[00:00.000 --> 00:05.560]  Our technical production team at KPFA in Berkeley is Rose Katapchi and Scott Pham.
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[00:23.560 --> 00:24.680]  Thanks for listening.
[00:24.940 --> 00:26.720]  In San Francisco, I'm Danny Wood.
[00:34.430 --> 00:37.530]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:37.710 --> 00:39.190]  The time is 7 o'clock.
[00:39.370 --> 00:41.550]  That means time once again for Off the Hook.
[01:07.430 --> 01:08.310]  That's understood.
[01:08.510 --> 01:09.330]  Funded in the book.
[02:33.480 --> 02:35.380]  And giving feedback, the program is Off the Hook.
[02:35.480 --> 02:37.890]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you this fine evening.
[02:38.420 --> 02:40.560]  Joined tonight by Mike.
[02:40.820 --> 02:41.040]  Hi.
[02:41.340 --> 02:41.780]  Voltaire.
[02:41.920 --> 02:42.070]  Hello.
[02:42.390 --> 02:42.800]  Rob T.
[02:42.920 --> 02:43.340]  Firefly.
[02:43.540 --> 02:43.880]  Good evening.
[02:44.060 --> 02:44.460]  Red Hack.
[02:44.600 --> 02:44.760]  Hi.
[02:44.940 --> 02:45.220]  Jim.
[02:45.480 --> 02:45.700]  Hi.
[02:46.020 --> 02:46.780]  And Bernie S.
[02:46.860 --> 02:47.460]  Down in Philadelphia.
[02:48.120 --> 02:49.200]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:49.800 --> 02:53.620]  Well, we were not on last week and we're not doing fundraising anymore.
[02:53.740 --> 02:56.540]  I want to thank everybody who called in during the three weeks that we were on.
[02:56.540 --> 02:58.060]  We did really well this time.
[02:58.200 --> 03:04.100]  So, uh, um, we, uh, we are in the process of, uh, making sure you get your premiums and various things like that.
[03:04.220 --> 03:08.060]  Please make sure that, uh, we get your, your pledge if you, uh, did not in fact already pay.
[03:08.520 --> 03:13.000]  Um, that's what keeps this radio station going and has kept this place around since 1960.
[03:13.060 --> 03:15.520]  So, thanks again to everybody for that.
[03:16.000 --> 03:19.080]  Um, all kinds of things going on in the world, uh, the world of technology.
[03:19.720 --> 03:25.600]  Uh, I guess we should just jump right in, uh, to, um, what everyone is going to want to talk about.
[03:26.020 --> 03:29.360]  I just don't want to, let me point out right now, I don't want to spend the entire hour talking about it.
[03:29.420 --> 03:36.680]  So, uh, if we can just get as much said as we can in as, as, as brief a period as possible, maybe we can have some phone calls about it later.
[03:37.260 --> 03:38.340]  Um, all right.
[03:38.420 --> 03:44.940]  So, uh, we're talking about Wienergate, of course, which now, uh, I think is about to move into its second week.
[03:45.440 --> 03:48.830]  Um, and of course, uh, I'm sure everyone has, has heard about this.
[03:49.000 --> 03:59.710]  We're talking about, uh, uh, uh, representative Anthony Wiener, um, who, um, has been making the rounds on, um, on, on, on the network TV shows and, and, and radio and all kinds of things like that.
[04:00.120 --> 04:04.700]  Answering questions about a lewd photo sent from his Twitter account to a college student.
[04:04.960 --> 04:07.140]  Uh, he has denied sending the image.
[04:07.240 --> 04:12.800]  He could not say, uh, for sure if it was, uh, a picture of him, but he said he did not send it.
[04:13.000 --> 04:21.440]  Now he has repeatedly said, uh, he would not allow this incident to distract him from his job, even as he's making the rounds and talking about nothing else.
[04:21.660 --> 04:28.240]  Uh, he likened this to what he described as a prank or, or somebody shouting out an insult or throwing a pie during a speech.
[04:28.920 --> 04:31.420]  Um, ask point blank, is that picture you?
[04:32.100 --> 04:35.120]  Uh, Wiener has replied, you know, I'm not going to talk about this anymore.
[04:35.420 --> 04:36.330]  This is the tactic.
[04:36.580 --> 04:45.140]  The guy in the back of the room was throwing the pie or yelling out the insult wants that to be the conversation, but I am not going to allow this thing to dominate what I talk about.
[04:45.330 --> 04:49.940]  Now Wiener's office initially said the congressman's account was obviously hacked.
[04:50.440 --> 04:51.580]  His Twitter account, that is.
[04:51.770 --> 04:54.900]  Uh, the representative has since taken to calling the incident a prank.
[04:55.120 --> 04:58.120]  Uh, he used both terms earlier today.
[04:58.270 --> 05:04.320]  In fact, um, the U S Capitol police so far have not opened an investigation into the matter.
[05:04.760 --> 05:14.600]  Um, and the exact quote from, uh, from Wiener today, I believe, uh, he says, you know, I, I can't say with certitude, my system was hacked.
[05:15.040 --> 05:16.270]  Pictures can be manipulated.
[05:16.900 --> 05:19.270]  Pictures can be dropped in and inserted.
[05:22.660 --> 05:25.660]  Well, I have to say this disturbs me greatly.
[05:26.040 --> 05:28.060]  Uh, I'm, I'm, I'm very distressed by this.
[05:28.220 --> 05:29.840]  We elect people, right?
[05:29.900 --> 05:31.260]  We elect people to represent us.
[05:31.400 --> 05:32.620]  We expect to trust them.
[05:32.740 --> 05:37.740]  We expect them to, uh, to be honorable and, uh, at the same time mature.
[05:38.100 --> 05:38.600]  All right.
[05:38.700 --> 05:42.020]  And, and, and be, uh, somebody we can point to with pride.
[05:42.120 --> 05:45.600]  But hearing that really bugs me with certitude.
[05:46.240 --> 05:47.360]  Why would you use a word like that?
[05:47.500 --> 05:47.880]  Certitude.
[05:48.120 --> 05:50.420]  Why not say with certainty, like everybody else does?
[05:50.560 --> 05:51.900]  Who uses the word certitude?
[05:52.080 --> 05:54.160]  Bernie, have you ever used the word certitude in your life?
[05:54.680 --> 05:55.520]  I've never used it.
[05:55.580 --> 05:59.220]  Maybe he's taking English lessons from, uh, either George Bush or Sarah Palin.
[05:59.260 --> 06:00.200]  Walter, you've never used the word.
[06:00.200 --> 06:00.620]  I don't know.
[06:00.800 --> 06:00.980]  No.
[06:01.400 --> 06:01.400]  No.
[06:01.540 --> 06:02.740]  Only dicks use certitude.
[06:03.020 --> 06:03.820]  Okay, fine.
[06:03.860 --> 06:06.560]  Is that supposed to be a reference to whatever was transmitted?
[06:06.840 --> 06:13.760]  According to whatever was transmitted, um, the, the, the photo shows a close-up shot of a man's bulging underwear.
[06:14.120 --> 06:17.020]  Uh, it was deleted within minutes of being sent.
[06:17.820 --> 06:33.120]  Um, they, uh, say it was tweeted to a Seattle woman, um, later identified as Jeanette Cordova, who was one of, uh, just 198 people that Wiener follows on Twitter, although he has nearly 50,000 followers, probably 500,000 now.
[06:33.780 --> 06:44.300]  Uh, porn star Ginger Lee tweeted last month that she received a direct message from Wiener and several other attractive women say they've been surprised to get a follow or a message from the prominent Democrat.
[06:44.760 --> 06:51.840]  Uh, those claims are all circumstantial, but it doesn't help his case should there ever actually be one.
[06:51.920 --> 06:52.880]  Now, here's what I don't get.
[06:52.880 --> 06:58.500]  Um, he, uh, he supposedly, uh, tweeted this, is that even what tweeting is?
[06:58.600 --> 07:00.560]  Tweeting is, is, is to everybody, not just to one person.
[07:00.580 --> 07:01.400]  That's a direct message.
[07:01.580 --> 07:03.060]  No, it was something in between.
[07:03.260 --> 07:06.680]  It was an at reply, which is like a public direct message.
[07:06.980 --> 07:07.480]  Oh, okay.
[07:07.560 --> 07:10.340]  So everybody can see it, but it was, it was aimed at, at somebody.
[07:10.440 --> 07:11.860]  Yeah, I don't think he understood that though.
[07:12.020 --> 07:17.980]  So he, he allegedly sent something to one person, but everybody could see it.
[07:18.100 --> 07:19.660]  It was an attached image of...
[07:19.660 --> 07:20.060]  Uh-huh.
[07:20.280 --> 07:23.100]  And it was in reply to something that this Seattle woman had said?
[07:24.240 --> 07:25.020]  I think so.
[07:25.140 --> 07:26.340]  We need to get to the bottom of this.
[07:26.500 --> 07:28.840]  Now, he's saying that his account was hacked.
[07:29.020 --> 07:30.220]  It's, it's extremely...
[07:30.220 --> 07:31.120]  He's walked back that statement though.
[07:31.540 --> 07:32.740]  Why would he take back that statement?
[07:32.860 --> 07:34.720]  It's so easy to hack a Twitter account.
[07:34.860 --> 07:37.500]  He hasn't taken it back per se, but he's kind of like walked it back.
[07:37.900 --> 07:38.340]  Uh-huh.
[07:38.840 --> 07:40.320]  So it's like not denial, it's denial.
[07:40.660 --> 07:40.840]  Right.
[07:41.140 --> 07:52.660]  So there, I read something today that apparently YFrog, which is a popular photo sharing service is, it's relatively easy to insert photographs in other people's, uh, streams on YFrog.
[07:52.960 --> 07:54.880]  You can insert, well, how would that work exactly?
[07:55.020 --> 07:55.800]  You would, uh...
[07:55.800 --> 08:00.800]  So there's like, there's an email address, and if you can get that email address, uh, it's an email address per account.
[08:00.940 --> 08:06.360]  And so if you can get that address, then you can email it and photos will start to show up under other people's names.
[08:06.480 --> 08:08.840]  And they have nothing, they have nothing to do with it at all.
[08:08.840 --> 08:10.140]  Well, they may or may not.
[08:10.400 --> 08:10.560]  Uh-huh.
[08:10.740 --> 08:15.440]  And also, I would assume since your account is linked, that it also can send a message as you that...
[08:15.440 --> 08:15.720]  Yeah.
[08:15.960 --> 08:21.000]  I, I didn't have time to read the article in full, but it's one possible mechanism that could explain this.
[08:21.060 --> 08:31.260]  I used a thing like that once, and I think when I was in Europe, and you know, if you sent an email to a certain email address, and your account was already linked to that, so it would tweet as you and then include that image.
[08:31.480 --> 08:36.670]  Let's say though, let's say that somebody guessed the Twitter password for Representative Wiener.
[08:36.960 --> 08:37.070]  Right.
[08:37.070 --> 08:38.100]  Guess the password.
[08:38.260 --> 08:39.430]  Or just side-jacked his account.
[08:39.550 --> 08:40.740]  Side-jacked, what's that?
[08:41.460 --> 08:54.540]  That's when, so, so a lot of these systems, like Facebook and Twitter and stuff, use a cookie to identify you, so once you log in, it gives you this kind of random string, which they can then associate with your account, or encrypted, or however they implement it.
[08:55.520 --> 08:56.340]  Transparent to the user.
[08:56.760 --> 08:59.690]  Well, it's, it's on their, it's on their computer, but yeah, it's a cookie.
[08:59.960 --> 09:05.220]  And so, if you're not using HTTPS, you can, then that can be read.
[09:05.220 --> 09:13.000]  So, say you go to start, you know, a couple months ago, we talked about, there was this Firefox extension called FireSheep, I think, and it basically did this for you.
[09:13.190 --> 09:22.160]  So, if, you know, say you were at a coffee shop and somebody was looking at Facebook or Twitter, and they weren't using HTTPS, which these services all now support, but you have to enable.
[09:22.160 --> 09:22.550]  Okay.
[09:23.500 --> 09:29.260]  It would be able to take their cookie, and then you could basically, you know, if you set that on your system, you can become them.
[09:29.420 --> 09:35.550]  And that, the extension made it pretty easy to do that, which is, I think, what prompted a lot of these services to make HTTPS an option.
[09:35.780 --> 09:37.860]  So, how easy would it have been for this to have happened?
[09:38.020 --> 09:42.400]  So, I mean, if he was sitting on some public network, somebody could have gotten it.
[09:42.520 --> 09:42.720]  Uh-huh.
[09:42.780 --> 09:46.070]  Or somebody just guessed a Twitter password, which is not the hardest thing in the world to do.
[09:46.190 --> 09:46.220]  Sure.
[09:46.220 --> 09:49.400]  Then you can post, and of course, would Twitter keep IP information?
[09:49.620 --> 09:51.690]  So, you could say, look, another computer, access my account.
[09:51.860 --> 09:52.480]  I mean, they probably do.
[09:52.720 --> 09:52.920]  Uh-huh.
[09:53.050 --> 09:58.500]  So, if, in fact, that is what happened, well, it's pretty easy to prove, but there are other ways as well.
[09:58.690 --> 10:08.670]  Also, if that was what would happen, why would the hacker only exploit the hack by doing a semi-public thing?
[10:08.900 --> 10:09.430]  Well, how many things?
[10:09.520 --> 10:11.350]  It doesn't show up in his mainstream, it only shows up.
[10:11.550 --> 10:16.540]  Like, if you follow Anthony Wiener, you wouldn't see that tweet.
[10:16.670 --> 10:18.170]  You'd only see it if...
[10:18.170 --> 10:20.400]  If you were looking for some particular reply.
[10:20.420 --> 10:21.400]  Yeah, if you follow both of them, basically.
[10:21.620 --> 10:23.880]  So, it's not... it doesn't seem like something a hacker would do.
[10:24.000 --> 10:27.020]  I cannot believe that we are actually spending...
[10:27.020 --> 10:27.880]  This much time on this.
[10:27.900 --> 10:28.170]  This much time.
[10:28.450 --> 10:40.740]  Not necessarily us, but that politicians are actually talking about Twitter and tweeting, and scandals are happening because 140 character text messages and pictures that are sent within those text messages.
[10:41.520 --> 10:46.160]  And, boy, this society has really turned into something pretty laughable.
[10:46.190 --> 10:53.170]  Well, I think that the fact that there are scandals about it might be ridiculous, but I don't think it's that silly to think that politicians would use something like that.
[10:53.310 --> 11:01.740]  I mean, you know, oftentimes I've found that, especially with companies and such, it's actually really nice to have them on there because you can make a, you know, send a message to them.
[11:01.850 --> 11:04.180]  And generally, they're pretty active about replying to stuff.
[11:04.180 --> 11:05.970]  Or, you know, in the past, I've complained.
[11:06.460 --> 11:11.700]  I complained once that a, you know, a package carrier had, you know, lost my package.
[11:11.820 --> 11:15.330]  And within minutes, one of their representatives was saying, hey, you know, how can we help you?
[11:15.580 --> 11:21.710]  So I don't find it crazy that politicians would use it to keep in touch with their base, I guess.
[11:21.880 --> 11:27.440]  It's just, to me, it's kind of offensive because you don't spell words right.
[11:27.620 --> 11:29.900]  You're constantly making things tiny.
[11:29.920 --> 11:32.160]  You can't say much in 140 characters.
[11:32.580 --> 11:37.800]  And it just seems like, you know, it's for people who have very short attention spans and quickly move on to the next thing.
[11:37.920 --> 11:40.020]  Have you read Anthony Wiener's longer works?
[11:40.180 --> 11:41.160]  They're not much better written.
[11:41.180 --> 11:43.680]  I haven't really paid much attention up until now.
[11:43.800 --> 11:45.400]  And this is what it takes for me to notice.
[11:45.520 --> 11:49.440]  I mean, to be fair, like, I agree with a lot of his positions on most but not all issues.
[11:49.660 --> 11:51.880]  But he really...
[11:51.880 --> 11:52.540]  About photography skills.
[11:52.580 --> 11:53.330]  What do you think about those?
[11:53.560 --> 11:54.160]  His what?
[11:54.300 --> 11:54.940]  Well, I don't know.
[11:55.060 --> 11:56.380]  Maybe he didn't take the picture.
[11:56.500 --> 11:56.740]  I don't know.
[11:56.800 --> 11:59.440]  I haven't seen his photography skills, alas, but...
[12:00.610 --> 12:05.350]  Since when is sending a picture of bulging underwear or something that is worthy of a scandal?
[12:05.460 --> 12:07.380]  In Europe, I would be just, you know, running the mill.
[12:07.580 --> 12:09.560]  Well, maybe this woman didn't care to receive it.
[12:09.620 --> 12:10.040]  I don't know.
[12:11.140 --> 12:12.090]  What else is new?
[12:12.520 --> 12:12.850]  Yeah.
[12:13.820 --> 12:14.180]  Okay.
[12:14.180 --> 12:16.380]  Well, that's it for that.
[12:16.540 --> 12:24.830]  But, you know, just on the subject of Twitter, though, it really is annoying because increasingly, when I'm trying to get a hold of somebody, I'm told they only talk on Twitter.
[12:25.040 --> 12:26.040]  They don't talk on email.
[12:26.210 --> 12:28.500]  When did email suddenly fall out of vogue?
[12:28.500 --> 12:28.960]  That's odd.
[12:29.160 --> 12:32.040]  To me, email is the best way to get a hold of somebody.
[12:32.210 --> 12:40.880]  But people these days, they only accept Facebook messages or direct messages on Twitter, which by the way, if they don't follow you on Twitter, you can't send them a direct message.
[12:40.970 --> 12:46.060]  So you have to sort of yell out publicly, hey, John Smith, follow me so I can send you a message.
[12:46.350 --> 12:52.380]  And if you send them email, they're not going to read it because I guess their mailbox has been taken over by spam or something like that.
[12:52.820 --> 13:00.520]  It's sad what's happened that this is where we've fallen, where we basically trust our communication to various corporations.
[13:00.590 --> 13:01.830]  Maybe they just don't want to talk to you.
[13:02.080 --> 13:07.740]  Well, it's possible, but they, you know, at least let me make initial contact so you can verify you don't want to talk to me.
[13:07.830 --> 13:09.920]  But by default, you can't talk to anybody.
[13:10.090 --> 13:14.200]  You know, for most people, their email is entrusting their communications to a corporation.
[13:14.380 --> 13:14.740]  Mm-hmm.
[13:14.920 --> 13:15.440]  I'm just saying.
[13:15.990 --> 13:17.210]  Well, yeah, that's true.
[13:17.350 --> 13:18.460]  That is definitely true.
[13:18.590 --> 13:22.700]  But to say that you only talk through Facebook or Twitter, I think is a step beyond that.
[13:23.470 --> 13:26.900]  And Facebook isn't trusting your messages to a corporation?
[13:27.520 --> 13:28.820]  No, I wasn't saying it wasn't.
[13:28.920 --> 13:31.560]  I was saying that the email wasn't much different in most cases.
[13:31.800 --> 13:33.820]  I know so many people who, like, I'm a holdout.
[13:33.830 --> 13:34.540]  I don't have a Facebook.
[13:34.760 --> 13:42.020]  And so many people I know, like real life friends, relatives, colleagues, whatever, are telling me, I have to join Facebook so we can keep in touch.
[13:42.660 --> 13:45.700]  And, you know, I tell them I have email, I have IMs, I have this, I have that.
[13:45.820 --> 13:51.210]  And, you know, all these, this lovely assortment of the methods to contact me by, including an old-fashioned phone number.
[13:51.580 --> 13:54.700]  And, but they're like, but, but if you were on Facebook, it'd be easier.
[13:54.920 --> 13:57.400]  Yeah, then they could find out what you're doing without having to ask you.
[13:57.470 --> 13:59.260]  You know, you'd learn way too much.
[13:59.460 --> 14:01.710]  You learn a lot more than you want to know about what they're doing.
[14:02.120 --> 14:04.850]  There's a reason why you don't talk to people all the time.
[14:05.080 --> 14:08.520]  You don't want to hear every single element of their days.
[14:09.020 --> 14:11.880]  There's, you know, time for one-on-one conversation.
[14:12.160 --> 14:13.240]  The kids these days.
[14:13.540 --> 14:14.000]  Yes, go ahead, Bernie.
[14:14.560 --> 14:23.620]  And I'd also like to point out that WikiLeaks founder, Julian Assange, calls Facebook a, uh, uh, a spy tool for the government.
[14:24.220 --> 14:26.500]  Well, can anybody be surprised by this?
[14:26.620 --> 14:28.160]  They, they, they store all the data.
[14:28.380 --> 14:32.400]  Uh, they can keep all this information, uh, and do whatever they want with it.
[14:32.470 --> 14:34.710]  And the same thing goes for, for email carriers as well.
[14:35.140 --> 14:37.830]  Don't get me started on my Gmail rant, because that'll go on for 20 minutes.
[14:38.420 --> 14:47.080]  Um, it used to be back in the nineties, people would, uh, run their own mail servers and, and store their own mail in, in their own property or, or on their own computer.
[14:47.580 --> 14:54.560]  And true, you could, uh, send email and it was vulnerable while it was being sent, but you could always encrypt things and, and, uh, protect it that way.
[14:54.680 --> 15:04.120]  I can't say that all social networking is bad though, because sometimes, even though, you know, most people just put inane stuff on there, sometimes you see something that either interests you or, or would connect you with somebody.
[15:04.240 --> 15:05.380]  So I'll give you an example.
[15:05.380 --> 15:08.060]  Um, a couple, maybe a month ago, I was in California.
[15:08.330 --> 15:12.620]  Um, and I was at some restaurant and I checked in on four square, right?
[15:12.880 --> 15:12.970]  Yeah.
[15:13.060 --> 15:13.380]  Another one.
[15:13.580 --> 15:19.260]  And within minutes, I got a phone call, uh, from, uh, David Dolphin and he was like, Oh, I'm in California too.
[15:19.330 --> 15:21.040]  Now he's not from California.
[15:21.420 --> 15:27.000]  And so we were actually able to connect because we happened to be in the same vicinity just because of this social networking tool.
[15:27.240 --> 15:27.500]  Uh huh.
[15:27.780 --> 15:28.470]  So yeah.
[15:28.470 --> 15:32.830]  But you know, um, have you ever been invited to a wedding via Twitter or Facebook?
[15:32.880 --> 15:35.280]  I have, I gotta tell you, it's annoying.
[15:35.280 --> 15:35.740]  It's annoying as hell.
[15:36.020 --> 15:37.580]  When someone says, Oh, you didn't get my invite.
[15:37.820 --> 15:39.020]  Uh, well, no, I checked the mail.
[15:39.210 --> 15:43.240]  No, I, I, I check your Facebook, you know, check my Facebook.
[15:43.440 --> 15:51.090]  I must have 900 messages in there from various, uh, um, uh, things, uh, automated invitation things and, and people I don't want to talk to.
[15:51.420 --> 15:54.080]  And I'm supposed to go through that and find things that are important.
[15:54.440 --> 15:56.320]  You know, it's not, uh, it's not right.
[15:56.620 --> 15:57.760]  There's nothing definitely wrong with that.
[15:58.640 --> 15:59.210]  Um, okay.
[15:59.350 --> 16:00.300]  So anyway, moving on.
[16:00.470 --> 16:00.660]  Yes.
[16:00.820 --> 16:07.330]  Uh, from, from social networking to, um, um, I guess, um, things related to that in a way.
[16:07.420 --> 16:10.260]  Well, you mentioned there are times when social networks are, are good.
[16:10.330 --> 16:15.320]  And I think fermenting revolutions is one of them, such as, uh, Tunisia and, uh, Egypt and, and things like that.
[16:15.380 --> 16:20.200]  And that of course leads us to WikiLeaks and that leads us to the, um, the frontline piece that aired last week.
[16:20.200 --> 16:21.580]  That was contrived, Emmanuel.
[16:22.210 --> 16:23.760]  Well, yeah, I had to get there somehow though.
[16:24.090 --> 16:30.640]  Um, and, um, yeah, uh, that was an interesting piece that has gotten, uh, a mixed reaction to say the least.
[16:30.680 --> 16:44.260]  Let me, uh, let me read what, uh, um, this particular news story says, uh, late Sunday night, hackers gained access to several areas of PBS web servers and were able to publish a fake news story on a PBS news blog.
[16:44.680 --> 16:51.850]  Uh, the hackers also published PBS internal user login information that they were able to siphon from PBS databases.
[16:52.160 --> 16:56.920]  Uh, there's a fake story posted about rapper Tupac Shakur, who died in 1996 after being shot in Las Vegas.
[16:57.200 --> 17:00.520]  Uh, they said he was found alive and well in a small resort in New Zealand.
[17:00.780 --> 17:02.520]  That really isn't important.
[17:02.880 --> 17:14.560]  That was obviously a fake story, but a group going by the name of LulzSec claimed responsibility for the hack, uh, saying the attack was a protest against a PBS frontline broadcast last week about WikiLeaks.
[17:15.160 --> 17:18.300]  Um, except they don't really say anything about that.
[17:18.540 --> 17:21.000]  All they do is post things about, uh, Tupac Shakur.
[17:21.660 --> 17:24.470]  Um, so there's no real information in here.
[17:24.660 --> 17:26.700]  I don't really know what, what their particular gripe was.
[17:26.780 --> 17:29.200]  I have heard some people, uh, say some critical things.
[17:29.740 --> 17:30.970]  Um, I don't know.
[17:31.020 --> 17:32.860]  Did we all see the, um, see the broadcast?
[17:33.040 --> 17:34.240]  Anybody not see the broadcast?
[17:34.470 --> 17:35.040]  I didn't see it.
[17:35.120 --> 17:35.540]  You didn't see it.
[17:35.580 --> 17:35.710]  Okay.
[17:35.780 --> 17:37.660]  So you can bow out of this conversation, Rob.
[17:37.900 --> 17:39.140]  Uh, and, uh, you see it, Mike?
[17:39.360 --> 17:39.680]  Not yet.
[17:39.780 --> 17:39.880]  No.
[17:40.020 --> 17:40.280]  Okay.
[17:40.520 --> 17:41.760]  Um, how about you both here?
[17:41.880 --> 17:42.060]  Yes.
[17:42.300 --> 17:42.460]  Okay.
[17:42.540 --> 17:42.940]  You saw it.
[17:42.940 --> 17:44.660]  And, uh, uh, nobody saw it.
[17:44.700 --> 17:47.740]  You know, I'm in that and not one of you, uh, except for Voltaire.
[17:48.420 --> 17:49.200]  Did you see it, Joe?
[17:49.440 --> 17:49.470]  Yeah.
[17:49.600 --> 17:50.360]  You saw it, Bernie.
[17:50.640 --> 17:51.970]  And I'm, I'm in it very briefly too.
[17:52.320 --> 17:53.160]  Wait, when are you in it?
[17:53.300 --> 17:53.470]  Yeah.
[17:53.880 --> 18:00.900]  Just a shot of, of, of, uh, sitting up at the, uh, what they were, what BBS referred to as the snitch panel, which was actually the panel.
[18:01.040 --> 18:03.640]  Uh, they even got the name of the panel wrong.
[18:03.640 --> 18:06.160]  It was, it was informants, hackers, or heroes.
[18:06.470 --> 18:09.710]  Oh no, informants, heroes, or villains.
[18:10.000 --> 18:11.000]  And they just call it the snitch panel.
[18:11.000 --> 18:13.470]  Well, yeah, because it was called the snitch panel informally.
[18:13.710 --> 18:15.780]  I mean, that was, uh, I might have even referred to it that way.
[18:16.100 --> 18:18.300]  Um, because Adrian Lima was on there.
[18:18.400 --> 18:21.520]  We were talking about the snitching in the hacker world and, and what that was all about.
[18:22.100 --> 18:24.970]  Um, but, um, okay, Voltaire, how about, how about your opinion on the whole thing?
[18:25.060 --> 18:25.260]  I don't know.
[18:25.340 --> 18:26.300]  It was very problematic.
[18:26.580 --> 18:36.460]  Uh, just like that, it focused on, it kind of, we're trying to make Bradley Manning seem to seem like some, like, unstable nutcase and they're trying to, like, depoliticize his motives and stuff like that.
[18:36.620 --> 18:37.520]  So, yeah.
[18:37.520 --> 18:42.100]  Well, how would, how would you politicize his motives without somebody saying what his motives were?
[18:42.660 --> 18:52.320]  No, they were trying to make it seem like he, the reason why he leaked the stuff was because he, he was just like some, some crazy person and not because he, he found injustices and one of them reported.
[18:52.560 --> 18:52.800]  Uh-huh.
[18:53.180 --> 18:53.780]  I don't know.
[18:54.020 --> 18:55.440]  Brennan, did you get that, that feeling from it?
[18:56.040 --> 19:00.720]  Well, I thought, I thought Bradley Manning was maligned in this, frankly.
[19:01.120 --> 19:14.420]  Uh, they didn't, apparently they didn't go into any attempt to interview him through a third party, which they probably could have, uh, had someone talk to him on their stead since they wouldn't be allowed to go into the, into Leavenworth to interview him.
[19:14.520 --> 19:21.320]  But, you know, I think it was just unfair, their treatment of Bradley Manning and how they just sort of almost put words in his mouth or in his mind.
[19:21.560 --> 19:26.780]  Well, first of all, I, I, I strongly doubt that they could have gotten to interview Bradley Manning in any way.
[19:27.000 --> 19:29.820]  I'm sure many, many people have tried and failed.
[19:30.440 --> 19:31.700]  Through, uh, through a friend of his.
[19:31.860 --> 19:35.180]  They could have sent a friend in to ask him specific questions or something, but they, you know.
[19:35.460 --> 19:37.120]  I really doubt that that would have happened.
[19:37.240 --> 19:39.260]  I, I don't think that's, that's, that's possible.
[19:39.400 --> 19:45.980]  And, and, and even if it was possible, I think it, it would not be wise for somebody, uh, facing so many charges to, uh, say anything.
[19:46.700 --> 19:47.780]  Um, I don't know.
[19:47.880 --> 20:01.160]  I, I, I seem to be in the minority here because I thought it humanized, uh, Bradley in quite a way to, to make, uh, I've asked a number of people this who weren't really familiar with the case after seeing the piece, uh, if they thought this is the kind of person who should spend the rest of his life in prison.
[20:01.460 --> 20:08.240]  And, and overwhelmingly, uh, uh, uh, people were sympathetic saying, no, the, the, the poor guy was, uh, a victim of don't ask, don't tell.
[20:08.500 --> 20:12.360]  And, and was, uh, basically, uh, doing what he thought was right at the time.
[20:12.720 --> 20:18.920]  And of course, all of this has to be, uh, one thing that the program is guilty of is, is not saying allegedly enough, but you know, there's only so many times he can say it.
[20:18.960 --> 20:24.540]  He can't say it on every single sentence, but that has to be understood, that nothing has been proven and, and he does have to be assumed to be innocent.
[20:24.540 --> 20:34.060]  It's not really saying much though, for somebody that's not familiar with the case to walk away from viewing this show and, and saying like, oh, he shouldn't be in jail for the rest of his life.
[20:34.180 --> 20:36.540]  It's like, no, it's kind of obvious.
[20:36.540 --> 20:42.500]  And there's a big difference from somebody not being, uh, in jail for the rest of their life and calling them a hero.
[20:42.700 --> 20:50.320]  And the, the show, I would argue, should have, um, like if they covered it fairly, he'd, they'd walk away saying, oh, he should be called a hero.
[20:50.400 --> 20:53.300]  But no, they're just walking away saying, oh, he shouldn't be in jail for the rest of his life.
[20:53.320 --> 20:53.400]  Yeah.
[20:53.400 --> 20:56.520]  But you see, that's, that's a very biased view to say that he should be called a hero.
[20:56.780 --> 20:57.860]  That's biased in the other direction.
[20:58.120 --> 20:59.800]  And most people are not going to go.
[21:00.100 --> 21:03.100]  I'm not saying that's what the, that's what the PBS should have been saying.
[21:03.240 --> 21:09.480]  I'm saying that's what the, if the proper evidence was shown, like a balanced view of the evidence, it would be kind of obvious.
[21:10.080 --> 21:14.420]  Well, I, I, I wish I had more time because yeah, there's a lot more they, they really should have gone into.
[21:14.700 --> 21:16.040]  And I would have liked to have seen one.
[21:16.120 --> 21:16.920]  Now, Rob, you have not seen it.
[21:16.980 --> 21:20.040]  So you really don't know anything about this topic, but I'm going to let you say something anyway.
[21:20.140 --> 21:20.320]  Go ahead.
[21:20.400 --> 21:22.780]  I know nothing about it, but I have a question for you guys who did see it.
[21:23.160 --> 21:31.360]  Um, do you think, uh, there was anything in it that, uh, affected the chances of Manning getting a fair trial on the level that, uh, like the takedown movie that we're all protesting 10, 15 years ago?
[21:31.540 --> 21:35.100]  No, because they didn't even mention his, how he was being treated unfairly.
[21:35.300 --> 21:38.520]  So, uh, well, um, they, but they touched upon it.
[21:38.600 --> 21:52.680]  They touched upon it, but what they didn't do, they didn't mention the connection with PJ Crowley's comment saying that he was being treated badly when he was being held in, in military confinement and how a mere couple of weeks later, he was suddenly moved to Kansas where he's being treated much more humanely.
[21:53.360 --> 21:55.160]  Uh, so, um, yeah, that there is...
[21:55.160 --> 21:56.080]  They interviewed Crowley.
[21:56.220 --> 21:58.120]  They interviewed him, yes, but they didn't mention...
[21:58.120 --> 22:01.940]  Yeah, but they didn't, and they didn't, and they didn't even touch on that after their, their source said other things.
[22:02.040 --> 22:02.360]  Crazy.
[22:02.600 --> 22:07.400]  Yeah, I don't know why they would miss that because that only strengthens the story unless, unless it was finished before then or something like that.
[22:07.500 --> 22:08.920]  But that's, uh, that's a big deal.
[22:09.000 --> 22:10.940]  That's something that, that, uh, certainly, certainly...
[22:10.940 --> 22:11.860]  Red Hat, did you have something?
[22:12.340 --> 22:12.640]  Okay.
[22:13.380 --> 22:14.300]  Um, so I don't know.
[22:14.420 --> 22:16.580]  I, I suggest people see it, uh, if they haven't seen it.
[22:16.580 --> 22:21.140]  It's, it's online, front line, uh, somewhere on the pbs.org site, if it's not, uh, hacked at the moment.
[22:21.360 --> 22:22.860]  Yeah, can you still get to it or has it been hacked?
[22:23.140 --> 22:25.460]  Uh, well, at last I checked, you could still get to it.
[22:25.600 --> 22:25.600]  Right.
[22:25.640 --> 22:28.780]  But, um, I, you know, also, what do you think of people hacking the site?
[22:28.980 --> 22:34.020]  Uh, first of all, if you're gonna hack a site because you're upset at something, at least tell people why you're upset, you know?
[22:34.360 --> 22:40.520]  So that you might come off looking like you have some intelligence and, uh, people might listen to what you actually have to say.
[22:41.000 --> 22:48.520]  Um, other than that, it's just kind of, uh, I don't know, it's sort of, um, um, um, gives hackers a bad image.
[22:48.640 --> 22:50.040]  I thought, I thought it was pretty clever.
[22:50.180 --> 22:58.340]  They could have added a little thing at the bottom about why they were upset, but, um, but yeah, it, it, it got, it got attention and they...
[22:58.340 --> 22:59.800]  Yeah, but it got attention to the wrong thing.
[22:59.940 --> 23:03.080]  Not that, not to anything about Bradley Manning, not to anything about WikiLeaks.
[23:03.200 --> 23:05.420]  Yeah, but it's, it's good in, in concept.
[23:06.380 --> 23:06.740]  Maybe.
[23:07.040 --> 23:07.280]  Rob?
[23:07.460 --> 23:18.160]  The, the whole thing left a really bad taste in my mouth just because, um, the way they, the way they did it, they, uh, they put up lists of, you know, employee accounts and phone numbers and info and things like that and, um, throughout the PBS organization.
[23:18.280 --> 23:24.460]  And it, it felt to me a bit like, uh, punching everyone at a family reunion in the throat because one of their cousins said something that made you angry.
[23:24.940 --> 23:30.380]  It was, it was a bit like, it was, uh, it was a bit overkill, I think, and it didn't, they, they didn't have a message really.
[23:30.520 --> 23:32.540]  They didn't appear to have a message that they were trying to get out.
[23:32.660 --> 23:34.560]  They were just like, we're going to swing out and break something.
[23:34.680 --> 23:39.680]  Yeah, not one story that I've read about this says anything about Bradley Manning and about, uh, the actual case.
[23:39.680 --> 23:42.240]  Would you blame them for that or would you blame the media that reports on it?
[23:42.280 --> 23:46.020]  Well, I'd say they had an opportunity to get the issue out there into the mainstream and they blew it.
[23:46.180 --> 23:48.260]  The media will never report.
[23:48.260 --> 23:48.400]  Go ahead.
[23:48.960 --> 23:51.440]  Defacing a page and not saying anything doesn't connect the story.
[23:51.540 --> 23:57.480]  I mean, it's not like the media said, oh, well, they wrote something about, you know, WikiLeaks or Bradley Manning and then they didn't report on it.
[23:57.580 --> 23:58.580]  There was nothing about that.
[23:58.580 --> 23:59.880]  It was just a defaced page.
[24:00.020 --> 24:01.240]  There's no reason to make the connection.
[24:01.520 --> 24:01.900]  I agree.
[24:01.940 --> 24:05.740]  But even if they had put something on the bottom, the media probably ignored that.
[24:05.840 --> 24:08.320]  But the media didn't ignore it.
[24:08.320 --> 24:13.160]  The new story you read just five minutes ago mentioned the connection to the Bradley Manning piece.
[24:13.300 --> 24:15.140]  Well, that's the only story that does, though.
[24:15.300 --> 24:16.780]  I mean, it doesn't say anything.
[24:16.920 --> 24:21.180]  All it says is that it was related to the piece.
[24:21.400 --> 24:24.440]  It is more about Tupac Shakur in here than about Bradley Manning.
[24:24.500 --> 24:27.380]  In fact, I don't even see the name Bradley Manning in this piece at all.
[24:27.600 --> 24:28.880]  So, no, I'm sorry.
[24:28.940 --> 24:30.360]  It doesn't cover the piece.
[24:30.460 --> 24:33.520]  So you're saying that because it says WikiLeaks instead of Bradley Manning?
[24:33.520 --> 24:38.320]  I'm saying that they had an opportunity to reach a lot of people if they wanted to do that.
[24:38.380 --> 24:39.400]  The people who defaced the website.
[24:39.420 --> 24:40.500]  Yeah, that's what I'm talking about.
[24:40.620 --> 24:41.500]  And they didn't.
[24:41.720 --> 24:46.980]  They basically made the media say, oh, look, hackers, don't talk to them.
[24:47.040 --> 24:50.940]  Because if you piss them off, they're just going to vandalize your site and act like children.
[24:51.180 --> 24:51.380]  Sure.
[24:51.500 --> 24:52.700]  And that's probably the right...
[24:52.700 --> 24:56.660]  I mean, that's the right reaction of the media, at least in that case, because there was no statement of intent.
[24:57.340 --> 24:58.280]  It's just a defacement.
[24:58.440 --> 25:00.680]  So I don't think you can blame the media for that.
[25:00.900 --> 25:01.920]  No, I'm not blaming the media.
[25:01.920 --> 25:06.060]  I'm saying that the people here blew an opportunity to actually get the...
[25:06.060 --> 25:06.360]  You know what?
[25:06.360 --> 25:11.100]  When Kevin Mitnick was in prison, people hacked websites because they were angry about Kevin Mitnick being in prison.
[25:11.220 --> 25:12.060]  And they talked about it.
[25:12.160 --> 25:13.900]  And it got to the media that way.
[25:14.000 --> 25:17.260]  They actually got the word out because the mass media wasn't covering the story.
[25:17.400 --> 25:20.760]  But when they covered the story of the hack, then they...
[25:20.760 --> 25:22.080]  It was sort of a hack in itself.
[25:22.200 --> 25:24.520]  It made it into the media because of what they did.
[25:25.160 --> 25:29.240]  So that's why, you know, if you're going to do something like that, try and think it through.
[25:29.420 --> 25:30.560]  And maybe you'll reach people.
[25:30.560 --> 25:30.940]  Yes, Bernie.
[25:31.920 --> 25:34.740]  A article I read in Security Week said that...
[25:34.740 --> 25:35.300]  I'm going to quote it.
[25:35.380 --> 25:46.140]  A group going by the name of LulzSec claimed responsibility for the hack, saying the attack was a protest against a PBS front-line broadcast last week about WikiLeaks.
[25:46.280 --> 25:46.400]  Right.
[25:46.400 --> 25:48.420]  So the organization did claim it.
[25:48.520 --> 25:53.840]  But they didn't do so on the hack webpage, which is kind of unfortunate.
[25:54.060 --> 25:55.460]  They didn't even say it on the webpage.
[25:55.520 --> 25:55.920]  Wow.
[25:56.680 --> 26:01.840]  So, you know, how do you even know that the person saying that is connected in any way to the actual hack?
[26:02.020 --> 26:02.360]  You don't.
[26:02.620 --> 26:03.020]  True.
[26:03.020 --> 26:05.600]  And the mass media doesn't really check on these things.
[26:05.700 --> 26:09.620]  And also, you know, maybe they're upset that they were too easy on Bradley Manning.
[26:09.700 --> 26:11.960]  You don't know what they were actually upset about.
[26:12.080 --> 26:17.000]  Maybe it was a bunch of conservative hackers that said this guy should be, you know, executed or something.
[26:17.000 --> 26:18.780]  And why didn't Frontline say that?
[26:18.880 --> 26:20.920]  You never know unless you actually make your point clear.
[26:21.100 --> 26:23.020]  Here's a letter that we got from Richard.
[26:23.600 --> 26:35.520]  When the group Anonymous released the low-orbit iron cannon seeking to avenge the treatment of WikiLeaks, oh boy, I think that you pretty much denied that this was really a group of any kind, but they appear in the news more and more.
[26:35.680 --> 26:41.500]  They have apparently repeatedly hit the Sony site and have referred to Sony as, and I quote here, dumbasses.
[26:42.580 --> 26:44.240]  Yeah, the heavy artillery is out.
[26:44.240 --> 26:55.120]  I see that a group called Lowe's Sec has, that name was probably made up two seconds before it was said, has attacked PBS after being unhappy with a show about WikiLeaks, which I have not seen.
[26:55.580 --> 27:01.660]  I am thinking that if these are actually hackers behind these things, then they are doing themselves more harm than good as far as public relations go.
[27:02.020 --> 27:04.920]  On the other hand, one wonders who is really behind all this.
[27:05.100 --> 27:10.740]  There was a rumor once that most of the dues paid to the KKK were from FBI agents who had infiltrated the group.
[27:10.740 --> 27:15.240]  Would it be overly paranoid to believe that there are a lot of FBI agents at hacker conferences?
[27:15.240 --> 27:19.340]  Is the man behind some of these so-called hacker attacks that have been in the news?
[27:19.580 --> 27:20.820]  It's an interesting question.
[27:21.060 --> 27:30.180]  I mean, when you have a group where nobody knows who anybody is, that pride itself on being anonymous, anybody can pretty much do anything and blame the group, right?
[27:30.180 --> 27:36.500]  And get all kinds of policies and initiatives moved along based on that.
[27:37.400 --> 27:41.140]  The social organization of anonymous is actually interesting.
[27:41.140 --> 27:42.960]  It's not null.
[27:44.320 --> 27:49.460]  And Professor Biela Coleman at NYU has been doing a lot of research into this structure.
[27:49.760 --> 27:55.960]  Unfortunately, I don't have any of it with me, but people who are interested in how these people operate should check it out.
[27:56.580 --> 27:59.280]  Yeah, I'd sure like to know more about it and how it works.
[27:59.280 --> 28:01.920]  I heard there was an insurrection within anonymous recently.
[28:02.080 --> 28:03.140]  I don't have that information with me either.
[28:03.260 --> 28:04.020]  There's always an insurrection within anonymous.
[28:04.080 --> 28:06.260]  Wait, but I heard they're fighting each other now.
[28:06.420 --> 28:07.160]  And this is inevitable.
[28:07.380 --> 28:07.940]  They're always fighting each other.
[28:08.060 --> 28:09.660]  Are they pointing the ion cannon at each other?
[28:09.660 --> 28:10.560]  I heard that was happening.
[28:10.700 --> 28:12.640]  I heard there were two ion cannons and they were both being...
[28:12.640 --> 28:13.700]  They were both being armed.
[28:13.860 --> 28:15.060]  It's gotten pretty messy.
[28:15.820 --> 28:18.200]  Okay, we also have this story about the Pentagon.
[28:18.400 --> 28:19.460]  Yeah, the Pentagon's getting in on the act.
[28:19.540 --> 28:25.100]  They concluded that computer sabotage coming from another country can constitute an act of war.
[28:25.100 --> 28:27.680]  I think I've heard this somewhere before, many years ago.
[28:28.260 --> 28:31.180]  So this opens the door, though, for the U.S.
[28:31.240 --> 28:35.820]  to respond to computer sabotage using traditional military force.
[28:36.060 --> 28:41.640]  So basically, you hack a website and you get shelled from the air, apparently.
[28:41.920 --> 28:56.100]  The Pentagon's first formal cyber strategy, unclassified portions of which are expected to become public pretty soon, sometime this month, actually, represents an early attempt to grapple with a changing world in which a hacker could pose as significant a threat to U.S.
[28:56.380 --> 29:00.520]  nuclear reactors, subways, or pipelines as a hostile country's military.
[29:00.940 --> 29:06.680]  In part, the Pentagon intends its plan as a warning to potential adversaries of the consequences of attacking the U.S.
[29:06.760 --> 29:07.260]  in this way.
[29:07.260 --> 29:12.560]  If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks, said a military official.
[29:12.560 --> 29:14.140]  That's a military official saying this.
[29:15.160 --> 29:16.200]  It's pretty unbelievable.
[29:16.200 --> 29:19.660]  I don't even know why the power grid would be accessible in this way.
[29:19.900 --> 29:22.520]  I think it's a very bad analogy there.
[29:24.400 --> 29:25.540]  But it makes you think.
[29:25.620 --> 29:25.720]  Rob?
[29:26.160 --> 29:26.520]  Yeah.
[29:26.640 --> 29:29.380]  First of all, I have some really, I think, some good advice for the military.
[29:29.500 --> 29:31.480]  Maybe don't put the power grid on the Internet.
[29:31.940 --> 29:32.240]  Right?
[29:32.360 --> 29:34.720]  I mean, wouldn't that be... that's good advice, I think.
[29:34.840 --> 29:41.560]  And another thing is any cyber attacker worth their salt knows at least half a dozen ways to make their attack look like it's coming from a different country.
[29:41.840 --> 29:45.120]  So the question then becomes, who would you like us to have a reason to attack?
[29:45.120 --> 29:51.580]  And also, if you look at what the United States does, we do things all the time to other countries.
[29:51.720 --> 30:00.540]  Does that mean that they now have the legitimate right to attack us militarily if we send a computer virus to their nuclear development agency?
[30:00.680 --> 30:03.100]  Look, for recent history, the U.S.
[30:03.500 --> 30:07.260]  government's policy has been, we'll attack anyone we feel like and we'll make up a reason.
[30:07.260 --> 30:10.400]  So now they just have a new way to make up a reason.
[30:10.580 --> 30:17.120]  But I don't think it... you know, they're not going to attack Canada if some people in Canada start taking down the U.S.
[30:17.160 --> 30:17.580]  power grid.
[30:17.720 --> 30:18.440]  They're just not.
[30:18.620 --> 30:22.240]  So... but if someone in a country they already don't like does it, they might attack.
[30:22.240 --> 30:22.960]  It's just silly.
[30:23.180 --> 30:27.640]  Well, I mean, if someone in Canada did it, they might go and attack Pakistan or something.
[30:27.720 --> 30:28.040]  Yeah, exactly.
[30:28.040 --> 30:28.340]  Who knows?
[30:28.380 --> 30:29.520]  That's how the Iraq war started.
[30:29.800 --> 30:31.440]  So it's entirely possible.
[30:31.660 --> 30:33.500]  But, you know, something like, what is it, Stuxnet?
[30:33.760 --> 30:34.560]  Is that what it was called?
[30:34.740 --> 30:34.860]  Yeah.
[30:34.980 --> 30:39.140]  That was aimed at the Iran nuclear program.
[30:40.050 --> 30:43.420]  And it's widely believed that that came from the United States.
[30:43.760 --> 30:48.760]  Well, no, this is a good example of why this policy is so stupid because nobody knows where it comes from.
[30:49.020 --> 30:49.900]  Some people believe that...
[30:49.900 --> 30:51.100]  But it's widely believed to have come from.
[30:51.280 --> 30:52.520]  Or Israel, the United States or Israel.
[30:52.800 --> 30:52.940]  Yeah.
[30:53.040 --> 30:55.220]  Well, because we have the biggest interest to...
[30:55.220 --> 30:55.620]  Mm-hmm.
[30:55.960 --> 30:57.020]  But we're not really sure.
[30:57.020 --> 30:57.740]  We're not really sure.
[30:58.040 --> 31:00.720]  And so then who would Iran want to attack?
[31:00.880 --> 31:02.480]  Would they want to attack Israel, the United States?
[31:02.940 --> 31:03.800]  Well, that's the thing.
[31:03.980 --> 31:06.560]  If someone doesn't claim credit, how do you know where something came from?
[31:06.660 --> 31:07.540]  How do you actually know?
[31:07.660 --> 31:12.900]  But Iran already wouldn't mind attacking the United States, like, if they had the means to do so.
[31:13.040 --> 31:14.300]  It's just...
[31:14.300 --> 31:18.240]  These cyber attacks add nothing to the likelihood of a war.
[31:18.400 --> 31:20.180]  Do you think Iran really would like to attack us?
[31:21.020 --> 31:21.660]  I'm sorry.
[31:21.800 --> 31:27.440]  If Iran felt the need for domestic political purposes to attack someone, they would probably pick Israel.
[31:27.440 --> 31:30.720]  But if that failed for whatever reason, they might try and pick the United States.
[31:30.900 --> 31:34.360]  But with Stuxnet, it was a little bit harder to trace because it wasn't...
[31:34.360 --> 31:37.180]  It didn't just go via the internet or anything.
[31:37.280 --> 31:38.940]  It was going via removable media.
[31:38.940 --> 31:42.380]  So somebody came in with a USB key or something that had the thing on it.
[31:42.440 --> 31:44.000]  And that's one of the ways it replicated.
[31:44.220 --> 31:48.920]  Because otherwise, there'd be no way it would actually get to the controller systems because they weren't connected to the internet.
[31:48.920 --> 31:54.100]  So you'd have to do some pretty heavy-duty forensics to figure out where that actually came from.
[31:54.220 --> 31:55.700]  I mean, that was really clever.
[31:55.900 --> 31:56.420]  All right, go ahead, Bernie.
[31:56.420 --> 32:11.840]  I just want to say that the panic on announcing that they can literally drop bombs on anybody that attempts to hack the United States, it seems like it adds another easily fudged rationale to bomb or invade other countries.
[32:12.020 --> 32:20.280]  So the Bush doctrine of preventive strike, which apparently hasn't been denounced by the current administration, is that going to be used against countries that the U.S.
[32:21.620 --> 32:26.080]  is going to claim might be developing virtual weapons of mass destruction?
[32:26.360 --> 32:30.240]  I mean, it just makes the fog of war even thicker.
[32:30.420 --> 32:37.200]  And as Mike pointed out, it just adds another excuse to the already long list of excuses for the U.S.
[32:37.280 --> 32:38.840]  to invade and bomb other countries.
[32:39.300 --> 32:43.420]  Speaking of virtual weapons of mass destruction, did you hear about the report out of the U.K.
[32:43.480 --> 32:47.100]  this week that they're developing cyber weapons as part of their arsenal?
[32:47.520 --> 32:47.940]  Really?
[32:48.100 --> 32:48.380]  Cyber weapons?
[32:48.500 --> 32:49.660]  What kind of cyber weapons?
[32:49.980 --> 32:50.660]  Ion cannons?
[32:50.840 --> 32:55.840]  They weren't specific, but the Armed Forces Minister in the U.K.
[32:56.160 --> 33:04.460]  told the Guardian that action in cyberspace will form part of the future battlefield and that he now regards cyber weapons as an integral part of the country's armory.
[33:04.700 --> 33:07.900]  Does that mean cyber soldiers will be sent off instead of real ones?
[33:07.980 --> 33:08.120]  Maybe.
[33:08.360 --> 33:12.380]  All right, well, you know, I could live with that if the real people get to stay home.
[33:12.480 --> 33:16.480]  I'm wondering if this means that nations will fight their future battles in, like, Quake or something.
[33:16.480 --> 33:19.680]  It seems a lot safer than the way they currently do it.
[33:19.920 --> 33:20.780]  Sort it out that way.
[33:20.880 --> 33:22.160]  I think that makes a lot more sense.
[33:22.320 --> 33:23.660]  So I'm down for that.
[33:23.800 --> 33:24.440]  Is Quake still a thing?
[33:24.500 --> 33:25.420]  What do people play these days?
[33:25.560 --> 33:30.780]  They play all kinds of, yeah, different things, three-dimensional.
[33:31.160 --> 33:31.200]  Games on the Internet.
[33:31.620 --> 33:31.840]  Right.
[33:32.820 --> 33:33.140]  Portal.
[33:33.280 --> 33:33.940]  Portal is one of them.
[33:34.640 --> 33:35.120]  That's... all right.
[33:35.120 --> 33:35.360]  Yeah.
[33:35.760 --> 33:42.360]  Anyway, point is, okay, it's basically an ongoing thing.
[33:42.460 --> 33:44.380]  We're going to keep following it.
[33:44.980 --> 33:53.000]  This is something, an update to a story that took place earlier in the year involving the Internet in Egypt.
[33:53.120 --> 33:56.160]  Remember, the Internet was shut down during the insurrection over there.
[33:56.160 --> 34:08.380]  Well, the Egyptian court has fined, ousted President Hosni Mubarak and two of his former ministers $90 million for shutting down telecommunication services during the country's popular uprising earlier this year.
[34:08.380 --> 34:13.320]  So that's the value of that particular action, $90 million.
[34:13.900 --> 34:18.400]  He must pay about $33 million immediately, I suppose.
[34:18.570 --> 34:30.070]  And $50 million goes to Minister Habib El-Adli, who is charged with damaging Egypt's economy while ordering the shutdown of the country's Internet and telephone services.
[34:30.340 --> 34:32.200]  And various other people were fined as well.
[34:32.200 --> 34:44.040]  Now, mobile operator Vodafone said in January that it and other telecom companies working in Egypt had no option but to comply with a government order to suspend services during the peak of the anti-government demonstrations.
[34:44.550 --> 34:49.960]  Now, activists relied on popular social media networks, such as Facebook, to organize most of their rallies.
[34:50.500 --> 34:59.570]  Internet experts have said that while the government was not the first to limit telecommunications, it was the first time that a government had done so in such a widespread manner.
[35:00.540 --> 35:05.400]  So that shows you that these kinds of actions will at some point be answered.
[35:05.570 --> 35:09.360]  I like the idea of suing the past rulers for things they did wrong.
[35:09.500 --> 35:13.000]  Can we possibly get in on some of that action for maybe our past couple of presidents?
[35:13.200 --> 35:13.920]  I had my opportunity.
[35:14.110 --> 35:16.900]  I almost was on a grand jury, but it didn't work out.
[35:17.630 --> 35:20.050]  So, no, I don't think that's going to happen here.
[35:20.760 --> 35:26.840]  Here's some other words of advice for people who are staying in motels or hotels or just public places.
[35:27.180 --> 35:29.050]  Keep your voice down while on the phone.
[35:29.570 --> 35:31.040]  Yeah, this happened in Maryland.
[35:31.260 --> 35:45.700]  The Wicomico County Sheriff's Office says a man who talked loudly in his motel room about being a fugitive was arrested after other guests heard him through the walls and called the cops.
[35:46.020 --> 35:49.180]  Happened early yesterday at the Traveler's Motel in Delmar.
[35:49.700 --> 35:53.680]  Deputies say guests there heard a man yelling during a phone conversation that there was a warrant for his arrest.
[35:53.680 --> 35:56.040]  And they just dutifully called the police.
[35:56.340 --> 35:58.040]  So, yeah, you've got to be careful what you say.
[35:58.180 --> 35:58.440]  I don't know.
[35:58.720 --> 36:03.600]  Bernie, were they guilty of any kind of wiretap charge for listening in like that?
[36:03.880 --> 36:05.940]  That's a really good question, but I don't think so.
[36:07.120 --> 36:13.620]  If he was too loud on his cell phone, the term of art is reasonable expectation of privacy.
[36:13.620 --> 36:17.960]  And I guess if you're too loud on your cell phone, you have no reasonable expectation of privacy.
[36:17.960 --> 36:19.260]  So, he screwed himself.
[36:19.720 --> 36:19.920]  Yeah.
[36:20.120 --> 36:25.620]  And maybe we have reasonable expectation that walls will keep our voices from going to other rooms.
[36:26.660 --> 36:28.220]  Well, maybe not hotel walls.
[36:28.440 --> 36:31.860]  Yeah, maybe he could sue the motel for insufficiently thick walls.
[36:31.860 --> 36:33.860]  Yeah, there's all kinds of possibilities here.
[36:34.180 --> 36:44.840]  On the other side of the country, Los Angeles County officials are demanding that a creative homeowner tear down a 20,000 square foot domicile he calls Phone Henge West, or face up to seven years in jail.
[36:45.000 --> 36:50.420]  Former telephone technician Alan Kimball Fahey began building the structure three decades ago in Acton.
[36:50.780 --> 36:56.100]  He christened the project Phone Henge because it sits atop pilings modified from phone utility poles.
[36:56.440 --> 36:59.920]  He says he intends to turn the compound into a museum.
[37:01.110 --> 37:10.160]  The labyrinthine network of buildings, where Fahey's wife, teenage son, live, even includes a 70-foot tower covered in Italian stained glass windows and a barn.
[37:10.560 --> 37:13.800]  He uses a motorized cart to get between buildings.
[37:15.340 --> 37:18.200]  Inside, the castle is filled with more than 20,000 books.
[37:19.190 --> 37:23.000]  And tourists come from all over to gaze at the creation, but not for much longer, apparently.
[37:23.320 --> 37:24.380]  Picks or it didn't happen.
[37:24.820 --> 37:25.340]  I'm sorry?
[37:25.480 --> 37:26.560]  Picks or it didn't happen.
[37:26.680 --> 37:26.940]  Right there.
[37:27.320 --> 37:28.580]  How are you going to show that on the radio?
[37:28.580 --> 37:30.860]  Well, now we have to believe you that there are pictures.
[37:31.040 --> 37:31.220]  Yeah.
[37:31.680 --> 37:32.420]  Well, it's on Yahoo.
[37:32.600 --> 37:33.800]  People can find it for themselves.
[37:33.960 --> 37:34.440]  Well, it's on Yahoo.
[37:34.480 --> 37:35.040]  It must be true.
[37:35.120 --> 37:39.600]  But he was building it for 30 years, and they only just now found out that it was a violation of the building code?
[37:39.740 --> 37:42.140]  They don't get around everywhere very often over in those parts.
[37:42.340 --> 37:43.960]  So, yeah, I guess they just noticed.
[37:45.020 --> 37:46.680]  And finally, we're going to take some phone calls.
[37:46.760 --> 37:48.180]  212-209-2900.
[37:48.320 --> 37:49.860]  So, please get you dialing fingers ready.
[37:49.860 --> 38:02.520]  We have this story that we've been hearing reported in various places from the World Health Organization who have reached a kind of startling conclusion from a report issued yesterday.
[38:02.700 --> 38:13.440]  The International Agency for Research on Cancer, which is an arm of the World Health Organization, said it now lists mobile phone use in the same category as lead, gasoline engine exhaust, and chloroform.
[38:13.440 --> 38:15.560]  Can we just leave the statement at that?
[38:15.920 --> 38:21.660]  Because I think that, yeah, mobile phone use is the same as gasoline engine exhaust and lead.
[38:21.760 --> 38:22.280]  Yeah, I'd like that.
[38:23.080 --> 38:27.180]  Cell phone radiation is listed as a carcinogenic hazard.
[38:27.860 --> 38:31.840]  Until then, they had said there were no adverse health effects from the use of cell phones.
[38:32.100 --> 38:36.100]  Of course, the wireless industry has long maintained that cell phones are safe.
[38:36.460 --> 38:42.440]  But I think what they're saying here is that they just really don't know for sure and that it's potentially dangerous.
[38:42.540 --> 38:42.820]  Voltaire?
[38:42.820 --> 38:44.600]  Yeah, they're saying they don't have enough information.
[38:44.600 --> 38:45.980]  It's not really startling at all.
[38:46.080 --> 38:47.440]  It's really inconclusive.
[38:47.700 --> 38:52.760]  And I'd be really surprised if they are dangerous because they don't produce ionizing radiation.
[38:52.820 --> 38:56.200]  And the scientific consensus is that they're not health risk at all.
[38:56.440 --> 39:03.500]  And the rates of brain cancer hasn't increased at all since cell phones became popular.
[39:03.500 --> 39:05.600]  So it's been like the same for 20 years.
[39:08.360 --> 39:08.900]  Okay.
[39:09.300 --> 39:11.280]  It doesn't emit ionizing radiation either.
[39:12.820 --> 39:13.200]  I'm sorry.
[39:13.280 --> 39:13.860]  Say that again, Bernie.
[39:14.140 --> 39:14.880]  I said...
[39:14.880 --> 39:19.880]  I was just telling Voltaire that a microwave oven does not emit ionizing radiation either.
[39:19.980 --> 39:23.820]  But it will fry your flesh if you can get your hand in it while it's operating.
[39:24.100 --> 39:25.460]  So, you know, that doesn't...
[39:25.460 --> 39:29.060]  Just because it's non-ionizing radiation doesn't mean it's good for you.
[39:29.060 --> 39:35.560]  So I am using a wired headset right now, which doesn't emit any RF energy into my head.
[39:35.780 --> 39:38.580]  But I'm also eating a Spanish cucumber sandwich right now.
[39:38.580 --> 39:39.420]  So I'm hedging my bets.
[39:39.620 --> 39:43.260]  Were they basing this statement on any research or they just put it out there?
[39:43.340 --> 39:44.440]  This is basically...
[39:44.440 --> 39:49.100]  It's based on all the different reports that have come out, kind of merged together.
[39:49.360 --> 39:49.520]  Right.
[39:49.740 --> 39:50.140]  And...
[39:50.140 --> 39:51.580]  Which probably go in all different directions.
[39:51.980 --> 39:52.240]  Yeah.
[39:52.500 --> 40:00.280]  So I think what they're saying is that they don't have enough evidence yet and it's possible, which doesn't surprise me because these things have not been around that long.
[40:00.320 --> 40:01.380]  It's entirely possible.
[40:01.500 --> 40:01.960]  There's a hazard.
[40:02.140 --> 40:06.720]  And when you look back into history in the 1950s and 40s, we can laugh at people and say, wow, they were so stupid then.
[40:06.900 --> 40:08.280]  But they hadn't done studies.
[40:08.400 --> 40:09.060]  They didn't know.
[40:09.060 --> 40:11.400]  And it might seem obvious in the future.
[40:11.660 --> 40:13.620]  Right now, we don't have enough information.
[40:13.800 --> 40:15.620]  The studies do go in all different directions.
[40:15.620 --> 40:26.600]  But a previous literature review found that studies sponsored by cellular phone companies are much less likely to find that there's a health effect caused by cell phones than independently funded studies.
[40:26.680 --> 40:27.300]  I've noticed that.
[40:27.420 --> 40:27.840]  And...
[40:27.840 --> 40:30.400]  Well, you can't notice it unless you read all the studies.
[40:30.560 --> 40:34.200]  But you can read the literature review and skip the first step.
[40:35.500 --> 40:36.560]  So, who knows?
[40:37.280 --> 40:37.580]  All right.
[40:37.840 --> 40:38.140]  Emanuel?
[40:38.480 --> 40:38.780]  Go ahead.
[40:39.060 --> 40:40.060]  One other thing.
[40:40.260 --> 40:45.500]  It's going to be really hard to do long-term studies on this stuff because the technology keeps changing every few years.
[40:46.460 --> 40:52.300]  Like, a few years ago, we were all using analog cell phones where the waveforms were a certain kind.
[40:52.300 --> 41:02.220]  And now that the waveforms are pulsed and radically different, and they probably will be a few years from now, there's no way to really tell, you know, long-term what...
[41:02.220 --> 41:04.660]  There's just too many variables that are changing.
[41:05.260 --> 41:06.200]  They're too dynamic.
[41:06.460 --> 41:08.880]  So, I think the jury's going to be out on this for a long time.
[41:09.060 --> 41:11.380]  But, I mean, don't they all have the same carrier frequencies?
[41:11.380 --> 41:13.880]  Or does that not matter when you're speaking in terms of the waveform?
[41:16.060 --> 41:16.420]  Bernie.
[41:17.380 --> 41:19.880]  I don't know where he went, but the answer is we don't know.
[41:20.300 --> 41:20.440]  All right.
[41:20.780 --> 41:21.440]  Nobody heard you, Bernie.
[41:22.240 --> 41:23.320]  Oh, there's a problem.
[41:23.460 --> 41:25.340]  Bernie can't hear Redhack, I think.
[41:25.540 --> 41:26.100]  Okay, I can't hear him.
[41:26.100 --> 41:27.660]  Let's settle this right now, okay?
[41:27.740 --> 41:30.220]  We've been trying to sort this out for months now.
[41:30.480 --> 41:32.420]  All right, Redhack, I want you to say something.
[41:32.560 --> 41:35.260]  Say something to Bernie, and Bernie, I want you to say what you hear.
[41:35.780 --> 41:36.420]  Hi, Bernie.
[41:37.140 --> 41:37.680]  All right, Bernie.
[41:37.760 --> 41:38.260]  Did you hear anything?
[41:38.580 --> 41:38.900]  No.
[41:38.960 --> 41:43.100]  In fact, the volume, even the studio volume dropped to zero at my end when he was speaking.
[41:43.240 --> 41:45.720]  So, whenever you're adjusting his pot up, I hear nothing.
[41:45.720 --> 41:48.420]  So, you didn't hear anything that Redhack said?
[41:48.860 --> 41:49.260]  Exactly.
[41:49.380 --> 41:50.080]  The whole show?
[41:50.540 --> 41:50.960]  No, no, no.
[41:51.080 --> 41:53.240]  I heard him when everybody's talking...
[41:53.240 --> 41:54.140]  Because other mics are on.
[41:54.500 --> 41:54.980]  Yeah, yeah.
[41:55.120 --> 41:57.400]  Then I hear him through other people's mics.
[41:57.660 --> 41:57.840]  All right.
[41:57.880 --> 42:03.400]  Right after I speak, then I hear nothing because you're turning up, I guess, his mic pot.
[42:03.480 --> 42:06.920]  Let the record show that the microphone that has the trouble has...
[42:06.920 --> 42:08.820]  What color would you say the cable is going to that?
[42:09.300 --> 42:11.480]  I'm sorry, I can't hear you now because I don't have the mic on at all.
[42:11.720 --> 42:11.960]  Gray.
[42:11.960 --> 42:12.820]  Gray, he says.
[42:13.360 --> 42:15.700]  Okay, so the gray microphone does not...
[42:15.700 --> 42:17.120]  It does not transmit to the telephone.
[42:17.600 --> 42:21.580]  We need to write this up and make sure that people realize this or rewire it.
[42:21.640 --> 42:23.520]  Now, you're going to say what you were going to say again?
[42:23.580 --> 42:23.740]  Yeah.
[42:23.880 --> 42:25.520]  So, my question, Bernie, was does it matter?
[42:25.820 --> 42:29.360]  You know, I feel like with cell phones, they all use similar carrier frequencies, though.
[42:29.440 --> 42:29.940]  Does it matter?
[42:30.280 --> 42:33.700]  Or is it really more the waveform that's important rather than the carrier frequency?
[42:33.780 --> 42:33.940]  It's both.
[42:34.080 --> 42:34.800]  I mean, it's both.
[42:35.000 --> 42:38.900]  But, you know, there are more harmful waveforms than other.
[42:39.020 --> 42:43.180]  Like, pulse waveforms can be more damaging than just like a sine wave.
[42:43.740 --> 42:45.000]  And at different frequencies.
[42:45.220 --> 42:46.120]  There's a lot of different variables.
[42:46.360 --> 42:58.840]  But, I mean, an 800 megahertz FM carrier wave may be less harmful than a GSM pulsed waveform at 800 megahertz.
[42:59.000 --> 43:01.000]  So, there's just no...
[43:01.000 --> 43:02.660]  And this stuff keeps changing every few years.
[43:02.660 --> 43:03.540]  So, it's going to be...
[43:03.540 --> 43:09.040]  One thing that I think we can all agree on is that a lot of people are getting sick and we don't know why.
[43:09.200 --> 43:11.420]  We don't know why that's happening.
[43:12.260 --> 43:15.960]  People get these horrible diseases and there's no explanation.
[43:16.500 --> 43:17.100]  I'm sorry.
[43:17.440 --> 43:18.040]  Different microphone.
[43:18.160 --> 43:18.260]  Go ahead.
[43:18.260 --> 43:21.680]  We do eat different food now than we did 50, 80 years ago.
[43:21.840 --> 43:23.200]  So, that could be part of it.
[43:23.320 --> 43:29.660]  I don't say it's purely it, but I'm saying that there are various factors beyond cell phones that could contribute to the illness.
[43:29.660 --> 43:30.900]  I'm not saying it's just cell phones.
[43:31.020 --> 43:34.420]  I'm saying there are all kinds of things happening in today's society that we don't understand.
[43:34.420 --> 43:36.360]  We haven't quite sussed out every year.
[43:36.360 --> 43:43.000]  And at least with the food chain, you know, you can look at various regions of the world and see how their diets differ and see how the health varies between those regions.
[43:43.880 --> 43:46.840]  But there aren't a lot of people getting sick, at least when it comes to brain cancer.
[43:46.960 --> 43:49.640]  The rates have been steady for the last 30 years.
[43:49.840 --> 43:54.040]  Well, I'm not an expert on the rates, but I do know that the cancer industry is huge.
[43:54.640 --> 43:56.020]  It's much bigger than it should be.
[43:56.100 --> 43:58.940]  Yeah, but the rate of brain cancer has not increased since the injection of cell phones.
[43:58.940 --> 44:00.340]  So how can you say that there's even a correlation?
[44:00.340 --> 44:02.920]  Because cell phones have not been around that long for that to be a factor.
[44:02.920 --> 44:04.460]  So then why would they even bother studying this?
[44:04.540 --> 44:05.600]  This should be a non-story.
[44:06.180 --> 44:09.460]  Well, we're supposed to wait for people to get sick before we even talk about it.
[44:09.520 --> 44:14.780]  Of course, if it's a potential risk, we should talk about it early and not wait for people to actually start being victims of it.
[44:14.860 --> 44:22.500]  Yes, but it just shows that the studies said that do find a correlation or a total bull because there's been no increase in the rate of brain cancer to begin with.
[44:22.720 --> 44:27.900]  Well, I don't know why it's so disturbing to look into the possibility that something could be harmful.
[44:27.900 --> 44:30.480]  It seems like common sense to me.
[44:30.480 --> 44:34.720]  The problem is that these correlations are much more complicated than that.
[44:34.840 --> 44:40.780]  People are dying of different things than they were 100 years ago in all kinds of different directions.
[44:40.780 --> 44:50.740]  And finding a cause for any one, you know, sort of injury is very difficult, which is not the same as impossible.
[44:51.160 --> 44:58.440]  But just to take one or two statistics and draw a conclusion from it just doesn't work with the number of variables that are out there.
[44:58.440 --> 44:59.080]  It's very complex.
[44:59.280 --> 45:13.260]  But you look at the way we live, we look at the quality of air, the quality of food, and various other things, and other potential invasive bits of technology that could have an effect on your internal workings.
[45:13.260 --> 45:16.280]  And you just have to consider maybe this is a risk.
[45:16.460 --> 45:25.800]  I mean, one of the reasons, for instance, that more people are dying now from cancer than in the past is because fewer people are dying from tuberculosis and everyone dies of something at some point.
[45:25.800 --> 45:34.500]  So the relative frequency of cancer has gone up, even though there may or may not be more, you know, cancerous stuff.
[45:34.720 --> 45:36.780]  Okay, well, let's not turn this into a health show too much.
[45:36.880 --> 45:37.720]  We want to take some phone calls.
[45:37.820 --> 45:39.780]  Red Hack, we're going to take this and then go to the phone call.
[45:39.780 --> 45:48.320]  I was just going to say one more thing about that is also, you know, up until very recently in human history, we've evolved to, you know, have a certain environment, and we've rapidly changed that.
[45:48.420 --> 45:49.840]  And I'm not talking about just global warming.
[45:50.000 --> 45:54.240]  I mean, just everything that, you know, that comes into our body or from wherever.
[45:54.240 --> 45:56.480]  So, yeah, there are lots of factors.
[45:56.640 --> 45:57.280]  I agree with Mike.
[45:57.380 --> 46:00.960]  There's a lot of variables that have changed recently that, you know, we're not used to.
[46:01.140 --> 46:01.820]  All right, let's take some phone calls.
[46:01.900 --> 46:03.240]  212-209-2900.
[46:03.340 --> 46:03.640]  Good evening.
[46:03.780 --> 46:04.560]  You're on Off The Hook.
[46:05.520 --> 46:06.080]  How are you doing?
[46:06.160 --> 46:06.920]  My name is Robert.
[46:07.780 --> 46:10.100]  And I just wanted to make a comment.
[46:10.400 --> 46:10.960]  Okay, go ahead.
[46:12.440 --> 46:17.800]  When they're talking about the cell phones, most people have the cell phones on their hip or in their purse, not next to their head.
[46:17.900 --> 46:23.120]  90% of the time, cell phones are being used and not on their heads.
[46:23.840 --> 46:24.500]  I'm sorry.
[46:24.600 --> 46:26.180]  First of all, do you have a radio on or something?
[46:27.880 --> 46:29.740]  We're hearing ourselves coming later.
[46:30.180 --> 46:34.460]  What the caller was pointing out is that cell phones are not in use most of the time.
[46:34.980 --> 46:40.900]  But they are transmitting much more energy when they are in use, which is why people are concerned about it, I think.
[46:42.220 --> 46:43.620]  All right, I love your show, guys.
[46:43.760 --> 46:44.180]  Keep it going.
[46:44.300 --> 46:44.520]  All right.
[46:44.640 --> 46:45.580]  Thanks for the call.
[46:45.640 --> 46:46.100]  Let's take another one.
[46:46.320 --> 46:46.680]  Good evening.
[46:46.860 --> 46:47.760]  You're on Off The Hook.
[46:47.760 --> 46:48.800]  Hi.
[46:49.560 --> 46:55.680]  You were talking earlier and made reference to a Stuxnet worm.
[46:56.300 --> 47:06.020]  For those of us who are ignoramuses and don't really know what that is, perhaps you could fill that in and how it relates to what you were talking about.
[47:06.200 --> 47:06.460]  Okay.
[47:06.740 --> 47:08.000]  Redhack, you're going to do this really quickly.
[47:08.000 --> 47:21.140]  Yeah, Stuxnet was just this worm that was basically designed very specifically to affect this kind of mechanical control system that was used in the Iran nuclear power plants.
[47:21.140 --> 47:27.420]  And so, you know, it made them basically speed up very fast so that they broke, essentially.
[47:28.380 --> 47:32.040]  And so it was transmitted in various ways.
[47:32.040 --> 47:40.440]  But the way that it got into the Iran nuclear power plants was that it would copy itself from an infected machine to removal media, from the removal media to another machine, et cetera, et cetera.
[47:41.660 --> 47:44.220]  And so it had a very specific target.
[47:44.220 --> 47:48.680]  It required a very specific knowledge of kind of how these controllers worked.
[47:49.120 --> 47:54.980]  And so there's a lot of speculation as to who is responsible for it and why they would want to target these systems, basically.
[47:55.240 --> 47:55.420]  Okay.
[47:55.440 --> 47:56.980]  Hopefully that was in-depth enough.
[47:57.320 --> 47:58.500]  Let's take another phone call.
[47:58.560 --> 47:58.840]  Good evening.
[47:58.980 --> 47:59.680]  You're on Off The Hook.
[48:00.260 --> 48:00.660]  Yes.
[48:00.900 --> 48:02.280]  Oh, here we have static on this line.
[48:02.640 --> 48:03.260]  Make it quick.
[48:03.480 --> 48:03.860]  Yes, go ahead.
[48:04.360 --> 48:05.420]  Hi, gentlemen.
[48:05.620 --> 48:07.860]  Thank you for another interesting show.
[48:08.120 --> 48:08.280]  Sure.
[48:08.280 --> 48:25.800]  But regarding the cell phone, and I don't want to turn this into a health issue, but there are several books that came out lately about the cell phone studies and how cell phone, the microwave, had started, generational microwaves, started with the microwave oven,
[48:26.100 --> 48:26.860]  et cetera, et cetera.
[48:27.320 --> 48:29.620]  But there are a couple of books out there.
[48:29.620 --> 48:37.060]  I can't remember the names regarding the cell phone and how it has affected the health of an individual.
[48:37.480 --> 48:43.300]  So, I would suggest, you know, maybe you guys could do... pick up some of those and do a little bit of reading regarding the topic.
[48:43.920 --> 48:49.120]  Yes, it's a little complicated because there are studies that indicate one thing and other studies indicate another.
[48:49.260 --> 48:55.340]  But a lot of the studies, I think, oversee from Europe and other places indicate some sort of a link.
[48:55.940 --> 49:02.240]  I don't think studies here that I recall have shown any kind of link, but some of the European studies have done that.
[49:02.600 --> 49:05.000]  I'm sure we'll have a lot to talk about in the years ahead.
[49:05.120 --> 49:06.280]  Thanks for the suggestion.
[49:06.280 --> 49:08.000]  And let's move on to another one.
[49:08.100 --> 49:08.400]  Good evening.
[49:08.540 --> 49:09.300]  You're on Off The Hook.
[49:10.580 --> 49:11.320]  Good evening.
[49:11.620 --> 49:11.780]  Hi.
[49:13.140 --> 49:14.780]  This is Winston from Brooklyn.
[49:15.120 --> 49:15.580]  How are you doing?
[49:15.700 --> 49:21.840]  I heard you were speaking about the cyber situation that England is trying to do.
[49:22.500 --> 49:30.800]  America have done it because they have the drones rising around that they remotely control and it bombs places.
[49:31.500 --> 49:34.240]  They shoot people with it and what have you.
[49:34.540 --> 49:35.660]  Yeah, that's a little different.
[49:37.100 --> 49:38.640]  It's a little different than cyber weapons.
[49:39.240 --> 49:41.620]  I mean, we're talking about purely kind of virtual stuff.
[49:41.740 --> 49:47.560]  So, you know, that if you're being attacked or something that they could kind of attack you back on the Internet.
[49:47.780 --> 49:52.680]  And, you know, yes, there are drones and those are controlled by computers, but they're not quite the same thing.
[49:52.680 --> 49:53.760]  Okay.
[49:54.160 --> 49:54.340]  Yeah.
[49:54.340 --> 50:02.880]  The internet is something, because the point you were making just now about Iran, that they claim it's a warm center by the U.S.
[50:03.320 --> 50:03.520]  Right.
[50:03.900 --> 50:09.080]  To damage the Iranians' nuclear situation.
[50:09.440 --> 50:09.560]  Right.
[50:11.720 --> 50:20.240]  And that is very sad, because if people were to do America the same thing, you know, you'll hear a big hullabaloo around the world about it.
[50:20.660 --> 50:23.760]  You know, it's a one-way street, it seems to be.
[50:24.940 --> 50:26.300]  Secondly, the cell phones.
[50:26.960 --> 50:37.060]  If you have a cell phone tower, they would not allow a cell phone tower to be put up near a school, because it says the radiation interferes with the children.
[50:38.860 --> 50:43.300]  And, you know, so there must be some truth in this cell phone affair.
[50:44.640 --> 50:46.600]  We would need to know more about it, though.
[50:46.600 --> 50:54.040]  Well, yeah, I think with that case, that might be just precaution, because, as the studies show, we don't really know for sure.
[50:54.300 --> 50:57.220]  And so, you know, with that kind of thing, people tend to be cautious.
[50:57.220 --> 51:00.920]  Okay, well, we don't want this near the children or that near the children, because we don't know what it'll do.
[51:02.020 --> 51:03.760]  Okay, we're going to move on to another phone call.
[51:04.360 --> 51:05.120]  And good evening.
[51:05.300 --> 51:06.120]  You're on Off the Hook.
[51:07.340 --> 51:07.700]  Hello?
[51:07.920 --> 51:08.380]  Yes, go ahead.
[51:08.720 --> 51:09.120]  Yeah, how are you doing?
[51:09.440 --> 51:12.760]  You know, I just want to say something very quickly about that.
[51:12.760 --> 51:20.880]  But, you know, it's interesting that people never point out that Bush created a democracy in Iraq that had a higher voter turnout percentage to the population than we had in our last election.
[51:21.040 --> 51:27.140]  25 million people liberated, and a Barack Obama's own kid brother still lives in a hut shack in Nairobi, Kenya, in a slump.
[51:27.460 --> 51:29.360]  How come nobody ever points that out?
[51:29.540 --> 51:32.780]  Well, you just did, and thank you for doing it on our show.
[51:33.400 --> 51:34.100]  Good evening.
[51:34.240 --> 51:34.980]  You're on Off the Hook.
[51:35.740 --> 51:36.140]  Hello?
[51:36.380 --> 51:36.760]  Yes, go ahead.
[51:36.860 --> 51:38.340]  I'm Tom from the Bronx here.
[51:38.480 --> 51:38.780]  How are you doing?
[51:38.780 --> 51:50.020]  I like to say that the type of cancer that's attributed to cell phones, fundamentally, from what I've read, was brain cancer.
[51:50.080 --> 51:58.660]  Because the radiation from the phone goes right into the ear, and the ear gets to the brain.
[51:59.100 --> 51:59.880]  Mm-hmm.
[52:00.140 --> 52:04.320]  And that's what they've studied.
[52:04.320 --> 52:15.280]  I had an uncle that caught brain cancer, but he would, in all truthfulness, he was a heavy smoker, too, all his years.
[52:15.340 --> 52:16.620]  And he was in his 70s.
[52:18.940 --> 52:30.840]  So, but the last few years, when cell phones came out, he had one on his ear from the morning, from the day, from the morning, he woke up to them when he went to sleep.
[52:31.100 --> 52:32.820]  He couldn't stop talking on it.
[52:34.320 --> 52:35.760]  I never had one myself.
[52:35.920 --> 52:36.220]  Uh-huh.
[52:37.460 --> 52:42.080]  But what I'm getting at is, I'm calling you from a regular phone.
[52:42.420 --> 52:43.460]  And you sound much better.
[52:43.560 --> 52:44.260]  That's the other thing.
[52:44.600 --> 52:46.360]  Landlines just sound better, okay?
[52:46.560 --> 52:47.380]  Well, I don't know.
[52:47.760 --> 52:48.360]  Does it really?
[52:48.520 --> 52:48.860]  It does.
[52:48.940 --> 52:49.340]  It really does.
[52:49.800 --> 52:52.240]  You've got to be the best sounding caller we've had tonight, actually.
[52:53.020 --> 52:53.900]  Well, that's...
[52:53.900 --> 52:54.400]  Thank you.
[52:54.480 --> 52:55.240]  That's a compliment.
[52:55.240 --> 53:11.640]  But I want to say, too, that somebody, or somebody else I know, has, his sister works, or is a big doctor, in Mount Sinai Hospital.
[53:12.280 --> 53:24.980]  And she had, like, pictures of what happens to the brain every time somebody uses a cell phone and it scrambles up the brain.
[53:24.980 --> 53:26.940]  Or it scrambles up the...
[53:26.940 --> 53:28.840]  I definitely would like to see that picture.
[53:29.020 --> 53:29.640]  Well, yeah.
[53:29.640 --> 53:30.060]  It sounds interesting.
[53:30.400 --> 53:31.980]  He just told me about it.
[53:32.020 --> 53:32.780]  He saw it.
[53:32.980 --> 53:33.260]  Uh-huh.
[53:33.500 --> 53:36.040]  It's something that she has in the hospital there.
[53:36.040 --> 53:36.560]  I don't know.
[53:36.880 --> 53:37.180]  All right.
[53:37.300 --> 53:40.360]  But it mixes it up.
[53:40.460 --> 53:43.600]  And it's something that adds to no good, anyway.
[53:43.780 --> 53:44.000]  All right.
[53:44.060 --> 53:45.420]  Well, thanks for the information.
[53:45.600 --> 53:45.860]  Go ahead, Mike.
[53:45.860 --> 53:56.620]  I think the thing that is so difficult about the modern world in general and about this issue in particular is that people have evolved to extrapolate from their personal experience.
[53:57.020 --> 54:09.880]  But with issues like this one, you can't because the difference between, you know, a tenth of a percent and two-tenths of a percent of your friends getting some disease is just not noticeable in an anecdotal way.
[54:10.880 --> 54:16.460]  And it's really hard for people to draw conclusions from large volumes of data.
[54:16.680 --> 54:18.280]  We're just not evolved to do it.
[54:19.200 --> 54:19.600]  Yeah.
[54:19.760 --> 54:20.520]  Not yet.
[54:20.720 --> 54:22.280]  Not in our current stage of development.
[54:22.940 --> 54:24.220]  Let's take another phone call.
[54:24.300 --> 54:24.580]  Good evening.
[54:24.700 --> 54:25.240]  You're on Off the Hook.
[54:26.040 --> 54:26.620]  Hi there.
[54:26.760 --> 54:26.920]  Hi.
[54:27.340 --> 54:30.740]  Is it okay if I bring some facts to the discussion?
[54:31.280 --> 54:33.340]  Well, facts tend to be the enemy, but okay.
[54:33.620 --> 54:33.920]  No, no.
[54:33.920 --> 54:35.940]  You can have your own opinions.
[54:35.960 --> 54:36.840]  You can't have your own facts.
[54:36.840 --> 54:48.440]  First of all, the kind of cancer that this report refers to are geoblastomas, which are a very unusual type of brain cancer.
[54:48.920 --> 54:52.120]  And the modality is thought that it goes through the ear canal.
[54:52.900 --> 55:00.880]  And the reason it's so unusual is because cell reproduction, that is cell turnover in the brain, takes a very, very long time.
[55:01.100 --> 55:05.560]  There are some cells in the body, like red blood cells, that reproduce very, very frequently.
[55:05.560 --> 55:11.220]  But brain cells, you have to run very, very long longitudinal studies.
[55:11.400 --> 55:17.400]  And as one of the fellows pointed out there, first of all, there's been band switching over the years.
[55:17.800 --> 55:20.940]  Secondly, there's been a change in modulation over the years.
[55:20.940 --> 55:37.500]  Third change in technology is that as the cell sizes get smaller, because cell phones are more frequently used, the cell phones that we have now automatically use the least amount of power required to capture and to hold the cell.
[55:38.320 --> 55:40.400]  So you've got a moving target here.
[55:40.400 --> 55:58.680]  There is some very good research that was done starting in the 1960s, when it was noticed that both policemen carrying Motorola handy talkies, and I'm sure you guys remember them, and ham radio operators, first on 6 meters, then on 144, then on 220, and then on 440 megahertz,
[55:59.160 --> 56:03.500]  were getting both glaucoma and cataracts in the eye.
[56:03.500 --> 56:05.500]  Okay, you've got to wrap this up in 30 seconds.
[56:05.600 --> 56:05.960]  Can you do that?
[56:06.240 --> 56:21.020]  What it is, is it's localized heating, and it basically cooks the fluid in the ear, and it's probably doing the same thing in the brain, but because DNA replication is so low, so slow, that it takes a long time for it to catch and to multiply.
[56:21.420 --> 56:23.360]  Anyway, Eric, good to talk to you.
[56:23.420 --> 56:23.720]  Bye-bye.
[56:23.860 --> 56:27.920]  All right, well, it's good to hear a voice of somewhat reason there.
[56:28.680 --> 56:31.640]  Yes, we have information on a hacker event this weekend?
[56:31.640 --> 56:39.180]  Yeah, next weekend, the 10th through the 12th, we have SummerCon and Park Slopes in Brooklyn, summercon.org.
[56:39.440 --> 56:40.380]  Okay, all right.
[56:40.520 --> 56:47.760]  One of the oldest hacker conferences comes to Brooklyn, and of course, 2600 meetings this Friday, all around the world.
[56:48.000 --> 56:49.600]  So thanks, everybody, for listening.
[56:49.900 --> 56:55.860]  Write to us, OTH at 2600.com, and let's not worry too much about these cell phones.
[56:55.880 --> 56:57.940]  Just think about something else.
[56:57.940 --> 56:59.360]  Yeah, let's go out with something cheerful.
[57:08.280 --> 57:12.420]  Everything, everything, everything, kills your cancer.
[57:12.820 --> 57:18.800]  Everything, everything, kills your cancer.
[57:19.220 --> 57:22.040]  There's no clue, there's no answer.
[57:22.640 --> 57:25.200]  Everything, kills your cancer.
[57:27.320 --> 57:30.740]  Don't touch that dial.
[57:33.800 --> 57:37.060]  Don't try to smile.
[57:40.220 --> 57:43.400]  Just take this pill.
[57:47.110 --> 57:50.130]  It's in your file.
[57:50.130 --> 57:52.950]  Don't work hard.
[57:53.590 --> 57:56.190]  Don't play hard.
[57:57.230 --> 57:59.050]  Don't play full.
[58:03.420 --> 58:05.180]  Remember, everything.
[58:07.400 --> 58:10.640]  Everything gives you cancer.
[58:11.060 --> 58:11.680]  Everything.
[58:13.700 --> 58:16.980]  Everything gives you cancer.
[58:17.440 --> 58:18.380]  There's no cure.
[58:19.060 --> 58:20.300]  There's no answer.
[58:20.820 --> 58:23.420]  Everything gives you cancer.
[58:25.620 --> 58:29.160]  Don't work by night.
[58:32.070 --> 58:35.310]  Don't sleep by day.
[58:39.050 --> 58:41.670]  Y'all feel alright.
[58:45.140 --> 58:48.300]  But you will play.
[58:48.300 --> 58:50.700]  No caffeine.
[58:51.580 --> 58:53.940]  No protein.
[58:55.460 --> 59:00.340]  No booze or nicotine.
[59:01.640 --> 59:03.660]  Remember, everything.
[59:05.540 --> 59:09.100]  Everything gives you cancer.
[59:09.500 --> 59:10.140]  Everything.
[59:12.660 --> 59:15.440]  Everything gives you cancer.
[59:15.960 --> 59:17.000]  There's no cure.
[59:17.540 --> 59:18.740]  There's no answer.
[59:19.300 --> 59:22.100]  Everything gives you cancer.
[59:46.230 --> 59:47.490]  All right.
[59:47.490 --> 59:50.990]  I love the off-the-hook music, you know.
[59:51.450 --> 59:53.210]  From the I-Lan and Ting.