[00:15.360 --> 00:18.320]  And you are listening to Radio Station WVAI New York.
[00:18.500 --> 00:20.000]  The time is 7 o'clock.
[00:20.340 --> 00:23.020]  Time, once again, for Off the Hook.
[00:24.420 --> 00:24.940]  Really.
[00:35.660 --> 00:37.760]  I cut myself while shaving.
[00:38.140 --> 00:40.320]  Now I can't make a cough.
[00:41.020 --> 00:43.080]  We couldn't get much worse.
[00:45.460 --> 00:48.540]  But the best is paid for worst.
[00:49.080 --> 00:51.040]  I hope that's understood.
[02:07.590 --> 02:09.310]  And good evening to everybody.
[02:09.390 --> 02:10.790]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:10.930 --> 02:14.490]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:17.550 --> 02:19.170]  Join tonight by Mike.
[02:19.370 --> 02:19.670]  Hi.
[02:19.850 --> 02:20.190]  Red Hack.
[02:20.370 --> 02:20.530]  Hello.
[02:20.810 --> 02:21.130]  Dot Red.
[02:21.490 --> 02:21.690]  Hello.
[02:22.650 --> 02:23.050]  Voltaire.
[02:23.270 --> 02:23.430]  Hey.
[02:24.210 --> 02:24.750]  Rob T.
[02:24.870 --> 02:25.210]  Firefly.
[02:25.470 --> 02:25.830]  Good evening.
[02:26.110 --> 02:27.570]  I'm confused because I don't see everybody.
[02:27.710 --> 02:27.970]  Jim.
[02:28.430 --> 02:28.810]  Hi.
[02:29.130 --> 02:30.170]  And is Gus in the room?
[02:30.550 --> 02:30.790]  Okay.
[02:31.010 --> 02:31.170]  Hello.
[02:31.650 --> 02:33.370]  And I understand it's Dr. Gus now.
[02:33.410 --> 02:34.030]  It's Dr. Gus.
[02:34.190 --> 02:34.570]  Congratulations.
[02:34.930 --> 02:35.430]  Thank you very much.
[02:35.610 --> 02:37.470]  We could certainly use a doctor in the house.
[02:38.270 --> 02:40.190]  I'm not licensed to perform surgery.
[02:40.310 --> 02:41.650]  Well, you're going to be the closest one we have.
[02:42.790 --> 02:43.210]  Okay.
[02:43.570 --> 02:47.630]  We have all kinds of fun things to talk about tonight.
[02:48.590 --> 02:55.630]  First being, we have our friend from Nauticon on the phone.
[02:55.810 --> 02:57.350]  I believe Froggy, are you joining us tonight?
[02:58.590 --> 02:59.010]  No?
[02:59.830 --> 03:00.270]  Uh-oh.
[03:00.430 --> 03:01.190]  Bernie, are you there?
[03:01.690 --> 03:02.810]  I'm here in Philadelphia.
[03:03.050 --> 03:03.190]  Okay.
[03:03.270 --> 03:04.530]  Well, Froggy doesn't seem to be here.
[03:06.270 --> 03:06.690]  Okay.
[03:06.850 --> 03:07.890]  That's kind of strange.
[03:08.090 --> 03:11.630]  And Mike has just left the room, so we're going to have to redial him.
[03:12.910 --> 03:14.590]  We've lost Froggy, Mike.
[03:14.970 --> 03:15.910]  No, he's just on hold.
[03:15.990 --> 03:16.630]  Oh, he's on hold.
[03:16.710 --> 03:16.930]  Okay.
[03:17.270 --> 03:17.590]  Sorry.
[03:17.730 --> 03:19.370]  We left you on hold and Mike left the room.
[03:20.250 --> 03:21.050]  Froggy, are you with us?
[03:21.190 --> 03:21.890]  Yes, I'm here.
[03:21.990 --> 03:22.150]  Okay.
[03:22.190 --> 03:23.530]  Sorry for the confusion.
[03:23.710 --> 03:24.490]  It's a bit confusing here.
[03:25.310 --> 03:28.510]  So, now, Nauticon, yeah, it's happening again this weekend coming up?
[03:28.670 --> 03:28.990]  Yes.
[03:29.110 --> 03:32.590]  This is going to be... Well, it's going to be happening next weekend, but it's going to be our seventh one, yeah.
[03:32.850 --> 03:34.810]  And when you say next weekend, what's the actual date?
[03:35.050 --> 03:36.390]  April 15th through the 18th.
[03:36.530 --> 03:36.750]  Okay.
[03:37.610 --> 03:39.090]  So, tax day, huh?
[03:39.630 --> 03:41.170]  Well, yeah, just around then.
[03:41.230 --> 03:43.170]  And I still have to do those, so I better get on it.
[03:43.670 --> 03:43.930]  Okay.
[03:44.930 --> 03:46.290]  Any highlights this year?
[03:46.570 --> 03:48.110]  Oh, there's a whole bunch of highlights.
[03:49.090 --> 03:59.890]  Some of our better talks are going to be including Hacking the Future, Weaponizing Our Generation, which is going to be given by James Arland and a trio of other lovely ladies.
[04:00.730 --> 04:02.930]  And I think that talk is going to be interesting.
[04:03.270 --> 04:14.730]  And in the spirit of Nauticon, doing things a little differently, there's also going to be a presentation on how to survive the zombie apocalypse when that comes upon us, which should be incredibly amusing.
[04:15.010 --> 04:16.050]  Zombie apocalypse, eh?
[04:16.810 --> 04:25.570]  Yeah, we have a whole group, a Cleveland troop of people that are going to educate us all on how to survive that apocalypse when it does happen.
[04:25.930 --> 04:29.810]  I think all of us need to be prepared for this.
[04:29.890 --> 04:32.350]  So, it should be interesting and entertaining.
[04:33.010 --> 04:38.790]  Are you implying that the Nazi Kenyan president apocalypse has not already happened?
[04:39.410 --> 04:49.590]  Well, you know, I can't say that, but all I know is that something big is coming down and that if you want to figure out how to survive, you probably should come to Nauticon and check out this presentation.
[04:49.990 --> 04:51.910]  Can I reuse my Y2K bunker?
[04:52.170 --> 04:53.090]  Oh, absolutely.
[04:53.310 --> 04:54.390]  Yeah, I figure why not.
[04:54.570 --> 04:55.650]  I'm going to reuse mine.
[04:55.910 --> 04:57.790]  So, you know, 2012 is just around the corner.
[04:57.870 --> 04:58.270]  You never know.
[04:59.230 --> 04:59.990]  Hey, Brody.
[05:00.230 --> 05:00.510]  Yes.
[05:00.970 --> 05:02.490]  It's Bernie at home in Philly.
[05:02.650 --> 05:06.190]  I just wanted to ask you, this weaponizing talk, can you be more specific?
[05:06.370 --> 05:08.150]  I mean, are you talking about real weapons or something else?
[05:08.670 --> 05:24.750]  Well, it's not really weaponizing in the real sense, but in terms of providing information to people so that they have all the tools that are necessary in order to, you know, to be effective.
[05:26.030 --> 05:41.050]  And basically preparing people to hack the planet and take it over when necessary so that people have all the skills they need, you know, both software, hardware, whatever it is, to take over the world and to really take advantage of everything that society has to offer.
[05:41.370 --> 05:43.550]  Can you tell us something about the history of Nauticon?
[05:44.450 --> 05:44.850]  Sure.
[05:45.170 --> 05:59.750]  Well, we started it about seven years ago as kind of a statement on what HackerCons were about at the time, which, in my opinion, was really too focused on security metrics and all that other kind of good stuff that people pay a lot of money to go to.
[06:00.470 --> 06:09.750]  And, you know, I felt that HackerCons kind of really got away from the spirit of what hacking is about, which is having fun with technology of all, you know, technology of all kinds.
[06:10.190 --> 06:22.050]  So whether it's, you know, hardware hacking on an Arduino processor or, you know, writing code or even knitting, just to throw that out there, you know, hacking really is a general term that we need to take back.
[06:22.050 --> 06:32.070]  And so the purpose of the event was to bring all these different people together and say, hey, you know, let's take a look at technology and ourselves as a community and see what we can do that's different.
[06:33.170 --> 06:36.510]  And the event is still open for people to show up if they haven't, you know...
[06:36.510 --> 06:36.850]  Oh, yeah.
[06:37.170 --> 06:43.570]  Yeah, well, we've already pre-sold about 280 tickets, but we will be selling tickets at the door, so everybody is welcome to come and attend.
[06:44.370 --> 06:45.130]  And where is it?
[06:45.130 --> 06:45.130]  Right.
[06:45.730 --> 06:52.670]  It's being held in Cleveland, Ohio, which I know gets a little bit, you know, gets some people up, you know, up in arms, but it's really not too bad.
[06:53.310 --> 06:56.290]  In fact, I like to think it's one of the best things going on in Cleveland right now.
[06:56.570 --> 06:58.170]  I think that's the slogan of Cleveland, in fact.
[06:58.290 --> 06:59.530]  It's really not too bad, right?
[06:59.610 --> 07:00.410]  Not too bad.
[07:00.430 --> 07:01.530]  We're not Detroit, after all.
[07:01.690 --> 07:03.210]  Well, okay, that's another good slogan to have.
[07:03.330 --> 07:03.550]  Absolutely.
[07:04.610 --> 07:04.930]  Wow.
[07:05.450 --> 07:08.110]  Okay, now, so Bernie, you're going to be heading down there yourself.
[07:08.630 --> 07:15.070]  Yeah, I'm heading out there with Travis Goodspeed, and I'll be picking up our friend Ed Piscor, the cartoonist, in Pittsburgh.
[07:15.310 --> 07:17.390]  So we're going to have a nice road trip all the way to Nauticon.
[07:17.650 --> 07:18.290]  Sounds great.
[07:18.410 --> 07:19.250]  That's the way it should be done.
[07:20.810 --> 07:21.210]  Okay.
[07:21.210 --> 07:24.590]  So I guess we'll be seeing you at Hope as well?
[07:25.030 --> 07:25.430]  Absolutely.
[07:25.430 --> 07:26.870]  I fully intend on being at Hope.
[07:27.110 --> 07:34.350]  In fact, one of the things I enjoyed about my last experience at Hope was that, you know, some of the ideas at Nauticon were borrowed, and I'm all about that.
[07:34.350 --> 07:39.550]  But it was really great to see art exhibits and visualization projects and all kinds of other stuff.
[07:39.650 --> 07:41.650]  So, yeah, I'm definitely going to try to make it out to Hope this year.
[07:42.810 --> 07:43.170]  Okay.
[07:43.170 --> 07:47.250]  Again, give us webpages, anything else you'd like to spread around?
[07:47.370 --> 07:51.670]  Any information you want to get about the event is at www.nauticon.org.
[07:51.670 --> 07:54.110]  That's N-O-T-A-C-O-N.O-R-G.
[07:54.290 --> 07:57.250]  Our full schedule's up, speaker bios and abstracts.
[07:58.190 --> 07:59.610]  You know, it's all right there.
[07:59.610 --> 08:05.810]  And you can probably also find a link to our IRC channel where you can pick me up tonight and ask me questions.
[08:06.610 --> 08:08.530]  Bernie, I'm going to give you the last word on this.
[08:08.610 --> 08:15.690]  And maybe you could just sort of convince people who might be sort of on the fence here why they should go to a con like Nauticon.
[08:16.350 --> 08:25.870]  You know, I don't know whether it's that Midwest friendliness or just because it's the best thing going on in a whole city, which, of course, Hope is the best thing going on in New York.
[08:26.030 --> 08:26.310]  I agree.
[08:26.310 --> 08:35.210]  But by degree standards, I think Nauticon is by far the most interesting thing going on all weekend in Cleveland.
[08:35.490 --> 08:38.490]  And it's just a really good, interesting mix of people.
[08:38.950 --> 08:40.990]  So is Hope, and so are some of the other cons.
[08:41.150 --> 08:44.190]  But I really like Nauticon the first time I went, I think it was three or four years ago.
[08:44.410 --> 08:47.690]  And I've been going back every year since because I really enjoy it.
[08:47.770 --> 08:49.830]  And it's got a different flavor.
[08:49.990 --> 08:51.870]  Every hacker con seems to have a different flavor.
[08:52.330 --> 08:53.730]  And I like your flavor.
[08:53.930 --> 08:54.870]  Well, I appreciate that.
[08:54.990 --> 08:55.590]  Thank you very much.
[08:57.350 --> 09:00.310]  Okay, thanks very much, Fragi, for joining us tonight.
[09:00.950 --> 09:02.210]  And Voltaire, you have something to contribute?
[09:02.210 --> 09:06.590]  Yes, Nauticon is most certainly the best thing that's happened to Cleveland since Dennis Kucinich.
[09:06.990 --> 09:07.890]  That's probably true.
[09:08.070 --> 09:08.770]  That is probably true.
[09:09.070 --> 09:12.310]  Except he still doesn't come to the conference despite being invited numerous times.
[09:13.990 --> 09:17.570]  Well, you know, he comes from Ohio, so he could go to Ohio pretty easily.
[09:17.730 --> 09:18.370]  He's pretty small.
[09:18.470 --> 09:18.950]  We could miss him.
[09:19.270 --> 09:20.870]  I can't believe you just said that about him.
[09:21.610 --> 09:22.950]  And you're one of his supporters, too.
[09:23.130 --> 09:23.290]  Yeah.
[09:23.330 --> 09:23.570]  Unbelievable.
[09:24.370 --> 09:24.570]  Okay.
[09:26.110 --> 09:26.530]  All right.
[09:26.570 --> 09:27.290]  Well, you just made a new enemy.
[09:28.330 --> 09:31.570]  We have a very special guest who is not here yet.
[09:31.670 --> 09:31.870]  Okay.
[09:31.950 --> 09:33.690]  I just want to let everybody know that he's on his way.
[09:33.790 --> 09:37.310]  He happens to be probably the most wanted man in the United States at the moment.
[09:37.830 --> 09:40.390]  Wait, we got the Yemeni cleric on?
[09:40.430 --> 09:44.030]  No, but I guess in the eyes of some, that might be very close.
[09:45.410 --> 09:47.670]  You know, it's embarrassing because I don't know how to pronounce his last name.
[09:47.750 --> 09:48.570]  Julian Assange?
[09:48.870 --> 09:49.190]  Assange?
[09:49.350 --> 09:50.030]  How do you say that?
[09:50.350 --> 09:51.550]  A-S-S-A-N-G-E.
[09:51.670 --> 09:53.230]  I think it's Assange, but I could be wrong.
[09:53.310 --> 09:54.030]  I'm going to say Assange.
[09:54.130 --> 09:54.750]  I'll trust you on this.
[09:55.070 --> 09:58.770]  He is the, I guess, the main force behind WikiLeaks.
[09:58.770 --> 10:07.390]  And those of you following the news in the last few days, WikiLeaks has been front page center insofar as releasing some video.
[10:07.550 --> 10:09.450]  And somebody, somebody was released there.
[10:09.730 --> 10:10.470]  Okay, video.
[10:10.830 --> 10:11.650]  Bernie, are you still with us?
[10:11.850 --> 10:12.610]  I'm still here.
[10:12.710 --> 10:12.850]  Good.
[10:13.590 --> 10:19.030]  As far as the videotape concerning U.S.
[10:19.330 --> 10:22.830]  troops shooting at civilians, journalists.
[10:23.110 --> 10:24.290]  Bernie, do you have details?
[10:24.290 --> 10:31.370]  I know you were following how, not only the video itself, but also how the story is changing from those in control.
[10:32.610 --> 10:33.830]  Well, I watched the video.
[10:33.970 --> 10:44.350]  You can go to WikiLeaks.org, W-I-K-I-L-E-A-K-S.org, and see this really interesting video, which apparently, I mean, Julian can fill us in on the story.
[10:44.350 --> 10:45.730]  I guess you're trying to get him back on the phone.
[10:45.730 --> 11:08.210]  But it's really a horrible depiction of what gunners on our Apache helicopters in Iraq were seeing as they were shooting a crowd of civilians, including two journalists from Reuters and Cameron and children.
[11:08.210 --> 11:30.930]  And it's really awful, and it's interesting to see how people in authority tend to look for something that's not there and seem to see it when it's not there and jump to conclusions and stretch their imagination to whether it's to circumvent rules of engagement or to circumvent the Constitution.
[11:30.930 --> 11:37.410]  I see this pattern over and over again, and that's exactly what I saw in this video, and it takes a strong stomach to watch.
[11:38.010 --> 11:42.870]  But it's worth seeing, and it's worth reading some of the U.S.
[11:43.030 --> 11:46.470]  Army's reports right after it happened.
[11:46.570 --> 11:53.350]  They did the interview, the gunners and so forth, and then you see the stories change as things go, and now we see the real truth.
[11:53.510 --> 11:55.430]  So, is Julian back on the phone yet?
[11:55.710 --> 11:57.830]  Well, he just got into the studio.
[11:57.830 --> 12:03.590]  Actually, Bernie's on the phone, so the only way to hear him is through the headphones there, as well as our callers later.
[12:04.030 --> 12:06.830]  But, Julian, welcome to WBAI.
[12:07.810 --> 12:08.970]  Believe me, you're a hero here.
[12:09.770 --> 12:09.990]  Thank you.
[12:09.990 --> 12:12.450]  I think you're probably one of the most popular people to walk through the door here.
[12:13.490 --> 12:20.330]  First of all, amazing congratulations for just pulling off what you do on a day-to-day basis with WikiLeaks.
[12:21.010 --> 12:25.170]  Can you start off just telling us something about how WikiLeaks got started, how you got involved with WikiLeaks?
[12:25.170 --> 12:30.170]  So, WikiLeaks started publishing in July 2007.
[12:30.550 --> 12:32.650]  It was in development in 2006.
[12:33.670 --> 12:38.690]  I was one of the principal people involved in its founding.
[12:40.150 --> 12:54.370]  We saw that from journalism community, from activism community, from people involved in cypherpunks, from those people who had fought the crypto wars, that what really pushed a reform agenda forward was unauthorized disclosures.
[12:54.630 --> 13:03.370]  And, in fact, unauthorized disclosures, before they are disclosed, give off an economic signal that you can smell.
[13:03.370 --> 13:21.230]  And that signal is, if work is put into restricting something from the public, then the people who know best, the people who have authored documents, the people who are trying to cover it up or conceal it, believe that it will have a reform effect.
[13:21.410 --> 13:27.870]  So, if you can selectively go after that information that has been restricted, you can selectively produce reform.
[13:29.390 --> 13:37.670]  And we have developed a theory on how to do that and have tried to put it into practice and have been largely successful, although there's a lot more work to do.
[13:38.070 --> 13:42.010]  Well, you've come up against everybody from PayPal to the Scientology.
[13:42.730 --> 13:46.730]  And I think you've pretty much landed on your feet almost each time.
[13:46.790 --> 13:48.190]  I think the most recent battle was with PayPal.
[13:48.310 --> 13:49.810]  They froze your assets at one point.
[13:50.230 --> 13:50.550]  Yes.
[13:50.550 --> 13:51.510]  Two points, actually.
[13:51.610 --> 13:52.050]  How many points?
[13:52.210 --> 13:52.630]  Two points.
[13:52.630 --> 13:52.890]  Really?
[13:53.270 --> 13:54.010]  It's incredible.
[13:54.090 --> 13:55.470]  They can just do that anytime they want.
[13:55.570 --> 13:56.290]  Did they ever give a reason?
[13:57.210 --> 14:00.550]  No, they gave no reason for this latest freezing.
[14:00.750 --> 14:04.050]  But PayPal is now some sort of chaotic network.
[14:04.790 --> 14:13.310]  It is so complex internally, the decision-making, and automated and put into neural networks that there is no sort of accountable decision-making involved.
[14:14.010 --> 14:16.570]  You've also come up against Chinese censorship.
[14:16.570 --> 14:20.970]  In fact, I think that's one of the forces behind the founding of WikiLeaks, was it not?
[14:20.970 --> 14:21.810]  Yes.
[14:22.050 --> 14:31.770]  And even before we started publishing, the Chinese added us to their filter under the basis, I think, that we had Wang Dan on our advisory board.
[14:32.070 --> 14:33.470]  And who is...?
[14:33.470 --> 14:36.970]  Wang Dan was one of the leaders of the Tiananmen Square revolt.
[14:37.630 --> 14:40.290]  I believe sentenced to 10 years?
[14:40.470 --> 14:41.110]  Yes, sentenced to 10 years.
[14:41.870 --> 14:43.850]  Just for releasing a memo or something, or an email.
[14:44.170 --> 14:44.650]  Served 6.
[14:45.610 --> 14:49.890]  He was the number one on the fugitive list for a while over Tiananmen.
[14:49.890 --> 14:50.430]  Right.
[14:50.550 --> 14:54.690]  But was it for releasing something about the 10th anniversary of Tiananmen Square that he got in trouble for that?
[14:54.810 --> 14:55.790]  No, that was another...
[14:55.790 --> 14:56.450]  That was somebody else.
[14:56.630 --> 15:05.530]  So there are all these people around the world being imprisoned and tortured and prosecuted in various ways, just for releasing information, whistleblowing, things like that.
[15:05.650 --> 15:09.730]  And what you provide is a way for people to do this and remain anonymous.
[15:09.730 --> 15:23.930]  Yeah, so we've tried hard to use both technical systems, so cryptographic systems and advanced networking, and combining that with legal approaches that multinational companies use to avoid tax.
[15:24.150 --> 15:45.790]  So that is spreading our infrastructure over multiple legal jurisdictions and sticking it into particularly favourable legal jurisdictions like Sweden, which has a source protection law, which makes it even a criminal offence for me to reveal my sources or for any of our consultants or technical advisors or any ISP that we have hired to do something.
[15:46.310 --> 15:51.930]  And which also makes an offence for government under most circumstances to spy on those communications.
[15:51.930 --> 15:58.010]  And Belgium, which has a communications protection law between journalists and sources, which is very broad.
[15:58.680 --> 16:06.470]  It defines source in a broad way, journalist activity in a broad way, and doesn't mention any particular communications method.
[16:06.470 --> 16:09.030]  So it refers to every possible communication type.
[16:09.270 --> 16:17.810]  So those are the friendlier regimes towards freedom of speech, journalism, things like that.
[16:18.190 --> 16:19.590]  Scandinavian countries for the most part.
[16:19.590 --> 16:22.510]  And, of course, do you want to tell us what's happening with Iceland?
[16:22.970 --> 16:23.410]  Yeah.
[16:23.610 --> 16:26.550]  So we saw something really quite interesting.
[16:27.570 --> 16:29.770]  We had dealt with a number of offshore banks.
[16:30.190 --> 16:40.330]  The biggest case was, and most well-known case is, the private Swiss bank, Bank Julius Baer, which is the biggest private bank.
[16:40.510 --> 16:42.330]  That means it specializes in private banking.
[16:42.530 --> 16:45.450]  You need a million bucks at least to even start opening an account.
[16:46.810 --> 16:51.750]  And it tried to sue us in San Francisco quite aggressively.
[16:51.750 --> 16:53.110]  We managed to defeat that.
[16:53.750 --> 17:08.790]  But we saw how they were working the operations with using Caribbean and off African coast islands and specialized laws there, secrecy laws, to funnel assets around the world.
[17:08.790 --> 17:14.410]  And companies would then use the registrations in those places to enable asset hiding.
[17:15.450 --> 17:24.830]  And we thought, well, we could possibly turn this idea on its head if we had a country that would be willing to do it, which is we could make some kind of openness haven.
[17:24.830 --> 17:38.290]  We could have a country that specialized and put together a package of really good laws to protect journalists, investigative journalism, ISPs, communications between sources and journalists.
[17:38.670 --> 17:51.630]  The whole flow of information from people who have access, whistleblowers, confidential government sources, computer hackers, to the people who give it out to the public.
[17:51.790 --> 17:54.630]  And in the end, that's ISPs and telecommunications companies.
[17:54.630 --> 18:08.550]  So if we could protect that whole pipeline, that whole flow, given that all publishing is moving onto the internet, we could in some way protect publishing everywhere in the world because people can stick servers or company registrations into Iceland,
[18:10.790 --> 18:16.210]  provided the Icelandic government would do it or some of the government would have the political will to do that.
[18:16.910 --> 18:28.250]  And a very interesting circumstance happened by coincidence in July last year where we leaked the Kerbthing large loan book.
[18:28.410 --> 18:43.390]  So that was all loans over 45 million euros made by the Kerbthing bank, which was the largest bank in Iceland, which had collapsed in December 2008 as part of the worldwide financial crisis, along with two other Icelandic banks.
[18:43.390 --> 18:54.710]  So that bank then went after us and tried to go after our source, although they didn't know who it was, threatening to put us into prison for a year for breaking Icelandic banking secrecy law.
[18:54.890 --> 18:55.050]  Wow.
[18:56.250 --> 19:04.350]  And of course, all our gear was outside of Iceland, so this threat was pretty much idle except for our source, and they didn't know who that was, so once again, another idle threat.
[19:04.350 --> 19:14.010]  So they then tried to attack the group that they could see, and that was the state TV in Iceland.
[19:14.330 --> 19:21.830]  So the next day, after we released the Kerbthing large loan book, the state nightly news, you know, the 7 p.m.
[19:21.910 --> 19:40.650]  nightly news, made the contents of that loan book and the things that revealed about sort of corrupt activities, insider loans and so on, its main news item, its first 10 minutes or so of its news program, and five minutes before the news was to go on air,
[19:40.730 --> 19:45.050]  an injunction landed on the desk, sort of like Hollywood, right?
[19:45.330 --> 19:45.470]  Yeah.
[19:45.590 --> 19:49.910]  But never had happened before in Icelandic history, preventing the news going on air.
[19:50.130 --> 19:56.310]  And so Roof, the state TV, was like, well, we can't tell you the news that you need to know tonight.
[19:56.510 --> 19:58.570]  So they went on the air to say, we can't tell you the news.
[19:58.770 --> 19:59.810]  We can't tell you the news.
[20:02.230 --> 20:04.130]  We can't tell you the contents of this news.
[20:04.310 --> 20:06.290]  However, we can tell you where you can get it.
[20:06.530 --> 20:06.910]  Oh, brilliant.
[20:07.050 --> 20:14.470]  And so they just left an image up of WikiLeaks, you know, for minutes and minutes on end as a sort of a penalty for the Kerbting Bank.
[20:14.670 --> 20:34.290]  And so every person with internet connection in Iceland, which is nearly everyone, because Iceland is the most connected country outside of Japan and South Korea, went and downloaded this document and started reading about the financial affairs of the richest people in the country.
[20:34.750 --> 20:40.750]  So in some ways, it sort of for a moment turned everyone in Iceland into investigative journalists.
[20:40.850 --> 20:45.070]  Well, it also must have gotten them a bit angry because they were told they were not allowed to know this.
[20:45.070 --> 20:49.370]  So that made them all the more determined to find out what it was they weren't allowed to know.
[20:49.570 --> 20:50.050]  Yeah, exactly.
[20:50.330 --> 20:53.970]  So by restricting supply, you increase perceived value.
[20:54.130 --> 20:56.850]  And so there was a signal that supply had been restricted.
[20:57.110 --> 21:02.570]  You see, now every time at 2600, we've gotten a lawsuit threat, we've printed it in the magazine.
[21:02.750 --> 21:09.850]  And that has always resulted in either the lawsuit being dropped or just so much unfavorable publicity being directed at the threatener.
[21:09.850 --> 21:15.630]  And I think that public disclosure serves us pretty well.
[21:16.330 --> 21:22.470]  One thing I want to read here, which is I think one of the most admirable things, has to do with Scientology.
[21:22.890 --> 21:35.170]  On April the 7th of 2008, WikiLeaks reported receiving a letter dated March 27th from the Religious Technology Center claiming ownership of several recently leaked documents pertaining to OT levels within the Church of Scientology.
[21:35.530 --> 21:40.990]  The email stated, The advanced technology materials are unpublished, copyrighted works.
[21:40.990 --> 21:45.010]  Please be advised that your customers' action in this regard violates the United States copyright law.
[21:45.130 --> 21:49.930]  Accordingly, we ask for your help in removing these works immediately from your service.
[21:50.150 --> 21:55.150]  The letter continued on to request the release of the logs of the uploader, which would remove their anonymity.
[21:55.530 --> 22:06.250]  WikiLeaks responded with a statement released on WikiNews stating, In response to the attempted suppression, WikiLeaks will release several thousand additional pages of Scientology material next week.
[22:06.250 --> 22:07.410]  And did so.
[22:08.250 --> 22:09.390]  Hats off to you for that.
[22:09.470 --> 22:10.310]  That's awesome.
[22:10.810 --> 22:12.110]  Also, there is...
[22:12.110 --> 22:14.170]  I think you're involved in every scandal going on.
[22:14.530 --> 22:17.570]  The Sarah Palin Yahoo hack that we were talking about here a couple of weeks ago.
[22:18.550 --> 22:20.690]  How did WikiLeaks play a part in that?
[22:21.250 --> 22:22.250]  Well, we...
[22:26.030 --> 22:30.570]  Someone posted a brief bit of information to 4chan about this.
[22:30.570 --> 22:39.850]  The allegation is this is the son of a Democratic legislative member in Tennessee who is now being investigated by the FBI.
[22:40.210 --> 22:46.130]  But our source came across that information and forwarded to us.
[22:46.450 --> 22:48.490]  It was immediately.
[22:49.030 --> 22:53.890]  And then we put that information up and other people took it from us and 4chan took it down quite quickly.
[22:55.470 --> 23:01.650]  That then became worldwide news because Sarah Palin was a very interesting figure and the U.S.
[23:01.990 --> 23:02.650]  primaries...
[23:02.650 --> 23:03.010]  Sorry, the U.S.
[23:03.350 --> 23:04.510]  election was in full flight.
[23:05.690 --> 23:06.330]  Interesting.
[23:06.550 --> 23:18.050]  In her book about her time as running for vice president, Sarah Palin says that that was the single most destructive event of the entire campaign.
[23:18.050 --> 23:18.670]  Wow.
[23:19.130 --> 23:20.290]  Really, a Yahoo hack.
[23:20.290 --> 23:20.830]  That's awesome.
[23:22.410 --> 23:24.030]  Okay, so now...
[23:24.030 --> 23:28.370]  Well, as far as how that person got caught, it wasn't by publishing on WikiLeaks.
[23:28.430 --> 23:30.190]  It was through logs of some other sort, I believe.
[23:30.870 --> 23:31.750]  We don't...
[23:31.750 --> 23:37.450]  Well, there's an allegation that the son of the Tennessee legislative member is the person concerned.
[23:37.450 --> 23:39.850]  We don't know whether that's true or not and don't pass any comment.
[23:41.830 --> 23:48.010]  But the police, the FBI, in their statements have said that it was...
[23:48.010 --> 23:54.310]  The information they came across was they had used their names or handles on 4chan.
[23:55.390 --> 23:56.850]  And so they left information.
[23:56.850 --> 23:58.870]  So if that was them, then that's...
[23:58.870 --> 24:00.690]  They did themselves in by doing this.
[24:00.810 --> 24:06.590]  As far as when somebody posts something to WikiLeaks, how secure is their anonymity?
[24:06.690 --> 24:10.170]  Are there logs of any sort that can be grabbed or stolen or anything?
[24:10.490 --> 24:24.830]  So we not only do not keep logs, but we pass everything through an encrypting network and make sure it goes through both Sweden and Belgium and another jurisdiction in order to pick up the source protection laws in those jurisdictions.
[24:24.970 --> 24:32.850]  And we have fully customized, very limited functionality web servers so that even in the event that...
[24:34.510 --> 24:37.530]  So those websites are very difficult to hack.
[24:37.890 --> 24:39.610]  from some sort of outside access.
[24:40.050 --> 24:48.390]  And then we have filters just in case they are hacked that there can't be any sort of JavaScript embedding to try and gain additional information.
[24:48.770 --> 24:52.770]  Now, let's move on to the story that everyone is talking about over the last couple of days.
[24:52.770 --> 24:55.210]  Front page of all the newspapers and websites.
[24:55.910 --> 24:58.410]  This video involving U.S.
[24:58.550 --> 24:58.950]  military.
[24:59.970 --> 25:02.030]  First of all, why is it getting so much attention?
[25:03.030 --> 25:09.730]  No, because it shows the slaughter of over a dozen people, up to 26 people.
[25:11.270 --> 25:13.970]  And two of those people are Reuters journalists.
[25:15.050 --> 25:25.330]  And it's the first time that such a video showing modern air-to-ground attacks has been shown.
[25:25.330 --> 25:31.650]  So it reveals what is going on with all these other Apache helicopter casualties, which have been many.
[25:32.850 --> 25:40.810]  Also, I mean, you can see that the tone of the pilots is, this is another day at the office.
[25:42.550 --> 25:56.330]  And why there's an initial confusion between whether a journalist is holding a camera or an RPG, actually the permission to engage is given before the Reuters journalist tries to take a photo.
[25:57.490 --> 26:06.410]  And then there's a really quite disgusting situation where everyone in the initial group except one man has been killed.
[26:06.620 --> 26:08.710]  And that is the Reuters driver.
[26:08.990 --> 26:19.950]  And he is crawling, wounded, prostrate in the gutter, crawling along and some good Samaritans stop in a van that van has two children sitting in the front street.
[26:20.110 --> 26:20.570]  They get out.
[26:20.690 --> 26:21.630]  They're completely unarmed.
[26:21.790 --> 26:22.770]  There's no arms around.
[26:24.610 --> 26:27.890]  And they go to lift him up and putting him in the van.
[26:28.130 --> 26:29.570]  They're looking at the helicopter.
[26:30.630 --> 26:35.350]  I assume they think that helicopter couldn't possibly fire on people who are rescuing a wounded man.
[26:36.670 --> 26:37.910]  And it does.
[26:38.230 --> 26:40.590]  And it does with permission from the commander.
[26:41.570 --> 26:46.630]  And then there's a hellfire missile attack later on which blows up passing pedestrians.
[26:46.630 --> 26:51.030]  And we sent two people to Baghdad to discover what was in that house.
[26:51.230 --> 26:52.990]  And in fact, three families were in that house.
[26:53.330 --> 26:56.190]  At least two women were killed during that attack.
[26:56.390 --> 26:57.790]  And then the whole thing was covered up.
[26:58.930 --> 27:03.350]  And Reuters tried to get that video for the past two and a half years under the Freedom of Information Act.
[27:04.790 --> 27:11.370]  The federal government is obligated to respond in some kind at least within 30 days of lodging and application.
[27:11.530 --> 27:15.910]  There was no response even to an organization like Reuters for over one year.
[27:16.390 --> 27:20.830]  And now, just after releasing this video, the U.S.
[27:21.170 --> 27:23.430]  military has said it can't find any copies of it.
[27:23.730 --> 27:25.830]  They appear to have all been deleted.
[27:26.310 --> 27:32.390]  And despite an existing Freedom of Information request being in for that video for the past two and a half years.
[27:32.390 --> 27:33.610]  So, a definite cover-up.
[27:33.910 --> 27:34.050]  Yeah.
[27:34.850 --> 27:38.970]  And statements made at the time like, we don't know how those children were injured.
[27:39.110 --> 27:41.210]  We don't know how the journalists were injured.
[27:41.370 --> 27:43.970]  Everyone's an insurgent except the two wounded children.
[27:44.110 --> 27:45.130]  Lie after lie.
[27:45.310 --> 27:50.030]  I imagine as soon as you got this video, you knew what you had to do with it.
[27:50.270 --> 27:54.750]  But did you have any doubts, second thoughts as to what would happen if you did release this?
[27:54.870 --> 27:58.270]  Well, when we first got the video, we weren't sure exactly what we had.
[27:58.410 --> 28:07.950]  We had a description that it was significant and showed an Apache attack killing people, but we had to decrypt it.
[28:08.730 --> 28:09.790]  So, it was encrypted.
[28:10.130 --> 28:11.230]  You had to decrypt it, huh?
[28:11.230 --> 28:12.230]  How was it encrypted?
[28:12.710 --> 28:13.510]  So, we don't...
[28:13.510 --> 28:17.670]  For source protection reasons, we don't want to say how it was encrypted.
[28:17.890 --> 28:30.950]  But we managed to decrypt it and we put out a call, in fact, for volunteers in relation to another video that we had for decryption.
[28:30.950 --> 28:41.350]  and we had some very large organizations step forward, not supply agencies, but very large, very, very large research institutions.
[28:42.230 --> 28:50.950]  Their head system administrators stepped forward and said, hey, look, we have, you know, several thousand computers here.
[28:51.130 --> 28:52.190]  They offered to help you.
[28:52.510 --> 28:52.850]  Yep.
[28:53.210 --> 28:53.830]  That's amazing.
[28:54.050 --> 28:54.770]  That really is amazing.
[28:55.550 --> 28:56.950]  We're speaking with...
[28:56.950 --> 28:59.150]  You know, I still don't have the last name pronunciation.
[28:59.550 --> 28:59.710]  Assange.
[28:59.970 --> 29:00.290]  Assange.
[29:00.430 --> 29:02.470]  Julian Assange from WikiLeaks.
[29:03.290 --> 29:08.670]  You've probably seen him on the news in the last couple of days, having to do with this incredible video that's been released.
[29:08.910 --> 29:11.490]  I want to open it up to our panel and then to our listeners.
[29:11.550 --> 29:14.690]  I would just like to make the first announcement that hasn't been announced before.
[29:16.370 --> 29:27.450]  even though we don't have any credit card facilities, online credit card facilities, because there was some, for just some technical reason involving our one that we had in the Netherlands.
[29:28.250 --> 29:30.090]  But we do take PayPal donations.
[29:31.470 --> 29:40.950]  We, over the weekend and the Monday, in response to this video, we have raised over $170,000.
[29:41.830 --> 29:43.190]  I think you can raise more.
[29:43.190 --> 29:46.290]  And I think our listeners and our readers can certainly help with that.
[29:46.490 --> 29:49.310]  How do people reach your site in order to be able to make donations?
[29:49.590 --> 29:53.770]  So they can just go to wikileaks.org and there's a number of different ways to donate.
[29:53.930 --> 30:01.030]  But I think that really is very interesting because it shows a genuine support by the public for what we're doing.
[30:01.230 --> 30:04.810]  And I think it means we're actually going to be sustainable in doing this.
[30:04.910 --> 30:08.710]  And we sent two senior people to Baghdad for this.
[30:08.710 --> 30:11.250]  I think we can continue doing that if we get that kind of support.
[30:11.270 --> 30:14.030]  Well, this shows the value of organizations such as you guys.
[30:14.090 --> 30:18.150]  I know we reported earlier this year that you had shut down as a result of not getting enough financing.
[30:18.330 --> 30:20.390]  Has that problem at least been overcome?
[30:20.730 --> 30:22.670]  Yeah, we have raised our yearly budget now.
[30:23.090 --> 30:24.230]  Okay, that's definitely good.
[30:24.290 --> 30:30.490]  And I don't think you can get better proof as to how important wikileaks can be in certain situations like that.
[30:31.190 --> 30:34.310]  Again, I want to open up to the panel here and then to the phones.
[30:42.950 --> 30:50.330]  admissions, what kind of steps do you go through to verify that they're actual, you know, what the content is and what the importance is?
[30:50.670 --> 30:55.450]  Yeah, so there's sort of a triage is the first thing, throwing out the absolute junk.
[30:56.130 --> 30:58.250]  And that's usually very, very quick.
[30:58.430 --> 31:00.230]  You develop an eye for what is crap.
[31:01.550 --> 31:05.130]  And that's just a kind of matter of experience and a little bit of judgment.
[31:06.570 --> 31:09.150]  And then there is looking at the forensics of the document.
[31:09.350 --> 31:14.890]  So you can see, in some cases, some metadata and other information or distortions.
[31:16.050 --> 31:24.110]  And just the sort of reading what is the potential motivation or the potential payoff for fabrication.
[31:24.590 --> 31:30.350]  And then in the end, you just call up the people who are meant to have authored it and say, did you write it?
[31:31.690 --> 31:36.010]  And for classified US documents, our experience is quite interesting.
[31:36.770 --> 31:44.150]  So OPSEC procedures say, if media contacts you and ask you about classified document to confirm it, you are neither to confirm or deny.
[31:44.550 --> 31:44.890]  But that's...
[31:45.490 --> 31:49.430]  WBAI, New York, 99.5 FM.
[31:49.710 --> 31:54.510]  In fact, if there's enough media coverage and enough push, they won't...
[31:54.510 --> 31:57.030]  they will remove that procedure.
[31:57.170 --> 31:58.430]  And you can just ask about all the facts.
[31:58.650 --> 32:01.470]  Just got to warn you about language on the United States radio.
[32:01.630 --> 32:01.890]  That's all.
[32:02.010 --> 32:02.730]  But we covered it.
[32:02.790 --> 32:03.030]  Don't worry.
[32:04.070 --> 32:04.550]  Okay.
[32:04.690 --> 32:05.430]  Gus, go ahead.
[32:05.870 --> 32:12.850]  I've been wondering for a while about Iceland and about this sort of journalistic and free speech haven they've been developing there.
[32:13.310 --> 32:21.550]  Do you think that there's any risk that Iceland will face isolation from stronger countries whose interests are threatened by this kind of openness?
[32:21.550 --> 32:23.210]  Well, like Qatar.
[32:24.170 --> 32:26.110]  So, Qatar is the base of Al Jazeera.
[32:26.390 --> 32:26.930]  Just the opposite.
[32:27.730 --> 32:30.150]  Qatar has a real big cannon in the Middle East now.
[32:30.270 --> 32:31.910]  And it's called Al Jazeera and around the world.
[32:32.290 --> 32:34.730]  So, I expect just the opposite.
[32:34.930 --> 32:40.990]  That, in fact, the diplomatic power of Iceland will substantially increase if it has media organizations based there.
[32:41.170 --> 32:41.410]  Rob?
[32:42.470 --> 32:47.210]  Obviously, you've been all over the news the last day or two discussing this.
[32:47.710 --> 32:51.110]  What can you tell us about the response that you've been getting from, say, the mainstream media?
[32:52.690 --> 32:53.610]  Yeah, quite interesting.
[32:54.510 --> 32:55.390]  Some has been good.
[32:55.570 --> 32:57.650]  New York Times has been pretty good.
[32:59.610 --> 33:02.570]  Washington Post early on, but as of Tuesday, did nothing.
[33:02.730 --> 33:04.830]  I think they did something later today.
[33:06.590 --> 33:07.610]  Took them that long, huh?
[33:07.790 --> 33:08.030]  Yeah.
[33:08.370 --> 33:09.190]  That was a bit strange.
[33:09.290 --> 33:12.590]  And we did a press conference in Washington, but maybe the right people weren't invited.
[33:14.930 --> 33:16.230]  Al Jazeera has been great.
[33:16.230 --> 33:17.330]  I mean, really good.
[33:17.530 --> 33:18.570]  Euronews, top story.
[33:18.730 --> 33:18.890]  Yeah.
[33:19.090 --> 33:23.930]  And they went down and interviewed the children who were in the van that were attacked.
[33:24.070 --> 33:26.330]  And we did this as well, but they did this independently.
[33:28.030 --> 33:29.190]  CBS was terrible.
[33:29.450 --> 33:32.650]  They just sort of did the first bit and they did a sort of spin on it.
[33:32.830 --> 33:37.030]  CNN yesterday was terrible, but that might have been CNN domestic.
[33:37.190 --> 33:41.030]  I did an interview this morning and the questions were actually quite good this morning.
[33:41.230 --> 33:45.250]  So I think this is a deep story.
[33:45.250 --> 33:47.410]  I mean, we've been working on this a long time.
[33:47.550 --> 33:51.390]  It's taken us a long time to sort of work, pull out the backstory, but there's a lot there.
[33:51.390 --> 33:57.510]  And I think the media will start to see that there's a lot to this and they can push it on for a long while.
[33:57.630 --> 33:58.830]  And it is one of their own.
[33:59.090 --> 34:03.290]  I mean, these are Reuters journalists, mainstream journalists, even though they're Iraqis.
[34:03.510 --> 34:05.070]  They're mainstream journalists who were killed.
[34:05.210 --> 34:08.850]  So there is a sort of bottom-up desire to push things, even if it's not for management.
[34:09.030 --> 34:10.050]  You didn't mention Fox News.
[34:10.230 --> 34:10.710]  How did they do?
[34:13.330 --> 34:14.630]  Are they even aware of the story?
[34:14.690 --> 34:16.310]  Surprisingly, well, I haven't seen the video footage.
[34:16.430 --> 34:18.370]  Fox actually sent someone to the press conference.
[34:18.790 --> 34:24.610]  They actually, in the article on Monday, they mentioned all three major events in the video.
[34:24.790 --> 34:26.770]  Most people only mentioned the first one.
[34:28.190 --> 34:36.530]  And today, it's quite interesting that the headline today was doubts raised about integrity of WikiLeaks video, et cetera, et cetera.
[34:36.750 --> 34:40.090]  And the leader paragraph is something conforming to that.
[34:40.090 --> 34:41.830]  But all the body is just the opposite.
[34:42.130 --> 34:46.250]  So all the body does actually go into the detail, repeats our statement, shows it's all a load of crap.
[34:48.590 --> 34:49.390]  So the...
[34:49.390 --> 34:51.650]  Sorry, I'm used to Australian radio.
[34:51.730 --> 34:52.650]  We can say anything there.
[34:52.650 --> 34:53.170]  That word is fine.
[34:53.370 --> 35:00.670]  But maybe the headline is just the request from the management as we'd like the story to reach this conclusion and the actual facts didn't quite add up.
[35:00.710 --> 35:00.810]  Yeah.
[35:00.930 --> 35:03.090]  So I think it's what the...
[35:03.670 --> 35:10.950]  I was speaking to a guy from New Yorker and he said what's probably going on is that the journalists involved want to get it past the editor.
[35:11.170 --> 35:13.950]  But the editor just reads like the first paragraph in the headline.
[35:14.590 --> 35:15.030]  So...
[35:15.030 --> 35:16.130]  So it's hidden in there.
[35:16.270 --> 35:16.770]  Yeah, yeah.
[35:16.770 --> 35:18.910]  If you read the whole story, you actually get the whole story.
[35:19.170 --> 35:19.350]  Walter.
[35:19.690 --> 35:21.170]  Back to the Iceland legislation.
[35:21.170 --> 35:22.130]  How is that coming along?
[35:22.290 --> 35:26.110]  We heard a lot about it moving forward really fast, like a month or two ago.
[35:26.310 --> 35:28.290]  But we haven't heard a lot of updates since.
[35:28.650 --> 35:28.890]  Yeah.
[35:28.990 --> 35:34.070]  It's in Parliamentary Committee now and the Parliamentary Committee is writing up a review report.
[35:34.070 --> 35:49.970]  So if anyone has any contact with Iceland or you might want to move servers there, so now is the time to tell the Icelandic government, the Ministry of Finance or invest.is, the sort of foreign investment part of the government.
[35:50.150 --> 35:53.670]  I write to them and say, hey, we want to move servers to Iceland if this goes ahead.
[35:54.150 --> 35:56.410]  That's the best way to encourage them to do it.
[35:56.550 --> 35:56.810]  All right.
[35:56.950 --> 35:59.550]  And I think that'd be a great thing for major companies in the U.S.
[35:59.590 --> 35:59.730]  to do.
[35:59.730 --> 36:01.130]  What does the timeline look like though?
[36:01.470 --> 36:04.630]  Like how, when can we expect this to actually pass?
[36:05.270 --> 36:07.250]  It has a few more hurdles to go yet.
[36:07.330 --> 36:16.150]  It's passed some significant ones and this Afghanistan video, sorry, this Iraq video has been quite important because we produced this in Iceland.
[36:17.910 --> 36:20.270]  And so that's all the news there.
[36:21.210 --> 36:26.110]  So it has to go through legislative drafting.
[36:26.330 --> 36:30.950]  At the moment, it's going through a process where the government has been ordered to draft the legislation by the parliament.
[36:31.150 --> 36:32.510]  But it actually has to do that.
[36:32.790 --> 36:37.390]  So I think it's probably six months or so before it becomes law.
[36:37.630 --> 36:43.970]  Are you able to tell us how long you were aware of the existence of the video or how long you had them before you released this information?
[36:44.190 --> 36:51.790]  Well, we're saying that we've had this for at least three months, but that includes a decryption time.
[36:52.010 --> 36:52.150]  Right.
[36:53.530 --> 37:01.710]  We've been working on it over the past, maybe just about three weeks, one month in its unencrypted form.
[37:02.030 --> 37:04.910]  Bernie, down in Philadelphia, I'm sure you have a point or two to raise.
[37:05.610 --> 37:07.070]  Yeah, actually, some questions.
[37:07.350 --> 37:11.150]  Julian, first I wanted to thank you for what you and your colleagues do.
[37:11.330 --> 37:13.290]  This is tremendously valuable work.
[37:13.290 --> 37:30.630]  But I've been reading something about some surveillance and threats, maybe veiled or not so veiled threats, that you or your staff received while developing this story and this project.
[37:30.790 --> 37:32.650]  Could you elaborate a little bit on that?
[37:33.230 --> 37:50.790]  Yeah, so we've had a number of surveillance issues and some very serious problems in Kenya where two people, two human rights lawyers who were working on something with us publicly were assassinated in March in broad daylight on their way to a meeting in the Kenya Human Rights Commission.
[37:51.490 --> 37:53.570]  We've had ambushes in Luxembourg.
[37:54.070 --> 37:58.070]  In the West, it's always been a sort of people meeting you and saying...
[37:58.070 --> 37:58.990]  Ambushes in Luxembourg?
[37:59.290 --> 37:59.730]  Yeah, yeah.
[37:59.810 --> 38:01.610]  It'd be in your interest to talk to us.
[38:01.610 --> 38:03.710]  So it doesn't go any more than that.
[38:03.830 --> 38:10.330]  But it's a clear, we followed you to the supermarket car park and maybe next time we won't just ask questions.
[38:11.090 --> 38:11.270]  Wow.
[38:11.750 --> 38:18.130]  But the number of surveillance events did increase perceptibly in Iceland.
[38:18.170 --> 38:24.930]  We're not sure whether that was because the surveillance was more incompetent than normal or whether the number of events were increasing.
[38:24.930 --> 38:34.130]  But I personally witnessed the two surveillance events which were clear because I challenged the people doing it and they ran away.
[38:35.510 --> 38:38.870]  And other people in the team say that they witnessed a number of these events.
[38:39.710 --> 38:44.250]  The two other events where there was a challenge and run away and, of course, many there were not.
[38:45.190 --> 38:56.350]  Then there was a volunteer who was arrested on another matter, but, insignificant matter, but was then asked questions about WikiLeaks.
[38:57.310 --> 39:02.070]  And he says the Iraq video was specifically mentioned.
[39:02.790 --> 39:08.490]  Now, we're not sure, we don't have independent confirmation of what he says during that interrogation.
[39:08.590 --> 39:09.530]  The police say something else.
[39:09.650 --> 39:13.990]  The police say that they were asking questions about WikiLeaks because they saw a sticker on his laptop.
[39:14.370 --> 39:18.410]  There are contradictions in the police story and there are contradictions in the volunteer story.
[39:18.410 --> 39:22.590]  And there's possibly other reasons for this sort of surveillance.
[39:22.950 --> 39:33.310]  We leaked several classified cables from the US Embassy in Reykjavik not long after Ayaget crashed a party there.
[39:33.730 --> 39:42.170]  And the US State Department has been aggressively investigating that leaking.
[39:42.330 --> 39:43.590]  We know this from two sources.
[39:43.850 --> 39:47.130]  They told senior Icelandic parliamentarians they were doing that.
[39:47.310 --> 39:50.350]  But that might have just been to say hey, we didn't deliberately leak this.
[39:51.350 --> 39:56.970]  But they also told the deputy head of news off the record that they are pursuing an aggressive investigation.
[39:57.250 --> 40:05.350]  And this is in fact the first time at least in the last 10 years that a full diplomatic cable has been leaked from any US embassy.
[40:05.910 --> 40:08.290]  So I think they are treating it seriously.
[40:08.670 --> 40:15.270]  And so the surveillance may have been related to the embassy leak and not the Iraq video.
[40:15.270 --> 40:25.270]  because it appears that CENTCOM essential command didn't have any pre-prepared press relations response to its release.
[40:25.490 --> 40:30.510]  We tried quite hard to maintain operational security in the production of the video.
[40:30.830 --> 40:36.790]  There were rumours that this was a video about Afghanistan and we deliberately allowed those rumours to flourish.
[40:37.010 --> 40:40.950]  We didn't say anything false but we didn't correct those rumours.
[40:42.550 --> 40:51.230]  and perhaps CENTCOM in fact did have a press relations package all ready to go about Afghanistan but they certainly did not about Iraq.
[40:51.450 --> 40:52.130]  Nice going.
[40:52.390 --> 40:52.850]  Very good.
[40:52.910 --> 41:16.590]  But speaking with Julian Assange from Wikileaks Wikileaks of course being responsible for the release of the video showing journalists civilians being killed by US troops in Iraq taking phone calls 212-209-2900 RedHack I'm still interested a little bit in the technology you use in terms of getting these leaks out I'm curious you mentioned before about the forensics of the documents and the things
[41:16.590 --> 41:41.630]  that are sent to you are there I mean measures obviously that you take to kind of clear those out but just maintain the content when you release this video do you change the format so that it's you know not any digital war marks Yeah, so we change the... we sort of recompile or reprint or transcode everything that we release as a precaution.
[41:41.830 --> 41:45.690]  And we also know about several tricks that are used in practice.
[41:46.010 --> 41:57.810]  So, as an example, the Bundeswehr and the Bundesstaat, the German Foreign Intelligence Service, places stamps at particular angles on their secret documents.
[41:58.010 --> 42:00.290]  And each angle is unique.
[42:00.430 --> 42:02.970]  So, if you know something like that, you can just remove the stamp.
[42:04.010 --> 42:13.090]  It's actually quite a nice, low-tech technique for watermarking, you know, just the sort of analog angle of the stamp and its page placement.
[42:13.810 --> 42:17.230]  Just as long as you do it in a random place on the page, each document becomes unique.
[42:18.830 --> 42:23.650]  So... but in fact, it is impossible to correct for all of those.
[42:23.730 --> 42:27.190]  In cases where we're very suspicious, we will rewrite a document by hand.
[42:28.110 --> 42:32.910]  And we haven't yet had a case where we were so suspicious that we just wanted to take quotes.
[42:33.030 --> 42:36.470]  But that is a way that some journalists have worked.
[42:36.490 --> 42:38.290]  You just take some quotes from a document.
[42:38.450 --> 42:48.130]  But, you know, if someone wants to trace something like this, they can just put a different word in and give that to a particular person.
[42:48.270 --> 42:52.150]  But that has a high level of logistical overhead in organisations.
[42:52.150 --> 42:54.510]  It means you can't swap documents between people.
[42:54.510 --> 42:56.070]  So it is very, very rarely done.
[42:56.310 --> 42:59.390]  Let's try one phone call, then we'll take some more questions in the studio.
[42:59.770 --> 43:00.350]  Good evening.
[43:00.550 --> 43:01.430]  You're on Off The Hook.
[43:02.650 --> 43:03.050]  Yes.
[43:03.050 --> 43:06.930]  Could you tell me when will our t-shirts be sent out?
[43:07.130 --> 43:07.390]  Okay.
[43:07.610 --> 43:12.570]  You know, I gotta... I gotta... Look, this is a valid question, but people, please stay on the subject.
[43:12.810 --> 43:15.610]  We have a lot of important things to talk about.
[43:15.810 --> 43:16.950]  Let's take one more over here.
[43:17.030 --> 43:17.390]  Good evening.
[43:17.530 --> 43:18.490]  You're on Off The Hook.
[43:19.430 --> 43:20.210]  Speak up, please.
[43:21.910 --> 43:22.230]  Yes.
[43:22.310 --> 43:22.810]  Yes, you're on the air.
[43:22.910 --> 43:23.170]  Go ahead.
[43:24.430 --> 43:26.030]  Oh, I was... Hi, guys.
[43:26.210 --> 43:27.710]  I was watching a program the other night.
[43:27.850 --> 43:28.170]  Orphan?
[43:28.510 --> 43:30.150]  Does this have anything to do with what we're talking about?
[43:31.370 --> 43:32.230]  Computer hacking, correct?
[43:32.550 --> 43:34.150]  Yeah, except we're not really talking about that tonight.
[43:34.150 --> 43:36.770]  We're talking about the WikiLeaks story.
[43:37.810 --> 43:38.410]  Oh, my God.
[43:38.530 --> 43:39.050]  But, I mean...
[43:39.050 --> 43:39.630]  Okay, you know what?
[43:39.690 --> 43:40.410]  Let's try another one.
[43:40.950 --> 43:41.510]  I don't know.
[43:41.610 --> 43:42.550]  Do anybody listen to the radio anymore?
[43:42.590 --> 43:42.910]  Good evening.
[43:43.030 --> 43:43.730]  You're on Off The Hook.
[43:44.250 --> 43:44.570]  Hi.
[43:44.630 --> 43:46.830]  I'm sorry if I came in the week of the show.
[43:46.870 --> 43:48.390]  Have you talked about steganography yet?
[43:48.390 --> 43:54.110]  And those possible avenues for the documents that you're talking about?
[43:55.810 --> 43:59.050]  We haven't so far needed steganography.
[43:59.270 --> 44:03.330]  But, of course, the opposite of steganography is fingerprinting.
[44:03.330 --> 44:06.510]  I mean, it's a steganography.
[44:06.710 --> 44:11.990]  Any stenographic process can be used for fingerprinting documents or watermarking documents.
[44:12.690 --> 44:19.570]  And, yeah, so we have ways of massaging out most or all of the popular techniques.
[44:19.910 --> 44:33.070]  And what we find in practice, although in theory these things are undefeatable, in practice, it's a logistical nightmare for organisations to do customised watermarks for particular documents.
[44:33.470 --> 44:36.490]  The work interferes with the workflow cycle.
[44:37.170 --> 44:40.810]  People can... means people can't be... swap documents with each other.
[44:40.930 --> 44:42.890]  They have to be clearly segregated.
[44:43.470 --> 44:48.250]  And if there's any opportunity to swap documents, the leaker can, of course, just take someone else's document.
[44:48.250 --> 44:53.610]  And very often, documents that are assigned to people travel over computer networks.
[44:53.610 --> 44:55.330]  They're stored on communications mechanisms.
[44:55.470 --> 44:56.830]  They go in the bin, et cetera, et cetera.
[44:57.030 --> 45:01.370]  So, just the people who you think have access to the document is...
[45:01.370 --> 45:07.590]  an organisation thinks has access to the document is always a very small component of who truly has access to the document.
[45:07.770 --> 45:11.710]  That is, police, computer hackers, telecommunications companies, et cetera.
[45:12.270 --> 45:21.570]  The Israel is only prepared in the scheme of things, but when you released the video, the Iraqi video, I noticed there was, like, an irregular copyright release.
[45:21.870 --> 45:26.210]  Have you given any thought to releasing your content under creative comments or a public domain or something?
[45:26.410 --> 45:27.090]  Yeah, we have.
[45:27.250 --> 45:28.970]  We didn't know what to do about that.
[45:28.990 --> 45:33.650]  And so, we're too busy actually preparing the video to understand how to manage the copyright.
[45:33.810 --> 45:35.050]  So, we just put a copyright on it.
[45:35.370 --> 45:38.410]  But in practice, we're giving it to anyone who asks.
[45:38.530 --> 45:40.330]  And I think we'll put a creative comments on the whole thing.
[45:40.750 --> 45:42.270]  Creative comments zero might be nice.
[45:42.890 --> 45:46.550]  I actually have a question, which is more or less from a WBAI listener.
[45:46.730 --> 45:54.970]  I was speaking with somebody I know, we'll call him Jay for the moment, yesterday about the video you released and about issues in general which governments try to hide.
[45:55.230 --> 45:57.030]  And this is going to be sort of a strange question.
[45:57.210 --> 46:03.290]  It may come off as a little bit slower than a lot of the speed that we're talking when we're talking about things like steganography and very high-tech things.
[46:04.710 --> 46:07.430]  I said to him, you know, that WikiLeaks had released this video.
[46:07.690 --> 46:12.350]  And he said to me, well, the really important stuff, they're never going to let you get.
[46:12.490 --> 46:14.470]  It's just going to be stuck in there.
[46:14.710 --> 46:20.570]  And we had a lot of talk about, like, why something would end up getting leaked and who might be involved in that and things like that.
[46:20.770 --> 46:27.110]  So, I'm just wondering, for WBAI listeners who may be thinking, well, we'll never really know the truth, what would you say to people like that?
[46:28.170 --> 46:35.670]  It sounds like your friend has been speaking to John Young since he just made these statements on Alex Jones not long ago.
[46:37.610 --> 46:39.990]  So, well, in a way, he's right.
[46:40.330 --> 46:42.850]  I mean, almost everything does not leak.
[46:43.690 --> 46:46.670]  Even with WikiLeaks, almost everything does not leak.
[46:46.950 --> 46:50.230]  However, more information is better.
[46:50.990 --> 46:55.210]  More information allows you to make decisions and actions that you couldn't make before.
[46:55.430 --> 46:57.470]  So, it is actually a false dichotomy.
[46:57.710 --> 46:58.910]  There is not a dichotomy.
[46:59.050 --> 47:00.310]  There is a spectrum of information.
[47:00.550 --> 47:04.810]  And the more you can move up on this spectrum, the more you can reform the world.
[47:04.810 --> 47:06.990]  And so, this is what we try and do.
[47:07.570 --> 47:15.670]  Also, any sort of human group has incentives to defect in it and people who betray each other.
[47:15.790 --> 47:21.030]  So, there's no human group that is immune from leaks.
[47:22.490 --> 47:32.490]  I'd just like to add a comment to that, which is that if you take the point of view that, okay, you're seeing this, but how much out there is there that you're not seeing?
[47:32.490 --> 47:47.010]  And I think it's important to realize that if you're seeing this now and it took all this time and effort to get this one video file out or this one document out or anything else, you have to really sit back and wonder what else is out there that's similar or worse.
[47:48.910 --> 47:56.550]  Have you been aware of other videos or other documents that you just can't get your hands on, but you know they're out there someplace?
[47:56.930 --> 47:56.970]  Yeah.
[47:57.290 --> 48:04.190]  Although, we're getting much better at going between realizing and having in a short period of time.
[48:04.550 --> 48:07.130]  But yes, think about this Iraq video.
[48:07.250 --> 48:18.870]  That did actually exist somewhere in the bowels of some American military computer network for the past two and a half years and not having a political impact.
[48:19.130 --> 48:26.010]  The rightful political impact that it should have had over that past two and a half years has been removed from our course of civilization.
[48:26.310 --> 48:31.330]  And civilization would have been better, probably, if it had been available two and a half years ago.
[48:31.470 --> 48:33.730]  And there's no doubt that there's thousands of other things.
[48:34.050 --> 48:41.010]  We have, in fact, over 10 more similar videos that we are working on.
[48:41.010 --> 48:41.430]  Uh-oh.
[48:42.110 --> 48:42.430]  Okay.
[48:43.130 --> 48:50.410]  Maybe you don't want to say more than that, but, well, on a related question, since this was released, personally, what have you had to deal with?
[48:50.530 --> 48:56.190]  Just coming here to New York, people recognize you on the street, any threats, or people hugging you, or what?
[48:57.030 --> 49:00.530]  Well, I would love to say I've actually had time to be on the streets at all.
[49:01.190 --> 49:04.050]  But no, just working in very little sleep.
[49:05.950 --> 49:08.110]  But, I mean, it's kind of nice.
[49:08.110 --> 49:22.270]  As WikiLeaks has shown over the past week that, using sort of military terms, that psychologically we are able to project force to Washington, to the press club, and we are able to project force to Baghdad.
[49:22.430 --> 49:27.090]  And I think that's a very important statement for a transparency organization to be making.
[49:27.290 --> 49:30.490]  You weren't worried at all about coming to the United States when this happened.
[49:30.490 --> 49:36.890]  I would almost expect you to be somewhere else, maybe Iceland, Australia, any place else than here when such a thing happened.
[49:36.890 --> 49:48.310]  I think having this video under my arm coming to the National Press Club was the safest moment for me to come to the United States.
[49:48.450 --> 49:56.190]  It would have been an instant career suicide for anyone to try and prevent that and that's probably why it was not prevented.
[49:56.750 --> 50:01.410]  Also, you know, there's a reason Guantanamo Bay is not in the United States mainland.
[50:01.730 --> 50:06.610]  It's because there is a perception how the law operates here.
[50:06.610 --> 50:11.270]  is that it doesn't operate offshore and so abuses are done offshore.
[50:11.510 --> 50:17.910]  So, to some degree, you are safest from American spying in the United States as opposed to out of the United States.
[50:18.450 --> 50:18.930]  Interesting.
[50:19.770 --> 50:27.890]  Those torture pictures that the Obama administration had promised to release last year and then kind of reneged on that, have you heard anything about that?
[50:28.750 --> 50:29.670]  The photos?
[50:29.890 --> 50:30.110]  Yes.
[50:31.490 --> 50:32.190]  Not yet.
[50:32.590 --> 50:36.270]  I mean, we would certainly, anyone who has them, contact us.
[50:37.650 --> 50:39.750]  No, we haven't heard about those.
[50:39.850 --> 50:43.950]  We had an interesting event on the way over here, trying to come here.
[50:44.710 --> 50:49.690]  So, Rob Hongrep, the founder of Access for All.
[50:49.750 --> 50:50.650]  Our good friend, yes, Rob.
[50:50.650 --> 50:51.290]  Our good friend.
[50:52.730 --> 51:03.310]  I, and a writer from The New Yorker, arrived at the Reykjavik airport to catch our flight to New York and then to DC.
[51:03.930 --> 51:07.470]  And, so, Rob checked in, no problem.
[51:07.830 --> 51:10.230]  Guy from New Yorker checked in, no problem.
[51:10.710 --> 51:15.030]  And then, I went to check in and it was, I'm sorry, sir, your ticket has been cancelled.
[51:15.610 --> 51:16.350]  Wow, really?
[51:16.650 --> 51:16.810]  Yeah.
[51:17.390 --> 51:17.910]  Cancelled?
[51:18.150 --> 51:18.390]  Yeah.
[51:18.930 --> 51:24.450]  And the New Yorker went into, quote, everything mode, ripped out his pad and was writing everything down.
[51:24.630 --> 51:27.870]  And Rob and I were looking at each other going, holy cow.
[51:28.570 --> 51:29.990]  Yes, except not cow, yeah.
[51:30.610 --> 51:31.570]  Except not cow.
[51:31.710 --> 51:34.030]  Who gets to cancel tickets?
[51:35.610 --> 51:36.430]  I don't know.
[51:36.950 --> 51:41.410]  We dealt things with the airlines and they said that my bank had had some problem.
[51:41.690 --> 51:44.810]  But, of course, they do actually authorize credit card transactions at that time.
[51:44.950 --> 51:46.790]  And I just bought the ticket again on the same credit card.
[51:47.270 --> 51:51.210]  I assume this was just some screw-up with the bank.
[51:51.410 --> 51:57.970]  But for a second there, we were, especially after what had happened with the State Department on my previous flight.
[51:59.370 --> 52:05.010]  Yeah, we had a moment of extreme panic that we weren't going to be making this press club meeting after all.
[52:05.210 --> 52:06.230]  Let me ask you one thing.
[52:06.390 --> 52:10.030]  We just had a development this week with regards to net neutrality.
[52:10.930 --> 52:14.850]  Comcast supposedly winning their fight for now against the FCC.
[52:15.490 --> 52:19.470]  Let's say that net neutrality was something that just didn't exist anymore.
[52:19.750 --> 52:25.230]  And let's say that Comcast was the company behind massacres of some sort or something like that.
[52:25.710 --> 52:31.710]  What kind of a world would we live in where they would have that kind of control?
[52:31.810 --> 52:43.350]  In other words, an organization like Wikileaks could survive if the values of net neutrality weren't cherished as much as they are now.
[52:43.490 --> 52:45.330]  Would you be able to simply be turned off?
[52:46.090 --> 52:52.450]  Yeah, so maybe there is steps afoot for some kind of balkanization of the internet.
[52:52.450 --> 52:55.850]  I see this when traveling in Eastern Europe and Cambodia.
[52:56.330 --> 53:11.070]  There's a whole bunch of websites you can't access because those websites have done a calculation that is your yearly, likely yearly income is less than they're going to make off you through advertising.
[53:11.390 --> 53:13.890]  And so you simply can't access those websites.
[53:14.090 --> 53:14.490]  That's true.
[53:14.690 --> 53:17.370]  Cambodia, Ukraine, Belarus.
[53:18.590 --> 53:22.170]  So that's a sort of balkanization on profit lines.
[53:22.870 --> 53:27.530]  I expect that that will continue unless something is done to stop it.
[53:28.630 --> 53:33.810]  Facebook censored outgoing links to this video on the .org address.
[53:34.030 --> 53:34.330]  Did they?
[53:34.470 --> 53:41.650]  We paid for a Vimeo account as a sort of backup account for YouTube and some other ways we had getting this video around.
[53:42.470 --> 53:45.290]  Vimeo took down that account.
[53:46.470 --> 54:02.930]  So although those organizations were not acting in their obvious direct interest, perhaps they were acting in what they perceived to be some sort of patronage network or just a general outrage by their customers.
[54:03.130 --> 54:14.530]  Or maybe reacting in the way that media networks self-censor and that they're not sure what the implications of them linking to this video are so they just want to take it down.
[54:14.610 --> 54:15.150]  We've seen that.
[54:15.230 --> 54:32.090]  I mean, that was just for this video but we've seen some truly horrific stuff in the UK where journalists, where the political editor of the New Statesman, a very senior and respected journalist who used to work for The Guardian lost his job at the New Statesman because he linked to one of our articles.
[54:32.710 --> 54:32.870]  Wow.
[54:33.990 --> 54:43.250]  Just going back to the question, I think this idea that countries might just, or certain sites might just not be in your country because you can't afford to buy the things that the advertising on themselves.
[54:43.550 --> 54:45.350]  Now, where is that decision made?
[54:45.410 --> 54:46.650]  Is that at the level of the ISP?
[54:46.690 --> 54:48.010]  Is that the websites themselves?
[54:48.310 --> 54:48.910]  Is that the government?
[54:49.390 --> 54:50.550]  That's the website themselves.
[54:50.770 --> 54:51.350]  The website themselves.
[54:51.650 --> 54:52.090]  Wow.
[54:52.150 --> 54:54.230]  And can you name any of the websites that are doing that?
[54:57.490 --> 54:58.910]  Vimeo is doing that.
[55:02.730 --> 55:06.610]  The distribution point for Comedy Central is doing that.
[55:06.810 --> 55:06.970]  Wow.
[55:08.230 --> 55:09.810]  John Stewart should know this.
[55:09.970 --> 55:10.950]  Yeah, the John Stewart show.
[55:10.950 --> 55:13.210]  that's because I went to look at it when I was in Ukraine.
[55:14.610 --> 55:15.050]  Okay.
[55:15.410 --> 55:31.810]  Anyway, we're just out of time but I want to give you one more opportunity to give out all the information you possibly can for people to both submit things that they like leaked and also ways that they can help WikiLeaks survive because I think you're going to need a lot of help,
[55:31.970 --> 55:32.530]  a lot of support.
[55:32.610 --> 55:35.830]  I think you pretty much have guaranteed that with actions over the last few days.
[55:44.030 --> 55:49.990]  People should submit leaks to secure.wikileaks.org and I'll give you editorial criteria.
[55:50.270 --> 55:50.930]  We make a promise.
[55:51.030 --> 56:02.710]  If you get us a document that fits the simply stated editorial criteria, we will publish it and we will try to get as much political impact for it as possible within the limited resources that we have.
[56:03.810 --> 56:19.750]  So the criteria is it should be restricted from the public, not published before of some legal injunction or something like that or classified and of diplomatic political or historical or ethical significance.
[56:20.810 --> 56:26.890]  And so those should go to secure.wikileaks.org We also take submissions in the post.
[56:27.130 --> 56:30.770]  Actually, a really good way of still doing anonymous stuff is in the post.
[56:31.930 --> 56:38.770]  or you can chat to us online and we arrange some other method.
[56:38.950 --> 56:41.890]  We have PO boxes in Cambodia and Kenya and Australia.
[56:43.710 --> 56:47.210]  And for donations, currently you can go to wikileaks.org.
[56:47.490 --> 56:49.050]  There's many different ways to donate.
[56:49.230 --> 57:02.530]  But people should also consider helping things like donations in an interesting way like creating t-shirts for us or there's one company that created soaps believe it or not, the wikileaks soap.
[57:03.990 --> 57:12.050]  So these sort of things that we would never ever have the time to do, couldn't possibly know where to begin, very very helpful.
[57:12.090 --> 57:13.130]  Just go out and do it.
[57:13.370 --> 57:16.610]  Don't even ask us for authorization, just go out and do it.
[57:16.950 --> 57:21.410]  Okay, Mike, real quick, just in case there's anyone not familiar with your work, how do you spell wikileaks?
[57:22.370 --> 57:29.330]  Wiki as in like Wikipedia, W-I-K-A, leaks as in leaked document, L-E-A-K-S.
[57:29.890 --> 57:32.050]  Okay, W-I-K-I-L-E-A-K-S.
[57:32.370 --> 57:33.110]  Voltaire, real quick.
[57:33.230 --> 57:42.090]  Are you still doing anything with the where you'll have like a link on it that like the BBC, that only the BBC can publish a document for like the first week?
[57:42.090 --> 57:59.870]  Yeah, we have, it looks like we may be successful in that funding, we applied funding to do that from the United Foundation and we are through to the final round of about a dozen people, there were 3,000 initial applicants and so that's $600,000 over two years.
[58:00.290 --> 58:02.770]  So we, looks like we'll be doing that.
[58:03.390 --> 58:15.030]  Okay, Julian Assange, thanks so much for stopping by, for doing what you do and may you continue doing it for a long, long time and hopefully people will be inspired by your actions this week and by your organization.
[58:15.310 --> 58:17.570]  You can write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[58:17.730 --> 58:18.430]  We'll see you next week.
[58:18.530 --> 58:18.670]  Good night.
[58:32.820 --> 58:34.880]  My computer My computer
[59:38.900 --> 59:42.760]  My computer My CPU.
[59:42.760 --> 59:42.760]  My computer.
[59:42.960 --> 59:43.560]  My CPU.
[59:44.980 --> 59:46.180]  My computer.
[59:46.380 --> 59:46.940]  My CPU.
[59:48.400 --> 59:49.600]  My computer.
[59:52.740 --> 59:56.800]  I'm a cybernetic organism living tissue over a metal endoskeleton.
[59:59.580 --> 01:00:02.060]  My CPU is a neural-led processor.
[01:00:02.300 --> 01:00:03.360]  A learning computer.
[01:00:09.900 --> 01:00:10.500]  Yeah.
[01:00:12.320 --> 01:00:17.840]  Alright, this is WBAI New York 99.5 FM, also streaming on the web at wbai.org.