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[01:17.570 --> 01:19.650]  It's 7 o'clock time for Off the Hook.
[01:30.600 --> 01:32.500]  I cut myself while shaving.
[01:33.040 --> 01:35.040]  Now I can't make a call.
[01:35.760 --> 01:37.840]  We couldn't get much worse.
[01:40.640 --> 01:43.280]  Fundidly Bump for the best, expect the worst.
[01:43.980 --> 01:45.800]  I hope that's understood.
[01:46.020 --> 01:46.880]  Fundidly Bump!
[02:31.950 --> 02:32.990]  And good evening to everybody.
[02:33.110 --> 02:34.010]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:34.090 --> 02:36.810]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:37.070 --> 02:38.330]  Joined tonight by Mike.
[02:38.570 --> 02:38.810]  Hi.
[02:38.970 --> 02:39.290]  Jim.
[02:39.570 --> 02:39.750]  Hello.
[02:39.990 --> 02:40.270]  Rob T.
[02:40.390 --> 02:40.850]  Firefly.
[02:41.030 --> 02:41.330]  Good evening.
[02:41.830 --> 02:42.430]  Dot Rhett.
[02:42.630 --> 02:42.870]  Hello.
[02:43.130 --> 02:44.490]  Down in Philadelphia, Bernie S.
[02:45.090 --> 02:46.170]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:46.530 --> 02:49.310]  And special guest joining us from Ireland is David Dolphin.
[02:49.530 --> 02:49.850]  Greetings.
[02:50.190 --> 02:50.530]  How are you doing?
[02:50.750 --> 02:51.490]  He's right there.
[02:51.590 --> 02:52.010]  That's not Ireland.
[02:52.010 --> 02:53.310]  Well, it's a good connection, isn't it?
[02:53.590 --> 02:54.970]  Well, I was in Ireland yesterday morning.
[02:55.350 --> 02:55.790]  Were you?
[02:55.910 --> 02:56.930]  How are things over there?
[02:57.150 --> 02:57.850]  Very well, rainy.
[02:58.390 --> 02:59.090]  Okay, good, good.
[02:59.350 --> 03:00.370]  Things are normal then.
[03:00.990 --> 03:07.770]  And here we all are for the first time doing a semi-normal show for, I guess, haven't done one of those in six weeks.
[03:07.930 --> 03:09.490]  We were fundraising for five weeks in a row.
[03:09.610 --> 03:10.450]  We were preempted last week.
[03:10.610 --> 03:11.590]  Here we are, finally.
[03:11.890 --> 03:14.330]  I don't think we've ever done anything normal on this show.
[03:14.330 --> 03:15.470]  Well, maybe not normal.
[03:15.670 --> 03:16.550]  Probably not the right word.
[03:16.670 --> 03:19.970]  But, you know, sort of able to take phone calls would be nice.
[03:20.150 --> 03:23.010]  We can talk to our listeners and update people on various things.
[03:23.150 --> 03:25.310]  And, boy, there sure are a lot of things to update people on.
[03:25.930 --> 03:32.610]  All kinds of things happening, most of them centered around the upcoming HOPE conference, taking place this July 16th through 18th.
[03:33.670 --> 03:34.630]  And, wow.
[03:34.730 --> 03:39.070]  Well, if you've been following the news, obviously, we talked about this a bit a couple weeks ago.
[03:39.570 --> 03:44.530]  You heard the whole thing about our keynote speaker being basically on the run right now.
[03:44.530 --> 03:50.170]  Now, I don't know how true that actually is, if he's in fear for his life or anything like that.
[03:50.170 --> 03:51.030]  But the U.S.
[03:51.350 --> 04:15.050]  authorities definitely do want to talk to him concerning the alleged 260,000 diplomatic cables that are supposedly in his possession because of the revelation that the military leak, this army intelligence specialist, basically told to a former hacker who then turned him in.
[04:15.230 --> 04:16.350]  It's a very complicated story.
[04:16.530 --> 04:17.170]  You say cables.
[04:17.310 --> 04:18.790]  I mean, did he swipe a bunch of patch cables?
[04:19.050 --> 04:19.270]  No, no.
[04:19.610 --> 04:19.750]  Okay.
[04:19.830 --> 04:21.850]  A cable really is a communication.
[04:22.190 --> 04:24.590]  It could be a whole email exchange.
[04:24.590 --> 04:25.370]  It could be a cable.
[04:25.730 --> 04:26.550]  It's a document.
[04:26.750 --> 04:28.410]  I think a document is a better way of saying it.
[04:28.550 --> 04:29.130]  Wouldn't you agree, Bernie?
[04:30.070 --> 04:30.470]  Yes.
[04:30.610 --> 04:37.230]  Or some people might refer to them as what people used to say, telegrams or telexes or something.
[04:37.230 --> 04:44.090]  You know, basically, they're classified emails is kind of what they come down to.
[04:44.330 --> 04:45.070]  Yeah, dispatches.
[04:45.090 --> 04:45.590]  How about that?
[04:45.930 --> 04:52.070]  Yes, but the key is these are classified communiques to and from the U.S.
[04:52.150 --> 05:01.010]  State Department with very sensitive information about, particularly in this case, about U.S.
[05:01.450 --> 05:03.150]  foreign policy, behind-the-scenes U.S.
[05:03.270 --> 05:05.070]  foreign policy in the Middle East region.
[05:05.550 --> 05:08.690]  And these would be of great concern to the U.S.
[05:08.750 --> 05:10.210]  State Department and the U.S.
[05:10.490 --> 05:13.370]  government in general if these ever saw the light of day.
[05:13.370 --> 05:19.510]  As the person who leaked them said, they contain terrible things that everyone should know.
[05:19.990 --> 05:22.550]  Yeah, and, you know, I'm all for people knowing terrible things.
[05:23.190 --> 05:29.110]  But it just seems so vague to me that this person had 260,000 of these things.
[05:29.230 --> 05:42.450]  And he told one person, and that one person is the person who turned him in, that person being Adrian Lamo, who we've had on this show in the past and is somebody that has a pretty prominent position.
[05:42.550 --> 05:44.630]  Not position so much, but just...
[05:44.630 --> 05:45.090]  Status?
[05:45.090 --> 05:46.150]  Not status, too.
[05:46.230 --> 05:46.990]  It's the same basic thing.
[05:48.450 --> 05:49.870]  It's, well, recognizable.
[05:51.030 --> 05:52.650]  Wherever the word works for that.
[05:52.810 --> 05:53.290]  He's well-known.
[05:53.450 --> 05:53.870]  I'm sorry?
[05:53.950 --> 05:54.370]  He's well-known.
[05:54.490 --> 05:55.030]  He's well-known, yes.
[05:55.090 --> 05:56.290]  Well-known in the hacker world.
[05:56.490 --> 05:58.630]  So it's been a bit of a shock.
[05:58.910 --> 06:02.430]  A lot of people that we know seem to be affected in one way or another.
[06:02.670 --> 06:05.850]  And, of course, there's a lot of back and forth as to whether or not he did the right thing.
[06:05.950 --> 06:14.530]  Basically, his point of view is that this person said that he had just given 260,000 classified documents to WikiLeaks and that they were going to be released.
[06:15.010 --> 06:18.110]  And his position is that, well, he doesn't know what he's going to do next.
[06:18.130 --> 06:20.230]  And he could be putting lives in danger or other people say nonsense.
[06:21.230 --> 06:22.270]  This guy is a hero.
[06:22.430 --> 06:24.890]  He's the one who released the video showing U.S.
[06:24.970 --> 06:30.250]  troops killing Reuters reporters, later denying involvement in that or guilt in that.
[06:31.950 --> 06:40.370]  And also the importance of having whistleblowers, the importance of having people leak information, classified information, get it out to the public.
[06:40.790 --> 06:41.750]  I think it's vital.
[06:41.750 --> 06:48.030]  And, of course, that's one of the reasons why we picked Julian Assange, the head of WikiLeaks, as our keynote for the HOPE conference.
[06:48.030 --> 06:49.850]  That's why we had him on the radio show a couple of months ago.
[06:50.750 --> 06:52.090]  We don't know the status of this.
[06:52.270 --> 06:54.070]  One way or another, we will hear from him.
[06:54.370 --> 06:56.550]  That much, I can assure you.
[06:57.370 --> 07:00.550]  But we don't know what the status of the story will be at that point.
[07:00.710 --> 07:02.690]  It's still about three and a half weeks away.
[07:03.030 --> 07:03.790]  A lot can happen.
[07:04.130 --> 07:07.130]  But, you know, it just goes to show that we're in the thick of things here.
[07:07.210 --> 07:11.250]  You know, we're talking to the people that really are movers and shakers.
[07:11.250 --> 07:12.510]  One way or another.
[07:13.730 --> 07:15.650]  And we'd love to hear people's opinions on this.
[07:15.690 --> 07:16.150]  What would you do?
[07:16.190 --> 07:17.530]  What would you do in a situation like that?
[07:17.650 --> 07:18.370]  You're talking to this guy.
[07:18.490 --> 07:19.510]  First of all, you know, why?
[07:19.690 --> 07:21.490]  Why are you talking to this guy all of a sudden?
[07:21.570 --> 07:28.170]  Why would somebody leaking all his classified information just suddenly reach out to someone without knowing who they are, just based on the Wired article?
[07:28.170 --> 07:29.230]  This is why he did it.
[07:29.590 --> 07:39.190]  The Army specialist reached out to Adrian Lema because he read about him in Wired and thought he would be a compatriot of sorts and somebody he could trust.
[07:39.650 --> 07:42.790]  And, well, it didn't quite turn out that way, did it?
[07:42.790 --> 07:45.550]  First, interesting, interesting turn of events.
[07:46.910 --> 07:49.430]  So this is something we'll be talking about at the Hope Conference for sure.
[07:49.570 --> 07:51.890]  We're going to have a special panel just for this as well.
[07:53.050 --> 07:55.090]  And the weeks leading up to it, in addition.
[07:55.350 --> 07:58.030]  You guys have any thoughts or updates or feelings?
[07:58.210 --> 07:59.990]  David, how do you feel about the story when you heard it?
[08:01.150 --> 08:01.750]  I don't know.
[08:01.850 --> 08:02.890]  I'm still quite mixed about it.
[08:04.610 --> 08:08.030]  Obviously, you know, WikiLeaks is incredibly important for freedom of press, freedom of expression.
[08:08.330 --> 08:12.930]  But there also has to, I think, be a certain line that...
[08:12.930 --> 08:16.150]  Now, I'm not an American, so maybe my views on this are slightly different.
[08:16.290 --> 08:25.070]  But I think you have to take a certain line on national security and wonder if there are certain pieces of information which are important for the interests of large populations.
[08:25.070 --> 08:28.390]  So if it was identified that X city in the U.S.
[08:28.390 --> 08:30.910]  would be very, very likely to be vulnerable to a chemical threat.
[08:31.090 --> 08:40.770]  And if this piece of information became available publicly, then it's possible that someone evil and malicious would know where to target their malevolent aims.
[08:41.630 --> 08:46.610]  Having that piece of information public, is that in the nation's best interest?
[08:46.870 --> 08:49.470]  Yeah, that's actually what a lot of people, I think, have been saying.
[08:50.010 --> 09:00.550]  It's one thing to release information that you've come across and realize and say to yourself, this should be known to the public, but it's another thing to just blindly release thousands upon thousands of documents?
[09:00.750 --> 09:01.330]  Sure, that's what I'm saying.
[09:01.430 --> 09:05.570]  And particularly if you have such a wide cache of documents, I mean, you're talking about a quarter of a million emails.
[09:05.690 --> 09:07.270]  There's no way you can read all those straight away.
[09:07.370 --> 09:17.830]  And it's only when a large group of crowdsourced people can sift through them afterwards that they may find some wonderful jewel in there that may be particularly useful to someone malicious.
[09:18.570 --> 09:26.870]  I also think it's worth noting Adrian's position that he was put in here because if he didn't say anything, I think that in itself would have been committing a crime.
[09:27.230 --> 09:30.990]  And I think it's rather unfair of this person to put Adrian in that position.
[09:31.030 --> 09:38.970]  And I don't think Adrian is completely to blame for any negative fallout of him basically doing what he had to to stay within the boundaries of the law.
[09:39.110 --> 09:43.050]  But then again, did he solicit such information from this person?
[09:43.250 --> 09:46.390]  I have to say, I can't believe you people are falling for this.
[09:46.870 --> 09:51.030]  I mean, like the US government says almost everything is a secret.
[09:51.690 --> 10:01.290]  And a lot of the times they say it's a secret because either just out of force of habit because they say everything's a secret or they say it's a secret because the information is embarrassing to the government.
[10:03.310 --> 10:15.270]  Not necessarily that it contains the plans to the air duct in the subway system that allows you to inject whatever paranoid fantasy you want to come up with.
[10:15.330 --> 10:17.930]  Okay, but who gets to classify documents then?
[10:17.990 --> 10:19.430]  Who's going to take on that responsibility?
[10:19.470 --> 10:22.190]  Who's going to say what is legitimately classified and what is not?
[10:23.490 --> 10:31.910]  I think it's the responsibility, you know, first of all, it's the responsibility of the government to like affirmatively like show that they have a reason for keeping things secret.
[10:31.950 --> 10:34.430]  I don't think their say-so should be sufficient.
[10:35.070 --> 10:43.310]  And I think, you know, first of all, we don't know if these quarter of a million cables actually exist, if Manning actually ever had them, if WikiLeaks ever actually got them.
[10:43.610 --> 10:45.570]  Manning being the army specialist is his name.
[10:45.710 --> 10:45.750]  Okay.
[10:47.810 --> 10:53.670]  But the document that WikiLeaks did release was classified document that the U.S.
[10:53.790 --> 10:56.050]  government said would be a threat to national security.
[10:56.270 --> 11:00.450]  They refused to release it to Reuters upon a Freedom of Information Act request.
[11:00.970 --> 11:06.270]  And we watched the video and the threat was to the notion that the U.S.
[11:06.390 --> 11:07.730]  government actually knows what it's doing.
[11:07.870 --> 11:09.450]  The threat was not to national security.
[11:09.450 --> 11:13.610]  No one's going to be able to watch that video and figure out how to attack anyone.
[11:13.890 --> 11:13.890]  Right.
[11:13.890 --> 11:13.910]  Okay.
[11:14.070 --> 11:17.970]  And I agree that that video certainly is not a threat to national security.
[11:18.130 --> 11:26.050]  But are you going to use that to say that none of the 260,000 dispatches are also a threat to national security based on that?
[11:26.210 --> 11:26.730]  I don't know.
[11:26.810 --> 11:30.650]  But it sure makes the government's claim that they are a threat sort of not very credible.
[11:30.890 --> 11:31.130]  Right.
[11:31.290 --> 11:36.490]  But, you know, I can sort of see the position that's being put out here that you don't really know.
[11:36.490 --> 11:37.930]  Well, 260,000 is a large number.
[11:38.250 --> 11:43.290]  Even if one of those is sensitive and you knew about it and you didn't say anything about it, you could be in trouble.
[11:43.490 --> 11:44.750]  I mean, Bernie, does that make sense to you?
[11:44.870 --> 11:45.050]  Go ahead.
[11:46.010 --> 11:46.650]  It can.
[11:46.850 --> 11:47.990]  And Mike's right.
[11:48.210 --> 11:48.630]  The U.S.
[11:48.730 --> 11:54.210]  government has historically overclassified more and more these days.
[11:54.210 --> 12:10.310]  We have another speaker at the HUB conference, John Young, who's for a long time released sensitive and classified information that was leaked to his group, Crypto, C-R-Y-P-T-O-M-E.org.
[12:10.490 --> 12:17.670]  Great website, which I'm sure inspired WikiLeaks to start its operations.
[12:17.950 --> 12:19.950]  But what the U.S.
[12:20.050 --> 12:30.270]  government and other governments around the world have frequently claimed about why their information needs to be classified is this phrase, sources and methods.
[12:31.150 --> 12:49.050]  And sources and methods basically come down to who your covert operatives are, your clandestine sources of information, and the methods you use or the methods governments use to obtain secrets of other nations.
[12:49.610 --> 13:01.070]  And these are like that that information, sources and methods, are really considered the crown jewels for how governments operate behind the scenes.
[13:01.330 --> 13:09.890]  And no doubt, if there are 260,000 classified State Department tables in possession of anyone, the U.S.
[13:09.930 --> 13:17.670]  government would certainly freak out that some of those would almost certainly have information about U.S.
[13:17.750 --> 13:20.190]  sources and methods that it doesn't want released.
[13:20.190 --> 13:39.250]  The reason that could be as Andrew Lamo's claims could put people's lives at risk would be if some of these secret sources or spies, that sort of thing, if their identity is revealed in any of these, those people's lives could be at stake.
[13:39.350 --> 13:39.830]  They could be killed.
[13:40.690 --> 13:53.590]  Whether we know for sure that any of these classified tables actually exist or are in possession of WikiLeaks or whether they really contain any sources and methods that would put people's lives at risk, we don't know.
[13:53.690 --> 13:54.470]  We may never know.
[13:55.130 --> 13:56.590]  I'm really curious, though.
[13:56.770 --> 14:01.830]  I would love to see behind the scenes what goes on with U.S.
[14:01.890 --> 14:04.570]  Middle East foreign policy, particularly those with respect to Israel.
[14:04.570 --> 14:09.350]  But, in any case, time will tell and this story keeps to be changing every day.
[14:09.690 --> 14:10.670]  So, hold on.
[14:10.790 --> 14:22.330]  Well, I mean, the real concern as far as I can see is the ridiculous amount of security or insecurity that supposedly sensitive documents are under.
[14:22.330 --> 14:32.410]  The fact that some guy can just get a hold of them and start leaking them and apparently not get caught unless he tells somebody who's going to tell someone else.
[14:33.750 --> 14:37.990]  Obviously, by sending them to WikiLeaks, he was safe because they don't reveal their sources.
[14:38.170 --> 14:43.330]  In fact, to this day, they're not revealing information about what they have or who supplied them with what.
[14:43.630 --> 14:49.270]  And that's exactly what you should do when you're getting anonymous tips and things like that.
[14:49.490 --> 15:00.730]  The thing that bugs me is that Adrian said he was acting as a journalist and betrayed that confidence if he was acting as a journalist because, well, obviously Julian Assange is acting as a journalist as well.
[15:00.850 --> 15:06.170]  He's releasing this information and keeping the source confidential because that's what you do.
[15:06.270 --> 15:07.390]  You keep the source confidential.
[15:08.330 --> 15:10.170]  That's just Journalism 101.
[15:11.290 --> 15:15.430]  And if somebody is going to say they're a journalist, they have to act that way.
[15:15.470 --> 15:19.770]  And if they're just saying it to trap somebody, then that's a whole different story.
[15:19.950 --> 15:20.330]  David?
[15:20.770 --> 15:21.450]  Two questions.
[15:21.610 --> 15:24.730]  First off, the guy in the military, why didn't he go to WikiLeaks straight away?
[15:25.090 --> 15:25.710]  Oh, he did.
[15:25.790 --> 15:25.990]  He did.
[15:26.190 --> 15:26.670]  Oh, sorry.
[15:26.810 --> 15:28.670]  But he went to Adrian Lamo as well?
[15:28.670 --> 15:32.550]  Well, he went to him afterwards and said, that was me that went to WikiLeaks with the video.
[15:33.050 --> 15:34.850]  And yeah, that's the thing.
[15:35.490 --> 15:36.010]  Go ahead.
[15:36.110 --> 15:45.370]  I mean, one of the things also is that the only source of information, and I said this two weeks ago, is this Wired article and a couple of follow-ups that they've done.
[15:46.450 --> 15:49.350]  there has been no indictment as yet.
[15:49.590 --> 15:52.350]  There has been no confirmation from WikiLeaks.
[15:52.350 --> 15:53.170]  Or indictment against who?
[15:53.490 --> 15:54.290]  Against Manning.
[15:54.910 --> 15:56.210]  Isn't he in jail?
[15:56.390 --> 15:58.230]  Yeah, but he has not been charged yet.
[15:58.350 --> 15:59.310]  Well, he's in the military.
[15:59.410 --> 16:00.310]  They do things differently there.
[16:00.450 --> 16:01.650]  I'm just saying that the U.S.
[16:01.950 --> 16:05.610]  government has not said we have evidence that these cables have gone missing.
[16:07.890 --> 16:12.610]  And, like, I don't know how the military criminal procedure works.
[16:12.630 --> 16:24.270]  Just throwing this out there, but do you think it's possible that this guy is some kind of psychopath inside the military, and they do have those, that simply is claiming credit for something he didn't do, sees something WikiLeaks says, that was me, and,
[16:24.410 --> 16:28.770]  oh, by the way, I can get access to this and tell somebody this that isn't necessarily what really happened.
[16:28.770 --> 16:29.490]  Do you think that's possible?
[16:29.610 --> 16:30.830]  I think it's entirely possible.
[16:31.710 --> 16:36.550]  One allegation that I'm not sure if I believe it or not is that it's a deliberate setup to make WikiLeaks look bad.
[16:37.290 --> 16:38.050]  I don't know if that's...
[16:38.050 --> 16:39.050]  I've heard that said, too.
[16:39.150 --> 16:42.150]  I've heard that said from surprisingly varied sources.
[16:42.150 --> 16:55.390]  I can't go into more detail than that, but people who have been in touch with, let's just say, authorities on the inside say that's pretty much what's happening, that they are being set up to look really, really bad, that they're a threat to society and must be stopped.
[16:55.530 --> 16:56.510]  So, interesting.
[16:56.670 --> 16:57.910]  Interesting that's coming from different directions.
[16:58.070 --> 16:58.210]  David.
[16:59.810 --> 17:00.490]  Go ahead, David.
[17:00.570 --> 17:00.870]  Then you, Bernie.
[17:01.570 --> 17:11.290]  One thing to draw a comparison with this, WikiLeaks last year released a lot of the 911, sorry, 9-11 communications, a lot of the communications that happened around the time.
[17:12.310 --> 17:22.050]  Are there differences, in your views, between these classified documents, these classified communications, and the 911 communications?
[17:22.430 --> 17:24.470]  Well, it depends what's in them, obviously.
[17:24.950 --> 17:29.650]  In both cases, it wasn't known what's in them until you can do a large amount of searching through them.
[17:30.030 --> 17:36.850]  Personally, I would think that the difference between the two would be that one is nine years after the fact, and the other, it could pertain to current information.
[17:36.850 --> 17:38.330]  Well, no, these were classified documents too.
[17:39.010 --> 17:39.330]  Sorry.
[17:39.530 --> 17:40.130]  Were these classified?
[17:40.290 --> 17:40.890]  No, these weren't.
[17:40.970 --> 17:41.270]  These weren't.
[17:41.310 --> 17:41.710]  These weren't.
[17:41.770 --> 17:42.950]  Okay, so there's really no comparison then.
[17:43.030 --> 17:46.250]  One is considered to be classified, one is public information?
[17:46.710 --> 17:47.190]  No, no, no.
[17:47.230 --> 17:48.790]  I'm not talking about the classification of it.
[17:49.230 --> 17:56.190]  I'm talking about the possibility for important information within a large body of information.
[17:56.370 --> 17:56.570]  Of course.
[17:56.570 --> 17:59.830]  There could be some hidden nugget in there that is...
[17:59.830 --> 18:02.590]  And if there is, then is that a valid reason for it to classify it?
[18:02.590 --> 18:04.710]  You know, you could classify anything based on that.
[18:04.830 --> 18:08.430]  An overheard conversation or, you know, a picture of someone's house.
[18:08.590 --> 18:12.770]  You know, there's all kinds of things you could find a little clue and use that to get something else.
[18:12.990 --> 18:31.730]  There possibly is one difference people could argue about that is that any documents released around 9-11 would be based around a situation that many people said was handled negligently or, say, there's conspiracies or cover-ups or whatever it is and that information needed to be shown to the public and the public needed to know A,
[18:31.810 --> 18:42.250]  B, and C and, you know, investigations and commissions and all that sort of stuff whereas this was no event to precipitate releasing this kind of information.
[18:42.410 --> 18:45.890]  Well, there are lots of events but no huge events.
[18:45.910 --> 18:48.130]  What I'm saying is like he was asking if people might perceive it differently.
[18:48.270 --> 18:53.070]  That's the only logic icon besides their classification levels.
[18:53.270 --> 18:53.890]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[18:54.810 --> 19:00.010]  The information that David brought up was, in fact, about the 9-11 documents.
[19:00.210 --> 19:10.730]  Those were actually trans of alphanumeric pager messages that were memory used to work carrying around pagers like text like one-way text messaging.
[19:11.130 --> 19:20.530]  These were like hundreds of thousands if not millions of pager text messages around just before and after 9-11.
[19:20.850 --> 19:23.650]  And these apparently were NSA intercepts.
[19:23.830 --> 19:36.650]  And while the information didn't start out as classified, classified the compilation of them by the NSA into a large database or document, that in itself probably did constitute a classified document.
[19:36.870 --> 19:49.410]  What I want to really bring up was that what you and Mike had mentioned was that you'd heard that this could be a government effort to discredit WikiLeaks.
[19:49.410 --> 19:55.070]  and it's really interesting because WikiLeaks released another U.S.
[19:55.930 --> 20:01.590]  classified document not too long ago from the Pentagon.
[20:01.950 --> 20:19.310]  And this Pentagon report was describing WikiLeaks and other organizations that provide an avenue for whistleblowers to release classified documents anonymously to the public.
[20:19.410 --> 20:46.870]  and this classified Pentagon document basically had a strategy for how to cut WikiLeaks and similar organizations off at the knees and how to discredit them in order to put them out of business because this classified Pentagon document that WikiLeaks released a couple three months ago basically said that WikiLeaks stock and trade is the trust that people have in knowing that when they release
[20:46.870 --> 20:50.550]  information to WikiLeaks They do so with complete anonymity.
[20:50.690 --> 20:52.090]  And WikiLeaks is set up for that reason.
[20:52.650 --> 21:11.270]  A lot of hackers have spent a lot of time at WikiLeaks devising a system by which people can send documents with pretty good assurance that their identities will not be known, even to WikiLeaks, let alone U.S.
[21:11.370 --> 21:12.350]  government or other governments.
[21:12.350 --> 21:21.870]  And this more or less bears that out because you can imagine the authorities really wanted to find the person who leaked that video, and they weren't able to do so until somebody blabbed.
[21:22.250 --> 21:23.770]  Someone outside of WikiLeaks did that.
[21:24.130 --> 21:29.130]  So yeah, nothing is better testament to the fact that it is pretty secure.
[21:29.370 --> 21:31.930]  Secured by hackers, I guess, is the best way to classify it.
[21:31.930 --> 21:33.490]  So if the U.S.
[21:33.870 --> 21:49.010]  government has stated, for the record, well, secretly, on the record anyway, with a classified Pentagon document that it has not denied the authenticity of, that it would be in the U.S.
[21:49.130 --> 21:55.190]  interest that organizations such as WikiLeaks do pose a national security threat to the United States government.
[21:55.190 --> 22:13.370]  And in order to put these organizations effectively out of business, you would have to discredit their ability to keep their sources secret, to keep WikiLeaks and other organizations like it, their leakers or whistleblowers identity secret.
[22:13.550 --> 22:21.110]  Once you make people afraid to submit information to WikiLeaks, then the problem of organizations like WikiLeaks for the U.S.
[22:21.250 --> 22:23.830]  will go away because then people will be afraid to information.
[22:23.830 --> 22:33.250]  And I will bet you right now there are a lot of people who are afraid to submit information to WikiLeaks because Bradley Manning, who worked for U.S.
[22:33.730 --> 22:40.750]  intelligence in Iraq, army intelligence in Iraq, is now in an army brig in Kuwait, not being charged.
[22:40.750 --> 22:44.530]  And who knows what pressure he's being subjected to, and he hasn't even been charged with anything.
[22:44.690 --> 22:45.010]  Right.
[22:45.070 --> 22:52.090]  But like I said, the fact that it needs to be borne out here is that WikiLeaks was not the source of his identity being revealed.
[22:52.090 --> 22:56.050]  So that's, yeah, it's proof that it is actually secure.
[22:56.150 --> 23:07.210]  But my question to you, Bernie, is what kind of legislation are we looking at down the road that would make submitting something to WikiLeaks either a whole lot more difficult or even illegal?
[23:07.870 --> 23:09.850]  Well, that's a really good question.
[23:09.890 --> 23:13.290]  And I didn't know if we'd even get to this tonight, but there was a U.S.
[23:13.370 --> 23:32.070]  Supreme Court decision this very week, just a couple of days ago, that allows the government to basically incarcerate people for like 15 years for merely providing what it calls providing material support to the enemy.
[23:32.730 --> 23:36.110]  And there was considerable dissent in the U.S.
[23:36.210 --> 23:49.030]  Supreme Court saying that this infringes in First Amendment rights if people simply say something that could be providing aid and comfort to, quote, the enemy.
[23:50.110 --> 23:54.570]  In this case, the enemy could be some sort of boogeyman that the government usually trots out.
[23:54.570 --> 24:17.270]  But we talked several months ago or last year about a guy in, I think it was in Queens, Brooklyn, who was providing satellite video services to people from a lot of foreign sources, including a channel called Al Manar, which is Hezbollah's TV channel.
[24:17.270 --> 24:26.190]  And this guy was thrown in prison for many, many years recently for simply allowing people to see a TV channel from the Middle East.
[24:26.430 --> 24:27.570]  And now the U.S.
[24:27.670 --> 24:42.230]  government has the Supreme Court's stamp of approval to constitutionally, believe it or not, lock people up for merely providing information that's not even classified that could be considered providing aid and comfort to the enemy.
[24:43.210 --> 24:46.490]  And so this really fits in all with this.
[24:46.570 --> 24:50.070]  We are so on top of it in the middle of all this stuff.
[24:50.450 --> 24:51.470]  It's scary.
[24:51.630 --> 24:52.170]  It really is.
[24:52.330 --> 24:53.050]  It really is.
[24:53.210 --> 25:08.250]  This is really important stuff that our listeners should be aware of, because here our own government is saying you can be locked up for 15 years for simply providing information that it alone considers could be of aid and comfort to the enemy.
[25:08.250 --> 25:10.690]  It didn't even have to be classified information.
[25:10.950 --> 25:15.950]  So you asked the question, how people can fear.
[25:16.110 --> 25:18.070]  That's one thing people can fear.
[25:18.070 --> 25:22.850]  But I don't think people need to fear having their identities disclosed by WikiLeaks.
[25:22.990 --> 25:23.590]  The U.S.
[25:23.690 --> 25:30.690]  government would like people to think that their identities could be exposed if they were whistleblower and provided information to WikiLeaks.
[25:30.690 --> 25:48.330]  But in this case, unfortunately, or reportedly, it was the leaker himself, allegedly Bradley Manning, who blabbed to Adrian Lamo, who then blabbed to Army Intelligence and the FBI that...
[25:48.330 --> 25:48.790]  And Wired.
[25:49.250 --> 25:59.810]  Yeah, and Wired magazine that Bradley Manning was the source of the collateral murder video that WikiLeaks released a few weeks ago, and we had talked about on the air here.
[25:59.810 --> 26:09.370]  So it's really scary, though, how we have really been in the middle of all this and how things are changing, as I mentioned just a little while ago.
[26:09.570 --> 26:11.810]  Things are changing minute to minute, and we've got a U.S.
[26:11.810 --> 26:15.050]  Supreme Court decision that strikes right at the heart of all this just a couple of days ago.
[26:15.130 --> 26:16.910]  So people really need to follow this story.
[26:17.030 --> 26:24.330]  It's really important to all of us with regard to our First Amendment rights and your right just to know what your own government is doing.
[26:24.550 --> 26:27.530]  Hey, Bernie, just a couple quick points, then we've got to move on.
[26:29.630 --> 26:33.370]  The one thing that we don't have in the United States is an Official Secrets Act.
[26:33.530 --> 26:36.870]  So it's not actually against the law to leak classified information.
[26:37.110 --> 26:38.390]  You can lose your job.
[26:38.390 --> 26:40.690]  If you have a government job, you can lose your security clearance.
[26:40.810 --> 26:41.710]  They can make your life difficult.
[26:42.470 --> 26:45.350]  But what they try and do is charge people with espionage.
[26:45.950 --> 26:52.430]  And the interesting thing is that the charges don't stick when they charge people with espionage for leaking secrets to the press.
[26:53.430 --> 26:59.050]  So there's some little bit of hope still left for these people.
[26:59.830 --> 27:08.950]  And the other interesting thing is that the amount of attempted prosecutions for leakers is really shot up with the Obama administration.
[27:08.950 --> 27:15.210]  The new administration of openness has brought more criminal charges against leakers than the Bush administration did.
[27:15.210 --> 27:17.550]  And it's been around for much less time.
[27:18.170 --> 27:21.690]  So worrying times ahead, but we'll see if any of it sticks.
[27:21.930 --> 27:30.550]  Well, this kind of thing makes it easy for them to file charges when people are spreading information like this and being openly too public about it.
[27:31.030 --> 27:32.150]  Here's a letter that we got.
[27:32.370 --> 27:35.450]  Dear Off The Hook, I listen to your program almost every week because I think it is quite entertaining.
[27:35.510 --> 27:37.730]  And you guys cover some really cool topics.
[27:37.930 --> 27:40.350]  I'm not a hacker, but I am a professional software developer.
[27:40.510 --> 27:41.490]  But here's why I'm writing.
[27:41.490 --> 27:44.470]  I listened to the fundraiser you did on the 9th of June.
[27:44.790 --> 27:48.830]  You folks touched on the case of Bradley Manning, who was alleged to have leaked the Pentagon video to WikiLeaks.
[27:49.250 --> 27:52.450]  A couple of questions come up in my mind that weren't asked by any of the people on the show.
[27:52.550 --> 27:54.950]  For one, how does Manning know Lamo?
[27:55.590 --> 27:57.110]  Well, I think we answered that here.
[27:57.230 --> 28:01.550]  He basically found him online after reading a story in Wired.
[28:02.150 --> 28:03.630]  And it was as simple as that.
[28:03.690 --> 28:06.610]  And that's what I mean by how this is so worrisome.
[28:06.610 --> 28:14.790]  Is that somebody uses some kind of communication method over the internet and forms this trust with somebody they've never met, they don't know.
[28:15.050 --> 28:18.670]  And who knows how insecure that method of communication was in the first place.
[28:19.230 --> 28:24.670]  So that's very troublesome right there as far as somebody protecting their own privacy and liberty.
[28:25.350 --> 28:26.030]  Next question.
[28:26.110 --> 28:27.410]  What's the nature of their association?
[28:27.410 --> 28:33.690]  Well, again, I believe some logs of the conversations were released and printed by Wired.
[28:33.730 --> 28:34.650]  A lot have not been.
[28:34.810 --> 28:37.990]  So it's hard to say exactly what the nature of their association was.
[28:38.130 --> 28:44.410]  But it seems as if Manning contacted Lamo just basically through the information in the Wired article.
[28:44.590 --> 28:47.830]  Is Lamo a government informant or was he used for this particular case?
[28:47.830 --> 28:49.410]  Well, that's a question a lot of people are asking.
[28:49.410 --> 29:01.830]  If there's prior incidents of this or any other cases that he might be involved in, it's hard to say without being able to scan somebody's brain and know exactly what's going on.
[29:01.950 --> 29:05.150]  But obviously, that's open to debate.
[29:05.750 --> 29:08.010]  Would the WikiLeaks video fit on a CD or W?
[29:08.610 --> 29:13.670]  Well, why wouldn't he use a more easy-to-conceal micro SD card?
[29:13.830 --> 29:19.130]  Who uses CD players to listen to music anyway in an age of iPhones, iPods, cell phones, and the like?
[29:19.410 --> 29:30.850]  This is an interesting point because what Manning said to Lamo in one of the chats is that he would go into a room that had classified information on it with a Walkman, I believe, and a Lady Gaga CD.
[29:31.390 --> 29:35.110]  And just simply copy files onto that.
[29:35.750 --> 29:37.330]  And yes, a good point.
[29:37.510 --> 29:42.910]  Why not use something that's so much smaller and more easy to hide and a lot more timely?
[29:43.410 --> 29:48.850]  I believe some people say that, well, in the Army, they still use a lot of this really ancient equipment.
[29:49.410 --> 29:50.710]  But it's a valid point.
[29:50.850 --> 29:54.910]  There are some interesting things in this story that I'm not too sure about.
[29:55.410 --> 29:55.630]  Go ahead.
[29:55.830 --> 29:57.630]  Yeah, because it sounds almost clever.
[29:57.790 --> 30:00.590]  Oh, yeah, you write Lady Gaga or whoever on a CD.
[30:00.750 --> 30:02.070]  And all of a sudden, no one suspects it.
[30:02.130 --> 30:08.370]  But I have SD cards, several, and they all scatter around my house that hold more than a gigabyte's worth of data on them.
[30:08.410 --> 30:09.810]  Or maybe they take those from you when you walk.
[30:09.870 --> 30:10.190]  I don't know.
[30:10.930 --> 30:14.250]  You hide that in the lining of your shoe and no one finds it.
[30:14.250 --> 30:22.810]  A lot of government computers, and particularly government computers that deal with classified information, have the USB ports disabled so that you can't put SD cards in.
[30:22.870 --> 30:23.870]  But not the CD writers.
[30:24.710 --> 30:25.110]  Okay.
[30:25.650 --> 30:26.050]  Well...
[30:26.050 --> 30:27.270]  Yeah, it's Army Intelligence indeed.
[30:27.270 --> 30:27.770]  Go ahead, Rob.
[30:27.950 --> 30:33.650]  Also, if I were the security officer in charge of checking over things, I would probably give the Lady Gaga CD a wide berth myself.
[30:34.750 --> 30:35.390]  Good point.
[30:35.510 --> 30:36.910]  Okay, one more letter, then we're going to move on.
[30:37.490 --> 30:38.570]  I'm new to the show.
[30:38.750 --> 30:40.570]  I don't know much about this sort of thing.
[30:40.690 --> 30:42.110]  But 260,000 documents?
[30:42.310 --> 30:45.750]  How many people can there be who have read that many government documents at all?
[30:45.870 --> 30:53.010]  And assuming the story is true, presumably the person who allegedly leaked them must have sifted through many times that to filter out the docs that were worth leaking.
[30:53.390 --> 30:55.190]  All the time risking getting caught.
[30:55.290 --> 30:59.350]  Sounds implausible to me, but maybe I just haven't mastered the art of fast skim reading.
[30:59.550 --> 31:00.050]  Signed, Julian.
[31:00.430 --> 31:01.050]  Different Julian.
[31:02.510 --> 31:04.430]  But I don't think he read through.
[31:04.430 --> 31:08.930]  I don't think he sifted through or skim read or anything like that, the documents.
[31:09.090 --> 31:16.350]  I think basically it just gets to the point where you have access to things and you just start copying it and leaking it.
[31:16.490 --> 31:19.770]  And, you know, he was on a leak binge, I suppose.
[31:20.350 --> 31:20.830]  I don't know.
[31:21.650 --> 31:22.970]  More will come out about this story.
[31:23.010 --> 31:23.610]  It's fascinating.
[31:23.610 --> 31:26.390]  And again, we'll be talking about it at the Hope Conference.
[31:26.470 --> 31:29.270]  And we'll hear from Julian Assange one way or another.
[31:29.270 --> 31:40.770]  By the way, to make donations to WikiLeaks, it really is important that people do that to keep the organization afloat and to make future leaks possible because they really are the foundation of democracy, I think.
[31:41.630 --> 31:43.030]  Go to wikileaks.org.
[31:43.050 --> 31:45.970]  W-I-K-I-L-E-A-K-S dot O-R-G.
[31:46.270 --> 31:48.450]  And you'll find ways to contribute there.
[31:48.630 --> 31:49.690]  It's extremely important.
[31:49.850 --> 31:53.070]  And if that's too long of a URL, you can always just go to hope.net.
[31:53.070 --> 31:55.150]  We have a big nice button on the website as well.
[31:55.230 --> 31:57.930]  Well, that's true too, though it's about the same length in letters anyway.
[31:57.930 --> 32:11.850]  Okay, joining us now on the telephone is Travis Goodspeed, one of the brains behind the upcoming Hope badge that is being widely heralded.
[32:12.070 --> 32:13.850]  It's starting to be widely heralded all around the world.
[32:14.850 --> 32:15.810]  Travis, you're with us?
[32:16.470 --> 32:16.770]  Yes.
[32:17.010 --> 32:17.450]  How are you doing?
[32:17.750 --> 32:18.990]  Yes, I hear you just fine.
[32:19.430 --> 32:25.110]  So now you've been working long and hard on this badge, which supposedly outdoes the badge of last time.
[32:25.170 --> 32:26.070]  Is that possible?
[32:26.950 --> 32:27.630]  Quite a bit.
[32:28.130 --> 32:34.050]  The new badge uses a much more powerful microcontroller, thanks to a donation by Texas Instruments.
[32:34.650 --> 32:41.110]  So while the default software is the same, you can slap on a USB port and reflash it with anything you like.
[32:41.810 --> 32:42.290]  Wow.
[32:42.450 --> 32:42.690]  Okay.
[32:42.910 --> 32:45.250]  So can you give us some examples of what somebody might do?
[32:45.810 --> 32:48.770]  Well, the simplest example is a packet sniffer.
[32:48.770 --> 33:04.290]  So in the same way that you can sniff packets from an Ethernet network, you can add a USB port to your badge, plug it into your computer, reflash it with what's called the Goodfet firmware, which lets your computer speak directly to the radio within the badge.
[33:04.990 --> 33:10.350]  And then you can watch all of the broadcasts made by other badges in your region.
[33:10.350 --> 33:11.350]  Oh my goodness.
[33:12.170 --> 33:20.850]  And every badge is broadcasting four times per second so that its position can be known to the Internet at large.
[33:20.990 --> 33:24.390]  And this is then published through Web API.
[33:24.550 --> 33:29.690]  So anyone on Earth who likes to can query the position of any single badge within the conference.
[33:30.470 --> 33:31.930]  This almost scares me.
[33:33.170 --> 33:40.050]  If I have a badge, does that mean my privacy is going to be completely invaded and compromised?
[33:40.570 --> 33:45.830]  I mean, it's done more to make a point or as a hobby thing.
[33:46.010 --> 33:48.650]  So if you like, you can always pop the battery out of your badge.
[33:48.970 --> 33:52.450]  Or you can even reprogram your badge to lie about your position.
[33:53.450 --> 33:54.150]  Oh, wow.
[33:54.650 --> 33:56.030]  And that's going to be permitted lying.
[33:56.450 --> 33:56.690]  All right.
[33:57.590 --> 34:02.910]  Sorry, your cell phone can be used to identify your position internationally in the same manner.
[34:04.930 --> 34:10.370]  The tower that it connects to is public knowledge throughout the GSM specification.
[34:10.410 --> 34:14.070]  So you're really giving the same information away every day.
[34:15.070 --> 34:18.030]  I understand, it's just that fewer people are looking at it.
[34:18.150 --> 34:21.790]  So now at the conference, how are people going to see this?
[34:21.790 --> 34:27.690]  Is it going to be some kind of a display for people that just want to see information about all sorts of different people?
[34:28.430 --> 34:44.250]  So the OpenAMD project, which is an extension of the OpenBeacon project from which the badge technology came, is being used to do 3D graphical representations on monitors displayed throughout the conference hall.
[34:44.250 --> 34:51.370]  So you'll see a map of the conference hall, and then little icons will be moving around for every single attendee.
[34:51.830 --> 34:56.370]  By pushing the button on your badge, you can change the color of your icon to identify where you are.
[34:56.610 --> 34:57.130]  Oh, wow.
[34:58.750 --> 35:08.790]  This can also be used as a screensaver between talks, or there's even a portable phone app in the works for Android and iPhone.
[35:09.010 --> 35:10.150]  It will display the same information.
[35:11.250 --> 35:13.050]  Okay, this is incredible.
[35:13.310 --> 35:15.010]  How did you guys put all this together?
[35:16.430 --> 35:23.530]  There was the base code, which began with the German OpenBeacon project that was used for the Sputnik tags.
[35:25.950 --> 35:30.770]  I believe it debuted at 23C3 in Berlin.
[35:31.410 --> 35:40.810]  That was extended at the last hope to the beacon tags that were given out as badges for that conference.
[35:41.110 --> 35:47.730]  The new badges have a circuit, which is redesigned to use more modern chips and more powerful chips.
[35:48.530 --> 35:56.150]  And then the software has been ported from the 8-bit PIC microcontroller to the 16-bit MSP430 microcontroller.
[35:57.890 --> 35:58.830]  Okay, so...
[35:58.830 --> 35:59.050]  Manual?
[35:59.270 --> 36:00.050]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[36:00.590 --> 36:08.650]  I just want to say, for listeners who aren't technical, what these badges are, they're basically, you know, when you go to a conference, they issue your badge with your name sort of thing.
[36:08.810 --> 36:09.990]  We're going one further.
[36:10.230 --> 36:23.770]  This badge that Travis and a really competent team of crack hackers have been working on for months is going to be issued to you when you come to the next hope conference in July, provided you pre-register and get one.
[36:23.890 --> 36:27.490]  If you don't pre-register, all the active badges may be run out, so you better pre-register it.
[36:27.490 --> 36:39.870]  Yeah, let me just, before you continue, let me just remind people of that because, yeah, we are going to run out of these things probably very early in the conference or before the conference even begins because the people who pre-register get them first.
[36:39.890 --> 36:41.330]  And that's another reason to pre-register.
[36:41.430 --> 36:47.730]  Just go to hope.net and all the information on how to pre-register is right there, and you'll definitely get one of these badges.
[36:48.630 --> 36:53.830]  Otherwise, you'll get a badge, but it won't have all these cool gizmos attached to it.
[36:54.490 --> 36:58.850]  So these badges, really, they're RFID transponders.
[36:59.010 --> 37:00.650]  You know, people are familiar with the E-Z Passes.
[37:00.790 --> 37:05.170]  These are like the E-Z Passes on steroids in a hacker realm.
[37:05.430 --> 37:13.210]  I mean, these have cool red, green, and blue blinky lights, and they talk with everybody else's badge and share information, and they do everything you do.
[37:13.370 --> 37:14.830]  They only do the thing because they're computers.
[37:14.830 --> 37:22.250]  You can make them do whatever you want to do, and there's going to be free applications that Travis, like the GoodFit software and other people are going to be writing.
[37:22.470 --> 37:27.010]  And when you come to the HOOP conference, Travis is going to give a really interesting panel.
[37:27.150 --> 37:32.830]  He's going to discuss this in a second about how the badges work, and then he's going to hold a badge hacking workshop.
[37:33.130 --> 37:49.790]  Mitch Altman, our great friend and inventor of the TVBGone, has created a bunch of kits, with Travis's help, for people for a very tiny fee to get the extra parts they need to add a USB port and a chip to these badges.
[37:49.850 --> 37:54.410]  So you can make them talk to your computer and do all kinds of needs.
[37:54.410 --> 37:57.890]  Seth, Travis, do you want to touch on your talk and the badge hacking workshop?
[37:58.810 --> 38:00.590]  So there will be two talks.
[38:00.790 --> 38:12.150]  There's a panel which describes the OpenMV project as a whole, how the badges work, how they talk to each other, how to access the position data, and that sort of thing.
[38:12.550 --> 38:13.730]  That's Friday night.
[38:13.990 --> 38:20.530]  And then Saturday night, there's a second talk in which I'll be showing you how to break the security of the badge.
[38:21.210 --> 38:29.570]  So the badge itself uses cryptography to defend itself, as most modern technology does, but you can steal the keys from it.
[38:30.970 --> 38:35.170]  So having these keys, you can then do malicious things in the network.
[38:35.330 --> 38:45.530]  And it's a good hands-on example of how technology with decent security features can still be exploited.
[38:46.730 --> 38:47.290]  Fascinating.
[38:47.490 --> 38:47.770]  David?
[38:49.870 --> 38:50.430]  Thanks.
[38:50.910 --> 38:52.890]  One thing that I think that hasn't been mentioned...
[38:52.890 --> 38:53.870]  Sorry, Travis, David here.
[38:54.170 --> 39:02.410]  One thing that hasn't been mentioned is that I think effectively we're giving people a free Arduino with this, that we're giving someone a development board that can be used for later projects.
[39:02.410 --> 39:04.890]  They can build their own little software projects with this later.
[39:05.290 --> 39:16.590]  And for someone who is interested in hardware hacking or has been kind of on the periphery of it, but not really dove in, just going to Hope alone, you will be given a piece of hardware which you can use later for your own personal projects.
[39:17.030 --> 39:29.630]  David makes a really good point there, is that if you aren't really that into hardware hacking at this moment or don't have a lot of stuff, or maybe you're new and don't know where to start, you come to this, people tell you about what's going on, you get to learn something,
[39:29.850 --> 39:35.430]  and then we're even having kits in workshops to help people then actually do it.
[39:35.950 --> 39:37.830]  Travis, what's going on at your workshop?
[39:39.230 --> 39:40.770]  All sorts of fun stuff.
[39:42.310 --> 39:47.530]  I've been working on extracting software from microcontrollers lately.
[39:48.370 --> 39:56.390]  I mean, the workshop at the hardware hacking forum at the Hope Conference, that workshop, Oh, that workshop.
[39:56.550 --> 39:57.570]  Okay, that makes a lot more time.
[39:57.590 --> 39:58.730]  There's a lot of workshops going on.
[39:59.310 --> 40:08.010]  Okay, so we'll be doing a simple workshop throughout the day of adding USB support to the badge, which allows you to plug it into your computer.
[40:08.010 --> 40:18.050]  So if you have two badges, you can use one as a remote-controlled input for your PC, or you can start writing new games that run through the badges.
[40:18.550 --> 40:20.790]  All of the badge source code is available.
[40:21.230 --> 40:27.150]  So if you want to change the behavior of your badge while keeping it a part of the network, that can be done.
[40:27.770 --> 40:36.110]  The second workshop is more advanced and will focus on actually breaking into the badge as a security workshop.
[40:36.910 --> 40:44.530]  And these will both be in the hardware hacking village within the...
[40:44.530 --> 40:45.870]  I don't know which room it's in yet.
[40:46.090 --> 40:52.230]  A hardware hacking village, I believe, is going to be downstairs near the lockpicking village and the hacker space village, right?
[40:52.790 --> 40:53.270]  Yes.
[40:53.550 --> 40:53.750]  Okay.
[40:54.070 --> 40:57.950]  We have a lot of villages, a lot of villages downstairs in the Hotel Pennsylvania.
[40:58.170 --> 41:01.230]  It's going to be really quite a site, a historical site, I think.
[41:01.970 --> 41:05.550]  Travis, any closing words on things you want to say about the badge?
[41:06.330 --> 41:14.790]  For those who would like a sneak peek at the technology of it, the schematics and an in-depth description of it are available at my blog.
[41:15.970 --> 41:18.130]  It's travisgoodspeed.blogspot.com.
[41:18.730 --> 41:19.170]  Okay.
[41:19.310 --> 41:24.690]  Well, from all of us, we want to thank you for your many days, nights of tireless work here.
[41:24.690 --> 41:28.270]  And we look forward to seeing just what you guys can pull off in July.
[41:29.270 --> 41:29.690]  Great.
[41:29.970 --> 41:30.390]  Thank you kindly.
[41:30.730 --> 41:31.070]  All right.
[41:31.390 --> 41:32.550]  Travis Goodspeed joining us.
[41:33.190 --> 41:34.590]  Having developed the...
[41:34.590 --> 41:38.190]  One of the people developing the Next Hope badge.
[41:38.490 --> 41:47.590]  And, you know, I got to say, this is well above my head as far as technologies that can be abused and, you know, used for all sorts of interesting things.
[41:47.810 --> 41:51.530]  It's going to be fun to see what people actually are able to do with this.
[41:51.530 --> 41:55.130]  And, again, to register for the conference, www.hope.net.
[41:55.170 --> 41:56.550]  It's going to be pretty awesome.
[41:56.630 --> 41:56.850]  Dot Red.
[41:57.270 --> 42:08.870]  Just one last thing on that is if you're interested in this kind of stuff and if you know any programming languages and you want to help out with this sort of stuff, send an email to amd.hope.net.
[42:08.970 --> 42:12.490]  You know, you might be able to help make this even better than it already is.
[42:12.690 --> 42:12.930]  Okay.
[42:13.950 --> 42:19.090]  Speaking of hope and speaking of the hotel, we have to update people on the fate of the hotel.
[42:19.290 --> 42:24.530]  As you know, Vornado Realty wants to demolish the hotel that we have our conferences in.
[42:25.190 --> 42:29.330]  I don't know about the rumor that it's because we have the conferences in there that they are so intent on doing this.
[42:30.590 --> 42:33.810]  I'd like to think not, but we still intend to fight this.
[42:33.910 --> 42:35.230]  And, you know, this is interesting.
[42:35.290 --> 42:38.890]  For those of you who were around in the year 2000, you guys remember H2K?
[42:39.330 --> 42:40.390]  Were you all around for H2K?
[42:40.530 --> 42:41.670]  David, you weren't around for that, weren't you?
[42:41.670 --> 42:43.090]  But everybody else, I think, was.
[42:43.530 --> 42:44.790]  No, I doubt right you weren't either, were you?
[42:45.130 --> 42:45.490]  No.
[42:45.730 --> 42:47.090]  I actually came a little bit after.
[42:47.190 --> 42:47.470]  All right.
[42:47.550 --> 42:53.790]  Well, you missed a good one because in the year 2000, that was the year that we were sued by the Motion Picture Association of America.
[42:54.330 --> 42:58.410]  And as luck would have it, our trial began the very day after Hope ended.
[42:58.830 --> 43:02.150]  So right after the conference, there was no time to rest.
[43:02.670 --> 43:08.630]  After Monday morning, bright and early, we had to head down to federal court in Lower Manhattan and defend ourselves.
[43:09.210 --> 43:12.370]  And more or less the same thing looks like it's going to be happening this time.
[43:12.490 --> 43:22.230]  Now, we're not getting sued, but it looks as if the final decision or the final public hearing on the fate of the hotel is going to be held the day after the conference ends.
[43:22.370 --> 43:33.270]  So if you guys are coming into the city or you're in the city, if you're coming into the country, plan on spending some time here so that you can be one of the people speaking out for the hotel.
[43:33.430 --> 43:41.370]  And especially those of you coming from overseas, you will make such an impression on people of the city planning commission or whoever it is that's making the decision here.
[43:41.430 --> 43:44.690]  We have to get our facts together and figure out exactly when it is and what's happening.
[43:44.970 --> 43:56.030]  But you will make such an impression on them when they see how many people from around the world are affected by the existence of this place and how its demolition would adversely affect your lives.
[43:56.290 --> 44:00.830]  Now, from what we've heard, the hearing is going to be on July 19th, which is the day after the conference.
[44:00.950 --> 44:02.070]  That would be the Monday after the conference.
[44:02.210 --> 44:07.630]  I've also heard July 14th, so we're trying to sort this out, but I believe July 19th is the date that we have right now.
[44:08.010 --> 44:15.230]  We'll be posting more information on the various websites, 2600.com, hope.net, and various other ones.
[44:15.330 --> 44:17.070]  And of course, we'll be updating people on the radio show.
[44:17.170 --> 44:25.650]  But I just wanted to mention a couple of things because I was reading through a lot of the documentation about the proposed demolition of the hotel.
[44:25.750 --> 44:28.350]  You guys have a chance to look at this and what they're proposing?
[44:28.750 --> 44:29.250]  It's really...
[44:36.110 --> 44:36.910]  67 stories.
[44:37.330 --> 44:38.330]  Yeah, imagine this.
[44:38.390 --> 44:41.950]  67-story building rising right across the street from Penn Station.
[44:42.470 --> 44:46.050]  I mean, yeah, it's convenient for people who work in that 67-story building.
[44:46.070 --> 44:46.650]  But you know what?
[44:46.850 --> 44:49.350]  That building is going to be closed off to everybody else.
[44:49.450 --> 44:51.830]  It's going to be another fortress because it's going to be another target.
[44:52.110 --> 44:55.190]  They're going to have all kinds of sentry guards around it, 24 hours a day.
[44:55.490 --> 44:56.630]  It's just going to be like...
[44:56.630 --> 44:59.210]  No offense to the people around here, but it's going to be like Wall Street.
[44:59.450 --> 45:01.230]  And we don't really want that.
[45:01.730 --> 45:04.750]  Why exactly do you wish to avoid offending the people around here?
[45:04.750 --> 45:07.130]  Well, I mean, the people immediately around.
[45:07.290 --> 45:08.770]  The people in this...
[45:08.770 --> 45:10.390]  That can reach me in a matter of a moment.
[45:10.490 --> 45:10.650]  All right.
[45:10.710 --> 45:13.390]  Those people are nice, but you go down the block.
[45:13.570 --> 45:14.190]  I don't know.
[45:14.350 --> 45:16.190]  But I don't want it to be like that up there.
[45:16.330 --> 45:20.070]  But obviously, I have more selfish reasons because it's the hotel where we have our conferences.
[45:20.510 --> 45:21.970]  But that's where a hotel should be.
[45:22.050 --> 45:23.710]  A hotel should be next to a train station.
[45:24.010 --> 45:29.590]  Isn't that, David, isn't that the European way to have a nice hotel next to a train station in Europe?
[45:29.730 --> 45:29.970]  Sure.
[45:30.070 --> 45:31.950]  So you can hop off your train and straight into the hotel.
[45:31.950 --> 45:33.690]  On a side note, one thing I wanted to mention...
[45:33.690 --> 45:34.390]  Nice cheap hotel is what I meant.
[45:34.530 --> 45:37.630]  One thing I wanted to mention was that in Ireland, this wouldn't happen.
[45:37.770 --> 45:44.530]  I don't mean to toot my own horn, but the planning commission in Ireland say that you can't build a building which breaks the skyline from a main road.
[45:45.590 --> 45:46.310]  It's a...
[45:46.310 --> 45:47.990]  Well, that ship has sailed in this city.
[45:48.050 --> 45:48.330]  Yeah.
[45:49.350 --> 45:50.270]  That's not going to happen.
[45:50.350 --> 45:52.930]  So you can't build incredibly high sky rises.
[45:53.050 --> 45:55.610]  And as a result, it's kind of to keep our green image for tourism.
[45:55.850 --> 45:57.770]  But we've only built up to about eight or ten stories.
[45:57.790 --> 45:58.550]  Here's the interesting thing.
[45:58.650 --> 46:05.210]  I was reading through all this documentation because there are all these different meetings and periods and comments and things that you can file.
[46:05.490 --> 46:06.550]  And people are doing it.
[46:06.650 --> 46:09.050]  And thank you very much everybody who's getting involved in this.
[46:09.590 --> 46:16.630]  But while looking through what has been said about this, I noticed that Vernado had several different plans.
[46:16.770 --> 46:20.830]  Vernado being the company that owns Hotel Pennsylvania and most of that area.
[46:21.330 --> 46:27.970]  And they want to refurbish everything and make a whole brand new type of part of the city.
[46:28.390 --> 46:31.790]  Which has some merits but a lot of bad points.
[46:33.130 --> 46:42.030]  They basically are pushing all the subway renovation that the city would get in exchange for the 67-story office building.
[46:42.210 --> 46:44.230]  So that's what people are thrilled about.
[46:44.310 --> 46:44.690]  Oh, wow.
[46:44.790 --> 46:49.310]  We're going to restore the passageway that Gimbels used to have next to Penn Station.
[46:49.450 --> 46:49.870]  You know what?
[46:49.890 --> 46:54.550]  You can still do that without tearing down a hotel and building a 67-story office building.
[46:54.610 --> 46:58.950]  But the only way that Vernado is going to do this is if they get what they want.
[46:58.950 --> 47:08.710]  And I think that is something that people need to look at as suspicious because why hold all this in front of people and say only if you give us this will we give you something nice.
[47:09.010 --> 47:13.650]  It makes the this that they're going to build maybe not so nice in the first place.
[47:13.670 --> 47:17.910]  Maybe it's not something that you would approve if it wasn't for that carrot they were hanging in front of you.
[47:17.910 --> 47:28.430]  And if you read the proposal a little bit further you realize that if they don't get what they want they still intend to demolish the hotel and put up what they call a...
[47:29.070 --> 47:30.070]  what's it called again?
[47:31.210 --> 47:34.910]  There's some special word for a building that doesn't do anything.
[47:35.050 --> 47:35.950]  It's just an office building.
[47:36.290 --> 47:41.510]  Yeah, it's just an office building that doesn't have any particular function other than to be an office building.
[47:41.570 --> 47:49.870]  In other words they're going to demolish a 1700 room profitable hotel and replace it with just a standard office building and there will be no subway renovation.
[47:50.130 --> 47:52.290]  So it's almost like they're doing that to spite the city.
[47:52.550 --> 48:04.450]  So they're saying no matter what no matter what we're going to destroy the hotel city might as well give us something nice so that we can renovate the subway station a little bit and everybody will be happy and we can just forget about the hotel.
[48:05.430 --> 48:06.370]  Yeah, you know what?
[48:06.450 --> 48:07.050]  That's a...
[48:07.050 --> 48:07.950]  it's a no action building.
[48:08.070 --> 48:08.490]  That's what it's called.
[48:08.550 --> 48:09.590]  A no action building.
[48:10.870 --> 48:13.110]  That is what they promised to build there.
[48:13.330 --> 48:18.950]  Probably a legal term meaning that they don't require a variance from the zoning bylaws or something.
[48:19.050 --> 48:20.210]  They don't require any kind of variance.
[48:20.390 --> 48:31.110]  They can do this tomorrow because they own the building and that's the problem is Renato owns the building and they could tear it down anytime they want just like Pacifica Foundation could turn us into a country station anytime they want they own the station.
[48:31.470 --> 48:33.190]  That's how it works when you own something.
[48:33.570 --> 48:37.770]  Now if the building was declared a landmark, well you know what?
[48:37.850 --> 48:42.990]  You need the owner to want it to be declared a landmark for that to really work successfully.
[48:43.230 --> 48:44.130]  Yeah, you can do it.
[48:44.230 --> 48:51.950]  You can override them but it's a lot harder and a lot more time consuming and people don't really want to spend that kind of time supporting that kind of thing.
[48:52.090 --> 48:53.090]  People in charge that is.
[48:53.850 --> 48:56.130]  So yeah, we've got our work cut out for us.
[48:56.210 --> 49:02.690]  But it's obvious that Renato is pushing this for some kind of profit motive but don't really know what it is.
[49:02.890 --> 49:05.130]  It should be about community service though.
[49:05.390 --> 49:14.630]  Serving the community and serving the world because people from around the world come to this place and stay there and see New York and that makes it possible.
[49:15.190 --> 49:17.970]  So okay, more information will be coming up on that very soon.
[49:18.090 --> 49:18.770]  Let's take phone calls.
[49:18.850 --> 49:20.530]  212-209-2900.
[49:21.190 --> 49:22.530]  Dot Red, you had something to add to that?
[49:23.010 --> 49:25.770]  When you said, you know, we're not quite sure what it is he wants.
[49:26.110 --> 49:45.170]  Well, I can't say I know but what it looks like to me is with this building this new hotel and renovation the train station and opening up the Gimble Pathway it sounds like he wants to make this little enclave where you have this I mean they want to make this столonically where you have this Vernado station and everybody gets shuttled into this enormous building and it's like their own little
[49:45.170 --> 49:51.790]  section of the city that they're like you know renovating and have their security guards running around and it sounds almost disturbing.
[49:51.970 --> 49:55.130]  The privatization of New York I guess is a big step.
[49:55.170 --> 49:56.850]  In a very important part of Midtown Manhattan.
[49:57.430 --> 50:04.370]  Yeah, it's scary and of course it would be the end of the Hope Conferences as we know them because I don't know any of the place we could possibly afford to be in New York.
[50:04.490 --> 50:12.150]  I don't know how many of you guys have looked around but I've checked a lot of hotels in the area most don't even have the space we need and most they even have anything close.
[50:12.370 --> 50:14.770]  The prices are more.
[50:16.570 --> 50:17.770]  Okay, very quick Bernie.
[50:18.590 --> 50:38.830]  I just want to say if people want more information on this go to hope.net and when you go to hope.net click on the button that says forum or forums and when you click on that you'll see one of the forums that talks about save the hotel or you can just do a Google search for save the hotel and hope and you will see a lot of people talking about this what we're talking about right now and what you
[50:38.830 --> 50:56.670]  can do to help save the hotel Pennsylvania which is a tremendous landmark built in 1919 and really a mecca for people who want to travel on a budget to New York so check that out and I hope we can all pool our efforts to save the hotel.
[50:56.670 --> 51:15.590]  And that's an important point there that you raise it's for people that travel to New York those people aren't consulted when these plans are made they're not around they can't go to the meetings but you know what on July 19th you will be around because so many of you will be at the HOPE conference so let's make this happen we can actually do this alright we're going to take some phone calls Mike
[51:15.590 --> 51:20.490]  you're going to press the buttons this time alright good evening you're on off the hook Yeah, hi.
[51:20.750 --> 51:21.450]  Hi, what's on your mind?
[51:22.550 --> 51:23.010]  Oh, okay.
[51:23.430 --> 51:24.030]  Turn on your radio.
[51:24.150 --> 51:24.230]  Are you ready?
[51:24.570 --> 51:25.330]  Yeah, turn on your radio, please.
[51:25.390 --> 51:25.610]  Go ahead.
[51:25.730 --> 51:26.190]  Hold on, hold on.
[51:26.310 --> 51:26.670]  Oh, boy.
[51:27.870 --> 51:31.610]  You know, you think at this time in history, people would know to turn down their radios.
[51:32.410 --> 51:34.150]  And it's located a mile away, too.
[51:34.830 --> 51:35.710]  Listen, it's in another room.
[51:35.970 --> 51:36.590]  He's coming back.
[51:36.670 --> 51:36.830]  Okay.
[51:37.230 --> 51:37.710]  Okay, listen.
[51:38.390 --> 51:38.910]  Yeah, listen.
[51:40.030 --> 51:40.610]  Am I there?
[51:40.750 --> 51:41.870]  Yeah, please go ahead.
[51:42.370 --> 51:42.570]  Okay.
[51:43.130 --> 51:47.790]  My question has to do with what happened on the...
[51:48.330 --> 51:52.730]  what happened on one of the float-teller ships the other day in the Middle East.
[51:52.870 --> 51:53.450]  Okay, you know what?
[51:53.450 --> 51:53.830]  I'm sorry.
[51:53.930 --> 51:55.770]  We have nothing to do with what we're talking about right now.
[51:55.870 --> 51:57.490]  We're going to have to call another show and ask that question.
[51:57.690 --> 52:00.950]  We've got... Really, try to stick to one of the topics.
[52:01.050 --> 52:03.570]  We have three different topics we brought up tonight, so it shouldn't be that hard.
[52:03.710 --> 52:04.010]  Good evening.
[52:04.150 --> 52:05.210]  You're on off the hook.
[52:05.270 --> 52:05.530]  Go ahead.
[52:07.290 --> 52:07.990]  Speak up, please.
[52:08.850 --> 52:09.170]  Hello.
[52:09.410 --> 52:10.050]  Hi, what's on your mind?
[52:11.410 --> 52:16.830]  I was actually calling about the WeHeLeaks and the Adrian case.
[52:16.830 --> 52:19.270]  And that is one of the topics we talked about tonight, so go ahead.
[52:20.870 --> 52:21.310]  Okay.
[52:21.310 --> 52:35.370]  I was just kind of curious if anyone had, you know, read the Salon article that, you know, had questioned a little bit of the, you know, statements that Adrian had made.
[52:36.110 --> 52:37.730]  Yeah, I saw that article.
[52:37.810 --> 52:40.810]  A bunch of us have read that article, and it's pretty good.
[52:40.910 --> 52:42.290]  Yeah, Salon.com, I believe.
[52:42.290 --> 52:43.010]  Yeah.
[52:44.170 --> 52:44.970]  I don't know.
[52:45.070 --> 52:52.730]  I was just, you know, wondering if, you know, what you thought as far as the validity of that versus, you know, some of the statements that are being made by Wired right now.
[52:53.430 --> 52:55.910]  This is the article that Glenn Greenwald wrote?
[52:56.170 --> 52:56.550]  Yes.
[52:56.690 --> 52:58.790]  Yeah, I thought it was fairly insightful.
[53:00.130 --> 53:08.530]  There's a lot of things that we don't know about what's going on, and I think Greenwald successfully asks a lot of those questions.
[53:09.990 --> 53:11.310]  Yeah, exactly.
[53:11.650 --> 53:12.230]  I don't know.
[53:12.390 --> 53:19.430]  I just, I was curious, you know, with him being kind of loosely affiliated with the show, if, you know, you had a...
[53:19.850 --> 53:21.110]  Who's loosely affiliated with the show?
[53:21.830 --> 53:25.550]  Well, doesn't he maintain the Facebook page or something?
[53:25.590 --> 53:26.090]  Oh, no, no.
[53:26.210 --> 53:27.270]  Well, you're talking about Adrian Lamo.
[53:27.690 --> 53:28.710]  Basically, here's what happened.
[53:28.850 --> 53:31.530]  He started the 2600 Facebook group.
[53:31.650 --> 53:32.270]  Is that what it's called?
[53:32.310 --> 53:34.130]  I don't even know the right terminology for it.
[53:34.130 --> 53:34.550]  Pretty much.
[53:34.670 --> 53:42.190]  And, you know, in this day of social networking, if you start something before somebody else, you basically get to run it, especially in the loosely knit 2600 world.
[53:42.330 --> 53:45.870]  You run a 2600 meeting in, you know, Topeka, Kansas or something like that.
[53:46.210 --> 53:48.430]  Well, then you're the person that put it together.
[53:49.170 --> 53:52.050]  That's the kind of loose affiliation that we have.
[53:52.250 --> 53:57.490]  And there's always risks that something like this might happen and threaten to tarnish the image.
[53:57.490 --> 54:05.450]  But I also believe there's a number of other people on that group who are administrators or officers, whatever they call them on Facebook.
[54:05.590 --> 54:06.270]  I don't know.
[54:06.310 --> 54:07.750]  I can't really take it that seriously.
[54:08.510 --> 54:11.650]  But that's the extent of any affiliation.
[54:12.210 --> 54:12.870]  Oh, okay.
[54:13.030 --> 54:15.390]  I mean, I really wasn't, you know, sure.
[54:15.550 --> 54:20.190]  But I was just kind of curious what your thoughts were as far as the article was concerned.
[54:20.850 --> 54:22.290]  I always like to hear other perspectives.
[54:22.290 --> 54:23.570]  I'd like to hear a dozen more.
[54:23.710 --> 54:27.230]  You know, I'd like to see what other people have to say about this and other people know anything about the situation.
[54:27.970 --> 54:29.690]  Yeah, it's very intriguing.
[54:29.690 --> 54:33.090]  And I'm looking forward to seeing how all this plays out.
[54:34.270 --> 54:37.590]  And also just wanted to say I'll be attending Hope for the first time this year.
[54:37.770 --> 54:39.370]  So really looking forward to it.
[54:39.510 --> 54:45.390]  You picked a good one to come to because, wow, this is really... it's going to be very intriguing and fascinating and topical.
[54:45.790 --> 54:46.870]  Yeah, can't wait.
[54:47.130 --> 54:47.450]  All right.
[54:47.590 --> 54:48.670]  Thanks for calling.
[54:49.190 --> 54:50.290]  Let's see if we can squeeze in another one.
[54:50.290 --> 54:55.910]  I just want to say one thing about the Greenwald article is that he should be commended for at least attempting to do a little bit of research.
[54:55.910 --> 55:01.990]  Which even the Times and other big media outlets have basically just summarized the Wired articles.
[55:02.590 --> 55:05.270]  And Greenwald at least tried to look into what's going on there.
[55:05.390 --> 55:06.250]  What kind of research did he do?
[55:06.430 --> 55:13.530]  He was trying to figure out the relationship between Adrian Lamo and Kevin Polson, which people know is a long one.
[55:14.450 --> 55:16.590]  And figure out how that may have affected the story.
[55:17.490 --> 55:17.890]  Okay.
[55:17.970 --> 55:19.270]  People should read it if they get a chance.
[55:19.410 --> 55:20.010]  Salon.com.
[55:20.090 --> 55:20.210]  Okay.
[55:20.370 --> 55:21.230]  Let's take another phone call.
[55:21.630 --> 55:22.390]  And good evening.
[55:22.530 --> 55:23.190]  You're on Off the Hook.
[55:23.330 --> 55:23.610]  Yes.
[55:23.690 --> 55:23.910]  Hello.
[55:24.170 --> 55:24.630]  Yes, go ahead.
[55:24.630 --> 55:41.450]  The story about the hotel in Brooklyn, there was a similar story, if it still isn't around, where they wanted to build this big apartment house, a condominium on the right in Coney Island.
[55:42.050 --> 55:49.410]  And it turns out that they wanted to build it because it was a tax write-off.
[55:50.210 --> 55:55.350]  And that's all it was, to build this big, big apartment house.
[55:55.530 --> 55:59.870]  Yeah, usually it's a reason like that, a tax write-off, some way of making quick money.
[55:59.950 --> 56:01.370]  And the same thing must be with the hotel, then.
[56:01.850 --> 56:03.690]  It must be somebody's tax write-off.
[56:03.790 --> 56:07.790]  Yeah, because, I mean, look at the economy right now.
[56:08.010 --> 56:11.770]  Does this make any sense to build a 67-story office building in this kind of economy?
[56:11.770 --> 56:15.990]  No, because, listen, look, they've got so much office space in Manhattan that's not rented.
[56:16.390 --> 56:16.510]  Right.
[56:16.630 --> 56:17.750]  Down here, especially.
[56:17.970 --> 56:20.630]  You know, they're going to be building that Freedom Tower one of these years.
[56:20.650 --> 56:24.990]  And when they do, they're going to be trying to fill it with all sorts of tenants.
[56:25.250 --> 56:29.730]  And, yeah, these tenants are going to be in competition uptown.
[56:29.730 --> 56:31.570]  And it doesn't seem like the wise move.
[56:31.570 --> 56:36.010]  Meanwhile, 1,700 hotel rooms just are vanished like that.
[56:36.330 --> 56:37.390]  Let's take one more phone call.
[56:37.650 --> 56:38.330]  Good evening.
[56:38.530 --> 56:39.210]  You're on Off the Hook.
[56:40.270 --> 56:41.070]  Speak up, please.
[56:42.410 --> 56:43.030]  Yeah, hello.
[56:43.250 --> 56:43.910]  Hi, what's on your mind?
[56:45.170 --> 56:47.510]  It's a question of technology.
[56:48.610 --> 56:52.150]  That is what you call technology using video cams and what have you.
[56:52.150 --> 57:09.990]  Is there a possibility of doing video footage in one area and have it referred to a remote server, recorded on a remote server, you know, maybe, what, a mile away, 100 miles away?
[57:10.190 --> 57:17.410]  And I am thinking about, and, you know, you hung up on me very, very quickly a while ago.
[57:17.550 --> 57:20.990]  I was thinking about what happened on that ship the other day out in the Gulf.
[57:20.990 --> 57:40.590]  Could the people who were monitoring the behavior of the Israeli troops, could they have set up their cameras in such a way that they would have recorded what is happening, but it was actually recorded not only in the cameras, but on a remote server, let's say 100 miles away or wherever?
[57:41.090 --> 57:43.070]  Okay, you know what, we're going to answer this question really quickly.
[57:43.150 --> 57:44.010]  Who wants to take a step?
[57:44.010 --> 57:49.870]  The answer is yes, it's possible, but in international waters without cell service, it can be rather difficult.
[57:49.870 --> 57:51.290]  Okay, that wasn't so bad, was it?
[57:51.630 --> 57:53.950]  All right, that's our show for tonight.
[57:54.630 --> 58:02.610]  Write to us, OTH at 2600.com, and keep checking hope.net and 2600.com for updates on the stories that we've been following.
[58:02.910 --> 58:04.210]  Stay tuned for The Personal Computer Show.
[58:04.290 --> 58:05.310]  We'll see you next week.
[58:05.410 --> 58:05.570]  Good night.
[58:54.650 --> 58:57.330]  But your regenerative circuits are toned asynchronously,
[59:07.750 --> 59:10.310]  and that causes concatenation in the intermediate amplitude.
[59:10.310 --> 59:25.770]  But your regenerated circuits are tuned asynchronously, and that causes concatenation in the intermediate amplifier.
[01:01:03.540 --> 01:01:04.220]  Yeah.
[01:01:04.220 --> 01:01:07.020]  Alright, you know what time it is.
[01:01:07.220 --> 01:01:11.780]  It's 8 o'clock here at WBAI New York 99.5 FM.