[00:00.000 --> 00:01.300] ...srn.org. [00:01.520 --> 00:03.980] Today's newscast was produced by Bernard K. [00:04.140 --> 00:07.380] Joes and Shannon Young, who's sitting in for Catherine Komp. [00:07.560 --> 00:14.920] Our headlines editor was Jess Burns, and the technical production team at KPFA in Berkeley includes Paclo and Rose Katabchi. [00:15.140 --> 00:17.880] From Bogota, Colombia, I'm Manuel Rueda. [00:32.970 --> 00:34.310] And very good evening to everybody. [00:34.410 --> 00:38.530] The program about to start is Off the Hook at 7 o'clock here on WSRN. [00:38.550 --> 00:39.850] WBAI, New York. [02:06.660 --> 02:07.580] And I give you a ride. [02:07.640 --> 02:09.460] The program, as I mentioned, is Off the Hook. [02:09.960 --> 02:11.080] Manuel Goldstein here with you. [02:11.360 --> 02:12.580] Joined tonight by Gus. [02:12.880 --> 02:14.120] How are you doing? [02:16.080 --> 02:18.520] Yeah, let's let that wear off after a little while. [02:18.740 --> 02:19.140] Rob T. [02:19.240 --> 02:19.640] Firefly. [02:19.780 --> 02:20.360] Good evening. [02:21.340 --> 02:21.880] Red Hack. [02:22.100 --> 02:22.260] Hello. [02:23.740 --> 02:24.900] Dot Red, welcome back. [02:25.020 --> 02:25.240] Hello. [02:25.800 --> 02:26.640] And not Kevin. [02:26.880 --> 02:27.300] Hello. [02:27.920 --> 02:29.700] Down in Philadelphia is Bernie S. [02:29.780 --> 02:31.060] Hopefully things are a little bit more normal. [02:32.020 --> 02:33.400] Very normal here in Philadelphia. [02:33.540 --> 02:34.140] Well, that's good to know. [02:34.260 --> 02:34.980] That's good to hear. [02:35.700 --> 02:43.860] All right, let's just jump in with both feet at the same time and get this over with, because it's really, hopefully, the last time we ever have to talk about this. [02:45.880 --> 02:46.520] The cutover. [02:47.820 --> 02:48.460] It's here. [02:49.200 --> 02:49.840] Digital TV. [02:50.340 --> 02:52.440] In a couple of days, it's all going to be over. [02:52.520 --> 02:52.840] I'm not ready. [02:53.120 --> 02:53.420] No, wait. [02:53.460 --> 02:53.960] You are ready. [02:54.000 --> 02:54.460] I'm not ready. [02:54.600 --> 02:54.860] No, no. [02:55.180 --> 02:56.540] No, but I didn't do what I have to do. [02:57.100 --> 02:57.760] Hold on a second. [02:57.800 --> 03:02.340] You moved into a new apartment, and you said, Emmanuel, I refuse to get cable. [03:02.440 --> 03:03.260] I am not going to get cable. [03:03.500 --> 03:04.740] I'm going to have an antenna. [03:05.100 --> 03:10.600] I'm going to watch digital television over this here antenna, is what you said to me while you were waving the thing in my face. [03:11.160 --> 03:12.000] And you did it, didn't you? [03:12.180 --> 03:12.560] I did it. [03:12.560 --> 03:16.840] In fact, you even tweeted about this the other day, saying that you were watching, what were you watching? [03:16.920 --> 03:17.160] Conan. [03:17.540 --> 03:18.240] Conan O'Brien. [03:18.380 --> 03:18.520] Yes. [03:19.280 --> 03:19.880] Over the air. [03:19.880 --> 03:20.320] Earlier now. [03:20.360 --> 03:21.100] I can go to bed earlier. [03:21.260 --> 03:21.820] Over the air. [03:22.280 --> 03:24.440] And yeah, so you're set. [03:24.440 --> 03:24.820] No, I'm ready. [03:24.960 --> 03:25.400] You're set. [03:25.500 --> 03:25.720] I'm ready. [03:25.900 --> 03:28.060] But apparently 3 million people still didn't get the memo. [03:28.240 --> 03:28.660] And you know what? [03:28.720 --> 03:30.080] I have no sympathy. [03:30.360 --> 03:35.680] Well, I have much less sympathy than when we talked about this months ago, because, well, they should have heard our show by now. [03:37.100 --> 03:39.160] But Bernie, I know you still have some feelings about this. [03:39.340 --> 03:40.280] Do you think we're ready? [03:41.140 --> 03:42.920] Well, probably most of us are ready. [03:43.020 --> 03:43.880] Actually, I'm not ready. [03:43.960 --> 03:44.980] I don't subscribe to cable. [03:44.980 --> 03:46.680] I do watch some TV over the internet. [03:46.940 --> 03:52.280] But I only have one little analog TV set, and I do have a converter box. [03:52.280 --> 03:55.880] I just haven't hooked it up yet, because I want to experience the cutoff. [03:56.120 --> 03:59.160] I want to experience being cut off and having to... [03:59.160 --> 04:00.340] We can do that right now. [04:00.500 --> 04:01.580] You can experience... [04:01.960 --> 04:04.260] We'd be happy to demonstrate what it's like to be cut off. [04:04.600 --> 04:05.700] It wouldn't be the first time. [04:05.820 --> 04:08.160] But in any case, I have... [04:09.280 --> 04:10.180] I've sort of prepared. [04:10.180 --> 04:14.340] I've gotten the converter box and a little antenna, and we'll see what happens. [04:14.340 --> 04:16.160] Bernie, you've got to get off your ass and prepare. [04:16.340 --> 04:16.920] I mean, this is... [04:16.920 --> 04:18.280] We're not kidding around here. [04:18.440 --> 04:19.360] This is... [04:19.360 --> 04:19.880] I just want to... [04:19.880 --> 04:20.800] I could have prepared. [04:21.020 --> 04:22.280] They're playing for keeps this time. [04:22.500 --> 04:23.480] The cutover... [04:23.480 --> 04:25.120] No, no, you know, no givebacks or anything. [04:25.420 --> 04:32.220] I just want to experience, Emmanuel, what millions of other people are going to experience who really just did not realize what this was about. [04:32.860 --> 04:44.560] There are literally millions of people in nursing homes, assisted living facilities, prisons, other types of institutions, or a lot of people that just aren't clued into technology at all. [04:44.560 --> 04:47.660] They just know they turn on their TV, and they get their programming. [04:47.820 --> 04:58.660] And like it or not, it's undeniable that television, as an information medium, has affected this society far more than the internet, far more than any... [04:58.660 --> 04:59.620] Don't say it. [04:59.760 --> 05:00.720] Don't say it. [05:01.000 --> 05:02.080] Far more than any other media. [05:02.080 --> 05:03.560] Not far more than radio. [05:03.960 --> 05:04.260] No. [05:04.760 --> 05:05.240] No. [05:05.460 --> 05:06.840] I will not believe that. [05:07.420 --> 05:09.240] And radio is not cutting over. [05:09.380 --> 05:11.880] Unless you listen to our April 1st show, radio is not cutting over. [05:11.880 --> 05:14.980] So, people can always turn on their friendly radio, right? [05:15.580 --> 05:21.020] Okay, I'm talking maybe over the last 50 years than any other medium over the past 50 years. [05:21.160 --> 05:23.400] If you want to call that news and information, yeah, I suppose. [05:24.060 --> 05:26.360] Well, yeah, I'm not talking about the quality of it. [05:26.460 --> 05:29.080] I'm just talking about how much it's affecting this society. [05:29.520 --> 05:44.580] Television is undeniably the medium that has affected popular culture and politics and everything else in our society, more than any other single electronic medium over the past half century. [05:44.840 --> 05:48.480] And it's going to have a remarkable change in a couple of days. [05:48.480 --> 06:05.480] This Friday, the FCC will order, or has already ordered, all analog TV stations, except for some small rural stations and some repeaters called translators, to turn off their analog broadcasts and switch to digital, which is a much more complex signal. [06:05.620 --> 06:08.380] It requires much more sophisticated equipment. [06:08.640 --> 06:11.120] It's more difficult to pick up in many cases. [06:11.120 --> 06:16.660] It doesn't work well with reflections and if the receiver is moving, if you've got a portable set. [06:16.760 --> 06:18.020] In fact, you can't buy a portable... [06:18.020 --> 06:22.640] It's almost impossible to buy a portable digital TV set. [06:22.820 --> 06:25.320] They just don't work well, and there are very few of them on the market. [06:25.720 --> 06:26.840] And, you know... [06:26.840 --> 06:28.300] But can I just bring up one thing here? [06:28.300 --> 06:38.100] Because we have tested this pretty thoroughly in New York City, where everybody was forced at a moment's notice to deal with life without television. [06:38.100 --> 06:41.120] And that was when the first World Trade Center bombing attack took place. [06:41.480 --> 06:44.260] Every single television station was off the air. [06:44.740 --> 06:46.000] And people had to go... [06:46.000 --> 06:49.740] People had to watch on cable and, you know, satellite and things like that. [06:50.140 --> 06:52.880] And people were so calm about that at 9-11, weren't they? [06:53.020 --> 06:53.540] Not 9-11. [06:53.680 --> 06:53.920] No, no. [06:53.940 --> 06:55.740] I'm talking about the one before that, the precursor. [06:55.820 --> 06:56.280] The 90s. [06:56.380 --> 06:57.320] Yeah, the one in the 90s. [06:57.320 --> 06:58.360] I just remember... [06:58.360 --> 06:58.460] Oh, when it blew up? [06:58.620 --> 06:59.120] Okay, yeah, yeah. [06:59.180 --> 06:59.480] I was... [06:59.480 --> 07:08.100] In fact, we did a radio program about that, and I was rather amazed that more people seem to be watching television over cable than over the air. [07:08.180 --> 07:11.760] And that's my first inkling that, wow, nobody watches broadcast TV anymore. [07:11.880 --> 07:15.560] Very few people seem to, because I was amazed by how few people were affected by this. [07:15.900 --> 07:16.440] That's true. [07:16.560 --> 07:17.040] There's about... [07:17.040 --> 07:22.400] Only about 15% of the American population still watches broadcast television. [07:22.400 --> 07:23.740] Yeah, and that was nearly 20 years ago. [07:23.740 --> 07:27.580] So, yeah, I think it'll be an interesting psychological experiment to see just what happens. [07:27.740 --> 07:29.680] And I don't mean that in a bad way. [07:29.800 --> 07:34.040] I'm not saying people should be treated as guinea pigs, but I am kind of fascinated by what's going to happen. [07:34.560 --> 07:35.140] So am I. [07:35.260 --> 07:36.980] A couple of predictions, Emanuel. [07:37.200 --> 07:37.320] All right. [07:37.320 --> 07:50.100] I predict, as I mentioned, people in nursing homes, assisted living facilities, prisons, other institutions, and people which are included in technology, are going to experience suddenly the loss of their main communications medium. [07:50.100 --> 07:52.120] Like it or not, that's just what's going to happen. [07:52.700 --> 08:00.880] I predict that a lot of TV stations are going to broadcast a very interesting thing at midnight on Friday, which is the old... [08:00.880 --> 08:06.420] Remember the old sign-off where they would show the American flag and play the Star Spangled banner and say we're going off the air? [08:06.420 --> 08:07.680] Well, I hope people record this then. [08:07.680 --> 08:12.740] If that is true, can people get out there with their VCRs and hook them up to analog TVs and record these last sign-offs forever? [08:12.980 --> 08:13.940] I mean, I'd like to see them. [08:14.100 --> 08:16.100] And I probably can't figure out how to do that myself. [08:16.520 --> 08:17.720] I hope some of them end up on YouTube. [08:17.760 --> 08:26.580] Although, a few months ago, when the first cutoff came and went, YouTube was sent a bunch of DMC take-down notices. [08:26.780 --> 08:26.900] Oh, boy. [08:26.900 --> 08:27.680] And these were... [08:27.680 --> 08:28.340] I know, it's ridiculous. [08:28.580 --> 08:29.480] These were taken down. [08:29.780 --> 08:30.780] But this is history. [08:30.920 --> 08:31.900] This is history in the making. [08:32.160 --> 08:33.520] And it's really going to be... [08:33.520 --> 08:33.900] You know what? [08:34.020 --> 08:34.300] All right. [08:34.300 --> 08:35.120] Forget about YouTube. [08:35.440 --> 08:40.580] Send them to us, and we'll distribute them on street corners or whatever we have to do to get it out just so that people can have a bit of history. [08:40.780 --> 08:41.020] Red Hack. [08:41.260 --> 08:47.900] So you're basically saying that these people who are not ready are all in facilities where really it's not their fault to be ready. [08:47.940 --> 08:51.860] It would be the caretakers, whether it's the prison or the nursing home. [08:51.960 --> 08:54.200] So, like, I don't really, you know... [08:54.200 --> 08:54.860] Not all of them. [08:54.900 --> 08:55.380] A lot of them. [08:55.760 --> 08:56.080] Fine. [08:56.220 --> 08:58.360] But then that's not really any fault of the government. [08:58.480 --> 09:03.340] That's the fault of these people who are clearly lazy, even though they know what's going to happen and they don't want to upgrade. [09:03.340 --> 09:04.600] Well, prisons are run by the governments. [09:05.060 --> 09:05.200] Right. [09:05.420 --> 09:07.580] But it's just kind of like a moot point. [09:07.920 --> 09:08.020] Yeah. [09:08.380 --> 09:08.920] Not Kevin. [09:09.060 --> 09:09.200] Go ahead. [09:09.340 --> 09:12.380] I disagree with that, Red Hack, because I'm not lazy and I'm not ready at all. [09:13.040 --> 09:14.080] Like, you also don't care. [09:14.240 --> 09:14.400] I'm sorry. [09:14.600 --> 09:16.200] I know you, and that's not true. [09:16.200 --> 09:18.480] But I also don't own a TV, so I'm not ready at that. [09:18.720 --> 09:18.740] Right. [09:19.200 --> 09:21.620] You don't own a TV and you're not ready for the cutover. [09:21.740 --> 09:22.320] I'm not ready for the cutover. [09:22.320 --> 09:23.340] I don't know how that makes any sense. [09:23.460 --> 09:23.900] Mike is here. [09:23.980 --> 09:24.380] Mike, welcome. [09:24.520 --> 09:27.900] And I just, I'm here just to point out that not Kevin is in fact lazy. [09:28.080 --> 09:28.540] It's not true. [09:28.620 --> 09:28.820] You can't prove it. [09:28.820 --> 09:29.820] But he also doesn't have a TV. [09:30.080 --> 09:30.720] I also don't have a TV. [09:31.380 --> 09:34.740] So, I don't know where that puts you exactly in this whole, in this realm of... [09:34.740 --> 09:34.900] It means I'm unprepared. [09:35.620 --> 09:35.860] Yeah. [09:36.020 --> 09:36.180] Okay. [09:36.260 --> 09:37.740] Well, that definitely, you're in that camp for sure. [09:37.900 --> 09:40.080] But just how big, unprepared you are. [09:46.200 --> 09:47.480] What happened or while nothing happened. [09:47.600 --> 09:47.780] Right. [09:47.960 --> 09:48.060] Yeah. [09:48.180 --> 09:50.300] When the rioting occurs, then we can talk about it. [09:50.400 --> 09:53.540] If people actually riot over TV, then that says a lot right there. [09:53.620 --> 09:55.320] In this country, I wouldn't be surprised. [09:55.660 --> 09:58.080] Well, remember the New York City blackout? [09:58.180 --> 09:58.820] There were no riots. [09:59.060 --> 09:59.980] No one had television then. [10:00.500 --> 10:00.800] Yeah. [10:00.800 --> 10:01.240] That's a good point. [10:01.300 --> 10:02.120] No one had television then. [10:02.340 --> 10:02.620] Yeah. [10:02.780 --> 10:06.260] People were too busy, you know, looting and pillaging and... [10:06.260 --> 10:07.180] Well, that too, I suppose. [10:08.120 --> 10:10.740] All kinds of possibilities of people. [10:10.860 --> 10:12.060] People might even read books, you know? [10:12.200 --> 10:12.780] That could happen. [10:12.980 --> 10:13.340] Books? [10:13.440 --> 10:13.620] Yeah. [10:14.140 --> 10:14.840] They're still out there. [10:14.860 --> 10:15.280] What's that? [10:15.280 --> 10:16.140] Yeah, what is that? [10:16.160 --> 10:17.440] And they're not being cut over to digital. [10:17.780 --> 10:18.280] I mean, they are. [10:19.420 --> 10:20.840] But not mandatorily. [10:21.360 --> 10:22.920] They're out there and you can still get them. [10:23.040 --> 10:24.320] If Amazon has anything to say about it. [10:24.440 --> 10:27.060] Well, their analog form, the libraries still exist. [10:27.380 --> 10:27.940] So, okay. [10:28.880 --> 10:29.560] Are we... [10:29.560 --> 10:30.480] Have we got it all in our system? [10:30.620 --> 10:31.520] Any other points, Bernie? [10:31.720 --> 10:32.360] Are you done with this? [10:32.760 --> 10:40.640] Well, you see, I would predict that outside of Radio Shack and other electronic stores, there will be lines of people trying to get antennas. [10:40.640 --> 10:48.840] It's because they'll find out that you actually need, in many cases, an outdoor antenna now to pick up a TV broadcast in a couple of days. [10:48.940 --> 10:54.620] Except that if they already got the converter box, then they already know that their antenna doesn't work and they'll already have taken care of this. [10:55.240 --> 10:56.980] And what's a Radio Shack, anyway? [10:57.260 --> 10:59.180] And does Radio Shack actually carry antennas anymore? [11:00.000 --> 11:00.560] They do. [11:00.680 --> 11:01.200] They're not very good. [11:01.200 --> 11:02.300] They carry radios anymore. [11:02.800 --> 11:03.700] That's what I'd like to know. [11:04.660 --> 11:05.180] We'll see. [11:05.180 --> 11:06.900] Yeah, we will see what happens. [11:07.200 --> 11:09.620] And we'll be here next week to tell you all about it. [11:10.380 --> 11:11.540] Okay, what else is in the news? [11:11.600 --> 11:12.440] Well, this is kind of interesting. [11:12.940 --> 11:18.880] Remember last year we were talking about the Scientology attacks by this group called Anonymous? [11:18.980 --> 11:20.460] Or is that really their name, Anonymous? [11:20.600 --> 11:21.760] Or are they just an anonymous group? [11:21.880 --> 11:23.040] No, they call themselves Anonymous. [11:23.060 --> 11:23.780] They call themselves Anonymous. [11:23.880 --> 11:24.060] Okay. [11:24.260 --> 11:30.260] But apparently the guy who was caught doing it is no longer Anonymous because he's being named all over the place. [11:31.180 --> 11:33.060] And they say he was part of... [11:33.060 --> 11:34.440] And this is sort of a theme tonight, I think. [11:34.440 --> 11:35.540] The misuse of the word hacker. [11:35.760 --> 11:41.200] He was part of the hacker group Anonymous that targeted Scientology, churches, web security. [11:41.700 --> 11:43.140] Okay, it's got nothing to do with hacking. [11:43.660 --> 11:45.380] Anonymous are not a bunch of hackers. [11:45.380 --> 11:46.820] They're a bunch of people, you know. [11:47.680 --> 11:48.260] Lots of them. [11:48.360 --> 11:49.160] Millions of them, I think. [11:49.420 --> 11:52.720] And they tend to do things in groups. [11:53.580 --> 11:54.880] Organize some things somehow. [11:55.080 --> 11:55.620] It's kind of weird. [11:56.000 --> 11:57.860] They're maybe social engineers to some extent. [11:58.000 --> 11:58.780] I mean, black faxing. [11:58.860 --> 12:00.660] Black faxing is a kind of hacking, I think. [12:00.740 --> 12:05.140] Like what they were doing to Scientology where you take a loop of black construction paper and fax it to them over and over. [12:05.140 --> 12:05.540] They still do that. [12:05.600 --> 12:06.640] We did that in the 80s. [12:06.760 --> 12:08.880] And, you know, who has a thermal fax anymore? [12:09.500 --> 12:10.260] I don't know. [12:10.580 --> 12:10.840] Wow. [12:11.080 --> 12:11.680] They do, apparently. [12:12.560 --> 12:12.860] Okay. [12:13.040 --> 12:13.900] It used to make it overheat. [12:13.980 --> 12:15.080] That was the whole point behind it? [12:15.260 --> 12:16.240] Or just use up toner? [12:16.240 --> 12:17.400] He didn't always have to make it overheat. [12:17.500 --> 12:19.260] He could just, you know, make them print out. [12:19.500 --> 12:19.760] Okay. [12:19.760 --> 12:20.340] I suppose. [12:21.540 --> 12:21.580] Yeah. [12:21.640 --> 12:23.140] People did that after Tiananmen Square. [12:23.320 --> 12:23.760] They did that. [12:23.920 --> 12:26.600] And I suppose that's one method. [12:26.840 --> 12:33.160] But anyway, they tracked down this guy in New Jersey, accusing him of the distributed denial of service attacks. [12:34.620 --> 12:38.020] And he's going to be sentenced on August 24th. [12:38.080 --> 12:42.020] Scientology is selling tickets to the sentencing in district court in New Jersey. [12:42.580 --> 12:43.200] I'm joking. [12:44.820 --> 12:45.880] But it's a good idea. [12:47.640 --> 12:48.780] And I don't know. [12:49.420 --> 12:55.380] I guess, are there more Scientology demonstrations that Anonymous is going to plan in this guy's honor? [12:55.600 --> 12:56.240] Maybe they're now. [12:56.400 --> 12:58.120] Or have they been cowed into submission? [12:58.900 --> 12:59.340] Emmanuel? [12:59.500 --> 12:59.880] Yes, go ahead. [13:00.900 --> 13:15.140] I think the group Anonymous might have to change their name pretty soon, because the word is that this individual is cooperating with the government under what's called the 5K1.1 upward departure rule of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. [13:15.240 --> 13:16.200] You're saying he's a stoolie? [13:16.560 --> 13:17.900] Which basically means, yes. [13:18.040 --> 13:26.300] It basically means the government will give someone a substantial downward departure in the length of their sentence. [13:26.480 --> 13:39.400] In other words, they reduce their sentence significantly if they provide substantial assistance that leads to the prosecution of other individuals that were involved in the same conspiracy or act. [13:39.520 --> 13:40.440] Bernie, how do you know this? [13:40.560 --> 13:41.640] Yeah, how do you know this, Bernie? [13:41.680 --> 13:42.760] I was a little curious myself. [13:44.180 --> 13:45.560] I said the word is. [13:45.860 --> 13:46.580] I don't know that. [13:46.580 --> 13:49.380] I'm not saying it's a fact, but I'm saying the word is. [13:49.520 --> 13:50.140] That's what's happening. [13:50.340 --> 13:51.420] And the word is he cooperating. [13:51.420 --> 13:54.820] Is the word is just because you're saying the word is, or is the word is because of something else? [13:55.220 --> 13:57.400] I have heard through sources that he is cooperating. [13:57.580 --> 14:02.260] The nature of that cooperation, I don't know. [14:02.260 --> 14:14.200] But there is something called 5K1.1, which is commonly used by the government to compel individuals who want to reduce their sentence to give up the names and activities of other people. [14:14.320 --> 14:20.860] So I'm just saying that the name of the group anonymous may have to be revised as we speak. [14:20.860 --> 14:32.800] But do you realize what would happen if what you're saying, this word that you're getting, made it out onto this vast, huge, anonymous, was it the B board where they all talk anonymously? [14:33.540 --> 14:35.960] And they took action based on that. [14:36.120 --> 14:38.020] You know, it could be very unpleasant for this guy. [14:39.120 --> 14:42.700] Well, I'm sure he's experiencing a lot of unpleasantness right now as we speak anyway. [14:42.960 --> 14:47.680] So we should point out, this is just a conjecture at this point, unless you have something more solid than that. [14:47.680 --> 14:49.920] Well, I just, I don't have any solid information. [14:50.060 --> 14:53.500] I said the word is, people are talking about that this is being the case. [14:53.640 --> 14:53.880] Uh-huh. [14:54.160 --> 14:54.440] Okay. [14:54.640 --> 14:54.900] All right. [14:54.980 --> 14:55.500] We'll find out. [14:55.660 --> 14:56.720] We'll find out for sure. [14:56.840 --> 14:57.040] Rob? [14:57.480 --> 15:01.220] The way I understand it, how this whole anonymous thing works, is it's very decentralized. [15:01.300 --> 15:10.740] There's no, like, one person or cabal of people in charge where anyone can throw in, be anonymous, contribute to this whole movement, and do things in the name of anonymous. [15:10.940 --> 15:14.800] So I don't think you're going to cow anybody off of one guy getting busted. [15:15.240 --> 15:16.280] Yeah, probably not. [15:16.280 --> 15:25.300] You know, I've never been able to wrap my head around how it actually works, how, you know, they pick, I guess, someone tried to explain to me, they said, if it's funny, they'll do it. [15:25.580 --> 15:30.140] And I'm making fun of Tom Hanks, Tom Cruise, sorry, I always do that. [15:30.520 --> 15:31.200] Sorry, Tom Hanks. [15:31.540 --> 15:34.020] And Scientology people, that was considered funny. [15:34.400 --> 15:38.620] So that's something that everybody just sort of joins up with. [15:38.720 --> 15:45.220] But something more socially conscious, like, you know, fighting for a woman's right to choose or something like that, they would never do that, because that's not really funny. [15:45.660 --> 15:50.140] Do we know yet whether this is one of the guys who was at the, at Hope this past year? [15:50.240 --> 15:50.840] Did we figure that out? [15:51.400 --> 15:52.760] I don't think so. [15:52.900 --> 15:53.340] It was not, no. [15:53.460 --> 15:54.980] Well, they had paper bags over their heads, didn't they? [15:55.140 --> 15:56.560] No, I'm going to take them off eventually. [15:56.860 --> 15:57.180] Okay. [15:58.160 --> 15:59.220] Um, yes, Mike. [15:59.420 --> 16:02.180] I'm just curious, what did he do exactly that is illegal? [16:02.380 --> 16:04.000] Because making fun of Scientology... [16:04.000 --> 16:04.600] DDoS attack. [16:04.680 --> 16:05.360] DDoS attack, yeah. [16:05.400 --> 16:05.760] DDoS. [16:06.020 --> 16:07.020] Distributed denial of service. [16:07.120 --> 16:13.800] He basically, well, they say he made their website unreachable and, you know, that kind of thing people like to do to shut other people up. [16:13.920 --> 16:16.480] You sure that their own web designers didn't make it so it was unreachable? [16:16.480 --> 16:20.280] You know, well, he was found guilty, so I imagine if that was a defense, it didn't work. [16:21.100 --> 16:23.660] So, well, we'll have to see what happens next. [16:24.320 --> 16:25.380] The saga continues. [16:25.380 --> 16:37.280] Okay, this is something, interesting story that somebody sent us about a shoemaker and a technology company teaming up to develop footwear with built-in GPS devices that can help track down wandering Alzheimer's patients. [16:38.080 --> 16:39.540] Yeah, well, you think that's funny, huh? [16:39.980 --> 16:41.280] You ever see a wandering Alzheimer's patient? [16:41.400 --> 16:42.580] It's good to be able to know... [16:42.580 --> 16:43.780] All the time, all the time. [16:43.900 --> 16:44.800] ...to guide them to the right place. [16:44.960 --> 16:50.780] The technology will provide the location of the individual wearing the shoes within 30 feet anywhere on the planet. [16:51.140 --> 16:53.720] You know, why just give these to Alzheimer's people? [16:53.720 --> 16:56.820] How about mountaineers, you know, people who get lost? [16:57.020 --> 16:58.120] Maybe people on airplanes. [16:58.280 --> 17:00.940] That would be kind of nice, especially if you're flying Air France. [17:01.200 --> 17:04.300] It's good to know where exactly you are at all times. [17:04.300 --> 17:04.800] Because airplanes don't have GPS. [17:05.260 --> 17:09.180] Isn't that weird that that airplane didn't have GPS at the critical moment? [17:09.280 --> 17:10.220] But I'm not going to get into that again. [17:11.300 --> 17:23.520] Basically, what they're saying is embedding a GPS device in a shoe is important because Alzheimer's victims tend to remove unfamiliar objects placed on them, but not their shoes, apparently. [17:23.700 --> 17:26.420] So I guess as long as they keep their shoes on, they're okay. [17:26.780 --> 17:35.240] A geofence will be placed around a person's home and a Google Map Alert sent to a cell phone, home or office computer, when a programmed boundary is crossed. [17:35.240 --> 17:48.740] First, the shoe we intend on developing with a company called Atrix should help authorized family members, friends, or caretakers reduce their stress and anguish by enabling them to locate their loved ones instantly with the click of a mouse. [17:49.140 --> 17:49.740] I don't know. [17:49.760 --> 17:50.660] It just sounds really... [17:50.660 --> 17:51.880] How does this track it? [17:51.980 --> 17:52.880] Like, what's it transmitting to? [17:52.960 --> 17:54.420] And how would it work anywhere in the world? [17:54.540 --> 18:00.800] Like, is it assumed that they're going to wander out of their house into an airport, get on a plane, and end up in, like, the Congo? [18:00.800 --> 18:02.180] I don't understand what... [18:02.180 --> 18:03.740] Well, I don't know about the Congo, but... [18:03.740 --> 18:10.800] Well, GTX Corporation is one of these companies, and they make miniaturized GPS tracking and location transmitting technology. [18:10.920 --> 18:12.020] So whatever that technology is... [18:12.020 --> 18:12.800] So it probably uses a cell network, probably. [18:13.100 --> 18:14.640] Well, then you have to have cell coverage. [18:14.820 --> 18:14.960] Right. [18:15.060 --> 18:18.940] And there are places in New York City that I don't have cell coverage, so you wouldn't be able to find me there. [18:19.440 --> 18:25.300] If this takes off, then I think it probably should or may expand into... [18:25.300 --> 18:25.840] for children. [18:26.520 --> 18:27.060] Oh, yeah. [18:27.120 --> 18:33.560] Lots of parents would want to, say, have some sort of boundary that if this kid wanders outside, they'll go after him, or if the kid gets kidnapped... [18:33.560 --> 18:36.760] Or child pornographers, or, you know, the sex offenders. [18:36.940 --> 18:38.740] You have to keep track of where they are at all times. [18:38.900 --> 18:40.180] Because they'll keep their shoes on. [18:40.300 --> 18:40.460] Yeah. [18:40.700 --> 18:42.900] And prisoners and politicians and people like that. [18:43.160 --> 18:45.720] We need to keep track of where they are at all times. [18:45.980 --> 18:46.660] Well, I sort of wonder... [18:46.660 --> 18:52.000] I mean, it sounds like it's sort of a pseudo-medical application saying it's just for Alzheimer's patients. [18:52.200 --> 18:56.000] But, I mean, I imagine people are going to buy it, you know, obviously, like you said, for other purposes eventually. [18:56.000 --> 19:02.540] But, like, what about the implication of having somebody who wants to know where their spouse is and just happens to have that kind of shoes for her? [19:02.540 --> 19:03.900] Here, honey, have a new pair of shoes. [19:03.900 --> 19:04.480] Right, exactly. [19:05.280 --> 19:05.640] And... [19:05.640 --> 19:07.040] But people do that already, right? [19:07.120 --> 19:07.700] If I was... [19:07.700 --> 19:08.600] If, you know, I was married... [19:08.600 --> 19:09.740] Not with GPS tags, they don't. [19:09.760 --> 19:10.480] No, I know they don't. [19:10.540 --> 19:11.360] But, okay, fine. [19:11.360 --> 19:15.280] I think that my spouse is doing something funny, so then I hire a private investigator. [19:15.400 --> 19:18.600] I mean, that's practically the same thing, except that just technology is making it easier. [19:18.760 --> 19:25.300] So I don't think that necessarily, I mean, it's going to make anyone's privacy more invaded in terms of that anyway. [19:25.300 --> 19:25.920] Here's a thought. [19:26.060 --> 19:32.880] How about inventing a device that transmits fake information for somebody who does want to cheat on their spouse and get away with it? [19:33.180 --> 19:38.300] And you tell where you should be at a particular time and date, and it relays that information. [19:38.340 --> 19:39.980] Or you just change your shoes at work. [19:40.040 --> 19:41.260] You could do that too, but then they know. [19:41.260 --> 19:43.340] You have somebody else wear the shoes and walk around. [19:43.340 --> 19:44.660] Yeah, but what if they're up to something? [19:45.380 --> 19:48.480] If you're listening to this right now, we've declared prior art on this idea. [19:48.620 --> 19:49.540] We're actually going to patent this. [19:49.600 --> 19:50.760] This is a very good idea. [19:50.860 --> 19:51.260] I like this. [19:51.420 --> 19:51.640] Thank you. [19:52.660 --> 19:55.560] Okay, and let's see what else we have here. [19:55.700 --> 19:57.280] We've got the T-Mobile story. [19:57.500 --> 19:57.840] All right. [19:57.920 --> 19:59.060] Who knows about this T-Mobile story? [19:59.140 --> 20:00.440] I've been hearing all kinds of reports about it. [20:00.540 --> 20:06.940] Supposedly they were breached, and then they say they weren't breached, or all this customer information is out there, or it's not out there. [20:07.860 --> 20:09.760] Kevin, I think you said you knew something about this? [20:09.880 --> 20:11.500] I know a little bit about it. [20:11.680 --> 20:12.760] Tell us what little you know. [20:12.760 --> 20:21.560] Well, it seems that the same people who hacked ChoicePoint not too long ago and held all their data ransom are the same ones behind this T-Mobile hack. [20:21.700 --> 20:23.040] Well, I guess you shouldn't be calling it a hack. [20:23.180 --> 20:23.820] It's more of a... [20:23.820 --> 20:25.280] Yeah, it's misuse of the word hack again. [20:25.300 --> 20:25.540] Misuse of the word. [20:25.700 --> 20:31.900] It seems to have been an inside job based on the list of IPs and servers that they released as proof. [20:32.580 --> 20:34.660] And that's what my sources are telling me. [20:35.420 --> 20:44.780] And the hackers who claim to have broken into the carrier said that they were trying to sell the data to the highest bidder, which is typically what hackers do, right? [20:44.860 --> 20:46.080] In the eyes of mass media. [20:46.220 --> 20:46.380] Of course. [20:46.660 --> 20:49.320] Hackers just get into things so they can sell them to the highest bidder. [20:49.480 --> 20:55.700] It just seems like an incredibly stupid thing, too, to announce that you've hacked into something and, okay, who wants to buy it now? [20:58.300 --> 21:01.400] Now, there's a lot of this floating around on the internet. [21:01.400 --> 21:07.280] I have a printout of what looked like, I don't know, some kind of server output of some sort. [21:07.380 --> 21:08.840] Nothing personal. [21:08.980 --> 21:11.160] Nothing having to do with customers or anything like that. [21:12.900 --> 21:15.100] But basically, this is what they said. [21:15.320 --> 21:18.240] And this was printed in a newsletter called Full Disclosure. [21:18.400 --> 21:19.180] Hello, world. [21:19.300 --> 21:28.720] The US T-Mobile network predominantly uses the GSM slash GPRS slash Edge 1900 megahertz frequency band, making it the largest 1900 megahertz network in the United States. [21:28.720 --> 21:33.800] Services available in 98 of the 100 largest markets and 268 million potential customers. [21:34.520 --> 21:36.000] That's grammatically wrong, but never mind. [21:36.360 --> 21:39.180] Like Checkpoint, T-Mobile has been owned for some time. [21:39.320 --> 21:39.920] We have everything. [21:40.020 --> 21:46.100] Their databases, confidential documents, scripts, and programs from their servers, financial documents up to 2009. [21:46.380 --> 21:48.580] We already contacted with their competitors. [21:48.900 --> 21:50.400] Again, that's grammatically wrong. [21:50.540 --> 21:55.200] And they didn't show interest in buying their data, probably because the mails got to the wrong people. [21:55.200 --> 21:57.700] So now, we are offering them for the highest bidder. [21:58.040 --> 21:59.480] Please, only serious offers. [21:59.820 --> 22:00.880] Don't waste our time. [22:01.620 --> 22:10.400] Contact, and then the address, which no longer works, by the way, is Pwnmobile, P-W-N-M-O-B-I-L-E at safe-mail.net. [22:12.020 --> 22:12.720] I don't know. [22:12.900 --> 22:13.640] Does this... [22:13.640 --> 22:16.580] I can tell by their grammar they were fully capable of pulling this off. [22:16.620 --> 22:16.940] You think? [22:17.000 --> 22:19.660] They're dangerous and capable of significant destruction. [22:20.500 --> 22:21.200] I don't know. [22:21.280 --> 22:21.960] It seems to me... [22:21.960 --> 22:22.260] Yes, Mike? [22:22.260 --> 22:29.120] I think, Emmanuel, if the magazine business goes downhill, you have a career ahead of you in fixing up these threat letters. [22:29.500 --> 22:30.800] Well, yeah, I could definitely... [22:30.800 --> 22:34.040] I'm offering to proofread for them so they don't sound so silly when they say these things. [22:34.120 --> 22:34.580] But then again... [22:34.580 --> 22:34.880] How can this... [22:34.880 --> 22:38.060] This is small peanuts grammatically in terms of the internet. [22:38.220 --> 22:39.080] I mean, that's minimal. [22:39.280 --> 22:41.700] It's not like, how is Babby formed or something like that. [22:41.720 --> 22:44.400] Yes, but the internet isn't threatening mobile phone accounts. [22:45.380 --> 22:46.580] Not so much, anyway. [22:46.780 --> 22:49.280] There's been a lot of talk of this being a complete hoax or scam. [22:49.280 --> 22:58.840] But T-Mobile did just release a plus release saying that they were breached, although it was just a single file, which is kind of calling them out to see if they're released anymore. [22:59.080 --> 23:02.400] And on Sunday, T-Mobile went down completely. [23:02.400 --> 23:03.900] You could not access the website. [23:03.900 --> 23:05.540] You could not call customer service. [23:05.700 --> 23:07.360] They literally shut everything down. [23:07.660 --> 23:08.480] Did phones work? [23:08.720 --> 23:11.800] The phones worked, but you couldn't talk to anybody and you couldn't log into your account. [23:12.000 --> 23:12.240] Wow. [23:12.240 --> 23:15.220] I mean, I don't know for T-Mobile, but for AT&T, that's pretty typical. [23:15.440 --> 23:16.900] It happens like three times a day. [23:16.900 --> 23:17.360] Yeah, I don't know. [23:18.720 --> 23:19.080] Unreal. [23:19.440 --> 23:21.600] Okay, well, that's not something. [23:21.660 --> 23:23.360] If you have T-Mobile, I don't know. [23:23.500 --> 23:25.940] Should we panic or should we just see what happens? [23:26.120 --> 23:26.660] I would panic. [23:26.800 --> 23:27.000] Yeah? [23:27.220 --> 23:27.400] Okay. [23:27.660 --> 23:28.180] Or not. [23:28.360 --> 23:29.820] Now is the time to panic, I suppose. [23:30.040 --> 23:31.080] That's responsible. [23:31.620 --> 23:41.700] Okay, so what do you guys think of this story about the founder of DEFCON being named as part of Obama's Homeland Security Advisory Council for cyber security? [23:42.180 --> 23:42.900] You guys hear about this? [23:43.000 --> 23:45.800] Jeff Moss, founder of the Black Hat and DEFCON Hacker and Security Conferences. [23:45.800 --> 23:50.880] He was among 16 people sworn in on Friday to the Homeland Security Advisory Council. [23:51.260 --> 23:56.360] They'll provide recommendations and advice directly to Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano. [23:57.100 --> 24:09.120] Moss's background is a computer hacker known as Dark Tangent and role as a luminary among young hackers who flock to DEFCON in Las Vegas every summer might seem to make him an odd choice to swear allegiance to the government, that according to this CNET story. [24:09.620 --> 24:15.460] Although before running his computer conferences, Moss also worked in the Information System Security Division at Ernst & Young. [24:16.740 --> 24:17.100] Interesting. [24:17.260 --> 24:19.080] I mean, this could go either way, I suppose. [24:19.080 --> 24:19.940] This could be a good thing. [24:19.940 --> 24:20.700] This could be a bad thing. [24:20.960 --> 24:23.460] It sounds like a symbolic gesture to me. [24:23.520 --> 24:29.780] It sounds like the Obama administration is trying to make a point of letting the community know that they're not exactly out to get us. [24:30.200 --> 24:30.600] Uh-huh. [24:31.260 --> 24:32.840] Well, do you think they really care what we think? [24:32.840 --> 24:34.040] I don't think so. [24:34.140 --> 24:40.580] I think, I mean, maybe, I mean, you know, a lot of what Obama does is he's trying to get, you know, more knowledge about technology into the government. [24:40.680 --> 24:43.740] And so this is a way to say, okay, well, this guy's probably an expert. [24:43.740 --> 24:45.640] Let's pull him in and see what he has to say. [24:45.960 --> 24:46.320] Mm-hmm. [24:46.440 --> 24:48.020] I think it's worth looking at this whole group. [24:48.200 --> 24:54.420] They have the whole list of people posted on their website, their .gov, whatever it is, and other places. [24:54.620 --> 24:56.460] And it's not just Jeff Moss. [24:56.600 --> 24:59.040] There's Ray Kelly from the NYPD is in there. [24:59.140 --> 24:59.760] Gary Hart is in there. [24:59.760 --> 24:59.900] Oh, yeah. [24:59.960 --> 25:00.780] He's the police commissioner. [25:00.840 --> 25:02.360] I would expect people like that to be in there. [25:02.460 --> 25:03.500] Gary Hart, the U.S. [25:03.800 --> 25:03.800] Senator? [25:04.020 --> 25:04.140] Okay. [25:04.280 --> 25:05.040] Yeah, Senator Gary Hart. [25:05.040 --> 25:08.820] But to hear somebody from the hacker community be part of this, that's... [25:08.820 --> 25:11.880] I think it's promising, though, because he's kind of building up a more eclectic group. [25:11.980 --> 25:17.240] It's not a bunch of people that are always going to say the same thing to each other and regurgitate out the standard answers to things. [25:17.300 --> 25:20.240] It's people who are going to have different viewpoints and be able to debate things. [25:20.280 --> 25:22.000] But I thought Kevin Mitnick had a good quote in this article. [25:22.160 --> 25:23.520] He said, why not somebody like Bruce Schneier? [25:23.820 --> 25:24.380] And that would be... [25:24.380 --> 25:25.760] I don't think Schneier would agree to do it. [25:25.840 --> 25:26.240] Well, still. [25:26.500 --> 25:26.760] All right. [25:26.940 --> 25:28.340] But ask the guy anyway. [25:28.600 --> 25:33.080] But I mean, the thing he comes up with, the security issues are simply incredible. [25:33.320 --> 25:35.860] And you really, you know, he's the Noam Chomsky of the computer world, I think. [25:36.940 --> 25:38.940] So, yes, Mike. [25:39.120 --> 25:52.780] I mean, I might even be prepared to argue that they intentionally chose someone who's not as useful as Bruce Schneier, because they want to appear to be reaching out to the community without actually hearing from people who would be able to deliver effective criticism of the government and the way it works. [25:52.800 --> 25:55.020] I just never thought that they'd care about reaching out to this community. [25:55.200 --> 26:02.120] Well, they care about appearing to reach out to everyone, whether they care about actually reaching out to everyone is another question. [26:02.460 --> 26:08.340] Well, in any event, it'll make Spot the Fed at the next DEF CON rather easy, because the guy running it will be one. [26:09.500 --> 26:10.920] But interesting, interesting times. [26:12.040 --> 26:12.840] So, I don't know. [26:12.920 --> 26:14.860] We'll just have to keep an eye on that, I suppose. [26:15.460 --> 26:16.820] Bernie, any thoughts from you on this? [26:17.820 --> 26:18.420] I actually... [26:18.420 --> 26:20.000] I think it's... [26:20.380 --> 26:20.920] Are you all right? [26:21.700 --> 26:22.000] Bernie? [26:23.040 --> 26:23.680] Bernie, are you there? [26:24.300 --> 26:24.800] Oh, no. [26:24.900 --> 26:25.260] He's gone. [26:26.400 --> 26:27.820] I guess we'll have to do without him. [26:27.880 --> 26:28.160] Well, no. [26:28.400 --> 26:31.340] Apparently, he was saying something, and somebody tried to silence it. [26:31.400 --> 26:32.880] But, you know, he hasn't made that noise yet. [26:32.980 --> 26:34.680] You know, it goes beep, beep, beep. [26:35.160 --> 26:36.120] Because I think he's still there. [26:36.200 --> 26:37.660] Bernie, hit a touchtone if you can hear me. [26:37.660 --> 26:38.800] Oh, that's not a touchtone. [26:38.960 --> 26:39.780] Okay, now there's that noise. [26:40.280 --> 26:42.000] Mike, can you come up to the other side of the room and reconnect? [26:42.000 --> 26:43.260] Not easily, without... [26:43.260 --> 26:45.580] I'm sorry, but I can't do it and talk at the same time. [26:45.760 --> 26:47.160] I might say the number out loud. [26:47.260 --> 26:48.980] You might hear me tripping over things. [26:48.980 --> 26:49.440] That's fine. [26:49.560 --> 26:50.120] That's good radio. [26:51.400 --> 26:52.840] Okay, well, I guess we'll... [26:52.840 --> 26:54.500] It's too bad we don't have a sound effect for it. [26:54.720 --> 26:55.580] Yeah, yeah. [26:55.800 --> 26:57.600] Make our own sound effects. [27:00.360 --> 27:02.200] You did that on purpose, didn't you? [27:03.600 --> 27:04.580] That's rather dramatic. [27:04.780 --> 27:05.040] All right. [27:05.220 --> 27:05.960] You know, you really... [27:05.960 --> 27:08.280] Why don't you stay on this side of the room anyway, because that's where you usually are. [27:08.680 --> 27:09.740] And you came late. [27:09.840 --> 27:10.220] Are you all right? [27:10.460 --> 27:10.980] Did you hurt yourself? [27:11.620 --> 27:13.440] It's more important to call Bernie... [27:13.440 --> 27:13.860] I'm fine. [27:14.000 --> 27:15.680] ...than to clean up the trash if you just fell over. [27:15.820 --> 27:16.340] No, he's not. [27:16.400 --> 27:16.800] He's limping. [27:16.980 --> 27:17.680] Meanwhile, you do that. [27:17.720 --> 27:26.360] I'm going to read the story about how the United States accidentally released a whole list of nuclear sites that hackers now apparently will have and sell to the highest bidder. [27:26.360 --> 27:30.540] The federal government mistakenly made public a 266-page report. [27:30.660 --> 27:32.120] It's page is marked highly confidential. [27:32.320 --> 27:43.240] That gives detailed information about hundreds of the nation's civilian nuclear sites and programs, including maps showing the precise locations of stockpiles of fuel for nuclear weapons. [27:43.620 --> 27:49.480] The publication of the document was revealed on Monday in an online newsletter devoted to issues of federal secrecy. [27:49.480 --> 27:54.680] That set off a debate among nuclear experts about what dangers, if any, the disclosures posed. [27:54.840 --> 27:59.440] It also prompted a flurry of investigations in Washington into why the document had been made public. [28:00.740 --> 28:09.000] Basically, several nuclear experts argued that any dangers from the disclosure were minimal, given that the general outlines of the most sensitive information were already known publicly. [28:09.380 --> 28:16.700] These screw-ups happen, said John Deutch, a former director of central intelligence and deputy secretary of defense, who is now a professor at MIT. [28:16.700 --> 28:20.120] It's going further than I would have gone, but it doesn't look like a serious breach. [28:20.500 --> 28:29.940] I guess this brings up the question as to how serious information being out there can be, especially things that were out there once and then get pulled back. [28:30.060 --> 28:35.080] You know, back in the pre-9-11 days, there were a lot more .mil sites that had all kinds of information. [28:35.620 --> 28:36.260] What, he's not answering? [28:36.800 --> 28:37.160] No. [28:37.500 --> 28:37.920] Not answering. [28:37.960 --> 28:38.900] He doesn't want to talk to us. [28:39.080 --> 28:39.500] All right. [28:39.760 --> 28:41.640] Well, give it a rest. [28:41.720 --> 28:45.140] Let him get over whatever happened, and then we'll try him again in a few minutes. [28:45.680 --> 28:49.960] But anyway, as far as once information is out there, can it ever be pulled back? [28:50.080 --> 28:54.540] Can it ever be silenced or quelled or anything like that? [28:55.020 --> 28:56.840] You cannot put toothpaste back in a tube. [28:56.900 --> 28:57.420] You can't. [28:57.500 --> 28:58.220] You can't do it. [28:58.320 --> 28:59.040] You really can't. [28:59.440 --> 29:07.080] And when Google Maps comes up and does their street view, and you see houses and things like that, and people want to blur their houses, is that effective? [29:07.640 --> 29:08.120] You know? [29:08.920 --> 29:14.720] Well, I think it depends on the volume of the information within which whatever you want to be. [29:14.720 --> 29:20.080] So in this case, right, if the paper was out there, then I'm sure there's, you know, a bunch of copies already that people made of it. [29:20.220 --> 29:28.920] But, you know, in terms of Google Maps, probably nobody's going and copying every single image that's on there, and nobody really cares about your house in the first place. [29:28.920 --> 29:31.780] So if you go and blur it, then the next person who comes and looks... [29:31.780 --> 29:33.160] Well, Dick Cheney's house. [29:33.760 --> 29:34.700] I might care about it. [29:34.720 --> 29:35.480] Okay, that's different. [29:35.500 --> 29:36.360] His house is blurred. [29:36.620 --> 29:36.920] Now... [29:36.920 --> 29:37.980] You have to know which house is his. [29:38.000 --> 29:38.740] You have to know what you're looking for. [29:38.780 --> 29:39.480] It's the one that's blurred. [29:39.480 --> 29:47.100] But most people, you know, if I have a house on a random street in some random city and I'm like, oh, no, they took a picture of my cat through the window. [29:47.100 --> 29:48.300] I'm really upset about this. [29:48.440 --> 29:48.560] Right. [29:48.760 --> 29:50.860] Nobody probably cares about you or your cat. [29:51.660 --> 29:54.100] But if you really feel better about it, then go ahead and blur your house. [29:54.100 --> 29:56.380] That's a good way to waste Google's time to make them blur all these things. [29:56.620 --> 29:58.640] I mean, you know, people have issues. [29:59.380 --> 30:00.240] Yes, I've noticed that. [30:00.320 --> 30:04.560] That has been sort of one of the great things about the internet is there's plenty of ways to hide in plain sight. [30:04.560 --> 30:06.400] I mean, there's always just sort of like... [30:06.400 --> 30:09.360] So much of the time, the stuff that's up there, it doesn't matter, ultimately. [30:09.540 --> 30:10.300] You just... [30:10.300 --> 30:15.300] You know, that's what's keeping you private is that nobody cares yet, you know, or nobody cares at all and never will care. [30:15.480 --> 30:16.320] Yeah, too much noise. [30:16.540 --> 30:16.980] Too much noise. [30:17.060 --> 30:17.180] Yeah. [30:17.400 --> 30:18.180] That's what it's all about. [30:18.180 --> 30:18.420] Too much to focus. [30:18.540 --> 30:19.320] A glut of information. [30:19.520 --> 30:20.600] It's the same thing, basically. [30:21.160 --> 30:31.920] We talk about the amount of surveillance going on, how much surveillance there is and how they could never possibly go through all of the interceptions and cameras and things like that. [30:31.920 --> 30:34.220] The same thing in Romania in the 1980s. [30:34.340 --> 30:37.460] They had everybody recording everybody else on the phone. [30:37.680 --> 30:43.080] And there were rooms and rooms and floors of hotels filled with these cassettes that they never had time to listen to. [30:43.220 --> 30:48.400] So basically, by spying on everybody, somehow everybody was more secure because they'd never had the time. [30:48.580 --> 30:48.740] Right. [30:48.820 --> 30:54.940] Well, we talked at all on the show about how there's been studies done that basically show that surveillance cameras don't actually change crime. [30:54.940 --> 30:57.500] It just sort of moves it 50 feet out of the range of the camera. [30:57.520 --> 30:57.700] Yeah. [30:57.720 --> 30:58.080] So, yeah. [30:58.080 --> 31:00.900] We've mentioned a couple of times over in England, they keep discovering that. [31:00.900 --> 31:02.660] And I imagine they'll continue to discover that. [31:02.780 --> 31:02.920] Don't write. [31:03.140 --> 31:07.500] But now, if they put cameras everywhere, then it'll push it, say, 50 feet outside of the city. [31:08.640 --> 31:10.040] Or they just won't have time to... [31:10.040 --> 31:11.000] I mean, you know... [31:11.000 --> 31:11.280] Yeah. [31:11.580 --> 31:14.720] I mean, most of these cameras aren't really used to be monitored in real time, right? [31:14.720 --> 31:15.700] It's more after the fact. [31:15.820 --> 31:16.860] Oh, somebody got attacked. [31:16.940 --> 31:18.060] Well, we're going to go look on the camera. [31:18.060 --> 31:19.120] This is the issue with the shoes. [31:19.300 --> 31:21.080] This is the issue with the GPS tagging in your shoes. [31:21.080 --> 31:21.800] The Alzheimer's shoes, okay. [31:21.940 --> 31:22.140] Yeah. [31:22.240 --> 31:25.980] Because if you're just doing a general surveillance of a house, that's a lot of space. [31:25.980 --> 31:29.220] But if it's actually on your physical person, it's on your physical person. [31:29.340 --> 31:30.260] They know where you are. [31:30.440 --> 31:30.540] Right. [31:30.600 --> 31:33.260] And that, I think, ultimately, at some point could matter. [31:33.420 --> 31:34.220] I mean, the more... [31:34.220 --> 31:37.620] That's the kind of thing where it's like trying to boil a frog. [31:37.760 --> 31:40.180] You turn the heat up very, very slowly and it's not going to jump out. [31:40.500 --> 31:42.040] First, it's shoes on Alzheimer's patients. [31:42.300 --> 31:44.300] Then it's shoes on, you know, errant spouses. [31:44.500 --> 31:45.320] Then it's shoes on children. [31:45.680 --> 31:47.740] And then, you know, everybody's like, oh, everybody's got the shoes. [31:47.760 --> 31:48.500] It's great, you know? [31:48.620 --> 31:49.700] And then it's like Twitter. [31:49.880 --> 31:52.400] Everybody wants to have it for some reason that we can't figure out. [31:52.500 --> 31:53.040] Bernie is back. [31:53.160 --> 31:53.580] Bernie, are you there? [31:54.120 --> 31:55.160] Yeah, sorry, Sprint. [31:55.280 --> 31:56.040] I just took a dump. [31:56.120 --> 31:57.980] You know, if I had T-Mobile, I'd have a good excuse. [31:58.960 --> 31:59.580] Yeah, okay. [32:00.600 --> 32:01.000] Not right. [32:01.680 --> 32:04.680] But, yeah, I agree with Mark that it's more of an after-the-fact thing. [32:04.760 --> 32:07.360] It's not necessarily important for them to watch it all in real time. [32:07.360 --> 32:17.820] As long as there is a logical way that this information is stored and able to be retrieved, then if anything happens, they can simply go back and figure out who did it and punish whoever it needs to be. [32:18.340 --> 32:22.960] And it's not necessarily required that they watch it all in real time. [32:24.220 --> 32:24.580] Okay. [32:25.800 --> 32:26.340] What else? [32:26.520 --> 32:29.520] Let's look at a couple pieces of mail, and we'll take some phone calls. [32:29.600 --> 32:31.760] 212-209-2900. [32:31.880 --> 32:32.180] Yes, Reddick. [32:32.180 --> 32:35.320] One thing about the shoe thing, again, since we brought it back. [32:35.660 --> 32:37.260] I mean, there are two things with that. [32:37.360 --> 32:39.520] One thing is that people do this now, right, voluntarily. [32:39.760 --> 32:43.680] There are already services that let you see where your friends are based on their cell phone. [32:43.880 --> 32:55.360] And actually, soon, right, I think with the next release of the iPhone, they're going to have a way that you can find your iPhone if it's lost, which just means that, obviously, this is something you can never shut off because you don't know when you're going to lose your phone. [32:55.360 --> 33:04.960] So, you know, somewhere, this is being recorded or at least possible to track where I'll be based on my phone and then whatever information it's transmitting. [33:05.380 --> 33:07.260] So, I mean, that's kind of happening now. [33:07.400 --> 33:08.020] And that's not something... [33:08.020 --> 33:14.360] Obviously, I'm not going to go out and throw out this phone because I like it for every other reason, but it's existing. [33:14.360 --> 33:17.200] But maybe it should be optional that that sort of thing should be turned off. [33:17.220 --> 33:19.420] And my phone right now has GPS and I can turn it off. [33:19.500 --> 33:26.040] I feel like, you know, we're walking right into Steve Rambam's hands again because he always says, thank you for giving me your information, basically. [33:26.040 --> 33:26.480] Yes, he's out there waiting. [33:26.480 --> 33:30.100] But people are going to leave it on, I think, because of the fact that they want that security. [33:30.240 --> 33:31.240] Oh, I left it in a cab, right? [33:31.240 --> 33:36.100] Well, they'll forget that it's on or it'll come on by default when you turn your phone on after changing the battery or something. [33:36.260 --> 33:36.680] I don't know. [33:36.760 --> 33:37.800] I think you have to think about the balance. [33:37.940 --> 33:40.540] Like, which is more important to you, finding a lost phone or... [33:40.540 --> 33:42.100] Which is probably pretty likely to happen. [33:42.100 --> 33:44.300] You know, for most people, I think finding a lost phone. [33:44.480 --> 33:49.760] Maybe for people who are concerned about privacy, then, you know, they'll shut it off and they'll say, you know what, it's worth it. [33:49.820 --> 33:50.820] And there are people like that. [33:51.380 --> 33:54.120] But I think that most people are not going to feel that way. [33:54.200 --> 34:03.620] All you need are more cases where a lost child can't be found because nobody knows where they are or some crazy homicidal maniac is on the loose and nobody knows where he is. [34:03.700 --> 34:05.100] If only he had his cell phone. [34:05.140 --> 34:10.700] If only there had been a camera filming some event that happened, then we'd know who was responsible for it, things like that. [34:10.760 --> 34:13.540] That's all you need to get people to believe that this is essential. [34:13.740 --> 34:18.360] This is where you can make that iPhone app, though, that gives out the bogus information about where your phone is or where you are. [34:18.440 --> 34:19.560] Wouldn't that turn into an iPhone app? [34:19.840 --> 34:21.560] No, because it would be easier to make it as an iPhone app. [34:21.620 --> 34:22.820] You could sell it for $1.99. [34:23.040 --> 34:23.760] Everybody would buy it. [34:23.980 --> 34:24.500] That'd be great. [34:24.620 --> 34:26.660] Once again, we have declared prior art on this. [34:26.840 --> 34:27.300] We've patented it. [34:27.500 --> 34:27.720] Yeah. [34:27.940 --> 34:28.080] Yeah. [34:28.120 --> 34:29.400] So don't even think about doing that. [34:29.940 --> 34:30.260] Emmanuel. [34:30.380 --> 34:30.700] Yes, go ahead. [34:30.700 --> 34:48.820] This whole thing with tracking elderly people using subterfuge or without their knowledge raises an interesting question as to when is it acceptable to electronically track someone's movements without their knowledge. [34:49.220 --> 34:57.460] You could say there's a good reason here, because people with Alzheimer's tend to wander off, and it's in their interest to find them. [34:57.460 --> 35:00.020] But maybe they have just mild Alzheimer's. [35:00.120 --> 35:07.700] They really don't wander, but their children, their daughters or sons or other family members think that they might. [35:07.920 --> 35:10.080] So it just raises some interesting ethical questions. [35:10.140 --> 35:11.640] And who is this going to be extended to? [35:13.080 --> 35:20.740] I'm wondering whether, especially since you raised the question of mild Alzheimer's, could it factor into a case of elder abuse? [35:20.880 --> 35:31.100] I mean, could you conceivably have somebody who, part of their control or intimidation of their elderly but relative, is that they put this on them and, you know, will it factor in that way legally? [35:32.000 --> 35:40.120] You could also then argue the reverse that some elderly person goes missing and they're charged for elder abuse for not having this system in place. [35:40.140 --> 35:40.420] Indeed. [35:40.960 --> 35:41.700] Make it mandatory. [35:42.820 --> 35:43.920] That would be something. [35:44.060 --> 35:46.080] Or for a preschool kid or something like that. [35:46.560 --> 35:47.920] And then who's it mandatory for next? [35:48.100 --> 35:48.420] Think of it. [35:48.500 --> 35:49.980] Kidnapping could be something in the past. [35:50.140 --> 35:51.100] I mean, don't put these on the shoes. [35:51.240 --> 35:53.700] You put them in the actual person. [35:53.800 --> 35:54.660] In the person, right. [35:54.660 --> 35:55.860] Make it mandatory at birth. [35:56.200 --> 35:57.380] So then, so then, okay. [35:57.600 --> 35:59.040] Tell me, tell me why that's a bad idea. [35:59.180 --> 36:02.460] Because then the kidnapper is going to cut into their arm and remove this chip. [36:02.460 --> 36:02.560] No, you don't know. [36:02.620 --> 36:04.360] It's like, it's like, it's like that car system. [36:04.580 --> 36:05.780] It's like, what's that called again? [36:05.840 --> 36:05.940] Blowjack. [36:06.060 --> 36:06.380] Blowjack. [36:06.540 --> 36:07.620] You don't know where it is exactly. [36:07.720 --> 36:08.980] But if everybody has it, then you, you know. [36:09.600 --> 36:12.300] It's like the camera, it's like the crime moving 50 feet to the left. [36:12.360 --> 36:17.500] Like if, if you know it's there, then you're going to do whatever you have to do to get rid of it. [36:17.520 --> 36:20.960] Unless you put it, the chip in a different part of everybody's body. [36:24.660 --> 36:25.880] Sometimes it's in the arm, sometimes it's in the foot. [36:26.080 --> 36:30.720] Unless you modify DNA somehow, the body itself is transmitting. [36:31.120 --> 36:31.920] And that's just, you know. [36:32.020 --> 36:32.780] That's just scary. [36:32.900 --> 36:33.680] It is scary. [36:33.680 --> 36:36.980] But in a few thousand years, I'll bet we will have gotten there. [36:37.240 --> 36:37.300] Yeah. [36:38.240 --> 36:38.340] Okay. [36:38.400 --> 36:40.380] 212-209-2900 is our phone number. [36:40.480 --> 36:41.080] We'd like to hear from you. [36:41.240 --> 36:44.680] Get your feelings and ideas and thoughts on what's going on out there. [36:45.500 --> 36:46.320] You're signaling to me. [36:46.400 --> 36:46.480] What? [36:46.660 --> 36:46.720] Nothing. [36:46.840 --> 36:47.280] No, don't worry about it. [36:47.280 --> 36:47.520] Okay. [36:49.300 --> 36:49.660] Okay. [36:49.840 --> 36:52.020] We're just going to mention this for a second while the calls come in. [36:52.120 --> 36:54.100] But there was that story about the T-word. [36:54.460 --> 36:54.760] Mm-mm. [36:55.280 --> 36:55.800] Mm-mm. [36:56.420 --> 36:56.780] No. [36:57.200 --> 36:57.580] What T-word? [36:57.580 --> 36:57.840] No. [36:58.400 --> 36:58.720] Listen. [36:59.100 --> 36:59.460] Twitter. [37:00.020 --> 37:00.180] Twitter. [37:00.600 --> 37:02.140] Antithetical to the hacker ethic, Twitter. [37:02.360 --> 37:02.900] Well, yeah. [37:03.140 --> 37:05.180] And lots of things are that we, that we discuss. [37:05.400 --> 37:21.140] But basically, there was a story in the New York Times last Tuesday, actually two Tuesdays ago, written by our friend Katie Hefner, who was basically telling us about how, how children or, or teenagers who, actually, this is texting. [37:21.300 --> 37:21.640] This isn't Twitter. [37:21.740 --> 37:22.040] I'm sorry. [37:22.220 --> 37:25.180] I've got the wrong, well, it's, it's another T-word. [37:25.360 --> 37:26.440] It's another, I saw a T. [37:26.680 --> 37:27.160] You know what? [37:27.200 --> 37:27.360] Okay. [37:27.420 --> 37:28.700] We'll skip the Twitter for now. [37:28.820 --> 37:29.300] But texting. [37:29.620 --> 37:35.340] People who text all the time are, are more, I guess, anxious. [37:36.260 --> 37:36.660] Yeah. [37:36.920 --> 37:39.940] Because they're, they're, because they're waiting for the next text, right? [37:39.940 --> 37:41.780] They're doing it so much, their thumbs hurt. [37:41.980 --> 37:42.920] How many, okay, now, wait a minute. [37:43.040 --> 37:54.920] This is a, this is, this is once again, a journalist getting up there and saying, oh, I happen to have noticed that a couple teenagers I know, they've, they seem to be like, they seem to be anxious because they use the, I know you hate that. [37:54.920 --> 37:55.220] Yeah. [37:56.060 --> 38:04.720] Basically, what they're, what they're, what they're saying is, kids are responding to texts late at night, and it's going to cause sleep issues in an age group that's already plagued with sleep issues. [38:04.720 --> 38:06.860] We don't have statistics to back this up, is what I'm saying. [38:06.860 --> 38:09.980] Well, Dr. Martin Joffe, a pediatrician in Greenbrae, California. [38:10.180 --> 38:10.980] Anecdotal evidence. [38:11.280 --> 38:12.240] Gives his opinion here. [38:12.560 --> 38:12.980] And yes. [38:13.140 --> 38:14.880] I completely agree with Gus. [38:15.000 --> 38:22.400] And the whole thing about sleep issues, that could just be argued about biologically when someone gets sleepy and that's school. [38:22.560 --> 38:25.920] It has been argued about teenagers in general having sleep issues in schools. [38:26.140 --> 38:27.340] Not being able to fall asleep until around 10 or 11. [38:27.340 --> 38:30.740] I mean, this is a perennial story that comes up, the perennial story of we need to worry about our teenagers. [38:30.980 --> 38:31.040] Okay. [38:31.160 --> 38:32.260] Let them grow up. [38:32.260 --> 38:32.920] Let them grow up. [38:33.000 --> 38:38.080] But I mean, there are, there's a lot of, a lot, I think teenagers are, are, are to a degree addicted to texting. [38:38.260 --> 38:39.480] I mean, just from what I've seen in life. [38:39.600 --> 38:43.420] Like there are people who- Do you have a, how do you, how do you define addicted? [38:43.680 --> 38:46.720] I mean, what is your, what is your, what is your scientific measure? [38:46.720 --> 38:54.200] How about Annie Wagner, a ninth grade, 15 year old in Bethesda, Maryland, who has painful, I'll tell her it's anecdotal. [38:54.360 --> 39:04.240] Her thumbs cramp something fierce because she's constantly, constantly texting with them and she had to switch to an iPhone where texting is slower and less painful, but it does, it does work. [39:04.440 --> 39:04.580] I'm sorry. [39:04.600 --> 39:06.020] Did Apple pay for this research? [39:06.080 --> 39:06.460] Maybe. [39:06.740 --> 39:08.160] It would explain the poor quality of the research. [39:08.280 --> 39:09.100] It's, it's possible. [39:09.860 --> 39:14.060] But no, I, I think Red Hector is absolutely right that people are addicted to this. [39:14.060 --> 39:15.720] I think that there are people who have a problem. [39:15.720 --> 39:17.600] Like with anything, you can have people who have a problem. [39:17.660 --> 39:29.120] And I didn't say that it's widespread and I don't, didn't say that we should go out and take cell phones away from all teenagers because, you know, Lord knows what they're doing, but it just, it's not completely without merit that this article- I want to see, [39:29.200 --> 39:35.120] I want to see, I want to see, I want to see articles that, that basically prove that journalism causes anxiety in people with children. [39:35.320 --> 39:35.480] All right. [39:35.520 --> 39:45.500] But 14,528 texts in one month, which Greg Hardesty, a reporter in Lake Forest, California, said his daughter ran, ran up on, uh, on her phone bill. [39:45.940 --> 39:47.340] That's, there's something wrong there. [39:47.540 --> 39:50.340] That many texts, that many little messages being sent on your phone. [39:50.660 --> 39:51.620] There's a problem with that. [39:51.680 --> 39:52.840] Oh, there's, there are people who have problems. [39:53.020 --> 39:53.200] Yes. [39:53.400 --> 39:55.420] And, and it needs to be addressed or at least acknowledged. [39:55.420 --> 40:01.540] But define, you have to define what the problem is because it, is it that people are addicted to texting or that they like talking with their friends. [40:01.700 --> 40:02.640] Well, then why aren't they on the phone? [40:02.720 --> 40:02.980] The text phone. [40:03.280 --> 40:03.360] What? [40:03.760 --> 40:03.880] Yeah. [40:04.200 --> 40:04.460] That's a good point. [40:04.660 --> 40:12.320] Because it's become the fad way of communicating, but if people are talking on these texts, it could be simply small messages and they get a full conversation out. [40:12.600 --> 40:15.760] It takes hundreds of messages over a month with a few individuals. [40:15.760 --> 40:16.620] Which could be great. [40:16.800 --> 40:19.320] I mean, you know, I mean, maybe, maybe they're feeling alienated in school. [40:19.440 --> 40:23.140] Maybe schools have been inherently alienating all this time and suddenly we have a solution. [40:23.280 --> 40:24.280] Why are we looking at it that way? [40:24.520 --> 40:30.280] This is just simply, this simply, you could look at this as a way that people are becoming more connected and it being a negative thing. [40:30.420 --> 40:30.580] Rob? [40:30.720 --> 40:32.680] Here's some more anecdotal evidence for you. [40:33.060 --> 40:38.060] When I was a kid, it was still kind of a relatively new thing for kids to have their own phones in their room, like a landline phone. [40:38.640 --> 40:40.200] And, you know, for those of you that remember those. [40:40.360 --> 40:40.760] Yeah, I remember that. [40:40.900 --> 40:43.280] And all these are pretty much the same arguments. [40:43.380 --> 40:44.360] Oh, they're going to be on this all night. [40:44.420 --> 40:45.180] They're not going to be sleeping. [40:45.200 --> 40:46.600] It's going to interfere with their schoolwork. [40:47.280 --> 40:48.720] Yeah, I mean, this happens perennially. [40:48.840 --> 40:56.040] We have a, in my department at school, we have a favorite anecdote about, where it's a piece of text from the 1800s. [40:56.160 --> 40:58.220] No, sorry, I just spoiled the joke. [40:58.220 --> 41:02.420] But it's a piece of text where basically somebody's going, this new technology is going to destroy classrooms. [41:02.420 --> 41:03.600] It's going to disrupt everything. [41:03.760 --> 41:06.260] Kids are going to be talking to each other and turning around. [41:06.260 --> 41:08.440] And the teacher isn't going to notice anything because their back will be turned. [41:08.640 --> 41:10.100] What is this disruptive technology? [41:10.320 --> 41:11.440] The blackboard. [41:12.140 --> 41:13.120] Heaven for fend. [41:13.260 --> 41:14.660] You know, it's just anything new. [41:14.800 --> 41:15.880] I mean, it's... [41:15.880 --> 41:20.580] How many cases of children being dragged away, kicking and screaming from a blackboard have you witnessed? [41:20.960 --> 41:23.300] But it's not the case of how it actually is. [41:23.300 --> 41:25.880] It's the case of that this is what people were saying about a new technology. [41:25.880 --> 41:28.820] They said the same thing about board games. [41:28.920 --> 41:30.620] Socrates said the same thing about the alphabet. [41:30.800 --> 41:33.800] It's like kids are not going to remember anything anymore because they can write things down. [41:33.900 --> 41:40.280] It's a bit of an injustice to lump those people in that are saying, you know, this is something to be concerned about with people that are hysterical against any new development of technology. [41:40.520 --> 41:45.900] I think having many, many articles which say you could be hysterical about this leads to more people being hysterical about these things. [41:45.900 --> 41:47.920] But there are these people that are racking up huge phone bills. [41:48.020 --> 41:51.940] I mean, we've talked about this before, where people don't realize every time they say, hi, how are you? [41:52.000 --> 41:53.440] That's like five or ten cents. [41:54.060 --> 41:56.240] And it's just incredible amounts that... [41:56.240 --> 41:58.620] Well, no, they're going to get unlimited text plans, or at least if their parents are smart. [41:58.620 --> 42:01.200] Okay, but then I say 20,000 text messages in a month is crazy. [42:01.200 --> 42:02.520] No, it's definitely an issue. [42:02.700 --> 42:07.100] There are people out there who seriously have an issue with it, an addiction like anything else. [42:07.260 --> 42:13.580] For another thing, you don't learn how to spell because you're always putting numbers in words and things like that and making everything 140 characters. [42:13.740 --> 42:17.640] Now, since language is a living and growing thing, you can argue that it's not misspelling. [42:17.720 --> 42:19.420] This is going to become the real way to spell. [42:19.420 --> 42:19.900] Help us. [42:20.080 --> 42:20.280] I'm sorry. [42:20.400 --> 42:21.700] Don't we have anything else to talk about? [42:21.860 --> 42:22.560] Well, no, he just... [42:22.560 --> 42:24.280] Then, like, teenagers texting too much? [42:24.280 --> 42:29.520] I'm sorry, but he just predicted the future of the English language is going to be like an instant message. [42:29.720 --> 42:32.560] And, boy, that's something that I think we need to band together now and stop. [42:33.040 --> 42:33.780] Oh, my God. [42:34.000 --> 42:35.320] Let's take some phone calls, though. [42:35.440 --> 42:35.460] Yeah, please. [42:35.560 --> 42:35.940] Help us out. [42:35.940 --> 42:36.840] They better be more insightful than this. [42:36.840 --> 42:37.920] Well, what was the Twitter story? [42:38.180 --> 42:39.040] Forget the Twitter story. [42:39.200 --> 42:40.060] We don't have time. [42:40.300 --> 42:40.560] There is no Twitter story. [42:40.640 --> 42:42.140] 212-209-2900. [42:42.180 --> 42:42.520] Good evening. [42:42.660 --> 42:43.580] You're on Off the Hook. [42:44.220 --> 42:44.920] Yes, hello. [42:45.200 --> 42:45.540] How you doing? [42:45.540 --> 42:46.000] What's on your mind? [42:46.100 --> 42:47.460] It's Tom from the Bronx here. [42:47.460 --> 42:48.160] Hi, Tom from the Bronx. [42:48.240 --> 42:48.560] What's on your mind? [42:48.620 --> 42:51.880] Yeah, like you said, why can't we go back to using beepers again? [42:52.340 --> 42:52.900] Oh, beepers. [42:53.040 --> 42:53.380] I had a... [42:53.380 --> 42:54.180] Who here had a beeper? [42:54.280 --> 42:54.900] I had a beeper. [42:54.900 --> 42:55.380] I had a beeper. [42:55.420 --> 42:55.900] They were great. [42:56.520 --> 42:58.040] Mine went off on the air several times. [42:58.480 --> 43:02.440] And basically, for those who don't know, they were these little things you clip onto your belt. [43:02.520 --> 43:02.900] They'd beep. [43:02.980 --> 43:03.480] You'd look at them. [43:03.520 --> 43:04.180] They'd have a phone number. [43:04.240 --> 43:05.960] You'd call the number back and say, yes, what do you want? [43:06.220 --> 43:07.900] And before that, they just beeped. [43:07.980 --> 43:10.600] And you could only call one number because that was the only person who had it. [43:10.720 --> 43:16.620] I like that because the quality of sound on cell phones is so crap that I really would rather be using a landline myself. [43:17.460 --> 43:17.760] What's the other thing? [43:17.840 --> 43:19.980] People have gotten used to worse quality. [43:20.140 --> 43:20.380] Yes. [43:20.500 --> 43:21.280] Any other comments? [43:21.480 --> 43:21.980] Yes, hello? [43:22.160 --> 43:22.300] Yes. [43:22.560 --> 43:24.160] I'd like to say I was kidding. [43:24.560 --> 43:25.800] I was actually kidding. [43:25.900 --> 43:26.540] Oh, you were kidding? [43:26.920 --> 43:29.400] Anyway, but it's a good thought, though. [43:29.560 --> 43:30.240] It is a good thought. [43:30.420 --> 43:30.540] It's a very good thought. [43:30.740 --> 43:30.980] Yes. [43:31.840 --> 43:38.080] I'd like to say that it has pushed up a lot of people. [43:38.260 --> 43:39.100] I don't have one. [43:39.100 --> 43:39.740] I never did. [43:39.940 --> 43:44.380] I never had a cell phone or anything or a computer or whatever. [43:44.580 --> 43:46.820] So you've never sent 20,000 text messages in a single month? [43:46.820 --> 43:49.680] No, I've never had anything like that. [43:49.800 --> 43:51.440] I still do snail mail. [43:52.080 --> 43:52.480] Wow. [43:52.880 --> 43:53.880] I respect that. [43:53.960 --> 43:54.320] I really do. [43:54.460 --> 43:54.940] Thank you. [43:55.420 --> 44:03.760] Anyway, I'd like to say that it has pushed a lot of people's telephone bills up, all these computers and all. [44:04.040 --> 44:04.340] Mm-hmm. [44:04.500 --> 44:04.620] Yeah. [44:04.640 --> 44:06.720] And the other thing I don't get, people who buy ringtones. [44:06.720 --> 44:07.760] I don't get that at all. [44:07.860 --> 44:08.360] Who does that? [44:08.440 --> 44:09.340] Apparently, a lot of people do. [44:09.760 --> 44:12.320] You pay to have your phone ring in a certain way. [44:12.320 --> 44:16.140] Yeah, well, I mean, there are ways to load ringtones onto phones for free. [44:16.180 --> 44:17.060] Well, it's a gimmick, right? [44:17.200 --> 44:17.940] No, it's a gimmick. [44:18.000 --> 44:19.820] It's just a way of ripping people off. [44:20.120 --> 44:20.800] It's really easy. [44:20.920 --> 44:21.900] All you need is a MIDI file. [44:22.000 --> 44:22.540] I do it all the time. [44:22.760 --> 44:23.720] Right, but there are people... [44:23.720 --> 44:28.480] But anyone who doesn't know these things is just going to say, oh, look, it's on the little store on my phone. [44:28.560 --> 44:29.100] I'll just buy it. [44:29.240 --> 44:29.420] Right. [44:29.780 --> 44:39.340] Talking about people racking up high phone bills as an argument, I mean, you know, people could simply have a cap on their bill so they don't have to worry about it going over a certain level. [44:39.340 --> 44:41.820] Well, that's a good idea, but I don't think the phone company is going to like that very much. [44:41.900 --> 44:42.820] Yeah, they probably wouldn't do it. [44:42.920 --> 44:43.180] Whatever. [44:43.420 --> 44:43.860] This is... [44:43.860 --> 44:45.820] America is a consumer culture. [44:46.220 --> 44:46.540] Then who should we be blaming? [44:46.740 --> 44:48.120] We buy stupid stuff, right? [44:48.200 --> 44:49.460] That's like our culture at this point. [44:49.560 --> 44:50.940] Yeah, well, we're in the midst of it right now. [44:51.260 --> 44:55.060] Listen, thanks for your call, and good luck with technology and snail mail and things like that. [44:55.120 --> 44:55.600] Let's take another call. [44:55.680 --> 44:56.000] Good evening. [44:56.640 --> 44:57.420] You're on Off the Hook. [44:57.980 --> 44:58.300] Hi. [44:58.440 --> 45:01.780] You've been talking about lots of stuff, and the conversation winds and weaves. [45:02.060 --> 45:02.660] Yes, it does. [45:02.800 --> 45:05.620] So I got a question that I think relates to something that was said. [45:06.160 --> 45:12.980] But it's a question, basically, it's a question for you guys maybe to talk about among yourselves, and I might learn a little something. [45:14.120 --> 45:15.800] What is the thing with privacy? [45:16.060 --> 45:22.220] It seems important, and yet it's not clear to me exactly what it is, why it should be maintained. [45:22.980 --> 45:26.800] And I just feel like it is important, but I'm not clear why. [45:26.940 --> 45:30.320] So I'm going to listen to the radio and hope you say very insightful things. [45:30.440 --> 45:30.900] We'll try. [45:31.100 --> 45:32.020] Thanks for your call. [45:32.440 --> 45:33.540] Rick, start us off. [45:33.540 --> 45:36.420] I would say that is the controversy, that very question. [45:36.420 --> 45:37.620] People argue over that. [45:37.780 --> 45:38.560] How important is it? [45:38.620 --> 45:40.380] What exactly should be private? [45:40.380 --> 45:41.540] What should not be private? [45:41.660 --> 45:42.700] That's a lovely question. [45:42.880 --> 45:43.420] I like that question. [45:43.420 --> 45:44.600] Yeah, it's open-ended. [45:44.600 --> 45:47.040] I would have liked to have asked him what he considers to be privacy. [45:47.460 --> 45:53.280] Everyone has a different definition of what should be maintained and what should not be maintained. [45:53.840 --> 45:55.020] It's different in every culture. [45:55.040 --> 45:57.200] Yeah, I think it's also different from person to person. [45:57.200 --> 45:58.160] It's really what... [45:58.160 --> 46:03.580] I mean, how much do you care and how much does anyone care to have your information, right? [46:03.680 --> 46:07.320] So, you know, if you're going to have... [46:07.320 --> 46:10.740] If you're a celebrity and you're going to have stalkers coming after you, you probably don't want your address out there. [46:10.820 --> 46:14.560] But me, if somebody knows my address, they're probably not going to be coming looking for me. [46:14.580 --> 46:21.880] There are people who post their cell phone number at the end of every email they send, even to strangers, or when they post on news groups or things like that. [46:21.940 --> 46:24.980] There are people who tweet publicly and people who tweet privately. [46:24.980 --> 46:26.080] You know, it just varies. [46:26.340 --> 46:32.000] Well, so I think privacy is different for celebrities and everyday people in as much that, like, the relationship is so unequal. [46:32.100 --> 46:35.400] There's one person receiving all of this attention in the case of a celebrity. [46:35.620 --> 46:39.060] And most of our everyday, you know, attentions, it's just one-to-one. [46:39.160 --> 46:46.000] And I think part of the problem with celebrities is there is such a broad range of people who are exposed to them, is that they, you know, they can't handle all of the stuff that people know. [46:46.080 --> 46:55.360] And yet, I mean, there's also, you know, speaking of privacy, there's this whole industry about, like, violating their privacy, which some people seem to really just get into as the thing that they do for entertainment, which I don't understand at all, [46:55.380 --> 46:58.100] because I grew up with a lot of celebrities in my area, being from Southern California. [46:58.340 --> 47:02.620] And, you know, it was just sort of like, they're normal people, but other people don't actually believe that about celebrities. [47:03.260 --> 47:09.780] If you start talking about privacy with celebrities, then a lack of privacy could actually be dangerous for them. [47:09.780 --> 47:15.460] I mean, how many celebrities have you heard of that have actually been shot, you know, say, outside their home? [47:16.560 --> 47:17.440] You know... [47:17.440 --> 47:17.800] Bernie, go ahead. [47:18.440 --> 47:24.560] I just wanted to say what Redhawk pointed out is very true, that privacy is different for different people. [47:24.880 --> 47:36.140] And I think what gives people angst, what gives some people angst about privacy or lack of it, is it's a feeling of a loss of control about themselves. [47:36.140 --> 47:39.620] Like, what information about them is looking at them? [47:39.700 --> 47:49.460] And it makes some people nervous that someone could be watching them walk down the street, or someone could be monitoring their phone calls, or their text messages, or whatever. [47:50.460 --> 47:58.460] Unfortunately, we don't live in a society where you can opt in to what information about yourself is available to others. [47:59.260 --> 48:02.440] In other societies, it is more of an opt-in thing. [48:02.620 --> 48:05.320] Here, you don't have an option to opt in or opt out. [48:05.320 --> 48:06.580] It just is pretty much... [48:07.120 --> 48:07.680] You're just... [48:07.680 --> 48:18.720] If you use electronic mediums that are two-way, unlike passive, like television or pagers, you can be tracked, your physical location, your communications, that sort of thing. [48:18.940 --> 48:21.520] And that gives people a lot of angst, myself included. [48:21.940 --> 48:23.220] I agree with that. [48:23.300 --> 48:29.480] I think the big issue, I think, is that privacy and what it is varies from culture to culture, from person to person. [48:29.480 --> 48:35.380] And the issue being that we, as responsible adults, should have the right to choose what we make private and what we make public. [48:35.800 --> 48:38.060] And bit by bit, those choices are being taken away from us. [48:38.620 --> 48:38.780] Right. [48:38.860 --> 48:46.480] Maybe we should actually have an opt-in, where at least it's, say, a category, such as things like addresses and whatnot, where people can opt in or opt out on what's private and whatnot. [48:47.860 --> 48:49.420] I think something that... [48:49.420 --> 49:02.200] One of the things that sort of is parallel to privacy or part of privacy that doesn't get talked about all that much is liberty, in terms of your freedom to go places and your freedom to be without, you know, maybe attention and stuff like that. [49:02.280 --> 49:07.040] And, I mean, I can think of a number of cases, just sort of everyday kinds of cases where, you know, that's really important. [49:07.040 --> 49:19.780] For example, if you're not out of the closet yet and, you know, you need to go explore and talk to people who understand you, for a lot of people, that's not going to be something that they can do in public, necessarily, right away before they're comfortable with it. [49:19.900 --> 49:23.660] Or if you are, you know, trying to escape an abusive spouse, for example, that's another way. [49:23.780 --> 49:35.740] So, I mean, a lot of the times we think, when we think about privacy, we, I mean, especially as people who are not celebrities and are not that well-known, we don't think about the times when there really could be a time when we needed the liberty to not be tracked as we walk to, [49:36.140 --> 49:39.620] you know, a gay club or when we walk to a police station or something like that. [49:39.620 --> 49:47.900] And I think increasingly people are going to find out because now what we have in our culture is this kind of voluntary giving up of our privacy, right? [49:47.920 --> 49:52.340] You go on Facebook and you put everything there and your pictures where you, you know, what you did last weekend or whatever. [49:52.560 --> 49:58.320] And right now, you know, as a person doing that, you might think that, okay, it's not that important right now. [49:58.440 --> 49:59.800] I don't really care who sees this information. [49:59.800 --> 50:02.200] But then, you know, five, ten years from now, you might care. [50:02.340 --> 50:10.460] And I'm interested to see what the fallout is when, you know, the president in 20 years were digging up his old Facebook photos or something like that. [50:10.580 --> 50:12.220] And just to kind of see where that goes. [50:12.520 --> 50:12.700] But... [50:12.700 --> 50:17.100] But do you think that is because of a lack of education of the consequences of privacy or the... [50:17.100 --> 50:18.420] I think people just don't care. [50:18.540 --> 50:21.120] And in most cases, they don't really need to, right? [50:21.280 --> 50:27.440] Again, like Joe Schmo, probably it doesn't matter that I can see, you know, some photo of what... when he went out for beers. [50:27.940 --> 50:44.000] I'm... from anecdotal evidence, I might say answer that is yes, because how many times we've heard of people who put stuff out on MySpace or Facebook and then be horrified to find out just how many people are actually looking at some photos that they only intended for their friends because they didn't understand the privacy settings, [50:44.140 --> 50:44.460] for instance. [50:44.700 --> 50:46.120] We're saying probably a lot. [50:46.220 --> 50:47.300] We're saying probably it doesn't matter. [50:47.420 --> 50:49.160] And so what this ends up being is really contextual. [50:49.440 --> 50:54.940] And it's sort of how many... it's sort of a matter of how many situations can you predict in which this will be a problem. [50:54.940 --> 50:59.020] And that's something I think we need to teach kids these days, too, which they were not doing a good job of in school. [50:59.160 --> 51:04.220] They're either like, don't put anything up online, or they're like, oh, you know, just be free and write things. [51:04.320 --> 51:10.740] But it's definitely something that we're all having to learn as a society is guessing probabilities of these things. [51:11.360 --> 51:15.360] Okay, let's squeeze in another phone call, see if anybody else has anything to say. [51:15.360 --> 51:15.900] That's very engaging. [51:16.120 --> 51:16.480] It was. [51:16.620 --> 51:17.840] I hope that listener is satisfied. [51:17.860 --> 51:18.280] That was a great question. [51:18.860 --> 51:19.380] Good evening. [51:19.460 --> 51:19.980] You're on Off the Hook. [51:20.420 --> 51:21.280] Hi, how are you doing? [51:21.440 --> 51:22.160] Hi, where are you calling from? [51:22.660 --> 51:24.180] I'm calling from Poughkeepsie, New York. [51:24.240 --> 51:24.860] Oh, great place. [51:25.280 --> 51:26.600] Yeah, I have a few. [51:26.820 --> 51:27.840] They're short. [51:28.040 --> 51:28.980] I write them. [51:29.100 --> 51:31.780] They're millennial proverbs that are apropos of our time. [51:32.100 --> 51:35.760] The one I wrote, actually, this is about almost eight years ago, I wrote this one. [51:36.240 --> 51:39.920] Ah, to sit weeping in grief and frustration in front of a blank screen. [51:40.720 --> 51:41.120] Good. [51:41.280 --> 51:41.800] Okay, nice. [51:41.940 --> 51:43.200] And now, this is a little better. [51:43.680 --> 51:45.240] Invention is the mother of necessity. [51:46.320 --> 51:47.140] You wrote that? [51:47.300 --> 51:48.100] I did, yes. [51:48.240 --> 51:48.540] Okay. [51:48.780 --> 51:49.040] All right. [51:49.160 --> 51:51.060] First the knee jerks, then the goose steps. [51:52.080 --> 51:56.380] And the last one, is TV, is the discursive narrative preventative? [51:56.700 --> 51:58.260] I thought McLuhan wrote that. [51:59.620 --> 52:00.120] What? [52:01.460 --> 52:03.560] Well, let's just agree to disagree on that. [52:03.960 --> 52:04.380] Good evening. [52:04.500 --> 52:05.360] You're on Off the Hook. [52:07.300 --> 52:08.000] What's on your mind? [52:08.160 --> 52:08.420] Hello? [52:09.180 --> 52:10.040] Hey, how's it going? [52:10.200 --> 52:10.900] Hi, where are you going from? [52:11.840 --> 52:12.820] Queens, New York. [52:12.980 --> 52:13.420] I've heard of it. [52:13.480 --> 52:14.260] Okay, what's on your mind? [52:15.920 --> 52:20.200] I just want to address, what's the topic today besides text messaging and things like that? [52:20.200 --> 52:21.640] Well, what's on your mind? [52:22.320 --> 52:24.320] We don't have enough time to go into what we have been doing. [52:24.540 --> 52:29.180] I just wanted to address, I hear a lot of people talking about a lot of text messages back and forth. [52:29.620 --> 52:33.200] There are unlimited texting plans for $14.50 out there. [52:33.200 --> 52:34.940] Yeah, unlimited. [52:35.180 --> 52:36.760] And it's a lot of texting going on. [52:36.960 --> 52:51.120] I think more what we were trying to discuss was, you know, at what point does it become a problem and is it, you know, because there was an article written basically about, I guess, a shock article saying, oh, you know, teens are going to be addicted and they're having all sorts of problems and this is a problem. [52:51.280 --> 52:52.400] And so that's kind of what we were discussing. [52:52.580 --> 52:58.300] So, yeah, these things exist and you can send 20,000 texts in a month for $40. [52:58.600 --> 53:00.700] I don't think the article is saying they're going to be addicted. [53:00.720 --> 53:02.800] I think they're saying a lot of people are addicted already. [53:03.200 --> 53:04.400] And so it's not necessarily... [53:04.400 --> 53:05.880] But it's not really how much it costs. [53:06.320 --> 53:07.360] It's just, is this a problem? [53:07.820 --> 53:13.440] I think it's really the next level of communication, like eming, text messages. [53:13.800 --> 53:13.820] Eming? [53:13.940 --> 53:14.660] Did you say eming? [53:14.780 --> 53:15.640] That's what you call I-M? [53:15.920 --> 53:16.140] Eming? [53:16.140 --> 53:16.840] Yeah, eming. [53:17.020 --> 53:17.520] All right. [53:17.920 --> 53:18.420] Em slang. [53:18.660 --> 53:19.260] Yeah, all right. [53:19.520 --> 53:20.900] I just have to keep up with these things. [53:22.480 --> 53:25.020] And let's see, other than that, free energy. [53:25.200 --> 53:25.600] Let's go. [53:25.900 --> 53:26.280] All right. [53:26.420 --> 53:27.680] Well, that I can get behind, definitely. [53:27.900 --> 53:28.060] Gus. [53:28.060 --> 53:33.200] I think we have to be careful about saying addiction when we're talking about this stuff, because we do not have a diagnosis. [53:33.440 --> 53:35.580] That's something that psychologists can talk about is addiction. [53:35.960 --> 53:39.920] And I think that once we start talking about it as an addiction, then people begin to think they can medicate it. [53:40.280 --> 53:40.860] Then people begin to think... [53:40.860 --> 53:41.680] I agree with that. [53:41.720 --> 53:42.100] I agree with that. [53:42.120 --> 53:44.820] We're over-medicating everything, everything left and right. [53:45.320 --> 53:47.220] How would you medicate someone addicted to text messages? [53:47.220 --> 53:48.640] But what would you call it? [53:48.640 --> 53:52.480] What would you call it when somebody is constantly on the phone? [53:52.600 --> 53:52.980] Obsession. [53:53.220 --> 53:54.720] It's a cause for further study. [53:54.920 --> 53:55.800] You look into it more. [53:55.920 --> 53:58.540] That sounds so tame, though. [53:58.760 --> 54:05.300] There's also a principle about any amount of resources we have, that the more resources we have, the greater our need for it is. [54:05.380 --> 54:09.260] So now that we say have unlimited text messages, people are going to text... [54:09.260 --> 54:10.100] Unlimited, yes. [54:10.240 --> 54:10.840] ...a lot. [54:10.840 --> 54:18.440] And since we like having conversations, is it that we're addicted to texting or that we are addicted to talking to people and is that really a problem? [54:18.440 --> 54:19.560] Quick survey here, right? [54:19.700 --> 54:20.240] On the spot. [54:20.400 --> 54:20.760] Quick survey. [54:21.000 --> 54:21.900] I just want to answer Redhack's question. [54:22.040 --> 54:22.840] The answer is Ritalin. [54:23.820 --> 54:24.440] Thank you. [54:25.500 --> 54:26.300] Quick question. [54:26.620 --> 54:28.360] How many text messages have you sent today? [54:28.400 --> 54:29.180] Not Kevin, you start. [54:29.300 --> 54:29.560] How many? [54:30.300 --> 54:30.540] Eight. [54:30.760 --> 54:31.060] Eight? [54:31.480 --> 54:31.860] Dot red? [54:33.020 --> 54:33.420] Ten. [54:33.700 --> 54:33.840] Ten? [54:34.060 --> 54:34.540] Okay, Redhack. [54:34.780 --> 54:35.640] Wait, ten or twenty? [54:35.940 --> 54:36.520] Somewhere around. [54:36.520 --> 54:37.000] We're going to say fifteen. [54:37.180 --> 54:38.260] Some number fewer than ten. [54:38.400 --> 54:38.860] Maybe five. [54:39.020 --> 54:39.260] All right. [54:40.840 --> 54:41.360] Five or six. [54:41.600 --> 54:41.880] Gus? [54:41.960 --> 54:42.620] My phone is dead. [54:42.660 --> 54:43.120] I can't tell. [54:43.240 --> 54:44.060] But why are you asking me? [54:44.120 --> 54:44.700] I'm not a teenager. [54:45.380 --> 54:46.420] I'm not asking teenagers. [54:46.560 --> 54:47.120] I'm asking people. [54:47.300 --> 54:48.320] And last I checked, you're one of those. [54:49.040 --> 54:49.640] So teenagers are people? [54:49.640 --> 54:50.620] Is it an embarrassing answer? [54:50.740 --> 54:52.100] Do you not want to tell us how many text messages you sent? [54:52.100 --> 54:53.320] I can't tell you because my phone... [54:53.320 --> 54:54.920] You have to ask your phone how many? [54:54.920 --> 54:55.320] I do. [54:55.620 --> 54:57.080] You don't know in your head how many... [54:57.080 --> 54:57.220] Four or five. [54:57.340 --> 54:57.760] It was like four or five. [54:57.760 --> 54:58.240] Four or five. [54:58.300 --> 54:59.140] That's a good answer, Mike. [54:59.360 --> 55:00.060] I sent eight. [55:00.320 --> 55:00.460] Eight? [55:00.540 --> 55:01.160] How about you, Bernie? [55:01.980 --> 55:02.300] Three. [55:02.520 --> 55:03.920] So do I win the lowest... [55:03.920 --> 55:05.260] I think I've sent four. [55:05.260 --> 55:08.880] So apparently we're not part of whatever it is we're talking about. [55:09.040 --> 55:14.740] I also want to clarify, of my eight, four were while we were talking about text messaging. [55:15.780 --> 55:17.140] I did send a few back. [55:17.540 --> 55:17.900] Anyway. [55:18.140 --> 55:18.280] Yeah. [55:18.340 --> 55:19.680] Let's talk about texting during the show. [55:19.820 --> 55:23.160] You see, if we had somebody in the show who's constantly texting, that would be an obsession, I think. [55:23.340 --> 55:24.160] That would totally be. [55:25.040 --> 55:25.400] Okay. [55:25.400 --> 55:27.060] Let's take one last call very quickly. [55:27.300 --> 55:27.980] And good evening. [55:28.160 --> 55:28.700] You're on Off the Hook. [55:29.420 --> 55:29.700] Hello? [55:29.880 --> 55:30.080] Yes. [55:30.100 --> 55:30.780] Make it very fast. [55:31.260 --> 55:31.620] Okay. [55:31.680 --> 55:32.160] It's really quick. [55:32.340 --> 55:37.960] It was in reference to the person who called and wanted to know what was this whole thing about personal freedom, privacy, and that sort of thing. [55:38.060 --> 55:38.380] Right? [55:38.620 --> 55:38.840] Yes. [55:39.020 --> 55:40.300] We had a long discussion about it. [55:40.760 --> 55:40.940] Yeah. [55:41.180 --> 55:46.980] Well, the issue that I think is so important is that this person was never really enslaved. [55:47.260 --> 55:51.940] And this person also doesn't know what it is to be free. [55:52.140 --> 55:55.340] So any freedom that this person has is really limited in his view. [55:55.800 --> 56:09.380] But if you were a black American and you were riding through the city of New York and you were stopped, you were riding across the country, you were stopped six or seven times, you would know the whole purpose of wanting to be anonymous and not having someone track you. [56:09.660 --> 56:10.860] Very, very interesting perspective. [56:11.060 --> 56:16.640] And I think, honestly, actually, that is an interesting perspective because I feel like Bernie gave us some of the best insight into privacy. [56:16.640 --> 56:18.700] And this is somebody who has had run-ins with the law. [56:18.780 --> 56:24.400] And I think once you've had a run-in with the law and had them physically on you and physically limiting you, you do feel that a lot more. [56:24.400 --> 56:41.720] What you have to say, what you have to say that's infringed on you, right, and you understand that, like, what a person who is also a person who's become civilized and really doesn't know what freedom is at certain points. [56:42.140 --> 56:44.400] It's almost like being a prisoner or a slave. [56:44.720 --> 56:47.400] Many times when they freed the slaves, the slaves didn't know what to do. [56:48.040 --> 56:48.580] All right, that read. [56:48.780 --> 56:49.020] Real quick. [56:49.480 --> 56:53.860] Ironically, people who say that they have nothing to hide many times have the most to hide. [56:54.400 --> 56:58.880] You know, they don't realize just how important their privacy is until it's everywhere. [56:58.880 --> 57:00.100] But you mean that in a good way, right? [57:00.100 --> 57:01.560] Not that they're guilty of something. [57:01.700 --> 57:02.840] I mean, no, no, in a good way. [57:02.900 --> 57:03.100] Okay. [57:03.260 --> 57:04.120] And Bernie, last word. [57:04.940 --> 57:08.260] There's a distinct difference between privacy and anonymity. [57:08.260 --> 57:10.820] And we don't have time to talk about it now, but maybe another show. [57:10.940 --> 57:11.220] Okay. [57:11.860 --> 57:12.980] We're out of here for this week. [57:13.060 --> 57:16.140] OTH at 2600.com is our email address. [57:16.400 --> 57:18.220] And yes, we'll be back again next week. [57:18.400 --> 57:21.040] In the meantime, please do not call this phone number. [57:22.160 --> 57:25.880] 6-0-6-0-8-4-2 Tina [57:29.980 --> 57:54.240] went to the ladies' room Soaring on the wall If you'd like a very nice time Just hit this number a call It was 6-0-6-0-8-4-2 And I'm waiting for you 6-0-6-0-8-4-2 And I'm waiting for you. [58:05.480 --> 58:06.230] And I'm waiting for you. [58:06.230 --> 58:08.060] Tina reached in her pocketbook. [58:08.660 --> 58:10.460] Pulled out a thin jaw. [58:11.520 --> 58:13.820] Dumped it in the phone lock. [58:14.500 --> 58:16.400] Praying she'd get the lock. [58:16.920 --> 58:19.820] It was 6060842. [58:21.040 --> 58:22.900] And I'm waiting for you. [58:24.800 --> 58:25.560] 6060842. [58:26.820 --> 58:28.760] And I'm waiting for you. [58:28.760 --> 58:31.840] Now the number to call. [58:34.560 --> 58:37.180] Get no answer at all. [58:40.320 --> 58:41.540] Dumped in the flop. [58:42.200 --> 58:42.980] Ready to try. [58:46.890 --> 58:48.810] Uh, 6060842. [58:52.750 --> 58:54.850] I've been trying all day. [58:57.660 --> 59:00.700] And I'm making no headway. [59:04.500 --> 59:06.640] Operator, what's wrong? [59:09.140 --> 59:12.700] A desk of a number all day long. [59:15.420 --> 59:17.160] Operator said... [59:17.160 --> 59:18.360] Your number's been disconnected. [59:19.860 --> 59:21.860] Your number's been disconnected. [59:22.860 --> 59:24.660] Your number's been disconnected. [59:25.880 --> 59:27.040] Your number's been disconnected. [59:27.040 --> 59:27.700] Your number's been disconnected. [59:53.290 --> 59:55.270] Your number's been disconnected. [59:55.270 --> 59:55.340] We are back.