[00:00.000 --> 00:05.400]  Ralph Nader, former presidential candidate and others, speaks to the need for resistance against the war machine.
[00:05.700 --> 00:07.780]  Have your voices heard in Washington, D.C.
[00:07.860 --> 00:09.580]  on Saturday, March 19th at noon.
[00:09.800 --> 00:18.880]  For more information, visit www.stopthesewars.org or call 866-973-4463.
[00:19.280 --> 00:21.360]  Without resistance, there is no peace.
[00:32.840 --> 00:35.780]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:36.030 --> 00:38.080]  Time is just about 7 o'clock.
[00:38.280 --> 00:39.740]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[02:15.070 --> 02:16.270]  And very good to hear everybody.
[02:16.370 --> 02:17.370]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:17.790 --> 02:21.970]  Matthew Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening, joined tonight by Mike.
[02:22.310 --> 02:22.490]  Hi.
[02:22.670 --> 02:23.150]  Redhack.
[02:23.350 --> 02:23.510]  Hello.
[02:23.990 --> 02:24.590]  Rob T.
[02:24.910 --> 02:25.390]  Firefly.
[02:25.710 --> 02:26.090]  Good evening.
[02:26.590 --> 02:27.070]  Voltaire.
[02:27.290 --> 02:27.410]  Hi.
[02:28.130 --> 02:29.590]  And Dot Red over there.
[02:29.870 --> 02:30.250]  Hello.
[02:30.750 --> 02:31.050]  Kyle.
[02:31.550 --> 02:31.730]  Hi.
[02:32.390 --> 02:32.870]  Jim.
[02:33.250 --> 02:33.470]  Hi.
[02:33.690 --> 02:34.310]  And Bernie S.
[02:34.430 --> 02:34.990]  down in Philadelphia.
[02:35.710 --> 02:36.650]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:36.970 --> 02:38.550]  Bernie, let me start by asking you something.
[02:39.050 --> 02:41.970]  Is there anybody that you did not hear just now?
[02:43.130 --> 02:44.430]  I heard everybody tonight.
[02:44.690 --> 02:45.010]  You did?
[02:45.490 --> 02:45.750]  Yeah.
[02:45.870 --> 02:58.330]  There's one... The reason for our listeners why you would probably ask me that question is there's some wacky problem with one of the microphone lines feeding our board where occasionally one of the people... One of the mics there doesn't feed audio to me.
[02:58.450 --> 03:01.250]  But everybody I heard tonight so far... Oh, I thought it was because you had a tin ear.
[03:01.410 --> 03:03.050]  No, it's because of... Okay.
[03:03.050 --> 03:04.030]  It was on our end then.
[03:05.790 --> 03:10.250]  Yeah, there's just... I can hear like them being picked up by other mics in the studio.
[03:10.370 --> 03:10.550]  Okay.
[03:10.550 --> 03:11.650]  Not the mic they're on.
[03:11.650 --> 03:13.070]  But it hurt everybody good tonight.
[03:13.170 --> 03:16.510]  And besides, my ear is made of plastic, not tin.
[03:16.670 --> 03:17.590]  Oh, you've had it upgraded.
[03:17.670 --> 03:17.810]  Good.
[03:17.950 --> 03:19.130]  Well, here's the thing.
[03:19.250 --> 03:21.910]  Kyle's at the microphone that was offending last week.
[03:22.010 --> 03:23.930]  And what I'm going to do is isolate him.
[03:24.130 --> 03:25.590]  Have him say something to you.
[03:25.730 --> 03:33.630]  And then if you could repeat back what he says, then we'll be able to troubleshoot this on the air and see if, in fact, there is still a problem.
[03:34.050 --> 03:34.290]  Now, Kyle...
[03:34.770 --> 03:37.650]  Is this the mic that somebody was on last week that I said...
[03:37.650 --> 03:39.590]  We believe that that is, in fact, the case.
[03:39.770 --> 03:43.690]  So Kyle is going to randomize some kind of a sentence or something like that that only he knows.
[03:44.410 --> 03:46.070]  And you're going to repeat that back to us.
[03:46.150 --> 03:47.570]  I'm going to turn down all the other microphones.
[03:48.230 --> 03:49.390]  And here we go.
[03:50.190 --> 03:50.670]  Hey, Bernie.
[03:50.870 --> 03:51.510]  This is Kyle.
[03:51.750 --> 03:54.170]  I wanted to let you know that I don't have a cell phone today.
[03:55.510 --> 03:56.690]  Did you hear any of that, Bernie?
[03:57.090 --> 03:58.870]  I heard that he didn't have a cell phone today.
[03:58.970 --> 03:59.970]  That's good troubleshooting.
[03:59.970 --> 04:01.010]  That's a remarkably good guess.
[04:01.150 --> 04:02.930]  Okay, well, I guess the microphone's working now.
[04:02.990 --> 04:04.130]  Maybe it actually got fixed.
[04:04.290 --> 04:05.350]  That does happen sometimes.
[04:05.670 --> 04:11.050]  Well, I hope our listeners weren't perplexed by our troubleshooting tonight, but you've got to do this with live radio.
[04:11.170 --> 04:14.790]  If, in fact, you don't hear somebody, feel free to mention it this week.
[04:14.870 --> 04:19.070]  Let us know, and we'll get to work on it and figure out what's going on.
[04:19.130 --> 04:21.610]  Maybe this fix was made possible by your pledges.
[04:21.850 --> 04:22.890]  It's entirely possible.
[04:23.550 --> 04:26.950]  Things get broken, and then things get fixed, and it's all made possible by you.
[04:27.210 --> 04:29.670]  Well, not the breaking part, I don't think.
[04:29.970 --> 04:31.470]  Listeners are responsible for things breaking down.
[04:31.830 --> 04:36.990]  But, you know, maybe you are because we use things a lot because you pledge and we do more things.
[04:37.450 --> 04:38.570]  And, yeah, okay.
[04:38.830 --> 04:44.330]  Oh, and by the way, special message to those of you out there who are still waiting for last summer's items.
[04:44.370 --> 04:46.330]  We're making progress on this.
[04:46.330 --> 04:47.050]  We're aware of you.
[04:47.490 --> 04:51.690]  There's a handful of people, and we're in the process.
[04:51.750 --> 04:59.110]  We have a plan in place now, and we'll be updating you on that personally at some point in the very near future.
[04:59.650 --> 05:02.270]  Anyway, yes, Kyle, you mentioned that you don't have a cell phone.
[05:02.390 --> 05:05.150]  And actually, this is something I think we should just mention for a brief moment.
[05:05.710 --> 05:12.790]  When we headed into the station today from Long Island, I made the unfortunate discovery that I had left my cell phone at home.
[05:13.250 --> 05:15.790]  And I said, oh, drats, or words to that effect.
[05:15.810 --> 05:17.510]  I don't have my cell phone with me.
[05:17.710 --> 05:19.470]  No, you were very, very calm about it.
[05:19.490 --> 05:20.070]  I was impressed.
[05:20.150 --> 05:24.430]  You just, you know, kept your course, and it wasn't even a big deal.
[05:24.430 --> 05:28.190]  You just realized it and continued your way rather calmly.
[05:28.470 --> 05:30.310]  You suggested I turn around and go get it.
[05:30.510 --> 05:31.030]  I did.
[05:31.250 --> 05:33.010]  And I said, no, you know what?
[05:33.970 --> 05:36.430]  I lived a lot of my life without a cell phone.
[05:36.830 --> 05:41.050]  Today is going to be one of those days where I just, the entire day, I'm not going to have a phone on me.
[05:41.330 --> 05:44.210]  And we had your phone anyway, so it didn't matter.
[05:44.430 --> 05:45.710]  We had a way of communicating.
[05:46.030 --> 05:57.070]  Yeah, and then I turned it on and checked, and I had a voicemail, Washington Mutual called me today, and they wanted to let me know that my credit cards have been canceled.
[05:57.690 --> 06:03.310]  And so right as I was about to delete that, it disconnected because the battery died.
[06:03.450 --> 06:05.050]  So then we didn't have any phones.
[06:05.290 --> 06:09.090]  You know, does anybody see anything wrong with what Kyle just said?
[06:10.390 --> 06:12.030]  Anybody in, Dotret, you?
[06:12.330 --> 06:13.410]  Nothing at all.
[06:13.590 --> 06:14.210]  Nothing at all.
[06:14.310 --> 06:15.450]  Well, then why would you say that?
[06:16.310 --> 06:18.150]  You just had to pipe up and say nothing at all.
[06:18.150 --> 06:21.330]  No, does anybody find anything wrong with what Kyle just said?
[06:21.730 --> 06:21.910]  Anybody?
[06:22.070 --> 06:22.470]  Bernie, you?
[06:22.590 --> 06:22.850]  No?
[06:22.970 --> 06:26.730]  I'm a little curious as to Washington Mutual, why Washington Mutual canceled his credit cards.
[06:26.830 --> 06:30.110]  But mainly, I didn't think Washington Mutual even offered credit cards.
[06:30.150 --> 06:30.790]  Well, you know what?
[06:30.810 --> 06:31.990]  You're kind of right in that.
[06:32.170 --> 06:32.730]  You're pretty close.
[06:32.910 --> 06:34.670]  Because Washington Mutual doesn't even exist anymore.
[06:34.670 --> 06:35.990]  They got taken over by Chase.
[06:36.410 --> 06:36.570]  Right.
[06:36.690 --> 06:40.270]  So why in tarnation is Washington Mutual calling Kyle on a cell phone right now?
[06:40.270 --> 06:41.470]  Are they from the past or something?
[06:41.510 --> 06:43.190]  Or do you just not check your voicemail very often?
[06:43.370 --> 06:45.030]  I'm fairly prudent.
[06:45.210 --> 06:46.490]  I check it often.
[06:46.490 --> 06:48.850]  So, yeah, it was sort of weird to hear.
[06:48.970 --> 06:50.530]  Actually, I think they locked my credit cards.
[06:50.670 --> 06:51.670]  They didn't cancel them.
[06:51.710 --> 06:56.570]  They said that they locked them and I have to press one to contact their security department.
[06:57.370 --> 06:58.930]  Which you can't do because there's a voicemail.
[06:58.950 --> 06:59.170]  Right.
[06:59.170 --> 07:01.210]  My voicemail picked up this computer.
[07:01.470 --> 07:04.010]  And the thing is, you don't really use your credit cards that much.
[07:04.410 --> 07:06.210]  No, I don't carry credit cards.
[07:06.350 --> 07:08.030]  So I was suggesting maybe they got locked because you don't use them enough.
[07:08.230 --> 07:09.710]  Yeah, I think that's what's going on here.
[07:09.710 --> 07:15.570]  But regardless, the thing is, your phone died because, well, you sort of let it die, right?
[07:15.690 --> 07:17.090]  And this is something you do on a regular basis?
[07:17.250 --> 07:21.050]  Yeah, I'm from the 90s and I discharged my battery all the way.
[07:21.070 --> 07:22.430]  That explains Washington Mutual if you're from the 90s.
[07:22.510 --> 07:22.730]  Yeah.
[07:23.010 --> 07:25.870]  Okay, so you let your phone die how often?
[07:26.890 --> 07:27.250]  Regularly.
[07:27.770 --> 07:28.750]  How often is regularly?
[07:29.110 --> 07:29.470]  Once...
[07:29.470 --> 07:31.230]  It dies like once a week.
[07:31.410 --> 07:32.730]  Or yeah, once a week.
[07:32.910 --> 07:38.010]  So once a week, you find yourself in this position where you don't have a phone because it's discharged completely.
[07:38.330 --> 07:41.070]  And after a certain time when it's low, it cuts off the radio.
[07:41.330 --> 07:42.350]  Does anybody else do this?
[07:43.330 --> 07:47.390]  I'm just wondering, would it solve your problem if I just offered to lend you my cell phone for the rest of the show?
[07:47.390 --> 07:48.630]  No, you're missing the point entirely.
[07:48.910 --> 07:49.330]  Clearly, yes.
[07:49.330 --> 07:54.350]  We're talking about ways of dealing with certain hardships, ways of dealing with our cell phones.
[07:54.490 --> 08:01.130]  I'm pretty sure that battery technology has advanced beyond the point where you have a memory in terms of if you don't let it discharge all the way.
[08:01.270 --> 08:06.470]  So I think it might be safe for you to recharge it more often than when it's out of battery.
[08:06.470 --> 08:07.150]  It's a habit.
[08:07.350 --> 08:08.350]  Bernie, you're the battery expert.
[08:08.430 --> 08:08.810]  What do you think?
[08:11.910 --> 08:12.830]  Actually, you're right.
[08:12.970 --> 08:19.150]  The older nickel-cadmium batteries, you did need to sort of deep-cycle them, like blend them all the way down and charge them up.
[08:19.330 --> 08:27.490]  But the newer nickel-metal hydride and lithium-ion batteries, you really don't need to discharge them all the way before charging them.
[08:27.890 --> 08:29.270]  But it doesn't wear them out either.
[08:29.610 --> 08:31.510]  So it's just kind of a waste of time.
[08:31.750 --> 08:35.270]  Well, Kyle's getting his battery out right now to read what kind it is.
[08:35.270 --> 08:36.930]  Yeah, let's see.
[08:37.030 --> 08:38.150]  My phone's made in Mexico.
[08:38.410 --> 08:39.310]  The battery's made in China.
[08:39.870 --> 08:41.470]  It's a real international phone.
[08:41.670 --> 08:41.850]  Yeah.
[08:44.070 --> 08:47.550]  Lithium-polymer rechargeable is what it says.
[08:47.890 --> 08:49.110]  So, yeah.
[08:49.170 --> 08:51.550]  And I discharge that very frequently.
[08:51.750 --> 08:52.290]  I mean, regularly.
[08:52.290 --> 08:54.190]  It's a religious thing.
[08:54.630 --> 08:59.370]  So, we find ourselves, the two of us driving into the city today without any way of communicating.
[08:59.710 --> 09:04.550]  And the thing is, we live in a country that doesn't really believe in clocks, unlike many of the others that we travel to.
[09:04.730 --> 09:07.690]  And it's very hard to find out what time it is just by looking around.
[09:07.690 --> 09:10.190]  You have to listen to the radio and hopefully somebody will save the time there.
[09:12.130 --> 09:13.990]  But there are certain challenges.
[09:14.390 --> 09:19.010]  I'd like to know, when's the last time anyone in this room didn't have a cell phone for an entire day?
[09:19.170 --> 09:19.710]  You read that?
[09:19.710 --> 09:23.190]  When I was on vacation a few weeks ago, I left it in the hotel safe every day.
[09:23.470 --> 09:23.790]  Really?
[09:24.050 --> 09:24.170]  Yeah.
[09:24.290 --> 09:24.890]  What was that like?
[09:25.070 --> 09:25.550]  It was fine.
[09:25.650 --> 09:26.730]  But of course, you were on vacation.
[09:26.730 --> 09:27.230]  I was enjoying myself.
[09:27.430 --> 09:28.090]  You were on vacation.
[09:28.090 --> 09:30.110]  You were intentionally getting away from everything.
[09:30.250 --> 09:34.050]  But I'm talking about when you're in the middle of your regular business.
[09:34.090 --> 09:36.750]  Have you tried to get around without a cell phone then?
[09:37.090 --> 09:37.790]  Not on purpose.
[09:38.050 --> 09:38.250]  Uh-huh.
[09:39.010 --> 09:40.450]  Well, this wasn't on purpose either.
[09:40.450 --> 09:41.050]  It's accidental.
[09:41.290 --> 09:43.190]  But it's a challenge.
[09:43.410 --> 09:44.050]  Two days ago.
[09:44.570 --> 09:45.070]  Two days ago.
[09:45.150 --> 09:45.390]  Tell us.
[09:45.450 --> 09:45.910]  Yes, yes.
[09:45.910 --> 09:47.110]  I was going to work.
[09:47.110 --> 09:47.810]  I was at work.
[09:47.810 --> 09:49.690]  And then I realized, oh, I don't have my phone.
[09:49.710 --> 09:51.370]  This happens to me quite often.
[09:51.570 --> 09:52.310]  Okay, good, good.
[09:52.610 --> 09:58.570]  So now my next question is, when you don't have your phone, how hard is it for you to communicate with people?
[09:58.790 --> 10:03.870]  For instance, do you have phone numbers memorized or do you just have positions in your phone that you know to hit?
[10:03.990 --> 10:06.490]  And if you don't have your phone, you're not going to be able to communicate with anybody.
[10:06.770 --> 10:10.850]  I know that phone numbers are the people who I actually would need to call in an emergency.
[10:11.110 --> 10:11.350]  Uh-huh.
[10:11.470 --> 10:14.710]  And I have used a pay phone when my battery's been dead.
[10:14.750 --> 10:18.570]  What about people you would rather just hang out with that you want to contact socially?
[10:18.690 --> 10:19.610]  You have no way of reaching them.
[10:20.250 --> 10:20.570]  Nah.
[10:20.810 --> 10:22.450]  I'm not going to use a pay phone to call them anyway.
[10:22.670 --> 10:23.570]  I suggest...
[10:23.570 --> 10:26.170]  This is just something that we were thinking up on the way in here.
[10:26.270 --> 10:33.730]  I think it would be a good idea for our listeners, for us, to just have a day where we don't have our cell phones on us and see how that works.
[10:33.870 --> 10:34.090]  Rob?
[10:34.810 --> 10:36.830]  Can I carry my old page box instead?
[10:37.370 --> 10:37.970]  You can do that.
[10:38.070 --> 10:39.230]  Yeah, I mean, you can use pay phones.
[10:39.450 --> 10:40.750]  You can clip onto people's lines.
[10:40.870 --> 10:41.990]  You can do all the old things.
[10:42.050 --> 10:43.310]  You can even have a pager if you want.
[10:43.840 --> 10:46.990]  But the thing is, try to get by without your cell phone.
[10:47.030 --> 10:47.850]  See how you do.
[10:47.990 --> 10:54.910]  There's one problem with that and that is, have you tried using any pay phone in this city over the past month or two?
[10:55.070 --> 10:55.730]  No, but now...
[10:55.730 --> 10:56.070]  I have.
[10:56.210 --> 10:56.750]  Now I'll try.
[10:57.250 --> 11:04.830]  And I will tell you, many of them do not work and a lot of them which don't work will just eat your money.
[11:04.950 --> 11:07.330]  Others, they can't hear you.
[11:07.750 --> 11:20.350]  A lot of people will walk around and they will like bang in the coin release switch and then you end up apparently won't take the coins or people will jam coins in there.
[11:20.430 --> 11:23.170]  I just heard a noise, Kyle, that sounded like your phone.
[11:23.990 --> 11:26.710]  But your phone is dead, so how's your phone making noise?
[11:27.190 --> 11:33.030]  Well, I took the battery out to look at it and then when it starts up it has a little bit of radio and then it cuts off.
[11:33.210 --> 11:33.470]  I see.
[11:33.610 --> 11:34.670]  So it's totally useless.
[11:34.670 --> 11:35.930]  It was on long enough to get a message.
[11:36.130 --> 11:36.310]  Rob?
[11:36.590 --> 11:38.970]  I actually discovered something interesting about a pay phone.
[11:39.210 --> 11:42.310]  This was after the 2600 meeting last week.
[11:43.350 --> 11:52.510]  A couple of us were walking around and trying to find a restaurant and we passed by a pay phone that was off the hook, funnily enough, and playing the off hook tone.
[11:53.170 --> 12:00.230]  And it's not something we'd heard in a while so I went up and investigated the pay phone and Jim actually found a bunch of change in it which was kind of cool.
[12:01.770 --> 12:03.310]  But the phone itself didn't work.
[12:03.350 --> 12:03.790]  It was broken.
[12:03.990 --> 12:05.690]  And I took a couple of pictures.
[12:05.690 --> 12:06.470]  I went home.
[12:06.590 --> 12:08.190]  I looked up the brand name of the phone.
[12:08.770 --> 12:11.910]  It was a brand called I think Titan 360 or something to that effect.
[12:25.350 --> 12:29.550]  for quite some time that the phones don't make any money but the advertising that's where the money is.
[12:29.890 --> 12:33.370]  But I did want to say earlier I've gone an entire day without making any phone calls.
[12:33.490 --> 12:35.390]  Well, it doesn't count because someone could still reach you.
[12:35.670 --> 12:36.770]  And I'll bet you texted.
[12:37.030 --> 12:37.890]  I'll bet you texted.
[12:37.890 --> 12:42.510]  I've gone an entire day without using the whole phone.
[12:42.670 --> 12:42.910]  Uh-huh.
[12:44.630 --> 12:45.430]  Related question.
[12:45.810 --> 12:46.910]  When's the last time you tweeted?
[12:47.910 --> 12:48.310]  Me?
[12:48.470 --> 12:48.610]  Yeah.
[12:49.150 --> 12:50.150]  A few hours ago.
[12:50.250 --> 12:50.410]  Okay.
[12:50.610 --> 12:51.010]  Red Hacked?
[12:51.490 --> 12:51.890]  Okay.
[12:52.050 --> 12:52.230]  Today?
[12:52.590 --> 12:52.950]  Rob?
[12:53.210 --> 12:54.010]  Last night, I think.
[12:54.070 --> 12:54.470]  Voltaire?
[12:55.410 --> 12:55.810]  Yesterday.
[12:56.510 --> 12:56.910]  Really?
[12:57.090 --> 12:57.270]  Okay.
[12:57.390 --> 12:57.730]  That's good.
[12:57.930 --> 12:58.390]  I think.
[12:59.010 --> 12:59.410]  Shocking.
[12:59.590 --> 12:59.910]  Dot Red?
[13:00.330 --> 13:02.790]  Someone will have to actually go online and tell me.
[13:03.390 --> 13:04.690]  It might have been a month ago.
[13:04.810 --> 13:05.770]  It might have been several weeks.
[13:05.770 --> 13:07.070]  It could have been a month and a half.
[13:08.170 --> 13:08.570]  Kyle?
[13:08.610 --> 13:09.530]  I've never tweeted.
[13:09.970 --> 13:10.830]  You've never tweeted.
[13:10.930 --> 13:11.570]  You win the prize.
[13:11.830 --> 13:12.610]  You win the prize.
[13:12.870 --> 13:13.590]  Jim, have you tweeted?
[13:13.750 --> 13:14.570]  I never tweeted either.
[13:14.630 --> 13:14.850]  No.
[13:15.150 --> 13:15.990]  Jim has not tweeted.
[13:16.190 --> 13:16.990]  Congratulations, Jim.
[13:17.110 --> 13:17.590]  And Bernie?
[13:18.350 --> 13:19.850]  I have never tweeted on Twitter.
[13:20.010 --> 13:23.630]  I've tweeted at live birds trying to get them to do things.
[13:23.930 --> 13:25.970]  And your claim, Bernie, is that that's better?
[13:26.230 --> 13:27.190]  I'm a bird watcher.
[13:27.270 --> 13:27.750]  What can I say?
[13:28.190 --> 13:28.750]  You're tweeting.
[13:28.990 --> 13:29.670]  That is better, yes.
[13:29.670 --> 13:30.970]  I will say that's better.
[13:31.290 --> 13:31.790]  All right.
[13:31.790 --> 13:32.290]  It is.
[13:33.010 --> 13:33.410]  Wow.
[13:33.550 --> 13:33.770]  Okay.
[13:33.850 --> 13:34.730]  Well, I'm impressed.
[13:34.770 --> 13:35.950]  But I do think people should try it.
[13:36.050 --> 13:40.170]  You know, try to get by without these little devices and see if you can communicate in other ways.
[13:40.390 --> 13:41.170]  It is interesting.
[13:41.430 --> 13:44.410]  It can be very liberating to go without your phone.
[13:44.690 --> 13:47.470]  The important thing is don't try to not take it.
[13:47.570 --> 13:49.410]  Just when it happens, embrace it.
[13:49.730 --> 13:54.390]  And try to think of all the numbers that you could use if you need to.
[13:54.530 --> 13:56.870]  I think the surprise is a key part of this.
[13:56.950 --> 14:02.770]  And that's why I think maybe we should pair up and have one person just take a cell phone from somebody and not tell them.
[14:02.870 --> 14:05.430]  And then they realize, oh, this is the day I'm not going to have my cell phone.
[14:05.530 --> 14:08.350]  Now I have to figure out how to get through the day.
[14:08.550 --> 14:10.810]  And let's do this in a kind of positive way.
[14:10.890 --> 14:13.810]  No hostility or revenge or anything like that.
[14:13.870 --> 14:15.030]  It's a good mental challenge.
[14:15.210 --> 14:17.210]  I mean, I can think of about four numbers quickly.
[14:17.430 --> 14:20.510]  And then, you know, as you start thinking about it, you can think of more and more numbers.
[14:20.750 --> 14:23.730]  It's amazing how many people don't remember phone numbers that are important.
[14:23.730 --> 14:29.710]  Like, I always tell the story of somebody whose phone died and they didn't know their parents' phone number.
[14:29.850 --> 14:34.070]  They didn't know how to reach their own parents because it was just a position in the phone.
[14:34.350 --> 14:35.450]  So many things like that.
[14:35.530 --> 14:38.590]  It's not hard to remember a phone number if you think it's an important thing.
[14:38.750 --> 14:40.970]  This sounds like this could go wrong in so many ways.
[14:41.150 --> 14:44.570]  Taking people's phones without them realizing you're going to put them into horrible panic attacks.
[14:44.710 --> 14:46.730]  Oh my God, my $300 phone.
[14:46.830 --> 14:47.690]  That's a part of it.
[14:47.790 --> 14:51.310]  How much do you need this little device to get through your day?
[14:51.470 --> 14:52.550]  Is it really that important?
[14:53.170 --> 14:56.190]  I used to drive into the radio show and not have a phone.
[14:56.430 --> 14:57.130]  I had a pager.
[14:57.290 --> 14:58.250]  Okay, someone would page me.
[14:58.370 --> 15:01.390]  I'd pull over to the side of the road, use a payphone, find out what they wanted.
[15:01.850 --> 15:04.450]  Or before then, I didn't have a pager at all and I got through just fine.
[15:04.610 --> 15:07.510]  Well, I'll just go back to saying try using payphones.
[15:07.630 --> 15:18.210]  I actually one time about a month and a half ago went on a mission through Manhattan trying to find payphones that worked and I burned through a couple of dollars just going down big avenues doing this.
[15:18.290 --> 15:21.450]  I don't think I've put coins in payphones for decades.
[15:21.690 --> 15:22.110]  Oh, I have.
[15:22.110 --> 15:24.230]  You can use payphones without putting coins in them.
[15:24.230 --> 15:25.690]  Most of them will just swallow...
[15:25.690 --> 15:27.010]  Well, yeah, if you're going to do collect calls.
[15:27.350 --> 15:27.990]  A lot of them do take...
[15:27.990 --> 15:31.310]  Not collect calls, 800 numbers or various other ways of making calls.
[15:31.590 --> 15:33.270]  Those do...
[15:33.790 --> 15:35.330]  A lot of those payphones will work.
[15:35.410 --> 15:38.970]  Some of them will actually get a dial tone but many of the ones that do get a dial tone will eat your money.
[15:39.490 --> 15:44.630]  But I'll admit, I only know my parents and my grandparents' phone numbers.
[15:44.830 --> 15:45.010]  Really?
[15:45.370 --> 15:45.770]  Yeah.
[15:46.350 --> 15:47.150]  Everyone else...
[15:47.150 --> 15:48.170]  You don't know my phone number?
[15:48.690 --> 15:49.850]  Yeah, yours I do know.
[15:49.990 --> 15:50.730]  It's memorable.
[15:51.550 --> 15:52.750]  No, not that one.
[15:53.410 --> 15:54.370]  The real one.
[15:54.630 --> 15:55.250]  Oh, okay.
[15:55.830 --> 15:56.470]  Well, yes.
[15:56.670 --> 15:58.090]  You could always call the operator, too.
[15:58.990 --> 16:00.030]  What do you mean you could call the operator?
[16:00.050 --> 16:00.410]  What does that mean?
[16:00.710 --> 16:01.750]  Yeah, like call the operator.
[16:01.950 --> 16:02.990]  What's the operator I don't know.
[16:03.030 --> 16:04.030]  It's another phone number you could call.
[16:04.030 --> 16:05.090]  how to call the operator anymore.
[16:05.290 --> 16:05.530]  Zero.
[16:05.890 --> 16:06.590]  No, okay.
[16:06.750 --> 16:07.330]  Or zero, zero.
[16:07.510 --> 16:09.610]  I've got different phone companies now.
[16:09.610 --> 16:10.330]  I don't have...
[16:10.330 --> 16:12.610]  I am not, believe it or not, a Verizon customer.
[16:12.850 --> 16:16.510]  Even though Verizon occasionally screws us over, I am not a Verizon customer.
[16:17.170 --> 16:19.370]  I don't know how to get the operator on the phone.
[16:19.490 --> 16:20.130]  We tried this.
[16:20.250 --> 16:21.250]  Kyle, we talked.
[16:21.430 --> 16:24.290]  We were calling all kinds of different people saying, how do you get the operator?
[16:24.430 --> 16:29.570]  Because we wanted to find out how much it cost to use the repeat call feature.
[16:29.570 --> 16:35.630]  I think it's star 66, where if a phone is busy, it'll call you back or something like that.
[16:35.770 --> 16:37.870]  And it's very hard to get in touch with the operator.
[16:38.050 --> 16:39.210]  That information is not in the phone book.
[16:39.290 --> 16:41.850]  That information is not available on their website.
[16:42.290 --> 16:44.990]  And so we figured we'd call an operator to find out.
[16:44.990 --> 16:49.470]  And we were trying to figure out what carrier access code does Verizon have so you can get an operator.
[16:49.790 --> 16:51.950]  And eventually we called 1-800-VERIZON.
[16:52.070 --> 17:00.690]  And I think you wound up speaking to a representative who was trying to divert you to the public relations office because you said you were writing an article about various services.
[17:00.690 --> 17:03.050]  And you wanted to know how much it cost to use this particular service.
[17:03.050 --> 17:03.330]  Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait.
[17:03.390 --> 17:04.410]  I think that was you.
[17:05.350 --> 17:05.710]  Maybe.
[17:05.890 --> 17:06.390]  It might have been.
[17:06.990 --> 17:07.770]  I don't remember.
[17:07.890 --> 17:09.290]  It was a traumatic experience.
[17:09.490 --> 17:14.490]  But this was all prompted by a recording that you get if you get a busy signal from out on Long Island.
[17:14.490 --> 17:18.150]  The recording, and it's reminiscent of your Washington Mutual recording.
[17:18.310 --> 17:24.070]  It says the number you have reached is busy, but you can have Bell Atlantic keep trying and call you back.
[17:24.370 --> 17:28.550]  And they never bothered to re-record when Bell Atlantic turned into Verizon.
[17:28.930 --> 17:29.750]  I remember those.
[17:29.990 --> 17:30.190]  Yeah.
[17:30.610 --> 17:33.630]  Well, still, you can come out and reminisce even more if you listen to the recordings.
[17:33.630 --> 17:36.330]  I don't believe I've ever spoken to an operator in my life.
[17:36.430 --> 17:37.470]  What can they do for me?
[17:37.870 --> 17:39.510]  Well, what can operators do?
[17:39.670 --> 17:41.090]  Bernie, you've talked to operators, haven't you?
[17:41.090 --> 17:44.150]  I've spoken to all kinds of operators, inward operators.
[17:44.350 --> 17:44.950]  Remember the old...
[17:44.950 --> 17:47.450]  You could get the rate and root information from an operator.
[17:47.650 --> 17:47.910]  Yeah.
[17:48.090 --> 17:48.630]  Yeah, absolutely.
[17:48.950 --> 17:49.970]  All kinds of things.
[17:50.150 --> 17:53.170]  You should listen to some of our old radio shows where we call the operators all the time.
[17:53.230 --> 17:58.710]  I think the only time I ever spoke to an operator was when I was putting tones into a payphone, and they picked up on it.
[18:00.730 --> 18:02.170]  Yeah, they'll pick up then.
[18:02.810 --> 18:05.730]  I think that was the only experience I had.
[18:06.150 --> 18:07.490]  Well, yeah, it's...
[18:07.490 --> 18:08.370]  All right, let's try it.
[18:08.450 --> 18:12.070]  Let's try get a Verizon operator, see how easy this is, okay?
[18:12.230 --> 18:16.290]  Well, first of all, Rob, you mentioned, you said that you heard an off-hook tone at a payphone.
[18:16.490 --> 18:16.710]  Yes.
[18:16.810 --> 18:18.530]  And that was something that you hadn't heard in a while.
[18:18.770 --> 18:19.750]  I definitely hadn't.
[18:19.850 --> 18:21.030]  You haven't heard an off-the-hook tone?
[18:21.250 --> 18:23.070]  What we start the radio show with.
[18:23.930 --> 18:26.990]  Yeah, I've heard it at the beginning of the radio show, but not out of an actual telephone.
[18:26.990 --> 18:29.110]  This is what we're talking about, this particular sound.
[18:30.050 --> 18:31.990]  That sound is the off-the-hook tone.
[18:32.110 --> 18:33.170]  That's how we begin the show.
[18:34.790 --> 18:36.250]  So, do phones not do that?
[18:36.330 --> 18:39.830]  I don't leave phones off the hook very often, so I don't know if they still make that noise.
[18:39.990 --> 18:42.530]  In New York City, they do.
[18:43.270 --> 18:44.810]  Let's find out on our phone system.
[18:44.870 --> 18:47.910]  Bernie, you're going to have to tolerate the dial tone and see what happens.
[18:48.770 --> 18:49.130]  Okay.
[18:49.530 --> 18:53.770]  All right, we're just going to leave the dial tone on and see what happens when we leave it on here.
[18:54.010 --> 18:55.830]  No one's ever done this before, I guarantee you.
[18:56.190 --> 19:03.970]  Well, we've had dial tones on the air for a long period of time while somebody tries to figure out where it's coming from, but I don't think we've ever done this intentionally before.
[19:04.930 --> 19:06.290]  Usually, it's about 20 seconds, right?
[19:06.310 --> 19:08.050]  Is this an actual landline?
[19:08.490 --> 19:09.150]  Of course not.
[19:09.450 --> 19:10.370]  Oh, look, it just hung up.
[19:10.450 --> 19:12.670]  You see, it's too intelligent for us.
[19:12.890 --> 19:13.510]  That's the problem.
[19:13.610 --> 19:17.590]  This could be the new WBAI fancy phone system that drops calls all the time.
[19:17.910 --> 19:19.870]  Yeah, but it was supposed to drop that call, at least.
[19:19.990 --> 19:20.870]  Well, so it did a good job.
[19:21.050 --> 19:22.070]  Okay, so now...
[19:22.070 --> 19:22.870]  It's good at dropping calls.
[19:22.890 --> 19:24.130]  Do we dial nine in this system or not?
[19:24.230 --> 19:24.750]  No, we don't.
[19:25.830 --> 19:28.050]  We're going to see if we get a New York telephone operator.
[19:28.150 --> 19:29.750]  Just don't try and get the long distance operator.
[19:29.970 --> 19:30.490]  We don't have that.
[19:30.590 --> 19:30.710]  No.
[19:30.850 --> 19:31.870]  Did I say New York telephone?
[19:32.110 --> 19:32.330]  Wow.
[19:33.090 --> 19:34.550]  All right, let's see if this is Verizon.
[19:39.890 --> 19:42.330]  Welcome to Verizon, your broadband company.
[19:43.030 --> 19:43.690]  How about that?
[19:43.690 --> 19:48.210]  For emergency police, fire, or ambulance service, press or dial nine now.
[19:48.210 --> 19:54.110]  To make a collect call, a calling card call, or to bill this call to another number, press two.
[19:54.390 --> 19:57.770]  To check on or interrupt a busy line, press three.
[19:58.090 --> 20:00.390]  For directory assistance, press four.
[20:00.730 --> 20:03.330]  To reach Verizon repair, press five.
[20:03.670 --> 20:07.530]  To reach a Verizon business office or to arrange credit, press six.
[20:07.870 --> 20:10.590]  For all other services, please hold for an operator.
[20:10.870 --> 20:13.310]  To hear these choices again, press seven.
[20:13.990 --> 20:17.650]  Well, let's at least ask the operator how much it costs to use repeat dialing.
[20:17.990 --> 20:19.530]  Yeah, see if we can get that information.
[20:22.230 --> 20:23.330]  She didn't say to press zero.
[20:23.410 --> 20:24.110]  Oh, she said to wait.
[20:24.290 --> 20:26.550]  Welcome to Verizon, your broadband company.
[20:28.630 --> 20:29.970]  I heard that already, but okay.
[20:35.890 --> 20:36.770]  May I help you?
[20:37.370 --> 20:37.950]  Yes, hi.
[20:38.050 --> 20:39.310]  Is this the Verizon operator?
[20:39.590 --> 20:40.230]  Yes, it is.
[20:40.330 --> 20:43.550]  Hi, I'm trying to find out how much it costs to use the repeat...
[20:44.190 --> 20:51.450]  If I get a busy signal and I want to hit a key to have it keep trying and call me back when the line becomes free, how much does that cost?
[20:51.610 --> 20:52.790]  I believe $1.50.
[20:53.170 --> 20:54.230]  $1.50 each time?
[20:54.370 --> 20:54.690]  Yes.
[20:55.050 --> 20:55.370]  Okay.
[20:55.650 --> 20:56.490]  All right, thank you very much.
[20:56.530 --> 20:56.910]  You're welcome.
[20:56.910 --> 20:57.470]  Have a good night.
[20:57.510 --> 20:57.810]  You too.
[20:57.950 --> 20:58.390]  Bye-bye.
[20:58.470 --> 20:58.630]  Bye.
[20:59.530 --> 21:00.590]  Wow, that was very helpful.
[21:00.590 --> 21:02.930]  And it was totally different than the information they gave us the first time.
[21:02.990 --> 21:04.030]  They said it was...
[21:04.030 --> 21:04.590]  75 cents.
[21:04.590 --> 21:06.590]  75 cents, because that's what the Bell Atlantic recording says.
[21:06.770 --> 21:08.450]  And of course, that's from 15 years ago.
[21:08.650 --> 21:08.830]  Right.
[21:09.850 --> 21:11.610]  Okay, so here it is possible to do that.
[21:11.730 --> 21:12.170]  It is.
[21:13.550 --> 21:16.070]  And as your local company, you're going to have trouble.
[21:16.870 --> 21:17.550]  You really will.
[21:18.030 --> 21:18.510]  All right.
[21:18.590 --> 21:20.510]  Well, we've played with the phones enough.
[21:20.610 --> 21:21.410]  We haven't done that in a while.
[21:21.610 --> 21:22.810]  It's fun to do that.
[21:23.350 --> 21:25.750]  But we have stories to get into as well.
[21:25.950 --> 21:29.130]  All kinds of interesting things have been going on in the world, as always.
[21:30.230 --> 21:31.310]  Anything on anyone's mind?
[21:32.010 --> 21:32.370]  No?
[21:32.850 --> 21:33.210]  Okay.
[21:33.870 --> 21:35.470]  Well, we have...
[21:35.470 --> 21:36.210]  Where should we start?
[21:38.410 --> 21:38.770]  Gosh.
[21:38.930 --> 21:39.350]  Well, okay.
[21:39.610 --> 21:40.370]  How about this?
[21:40.670 --> 21:42.090]  We talk about WikiLeaks a lot.
[21:42.090 --> 21:44.950]  And now, there's a service called Local Leaks.
[21:45.070 --> 21:45.770]  You guys heard about this?
[21:46.170 --> 21:47.030]  Local Leaks.
[21:47.190 --> 21:54.010]  Although the mission of WikiLeaks is to open governments, it's done quite a lot to make us think about how to open journalism as well.
[21:54.590 --> 21:56.770]  We've seen a number of new whistleblower sites.
[21:56.770 --> 22:03.730]  Read, writeweb.com, openleaks.org, various other ones.
[22:04.870 --> 22:10.270]  Al Jazeera has put out a site called ajtransparency.com.
[22:11.650 --> 22:24.110]  But according to this particular article, they asked the question, why wait for local newspapers to roll out their own anonymous tips pipeline when a project from CUNY Graduate School, from their entrepreneurial journalism program.
[22:24.270 --> 22:25.990]  They've designed just that thing.
[22:27.230 --> 22:33.550]  Using localeaks.com, you can send an anonymous tip, including a file, to over 1,400 newspapers in the U.S.
[22:33.670 --> 22:35.110]  through one online form.
[22:35.370 --> 22:40.050]  Choose your state, choose the newspaper, enter your information, and submit your anonymous tip.
[22:40.290 --> 22:51.470]  Each Dropbox consists of a secure web connection and a form that encrypts both files and the text submitted and then destroys the originals, as well as removing identifying metadata from documents.
[22:51.650 --> 23:02.850]  The system also makes every effort to leave no traceable remnants from the transaction, such as identifiable session cookies on the client's side or logging of any IP addresses on the server side.
[23:02.990 --> 23:08.430]  So once the file gets submitted, the newspaper will receive an email alerting them to the tip.
[23:08.670 --> 23:10.830]  The newspaper then needs to reply that it's interested.
[23:11.350 --> 23:14.370]  Then a temporary secure file transfer is established.
[23:14.730 --> 23:17.090]  This last step isn't yet automated.
[23:17.090 --> 23:29.670]  According to the web development director at the Hour Publishing Company, one of the members of the project, the best way to do so would be to have the encryption software, GNU PGP...
[23:29.670 --> 23:32.450]  I'm sorry, GNU PG.org.
[23:32.550 --> 23:34.010]  Why do they make them all sound so similar?
[23:34.350 --> 23:37.990]  GNU PG, in this case, is set up on the newspaper's end.
[23:38.230 --> 23:41.830]  It is unlikely most would have it yet, they say.
[23:42.270 --> 23:46.690]  They're working on helping newspapers set up their own drop boxes to avoid this step.
[23:47.090 --> 23:52.450]  I went to the site, localeaks.com, and also localeaks.net goes there.
[23:52.510 --> 23:54.030]  But how do you spell localeaks?
[23:54.090 --> 23:55.490]  Who would like to spell localeaks for me?
[23:55.750 --> 23:56.150]  Anybody?
[23:56.550 --> 23:58.470]  I'm going to try, but I'm probably going to be wrong.
[23:58.650 --> 23:58.890]  Go ahead.
[23:59.150 --> 24:02.630]  L-O-C-A-L-L-E-A-K-S.
[24:02.730 --> 24:04.530]  That's how I would spell it.
[24:04.590 --> 24:09.050]  But if you spell it that way and add the .net to it, you get a different site.
[24:09.050 --> 24:14.590]  You get another localeaks site that spells the word volunteer wrong and doesn't have any features.
[24:15.130 --> 24:20.910]  People helping people to live in a fair and transparent world, removing the veil of secrecy, January 1st, 2011.
[24:21.270 --> 24:23.130]  And that's pretty much all it says or does.
[24:23.330 --> 24:28.510]  If you go to localeaks.net with one L, then you get these guys.
[24:28.590 --> 24:30.990]  Two L's, but not next to each other.
[24:31.210 --> 24:32.390]  Well, yeah, okay.
[24:32.510 --> 24:33.790]  Make it more complicated, why don't you?
[24:34.190 --> 24:34.630]  Fine.
[24:34.630 --> 24:41.250]  If you go to localeaks.net with two L's and no L's next to each other, you'll get the right one.
[24:41.250 --> 24:47.050]  If you use three L's with two of them next to each other, which is the way I would think to spell the word, you'll get the wrong one.
[24:47.090 --> 24:48.010]  So it's localeaks.
[24:48.630 --> 24:49.390]  Something like that.
[24:49.470 --> 24:50.230]  Yeah, localeaks.
[24:50.370 --> 24:51.890]  For really crazy leaks, basically.
[24:52.090 --> 24:52.350]  Yeah.
[24:53.150 --> 24:56.770]  So this actually is something that I think could be interesting.
[24:56.970 --> 25:00.030]  It seems like it's easy to use if it actually works.
[25:00.030 --> 25:04.430]  I went to their website, and you could just simply submit things, and supposedly it gets leaked.
[25:04.690 --> 25:05.450]  You have something to leak, Mike?
[25:05.770 --> 25:20.310]  Well, I have a question, which is how do we know if we should trust the encryption and anonymity mechanisms of this website, and in particular of their 1,400 newspaper partners, some of which are bound to be savvier than others?
[25:20.650 --> 25:24.770]  Well, how would a satisfactory answer be given to that?
[25:24.930 --> 25:27.410]  What would you need as evidence that you could trust it?
[25:27.410 --> 25:41.330]  Well, either a track record of protecting sources' anonymity, which is, of course, hard to get before you start, or an explanation of what they do, how they ensure that your anonymity will be protected.
[25:42.170 --> 25:46.510]  Otherwise, you could just drop something in the mail to the newspaper of your choice.
[25:46.630 --> 25:47.410]  You wouldn't need the service.
[25:47.610 --> 25:48.450]  Oh, then you have fingerprints and postcards.
[25:48.450 --> 25:51.410]  I'm saying if you don't care about anonymity, then you don't need the service.
[25:51.550 --> 25:55.150]  So what the service can do for you is provide anonymity.
[25:55.150 --> 25:59.070]  So in order to know that we should use it, we have to know that we can trust it.
[25:59.310 --> 26:08.230]  What sites exist for us to submit leaks to and get credit and not be anonymous and have our names displayed?
[26:08.710 --> 26:09.890]  You can just call a reporter.
[26:10.070 --> 26:10.630]  That's true.
[26:10.750 --> 26:11.210]  That's true.
[26:11.670 --> 26:12.990]  If you can get through to them on the phone.
[26:13.230 --> 26:19.970]  But yeah, I think maybe someone should have a site that just has leaks and tells exactly who leaked the information.
[26:20.130 --> 26:21.810]  But that's not much demand for that, I guess.
[26:21.810 --> 26:23.730]  I think some of us have our own websites.
[26:23.730 --> 26:25.210]  We could probably do that sort of thing on.
[26:25.270 --> 26:29.830]  But then you got to get people to go to those websites and read the information.
[26:30.050 --> 26:30.250]  Got it.
[26:30.730 --> 26:38.390]  Well, a solution for Mike would be very simple if you're not sure about the track record of someone you want to secretly leak something to.
[26:38.570 --> 26:39.770]  Use something like Tor.
[26:40.290 --> 26:42.730]  And then, you know, then you'll be hidden.
[26:43.010 --> 26:48.730]  But it's harder than just Tor because there's other ways for anonymity to be compromised.
[26:48.730 --> 26:56.050]  If I have a document that I created in Microsoft Word or something, it will have my name in it.
[26:56.330 --> 27:01.030]  And not everyone knows how to take that name out in all the proper ways.
[27:01.170 --> 27:06.670]  Now, for somebody who has no idea what Tor is, who would like to explain so that someone could use it for the first time tonight?
[27:08.550 --> 27:10.390]  Oh, we want to talk about Tor.
[27:10.450 --> 27:11.330]  We don't want to explain Tor.
[27:11.450 --> 27:12.010]  Now, come on.
[27:12.010 --> 27:22.430]  It's called the Onion Router, and it's a way of basically hiding your source location from whatever destination you're connecting to by going through various nodes in the middle.
[27:23.490 --> 27:25.770]  That's why it's called the Onion Router because it resembles...
[27:25.770 --> 27:27.090]  It's like the layers of an onion.
[27:27.190 --> 27:27.470]  Interesting.
[27:27.810 --> 27:30.430]  It's T-O-R, torproject.org.
[27:30.550 --> 27:41.430]  So anyone can run a Tor node, and basically they just make encrypted connections to each other and, yeah, that's as far as I'm going to go.
[27:41.530 --> 27:42.270]  That's a good explanation.
[27:42.270 --> 27:43.790]  And how does somebody initiate it?
[27:45.110 --> 27:49.330]  You can go to torproject.org, and they have reasonably good documentation there.
[27:49.670 --> 27:49.930]  Okay.
[27:50.050 --> 27:51.330]  So basically, that'll explain it to you.
[27:51.410 --> 27:51.590]  Yeah.
[27:51.710 --> 27:51.930]  Hopefully.
[27:52.170 --> 27:54.510]  Better than we can do from memory on the radio, for sure.
[27:54.670 --> 27:54.870]  Okay.
[27:55.130 --> 27:55.350]  All right.
[27:55.470 --> 27:57.030]  Do you guys use Tor on a regular basis?
[27:57.070 --> 27:57.270]  Anyone?
[27:58.070 --> 27:58.370]  No?
[27:58.450 --> 27:58.790]  I have.
[27:59.270 --> 27:59.810]  You have.
[27:59.910 --> 28:01.290]  Tell us how you used it and what you did.
[28:01.730 --> 28:06.710]  Well, first you need to download a Tor client, which you can find pretty easily online.
[28:07.790 --> 28:10.590]  Mike, do you recall what the website for the Tor project is?
[28:10.870 --> 28:16.070]  And plenty of mirrors you can download it from, too, but you want to download trusted code, obviously.
[28:16.870 --> 28:18.710]  I think it's torproject.org.
[28:18.830 --> 28:19.610]  Yeah, that's correct.
[28:20.070 --> 28:20.350]  Okay.
[28:20.530 --> 28:21.770]  And it's pretty self-explanatory.
[28:22.230 --> 28:25.910]  It steps you through the process, and I've used it a couple of times.
[28:26.910 --> 28:27.270]  Okay.
[28:27.310 --> 28:31.270]  So, again, go to the website to get the explanation, because we're not going to give you any more here.
[28:31.950 --> 28:32.550]  Yes, Barb?
[28:32.730 --> 28:35.750]  We'd be here all night explaining the intricacies of Tor, but...
[28:36.030 --> 28:41.110]  There are very good documents there, including newbie-friendly, I think, comparatively newbie-friendly ones.
[28:41.330 --> 28:52.010]  Yeah, and now they also even have, like, this sort of, like, hidden service website world going on where you have websites that you can only really access from the Tor network.
[28:52.850 --> 28:54.270]  We will call the Onion Web.
[28:54.270 --> 28:57.910]  Okay, moving on to other stories.
[28:57.910 --> 28:59.350]  Here's one out of Beijing.
[28:59.890 --> 29:01.370]  Talk about Big Brother.
[29:01.570 --> 29:07.310]  Every Beijing mobile phone user will be tracked through the use of the latest global positioning technology.
[29:07.650 --> 29:12.230]  The project is called the Information Platform of Real-Time Citizen Movement.
[29:12.230 --> 29:13.050]  What a great name.
[29:13.490 --> 29:18.950]  Aims to watch over more than 20 million people in Beijing alone, 24 hours a day.
[29:19.310 --> 29:20.690]  And that's according to local media.
[29:20.990 --> 29:24.970]  Wherever you are, whether in the bathroom, on the subway, or in Tiananmen Square, the government will know.
[29:25.050 --> 29:26.690]  Now, I don't know if that's necessarily true.
[29:26.830 --> 29:29.250]  This story comes from China Newswatch.
[29:29.490 --> 29:31.250]  Are they really going to know if you're in the bathroom?
[29:31.610 --> 29:32.950]  Is the tracking that good?
[29:33.910 --> 29:35.090]  They'll probably know you're at home.
[29:35.230 --> 29:37.390]  They'll know you're at home, but they won't know where in your house you are.
[29:37.550 --> 29:37.990]  I mean...
[29:38.810 --> 29:38.970]  I mean, it's...
[29:38.970 --> 29:41.310]  I mean, that's bad enough, but will they have that much in there?
[29:41.310 --> 29:45.470]  They may not have an exact position, but, you know, it would at least place you in a general area.
[29:45.950 --> 29:52.950]  And I don't know how the technology works, because I haven't read that article, but if they're using the cell phone towers, then, you know, they can kind of get a pretty good fix.
[29:53.210 --> 30:03.550]  Well, wireless communications experts say the system would be particularly useful not only for following the whereabouts of individuals, but also in detecting any unusual gathering of a large number of people.
[30:04.470 --> 30:05.650]  They're not sure...
[30:05.650 --> 30:11.390]  Nobody's sure, really, whether the government launched the project to prevent a Jasmine revolution or other social unrest.
[30:11.690 --> 30:17.970]  But with the help of supercomputers, officials will know where the next gathering spot is before protesters get there.
[30:20.250 --> 30:29.870]  Basically, using the data, which is provided by mobile service providers, the government will know the population distribution and movement of cities with unprecedented accuracy.
[30:30.310 --> 30:32.350]  To some degree, they say the...
[30:32.830 --> 30:46.230]  Or experts say, rather, the project can effectively increase citizens' traveling efficiency and ease traffic jams by giving officials information such as which subway line was crowded, which bus line was filled, and which road was congested.
[30:47.530 --> 30:51.290]  Citizens actually can get this information, too, but they're going to have to pay for it.
[30:51.610 --> 30:59.870]  I mean, the thing about it is it sounds like it's a, you know, a huge, large-scale thing, but it's really just a matter of getting enough horsepower to kind of crunch the numbers.
[30:59.930 --> 31:01.110]  It's just a stream of numbers.
[31:01.290 --> 31:06.550]  And, yeah, there's 20 million people, but you're just, you know, processing the stream for each one of them and recording it.
[31:06.550 --> 31:07.710]  It's not that much data, really.
[31:08.710 --> 31:11.170]  And the thing is, this stuff would work pretty well.
[31:11.290 --> 31:19.570]  I actually have kind of a local version of that on my phone where, based on where I am in the city, I have it, you know, set my volume at various levels.
[31:19.690 --> 31:24.530]  So when I come to WBAI between 7 and 8 p.m., my phone goes to silent, things like that.
[31:24.610 --> 31:26.790]  And that's just based on, you know, what towers I'm connected to.
[31:26.950 --> 31:31.910]  So if they just expanded that for 20 million people and can crunch the numbers, it's pretty feasible.
[31:32.110 --> 31:34.690]  Well, I think every government is going to want to do this at some point.
[31:34.690 --> 31:39.170]  And I think this is a threat that we're going to face in all parts of the world.
[31:39.350 --> 31:42.830]  Do they say in this article who's providing the technology that enables this?
[31:43.110 --> 31:45.250]  They don't point to a specific company.
[31:45.250 --> 31:48.850]  They say there are three basic providers that are cooperating with this.
[31:48.870 --> 31:50.750]  Well, yeah, there's the cell phone companies.
[31:50.750 --> 31:57.070]  But there's also, you know, someone, some entity is doing the analytics and the logging.
[31:57.270 --> 31:58.910]  And I'd be curious to know who that is.
[31:59.390 --> 31:59.590]  All right.
[31:59.590 --> 32:11.970]  In the article that the Beijing Municipal Science and Technology Commission worked on the project with China Mobile and presumably two other state-owned mobile service providers, China Unicom and China Telecom.
[32:11.970 --> 32:17.770]  But I would be surprised if there wasn't a foreign, particularly a U.S.
[32:18.230 --> 32:24.790]  or Western European-based company like Siemens or someone who's provided such technologies to other countries' governments.
[32:25.630 --> 32:29.490]  I think it's really important for us to keep track of what U.S.
[32:29.570 --> 32:41.550]  or other Western companies are providing technology to other countries who could be misusing it to clamp down on political protests.
[32:42.510 --> 32:51.370]  Yeah, I think it's worth thinking about that the cell phone system itself has to have already been able to track all these people and figure out which subscribers where just to provide the service.
[32:51.590 --> 33:02.050]  And it's worth thinking about that we have so many of these services that this data is somewhere and it's just a matter of somebody getting the idea or the wherewithal to go and analyze it and log it and so forth.
[33:02.390 --> 33:05.710]  Okay, we have an update on the Bradley Manning case.
[33:06.030 --> 33:10.630]  As you know, or may know, more charges were filed against him last week.
[33:10.630 --> 33:12.310]  I think, what, 22 more charges?
[33:12.470 --> 33:13.270]  Is that right about that?
[33:13.550 --> 33:13.730]  Yeah.
[33:14.130 --> 33:19.130]  This comes from a very interesting site, armycourtmartialdefense.info.
[33:19.130 --> 33:22.930]  It's actually run by his attorney, David Edward Combs.
[33:23.130 --> 33:24.130]  I believe it's run by his attorney.
[33:24.310 --> 33:26.310]  It says in the front, the law offices of David E.
[33:26.410 --> 33:30.310]  Combs, the specialist you need at your side is in quotes.
[33:30.750 --> 33:32.110]  Yeah, that's Bradley Manning's attorney.
[33:32.310 --> 33:34.090]  It's great when lawyers have slogans, isn't it?
[33:35.030 --> 33:39.650]  There's all kinds of crazy pictures of him in silly military uniforms too.
[33:39.650 --> 33:40.490]  Bradley Manning.
[33:40.610 --> 33:40.990]  No, no, no.
[33:41.150 --> 33:41.890]  Oh, David Combs.
[33:42.190 --> 33:55.490]  His history is that he's a military defense counsel and he's notable for his role in several high-profile cases, including the guy who lobbed some grenades into an army barracks over in Iraq.
[33:55.490 --> 33:58.010]  And I believe that client got the death penalty.
[33:58.010 --> 34:01.850]  But I think he has a better track record with other clients, hopefully.
[34:01.970 --> 34:03.330]  And with Bradley, he'll do much better.
[34:03.870 --> 34:06.070]  Um, but, um, yes, go ahead, Voltaire.
[34:06.450 --> 34:06.930]  No?
[34:07.050 --> 34:07.230]  Okay.
[34:07.830 --> 34:20.430]  Uh, so we have this, uh, this particular update, uh, which, uh, is, is, is pretty disturbing, um, that, uh, Bradley Manning, uh, was forced for the second time to strip naked in his cell.
[34:20.950 --> 34:28.010]  Um, Quantico Brig guards where he's being held, uh, at Quantico, uh, required him to, uh, surrender all of his clothing.
[34:28.010 --> 34:31.290]  He then had to walk back to his bed, spend the next seven hours in humiliation.
[34:31.810 --> 34:38.290]  Uh, the decision to require him to be stripped of all clothing was made by the Brig Commander, Chief Warrant Officer 2.
[34:38.530 --> 34:39.550]  Is that really a title?
[34:39.730 --> 34:40.870]  Chief Warrant Officer 2?
[34:41.250 --> 34:42.810]  Or are there two Denise Barnes?
[34:43.190 --> 34:43.770]  No, that...
[34:43.770 --> 34:44.230]  That's...
[34:44.230 --> 34:44.890]  You know something about this?
[34:44.910 --> 34:48.650]  Yeah, there's, uh, more than one grade of, uh, Chief Warrant Officers.
[34:48.870 --> 34:52.190]  There's, um, basically, it goes up to five and, uh...
[34:52.190 --> 34:54.010]  Well, why is it necessary to know which one...
[34:54.010 --> 34:56.150]  Okay, I'll never understand the military.
[34:56.270 --> 34:57.630]  Okay, Chief Warrant Officer 2.
[34:58.010 --> 35:03.730]  Uh, Denise Barnes made the determination that, uh, that Bradley Manning was to, uh, have all of his clothing taken away.
[35:04.150 --> 35:11.930]  Uh, according to First Lieutenant Brian Villard, a Marine spokesman, the decision was not punitive and done in accordance with Brig rules.
[35:12.170 --> 35:13.830]  So apparently this kind of thing happens all the time.
[35:14.150 --> 35:23.390]  Uh, there can be no conceivable justification for requiring a soldier to surrender all his clothing, remain naked in his cell for seven hours, and then stand at attention the subsequent morning.
[35:23.910 --> 35:30.370]  This treatment is even more degrading, considering that Private Manning is being monitored both by direct observation and by video at all times.
[35:30.590 --> 35:39.550]  The defense was informed by Brig officials that the decision to strip Private Manning of all his clothing was made without consulting any of the Brig's mental health providers.
[35:40.130 --> 35:47.650]  Uh, last Wednesday, the government filed its response to the defense's Article 138 complaint concerning Private Manning's confinement conditions.
[35:47.650 --> 35:56.010]  The preliminary decision made by the government was to deny Private Manning's request to be removed from maximum custody and from prevention of injury watch.
[35:56.270 --> 35:59.770]  The defense now has 10 days to file a rebuttal to this determination.
[36:00.210 --> 36:05.690]  After submitting the rebuttal, the matter will go to the Quantico base commander, Colonel Daniel J.
[36:06.210 --> 36:07.470]  Troik, for his review.
[36:07.630 --> 36:11.210]  Once complete, he will forward the report to the Secretary of the Navy for final review.
[36:11.210 --> 36:12.130]  Very interesting site.
[36:12.230 --> 36:15.550]  A lot of, uh, um, facts that need to be known.
[36:15.690 --> 36:16.650]  A lot of, uh, commentary.
[36:17.070 --> 36:21.870]  Uh, and again, the site is armycourtmartialdefense.info.
[36:22.410 --> 36:27.430]  And there you'll find, uh, latest updates on, uh, on Bradley Manning case and other, other things as well.
[36:27.770 --> 36:43.670]  But boy, this is, uh, it just gets more and more disturbing seeing all the charges, seeing the way he's being treated, uh, realizing how hard it's going to be to really achieve justice in this case and have, uh, uh, have his actions be, uh, uh, his alleged actions be,
[36:43.670 --> 36:48.510]  uh, uh, judged fairly and not, uh, with hysteria like we've seen so far.
[36:49.310 --> 36:57.570]  Um, meanwhile, uh, I'm not sure, uh, if I have this story on me, but, uh, I read this earlier where, um, yeah, here it is.
[36:58.250 --> 37:14.750]  Um, the former head of Britain's secret intelligence service has credited WikiLeaks and other secret spilling sites with sparking the revolutions sweeping the Middle East at, uh, what was supposed to be an off-the-record appearance last month at the Cambridge Union Society,
[37:15.430 --> 37:25.770]  uh, former MI6 chief Richard Dearlove said that the technology WikiLeaks harnesses is fundamentally strengthening the hand of the individual as he goes up against powerful organizations.
[37:26.170 --> 37:26.910]  Here's the quote.
[37:27.010 --> 37:36.690]  I would definitely draw parallels at the moment between the wave of political unrest, which is sweeping through the Middle East in a very exciting and rather extraordinary fashion, and also the WikiLeaks phenomenon.
[37:36.930 --> 37:47.530]  Really, what ties these two events together, and of course, a number of other events, is the diffusion of power away from the states and the empowerment of individuals and small groups of individuals by technology.
[37:48.270 --> 37:52.370]  Now, the former spy didn't know just how prophetic his words would be.
[37:52.530 --> 37:56.170]  Much of the talk was captured on video, including an exchange with a critic.
[37:56.410 --> 38:06.910]  Uh, she cited a leaked document from 2002 that has come to be known as the Downing Street Memo, which appeared to show him as saying that the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy of then U.S.
[38:06.990 --> 38:07.790]  President George W.
[38:07.930 --> 38:10.770]  Bush of removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.
[38:11.070 --> 38:19.810]  I find that a terrible betrayal of everything democracy is supposed to stand for and that the intelligence service is supposed to provide, the unidentified woman told Dear Love.
[38:19.910 --> 38:28.110]  She went on to challenge his assertion that WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange is an undignified flag carrier who has yet to justify his zeal for radical transparency.
[38:28.750 --> 38:40.030]  To find out information like that, and that's what public servants are actually doing, and that's how intelligence is being used, I think the most dignified way we can recover from that is to find out that information and move forward from there.
[38:41.090 --> 38:49.810]  Dear Love first said he wouldn't comment, but couldn't help adding the Downing Street memo, which you just read, is a misquotation of what I said, and what I said is not in the public record.
[38:50.490 --> 38:59.790]  Elsewhere in the 20-minute video, he said, I think it would be generally accepted that most organizations, large and small, also require moments in their existence for the benefit of their members of confidentiality.
[38:59.870 --> 39:09.050]  However, there's absolutely no question that technology is significantly shifting these domains and altering the relationship quite fundamentally between the citizen and the government.
[39:09.250 --> 39:20.830]  Following the exchange with the critic, Dear Love quickly took a question from what is assumed to be a more sympathetic audience member, but the leaked comments and conversation are now a permanent part of the internet record.
[39:21.550 --> 39:25.990]  The irony, as the register says in that particular story.
[39:26.110 --> 39:34.490]  And I find that amazing that this kind of perspective is actually showing up now amongst people in MI6.
[39:35.530 --> 39:37.250]  So, something to keep in mind.
[39:37.350 --> 39:37.490]  Go ahead.
[39:37.550 --> 39:39.110]  I don't think it's really surprising at all.
[39:39.230 --> 39:44.050]  I think it explains why Western governments are so interested in shutting down WikiLeaks.
[39:45.190 --> 39:53.190]  I mean, if, you know, if you have a tool that enables the destruction of governments, then governments will dislike it.
[39:53.450 --> 39:53.910]  Well, I guess.
[39:54.010 --> 39:58.810]  But the way that he was quoted, the way that he said this, it sounded like a positive thing.
[39:58.930 --> 40:08.590]  I mean, I guess he was saying it as a negative thing, that the wave of political unrest in a very exciting, rather extraordinary fashion, to me, that sounds like a positive thing.
[40:08.610 --> 40:10.890]  You're saying it's a negative thing, the way he was describing it.
[40:10.890 --> 40:11.270]  No, no, no.
[40:11.350 --> 40:14.910]  I'm saying that the exact same analysis applies.
[40:15.110 --> 40:22.950]  Like, if you believe that WikiLeaks can topple governments and you run a government, then you don't like it.
[40:23.030 --> 40:28.510]  But if there's a government that you wish would fall, then you like that aspect of it.
[40:28.530 --> 40:32.150]  I don't think it's contradictory at all.
[40:32.150 --> 40:40.210]  But I think they can't have it both ways, where they say that something like WikiLeaks can topple bad governments, but they can also topple good governments.
[40:40.370 --> 40:50.450]  So therefore, WikiLeaks is evil unless it topples a bad government, in which case it inspired this particular wave of democracy across the world, but still evil because it could do something bad to us.
[40:50.450 --> 40:54.050]  The logic starts to spin in the mud at that point.
[40:54.230 --> 40:58.270]  And I think people might see through the... I don't know.
[40:58.890 --> 41:03.910]  It seems like a very weak point that these guys are now spouting.
[41:04.070 --> 41:04.250]  Go ahead.
[41:04.350 --> 41:04.570]  Thought, Ray.
[41:04.890 --> 41:10.210]  Well, I think personally, though, it depends on context, you know, the particular perspective.
[41:10.670 --> 41:16.350]  You know, if people in this room hear shifting power away from the government towards the individual, that all sounds positive to us.
[41:16.350 --> 41:24.970]  But to someone who exists in the system where they feel the government must have a certain amount of power, that very line can be very scary.
[41:25.350 --> 41:27.250]  So, you know, it really does depend.
[41:27.410 --> 41:28.310]  You know, he could have meant it bad.
[41:28.310 --> 41:29.190]  He could have meant it good.
[41:29.670 --> 41:31.330]  You know, but it's irrelevant.
[41:31.350 --> 41:36.610]  People who are in that position of power and they don't want to lose it, that's something they won't like.
[41:36.750 --> 41:42.470]  Well, as people, as the people, not the governments, I don't see how we can see this as anything but good.
[41:42.470 --> 41:44.310]  We shouldn't see it as anything but good.
[41:44.490 --> 41:48.410]  I mean, the whole point of these governments were supposed to, at least...
[41:48.410 --> 41:50.990]  But there are many people who do see it as bad.
[41:51.150 --> 41:55.110]  They do see it as leaks of information, what governments are really saying and doing.
[41:55.350 --> 41:58.210]  This is something that should be punished if somebody does this.
[41:58.350 --> 42:06.050]  And if you look at what's going on in the world, you see how people can be inspired to do something based on the truth coming out.
[42:06.050 --> 42:08.530]  I don't see how you can look at it that way anymore.
[42:09.370 --> 42:17.730]  You have to start asking yourself, maybe lives were saved rather than lost by having the truth come out at a certain point.
[42:17.950 --> 42:21.170]  Maybe more lives would have been saved had the truth come out years earlier.
[42:21.810 --> 42:23.770]  Maybe we need more people doing this kind of a thing.
[42:23.830 --> 42:31.310]  And I think once you get people thinking that way, maybe you won't have such horrible conditions, meeting the people who do these kinds of things in the first place.
[42:31.310 --> 42:32.110]  What do you think, Barney?
[42:32.690 --> 42:53.950]  I think really what this former head of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, Richard Yearlove, stated, and I'm going to quote him again because it might have run by our listeners too quickly, characterizing what's going on is the diffusion of power away from the states and the empowerment of individuals and small groups of individuals by technology.
[42:53.950 --> 43:09.310]  In other words, WikiLeaks, the Internet, social media, social networking technologies like Facebook and Twitter, all of these things.
[43:10.710 --> 43:21.930]  The former head of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, now he's crediting these technologies with sparking revolutions that are sweeping the Middle East right now.
[43:21.930 --> 43:23.470]  And I think this is fantastic.
[43:23.810 --> 43:27.170]  This is what we've really been talking about on this show for a long time.
[43:27.590 --> 43:39.870]  And I think we're kind of reaching a critical mass where these technologies are becoming so readily available in so many different places in the world that they're having a really practical effect now.
[43:40.350 --> 43:44.650]  I think it's also interesting, and we should take some phone calls, 212-209-2900.
[43:45.070 --> 43:57.890]  If you look at the situation, say, in Iraq, for instance, where there are demonstrations going on as well as so many other countries in the area, might the demonstrations have toppled Saddam Hussein if he was still in power?
[43:57.890 --> 44:03.590]  Well, we've seen all kinds of dictatorial leaders being toppled in recent weeks and months.
[44:03.590 --> 44:05.450]  So, yeah, imagine that.
[44:05.650 --> 44:18.710]  Imagine he could have been driven out of power by demonstrations, inspired by other demonstrations, inspired by leaked information, inspired by somebody with ideals inside the military.
[44:18.930 --> 44:25.910]  It makes you think a little bit differently about leaking information, and think of how many lives would have been saved had that happened.
[44:26.170 --> 44:26.810]  Simply incredible.
[44:27.210 --> 44:29.090]  212-209-2900.
[44:29.290 --> 44:29.710]  Voltaire.
[44:29.710 --> 44:33.310]  Yeah, but I don't think that would have changed the Bush administration's mind about going in.
[44:33.470 --> 44:35.450]  Yeah, the Bush administration is one thing.
[44:35.550 --> 44:38.270]  Of course, yeah, they're going to be stubborn and upset about what they do.
[44:38.690 --> 44:39.690]  Yeah, absolutely.
[44:39.850 --> 44:43.830]  But the thing is, when the truth comes out, maybe people will look differently.
[44:43.850 --> 44:47.110]  But he didn't sell the war as instilling democracy.
[44:47.110 --> 44:49.330]  He sold it as saving us from weapons of violence.
[44:49.330 --> 44:53.450]  It would have been harder for him to do what he did with the truth out.
[44:53.450 --> 45:03.270]  It wouldn't have been any harder because the whole democracy thing was a post-hoc rationalization of it.
[45:03.370 --> 45:05.090]  It was like a changing of the goal of the war.
[45:05.570 --> 45:06.330]  Well, okay.
[45:06.530 --> 45:08.030]  I mean, you think Bradley Manning...
[45:08.570 --> 45:22.190]  If Bradley Manning was the person who released all this information, it had come out earlier, and there had been information that would have shown various things in the Middle East and in the United States government that wouldn't have had any effect,
[45:22.310 --> 45:23.650]  you think, on ultimate policy.
[45:23.670 --> 45:30.230]  No, because there's already plenty of information that showed that the Bush administration's logic for invading Iraq was bold and...
[45:30.230 --> 45:32.230]  Right, but maybe the people would have been swayed.
[45:32.810 --> 45:34.310]  You can't sway people that...
[45:34.310 --> 45:38.590]  They need the media to help educate the people, and the media was on the Bush administration side.
[45:38.590 --> 45:40.370]  It just sounds like nothing can change anything.
[45:40.650 --> 45:41.950]  No, it can.
[45:42.090 --> 45:51.030]  As long as you had to start higher, and you had to start with the media, and they've been better since the Bush administration, and that's why WikiLeaks is important.
[45:51.650 --> 45:55.250]  I think that's the real point behind all of this, is that you can call WikiLeaks good or bad.
[45:55.290 --> 46:07.430]  You can call leaking information to the world at large good or bad, but when it comes down to it, it's a decision between putting the truth out there, because when you put the truth out there, the people will react to it and react accordingly, whether they react in a good way,
[46:07.510 --> 46:12.710]  in a bad way, whatever, they're reacting to the truth, and that's what all this is enabling, and that, I think, is a very good thing.
[46:12.950 --> 46:18.390]  Right, absolutely, and that could change the course of history, regardless of who you have in power at a particular moment.
[46:19.190 --> 46:20.510]  Let's see if we can take some phone calls.
[46:20.550 --> 46:22.670]  212-209-2900, good evening, you're on off the hook.
[46:23.430 --> 46:24.930]  Okay, well, you weren't off the hook.
[46:25.450 --> 46:27.950]  I had a quick comment, though, or a quick thought, anyway.
[46:28.150 --> 46:28.410]  Very quick.
[46:28.710 --> 46:42.070]  In terms of WikiLeaks, it's good that it exists, and it's good that it's a place where people can send this kind of information, but if these ambassadors or whoever were sending these cables didn't think it was going to be secure in the first place, they might not have spoken so candidly,
[46:42.150 --> 46:44.970]  and bits might not have been there.
[46:44.970 --> 46:52.930]  So, on the one hand, the fact that they have these secret communication channels is good because it gave them this false sense of security.
[46:53.970 --> 46:54.750]  So, I don't know.
[46:54.790 --> 46:56.870]  If you had complete transparency, what would happen then?
[46:57.010 --> 46:58.250]  Where would the secrets go?
[46:58.730 --> 46:59.690]  All right, let's take a phone call.
[46:59.770 --> 47:00.050]  Good evening.
[47:00.150 --> 47:00.750]  You're on off the hook.
[47:01.670 --> 47:02.070]  Hey.
[47:02.350 --> 47:02.610]  Hi.
[47:02.710 --> 47:03.070]  What's on your mind?
[47:03.090 --> 47:15.770]  I'm wondering if you guys could be somewhat specific as to what Bradley Manning leaked, if you know, just because I heard about the results of what happened in Belarus regarding the WikiLeaks.
[47:16.210 --> 47:17.830]  Did you guys hear about Belarus?
[47:17.910 --> 47:19.510]  Actually, something new in Belarus?
[47:20.310 --> 47:23.890]  No, just from a couple months ago when they rounded up the 600 protesters.
[47:23.990 --> 47:26.790]  Yeah, well, I mean, that kind of thing is going on in a lot of different countries.
[47:26.870 --> 47:29.270]  Basically, Bradley Manning is accused of leaking everything, I think.
[47:29.930 --> 47:33.650]  Certainly, collateral murder, the video of U.S.
[47:33.950 --> 47:47.650]  troops killing all kinds of innocent people, including journalists, and the diplomatic cables, and the Iraq war logs, and Afghanistan war logs, and basically all of it he's being accused of.
[47:47.710 --> 47:51.630]  He is the target, I guess, is the best way to phrase it.
[47:52.390 --> 47:53.390]  Does that answer your question?
[47:54.130 --> 48:09.350]  Um, well, I just, I always like to get inside the minds of people, and, you know, so I just, I just wanted to know, like, you know, like, what, what are they so upset about that they might want to be torturing this dude?
[48:10.130 --> 48:11.930]  Because their secrets got out.
[48:12.110 --> 48:13.970]  They wanted things to keep, to be kept quiet.
[48:14.350 --> 48:18.850]  My point is that the secrets are out, and what harm has been caused?
[48:18.850 --> 48:31.530]  I see a lot of good that has happened as a result, and I'm trying to find the actual bad that has happened, other than some red faces in the State Department, and some, uh, some, some policies that might have to be rethought.
[48:32.130 --> 48:33.330]  Uh, where is the bad?
[48:33.430 --> 48:45.910]  The good is very easy to see, but I don't see, and the good, even if you just look at it as empowerment, people feeling good, that, wow, the truth is finally getting out, but maybe something a lot more meaningful than that, maybe actually regimes being changed.
[48:45.990 --> 48:47.510]  And that's the point I was trying to make before.
[48:47.750 --> 48:51.890]  If this information had gotten out earlier, maybe people would have changed regimes quicker.
[48:52.130 --> 48:54.070]  Maybe, uh, good things could have happened earlier.
[48:54.130 --> 48:56.430]  Maybe all the bad things could have been avoided.
[48:56.630 --> 48:59.730]  So, sometimes the truth is the best policy.
[48:59.810 --> 49:01.970]  In fact, I think most of the times the truth is the best policy.
[49:02.270 --> 49:03.310]  Anyway, thanks for that call.
[49:03.450 --> 49:05.270]  Let's see if we can, uh, fit in another one.
[49:05.330 --> 49:05.590]  Good evening.
[49:05.710 --> 49:06.370]  You're on Off the Hook.
[49:07.370 --> 49:07.690]  Hi.
[49:07.970 --> 49:08.110]  Hi.
[49:08.110 --> 49:08.590]  What's on your mind?
[49:09.330 --> 49:13.390]  Um, just wanted to, you guys know about the residential camps?
[49:13.570 --> 49:21.730]  I just wanted to expand on it, uh, saying that they're now have guillotines in these residential camps that they've built all around the country.
[49:21.970 --> 49:23.370]  Where can we see one?
[49:24.130 --> 49:29.330]  Um, my friend told me that there's been many, uh, there's been a lot of people that have verified it.
[49:29.470 --> 49:31.030]  Okay, well, can we speak to one?
[49:31.850 --> 49:32.970]  Can we speak to one what?
[49:33.090 --> 49:34.870]  A person who's verified, or see it ourselves.
[49:34.870 --> 49:37.790]  Cause, you know, I like, we have a camera and we want to go over there and...
[49:37.790 --> 49:39.590]  You don't know about the residential camps?
[49:39.690 --> 49:40.190]  Have you ever seen?
[49:40.210 --> 49:43.490]  You know the guy who used to, uh, be the wrestler who was the governor?
[49:43.730 --> 49:44.550]  Uh-huh, yeah, that guy.
[49:44.650 --> 49:45.990]  Of course we know about the residential camps, yeah.
[49:46.070 --> 49:51.010]  He has a whole video on the residential camps and he goes around to all of them and he shows the coffins that they have.
[49:51.110 --> 49:53.210]  Right, and guillotines and, uh, there's...
[49:53.210 --> 49:58.310]  And, uh, he hasn't shown the guillotines, but the new thing is that they've now built guillotines inside these camps people.
[49:58.450 --> 49:59.670]  Well, there's gas too.
[49:59.910 --> 50:01.810]  I believe certain buildings have gas in them.
[50:02.350 --> 50:02.630]  Boo!
[50:03.830 --> 50:04.150]  What?
[50:04.150 --> 50:06.370]  Oh, I think I overloaded his circuits.
[50:07.010 --> 50:07.510]  All right.
[50:07.610 --> 50:07.930]  Good evening.
[50:08.090 --> 50:08.650]  You're on Off the Hook.
[50:09.870 --> 50:10.370]  Yeah, hello?
[50:10.630 --> 50:11.330]  Hi, what's on your mind?
[50:11.690 --> 50:12.070]  Oh, yeah.
[50:12.270 --> 50:12.430]  Hi.
[50:12.930 --> 50:13.530]  Hey, Manuel.
[50:13.910 --> 50:14.530]  Hi, how are you doing?
[50:14.970 --> 50:15.290]  All right.
[50:15.310 --> 50:16.010]  I'm just chilling.
[50:16.850 --> 50:17.510]  Is this Rebel?
[50:18.410 --> 50:19.410]  Yeah, what do you think it is?
[50:19.850 --> 50:20.430]  I don't know.
[50:20.490 --> 50:21.590]  I was hoping it might be somebody else.
[50:21.690 --> 50:22.930]  But okay, it's you.
[50:23.290 --> 50:23.610]  Great.
[50:23.910 --> 50:25.150]  Well, what's on your mind, Rebel?
[50:26.110 --> 50:26.790]  Nothing, really.
[50:26.950 --> 50:29.290]  I've just been like, you know, nothing works anymore.
[50:29.290 --> 50:33.970]  And I've just been like, you know, nothing works in terms of phones.
[50:34.010 --> 50:35.990]  And I can't do what you used to do.
[50:36.170 --> 50:37.490]  So, you know.
[50:38.230 --> 50:38.850]  That's sad.
[50:38.970 --> 50:39.770]  It's sad to hear that.
[50:40.450 --> 50:47.370]  I've been just getting into, you know, more extreme sports, you know, like racing quads and, you know, things like that.
[50:47.570 --> 50:48.270]  That's what you've been doing.
[50:48.350 --> 50:48.550]  Okay.
[50:48.890 --> 50:55.550]  But, you know, I wanted to say that I'd like an operator switchboard from, like, 1970s or 80s.
[50:55.550 --> 51:01.330]  Because I, you know, the TSPS type, you know, I know one of them.
[51:01.370 --> 51:02.410]  I want to put one in my house.
[51:02.910 --> 51:04.350]  That's actually not a bad idea.
[51:04.350 --> 51:05.530]  I don't think they're using them anymore.
[51:05.750 --> 51:06.410]  So, maybe...
[51:06.410 --> 51:07.670]  I know they're not using them anymore.
[51:07.670 --> 51:12.650]  But I'm saying if somebody has one at the phone, I'll give somebody my truck for it.
[51:13.590 --> 51:16.930]  You'll trade a truck for a TSPS operator console.
[51:17.370 --> 51:17.950]  Yeah, of course.
[51:18.250 --> 51:21.630]  I'm getting another pickup truck.
[51:21.750 --> 51:24.350]  So, you know, I got my old, you know, toys.
[51:24.350 --> 51:24.890]  Okay.
[51:24.930 --> 51:25.390]  All right.
[51:25.410 --> 51:27.150]  Well, that's something to consider.
[51:27.610 --> 51:28.230]  I'll tell you what.
[51:28.290 --> 51:34.330]  If somebody writes in to us with a TSPS operator console, we'll read it on the air next week and maybe we can make this happen.
[51:34.450 --> 51:36.590]  That sounds like a good trade.
[51:36.590 --> 51:38.150]  Anything to get a pickup truck off the road.
[51:38.490 --> 51:40.250]  Thanks for your call, Rebel.
[51:40.750 --> 51:41.930]  212-209-2900.
[51:42.010 --> 51:42.250]  Good evening.
[51:42.350 --> 51:42.950]  You're on Off the Hook.
[51:43.550 --> 51:43.910]  Hi.
[51:44.190 --> 51:44.350]  Hi.
[51:44.350 --> 51:44.830]  What's on your mind?
[51:45.610 --> 51:48.970]  Just a quick comment or a quick question to you guys.
[51:49.110 --> 51:49.330]  Go ahead.
[51:49.330 --> 52:10.910]  I was just wondering if you think the new generation of interest in the government's monitoring of mobile communications would then lead to a whole new zone of hacking whereby people would develop codes, avoidances, and other even nonverbal or verbal signals to make sure that we're,
[52:11.030 --> 52:17.210]  since we're all going to be monitored, to avoid it the same way we've had to do with everything else.
[52:18.270 --> 52:32.410]  That is very possible, depending on how... it all depends on how a system is deployed, but I will say that if a system is designed just the right way, someone evil enough might decide to mess with a system and see if possibly they could trick the government into thinking there was a mass rally somewhere,
[52:32.410 --> 52:34.190]  when in fact it was somewhere else.
[52:34.190 --> 52:37.390]  Or the other way around, as the Koch brothers are now quite famous for doing.
[52:37.850 --> 52:51.730]  Planting incidents and creating fake organizations that supposedly spontaneously have sprouted up on the right wing, but really, in fact, are just props.
[52:52.630 --> 52:57.550]  I mean, it could be used by either side, but I think it seems to be a race.
[52:57.550 --> 53:03.610]  Well, the technology can always, can always be... did someone... it's like a phone somehow picked up on its own.
[53:06.530 --> 53:11.190]  Somehow, technology is always able to be used by all kinds of different sides, good or bad.
[53:11.830 --> 53:23.810]  Another good thing about technology is that you can use it to verify things, like you can, without the internet and stuff, it would be much more difficult to find out that this group you never heard of, it's in fact an actual, actual turf group.
[53:25.150 --> 53:27.130]  So that's a good side of our technology.
[53:27.590 --> 53:29.770]  Okay, let's see if we can squeeze in one or two more.
[53:30.050 --> 53:30.730]  And good evening.
[53:31.010 --> 53:31.370]  No?
[53:31.630 --> 53:32.210]  Okay, hold on.
[53:32.350 --> 53:32.690]  Over here.
[53:32.770 --> 53:33.050]  Good evening.
[53:33.150 --> 53:33.750]  You're on off the hook.
[53:34.650 --> 53:35.170]  Go ahead.
[53:36.370 --> 53:37.490]  Good evening, sir.
[53:37.950 --> 53:38.590]  Rebel, yes.
[53:38.690 --> 53:39.430]  You had your time.
[53:39.670 --> 53:40.330]  Good evening.
[53:40.390 --> 53:41.230]  You're on off the hook.
[53:42.630 --> 53:42.990]  Hello?
[53:43.270 --> 53:43.450]  Hi.
[53:43.470 --> 53:43.930]  What's on your mind?
[53:44.530 --> 53:46.030]  My name is Janet Christian.
[53:46.310 --> 53:48.490]  I need to ask you a question.
[53:48.870 --> 53:49.530]  Okay, go ahead.
[53:50.530 --> 53:53.290]  Can they increase your social security in your job?
[53:54.370 --> 53:55.290]  Say that again, what?
[53:56.630 --> 53:58.350]  I work in a decay center.
[53:58.550 --> 53:58.810]  Uh-huh.
[53:58.970 --> 54:04.470]  And they decreased my social security and they said that the government asked to do that.
[54:04.650 --> 54:05.310]  Can they do that?
[54:05.410 --> 54:06.230]  Is that by law?
[54:06.370 --> 54:08.450]  You know, I honestly have no idea.
[54:08.970 --> 54:13.290]  There's probably another program you can call to ask that question, like any other program.
[54:14.110 --> 54:15.610]  Does anybody here know an answer to that?
[54:15.750 --> 54:15.890]  No.
[54:16.030 --> 54:17.330]  We're all shaking our vault here.
[54:17.390 --> 54:18.210]  Do you really have an answer?
[54:18.330 --> 54:19.930]  That's the personal computer show, guys.
[54:21.070 --> 54:21.890]  Oh, that's mean.
[54:22.270 --> 54:23.710]  Well, yeah, good luck.
[54:23.830 --> 54:25.730]  Or, yeah, we have...
[54:25.730 --> 54:29.350]  You know, I wish I had a schedule in front of me, but call during the day.
[54:29.350 --> 54:29.910]  How about that?
[54:29.990 --> 54:33.630]  I know we have lots of call-in people that can answer any question in the world.
[54:34.050 --> 54:34.570]  Good evening.
[54:34.670 --> 54:35.170]  You're on off the hook.
[54:35.690 --> 54:36.150]  Yeah, hi.
[54:36.350 --> 54:36.490]  Hi.
[54:36.490 --> 54:44.250]  I was interested in Facebook, and about the Chinese exchange student who was using a pen name that got kicked off Facebook.
[54:45.190 --> 54:46.310]  I'm not familiar with that one.
[54:46.770 --> 54:48.210]  Yeah, it was in yesterday's...
[54:48.210 --> 54:49.070]  I forget which paper.
[54:49.830 --> 54:56.070]  Yeah, it was a couple of years ago, and he was using a pen name, and they kicked him off Facebook because he wasn't using his real name.
[54:56.650 --> 55:10.490]  And then they, you know, and he's complaining that not only has he lost his contact data for everybody, he's saying that other people in China have used pen names also, and they can't afford to use the real names because they get in trouble with the government.
[55:10.870 --> 55:11.170]  Mm-hmm.
[55:11.410 --> 55:12.050]  That's interesting.
[55:12.050 --> 55:14.510]  I've never heard of a case like that happening.
[55:15.030 --> 55:17.270]  I mean, in theory, it could happen.
[55:17.270 --> 55:19.130]  I have never heard of it actually happening.
[55:19.130 --> 55:19.790]  Yeah.
[55:20.170 --> 55:21.050]  I don't have the clipping.
[55:21.430 --> 55:25.450]  Also, is there a social website that does not want your real name?
[55:26.450 --> 55:27.610]  I'm not on Facebook.
[55:28.090 --> 55:28.310]  Twitter?
[55:28.570 --> 55:30.130]  I mean, most of them except...
[55:30.130 --> 55:36.110]  Facebook has this very strict policy that you must use your real name, and it's sort of sporadically enforced.
[55:36.390 --> 55:42.710]  But if you get more, you know, popular, they'll be more likely to check in to see if you're a real person or not.
[55:42.710 --> 55:53.470]  But, and as you said, this is particularly problematic in regimes where you can't make political comments under your real name without real fear of trouble.
[55:53.670 --> 55:53.910]  All right.
[55:54.050 --> 55:57.190]  That's going to have to be the last word on that, but thanks for all the calls.
[55:57.670 --> 56:00.390]  Write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[56:00.530 --> 56:04.250]  We'll be happy to read your email on the air, maybe even answer you in person.
[56:05.210 --> 56:08.250]  And we'll see you again next week, same time, same place.
[56:08.950 --> 56:10.350]  Stay tuned for The Personal Computer Show.
[56:10.470 --> 56:10.890]  Have a good night.
[56:10.890 --> 56:13.090]  Do you want to carry on the air?
[56:13.550 --> 56:15.290]  influenza, my husband is a busy topic and the company wants to carry on the air, for those of us.
[56:15.290 --> 56:17.270]  We might have to carry our hands up, say, say, say, say, ...
[56:17.270 --> 56:19.370]  Come short call home, view 만들어.
[56:19.510 --> 56:20.230]  Come tell him.
[56:20.270 --> 56:20.790]  Now Liz.
[56:25.240 --> 56:27.640]  And you much, our house six out.
[56:27.640 --> 56:28.560]  I have to.
[56:38.220 --> 56:41.740]  House six out there.
[56:43.080 --> 56:52.340]  Check out there.yang ISIS Com여� dries If you want to have to make money Aouldering you But I don't fret.
[56:53.060 --> 56:56.400]  I don't say you're pleased with coffee and cigarettes.
[56:58.140 --> 57:00.940]  Knowledge and numbers still ain't paid.
[57:02.740 --> 57:05.780]  Brothers and sisters, you know what I'm saying.
[57:09.430 --> 57:10.430]  Ain't paid.
[57:11.690 --> 57:16.100]  I hear something about myself.
[57:16.750 --> 57:18.060]  Know the right hand shake.
[57:18.230 --> 57:19.160]  There's no other brother make.
[57:19.290 --> 57:21.520]  Ain't about the way you talk or the way you walk.
[57:21.660 --> 57:22.660]  Got the right ear do.
[57:22.770 --> 57:23.820]  Know the right school soon.
[57:23.960 --> 57:25.000]  Shut your mouth, get into gear.
[57:25.000 --> 57:26.210]  I ain't impressed by what to wear.
[57:26.270 --> 57:28.290]  Likes are down, you're all in your own.
[57:28.520 --> 57:30.660]  No more applause, the crowd's gone home.
[57:30.900 --> 57:31.980]  Now we're gonna hurt them.
[57:32.120 --> 57:32.920]  Where are we gonna go?
[57:33.020 --> 57:35.340]  Tell me what we're gonna do at the end of the show.
[57:35.600 --> 57:38.580]  Knowledge and numbers still ain't paid.
[57:40.180 --> 57:43.210]  Brothers and sisters, you know what I'm saying.
[57:57.830 --> 57:59.550]  No, take it for admission.
[58:00.510 --> 58:01.870]  My cultural tradition.
[58:02.930 --> 58:04.510]  Say that you can say to me.
[58:05.250 --> 58:06.390]  An opposition globally.
[58:07.350 --> 58:09.610]  Don't do nobody good.
[58:09.790 --> 58:10.710]  It's only understood.
[58:10.710 --> 58:12.250]  If it's only understood.
[58:12.390 --> 58:13.570]  You might have changed the world.
[58:14.350 --> 58:15.850]  Start with your neighborhood.
[58:15.990 --> 58:16.970]  Start with your neighborhood.
[58:17.610 --> 58:19.870]  Consider you, consider me an opposition globally.
[58:20.150 --> 58:22.170]  Look around, it's meant to see all the possibilities.
[58:22.390 --> 58:23.530]  Consider you, consider me.
[58:23.710 --> 58:24.450]  Talk about minority.
[58:24.730 --> 58:25.850]  Consider you, consider me.
[58:26.070 --> 58:26.890]  I'm smart specifically.
[58:31.710 --> 58:33.810]  Likes are down, you're all in your own.
[58:33.990 --> 58:36.210]  No more applause, the crowd's gone home.
[58:36.470 --> 58:37.470]  Now we're gonna hurt them.
[58:37.710 --> 58:38.490]  Where are we gonna go?
[58:38.570 --> 58:40.890]  Tell me what we're gonna do at the end of the show.
[58:41.110 --> 58:43.850]  Knowledge and numbers still ain't paid.
[58:45.650 --> 58:48.590]  Brothers and sisters, you know what I'm saying.
[58:49.070 --> 58:53.350]  At the end of the show, knowledge and numbers still ain't paid.
[58:59.730 --> 59:00.650]  I'm black.
[59:01.330 --> 59:02.770]  Still ain't paid.
[59:04.350 --> 59:05.690]  Life ain't a sweet show.
[59:05.870 --> 59:08.070]  Ain't about what you know is how you materialize.
[59:08.210 --> 59:09.230]  Words that you vocalize.
[59:09.310 --> 59:12.250]  Knowledge and numbers still ain't paid.
[59:13.950 --> 59:15.110]  Know the right and shape.
[59:15.450 --> 59:17.430]  Ain't about the way you talk.
[59:17.650 --> 59:18.550]  Or the way you walk.
[59:18.670 --> 59:21.450]  Brothers and sisters, you know what I'm saying.
[01:00:27.810 --> 01:00:31.950]  Man, they play some good music, that off the hook.
[01:00:32.650 --> 01:00:34.050]  Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[01:00:34.330 --> 01:00:34.870]  All right.
[01:00:37.290 --> 01:00:40.030]  You know, this WBAI is great.
[01:00:41.230 --> 01:00:44.430]  Yeah, it feels great to be here at WBAI.
[01:00:44.970 --> 01:00:48.030]  Man, I'm glad that I can get WBAI on my radio.