[00:24.660 --> 00:26.500]  The struggle continues.
[00:26.820 --> 00:29.220]  Thank you for supporting People Powered Radio.
[00:30.160 --> 00:31.360]  WBAI, New York.
[00:41.790 --> 00:44.790]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI.
[00:45.110 --> 00:48.450]  It's just about 7 o'clock on a Wednesday.
[00:48.710 --> 00:52.510]  That means it's time once again for Off the Hook.
[00:58.810 --> 01:03.310]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[01:04.250 --> 01:08.790]  I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a cough.
[01:09.410 --> 01:11.630]  We couldn't get much worse.
[01:14.490 --> 01:17.070]  Billy Bump for the best, expect the worst.
[01:17.850 --> 01:19.610]  I hope that's understood.
[01:19.750 --> 01:20.630]  One day, let me know.
[02:05.050 --> 02:05.930]  And good evening to everybody.
[02:06.050 --> 02:07.330]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:07.510 --> 02:09.450]  Magnus Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:09.510 --> 02:11.070]  Joined tonight by RedHack.
[02:11.310 --> 02:11.590]  Hello.
[02:11.990 --> 02:12.430]  Wait a minute.
[02:12.510 --> 02:13.350]  That didn't work for some reason.
[02:13.890 --> 02:14.190]  Hello.
[02:14.190 --> 02:15.090]  No, it's not working.
[02:15.230 --> 02:15.670]  I don't know why.
[02:15.890 --> 02:16.710]  What is that, Red?
[02:17.230 --> 02:18.130]  Is it plugged in?
[02:18.710 --> 02:19.070]  Yeah?
[02:19.550 --> 02:20.790]  Not getting anything on that mic.
[02:20.950 --> 02:21.150]  Sorry.
[02:21.570 --> 02:22.190]  Nope, it's not working.
[02:22.330 --> 02:24.850]  You're going to have to use a different mic or figure out how...
[02:24.850 --> 02:25.530]  Okay, try that one.
[02:25.710 --> 02:25.910]  Hello.
[02:26.070 --> 02:26.570]  Yeah, that's better.
[02:26.690 --> 02:27.750]  That one's totally useless.
[02:27.970 --> 02:30.510]  Which kind of sucks because we have so many people in the studio tonight.
[02:31.370 --> 02:31.950]  Rob T.
[02:32.270 --> 02:32.630]  Firefly.
[02:32.930 --> 02:33.430]  Good evening.
[02:33.970 --> 02:34.270]  Jim.
[02:34.970 --> 02:35.330]  Hi.
[02:35.330 --> 02:36.130]  How are you doing?
[02:37.250 --> 02:38.710]  We have Dot Red.
[02:39.250 --> 02:39.650]  Hello.
[02:40.090 --> 02:40.470]  Gus.
[02:40.770 --> 02:41.130]  Oh, hi.
[02:41.270 --> 02:41.770]  Bernie S.
[02:41.830 --> 02:42.650]  down in Philadelphia.
[02:43.210 --> 02:44.190]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:44.790 --> 02:46.390]  Special guest, Mitch Altman.
[02:46.870 --> 02:47.230]  Hello.
[02:47.910 --> 02:48.550]  And Voltaire.
[02:49.010 --> 02:49.370]  Hey there.
[02:49.490 --> 02:50.170]  It's your last show.
[02:50.390 --> 02:50.610]  Indeed.
[02:51.090 --> 02:51.830]  You've been canceled.
[02:52.430 --> 02:52.630]  Yeah.
[02:53.210 --> 02:54.250]  I'm moving to D.C.
[02:54.250 --> 02:56.110]  No, actually, you've got to speak into the microphone, too.
[02:56.310 --> 02:57.170]  I'm moving to D.C.
[02:57.290 --> 02:58.430]  Yes, moving to D.C.
[02:58.550 --> 03:01.890]  Because you don't have to speak into the microphone, we have to teach you how to speak into the microphone in D.C.
[03:02.090 --> 03:02.990]  Yeah, moving on down.
[03:03.170 --> 03:04.630]  You're moving down to D.C., huh?
[03:04.630 --> 03:04.930]  Yeah.
[03:05.090 --> 03:05.890]  What's this all about?
[03:06.330 --> 03:06.650]  College.
[03:07.410 --> 03:07.730]  College?
[03:08.090 --> 03:08.350]  Yeah.
[03:08.730 --> 03:10.310]  So you're basically killing me off.
[03:10.490 --> 03:14.390]  And maybe my other show will get canceled, and I'll come back on this show, but...
[03:14.390 --> 03:15.270]  Well, for now, yes.
[03:15.270 --> 03:16.210]  Yeah, he's getting a spinoff.
[03:16.290 --> 03:16.590]  That's right.
[03:16.990 --> 03:17.110]  Rather...
[03:17.110 --> 03:18.850]  Well, you got any radio show down there in D.C.?
[03:18.850 --> 03:19.070]  Yeah.
[03:19.070 --> 03:19.110]  Yeah.
[03:19.110 --> 03:19.770]  Good luck with that.
[03:19.870 --> 03:20.770]  Cold Cold Cold Terror's Tales.
[03:20.890 --> 03:21.150]  Uh-huh.
[03:22.050 --> 03:22.590]  All right.
[03:22.730 --> 03:26.410]  Well, so this is your last show, at least your last scheduled show.
[03:26.490 --> 03:28.390]  Of course, you'll be up here for visits and things like that.
[03:28.470 --> 03:30.190]  And if you get kicked out of college, you'll be up here again.
[03:30.410 --> 03:30.570]  Yeah.
[03:31.610 --> 03:32.630]  But, yeah, okay.
[03:32.630 --> 03:38.110]  Okay, and I guess this is kind of a somber note, but we have all kinds of other things to talk about.
[03:38.150 --> 03:38.530]  Yes, Redhack.
[03:38.650 --> 03:44.910]  Can I say, after spending last Wednesday standing in the rain waiting for a phone call, I'm quite happy to be back in the studio.
[03:45.190 --> 03:45.510]  Yeah.
[03:45.710 --> 03:48.130]  Well, now, you were somewhere in Scotland, right?
[03:48.470 --> 03:50.670]  I was in Scotland, too, but we were in different parts of Scotland.
[03:51.190 --> 03:55.110]  Junes and I were in Scotland, and we didn't mention it, but it was actually raining the whole time.
[03:55.350 --> 03:58.410]  And by the time I went back in, my clothes were fairly well soaked.
[03:58.530 --> 03:58.790]  Uh-huh.
[03:59.550 --> 04:05.070]  The cell phone signal in the apartment that we were staying in wasn't that good, so we didn't want to risk it.
[04:05.210 --> 04:05.430]  Uh-huh.
[04:05.610 --> 04:12.490]  Yeah, I understand that we had some difficulty making two phone calls at the same time here at the station, so sometimes that can be a challenge.
[04:12.490 --> 04:15.650]  And I was on one line in Glasgow, and you were... where were you again?
[04:15.890 --> 04:16.290]  Isla.
[04:16.450 --> 04:16.830]  Isla.
[04:16.830 --> 04:17.190]  Yeah, you were...
[04:17.190 --> 04:20.030]  Spelled I-S-L-A-Y, but pronounced differently.
[04:20.250 --> 04:23.770]  And then later, we both wound up in Edinburgh, which was an amazing city.
[04:24.010 --> 04:25.070]  Yeah, it was pretty crazy.
[04:25.230 --> 04:30.490]  I mean, the Edinburgh Festival was going on at that time, and this place was swamped.
[04:30.490 --> 04:31.070]  It was.
[04:31.170 --> 04:33.410]  A lot of people, a lot of artisans and their art.
[04:33.530 --> 04:34.610]  But we got away from it.
[04:34.630 --> 04:35.950]  We went and climbed a mountain instead.
[04:35.950 --> 04:40.710]  We climbed a semi-mountain, yes, and had a great time overall.
[04:40.830 --> 04:41.710]  But we're all back now.
[04:42.110 --> 04:43.010]  We're all back...
[04:43.010 --> 04:45.710]  Actually, Mike is back, too, but he's away this week.
[04:46.030 --> 04:47.830]  But, Bernie, you got back safely?
[04:48.330 --> 04:48.970]  I did.
[04:49.150 --> 04:54.250]  Now, we were expecting to hear from you as you were going through customs, but instead, I think we just got some flashing lights.
[04:54.330 --> 04:56.130]  I don't know if you were trying to send us a signal or something.
[04:57.410 --> 05:07.030]  Well, it turns out that when you get off the JFK, at least at the gate I got off of, there's no usable Sprint PCS signal there.
[05:07.030 --> 05:10.470]  So I couldn't call while I was picking up my luggage.
[05:10.750 --> 05:11.450]  And then by the...
[05:11.450 --> 05:13.370]  So I went through passport control.
[05:13.630 --> 05:16.290]  Then when I went through customs with my bags, they just waved me through.
[05:16.410 --> 05:18.690]  They didn't look in a single one of my bags.
[05:18.730 --> 05:19.210]  It was amazing.
[05:19.590 --> 05:20.890]  Well, that's interesting.
[05:21.110 --> 05:22.750]  First of all, it's interesting that there's no signal.
[05:22.870 --> 05:26.330]  Do you think they're blocking the signal, or it just doesn't penetrate the building?
[05:26.750 --> 05:28.130]  I was wondering that myself.
[05:28.630 --> 05:29.970]  I think it's just...
[05:29.970 --> 05:31.750]  At first, I thought, oh, they're jamming me.
[05:31.750 --> 05:33.950]  But no, I just think it's poor coverage.
[05:35.050 --> 05:36.450]  So just the way it is.
[05:37.090 --> 05:41.590]  They could easily put one of those nano-cells or micro-cells in there to provide coverage.
[05:41.610 --> 05:44.650]  But there's signs all over the place saying, no cell phone use.
[05:46.050 --> 05:49.210]  So, you know, my guess is it's just bad coverage.
[05:49.350 --> 05:50.330]  Bernie, I had the same thing.
[05:50.450 --> 05:51.750]  I don't know if we were in the same terminal.
[05:52.210 --> 05:56.130]  But when I was going to pick up my luggage and through customs, I didn't have any coverage either.
[05:56.890 --> 05:59.470]  So were you in the Delta terminal or a different one?
[06:00.710 --> 06:03.170]  I believe it was American Airlines.
[06:03.410 --> 06:10.270]  So they might actually be blocking it then, because it would be kind of conspicuous that two different baggage claims had no service.
[06:10.730 --> 06:12.090]  I could use my phone.
[06:12.250 --> 06:13.390]  I was able to use it.
[06:13.530 --> 06:14.590]  I had 18T.
[06:14.950 --> 06:16.750]  But you could use your phone or you couldn't use your phone?
[06:16.750 --> 06:22.130]  Well, I could use it very sporadic, very erratically, sporadically, rather.
[06:22.310 --> 06:24.010]  I mean, I could get a text message out.
[06:24.070 --> 06:30.390]  I think I sent one to Mike saying, I'm trying to contact you, but it's not working very well.
[06:30.470 --> 06:31.010]  Bad signal.
[06:31.250 --> 06:35.150]  So if it was being jammed, I wouldn't even be able to get or receive text messages.
[06:35.770 --> 06:38.570]  Well, if it's being jammed, I think they would have jammers.
[06:38.870 --> 06:39.590]  And I don't know.
[06:39.650 --> 06:41.750]  I just think that that would be known a little bit more.
[06:41.890 --> 06:44.030]  Well, couldn't they shield it, you know, put it in a big Faraday cage?
[06:44.390 --> 06:45.410]  Maybe something like that.
[06:45.750 --> 06:52.630]  I can speak from my personal experience that Continental International Arrivals in Newark did have service for Verizon.
[06:52.930 --> 06:53.170]  Uh-huh.
[06:53.670 --> 06:55.990]  But were you on the phone as you were going through customs, though?
[06:56.870 --> 07:00.130]  Yeah, well, like when people were getting their bags, I was on the phone, so...
[07:00.130 --> 07:00.370]  Uh-huh.
[07:00.670 --> 07:01.770]  Well, that's baggage claim, though.
[07:01.910 --> 07:02.510]  Baggage claim is different from going...
[07:02.510 --> 07:03.410]  Yeah, but that's before customs.
[07:03.670 --> 07:04.130]  Well, that's true.
[07:04.190 --> 07:06.790]  I mean, I can get the signal on the airplane, you know, as we're landing.
[07:06.970 --> 07:08.090]  I'm talking on the phone usually.
[07:08.210 --> 07:08.570]  No, I'm kidding.
[07:08.990 --> 07:15.210]  But, you know, as soon as they make that little ding noise, I turn it on and almost always get signal right away.
[07:15.410 --> 07:17.450]  But I had a very interesting experience coming into...
[07:17.450 --> 07:19.890]  First of all, I had an interesting experience coming out of Ireland.
[07:20.550 --> 07:22.330]  Tony, who traveled out of Ireland?
[07:23.550 --> 07:24.210]  No, you didn't.
[07:24.270 --> 07:24.870]  You traveled into Ireland.
[07:24.930 --> 07:27.570]  I traveled out of Ireland, but to...
[07:27.570 --> 07:28.230]  Within the EU.
[07:28.410 --> 07:34.010]  Now, well, the interesting thing, I had to fly from Edinburgh to Dublin and then from Dublin over to New York.
[07:34.010 --> 07:36.330]  The thing is, don't ever do this, folks.
[07:36.470 --> 07:38.570]  I mean, I got a good price as a result of doing that.
[07:38.650 --> 07:44.350]  But apparently, when you do that, you have to follow the sign in Dublin for connecting flights.
[07:44.590 --> 07:47.530]  And it's this long corridor where nobody is.
[07:47.530 --> 07:50.190]  You're going through back rooms and alleys and things like that.
[07:50.330 --> 07:56.730]  And then you come through a door and all of a sudden, there you are right in the middle of a second security check or the first security check for these people.
[07:56.790 --> 07:57.750]  But you're in front of the line.
[07:57.750 --> 07:59.530]  But you have to go through it all over again.
[08:00.650 --> 08:02.050]  And that's always a lot of fun.
[08:02.170 --> 08:09.050]  Then you have to go through some kind of stamp where they stamp your passport or they give you a form.
[08:09.570 --> 08:10.730]  And you actually...
[08:10.730 --> 08:15.090]  There's a sign for the United States saying, welcome to the United States, US Border Patrol.
[08:15.210 --> 08:17.190]  And you're in Ireland, which is awfully weird.
[08:17.570 --> 08:23.410]  So what happened to me that was strange, I asked the guy, so I won't have to go through this again in the States if I'm going through it now.
[08:23.450 --> 08:24.150]  I said, no, you won't.
[08:24.150 --> 08:28.510]  But when we got to Terminal 4, JFK, it was mayhem.
[08:28.690 --> 08:29.650]  Everybody got off the plane.
[08:29.670 --> 08:32.330]  And of course, we had all been cleared already in Ireland.
[08:32.590 --> 08:35.170]  But other flights had come in too.
[08:35.330 --> 08:39.230]  And some people were waiting on these long lines to get stamped like we had already done in Ireland.
[08:39.590 --> 08:44.290]  To the right of all this was simply a corridor where you just bypassed all of this.
[08:44.590 --> 08:47.310]  And I thought to myself, yeah, you know, I don't want to wait on that line.
[08:47.370 --> 08:48.430]  So I'm just going to walk past it.
[08:48.490 --> 08:48.810]  And I did.
[08:48.930 --> 08:49.650]  Nobody challenged me.
[08:49.870 --> 08:51.090]  Then I walked down the corridor.
[08:51.570 --> 08:53.870]  Some guy asked for a little form that I had filled out.
[08:54.110 --> 08:55.390]  Didn't ask for my passport or anything.
[08:55.490 --> 08:56.130]  I handed him the form.
[08:56.210 --> 08:57.270]  He said, wow, that's great.
[08:57.390 --> 08:58.070]  You know, I didn't even read it.
[08:58.110 --> 08:58.810]  Just took the form.
[08:58.990 --> 08:59.710]  And I was through.
[08:59.850 --> 09:02.210]  I was in the country without having my passport even looked at.
[09:02.450 --> 09:11.570]  And the reason that's significant is because a lot of the people coming into Terminal 4, from what I could see, had not had their passports stamped yet because they were all waiting on this line.
[09:11.570 --> 09:19.890]  So it's like they installed some new security but took away a couple of steps of actually checking to see if people were supposed to be there.
[09:20.370 --> 09:25.610]  And just when you think you've gone through all the possible stories of getting into the country, something like this happens.
[09:26.390 --> 09:27.690]  Bernie, does this make sense to you?
[09:29.150 --> 09:38.050]  It makes perfect sense for the American United States Transportation Security Administration to leave out steps that are important.
[09:39.030 --> 09:42.930]  I'm glad you tested their security and you learned something.
[09:43.030 --> 09:46.410]  Now, what if someone had one of those forms and just filled it out themselves?
[09:46.810 --> 09:50.510]  Would it have looked like it had been filled out by an official person?
[09:50.570 --> 09:51.610]  No, I filled out the form myself.
[09:51.830 --> 09:53.970]  It's those little cards that you're supposed to fill out.
[09:53.970 --> 09:58.830]  And my passport had already been stamped in Ireland, but nobody looked at my passport in America.
[09:59.030 --> 10:04.470]  And it was obvious that not everybody in that big room had had their passports looked at in whatever originating country they came from.
[10:04.770 --> 10:07.790]  So maybe I'm missing something, but I can't imagine what it is.
[10:07.970 --> 10:08.490]  I think you're missing...
[10:08.490 --> 10:09.570]  Anybody could have just come in.
[10:09.710 --> 10:11.550]  Anybody could have just entered the country that way.
[10:12.110 --> 10:14.650]  Assuming, yeah, assuming not everybody had already been checked.
[10:14.770 --> 10:15.890]  And from what I could see, they hadn't been.
[10:15.890 --> 10:17.990]  I think that what you're missing is a wall.
[10:18.130 --> 10:29.430]  You're basically saying that, okay, I was checked in Ireland, so I'm done and I don't I don't have to be checked on the U.S., but there's no partition separating me from all the people who have to be checked coming from other countries.
[10:29.450 --> 10:29.530]  Right.
[10:29.570 --> 10:41.990]  I could have waited in that line and been checked a second time, or I could have not been checked in Ireland and simply moved over to that express lane that didn't get checked by anybody because no one was looking at the passport to see if I had been checked before.
[10:42.030 --> 10:44.810]  You couldn't have not been checked in Dublin because they do check everybody.
[10:44.970 --> 10:47.430]  I dropped someone off who was flying to the U.S.
[10:47.490 --> 10:48.210]  and they had to go through customs.
[10:48.210 --> 10:49.130]  And how long has that been going on?
[10:49.190 --> 10:52.150]  Mitch, I know you traveled out of Ireland not too long ago.
[10:52.190 --> 10:52.810]  Is that correct?
[10:53.450 --> 10:53.850]  Yeah.
[10:53.850 --> 10:56.990]  When I did it, I was checked in Shannon Airport.
[10:57.270 --> 10:58.430]  And they check you there as well?
[10:58.610 --> 10:58.670]  Yeah.
[10:58.670 --> 11:00.230]  Again, they say, welcome to the United States.
[11:00.230 --> 11:00.790]  That's weird.
[11:00.810 --> 11:02.210]  Is it only Ireland that does that?
[11:02.350 --> 11:03.510]  I believe it is.
[11:03.650 --> 11:03.790]  Huh.
[11:03.910 --> 11:07.730]  Well, you know, I don't think every single flight coming into Terminal 4 or JFK is from Ireland.
[11:07.730 --> 11:15.630]  So I'm pretty sure they mix people up and the long lines of people waiting for customs people to stamp their passports tells me that they weren't already checked.
[11:16.210 --> 11:21.870]  So yeah, if anybody has any more information on that, please write to us or tell us your particular story.
[11:21.870 --> 11:29.230]  Now, I know, Red Heck, you had a bit of a run-in in Scotland, of all places, on that crazy island.
[11:29.350 --> 11:30.550]  First of all, tell us something about this island.
[11:30.650 --> 11:31.810]  Why were you there in the first place?
[11:31.930 --> 11:42.810]  So Junets and I traveled to this island because basically it's one of the Scotch-producing regions of Scotland and one of our favorite in terms of we like the stuff that comes out of there.
[11:44.270 --> 11:45.530]  So that's why we were there.
[11:45.710 --> 11:46.510]  It's a very small island.
[11:46.790 --> 11:48.050]  The airport has one runway.
[11:48.330 --> 11:53.050]  I believe two flights a day land and two flights a day leave.
[11:53.430 --> 11:54.210]  That's about it.
[11:54.350 --> 11:57.410]  Besides, I'm not counting private planes, but two commercial flights.
[11:57.550 --> 11:58.570]  How big a plane is it?
[11:59.230 --> 12:03.370]  It had propellers and it had maybe room for 30 or 40 people at the most.
[12:04.930 --> 12:08.090]  But so we were there and, you know, it was pretty uneventful.
[12:08.290 --> 12:18.250]  And upon departure, what happened was I had built a brain machine at Har out of a kit at the Hardware Village.
[12:18.510 --> 12:19.910]  And he did really well.
[12:19.970 --> 12:20.890]  I did really well.
[12:22.590 --> 12:24.130]  How long did it take you to build it?
[12:24.270 --> 12:25.090]  A few hours.
[12:25.310 --> 12:25.770]  A few hours.
[12:25.850 --> 12:26.030]  Okay.
[12:26.450 --> 12:27.270]  Three and a half.
[12:27.610 --> 12:28.050]  Three and a half.
[12:28.290 --> 12:29.630]  You're running a timer on him.
[12:29.910 --> 12:30.390]  Okay.
[12:30.750 --> 12:38.270]  And so I had taken it with me through Amsterdam, Schiphol Security, London Heathrow, where I had a connection, and Glasgow.
[12:38.710 --> 12:39.750]  And nothing had been said.
[12:39.830 --> 12:40.890]  It had always been in my carry-on.
[12:41.030 --> 12:43.550]  I just had it there because I didn't want it to get broken in my backpack.
[12:45.130 --> 12:50.610]  So now I've been in Islay a few days and I'm going to leave and I have it in my carry-on.
[12:50.850 --> 12:56.250]  And my bag, along with everybody else's bag on the flight, was randomly selected to be searched.
[12:56.430 --> 12:58.750]  They pretty much just hand searched everyone's carry-on.
[12:58.790 --> 12:59.290]  I don't know why.
[12:59.950 --> 13:01.410]  I guess they were looking for whiskey or something.
[13:01.490 --> 13:01.970]  I don't know.
[13:04.210 --> 13:06.610]  But what happened was they found the brain machine.
[13:06.750 --> 13:08.290]  Because it's sitting there and, you know, I have nothing to hide.
[13:08.430 --> 13:09.210]  It's nothing dangerous.
[13:09.770 --> 13:11.450]  They didn't like it at all.
[13:11.890 --> 13:12.810]  They saw wires.
[13:12.970 --> 13:13.590]  They saw a chip.
[13:13.750 --> 13:14.650]  And that scared them.
[13:17.630 --> 13:19.810]  So suddenly I was in a bit of hot water.
[13:19.950 --> 13:20.970]  They were asking me, what is this?
[13:21.050 --> 13:24.230]  And I was explaining, well, it blinks these LEDs and it makes some audio.
[13:24.490 --> 13:26.490]  And, you know, it's just, that's all it does.
[13:27.550 --> 13:28.970]  And so they said, oh, hang on.
[13:29.050 --> 13:29.170]  Okay.
[13:29.290 --> 13:30.450]  So they took it into the back room.
[13:30.590 --> 13:31.730]  They start calling people.
[13:31.850 --> 13:32.910]  They're calling supervisors.
[13:32.970 --> 13:35.350]  They're calling all sorts of people.
[13:35.670 --> 13:40.350]  I'm sitting there waiting for this to blow over and then say, yeah, okay, it doesn't have any explosives or anything in it.
[13:40.410 --> 13:41.370]  So sure, here you go.
[13:41.370 --> 13:43.150]  So, but they call me to the back room.
[13:43.270 --> 13:44.250]  They ask to see my passport.
[13:44.430 --> 13:45.550]  They're like running my passport.
[13:45.550 --> 13:46.910]  They're looking at my boarding pass.
[13:47.070 --> 13:50.450]  They're asking me, you know, what I'm doing, where I got this and all that.
[13:50.730 --> 13:57.470]  And I'm actually in the back room when finally the, I guess the supervisor at the time calls there, as she called it, a risk assessor.
[13:58.670 --> 13:59.590]  What's a risk assessor?
[13:59.630 --> 14:00.210]  I don't know.
[14:00.310 --> 14:01.390]  She called somebody on the phone.
[14:01.530 --> 14:02.670]  Oh, she called a risk assessor.
[14:02.670 --> 14:03.730]  Yeah, I'm sorry.
[14:03.810 --> 14:08.970]  She called on the phone the risk assessor for, I guess, the airport or the airport management company or something.
[14:10.850 --> 14:15.530]  And after she got off the phone, she told me, okay, well, you can get on the plane, but this is staying here.
[14:16.010 --> 14:17.410]  They wanted to play with it or?
[14:17.570 --> 14:23.570]  Well, they didn't want to let me take it on the plane, at which point I started to get upset, let's say.
[14:23.750 --> 14:25.390]  I didn't, you know, throw too much of a...
[14:25.390 --> 14:26.450]  Did you turn American on them?
[14:26.750 --> 14:29.070]  Well, you know, it sometimes solves problems.
[14:29.470 --> 14:32.630]  But anyway, so I started to argue my case.
[14:32.710 --> 14:33.550]  You know, it's not dangerous.
[14:33.570 --> 14:34.370]  I've told you this.
[14:34.410 --> 14:35.370]  I've told you how it works.
[14:35.550 --> 14:37.050]  I've, you know, they wouldn't let me turn it on.
[14:37.270 --> 14:42.150]  There was no way they were going to let me turn it on because I don't know what it would do, cause the lights to go off or something.
[14:42.230 --> 14:42.690]  I have no idea.
[14:44.550 --> 14:46.150]  So I couldn't show them how it worked.
[14:46.170 --> 14:46.790]  I couldn't do anything.
[14:46.990 --> 14:47.630]  My hands were tied.
[14:47.770 --> 14:49.810]  They'd also, in the meantime, called the police.
[14:50.750 --> 14:51.790]  They have police on that island.
[14:51.790 --> 14:52.750]  They have at least one.
[14:52.850 --> 14:53.250]  How many...
[14:59.570 --> 15:01.010]  Mostly for tourism purposes.
[15:01.330 --> 15:01.690]  All right.
[15:02.150 --> 15:04.490]  Actually, the distilleries don't employ that many people anymore.
[15:04.710 --> 15:04.950]  Uh-huh.
[15:05.990 --> 15:09.270]  And so the police came and they took, you know, my name and...
[15:09.270 --> 15:11.770]  Oh, also June, I told them to get on the plane.
[15:11.970 --> 15:13.110]  I said, you might want to get on the plane.
[15:13.210 --> 15:14.870]  They said, well, I don't want it to leave without you.
[15:14.950 --> 15:15.870]  So I'll wait with you.
[15:16.310 --> 15:21.150]  And once they realized that he was waiting for me, then he was in hot water too, cause he was associated with me.
[15:21.410 --> 15:21.650]  Uh-huh.
[15:21.650 --> 15:34.250]  So the police came, they interviewed us, they pulled all of our luggage off the plane to hand search, which was annoying because it was all tightly packed into a backpack, which then I had to pack again when I finally got it back.
[15:35.790 --> 15:37.870]  And the security staff kept apologizing.
[15:37.870 --> 15:41.470]  They said, we realize that it's not dangerous, but, you know, we have policies.
[15:41.870 --> 15:42.190]  Uh-huh.
[15:42.390 --> 15:47.330]  And this was literally, what, the day or the day after they released the Lockerbie bomber.
[15:47.370 --> 15:47.910]  This is true.
[15:48.050 --> 15:49.910]  So that certainly couldn't have helped.
[15:49.910 --> 15:52.830]  Um, but anyway, you know, they ended up confiscating...
[15:52.830 --> 15:53.970]  What policies would these be?
[15:54.570 --> 15:57.430]  The policy that anything homemade is clearly dangerous.
[15:57.710 --> 16:00.470]  Anything with a blinking light is clearly blinking lights.
[16:00.670 --> 16:04.230]  Well, you know, we have a thing about blinking lights at these hacker conferences, so...
[16:04.230 --> 16:06.450]  They didn't even see the blinking lights, cause they wouldn't let me turn it on.
[16:06.670 --> 16:14.830]  But, um, but I did, I did explain to the policeman how to use it for after I left when he would then be in possession of it, cause I didn't want it to go to waste.
[16:14.830 --> 16:17.610]  So I gave him detailed instructions on, on how to operate it.
[16:17.970 --> 16:19.870]  Um, but, uh, yeah.
[16:19.990 --> 16:21.590]  So they confiscated it and they let me on the plane.
[16:21.730 --> 16:23.190]  They delayed the plane, the flight.
[16:23.330 --> 16:27.130]  They, they held the flight, which was nice, cause otherwise I would have, wouldn't have been able to get out till the next day.
[16:27.610 --> 16:29.130]  Um, but they delayed it 40 minutes.
[16:29.290 --> 16:29.470]  Wow.
[16:29.570 --> 16:30.710]  Uh, it was a 25 minute flight.
[16:31.290 --> 16:34.410]  So, uh, the passengers weren't really happy about that.
[16:34.550 --> 16:35.810]  But, uh, I don't think they blamed us.
[16:35.990 --> 16:38.690]  They applauded when we got on the plane, I guess cause they were happy to finally leave.
[16:38.830 --> 16:40.090]  Wait, what made them applaud?
[16:40.410 --> 16:41.950]  That they were happy to finally leave.
[16:41.950 --> 16:43.490]  Just to see you or did they know what happened?
[16:43.610 --> 16:49.010]  Well, no, they asked us what it was and we said, we told them, we basically repeated, uh, suspicious electronic devices.
[16:49.150 --> 16:50.590]  And I heard someone say, oh, don't say that.
[16:51.970 --> 16:53.170]  Uh, but yeah.
[16:53.170 --> 16:53.430]  Wow.
[16:53.650 --> 16:54.610]  So it was...
[16:54.610 --> 16:54.950]  All right.
[16:55.010 --> 16:56.130]  So you're going to try to get this back?
[16:56.350 --> 16:56.610]  Uh, yeah.
[16:56.610 --> 16:57.330]  I'm going to write a letter.
[16:57.530 --> 17:00.930]  Uh, I have the contact information now of the airport, uh, manager.
[17:01.190 --> 17:04.050]  Um, so I'm going to write a letter demanding the return of my property.
[17:04.330 --> 17:06.910]  Yeah, you should definitely write a letter cause this is totally absurd.
[17:07.730 --> 17:11.710]  I've been traveling with more than just brain machines and everything's homemade.
[17:12.070 --> 17:13.150]  I've never had any trouble.
[17:13.310 --> 17:15.170]  Of course, I've never gone through Logan in Boston.
[17:15.370 --> 17:22.630]  Well, I think that the difference, at least with this airport, is that in the major airports, they pass it through to the x-ray and if they don't see any explosives, then it's probably fine.
[17:22.770 --> 17:23.650]  Like, it's not going to do anything.
[17:23.830 --> 17:29.250]  But in this airport, because they have the time, they searched our bags by hand just for no reason.
[17:29.370 --> 17:31.690]  And so that's why they found this suspicious device.
[17:32.070 --> 17:36.130]  Despite the fact that after x-raying it repeatedly, they didn't find anything dangerous in it.
[17:36.310 --> 17:42.570]  Well, did they have, did they have, um, you know, because I know they now have all those various things that they use where they swab your bag and stuff like that.
[17:42.650 --> 17:43.450]  Did they not have those?
[17:43.530 --> 17:44.550]  No, they didn't have that.
[17:44.630 --> 17:46.030]  Because that might have been, that might have been another reason.
[17:46.130 --> 17:50.210]  Like, they didn't have the additional resources that, you know, other airports have nowadays to do those things.
[17:50.370 --> 17:52.590]  So too much of the wrong resources, you're saying?
[17:52.950 --> 17:53.070]  Hmm.
[17:53.590 --> 17:53.830]  Maybe.
[17:53.830 --> 17:54.830]  The people instead of the machine.
[17:54.890 --> 17:54.890]  Interesting.
[17:54.890 --> 17:55.010]  Rob.
[17:55.010 --> 17:57.610]  So you're saying your brain machine did not have explosives in it?
[17:57.630 --> 17:59.490]  I mean, did you forget that step when you were building it?
[17:59.650 --> 18:00.870]  I forgot to add them.
[18:01.010 --> 18:02.450]  That was my favorite part of building mine.
[18:02.510 --> 18:03.550]  They also, oh, this was good.
[18:03.670 --> 18:07.630]  My, I had my DECT phone still in my carry-on, but the battery had long since died.
[18:07.950 --> 18:10.030]  DECT phone being the phones that were used at the conference.
[18:10.210 --> 18:10.350]  Right.
[18:10.530 --> 18:13.410]  The, the, it's basically just a, you know, the normal wireless handset.
[18:14.130 --> 18:16.610]  Um, and so, uh, but it wouldn't turn on.
[18:16.750 --> 18:19.370]  And that was a clear indicator that it must also be dangerous.
[18:19.590 --> 18:22.150]  So they asked me if, uh, it had batteries in it.
[18:22.230 --> 18:23.290]  Um, and I said yes.
[18:23.290 --> 18:25.950]  And I went to open the battery cover and they did not like that.
[18:26.270 --> 18:29.810]  Uh, uh, so then they x-rayed that too, just to make sure.
[18:30.190 --> 18:33.010]  Um, well, you provided them with more excitement than they've seen in years, I'll bet.
[18:33.650 --> 18:33.930]  Over there.
[18:34.590 --> 18:34.910]  Wow.
[18:35.050 --> 18:37.870]  But Mitch, yeah, you travel around with all kinds of things in your bags.
[18:38.010 --> 18:43.090]  I've, I've, I've seen the size of them and, uh, well, you must've been questioned at least once for some of the things that are in there.
[18:43.310 --> 18:47.110]  Uh, the only time I've ever been questioned is, uh, coming back into the U.S.
[18:47.290 --> 18:49.990]  through, uh, customs to see if it's dutiable.
[18:49.990 --> 18:50.590]  Mm-hmm.
[18:50.710 --> 19:00.350]  And, um, quite often I get that and the, um, the people look at it and they go, uh, this turns TVs off?
[19:00.750 --> 19:02.790]  And I go, uh, yeah.
[19:03.230 --> 19:05.130]  And that, that's, that's all it does.
[19:05.270 --> 19:07.370]  And then they usually just smile and then wave me by.
[19:07.510 --> 19:09.390]  Well, it's a TV becones, but have brain machines.
[19:09.570 --> 19:10.090]  Do they ever look at?
[19:10.110 --> 19:11.770]  Yeah, brain machines I don't, they don't even blink at.
[19:11.910 --> 19:12.290]  Interesting.
[19:12.290 --> 19:23.390]  Yeah, so I've, I've never had any trouble at all, um, the only trouble I've ever had through customs, and I go through customs, uh, and border, um, uh, control a lot, is going into the U.K.
[19:23.390 --> 19:31.210]  I had to sign a receipt stating that I'm an artist, because evidently an artist can demonstrate their art, uh, without needing a work permit.
[19:31.370 --> 19:32.950]  So I'm officially an artist in the U.K.
[19:33.050 --> 19:33.150]  now.
[19:33.290 --> 19:34.070]  Well, good for you.
[19:34.210 --> 19:34.750]  How about that?
[19:35.290 --> 19:45.550]  The, the one good, fun thing about it, though, was with the police and with the airport staff, I got to joke a lot, well, the policeman said, no, okay, well, you, you can't take it on the plane, because, you know, we don't, you know, it's probably not dangerous,
[19:45.690 --> 19:46.810]  but we don't want the plane to go down.
[19:46.890 --> 19:48.930]  And I said, I don't want the plane to go down either, I'll miss my flight.
[19:51.790 --> 19:52.350]  Ah, boy.
[19:52.550 --> 19:54.170]  Wow, fun with airport security.
[19:54.930 --> 19:55.490]  Never ends.
[19:55.550 --> 19:55.890]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[19:56.630 --> 20:09.810]  I, I was, uh, joking with Mitch about this earlier, and we should probably explain to our listeners who don't know what a brain machine is, it's a, it's a, it's an invention by, uh, Mitch, who's with us tonight, of, it's, it's a pair of clear plastic goggles with a,
[20:09.810 --> 20:22.270]  a, a red LED positioned right at the center of each lens, and there's a tiny little circuit board with a chip on it and a few other passive electronic components, uh, and a battery pack and a switch.
[20:23.090 --> 20:43.190]  Um, and as you pointed out, Emmanuel, um, uh, this all happened, like, one day after Scotland released the alleged, uh, Pan Am 103 bomber who, I don't know, like 20 years ago or something, was, uh, alleged, uh, put a, uh, um, a Toshiba boombox, uh, that had,
[20:43.230 --> 20:49.210]  uh, a special chip, um, special timer chip and a bomb in it which brought down the plane over the British Isles.
[20:49.370 --> 20:56.150]  So, because this was all the news, I'd be there probably in a heightened alert looking for chips and wires and things like that.
[20:56.230 --> 21:11.290]  But I suggested to, to Mitch, Mitch, why don't you create a really cool-looking official certificate for all brain machine carriers to, uh, carry with them so when they go through, uh, various airport security like this, they can present this official-looking certificate.
[21:11.630 --> 21:17.010]  Uh, if anything, it would be amusing to watch the security people have to read this thing and, and puzzle over it.
[21:17.050 --> 21:18.350]  And what about that, Mitch?
[21:18.410 --> 21:22.410]  You think you could have some fun putting that together and having people present it to officials?
[21:22.750 --> 21:24.810]  Yeah, yeah, I, I think that that's a good idea.
[21:25.110 --> 21:37.690]  Uh, everyone says that these people have no sense of humor and, uh, they, they really do at, uh, PlumberCon which is a small hacker conference that, uh, a bunch of us went to before HAR, the weekend before.
[21:37.910 --> 21:38.350]  In Vienna.
[21:38.670 --> 21:39.450]  Yeah, in Vienna.
[21:39.670 --> 21:49.910]  It was really wonderful, 150 people, uh, everyone did everything together and, um, yeah, it was a really cool bonding experience for all of us, uh, as well as learning a lot from each other.
[21:50.090 --> 21:55.670]  But, um, uh, Babak, who is an incredible teacher for lockpicking was there.
[21:55.930 --> 22:09.090]  And he brought along this really cool teaching device which was a locked box that has a locked box in it that has a locked box in it that's smaller, a smaller one in that, and a smaller one in that, and a smaller one in that, and each one along the way is locked.
[22:09.490 --> 22:15.010]  And, uh, if you can pick your way through the whole thing, then you get this little teeny thing in the middle.
[22:15.270 --> 22:22.990]  But, um, he had, uh, this in his suitcase with a whole bunch of keys so that the TSA people could look inside.
[22:24.190 --> 22:29.730]  And so when he got to Vienna, he opened the whole thing and he opened up the box and the smaller box, smaller box, etc.
[22:30.050 --> 22:36.230]  And inside was folded up in like sixteenths, one of those TSA letters saying that they inspected it.
[22:39.170 --> 22:45.750]  Oh, I was thinking about the whole official looking document for things like brain machines.
[22:45.930 --> 22:50.210]  You should use the biggest words possible known to legalese.
[22:50.210 --> 22:52.890]  See, you know, see how much you can screw with these people.
[22:53.550 --> 23:02.610]  You know, it'd just be kind of fun just saying, stating officially that this is not a dangerous device with maybe the curly Q kind of certificate things on the border.
[23:02.970 --> 23:03.810]  Give it a hologram.
[23:04.570 --> 23:05.590]  Holograms make it official.
[23:05.850 --> 23:06.610]  Give it a hologram.
[23:06.830 --> 23:08.150]  Yeah, that makes it hard to counterfeit.
[23:08.510 --> 23:09.810]  And the New York State bird...
[23:09.810 --> 23:10.270]  Sorry, go ahead.
[23:10.550 --> 23:12.450]  The New York State bird underneath is a graphic.
[23:13.970 --> 23:14.570]  All right.
[23:14.790 --> 23:18.170]  By the way, we mentioned that some of our listeners know what brain machines are.
[23:18.170 --> 23:22.530]  And certainly those of you who pledged for brain machines back at the beginning of the year, you know what they are.
[23:22.870 --> 23:24.410]  And you might be wondering where they are.
[23:24.530 --> 23:25.530]  They're on their way now.
[23:25.730 --> 23:30.190]  I believe, Mitch, they've arrived on that boat from China and they're about to be shipped out.
[23:30.350 --> 23:30.850]  Yeah, yeah.
[23:30.950 --> 23:32.330]  Thanks, everyone, for your patience.
[23:33.110 --> 23:34.570]  Manufacturing often has delays.
[23:34.570 --> 23:35.930]  In fact, almost always.
[23:36.270 --> 23:40.190]  And, you know, I tried to stress that I didn't know when these were going to be done.
[23:40.190 --> 23:48.310]  But you, faithful listeners, are the first people in the world who will be having actual, real, live, manufactured brain machines called trip glasses.
[23:48.770 --> 23:53.410]  They arrived at our warehouse just days ago and they'll be off to you soon.
[23:53.570 --> 24:00.010]  And also, those of you who pledged during the fundraiser back in May, we're processing you as well.
[24:00.010 --> 24:07.230]  And, of course, the fundraisers that we had over the last three weeks in August, we're going to get to you as well.
[24:07.230 --> 24:09.470]  Thanks, everybody, for calling in, for making it such a success.
[24:09.470 --> 24:10.530]  We did very well last week.
[24:10.650 --> 24:12.030]  We did well all three weeks, in fact.
[24:12.190 --> 24:13.030]  And that's incredible.
[24:14.310 --> 24:14.830]  All right.
[24:15.330 --> 24:18.070]  We're going to take phone calls a little bit later on because we haven't done that in a while.
[24:18.090 --> 24:20.430]  But we have some stories we'd like to get into.
[24:20.850 --> 24:30.030]  Speaking of airports, you guys remember the Fast Pass company that went out of business and had all this information of travelers?
[24:30.870 --> 24:31.450]  What was it?
[24:32.250 --> 24:34.510]  Verified Identity Pass, Inc., known as VIP.
[24:35.430 --> 24:51.490]  While a federal judge has issued an order banning the operator of that now-defunct registered air traveler program from selling any of the highly personal data it collected on tens of thousands of people who signed up for the program, the order enjoins VIP of New York from selling,
[24:51.650 --> 25:00.690]  transferring, or disclosing to any third party the data it collected while operating the clear service, which was designed to help air travelers get through airport security checks faster.
[25:00.690 --> 25:03.730]  The service is one of seven approved by the TSA.
[25:03.950 --> 25:11.730]  It had been available at 21 major airports, including JFK and LaGuardia here in New York, Boston's Logan, and Atlanta's Hartfield-Jackson Airport.
[25:11.970 --> 25:14.430]  Do they have to destroy the data or they just can't sell it?
[25:14.830 --> 25:16.430]  Well, that's a good program.
[25:16.670 --> 25:17.270]  A good question.
[25:17.370 --> 25:23.030]  The decision says that they have to just not sell the information.
[25:23.910 --> 25:26.910]  I don't think it says anything about destroying it, though, which is interesting.
[25:27.070 --> 25:28.530]  You'd think that they would have to do that.
[25:28.890 --> 25:35.510]  But basically, they have social security numbers, biometric identifiers like fingerprints, iris scans, things like that.
[25:36.270 --> 25:37.310]  A lot of information.
[25:37.350 --> 25:37.710]  Yes, Bernie?
[25:38.410 --> 25:50.110]  I wanted to point out that this company had clearly put in its terms of service a provision that said that they would not sell or transfer this information to any third parties under any circumstances.
[25:50.110 --> 25:59.410]  So they were apparently trying to do so when they were looking for a buyer for the remnants of their bankrupt company.
[25:59.550 --> 26:04.930]  And that's when this judge said, no, you can't do that because you promised to in your terms of service.
[26:05.130 --> 26:15.570]  This is one of those rare cases where terms of service actually was in favor of the consumer and enforced by a judge as opposed to the other way around.
[26:17.630 --> 26:20.390]  The judge told them that they can't sell off this information.
[26:20.390 --> 26:22.810]  So does that mean they can't raffle it off?
[26:23.910 --> 26:24.950]  They said they cannot.
[26:25.170 --> 26:29.650]  Not only can they not sell it, but they said they cannot transfer it to any third party.
[26:29.770 --> 26:30.110]  Okay.
[26:30.750 --> 26:31.470]  That's interesting.
[26:32.450 --> 26:34.790]  Yeah, that's how some people get away with things.
[26:34.930 --> 26:36.470]  They don't sell.
[26:36.570 --> 26:37.430]  They just give away.
[26:37.490 --> 26:48.510]  Speaking of information that was kind of weird, when I was traveling, when I was in Heathrow, and I don't know how many of you have been through Heathrow, but I experienced this weird thing where they take your picture and then they check it later.
[26:48.630 --> 26:49.570]  Did anyone have to do this?
[26:49.690 --> 26:51.390]  They take your picture and they check it later?
[26:51.510 --> 26:52.490]  I went through this thing.
[26:52.590 --> 26:53.870]  It was biometric security.
[26:53.930 --> 26:54.250]  Okay.
[26:54.330 --> 26:56.250]  And all it was was they took a picture of your face.
[26:56.370 --> 27:03.670]  And it did say on the side that they destroy it within 24 hours, any data collected, and it's anonymous, which is true because all they did was take a picture of me.
[27:03.910 --> 27:07.230]  They gave me a sticker, which they stuck on my passport.
[27:08.470 --> 27:08.790]  Really?
[27:08.790 --> 27:09.210]  That's all they did.
[27:09.310 --> 27:12.130]  They took a picture of me, stuck this barcode on my passport.
[27:12.270 --> 27:12.550]  Uh-huh.
[27:12.690 --> 27:24.630]  And then later, I guess when I was going back into the terminal or something, I didn't leave the terminal, but when I was going to my flight or to the departure gates or something, they then scanned that barcode, looked at the picture, and let me through.
[27:24.770 --> 27:32.070]  But what I didn't understand was what difference was them taking a picture of me and then me presenting this barcode and them checking the picture than me just having my passport the whole time.
[27:32.070 --> 27:38.970]  Apparently, there must have been some kind of opportunity for you to swap yourself out with somebody else in that time period, and they wanted to see if you were the same person?
[27:39.090 --> 27:39.710]  I guess.
[27:39.850 --> 27:48.690]  I mean, but that doesn't make any sense, because if they have a passport with my face or their face and my name on it anyway, then it doesn't really matter, does it?
[27:48.770 --> 27:54.410]  I mean, they could just present themselves as me to the biometrics checkpoint and then go through.
[27:54.650 --> 27:57.690]  And normally, they would tie it to the ticket.
[27:58.310 --> 28:01.230]  They wanted to scan our boarding pass, but our boarding passes didn't scan.
[28:01.650 --> 28:03.310]  So, they gave us a sticker instead.
[28:03.310 --> 28:04.250]  I didn't understand it at all.
[28:04.290 --> 28:08.510]  I think we've established by now that the British just like pictures.
[28:08.710 --> 28:09.810]  They like to have lots of pictures.
[28:10.050 --> 28:14.990]  This is why they also have so many closed-circuit cameras that they're struggling with right now.
[28:16.350 --> 28:24.690]  But unlike the U.S., which collects all this information on people coming in and then keeps it, they supposedly, or at least they promised, to destroy it within 24 hours.
[28:24.810 --> 28:26.490]  And it was only a picture.
[28:26.490 --> 28:29.870]  Well, they don't destroy the CCTV footage.
[28:29.930 --> 28:31.330]  They keep that for quite a while.
[28:31.790 --> 28:42.930]  In fact, there was a story that came out this week saying that, and this is not surprising to any of us or anyone who listens to us, that, what is it, one in 1,000 CCTV images or cameras helps to solve a crime.
[28:43.030 --> 28:43.990]  Does anybody have the exact figure?
[28:44.190 --> 28:45.450]  I believe that's what it was.
[28:45.690 --> 28:45.810]  Yeah.
[28:46.250 --> 28:47.730]  And is anybody surprised by this?
[28:47.850 --> 28:48.070]  No.
[28:48.230 --> 28:48.390]  No.
[28:48.750 --> 28:48.950]  No?
[28:48.950 --> 29:01.230]  I mean, there was that study done in Britain as well that said, basically, if you have a closed-circuit camera monitoring an area, basically all that happens is the crime that's in that area moves maybe, you know, 50 yards outside of the radius of the camera itself.
[29:02.270 --> 29:19.550]  Now, I feel I need to point out right now, a lot of people are probably using this to say that the CCTVs don't need to be around, that they don't serve any valid purpose, but there is also the argument that if one in 1,000 cameras will prevent a crime,
[29:19.570 --> 29:24.910]  or for every 1,000 cameras, one crime is prevented, that that's worth it.
[29:25.390 --> 29:28.450]  That if you, say, have a million cameras, you're preventing 1,000 crimes.
[29:28.470 --> 29:30.570]  So we need more cameras to prevent more crimes.
[29:30.890 --> 29:32.190]  That's actually the logic.
[29:32.210 --> 29:35.730]  That's actually the logic that a lot of people have, especially overseas in the UK.
[29:35.730 --> 29:41.490]  Well, I think the real point of the study, which people are overlooking, is that none of that one in 1,000 is able to help solve a crime.
[29:41.650 --> 29:56.050]  It's that it's the cost of the CCTV cameras and the chance of them being able to solve a crime is a lot lower than, or a lot higher than per crime cell than, like, putting more cops in the street or helping with social equality and stuff like that.
[29:56.110 --> 29:57.690]  Also, isn't the inverse really true?
[29:57.770 --> 30:05.010]  That the more cameras you have, the more data you have to sift through, and the less that you actually care about it anymore or look carefully at it.
[30:06.110 --> 30:18.870]  Now, the argument about cost, you know, again, you could have the reverse argument saying, well, how much is too much to solve a crime to bring, to give somebody justice that was some crime against them?
[30:18.870 --> 30:29.590]  If you have $10,000 to spend, you can spend it by buying, by putting, like, 10 cops in the street and saving 100 lives, or you can spend it by putting 100 CCTV cameras and saving one life or something like that.
[30:29.830 --> 30:34.410]  I'm curious for the figures of how many crimes are prevented by putting 1,000 extra cops on the street.
[30:34.410 --> 30:35.890]  That would be an interesting comparison.
[30:36.170 --> 30:38.050]  Well, I'm not saying that cops, per se, are better.
[30:38.730 --> 30:39.190]  I'm not either.
[30:39.370 --> 30:40.830]  I'm saying I'd like to see the study.
[30:41.090 --> 30:44.550]  All I know is it doesn't seem to affect crime in the UK at all.
[30:44.670 --> 30:47.270]  There's a lot of crime going on, on camera, off camera.
[30:47.370 --> 30:48.570]  It doesn't seem to really have any effect.
[30:48.670 --> 30:52.430]  One thing, though, we did have fun with occasionally when we were in London, Voltaire.
[30:52.990 --> 30:56.970]  We were with a friend of ours, and I would just stop occasionally and say, find the camera.
[30:57.250 --> 30:59.230]  Am I on camera right now at this particular moment?
[30:59.330 --> 31:00.790]  And I think I was almost every single time.
[31:00.890 --> 31:01.530]  There was one time...
[31:01.530 --> 31:01.870]  The park.
[31:02.030 --> 31:02.530]  In the park.
[31:02.670 --> 31:03.390]  We were in the middle of a park.
[31:03.510 --> 31:04.490]  We couldn't find the camera there.
[31:04.690 --> 31:05.690]  In front of Westminster.
[31:05.970 --> 31:06.070]  Yeah.
[31:06.310 --> 31:11.190]  Do we know if these cameras have infrared filters or if they're just foiled by putting some IR LEDs under a baseball cap?
[31:11.290 --> 31:12.370]  We don't really know that yet.
[31:12.370 --> 31:16.870]  I do the same thing that you were just talking about in New York.
[31:17.110 --> 31:19.850]  Well, you won't find nearly as much success as in London.
[31:20.010 --> 31:21.730]  I mean, upstate on the highways.
[31:21.990 --> 31:24.990]  I'll do a random thing of saying, okay, where's the camera?
[31:25.030 --> 31:32.330]  I'll look on the back of the billboard signs, and a lot of times I'll see a camera looking at me.
[31:32.470 --> 31:37.670]  Well, if you really want to practice this in the States, your best bets are two places, Las Vegas and Atlantic City.
[31:38.110 --> 31:43.590]  Anywhere in those two cities, you will be on camera at all times because there's casinos everywhere, and they always want to know where people are.
[31:44.110 --> 31:45.550]  And I guarantee if you walk around...
[31:45.550 --> 31:48.110]  I noticed this over 10 years ago in Las Vegas.
[31:48.270 --> 31:54.690]  As soon as you go out of eyesight of one camera, another one takes over, and you're never out of their view.
[31:55.450 --> 31:57.590]  Shopping malls are also a great place to practice.
[31:57.590 --> 31:58.730]  That's another place to practice.
[31:58.730 --> 32:00.550]  You know, there are a lot of cameras in Manhattan, too, though.
[32:00.630 --> 32:10.130]  And I remember a few years ago, we covered a website, and I don't know if it's defunct or not, but that basically, if you punched in a from address and a to address, it would tell you how to walk to get from A to B.
[32:10.130 --> 32:11.190]  Those cameras are not into length.
[32:11.250 --> 32:13.510]  A lot of them are private cameras run by companies.
[32:13.710 --> 32:16.690]  But the ones in London, they're pretty much all city-run.
[32:16.850 --> 32:19.090]  I mean, they have private ones as well, but there are just so many.
[32:19.330 --> 32:19.970]  But you can still play the game.
[32:20.070 --> 32:20.930]  You can still play the game.
[32:21.050 --> 32:21.450]  Yeah, yeah.
[32:21.530 --> 32:23.030]  But they're playing the game.
[32:23.150 --> 32:24.430]  The authorities are playing the game over there.
[32:25.130 --> 32:26.530]  Yeah, I get...
[32:26.530 --> 32:28.050]  You know, excuse me.
[32:28.050 --> 32:30.610]  I'm pretty good with infrared because of TVBGone.
[32:30.850 --> 32:34.410]  And these people email me things that are mildly related.
[32:34.410 --> 32:44.310]  I've gotten several emails from anarchist types in London who put infrared LEDs blinking at TVBGone rates.
[32:44.310 --> 32:54.690]  They hack a TVBGone, and they have a lot of infrared LEDs around their hoodie, and they claim that that keeps it, these CCTV cameras, from being able to see their faces.
[32:54.970 --> 32:56.950]  Well, that's good to have these little creative projects.
[32:57.450 --> 32:59.690]  Could you do that with a necklace or something?
[33:00.670 --> 33:02.630]  I think you have to have it somewhat...
[33:02.630 --> 33:03.930]  Well, it probably would work with a necklace.
[33:04.050 --> 33:04.530]  Or an earring?
[33:04.870 --> 33:06.190]  If you're worried about...
[33:06.190 --> 33:06.370]  Nose ring.
[33:07.250 --> 33:08.890]  These are the projects we need to focus on.
[33:08.930 --> 33:12.310]  Yeah, software that's facial recognition can be fooled rather easily.
[33:12.330 --> 33:16.070]  If you smile, evidently it fools the software as well.
[33:16.110 --> 33:17.210]  Oh, so we must smile more often.
[33:17.210 --> 33:17.990]  Yeah, you should be more happy.
[33:18.130 --> 33:24.370]  Those hoodies loaded with LEDs, that must be fun for whoever has to watch the footage because they see a hoodie and then blinking lights where the face should be.
[33:24.450 --> 33:25.210]  It's like we're being invaded.
[33:26.670 --> 33:32.530]  Actually, they were playing with some face recognition software at my job, a little while ago at our sort of little digital skunk works that we have.
[33:33.450 --> 33:34.990]  And I think Rob stopped through.
[33:35.110 --> 33:37.610]  Well, actually, all of you guys stopped through while they were doing this.
[33:37.810 --> 33:40.570]  And the fun thing is, you know, you can...
[33:40.970 --> 33:42.890]  It's okay at figuring out if you're smiling.
[33:42.890 --> 33:45.250]  It's kind of okay at figuring out if you're sad.
[33:45.250 --> 33:47.010]  It wasn't great at figuring out if you were angry.
[33:47.610 --> 33:50.710]  But you could fool it generally by just taking a bunch of stickers.
[33:50.810 --> 33:53.990]  We have like those little brown dot stickers that you just have for labels or whatever in an office.
[33:54.150 --> 33:56.510]  And I made a little smile on my face and I thought I was smiling.
[33:56.510 --> 34:00.470]  If you made yourself really serious eyebrows, it would be like... it would think you were angry.
[34:00.630 --> 34:06.050]  So there are some very, very simple, you know, physical ways to do this in addition to having gadgets that do it.
[34:06.570 --> 34:06.890]  Emmanuel?
[34:07.010 --> 34:07.450]  Yes, go ahead, Bernie.
[34:08.290 --> 34:15.250]  One of the issues raised by this story that all these closed-circuit TV cameras in the U.K.
[34:15.630 --> 34:32.570]  result in solving one crime per 1,000 cameras, which was documented, is that the story going on the news seems to be more outraged about the expense of this, which works out to reportedly about 20,000 pounds, which is what?
[34:33.070 --> 34:35.590]  About, what, about 30,000, 25,000, 30,000 dollars?
[34:35.830 --> 34:36.570]  What would that work out to you?
[34:36.570 --> 34:37.870]  About 35,000, I'd say.
[34:38.030 --> 34:38.490]  Probably about that.
[34:38.990 --> 34:40.610]  35,000 pounds per camera.
[34:40.610 --> 34:41.630]  About 35,000 dollars.
[34:42.330 --> 34:50.710]  Yeah, and if that money would be better spent, as someone just pointed out, on having cops on the street, or coppers, as they call them there.
[34:50.710 --> 34:54.110]  But the issue in the news in the U.K.
[34:54.190 --> 35:03.910]  seems to be, why are we wasting all this money on these things, as opposed to the civil liberty and privacy violations that all these cameras cause?
[35:03.910 --> 35:11.630]  So it seems to be that maybe the public is more concerned about the waste of their tax dollars than about their privacy and civil liberties.
[35:11.790 --> 35:15.710]  But whatever works in making less cameras, I'm happy with.
[35:15.710 --> 35:28.290]  But I just think it's ironic that people are more concerned about how their tax dollars are spent on all these cameras than their own privacy or the preservation of their civil liberties.
[35:28.630 --> 35:38.070]  Well, I think it's pretty well ingrained into British society that there to speak cameras and voices talking to you from all kinds of hidden places.
[35:38.410 --> 35:39.050]  I don't know.
[35:39.110 --> 35:41.550]  This is something that I've noticed for decades over there.
[35:41.610 --> 35:44.490]  I'm not sure it's something that's going to be easily wiped away anytime soon.
[35:44.490 --> 35:46.330]  I think it's something that's more or less expected.
[35:46.890 --> 35:58.230]  But staying on the subject of England for a moment, this is a rather humorous story that I saw concerning ATMs and some humor that was injected onto ATMs and the reaction.
[35:58.690 --> 36:03.890]  Young people laughed when the ATM asked them if they required some moolah for your skyrocket.
[36:04.390 --> 36:13.630]  The machine in Spitalfields was one of five Cockney cash dispensers from East London to Barnett that began dispensing moolah yesterday morning.
[36:13.850 --> 36:15.150]  This was actually a couple of days ago.
[36:15.790 --> 36:23.850]  Bank machine, which runs 2,500 ATMs across the country and really has a pretty good name for their company, was aiming to amuse, but it has grander ambitions too.
[36:23.930 --> 36:26.230]  It hopes to follow the Cockney cash machines with...
[36:26.230 --> 36:27.410]  I don't even know what these are.
[36:27.770 --> 36:31.410]  Broomie, Geordie, Scouse, and Scots ATMs.
[36:31.490 --> 36:32.610]  I can guess what the last one might be.
[36:32.950 --> 36:36.950]  It hopes that ATMs will serve to keep these dialects alive in Britain.
[36:36.950 --> 36:40.470]  Again, responses to the initiative varied.
[36:40.990 --> 36:48.030]  In Spitalfields, Caroline Smith, a brand consultant from West London, said the machine had, quote unquote, made my day.
[36:48.470 --> 36:53.270]  But John Strachan, an IT worker from Dundee, found the experience troubling.
[36:53.270 --> 36:56.570]  When it offered to serve him in English or Cockney, he suspected a hoax.
[36:56.690 --> 36:57.590]  He selected Cockney.
[36:58.310 --> 37:01.570]  Reading your bladder of lard, read the message on the screen.
[37:01.570 --> 37:04.090]  It asked for his huckleberry fin.
[37:05.590 --> 37:07.750]  Then more bewildering questions.
[37:07.990 --> 37:11.950]  Did he want to see his balance on the Charlie Sheen?
[37:12.230 --> 37:16.490]  Did he wish to change his huckleberry fin?
[37:16.550 --> 37:19.990]  Or did he simply require sausage and mash with or without a receipt?
[37:20.750 --> 37:21.730]  I love England.
[37:21.910 --> 37:23.250]  After the concept was...
[37:23.250 --> 37:24.930]  This almost makes the cameras worthwhile.
[37:25.170 --> 37:29.170]  After the concept was explained to him, he was so indignant that he resorted to slang himself.
[37:29.170 --> 37:31.070]  It's complete pants, he said.
[37:31.170 --> 37:32.310]  I believe we've said that word before.
[37:33.070 --> 37:35.250]  Using an ATM is a very sensitive moment.
[37:38.930 --> 37:40.350]  I think I'll just leave it there.
[37:41.150 --> 37:43.370]  But yes, very sensitive moment.
[37:43.590 --> 37:46.290]  You know, have you ever seen humor on ATMs in America?
[37:46.510 --> 37:50.390]  The most humorous thing, I think, is when they refer to themselves in the first person.
[37:50.430 --> 37:51.110]  Can I help you?
[37:51.170 --> 37:52.290]  It's like, you know, you're an ATM.
[37:52.290 --> 37:53.110]  You're not a person.
[37:53.270 --> 37:54.650]  You don't have a sense of identity.
[37:55.430 --> 37:59.770]  Most of the best humor I've seen on American ATMs was squirreled on in marker, and I can't repeat it on the radio.
[37:59.890 --> 38:01.570]  But I like this idea.
[38:01.670 --> 38:02.290]  We need to bring this here.
[38:02.410 --> 38:04.050]  We need ATMs in, like, Brooklynese.
[38:04.490 --> 38:05.130]  I don't know.
[38:05.130 --> 38:05.490]  I don't know.
[38:05.550 --> 38:10.150]  I mean, I think the overall effect of this is going to be, like, and if you like Monty Python, you should look for this.
[38:10.270 --> 38:15.830]  The Armstrong and Miller RAF sketch, which is a comedy group in England, which is not well-known enough over here.
[38:15.950 --> 38:21.630]  They have this really, really funny sketch about a couple of Royal Air Force pilots during World War II where they're speaking in youth slang.
[38:21.690 --> 38:22.770]  And it's well worth looking up.
[38:22.870 --> 38:23.670]  It's Armstrong and Miller.
[38:23.810 --> 38:24.410]  Look for it on YouTube.
[38:24.890 --> 38:25.610]  All right.
[38:25.910 --> 38:26.770]  Some other stories.
[38:26.910 --> 38:28.050]  And we're going to take some phone calls.
[38:28.310 --> 38:33.050]  212-209-2900 is our phone number.
[38:33.190 --> 38:37.770]  This shouldn't be a surprise to anybody, but the story came out a little while ago.
[38:38.270 --> 38:45.710]  The nation's first secretary of Homeland Security alleges in a new book that two colleagues in the cabinet of former President George W.
[38:45.850 --> 39:04.530]  Bush pressed to raise the terror alert level ahead of the 2004 presidential election, suggesting they wanted to tip the voting scales in favor of their boss, Tom Ridge, the former Republican governor of Pennsylvania, says he refused to yield to the alleged wishes of then Attorney General John Ashcroft and then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld,
[39:04.610 --> 39:08.910]  and that his staff won the day by making its strong opposition clear to the White House.
[39:09.110 --> 39:10.530]  The alert was not raised.
[39:10.690 --> 39:14.450]  But I mean, is anybody really surprised that they wanted to do this to win the election, Walter?
[39:14.450 --> 39:15.050]  I don't know.
[39:15.110 --> 39:17.510]  This is something that, like, eternally disgusting.
[39:17.710 --> 39:22.830]  Like, it's something that I'd hear of claims about, like, especially on, like, BAI and lots of other leftist stations.
[39:23.010 --> 39:24.390]  I'd be like, oh, they're just being paranoid.
[39:24.890 --> 39:28.570]  And I'd think of it kind of playing the same light that we think of the birther movement.
[39:28.710 --> 39:30.450]  But then it turns out that this is completely true.
[39:30.610 --> 39:30.910]  It's like...
[39:30.910 --> 39:31.850]  Yeah, it comes out years later.
[39:32.090 --> 39:32.230]  Yeah.
[39:32.290 --> 39:33.430]  Yeah, that was true all along.
[39:34.350 --> 39:35.030]  They're politicians.
[39:35.230 --> 39:37.750]  Would you expect them not to try something like that?
[39:37.750 --> 39:37.750]  Yeah.
[39:38.070 --> 39:40.210]  Well, I mean, they're people in power.
[39:40.510 --> 39:48.870]  You sort of want to be able to trust them not to put everybody's life and safety at risk by, you know, playing with national security to win an election.
[39:48.910 --> 39:53.110]  You would hope that many people in positions of power would do the right thing.
[39:53.190 --> 39:54.130]  And I think many do.
[39:54.310 --> 39:58.810]  But there's still politicians, and lots of politicians are there just to, you know, get more.
[39:58.910 --> 40:03.530]  I'm actually surprised that we're hearing Tom Ridge saying that he did not go along with it.
[40:03.630 --> 40:06.030]  Because last I heard of him, I think, was at a protest down in Philly.
[40:06.190 --> 40:13.270]  And I think he was supporting the busting of people who were building puppets on the puppeteering barns that they had down there.
[40:13.530 --> 40:14.450]  And so, yeah.
[40:14.670 --> 40:17.770]  Well, he certainly wouldn't be telling the story if he did go along with it.
[40:17.850 --> 40:18.030]  Yeah.
[40:18.150 --> 40:21.790]  So the only way you're going to hear the story is by somebody who refused to go along with it.
[40:21.950 --> 40:24.650]  And yeah, it's just, it's pretty fascinating.
[40:24.870 --> 40:26.030]  Now, Bernie, you're a former governor.
[40:26.090 --> 40:26.530]  You're surprised?
[40:27.310 --> 40:27.950]  Not at all.
[40:28.110 --> 40:32.670]  Tom Ridge, as you pointed out, was the governor of Pennsylvania for several years.
[40:33.090 --> 40:35.410]  And I got to know about his policies.
[40:35.410 --> 40:37.110]  And he came from, he was a district attorney.
[40:37.230 --> 40:47.030]  As a lot of politicians end up, who are district attorneys, end up being, you know, mayors and governors and that sort of thing.
[40:47.190 --> 40:51.330]  But we talked about this very likelihood, when was it?
[40:51.430 --> 41:00.270]  Almost eight, you know, seven, eight years ago, when this whole ridiculous color code scheme for alerting the public was announced.
[41:00.510 --> 41:13.010]  And we widely spoofed it at the H2K2 conference back in 2002, saying that, you know, this is a silly, a very silly thing.
[41:13.030 --> 41:23.650]  And what could be, what could be better than, it seems like also it was custom designed to sort of tweak and trigger the public sphere with these color alerts, just like you could raise the color and change people's moods.
[41:23.750 --> 41:35.290]  And it turns out that's exactly what the Bush administration was trying to do, according to Tom Ridge, is to make people feel more afraid and dependent upon their government just before the election, so they would vote the incumbent in to keep them safer.
[41:35.630 --> 41:43.430]  But I'm hoping that this was laid bare to enough for the public to realize that this sort of thing is not in their best interest, so we don't see more of it coming.
[41:44.510 --> 41:45.090]  All right.
[41:45.170 --> 41:48.970]  Again, our front number 212-209-2900, taking phone calls in just a couple of minutes.
[41:49.230 --> 42:04.570]  The Chaos Computer Club, our friends over in Germany, has told the Financial Times in Europe that in the couple of months, in a couple of months, rather, it will be releasing code capable of cracking GSM, the GSM phone system, with just a laptop and an antenna.
[42:04.810 --> 42:19.350]  In comments made to the German edition of the newspaper, the hacking group claims that governments and criminals are already using the technique which can break the encryption used to protect 2G GSM calls in near real time using existing systems.
[42:19.350 --> 42:28.890]  The group says a public exposure of the technique will take place in the next month or two and allow anyone equipped with a laptop and an antenna to listen in to GSM phone calls.
[42:29.110 --> 42:38.770]  I'm going to miss the Chaos Computer Club when they get destroyed in the next couple of days by the powers that be, but it's brave of them to make this statement.
[42:38.910 --> 42:42.350]  But wasn't there Red Hacked a panel at Hacking at Random?
[42:42.490 --> 42:42.650]  Yeah.
[42:43.770 --> 42:51.110]  We mentioned it last week, but basically, at HAR, there was a talk given by probably the very same people.
[42:51.590 --> 43:04.270]  And basically, what they were asking the audience there to do, and I wish I had the URL, I don't know it off the top of my head, was to download this software and basically contribute computing resources into generating rainbow tables.
[43:04.730 --> 43:16.090]  So basically, the way the software works is you're pre-computing a lot of the data and then that's why then you can just run it quickly on a laptop computer because you can just do a lookup in a table and find the key.
[43:16.630 --> 43:24.910]  And so they were asking the audience to contribute their computing resources and then anonymously post the resulting tables via BitTorrent.
[43:25.490 --> 43:33.490]  So that essentially, I think what they want to do is when somebody says, well, you can't release this data, they say, well, we only released the code to generate the data.
[43:33.730 --> 43:35.210]  The data is out there too bad.
[43:35.530 --> 43:39.090]  And you can't really blame us for that because we didn't generate the data.
[43:39.210 --> 43:39.810]  We just wrote the code.
[43:39.910 --> 43:43.110]  I mean, obviously, somebody could try to blame them, but that is their defense.
[43:43.950 --> 43:50.170]  Well, now, as far as security of phone calls on GSM networks in this country, we're talking about AT&T and T-Mobile.
[43:51.270 --> 43:53.470]  What is it that we have to worry about?
[43:53.610 --> 43:55.590]  Can all calls be intercepted very easily?
[43:55.630 --> 44:01.250]  Well, apparently, according to that article anyway, 3G uses a stronger form of encryption.
[44:01.390 --> 44:03.890]  And by stronger, probably it just has a larger key size.
[44:04.050 --> 44:07.450]  I don't know the technical specifications, but that would be what I assume.
[44:08.930 --> 44:11.790]  Well, they say here A51 is the European standard.
[44:11.950 --> 44:13.730]  It seems to be the target of this latest breach.
[44:13.910 --> 44:23.010]  A52 is used in the USA and generally considered weaker than A51, while A53 is the strongest of the lot and mandated by the 3G GSM standard.
[44:23.330 --> 44:25.350]  And GSM has been cracked before, they say.
[44:25.850 --> 44:34.890]  The early algorithms used were weak and kept secret and thus not exposed to public scrutiny, a situation made worse by network operators padding the keys with zeros to reduce the cost of SIM cards.
[44:35.130 --> 44:41.210]  And actually, what's interesting was a group a few, a year or a few years ago did what the CCC is doing now.
[44:41.430 --> 44:42.550]  And they were stopped.
[44:42.710 --> 44:44.030]  They were stopped from releasing it.
[44:44.130 --> 44:46.670]  And so basically, the CCC is trying to do it again.
[44:47.050 --> 44:52.010]  But this time, they've, I mean, basically, it can't be stopped now because they've put the code out there.
[44:52.070 --> 44:58.050]  And as long as people have access to the code and enough people post various bits of this rainbow table via BitTorrent, then it's pretty much unstoppable.
[44:58.590 --> 44:59.170]  Go ahead.
[44:59.250 --> 45:07.410]  There's another example of why security through obscurity does not work because it just allows corporations to keep protocols private.
[45:07.690 --> 45:12.710]  And the only people that will have them are the corporations who are too lazy to upgrade their security systems.
[45:12.910 --> 45:23.770]  And the, and like, basically, cracker, black hat people that aren't, that like underground people that aren't willing to share it, but will use it just to steal information.
[45:23.770 --> 45:26.210]  Can't we just use those two phrases, cracker and black hat?
[45:26.310 --> 45:28.430]  Man, I, I hate both of those phrases so much.
[45:28.430 --> 45:29.230]  I can't even begin.
[45:29.230 --> 45:29.750]  What is this supposed to say instead?
[45:30.090 --> 45:30.870]  How about criminal?
[45:31.030 --> 45:33.330]  How about somebody who's like up to something nefarious?
[45:33.430 --> 45:37.050]  You don't need to make these new labels that don't even make any kind of a distinction.
[45:37.410 --> 45:39.170]  But the point is that they'd be high tech.
[45:39.310 --> 45:40.650]  And it's not how the script could use.
[45:40.770 --> 45:45.430]  It's that they're actually high tech, but they have access to the information and, but they're not willing to share it.
[45:45.530 --> 45:47.010]  And that's why they're not able to get caught.
[45:47.150 --> 45:47.890]  And that's why.
[45:48.130 --> 45:55.830]  But if the information is out there, then it would push the, um, the, uh, companies to upgrade their, uh, encryption systems.
[45:56.270 --> 45:59.590]  Well, you know, I don't know that the, the protocol itself wasn't public.
[45:59.770 --> 46:00.690]  I do think it's just flawed.
[46:00.730 --> 46:06.390]  And the idea was that, okay, well, we'll, you know, we'll replace it eventually, but they haven't, and it's still broken.
[46:06.550 --> 46:09.530]  And it was theoretically broken before, and now it will be practically broken.
[46:10.090 --> 46:13.270]  Um, but there was a, you know, there was a really interesting talk about this at heart.
[46:13.350 --> 46:15.870]  And I'm going to go to the computer now and try to find out a URL for that.
[46:15.970 --> 46:17.490]  So anyone interested can, can check it out.
[46:17.490 --> 46:17.650]  Okay.
[46:17.790 --> 46:18.630]  Go, go to the computer.
[46:18.830 --> 46:19.630]  We go to Rob T.
[46:19.750 --> 46:20.170]  Firefly here.
[46:20.470 --> 46:28.550]  Well, as, as any cryptographer will tell you, any, uh, any encryption is only, is, is only, uh, good until somebody has sufficient resources to throw it, busting it.
[46:28.670 --> 46:35.850]  So, and, uh, when you take things public, you take things to BitTorrent, you, you crowdsource them, you're exponentially increasing the power you have to throw at it.
[46:35.930 --> 46:38.390]  So this can't be a secret, uh, surprise to anybody.
[46:38.590 --> 46:40.550]  You know, it's a surprise to me is we have no phone calls.
[46:41.150 --> 46:42.910]  Are we not talking about interesting things?
[46:43.030 --> 46:43.190]  Maybe?
[46:43.350 --> 46:44.070]  Save the number again.
[46:44.330 --> 46:44.570]  Okay.
[46:44.670 --> 46:45.610]  But we're not asking for money.
[46:45.730 --> 46:46.730]  Maybe people think we're asking for money.
[46:46.730 --> 46:48.550]  212-209-2900.
[46:48.610 --> 46:50.810]  I know because we, when we do ask for money, we get more calls than this.
[46:50.970 --> 46:55.070]  So now we're asking for people's thoughts and opinions and ideas and feedback and things like that.
[46:55.170 --> 46:56.590]  It's not, you know, it's not going to bite.
[46:56.990 --> 46:58.590]  212-209-2900.
[46:58.750 --> 46:59.970]  Let's, uh, talk about this.
[47:00.030 --> 47:02.730]  And hopefully by the time we finish talking about this, there'll be a whole lot of phone calls.
[47:02.870 --> 47:09.930]  Uh, the Obama administration's FCC plans to keep the internet free of increased user fees based on heavy web traffic and slow downloads.
[47:10.230 --> 47:17.030]  Uh, Julius Genachowski, the FCC chairman told, uh, Capitol Hill actually told the hill.com.
[47:17.110 --> 47:27.270]  I misread that the hill.com, some website someplace, uh, that his agency will support net neutrality and go after anyone who violates its basic rules.
[47:27.630 --> 47:36.590]  One thing I would say, so that there is no confusion out there, is that this FCC will support net neutrality and will enforce any violation of net neutrality principles.
[47:36.810 --> 47:38.250]  Now, uh, this is good, right?
[47:38.370 --> 47:39.390]  We should be happy about this.
[47:40.050 --> 47:48.630]  Uh, the first thing I would have to ask, which I'm sure most, many listeners would like to know, is what exactly is the government's definition of net neutrality?
[47:48.870 --> 47:51.330]  Well, haven't they, haven't they pretty much said that?
[47:51.650 --> 47:56.330]  Genachowski himself is an internet entrepreneur, so I think that he understands the importance of net neutrality.
[47:56.410 --> 48:01.250]  If you look at his statements in the past, he's been pretty outspoken to get, uh, for, uh, net neutrality.
[48:01.410 --> 48:04.070]  He's done volunteer work for, uh, uh, what is it?
[48:04.150 --> 48:05.390]  Save the net.org?
[48:05.890 --> 48:07.650]  Or say, what is the URL?
[48:07.870 --> 48:08.650]  I'm looking for it.
[48:08.670 --> 48:12.910]  I don't see it here in this story, but I, I, I, I remember that URL, something like that.
[48:13.410 --> 48:18.850]  Anyway, he, he supported bills in the past that have generally been approved by the EFF and other good organizations.
[48:18.870 --> 48:21.590]  I would guess we're in agreement on what net neutrality definition is.
[48:21.690 --> 48:23.530]  I think that this is a generally good endorsement.
[48:23.630 --> 48:37.070]  I think that we should move on from questioning whether or not he's truly supportive of this and, and, uh, pressure him on other issues such as not supporting the RIAA and their, um, cracking on other people and stuff like that.
[48:37.170 --> 48:42.650]  Well, let's at least get this done first before we start pressuring him to do other things and just make sure this happens.
[48:42.870 --> 48:45.090]  Well, let's not, uh, pretend this isn't an issue.
[48:45.170 --> 48:55.330]  I mean, if the FCC is going to enforce it now, then it'll only be for as long as Obama's in power until the next, um, uh, Republican government.
[48:55.330 --> 48:55.330]  Right.
[48:55.650 --> 48:56.510]  Well, yeah, hopefully.
[48:56.750 --> 48:57.130]  Well, okay.
[48:57.530 --> 49:03.770]  Hopefully by the time the next president comes in, uh, the sort of precedent will be set and it will be expected for this to happen.
[49:04.250 --> 49:13.370]  Personally, I agree with this because I, to me, it's the, uh, the importance of the internet and how it is now, it seems like it should be regulated like any other utility.
[49:13.810 --> 49:19.330]  Um, you know, it's, it's not just simply some private company, uh, that can do whatever it wants to its customers.
[49:19.470 --> 49:21.810]  This is now a vital service in many cases.
[49:22.430 --> 49:22.490]  Okay.
[49:22.490 --> 49:23.190]  And it should be treated as such.
[49:23.210 --> 49:24.110]  Bernie, are you happy with this?
[49:24.990 --> 49:25.910]  Uh, I am.
[49:26.010 --> 49:35.630]  Although if you read carefully Janikowski's statement, it almost seems to say he's trying to enforce people, uh, to get people to violate it.
[49:35.630 --> 49:38.930]  I'm sure that was a slip of the tongue, but, or what is it?
[49:39.150 --> 49:40.230]  What is the last sentence?
[49:40.510 --> 49:41.930]  What is, what is he saying in his last sentence?
[49:41.930 --> 49:42.950]  His last sentence.
[49:43.470 --> 49:46.690]  Uh, well, his, the last sentence here might not be, uh, okay.
[49:46.810 --> 49:47.990]  This is the last sentence in this story.
[49:48.430 --> 49:53.990]  Uh, the FCC's job for legislation like that is to be a resource to make sure they have the facts and the data that they need.
[49:54.070 --> 49:55.210]  So I don't think there's anything wrong with that.
[49:55.410 --> 49:55.890]  No, no.
[49:55.990 --> 50:12.930]  What, what Janikowski said in his own, in his own statement, uh, he said with, uh, here we go, uh, he will go after anyone who violates, uh, Janikowski told the hill that his agency will support neutrality and go after anyone who violates its tenants.
[50:13.930 --> 50:19.050]  So, um, does that mean that he's going to go after anybody who, it just seemed ambiguous.
[50:19.350 --> 50:30.670]  And I'm, I'm hoping what they mean is that they will support, uh, uh, uh, the ban on any internet service provider from throttling or restricting traffic, uh, based on its content.
[50:31.250 --> 50:33.510]  Um, that's what we would think as.
[50:33.570 --> 50:33.690]  Yeah.
[50:33.690 --> 50:39.810]  I mean, I read that to indicate that he'd go after anybody who violates the, the basic rules of net neutrality, the basic concept of it, right?
[50:40.010 --> 50:40.270]  Okay.
[50:40.430 --> 50:41.470]  Well, I hope that's what he does.
[50:41.650 --> 50:41.850]  All right.
[50:41.930 --> 50:43.170]  212-209-2900.
[50:43.310 --> 50:44.710]  Let's see if we have any phone calls out there.
[50:44.710 --> 50:45.030]  Good evening.
[50:45.030 --> 50:45.930]  You're on off the hook.
[50:46.410 --> 50:47.210]  Oh, hi.
[50:47.330 --> 50:47.470]  Hi.
[50:47.510 --> 50:47.950]  What's on your mind?
[50:48.170 --> 50:53.930]  Um, all I want to say, just, just adding on to them with that election and heightening the warning alert.
[50:54.090 --> 50:56.790]  I never paid attention from the very beginning.
[50:56.790 --> 51:03.250]  I felt it was always, um, you know, to, uh, just ridiculous hype.
[51:03.530 --> 51:04.250]  Uh, that's what it was.
[51:04.250 --> 51:05.790]  Do you mean you don't know what color it is right now?
[51:05.990 --> 51:07.150]  Uh, I have no idea.
[51:07.490 --> 51:15.090]  And if whatever came up with the colors, I'm talking about way back, you know, in the early, uh, 2000, I wasn't paying, you know, I wouldn't listen to any of it.
[51:15.430 --> 51:15.550]  Right.
[51:15.730 --> 51:18.130]  Very negative messages coming your way.
[51:18.130 --> 51:21.890]  And we have to screen what goes in our mind, you know, don't live that way.
[51:22.090 --> 51:22.230]  Yeah.
[51:22.510 --> 51:23.130]  Thanks so much.
[51:23.290 --> 51:23.470]  All right.
[51:23.550 --> 51:24.010]  Thanks for your call.
[51:24.930 --> 51:26.150]  212-209-2900.
[51:26.250 --> 51:26.530]  Good evening.
[51:26.710 --> 51:27.370]  You're on off the hook.
[51:27.370 --> 51:27.750]  Yeah.
[51:28.570 --> 51:28.930]  Whoa.
[51:29.450 --> 51:29.990]  Where are you coming from?
[51:30.090 --> 51:30.270]  Yes.
[51:30.510 --> 51:31.270]  Are you in a car?
[51:31.430 --> 51:32.290]  Sounds like you're in a car.
[51:32.850 --> 51:33.250]  Uh, yes.
[51:33.490 --> 51:34.610]  Uh, right now I'm in the car.
[51:34.730 --> 51:34.950]  All right.
[51:34.990 --> 51:35.250]  Be careful.
[51:35.830 --> 51:36.990]  I, I most certainly will.
[51:37.130 --> 51:37.810]  Thanks for my concern.
[51:38.590 --> 51:46.870]  Uh, well, first of all, I'm glad you guys are all back and I've been to pretty much all the countries you guys have mentioned with the exception of Germany.
[51:47.310 --> 51:49.790]  I've been to Germany and that's something I need to get to.
[51:50.190 --> 51:57.370]  But, um, a little earlier, the young lady was mentioning about something in Armstrong, a, a British comedy troupe.
[51:57.450 --> 51:58.590]  I didn't catch all of that.
[51:58.790 --> 51:59.070]  Yes.
[51:59.410 --> 52:02.270]  Armstrong and Miller look for the RAF sketch.
[52:02.430 --> 52:03.730]  That's the Royal Air Force sketch.
[52:04.210 --> 52:04.650]  Okay.
[52:04.890 --> 52:05.750]  I'm going to look at that.
[52:05.810 --> 52:08.350]  Cause actually Monty Python did something similar to that.
[52:08.510 --> 52:10.450]  I bought the entire box set.
[52:10.690 --> 52:18.070]  Um, there's a, I don't know, two minute, uh, sketch where they're actually in one of those bunker things, you know, in the middle of a field someplace.
[52:18.870 --> 52:22.290]  And, uh, it's, you know, they do a lot of that exactly.
[52:22.390 --> 52:23.570]  Like one guy is speaking.
[52:23.950 --> 52:23.970]  Yeah.
[52:23.970 --> 52:29.370]  Well, you can't, you really can't beat, uh, British comedy when it comes to class humor and, uh, linguistic humor like that.
[52:29.470 --> 52:30.170]  They're really pretty excellent.
[52:30.470 --> 52:30.790]  That's for sure.
[52:30.930 --> 52:30.990]  Yeah.
[52:31.210 --> 52:31.470]  All right.
[52:31.550 --> 52:31.950]  Anything else?
[52:32.550 --> 52:34.110]  No, I'm going to, I'm going to give that a try then.
[52:34.230 --> 52:34.550]  R.A.S.
[52:34.630 --> 52:34.730]  sketch.
[52:34.850 --> 52:35.370]  Thank you very much.
[52:35.410 --> 52:35.670]  Okay.
[52:35.690 --> 52:36.130]  I appreciate your time.
[52:36.310 --> 52:36.770]  Drive safely.
[52:37.850 --> 52:38.430]  And good evening.
[52:38.650 --> 52:39.350]  You're on off the hook.
[52:40.790 --> 52:41.490]  Speak up, please.
[52:41.750 --> 52:42.290]  Yes, go ahead.
[52:42.470 --> 52:42.470]  Hello.
[52:43.730 --> 52:51.290]  Um, uh, talking about the crime and crime prevention in other countries, that there was a thing on, on YouTube or Vimeo.
[52:51.450 --> 52:52.750]  This guy was in Japan.
[52:52.750 --> 52:54.710]  He was visiting Japan with a friend of his.
[52:55.110 --> 52:59.390]  And, uh, they use this thing where they took a bicycle to the train station.
[52:59.590 --> 53:05.890]  And because it was Japan, they left a bicycle unlocked at the train station while they went to Osaka or someplace in Tokyo.
[53:06.210 --> 53:08.630]  And, uh, they came back and the bicycle was stolen.
[53:09.090 --> 53:12.250]  So then these police guy came, they reported it and everything.
[53:12.550 --> 53:14.830]  In other words, the stealing of an unlocked bicycle.
[53:14.830 --> 53:22.790]  And the guys, uh, from the police, they, they did things like they made sort of chalk outlines of a bicycle only in that yellow tape.
[53:22.970 --> 53:24.410]  How could they do that if the bicycle was stolen?
[53:24.890 --> 53:27.310]  No, but they did where they thought it was going to be.
[53:27.450 --> 53:28.610]  They asked the guy to point to it.
[53:28.610 --> 53:36.170]  And then they like did look for fingerprints and took DNA and they went completely bananas over it.
[53:36.290 --> 53:39.090]  And then two days later, this person called up.
[53:39.090 --> 53:41.850]  It was the parents of the guy who stole the bicycle.
[53:41.870 --> 53:42.290]  Oh no.
[53:42.530 --> 53:49.310]  And super apologetically, they called up and they returned the bicycle and they gave them money or they did something.
[53:49.570 --> 53:58.050]  And, uh, it was the idea that on the most minor crimes, they like, uh, uh, totally, uh, solved it, I guess.
[53:58.450 --> 53:58.590]  Wow.
[53:58.650 --> 54:00.870]  And they did that without any surveillance cameras at all, did they?
[54:01.050 --> 54:02.470]  Yeah, no surveillance cameras.
[54:02.770 --> 54:04.410]  Just like, it was really weird.
[54:04.410 --> 54:12.870]  He said, instead of seeing the chalk outline of a man and tape, you know, this yellow tape, they have the sort of square wheels for the bicycle and stuff like that.
[54:13.650 --> 54:13.950]  Wow.
[54:14.390 --> 54:17.110]  Well, where'd you see this?
[54:17.910 --> 54:19.110]  I think it was on YouTube.
[54:19.310 --> 54:20.390]  I'll try to send you the URL.
[54:20.490 --> 54:20.850]  Yeah, please.
[54:20.990 --> 54:22.650]  We'd like to have a good laugh at that.
[54:23.310 --> 54:23.610]  Thanks.
[54:23.870 --> 54:24.490]  Uh, thanks for the call.
[54:24.870 --> 54:25.170]  Bye.
[54:25.390 --> 54:25.590]  All right.
[54:25.670 --> 54:27.110]  212-209-2900.
[54:27.250 --> 54:30.570]  Can I mention quickly, um, I was able to dig up the URL of the software.
[54:30.730 --> 54:33.490]  So if anyone in the, of our listeners wants to get involved.
[54:33.490 --> 54:34.370]  My attention span has run out.
[54:34.450 --> 54:35.190]  What software we're talking about?
[54:35.210 --> 54:35.270]  The GSM.
[54:35.330 --> 54:35.870]  Oh, GSM.
[54:36.030 --> 54:36.190]  Okay.
[54:36.310 --> 54:36.450]  Yes.
[54:36.490 --> 54:37.010]  GSM cracking.
[54:37.150 --> 54:37.310]  Go ahead.
[54:37.410 --> 54:40.690]  Um, so this, this would be to contribute basically your computing resources.
[54:40.970 --> 54:49.670]  Uh, so if you have a Linux, and I think an NVIDIA graphics card, your ideal, although a regular computer could be used as well, but the NVIDIA ones are better for whatever reason.
[54:49.810 --> 54:50.690]  They're more multi-threaded.
[54:50.750 --> 54:57.110]  But anyway, the website is Reflextor, R-E-F-L-E-X-T-O-R, uh, I think.com.
[54:57.650 --> 54:59.070]  Um, yes.
[54:59.290 --> 55:03.010]  Slash, uh, T-R-A-C-slash.
[55:03.250 --> 55:04.130]  A-5-1.
[55:04.330 --> 55:05.130]  Dot something.
[55:05.370 --> 55:05.830]  No, that's it.
[55:05.830 --> 55:06.270]  A-5-1.
[55:06.270 --> 55:06.670]  A-5-1.
[55:06.730 --> 55:06.910]  Yeah.
[55:07.070 --> 55:07.270]  Okay.
[55:07.790 --> 55:13.270]  Uh, with the mentioning of, uh, drawing chalk lines around bodies and whatever, I think I should point out as far as I know.
[55:13.490 --> 55:13.970]  Bodies, bicycles.
[55:14.830 --> 55:23.570]  But, uh, a comparison to drawing chalk line around a bike instead of a body, is that they don't actually, as far as I know, they don't do that to bodies because that, um, I think they do.
[55:23.650 --> 55:24.430]  Contaminates the crime scene.
[55:24.530 --> 55:25.390]  I think they still do.
[55:25.630 --> 55:26.990]  Contaminates, no, that they never did.
[55:27.390 --> 55:28.330]  No, that's not true.
[55:28.470 --> 55:35.590]  They, they, if anybody out there has been involved in the murder, or, you know, I'm sure that that's... When was the last time you saw a murder scene?
[55:35.590 --> 55:39.130]  Well, I don't want to get into that right now, but the point is, I'm pretty sure they do that.
[55:39.430 --> 55:39.830]  Yeah, you saw.
[55:39.910 --> 55:40.950]  Maybe they don't anymore.
[55:41.570 --> 55:43.410]  Usually you're gone before the chalk scene.
[55:44.010 --> 55:50.970]  Yeah, well, you know, well, you just have to call a precinct, ask if they need a resupply of their chalk, and I'm sure you'll find out how much they use in a typical month.
[55:51.250 --> 55:56.430]  I'm, uh, well, one, uh, sorry to go back to it again, but one further note, uh, during the talk, they, they...
[55:56.430 --> 55:57.530]  Are you sorry about the GSM software?
[55:57.710 --> 56:07.230]  Yeah, well, I just want to make sure, if you do want to participate in this, they emphasize during the talk that when you actually upload it to torrents or seed it initially, to try to do it, uh, anonymously using, like, Tor or something.
[56:07.330 --> 56:10.810]  I don't mean to scare people, but just, you know, cover your own, uh, self.
[56:11.010 --> 56:11.190]  Mm-hmm.
[56:11.250 --> 56:12.210]  Is Tor really anonymous?
[56:12.690 --> 56:13.010]  Yeah.
[56:13.250 --> 56:13.510]  Yes.
[56:13.790 --> 56:14.110]  Supposedly.
[56:14.590 --> 56:20.650]  Well, at least for the initial seed of getting it on BitTorrent, uh, it would be, I mean, it would be a good way to get there anonymously, so...
[56:20.650 --> 56:22.150]  All right, you know, we have no calls again.
[56:22.390 --> 56:23.750]  I don't know what's going on with the phone calls.
[56:23.790 --> 56:33.290]  Maybe because we're asking for money for the last three weeks, people just don't want to call in at all, or, uh, you know, I'm not sure, but, uh, you'll have maybe two minutes to make, uh, phone calls, 212-209-2900.
[56:33.570 --> 56:38.010]  Yes, and if you call, you will talk to Emmanuel, um, rather than me, because he's at the controls again.
[56:39.230 --> 56:45.150]  Well, you'll talk to all of us, all of us, and this is Voltaire's last show, so, uh, you'll talk to him, and, uh, wish him well, and all that kind of thing.
[56:45.850 --> 56:52.390]  Uh, maybe that's why they're not calling, because they're afraid they'll burst into tears or something when, when they, when they call up, but, um, yeah.
[56:53.250 --> 56:54.850]  Be strong, be a part of history.
[56:55.050 --> 56:57.030]  They send me, uh, thank you letters to the station.
[56:57.530 --> 56:58.550]  Yes, you can do that as well.
[56:58.550 --> 57:00.550]  With, uh, envelopes, with money and stuff.
[57:00.570 --> 57:01.930]  All right, we have, we have a flurry of calls here.
[57:01.950 --> 57:02.510]  Shh, I'm doing a fundraiser.
[57:02.610 --> 57:04.090]  Good evening, you're on, off the hook.
[57:04.590 --> 57:06.370]  Hi, this is Noelle from Long Island.
[57:06.490 --> 57:08.830]  Hi, gentlemen, hi, hi, uh, everyone.
[57:10.490 --> 57:20.030]  Um, this may sound like a silly question, but, um, and it's not on the topic of anything you're discussing tonight, but I need to buy a prepaid cell phone, and I don't have any experience with this.
[57:20.150 --> 57:23.870]  I, I always just pay per month and stuff, but I don't, I don't use the minutes a lot.
[57:24.390 --> 57:27.990]  Anyway, um, is there, does anybody have, like, a caveat emptor for me?
[57:27.990 --> 57:30.970]  Are there any scams out there I should beware for, or?
[57:31.510 --> 57:34.510]  Well, I know that, uh, you know, actually, I wanted to get into this a little bit more.
[57:34.610 --> 57:35.130]  I'll do it next week.
[57:35.210 --> 57:39.490]  But we had several, uh, interesting encounters with, uh, prepaid, uh, phones overseas.
[57:39.710 --> 57:40.070]  Oh, really?
[57:40.070 --> 57:42.270]  Very different than what we have here in, in this country.
[57:42.830 --> 57:50.610]  Uh, I know some people who do use prepaid services, and they don't spend very much on their, on their phone, phone bills, or they don't use their phone very much.
[57:50.610 --> 57:52.390]  I'm just using it, you know, domestically.
[57:52.590 --> 57:54.990]  I'm not going overseas or anything, so, I mean, I don't, you know.
[57:55.090 --> 57:55.890]  Walter, do you have a suggestion?
[57:56.030 --> 57:57.150]  Uh, Metro PCS.
[57:57.290 --> 57:58.130]  Uh, Metro PCS?
[57:58.150 --> 58:02.330]  Has a good, I, I don't know if it's prepaid, but it's like a good $50 a month all-included plan.
[58:02.510 --> 58:02.810]  Uh-huh.
[58:02.930 --> 58:05.310]  And this is, this is online I purchase this?
[58:05.790 --> 58:07.350]  Um, I'm not sure, um, but...
[58:07.350 --> 58:09.370]  They have stores, uh, physical locations you could.
[58:09.370 --> 58:13.250]  Yeah, I know, there's a million stores out there, and I just don't want to, like, you know, get ripped off.
[58:13.310 --> 58:14.330]  Bernie, do you have a suggestion?
[58:14.330 --> 58:15.650]  Yes, I do, actually.
[58:15.810 --> 58:20.450]  Metro PCS is a, it's, it's a prepaid plan as opposed to prepaid usage.
[58:21.070 --> 58:25.830]  Um, the cheapest prepaid usage I've found is through track phone.
[58:26.010 --> 58:35.950]  It's T-R-A-C-F-O-N, and if you shop wisely and do some research on the internet, you can, you can get it for about $8 a month for very limited usage.
[58:36.270 --> 58:36.530]  Okay.
[58:36.750 --> 58:40.370]  All right, we're going to have to leave it there, but thanks, everybody, for calling in, and thanks for listening.
[58:40.790 --> 58:43.090]  O-T-H at 2600.com is our email address.
[58:43.090 --> 58:44.030]  We'll see you again next week.
[58:44.030 --> 58:44.590]  Have a good night.
[58:45.290 --> 58:46.710]  Oh, and goodbye, Voltaire.
[58:47.030 --> 58:49.570]  I've got an hour porch drawing out the door.
[58:49.890 --> 58:52.990]  Think I'll set up my bulletin board.
[59:00.520 --> 59:03.600]  Got a motor when I'm 213.
[59:04.340 --> 59:08.500]  Glad my dad doesn't know what the lock, but he means.
[59:08.840 --> 59:11.280]  Only 1,200 part.
[59:11.660 --> 59:14.820]  Never leave my room isn't that high.
[59:16.160 --> 59:18.580]  My skin's turning hills.
[59:19.840 --> 59:21.820]  Locks on the door.
[59:24.220 --> 59:26.260]  Please don't disturb me.
[59:26.500 --> 59:28.420]  I'm here with my C64.
[59:36.890 --> 59:39.190]  Freak through the phone company.
[59:39.970 --> 59:42.750]  I've got friends somewhere in Germany.
[59:43.730 --> 59:46.570]  Crack the file to join M.O.D.
[59:47.270 --> 59:49.930]  Make free long-distance calls overseas.
[59:51.330 --> 59:57.790]  On Saturday morning, bed's at the door.
[01:00:00.390 --> 01:00:04.210]  Seize all my notebooks and take away my Commodore.
[01:00:59.040 --> 01:01:04.100]  Hey, you're listening to WBAI, New York 99.5 FM.
[01:01:05.400 --> 01:01:08.560]  All right, let's just get on with the show.
[01:01:08.560 --> 01:01:08.660]  Whoa.
[01:01:09.000 --> 01:01:09.040]  Whoa.
[01:01:09.040 --> 01:01:09.140]  Whoa.
[01:01:09.140 --> 01:01:09.260]  Whoa.
[01:01:09.260 --> 01:01:09.300]  Whoa.
[01:01:09.580 --> 01:01:09.760]  Whoa.
[01:01:09.760 --> 01:01:09.800]  Whoa.