:35.790 --> 24:43.650]  I believe there was a letter from you that advised the White House on this whole cyber security policy, right?
[24:44.850 --> 24:57.170]  Yeah, it's not really very interesting, since I believe the cyber security team went out and talked to just about everybody in the country and said, gee, send us white papers about anything you want.
[24:57.430 --> 24:58.770]  So we did come up on it.
[24:58.890 --> 24:59.810]  What did yours cover?
[25:00.530 --> 25:05.870]  Well, we primarily hit, you know, as you might expect, civil liberties-type issues.
[25:05.870 --> 25:22.330]  We were very concerned about the, at the time, you know, Rod Dextrin's resignation letter had come out, and so we were very concerned about the continued NSA, potential NSA dominance or integrity dominance in cyber security.
[25:22.330 --> 25:41.650]  And we argued rather strenuously that the problems that the government certainly has in terms of cyber security have nothing to do with any kind of special expertise that the NSA has and that, frankly, that, you know, most of what they need to practice is hygiene and patching,
[25:41.710 --> 25:46.290]  which doesn't require any kind of incredibly special expertise.
[25:46.970 --> 26:04.710]  We also talked a little bit about our concerns about the way that the whole cyber security drumbeat since, really, I guess, since the election, has been really connected very strongly with cyber crime.
[26:05.010 --> 26:14.210]  And we wanted to make sure that privacy and civil liberties were going to actually be observed in terms of the cyber security push.
[26:14.390 --> 26:26.110]  And we also put in a pitch for open source code and talking about ways in which we thought that the government could do a little bit more to support.
[26:26.110 --> 26:29.330]  Well, I assume you read the report, too.
[26:29.570 --> 26:31.810]  I looked over it as much as I could.
[26:31.970 --> 26:41.490]  And I noticed that there seems to be a bit of a good emphasis on civil liberties being observed while these policies are followed.
[26:42.130 --> 26:42.910]  Well, that's right.
[26:43.150 --> 26:54.350]  I mean, they certainly utter the words and pay far more lip service to the importance of privacy and civil liberties in a cyber security context than anyone else ever has.
[26:54.570 --> 26:55.750]  I'll give you credit for that.
[26:56.150 --> 26:58.230]  So how that actually works out, we'll see.
[26:58.970 --> 26:59.630]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[27:00.050 --> 27:04.790]  I just wanted to point out that our previous president, George W.
[27:04.830 --> 27:07.110]  Bush, he also had a cyber security plan.
[27:07.410 --> 27:18.590]  But unlike Obama, Bush just classified his, so nobody could read it outside of the ivory towers of the White House and the NSA, I guess.
[27:18.590 --> 27:29.930]  So at least we have to give credit for Obama being slightly transparent or at least accepting other people's viewpoints and putting the report out there.
[27:30.010 --> 27:36.530]  Now, this is just sort of a... Lee, isn't this sort of like just a preliminary announcement that's been made?
[27:36.530 --> 27:38.890]  This is all going to be hashed out in Congress, I assume.
[27:38.890 --> 27:42.770]  Are there any particular parts of the original announcement that concerned you?
[27:43.610 --> 27:45.390]  Well, you know, you're right.
[27:45.570 --> 27:50.270]  I mean, I agree with everything you said about this being way better than the Bush situation.
[27:50.290 --> 27:53.050]  And Bush, of course, really had sort of two plans, right?
[27:53.150 --> 27:59.950]  Because he had that first 2003 report, which really was mostly exhortation that everyone should do a better job.
[28:00.010 --> 28:03.550]  And then he had the classified stuff that no one could see.
[28:05.210 --> 28:08.950]  But, yeah, this is really the beginning of the beginning.
[28:09.350 --> 28:14.510]  You know, Melissa Hathaway, who ran the security review, was really open.
[28:14.510 --> 28:18.190]  And the process was, I think, about as open as this has ever been.
[28:18.190 --> 28:27.510]  But you've got a lot of vague pronouncements in the actual cybersecurity review report.
[28:27.950 --> 28:39.930]  You've got some things that I consider troubling, such as the continued focus on identity management, without any clear, you know, sense of what that really means.
[28:40.110 --> 28:42.970]  Can you tell us, can you tell us for our listeners what that could mean?
[28:43.690 --> 28:44.570]  Identity management.
[28:44.570 --> 29:03.450]  Yeah, I mean, it's, you know, the kinds of things that they referred to in that section included, you know, HSPV-12, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, which is one that started this sort of uniform standard government ID card.
[29:03.950 --> 29:13.050]  They've also, that a number of people have been, you know, really upset about because it combines some sort of smart cards along with some biometrics.
[29:13.050 --> 29:16.510]  Biometrics is another thing that pops up in that section.
[29:16.690 --> 29:30.590]  So we are, and we have seen from the CSIS report, that's the Center for Strategic and International Studies, I think they're a pretty hawkish group that published something in the fall which really got us concerned.
[29:30.590 --> 29:51.530]  And they were talking very much about the need to really batten down the hatchet on who is who on the Internet, which, you know, is not something that's, you know, really good for civil liberties, where, you know, we consider it the ability to be anonymous on the Internet to be still pretty important.
[29:51.530 --> 29:52.810]  So that's a problem.
[29:53.030 --> 29:57.510]  The bigger issue, though, the even bigger issue is, as you mentioned, Congress.
[29:58.070 --> 30:12.950]  I mean, you know, whatever one might say about the White House report, boy, when you put it next to something like the Rockefeller Snow Bill on cybersecurity, then, you know, it's, you know, there's really no comparison.
[30:12.950 --> 30:21.850]  Congress and the folks who are pushing stuff in Congress get very, are very, very scary in terms of what they are willing to do in terms of cybersecurity.
[30:23.070 --> 30:38.310]  Since the, like, so-called civil war between the, or between Russia and Estonia, where it was blamed on government actors, but it turned, I'm pretty sure that it's mostly just, like, individual civilians and English nationalist script kiddies.
[30:38.750 --> 30:40.950]  We've seen, like, the same type of thing happen in the U.S.
[30:41.010 --> 30:52.670]  where the White House has said that they've been under, like, daily attack from, like, Chinese spies, and they'll, like, specifically name, or imply that it's government agencies.
[30:52.870 --> 31:00.870]  But do you find that it's mostly not government agencies, but just, like, the same spam people that send that request to anybody that would have it there on server?
[31:02.150 --> 31:03.710]  Honestly, I just don't know.
[31:03.710 --> 31:16.350]  I mean, it's pretty hard to come out from where we sit, you know, because we don't run any intrusion detection systems, you know, to really have an idea of what those big threats out there are.
[31:16.470 --> 31:31.230]  We do think that it's a little, you know, it's kind of, you know, funny to have Stuart Baker, you know, talking as he was at CFP, I think, yesterday, about how, well, you know, the big, big threat we've got to worry about is China.
[31:31.570 --> 31:42.810]  I mean, China is becoming a really convenient scapegoat for a lot of what people are trying to achieve in the cybersecurity slash cyber warfare arena.
[31:42.810 --> 31:46.630]  I mean, I wish we knew more about what the facts were.
[31:46.810 --> 31:49.230]  The rhetoric is, though, disturbing.
[31:49.510 --> 31:56.950]  I mean, the rhetoric... and that's, unfortunately, where policy usually ends up being made in Congress is based on the rhetoric.
[31:56.970 --> 32:03.390]  And they've really amped up the China slash warfare slash, you know, cyber attacks.
[32:03.570 --> 32:07.710]  Well, I mean, do you think that... I mean, rhetoric is par for the course in something like this.
[32:07.710 --> 32:14.530]  Do you think they're just using rhetoric so that they can sell a plan of any sort and maybe get people to be taking it more seriously?
[32:15.610 --> 32:19.150]  Well, I think they is not a monolithic entity.
[32:19.730 --> 32:32.230]  I think that when you... that, you know, I didn't know, you know, when he let off talking about the obonious use of hackers and those incidents in his speech, I hadn't realized that he'd said those things.
[32:32.910 --> 32:33.710]  That's annoying.
[32:34.010 --> 32:35.490]  You know, but I do take some comfort.
[32:35.490 --> 32:39.330]  They don't appeal to that kind of rhetoric in the report itself.
[32:39.650 --> 32:55.050]  But when I hear this coming from the congressional side, or I hear it coming from CSIS and other folks who are known to have taken a very hawkish approach towards things during the Bush administration, that does worry me.
[32:55.050 --> 33:08.650]  It worries me that they will use all these kinds of security concerns precisely in order to make the cybercrime laws harder and tougher and to create more sort of...
[33:08.650 --> 33:12.030]  And, you know, basically treat it more like a fear of war.
[33:12.170 --> 33:13.970]  Bad enough that there's a lot of...
[33:13.970 --> 33:15.950]  We're always throwing criminality around.
[33:15.950 --> 33:21.330]  And then they add the war on hacking and, you know, it just gets worse.
[33:21.370 --> 33:27.890]  Well, you have to add the war bit onto any word to get people to take it seriously.
[33:27.890 --> 33:34.490]  But I'd like to focus on one positive view of what happened on Friday.
[33:34.490 --> 33:38.190]  Anyway, this is from a website called SaveTheInternet.com.
[33:38.310 --> 33:43.230]  President Obama has done it again, reaffirming his unyielding commitment to an open internet.
[33:43.230 --> 33:48.250]  It happened this time during an announcement on Friday of a new initiative to beef up the nation's defenses against cyber attacks.
[33:49.190 --> 33:53.790]  The web-savvy commander-in-chief said he planned to select a new cyber czar.
[33:54.610 --> 33:59.150]  But he also said that he was supporting net neutrality.
[33:59.310 --> 34:02.570]  And the quote goes, Let me also be clear about what we will not do.
[34:02.570 --> 34:08.690]  Our pursuit of cyber security will not, I repeat, will not include monitoring private sector networks or internet traffic.
[34:08.890 --> 34:13.510]  We will preserve and protect the personal privacy and civil liberties that we cherish as Americans.
[34:13.810 --> 34:19.250]  Indeed, I remain firmly committed to net neutrality so we can keep the internet as it should be, open and free.
[34:19.470 --> 34:24.010]  Now, Li Tian, do you think that's something that we should be encouraged by?
[34:25.450 --> 34:27.050]  Only very cautiously.
[34:27.690 --> 34:32.430]  You know, so many people use net neutrality to mean different things.
[34:32.570 --> 34:33.770]  Especially in Washington.
[34:34.490 --> 34:39.830]  And it's one of the hottest, hottest, biggest money issues around.
[34:40.050 --> 34:44.750]  With a lot of stakeholders and a lot of different sort of battlegrounds.
[34:44.870 --> 34:50.250]  Not just the White House and cybersecurity, but also Congress itself, along with the FCC.
[34:50.790 --> 34:53.230]  I mean, there's so much money chasing that issue.
[34:53.230 --> 34:57.750]  So, you know, I really, the jury's really out on that one.
[34:58.450 --> 34:58.970]  Okay.
[34:59.650 --> 35:06.670]  Well, overall, I guess, you guys have any views on whether we should be optimistic about this, Gus?
[35:07.310 --> 35:17.010]  I was sort of encouraged by the fact that there was a mention of providing the research community access to data to facilitate developing tools, testing theories, and identifying workable solutions.
[35:17.010 --> 35:23.050]  So, to me, that sounds like the kind of thing we see at Hope, is when people are testing out whether voting booths are secure.
[35:23.370 --> 35:26.070]  When they're testing out other security things, just, you know, check that out.
[35:26.130 --> 35:27.830]  So I think hackers should be encouraged by that.
[35:28.970 --> 35:32.110]  Most likely the ones in academia and the ones in industry.
[35:32.950 --> 35:35.650]  But, you know, just about anybody, I think, should be encouraged by that.
[35:36.670 --> 35:37.290]  Go ahead.
[35:37.430 --> 35:44.710]  Can I mention sort of a trickle-down effect that I've heard in terms of the policies that are kind of happening in our government with regards to the Internet?
[35:44.950 --> 35:53.050]  I was actually at the New York Tech meetup last night, and one of the presenters was the NewYorkSenate.gov, NYSenate.gov.
[35:53.050 --> 36:05.090]  And basically what's happened in New York is the person who is the majority leader in the Senate, they hired a CIO, they made a new site, they made everything new where they're actually trying to emphasize transparency with the Senate using technology.
[36:05.610 --> 36:11.630]  So all of the kind of committee documents are online, the data that they're going through is being put online.
[36:13.710 --> 36:17.610]  This is totally useless because in New York State, the Senate committees don't actually meet.
[36:17.610 --> 36:21.170]  So the fact that they're transparent about this is, like, pathetic.
[36:21.170 --> 36:21.590]  Well, but it's...
[36:22.050 --> 36:23.090]  Okay, fine.
[36:23.190 --> 36:30.130]  But the fact of the matter is that they're actually putting this kind of stuff online, and they're trying to use technology in a way that makes the government more open.
[36:31.090 --> 36:34.130]  Ultimately, sort of the last word in any of this is where the money is allocated.
[36:34.310 --> 36:38.870]  If money is not allocated towards this, obviously he's hiring somebody, you know, as a czar, and that's promising.
[36:39.050 --> 36:42.610]  But if the money is not allocated towards a policy, it's just not going to happen.
[36:42.750 --> 36:44.150]  So that's ultimately going to be the proof of this.
[36:44.270 --> 36:45.350]  Okay, we're going to keep an eye on this.
[36:45.350 --> 36:48.450]  Obviously, very interesting developments from Washington, D.C.
[36:48.590 --> 36:50.590]  But we have more to talk about tonight as well.
[36:50.730 --> 36:54.290]  In fact, joining us on the phone is someone else from the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
[36:54.610 --> 36:56.950]  And please tell me if I'm pronouncing your name incorrectly.
[36:57.610 --> 36:58.930]  Koyin McSherry, are you with us?
[36:59.130 --> 36:59.670]  I am.
[36:59.750 --> 37:00.530]  It's Koryin, actually.
[37:00.770 --> 37:00.950]  Koryin.
[37:01.030 --> 37:01.310]  I'm sorry.
[37:01.430 --> 37:02.250]  Koryin McSherry.
[37:02.690 --> 37:04.350]  Now, you've been involved in something that...
[37:04.970 --> 37:05.230]  Uh-oh.
[37:05.550 --> 37:06.070]  Did we lose somebody?
[37:06.210 --> 37:06.670]  We did.
[37:06.930 --> 37:07.410]  We lost somebody.
[37:07.490 --> 37:08.310]  You figured out who we lost.
[37:08.510 --> 37:10.590]  Let's make sure we don't hang up on Koryin.
[37:11.010 --> 37:12.490]  I'm going to try.
[37:12.490 --> 37:13.510]  I hate this phone system.
[37:14.010 --> 37:14.350]  Okay.
[37:15.530 --> 37:15.990]  All right.
[37:16.130 --> 37:18.190]  So, apparently, we lost Lee.
[37:18.350 --> 37:18.530]  All right.
[37:18.590 --> 37:18.870]  Lee Tian.
[37:18.970 --> 37:19.650]  That was Lee Tian.
[37:19.790 --> 37:22.490]  I guess he disconnected from the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
[37:22.950 --> 37:23.810]  Bernie, are you still with us?
[37:24.070 --> 37:25.610]  No, he's not, but we'll call him that.
[37:25.610 --> 37:25.950]  He's not with us either.
[37:25.950 --> 37:27.350]  It wasn't his fault, I just guessed.
[37:27.450 --> 37:27.850]  All right.
[37:28.230 --> 37:29.730]  But, Koryin, you're with us.
[37:29.870 --> 37:30.230]  I'm with us.
[37:30.230 --> 37:31.310]  Koryin, am I still pronouncing it right?
[37:31.390 --> 37:31.550]  Okay.
[37:31.610 --> 37:32.470]  Koryin, don't worry about it.
[37:32.550 --> 37:33.190]  I'm so sorry.
[37:33.750 --> 37:36.610]  You are involved in something really fascinating.
[37:36.610 --> 37:37.550]  I find fascinating.
[37:37.870 --> 37:50.210]  An actual teaching curriculum for schools on copyright, but not the kind of teaching curriculum that you would see from the various copyright associations, MPAA, RIAA, things like that.
[37:50.410 --> 37:55.710]  This from a more of a civil rights freedom type of perspective.
[37:55.710 --> 37:58.810]  Do you want to tell us something about the EFF teaching copyright curriculum?
[37:59.510 --> 37:59.810]  Sure.
[38:00.810 --> 38:02.730]  It's helpful to know a little bit about the background.
[38:02.870 --> 38:23.790]  What happened is in California a couple years ago, at the behest of the RIAA and the MPAA and similar organizations, the California legislature passed a law that requires public schools that receive technology funding, which is pretty much everybody, need to teach about copyright.
[38:23.790 --> 38:29.170]  You need to add some kind of aspect of their curriculum that addresses copyright issues.
[38:29.370 --> 38:42.970]  So we got wind of this, and we said, well, okay, that's not such a terrible thing, but we need to make sure that copyright is taught correctly, that it's taught right, which means that you teach the whole picture of copyright.
[38:43.570 --> 38:52.970]  So you don't just talk about what copyright forbids, which is plenty of things, but also what copyright law permits via doctrines like fair use.
[38:52.970 --> 39:12.410]  And we thought it was pretty important that students, you know, really get that full picture because, unfortunately, I think there's a lot of propaganda out there telling young, you know, the people who are going to be innovators and creators of tomorrow that there's all this stuff that they can't do and focusing on what's forbidden.
[39:12.970 --> 39:17.290]  And, of course, there's all kinds of things that they can do, and they need to understand that as well.
[39:17.570 --> 39:29.890]  And another thing that we thought was pretty important is it seemed to us that it was really important that people who are, you know, future voters and people who are going to be rewriting copyright law down the line, which is done almost every generation,
[39:30.330 --> 39:35.890]  they need to really understand copyright law so that they can sort of fulfill their duties as citizens.
[39:35.890 --> 39:43.250]  And it seemed like a really great opportunity to engage in some civics lessons as well as understanding copyright.
[39:43.950 --> 39:47.270]  I think this is really great, I have to say, because I do some work with teachers.
[39:47.330 --> 39:53.530]  And one of the things we know is that unless they actually have lesson plans to use, they don't tend to want to implement any curriculum.
[39:53.530 --> 40:07.450]  So I think it's fabulous that the EFF is coming up with these curricula, especially also seeing as there's a study that came out last year from Renee Hobbs, who I think is at Temple University, showing that educators at all levels are really, really confused about copyright and fair use law.
[40:07.590 --> 40:12.650]  And what this tends to lead to is a chilling effect, where they don't actually, you know, do any teaching about it at all.
[40:13.610 --> 40:20.610]  And like Corinne said, it's the stuff that's being put out by, you know, business associations is really pretty creepy.
[40:20.750 --> 40:21.630]  I have an example here.
[40:21.730 --> 40:22.370]  Can I share it?
[40:23.050 --> 40:26.610]  Is this the pro-copyright propaganda that's already in the U.S.
[40:26.670 --> 40:26.990]  classrooms?
[40:27.290 --> 40:27.650]  Yes.
[40:27.890 --> 40:28.330]  Yeah, who does it?
[40:28.350 --> 40:29.690]  The Copyright Alliance is behind this, right?
[40:29.690 --> 40:31.850]  In this case, it's the Business Software Alliance.
[40:31.950 --> 40:32.970]  Oh, there's more than one.
[40:33.110 --> 40:33.410]  Oh, yeah.
[40:33.690 --> 40:35.450]  I'm sure everybody's got their own curriculum coming out.
[40:35.570 --> 40:35.890]  Do share.
[40:36.170 --> 40:40.090]  I also know of a curriculum that was developed by, you know, just a textbook publisher.
[40:40.090 --> 40:44.030]  And a lot of the times, textbook publishers will just say, well, yeah, let's take some English BAs and throw them at this.
[40:44.190 --> 40:47.810]  So it's people with no content knowledge writing these curricula, and they come up with stuff that's complete crap.
[40:47.810 --> 40:50.730]  Are these people who give the merit badge and respect and copyright to Boy Scouts?
[40:51.170 --> 40:52.770]  Because they actually do that.
[40:52.890 --> 40:53.390]  That's disturbing.
[40:53.510 --> 40:54.090]  Yeah, there is.
[40:59.710 --> 41:05.650]  It very much, it's, whereas the EFF's curriculum is very toned down, and it's just like, here's what the law says.
[41:05.790 --> 41:09.390]  The business stuff says, we have to teach kids to respect the law.
[41:09.530 --> 41:11.390]  We have to teach them to be good citizens.
[41:11.490 --> 41:12.330]  This is about citizenship.
[41:12.510 --> 41:17.530]  So there's this really, I mean, it sounds like patriotism education from the 30s or whatever going on in the business stuff.
[41:17.890 --> 41:19.750]  But anyway, I'll read an example here.
[41:19.970 --> 41:21.990]  Here's something from a worksheet for middle schoolers.
[41:22.770 --> 41:27.450]  And it's, so I'll give you the question that's given to the kids, or the prompt that's given to the kids, and the answer that's suggested.
[41:28.270 --> 41:36.150]  So in this case, kids are supposed to be responding to questions from, you know, in this case, from Panicked, for example.
[41:36.250 --> 41:37.410]  That's the name given here.
[41:37.810 --> 41:40.190]  And this prompt says, this is serious.
[41:40.390 --> 41:44.270]  I've been getting email receipts for all kinds of things, kinds of things I didn't buy.
[41:44.730 --> 41:46.750]  Jewelry, cameras, even a big screen TV.
[41:47.030 --> 41:50.230]  It's thousands of dollars, and these things are being shipped to people I don't even know.
[41:50.230 --> 41:55.510]  So I think it all started after I found a free copy of a computer graphics program I wanted to try.
[41:55.510 --> 41:56.470]  What should I do?
[41:56.710 --> 41:59.270]  And the answer says, oh, the problem here is spyware.
[41:59.850 --> 42:00.150]  What?
[42:01.130 --> 42:02.910]  I thought they were going to say the problem was hackers.
[42:03.230 --> 42:03.810]  They are.
[42:03.910 --> 42:04.670]  Wait, they're going to say that too.
[42:04.790 --> 42:08.630]  The student's example would have to uninstall the illegal computer graphics program.
[42:08.630 --> 42:09.730]  It's an illegal program.
[42:09.850 --> 42:12.910]  And use antivirus software to eliminate spyware.
[42:13.030 --> 42:14.670]  And then all the free merchandise will stop coming your way?
[42:14.990 --> 42:20.670]  The student should also install a firewall, which will protect his or her computer from unauthorized access and use by hackers.
[42:20.870 --> 42:25.930]  Where are they supposed to get the antivirus software and the firewall if they're a poor student without any money?
[42:26.030 --> 42:28.790]  There's some online resources here that direct you to the business software.
[42:28.970 --> 42:30.990]  Download it for free from a site of Malaysia I can direct you to.
[42:31.030 --> 42:43.210]  But I think the thing that this really points to that's really concerning to me is it seems to be fundamentally disturbing that we're asking our public school teachers to be for spokespeople for a particular point of view.
[42:43.210 --> 42:46.730]  And that's what we tried very hard to present a balanced curriculum.
[42:46.930 --> 42:52.930]  So, for example, on peer-to-peer file sharing, you know, people feel very strongly about peer-to-peer file sharing in all kinds of ways.
[42:53.170 --> 43:05.070]  So what we tried to do is our lesson has the students kind of look at the positions of the different stakeholders of independent musicians who are against file sharing or, you know, any kind of file sharing.
[43:05.510 --> 43:18.890]  Musicians that are actually in favor of it and actually, you know, try to encourage downloading of their music, you know, industry executives, lawyers, you know, so that they can sort of see that there's a lot of different perspectives on this issue and really think it through.
[43:19.170 --> 43:31.490]  So, again, it's trying to be balanced about it as opposed to just telling them one story and kind of blending using education as sort of a vehicle for intimidation, which I just think is not... that's not what school is supposed to be about.
[43:31.650 --> 43:33.090]  It's supposed to be about learning to think.
[43:33.270 --> 43:45.590]  And we thought... that was really one of the major motivations for us is we thought, well, you know, this copyright education could actually be a really great vehicle for encouraging students to sort of think about law in creative and interesting and critical ways,
[43:45.610 --> 43:48.850]  which is what they're supposed to be going to school in part to do anyway.
[43:50.190 --> 43:59.470]  So that seemed pretty important, but, you know, it's not... it's not easy to combat the power of the propaganda against, I have to tell you.
[44:00.270 --> 44:07.590]  That's really something I noticed as we were... as I was going over this curriculum was that they're not telling kids that the adults still haven't decided yet.
[44:07.970 --> 44:13.250]  They're... they're... the... the business curriculum treats this as if it's something that's said and done, that the laws are not currently still being made.
[44:13.390 --> 44:14.430]  I think that's really interesting.
[44:14.430 --> 44:23.150]  What I'm remembering is when I was in high school and they didn't even touch the 60s because that... that controversy was so close and so recent that they just didn't even want to touch it.
[44:23.230 --> 44:27.310]  But in this case, they're like, yes, we do want to touch the... the... the... the... controversy and we're right.
[44:28.030 --> 44:28.390]  So...
[44:28.390 --> 44:29.150]  Okay, Bernie, quickly.
[44:29.150 --> 44:44.350]  Kareem, I just wanted to ask you, all these... all these content producers have... have their axe to grind and are spending millions of dollars to... to... to force their viewpoints on teachers so that it will be forced down students' throats.
[44:44.970 --> 44:55.790]  What... what age groups or grades is this curriculum geared towards and how is EFF making teachers and other educators aware of its availability?
[44:56.570 --> 45:00.450]  Well, it... this current curriculum is geared towards high schoolers.
[45:00.710 --> 45:03.090]  There... it can be adapted for middle school.
[45:03.570 --> 45:05.050]  Many of the lessons can be.
[45:05.490 --> 45:07.630]  But we just haven't quite gotten there yet.
[45:07.630 --> 45:09.110]  We... we started at the high school level.
[45:09.290 --> 45:11.450]  And in terms of outreach, we're doing a few different things.
[45:11.630 --> 45:17.330]  We're... we're going to conferences and talking to... teacher conferences and kind of getting the word out in that kind of traditional way.
[45:17.930 --> 45:20.410]  We've done our usual sort of email blasts.
[45:20.410 --> 45:27.290]  And also, we're doing kind of a grassroots thing, sort of asking folks, you know, if you know a teacher, pass this on.
[45:27.410 --> 45:28.150]  Tell them about it.
[45:28.210 --> 45:34.270]  I mean, a lot of teachers don't realize that there's this requirement now that they have to teach copyright, at least in California and some other states as well.
[45:34.410 --> 45:36.810]  So, you know, get... get this out to them.
[45:36.890 --> 45:37.670]  Point them to it.
[45:37.770 --> 45:42.050]  You know, it's... it's... it's a CC license, so anyone can just go to our website, download the site.
[45:42.150 --> 45:43.970]  You don't have to register or do anything tricky.
[45:44.130 --> 45:44.810]  It's all right there.
[45:44.930 --> 45:46.190]  It's very easy to look at.
[45:47.150 --> 45:53.270]  And we've had... happily had some good feedback from folks who are EFF members, said, yeah, my kid's in school.
[45:53.270 --> 45:55.110]  I'm going to tell the teachers there about it.
[45:56.210 --> 45:58.010]  So we're trying to sort of proceed that way.
[45:58.210 --> 46:08.230]  So, Corinne, how can our listeners who want to make teachers in their area aware of this curriculum, make them aware of it?
[46:09.230 --> 46:12.650]  Well, let me first give the website for the curriculum.
[46:12.650 --> 46:14.510]  The first thing to know, it's simple.
[46:14.670 --> 46:17.530]  It's just teachingcopyright.org.
[46:17.790 --> 46:20.790]  Or you can go to the EFF website, which is eff.org.
[46:20.950 --> 46:21.650]  Even simpler.
[46:21.810 --> 46:23.290]  And there's a link right there.
[46:23.930 --> 46:32.450]  So what they can do is they can reach out to teachers, you know, when they do parent-teacher conferences or whenever they interact with teachers and say, hey, you know, you might want to check out this curriculum.
[46:32.450 --> 46:33.370]  It's right here.
[46:33.670 --> 46:35.270]  And just point them to the site.
[46:36.390 --> 46:44.870]  And we've, you know, like I said, we've really tried very hard to make it very accessible and easy to review quickly because we know that teachers are busy and they got a lot on their plate.
[46:45.710 --> 46:48.910]  And adding this to the curriculum is not going to be the easiest thing for them.
[46:49.110 --> 46:49.270]  All right.
[46:49.410 --> 46:50.930]  So are these actual lesson plans?
[46:51.070 --> 46:54.490]  These are actual lessons plans that were drafted for them to use?
[46:54.970 --> 46:55.410]  Absolutely.
[46:55.410 --> 46:56.350]  They're all right there.
[46:56.350 --> 46:59.510]  And you can use them together or you can break them apart.
[46:59.710 --> 47:15.550]  The most fun exercise is sort of the final exercise where they do a mock trial and they get to watch a really funny video about fair use and then do a mock trial where Disney basically sues the creator of the video and they have to sort of defend him.
[47:15.670 --> 47:18.910]  And that's good fun and it's a good way for students to understand fair use.
[47:19.050 --> 47:24.030]  Fair use is one of those things where it's a little complicated until you get some practice applying it.
[47:24.130 --> 47:28.250]  And then once you apply it, you can sort of understand what it is, which is really crucial.
[47:28.370 --> 47:33.470]  These guys, these students today, they're going to go out and do amazing, cool things.
[47:33.470 --> 47:42.410]  And understanding fair use is going to take them a long way towards being able to do those amazing, cool things without going over the line and getting themselves in trouble.
[47:42.570 --> 47:50.910]  We're talking with Corin McSherry from the Electronic Frontier Foundation about the EFF's teaching copyright curriculum now being made available to teachers all around the country.
[47:51.450 --> 47:54.390]  Information at www.teachingcopyright.org.
[47:54.550 --> 47:57.310]  Taking phone calls, 212-209-2900.
[47:57.310 --> 48:01.810]  If you have any questions on the subject or on the subject we were discussing previously, please give us a call.
[48:01.810 --> 48:02.810]  We only have a few minutes.
[48:02.810 --> 48:15.090]  I think some of our best activists in terms of, like, civil liberties and the Internet come from, like, free culture clubs at colleges, but there doesn't seem to be many at the high school level.
[48:15.330 --> 48:23.650]  What would you recommend, or how could free culture clubs at colleges, universities help spread this curriculum?
[48:25.130 --> 48:26.370]  Well, that's interesting.
[48:26.610 --> 48:30.570]  I think that's not something that I had thought about, but it's actually a very good point.
[48:30.570 --> 48:43.210]  I think that the, you know, people at universities, the university students are unlikely to sort of have the direct connections with high school students, but I know that they are sort of mentoring relationships that sometimes happen.
[48:43.210 --> 48:45.730]  So that might be a way of reaching out.
[48:45.830 --> 48:59.810]  I think it'd be fantastic if a free culture club at any university sort of wanted to take it on as a project to reach out to the schools and the local communities and connect to teachers and point them to this and sort of explain the background.
[48:59.830 --> 49:01.550]  I think that would be a fantastic project.
[49:01.790 --> 49:06.650]  And the thing about it here is, you know, EFF just does not have the resources that the RIAA has.
[49:06.830 --> 49:07.870]  I mean, that's just the reality.
[49:08.050 --> 49:13.510]  So we really are going to have to count on that kind of grassroots activism to spread this stuff around.
[49:13.510 --> 49:19.950]  Okay, and remember, those guys, they are by default in the classroom already, folks like the Copyright Alliance.
[49:20.170 --> 49:26.910]  They describe themselves as a non-profit, non-partisan educational organization dedicated to promoting the value of copyright as a means to make money.
[49:27.090 --> 49:35.950]  They describe Professor Lawrence Lessig as a hypocritical demagogue whose book imposes a quasi-socialist utopianism while demonizing copyright.
[49:36.630 --> 49:37.670]  So it doesn't.
[49:38.450 --> 49:41.350]  Well, I know you disagree, but that's what kids are being taught.
[49:41.390 --> 49:42.310]  They have not read that book.
[49:42.450 --> 49:43.490]  That's what kids are being taught.
[49:43.490 --> 49:46.430]  And this is a great way to get a different perspective out there.
[49:47.470 --> 49:48.590]  So teachingcopyright.org.
[49:48.730 --> 49:51.490]  Let's take some phone calls, see if listeners have any questions.
[49:51.910 --> 49:52.590]  Yeah, it's pretty funny.
[49:52.650 --> 49:53.570]  I know Lawrence Lessig.
[49:53.590 --> 49:54.650]  He's not a socialist.
[49:55.190 --> 49:56.070]  Is he a demagogue?
[49:57.270 --> 49:58.810]  No, he's not a demagogue either.
[49:58.810 --> 50:01.610]  But it's pretty funny to describe him as a socialist, believe me.
[50:01.690 --> 50:03.090]  Yeah, let's take a phone call.
[50:03.490 --> 50:04.150]  Good evening.
[50:04.450 --> 50:05.070]  You're on Off the Hook.
[50:05.730 --> 50:06.090]  Hello.
[50:06.590 --> 50:06.950]  Hi.
[50:07.830 --> 50:09.890]  Yeah, turn your phone down, please, or you'll get very confused.
[50:10.610 --> 50:11.490]  What question do you have?
[50:13.130 --> 50:19.830]  Yeah, switching your phone from one to, say you want to switch from Sprint to Boost, and you want to keep your phone...
[50:19.830 --> 50:22.950]  Okay, I'm sorry, but let's stick to the subject right now.
[50:23.150 --> 50:24.490]  We don't want to talk about phone companies.
[50:24.710 --> 50:27.390]  Let's talk about the curriculum or the Obama thing.
[50:27.530 --> 50:33.210]  I don't mean to cut people off, but we only have a couple of minutes left, so please stick to the subject that we're discussing now.
[50:33.830 --> 50:35.550]  212-209-2900.
[50:35.690 --> 50:35.970]  Good evening.
[50:36.230 --> 50:37.170]  You're on Off the Hook.
[50:38.390 --> 50:38.990]  Speak up.
[50:40.270 --> 50:41.190]  Okay, nobody there.
[50:42.030 --> 50:42.950]  Is this line working?
[50:43.150 --> 50:44.330]  It's got a piece of tape over it.
[50:44.550 --> 50:45.410]  It's been blinking.
[50:45.630 --> 50:47.690]  It's been blinking all hour.
[50:47.690 --> 50:48.270]  I don't trust it.
[50:48.370 --> 50:49.150]  Okay, you don't trust that one.
[50:49.230 --> 50:49.650]  Okay, you know what?
[50:49.670 --> 50:51.070]  Let's wait for some more calls to come in.
[50:51.970 --> 50:53.830]  Did you guys in the studio have any points?
[50:54.530 --> 51:03.070]  Corinne, I wanted to ask you, the term fair use, a lot of people think, well, it just means it's fair, but fair use is an actual legal term of art.
[51:03.070 --> 51:05.710]  Could you, in a nutshell, tell us what fair use is?
[51:06.030 --> 51:06.430]  Sure.
[51:06.630 --> 51:20.990]  I mean, what fair use is is basically a great big exception to the sort of default rule in copyright law, which is that if you make a copy that you're without the permission of the copyright owner, then that would be infringing.
[51:21.210 --> 51:23.830]  And fair use says, well, no, it's not.
[51:23.970 --> 51:25.810]  As long as it's fair use, it's not infringing.
[51:25.890 --> 51:26.590]  It's not a violation.
[51:26.810 --> 51:30.770]  And for something to be a fair use, you basically apply four factors.
[51:31.690 --> 51:36.390]  You look at whether the second use harms the market for the first use.
[51:36.530 --> 51:41.890]  So, for example, an entire copy of a song that you then you repost, well, that might harm the market for the original song.
[51:42.410 --> 51:45.830]  You look at what's the purpose of the second use.
[51:46.490 --> 51:48.410]  Are they doing something non-commercial?
[51:48.770 --> 51:49.790]  Are they changing it up?
[51:49.870 --> 51:50.630]  Are they doing something different?
[51:50.830 --> 51:55.970]  So, like, a remix is a really good example, or especially, like, a remix that engages in some kind of social commentary.
[51:56.510 --> 52:01.650]  That's probably going to be what's called a transformative purpose, and that's going to tend to weigh in favor of fair use.
[52:02.070 --> 52:08.410]  You look at whether the original work is factual or fictional, because we give less protection to facts than we do to...
[52:08.410 --> 52:15.630]  Well, we don't give any copyright protection to facts, but the closer something is to being fact as opposed to fiction and it's something really creative, the less we protect it.
[52:16.050 --> 52:19.370]  And finally, you look at how much did you use of the original work.
[52:19.490 --> 52:25.670]  So, did you take just a few seconds, maybe, of some news footage, or did you recopy an entire broadcast?
[52:26.390 --> 52:35.690]  So, you look at those four different factors, and I realize that it can be a little confusing, but, again, that's why it's really useful to spend some time practicing applying them to specific situations.
[52:35.690 --> 52:37.030]  So, it's easy to...
[52:37.030 --> 52:41.050]  You know, we have little videos, and we have people look at those and say, you know, is this fair use or not?
[52:41.210 --> 52:43.790]  Why is it fair use, or why wouldn't it be fair use?
[52:44.390 --> 52:48.690]  So, students get accustomed to sort of thinking about it in an intelligent way.
[52:48.810 --> 52:54.030]  One of the things that we think is really important is that a lot of people think that if it's non-commercial, it must be fair use.
[52:54.590 --> 52:57.190]  People will call me up and say, well, I didn't make any money off of it.
[52:57.190 --> 52:58.050]  It must be fair use.
[52:58.190 --> 52:59.650]  And, well, now, that's not how it works.
[53:00.850 --> 53:02.190]  That's not the answer.
[53:02.350 --> 53:08.430]  But it actually isn't that hard to figure out, a lot of times, whether something's a fair use or not, as long as you get accustomed to it.
[53:08.510 --> 53:12.150]  And lay people can, you know, get some basic skills in this area that will help them.
[53:12.250 --> 53:17.710]  I think another great way to learn about this is to look at the quiz that's up on the website, teachingcopyright.org.
[53:17.970 --> 53:18.690]  I don't want to give...
[53:18.690 --> 53:24.230]  Is it okay to give away the answers, or will students get an easy ride if I do this?
[53:24.390 --> 53:25.310]  I think it's okay.
[53:25.490 --> 53:25.730]  All right.
[53:25.730 --> 53:27.290]  Well, let's read a couple of questions here.
[53:27.390 --> 53:31.650]  The sole purpose of copyright is to make authors money and protect them from getting their works stolen.
[53:31.810 --> 53:32.750]  Anybody want to...
[53:32.750 --> 53:32.950]  True.
[53:33.370 --> 53:33.790]  What, true?
[53:33.910 --> 53:35.330]  No, you're wrong, Voltaire.
[53:35.450 --> 53:35.790]  It's false.
[53:36.290 --> 53:36.730]  Yeah.
[53:37.290 --> 53:41.190]  Copyright was established to encourage the growth of science, education, and the arts.
[53:41.730 --> 53:42.490]  How about this?
[53:43.190 --> 53:47.410]  Amy tells Daniel about her summer vacation, and he says he'd love to see her pictures.
[53:47.670 --> 53:52.970]  Amy uses a peer-to-peer file sharing program to upload the photographs she took at camp so he can download them.
[53:53.250 --> 53:54.450]  That's copyright infringement.
[53:54.550 --> 53:54.910]  True or false?
[53:54.910 --> 53:55.510]  And terrorism.
[53:56.050 --> 53:56.410]  Illegal.
[53:56.570 --> 53:57.030]  It's terrorism.
[53:57.130 --> 53:57.790]  Yeah, it's false.
[53:59.310 --> 54:04.090]  Sharing your own original work using peer-to-peer file sharing technology is totally legal.
[54:04.290 --> 54:05.190]  Here's one more.
[54:05.190 --> 54:05.570]  And a communist dictatorship.
[54:05.830 --> 54:06.410]  Here's one more.
[54:06.530 --> 54:10.370]  The Motion Picture Association of America has anti-piracy sniffing dogs.
[54:12.250 --> 54:12.730]  True.
[54:13.050 --> 54:13.470]  Very true.
[54:13.590 --> 54:14.130]  That is true.
[54:14.350 --> 54:20.410]  According to the MPAA, they've trained two black Labradors named Lucky and Flo to sniff out DVD piracy.
[54:21.090 --> 54:23.310]  It just shows you what we're up against here, folks.
[54:23.510 --> 54:23.870]  It's unbelievable.
[54:24.090 --> 54:26.010]  There's a whole curriculum actually all about Lucky and Flo.
[54:26.010 --> 54:26.830]  Oh, wow.
[54:26.990 --> 54:30.710]  So you don't have any little cute mascots, do you?
[54:31.810 --> 54:35.650]  Well, we actually have a couple of dogs in the office, but we don't use them in the curriculum.
[54:36.310 --> 54:39.150]  But it is actually one of the points that we try to make about file sharing.
[54:39.150 --> 54:42.070]  And throughout the curriculum is...
[54:42.730 --> 54:45.710]  And again, I think it's where I think we're trying to attain balance.
[54:46.290 --> 54:50.690]  It's not that the technology in and of itself can be used for a variety of different things.
[54:50.850 --> 54:53.870]  So, you know, I think too often people come away with the notion that if it's...
[54:53.870 --> 54:56.430]  If you hear the word peer-to-peer, you think, oh, it must be illegal.
[54:56.610 --> 54:57.830]  Well, that's not the way it works.
[54:57.950 --> 54:58.970]  It's not true at all.
[54:59.130 --> 55:01.430]  And students really shouldn't be led to believe that.
[55:01.850 --> 55:02.310]  All right.
[55:02.530 --> 55:10.230]  Corinne McSherry from the EFF, thanks again for talking to us about this amazing curriculum that the EFF is offering.
[55:10.450 --> 55:17.170]  Do you want to give out the contact information once again for teachers or anybody in a school who might be interested in teaching their kids this?
[55:17.470 --> 55:17.850]  Sure.
[55:18.070 --> 55:29.410]  So, the curriculum is available at www.teachingcopyright.org or you can just go to www.eff.org and there's a link right there.
[55:29.570 --> 55:31.850]  And while you're on EFF.org, send them some money.
[55:32.030 --> 55:32.650]  Yes, absolutely.
[55:32.850 --> 55:33.990]  Send us some money.
[55:34.130 --> 55:34.450]  Thank you.
[55:34.630 --> 55:34.870]  All right.
[55:34.950 --> 55:36.150]  Thanks again for joining us.
[55:36.150 --> 55:37.850]  Now, Gus, I believe you had something to tell us about as well.
[55:38.010 --> 55:38.170]  Yes.
[55:38.170 --> 55:43.670]  If you are looking for a mascot for fair use, I would volunteer my puppet wean on our show, The Media Show.
[55:43.810 --> 55:47.110]  That's youtube.com slash user slash The Media Show.
[55:47.290 --> 55:51.490]  We did a short piece the other day about fair use after one of our videos got taken down by YouTube.
[55:51.910 --> 55:56.090]  And James Grimmelman, who's a professor at New York Law School, came on and talked to us about that.
[55:56.470 --> 55:56.890]  All right.
[55:57.430 --> 55:59.510]  I want to thank everybody for being a part of the show.
[55:59.710 --> 56:01.870]  And write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[56:01.970 --> 56:04.710]  Sorry, we couldn't get any calls, but I think the phone system's all kablooey.
[56:05.410 --> 56:06.490]  2600 meetings this Friday.
[56:06.790 --> 56:07.770]  So we'll see you then.
[56:08.090 --> 56:08.350]  Good night.
[56:42.960 --> 56:43.080]  Bye, guys.
[56:43.080 --> 56:45.220]  You didn't get that scotch from the cat.
[56:46.440 --> 56:47.880]  And I'll be stripped to the skin.
[56:48.160 --> 56:49.740]  You'll be stripped to the bone.
[56:50.060 --> 56:51.660]  You'll be stripped to the bone.
[56:51.920 --> 56:53.440]  I won't say no.
[56:53.700 --> 56:56.940]  I won't say no to the picture bone.
[56:58.800 --> 57:00.660]  You'll be stripped to the skin.
[57:00.960 --> 57:02.460]  I'll be stripped to the skin.
[57:02.680 --> 57:04.360]  You'll be stripped to the bone.
[57:04.640 --> 57:06.240]  And you'll be stripped to the bone.
[57:06.460 --> 57:08.400]  I won't say no, no.
[57:08.480 --> 57:11.580]  I won't say no to the picture bone.
[57:27.950 --> 57:34.170]  And you have come to depend on your right to pretend you're alone.
[57:35.510 --> 57:39.330]  Would the star of the screen ever wish of the same?
[57:39.910 --> 57:42.650]  Red-eyed and dying through the morning call.
[57:42.950 --> 57:46.450]  And the president's friends, would they live for long?
[57:46.690 --> 57:52.010]  If they saw down the wire, what really goes on when you're home to relax?
[57:52.290 --> 57:53.830]  Because we should attack.
[57:54.110 --> 57:56.630]  Yeah, the breathers and men don't know.
[57:57.250 --> 57:59.350]  And I'll be straight to the skin.
[57:59.590 --> 58:01.070]  I'll be straight to the skin.
[58:01.490 --> 58:03.090]  You'll be straight to the bone.
[58:03.310 --> 58:04.830]  You'll be straight to the bone.
[58:05.170 --> 58:06.770]  I won't say no.
[58:07.010 --> 58:10.150]  I won't say no to the bitchy bone.
[58:12.010 --> 58:13.930]  I'll be straight to the skin.
[58:14.270 --> 58:15.690]  I'll be straight to the skin.
[58:15.930 --> 58:17.610]  You'll be straight to the bone.
[58:17.930 --> 58:19.450]  You'll be straight to the bone.
[58:19.690 --> 58:21.290]  I won't say no.
[58:21.530 --> 58:24.770]  I won't say no to the bitchy bone.
[58:28.060 --> 58:40.380]  Early morning calling I'm trying to reach a picture, early morning calling I'm trying to reach a picture.
[58:42.850 --> 58:45.130]  Early morning, slip through the skin,
[58:50.700 --> 58:54.060]  I will hold it up till the dropping form.
[58:56.000 --> 59:01.680]  I'll be straight to the skin, you'll be straight to the bone.
[59:28.300 --> 59:29.700]  Yeah!
[59:29.700 --> 59:30.120]  Yeah!
[59:31.060 --> 59:31.300]  Hey!