[00:00.710 --> 00:02.330]  Got questions about your computer?
[00:02.670 --> 00:03.250]  Mm-hmm.
[00:03.550 --> 00:05.130]  Want to know about the latest electronics?
[00:05.450 --> 00:05.810]  Yeah.
[00:06.150 --> 00:08.050]  Are you confused by high-definition TV?
[00:08.430 --> 00:08.850]  A little.
[00:09.030 --> 00:12.050]  Well, tune into WBAI every Wednesday at 8 p.m.
[00:12.170 --> 00:13.850]  for The Personal Computer Show.
[00:14.070 --> 00:14.350]  Yeah.
[00:14.550 --> 00:18.970]  Yeah, that's every Wednesday on WBAI 99.5 FM.
[00:19.210 --> 00:19.490]  Oh.
[00:19.770 --> 00:20.870]  So why don't you tell a friend?
[00:21.050 --> 00:21.490]  Oh, okay.
[00:21.750 --> 00:22.590]  And tell your boss.
[00:22.830 --> 00:23.070]  Well.
[00:23.210 --> 00:28.170]  Hey, call your mom and tell them about The Personal Computer Show every Wednesday at 8 p.m.
[00:28.250 --> 00:30.170]  on WBAI 99.5 FM.
[00:30.170 --> 00:31.710]  99.5 FM.
[00:31.910 --> 00:32.730]  Oh, okay.
[00:49.370 --> 00:51.230]  The telephone keeps ringing.
[00:51.670 --> 00:53.770]  So I ripped it off the wall.
[00:54.810 --> 00:56.730]  I cut myself while shaving.
[00:57.330 --> 00:59.290]  Now I can't make a call.
[00:59.970 --> 01:02.110]  We couldn't get much worse.
[01:04.420 --> 01:04.660]  Good.
[01:04.920 --> 01:05.560]  Bum-dilly-bum.
[01:05.740 --> 01:07.560]  But the best is paid for worst.
[01:08.200 --> 01:10.020]  I hope that's understood.
[01:10.260 --> 01:11.040]  Bum-dilly-bum!
[01:26.640 --> 01:27.900]  Well, that was fun, wasn't it?
[01:28.040 --> 01:29.840]  You didn't hear my voice at all, did you?
[01:30.380 --> 01:32.420]  Somebody pressed the wrong button on the microphone here.
[01:32.760 --> 01:34.240]  It's sabotage, is what it is.
[01:35.300 --> 01:40.780]  Well, I said it's 7 o'clock time for Off the Hook, and I played the theme, so you didn't really miss much.
[01:40.900 --> 01:43.300]  But you could have missed a lot if we didn't catch this.
[01:43.560 --> 01:45.680]  Did you mention that this is WBAI New York?
[01:45.840 --> 01:49.380]  I mentioned it then, but I guess nobody heard... well, you guys heard me, but nobody on the air heard me.
[01:50.140 --> 01:51.460]  But everything's all fixed now.
[01:51.680 --> 01:53.500]  Yes, Off the Hook is on the air.
[02:03.680 --> 02:09.760]  See, the thing is, if you press the button, that's what cuts when you're talking.
[02:09.980 --> 02:11.200]  So, never press that button.
[02:11.240 --> 02:12.200]  I don't know why somebody did that.
[02:13.180 --> 02:15.160]  It's just there to cause mayhem.
[02:15.480 --> 02:17.700]  This is Emmanuel here with Mike.
[02:17.940 --> 02:18.120]  Hi.
[02:18.460 --> 02:18.920]  Dotret.
[02:19.220 --> 02:19.600]  Hey, Luke.
[02:19.760 --> 02:20.220]  Voltaire.
[02:20.440 --> 02:20.560]  Hey.
[02:20.800 --> 02:21.140]  Jim.
[02:21.400 --> 02:21.560]  Hello.
[02:22.080 --> 02:22.780]  Bernie S.
[02:22.980 --> 02:24.080]  down there in Philadelphia.
[02:24.680 --> 02:25.700]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:25.700 --> 02:28.100]  And we're going to try something.
[02:28.840 --> 02:30.540]  All kinds of changes here at the radio stations.
[02:30.660 --> 02:34.060]  You can hear Al Jazeera now is preceding us, which is quite interesting.
[02:34.220 --> 02:35.520]  We've been talking about Al Jazeera for many years now.
[02:35.600 --> 02:37.420]  And now it precedes Off the Hook.
[02:37.540 --> 02:37.780]  Incredible.
[02:39.120 --> 02:46.980]  But we also have, finally, after many years of begging and pleading, we finally have Skype set up in the studios.
[02:47.020 --> 02:49.920]  And I understand that it's going to work.
[02:50.080 --> 02:50.900]  That's what I'm told.
[02:51.020 --> 02:51.960]  I'm told that it works.
[02:52.260 --> 02:52.660]  Uh-huh.
[02:54.160 --> 02:55.240]  Well, may you say that, Jim.
[02:55.380 --> 02:57.500]  But I think, finally, we got it right.
[02:57.660 --> 03:06.180]  What we're going to do, and bear with us, because this is a show that experiments on the air, we're going to try and make contact with Kyle in Seattle.
[03:06.300 --> 03:09.060]  Now, first, what we have to do, I've got...
[03:09.060 --> 03:09.860]  Have you all used Skype?
[03:10.040 --> 03:10.960]  Has everybody here used Skype?
[03:10.980 --> 03:11.200]  Yeah.
[03:11.300 --> 03:12.380]  I've tried to use it.
[03:12.460 --> 03:13.000]  You've tried to use it.
[03:13.040 --> 03:13.200]  Okay.
[03:13.300 --> 03:14.020]  I used it the other day.
[03:14.040 --> 03:14.800]  It was pretty impressive.
[03:14.820 --> 03:16.980]  Although, you know, we don't need video.
[03:17.160 --> 03:19.220]  And I think if you don't use video, you get better sound quality.
[03:19.340 --> 03:19.920]  Does that make sense?
[03:20.040 --> 03:21.540]  Well, I use it on my phone.
[03:21.540 --> 03:23.660]  I have a Skype on my phone, and it cuts out.
[03:23.860 --> 03:26.700]  The other person stops being able to hear me after about 10 minutes.
[03:27.140 --> 03:27.340]  Okay.
[03:27.380 --> 03:29.620]  Now, you heard that horrible noise that came from Bernie's phone just now.
[03:29.720 --> 03:30.880]  That was him breathing into the phone.
[03:31.080 --> 03:33.500]  Actually, it was a microphone rubbing against my shirt collar.
[03:33.600 --> 03:34.120]  Sorry about that.
[03:34.140 --> 03:34.320]  All right.
[03:34.380 --> 03:37.000]  Well, that's the kind of noise you hear on a cell phone.
[03:38.020 --> 03:41.540]  Supposedly, with Skype, we won't hear that quite so badly.
[03:41.900 --> 03:42.600]  I'm not sure.
[03:42.960 --> 03:48.780]  So, anyway, I just pressed the button for adding a contact, and I think I froze something there.
[03:49.420 --> 03:50.840]  Is that supposed to be there, those arrows?
[03:51.060 --> 03:51.880]  It doesn't look right.
[03:52.000 --> 03:52.880]  No, it doesn't look right at all.
[03:53.580 --> 03:53.840]  Okay.
[03:53.900 --> 03:55.440]  So, right away, we're running into difficulties.
[03:56.320 --> 03:56.900]  Oh, there we go.
[03:56.960 --> 03:57.160]  Okay.
[03:59.680 --> 03:59.960]  Wait.
[03:59.980 --> 04:00.940]  I'm supposed to add a contact.
[04:01.120 --> 04:02.700]  I'm supposed to put in their full name.
[04:02.820 --> 04:02.980]  Okay.
[04:03.020 --> 04:04.280]  I'm just going to put in their Skype name.
[04:04.460 --> 04:05.420]  This is very complicated.
[04:05.420 --> 04:07.900]  Yeah, please fill the time while...
[04:07.900 --> 04:09.700]  Some people would do this before we go on the air.
[04:09.760 --> 04:10.960]  Well, I wanted to demonstrate it.
[04:10.960 --> 04:11.760]  This is like people, some people.
[04:11.760 --> 04:15.740]  I wanted to demonstrate it live, and I think that's the effect that we're achieving here.
[04:15.900 --> 04:16.920]  So, yes.
[04:17.280 --> 04:17.540]  All right.
[04:17.580 --> 04:18.500]  I'm going to put in the name now.
[04:18.680 --> 04:20.300]  You're making us look incompetent, Emmanuel.
[04:20.600 --> 04:21.580]  No, you're doing that yourself.
[04:21.580 --> 04:23.520]  You have nothing to say while I'm typing on the keyboard.
[04:24.400 --> 04:26.020]  I can tell you what happened this week.
[04:26.580 --> 04:28.780]  Well, don't do that because that might lead to an extended discussion.
[04:28.780 --> 04:30.200]  We do have a lot of things to talk about.
[04:31.560 --> 04:36.200]  You know, you're making me take a minute to type six characters here.
[04:36.300 --> 04:36.420]  All right.
[04:36.500 --> 04:37.800]  Let's talk about what happens next week.
[04:39.280 --> 04:42.500]  Well, I can tell you what happens next week, but I'm not allowed to do that either.
[04:43.760 --> 04:44.860]  I could tell a joke.
[04:47.380 --> 04:47.900]  Oh, wow.
[04:47.960 --> 04:49.140]  It knew his name right away.
[04:49.180 --> 04:49.840]  That's kind of scary.
[04:50.160 --> 04:50.400]  So...
[04:50.400 --> 04:50.960]  How many...
[04:51.500 --> 04:52.680]  Here's the joke question.
[04:52.700 --> 04:55.060]  How many hackers does it take to establish a Skype connection?
[04:55.260 --> 04:55.440]  All right.
[04:55.520 --> 04:56.220]  I've added...
[04:56.220 --> 04:56.640]  Too many.
[04:56.780 --> 04:57.460]  I've added his name.
[04:57.520 --> 04:58.600]  Now, I'm going to send a request.
[04:58.780 --> 04:59.820]  Let's see if we hear a noise.
[05:01.640 --> 05:02.000]  Okay.
[05:02.760 --> 05:03.400]  Something's happening.
[05:04.820 --> 05:05.980]  I want to call them...
[05:05.980 --> 05:07.420]  No, I don't want to call their landline.
[05:07.560 --> 05:08.480]  I just want to...
[05:08.860 --> 05:10.440]  The contact request has been sent.
[05:10.580 --> 05:14.600]  So, I think we have to wait for Kyle to respond and approve us.
[05:14.800 --> 05:19.460]  And then once that happens, then we can contact him and then we can have him on the air and it'll sound kind of cool.
[05:20.420 --> 05:20.780]  Right?
[05:20.980 --> 05:21.600]  You don't say.
[05:22.280 --> 05:23.240]  Well, I don't know.
[05:23.400 --> 05:24.520]  I think that's how it works.
[05:26.320 --> 05:26.680]  Well...
[05:27.700 --> 05:28.640]  What is wrong with him?
[05:28.700 --> 05:29.760]  I've never been on the radio before.
[05:30.100 --> 05:30.980]  Let's bring our sentence together.
[05:31.060 --> 05:31.400]  Go ahead.
[05:31.720 --> 05:33.100]  We're just waiting for something to happen here.
[05:33.140 --> 05:33.440]  That's all.
[05:34.460 --> 05:35.780]  How long do we have to wait for this?
[05:35.960 --> 05:37.820]  Well, I thought it would be instant, but...
[05:37.820 --> 05:39.380]  Is Kyle expecting a...
[05:39.380 --> 05:40.180]  Yes, he is.
[05:40.180 --> 05:40.440]  All right.
[05:40.440 --> 05:40.720]  He is.
[05:40.840 --> 05:47.340]  And I'm not sure if it's just a network delay or if we are waiting for a particular noise.
[05:47.920 --> 05:48.740]  We'll give it a minute.
[05:48.820 --> 05:50.660]  We'll give it a minute and check in again.
[05:50.800 --> 05:51.000]  Yes.
[05:51.020 --> 05:51.940]  I like Google Voice better.
[05:52.280 --> 05:52.940]  You like Google Voice?
[05:53.060 --> 05:53.180]  Why?
[05:53.600 --> 05:53.960]  Better.
[05:54.840 --> 05:58.440]  It sends your communications directly to Google for analysis as opposed to...
[05:58.440 --> 05:59.720]  Skype is owned by Microsoft now.
[06:00.060 --> 06:00.500]  Are they?
[06:00.680 --> 06:00.800]  Yeah.
[06:00.800 --> 06:02.740]  It's hard to keep track of who's owned by whom.
[06:03.960 --> 06:04.160]  Okay.
[06:04.620 --> 06:05.220]  It just happened.
[06:05.220 --> 06:09.300]  This is a recent state of affairs, so I can remember for a few months.
[06:09.400 --> 06:10.780]  Didn't eBay used to own it before?
[06:10.780 --> 06:22.840]  Yeah, eBay owned it, and then they discovered that auctions and Skype have really nothing to do with each other, so they sold it to some private firm, and Microsoft just recently bought it, which probably explains why it stopped working.
[06:22.920 --> 06:23.040]  Okay.
[06:23.040 --> 06:26.140]  I'm going to hit call now, because I see his...
[06:26.760 --> 06:27.120]  Okay.
[06:27.120 --> 06:27.740]  You heard that noise?
[06:27.900 --> 06:28.000]  Yeah.
[06:28.000 --> 06:29.120]  I think that was us being approved.
[06:29.260 --> 06:30.920]  No, actually, that was mine.
[06:31.020 --> 06:31.820]  I was establishing...
[06:31.820 --> 06:32.200]  Are you kidding?
[06:35.220 --> 06:35.800]  I didn't answer.
[06:36.000 --> 06:36.700]  I thought you could try me.
[06:36.700 --> 06:36.960]  Do it.
[06:37.320 --> 06:37.540]  All right.
[06:37.640 --> 06:41.360]  Let's not cross Skype's here, because that's just going to lead to confusion.
[06:41.500 --> 06:43.260]  I'm going to hit the call button, and we're going to see what happens.
[06:43.720 --> 06:44.060]  All right.
[06:44.140 --> 06:46.900]  I've hit the call button, and hopefully something will happen.
[06:49.260 --> 06:49.900]  It doesn't...
[06:50.660 --> 06:51.740]  There's no progress bar.
[06:52.000 --> 06:53.140]  Emmanuel, did you approve Bernie?
[06:53.600 --> 06:54.680]  No, I didn't approve him.
[06:54.920 --> 06:55.840]  This is your problem.
[06:56.500 --> 06:56.820]  Yeah.
[06:56.920 --> 06:57.020]  Okay.
[06:57.100 --> 06:57.560]  Something's happening.
[07:07.780 --> 07:08.180]  Contacts.
[07:09.320 --> 07:11.620]  Sounds like a slow Kyle there.
[07:12.060 --> 07:12.240]  All right.
[07:12.980 --> 07:13.860]  He sounds good.
[07:13.940 --> 07:14.740]  Can you hear us, Kyle?
[07:14.860 --> 07:15.500]  Yeah, I did everything right.
[07:15.720 --> 07:16.160]  Yeah, you did.
[07:16.360 --> 07:16.600]  You did.
[07:17.140 --> 07:18.820]  Try to make it Skype.
[07:18.940 --> 07:19.980]  Check your microphone.
[07:20.300 --> 07:22.440]  Can we have some support over here, please?
[07:22.680 --> 07:23.780]  We need some technical support.
[07:24.040 --> 07:24.640]  No, it's not going to work.
[07:24.660 --> 07:28.140]  The computer is saying that we have to check our microphones and...
[07:28.140 --> 07:30.420]  Well, it seems like I've opened the call.
[07:30.660 --> 07:34.180]  The magic of voice...
[07:34.180 --> 07:34.980]  No, no.
[07:35.240 --> 07:37.260]  IP telephony...
[07:37.260 --> 07:38.180]  It does sound good.
[07:38.340 --> 07:39.400]  ...has me connected.
[07:40.060 --> 07:41.340]  As far as I can tell.
[07:41.880 --> 07:42.120]  Uh-huh.
[07:42.240 --> 07:43.240]  What did you just do, Mike?
[07:43.260 --> 07:46.080]  I did nothing except switch to the tab and switch back.
[07:46.560 --> 07:49.220]  It seems that we can hear him, but he can't hear me.
[07:49.540 --> 07:52.660]  It seems like we can hear him, yes, but for some reason, he can hear us.
[07:52.780 --> 07:52.900]  Can I not hear you?
[07:53.540 --> 07:53.920]  Hello?
[07:54.480 --> 07:54.700]  Yeah.
[07:54.860 --> 07:56.060]  You have a suggestion, Dot Red?
[07:56.080 --> 08:03.400]  I think we can just blame the setup for this, because Skype seems to be working, but the board just might not be connected to the computer properly.
[08:03.580 --> 08:03.840]  All right.
[08:04.940 --> 08:05.520]  That's my thing.
[08:05.740 --> 08:05.840]  Hello?
[08:06.120 --> 08:07.380]  I don't think the problem is on Kyle's...
[08:07.380 --> 08:07.660]  Caller?
[08:08.020 --> 08:09.760]  Kyle, can you hear us at all, Kyle?
[08:09.880 --> 08:10.800]  No, he can't hear us.
[08:10.840 --> 08:14.320]  You see, it's pretty obvious that this is not set up the way it's supposed to be set up.
[08:14.600 --> 08:23.220]  This is the problem that we had the first time we did this, in that the caller couldn't hear us, and we were able to hear them just fine.
[08:23.360 --> 08:28.400]  But, Kyle, if you have your internet on, there's going to be a slight delay, but you can hear us talking to you.
[08:29.360 --> 08:30.660]  This is kind of pathetic.
[08:30.720 --> 08:32.200]  This person's going to have to try back again.
[08:32.680 --> 08:34.120]  Sorry if I'm interrupting.
[08:34.500 --> 08:35.080]  No, no.
[08:35.240 --> 08:42.120]  This is remarkably smooth, considering you can't hear us, and there's a long delay between when you can hear us.
[08:42.140 --> 08:42.220]  Nothing.
[08:42.420 --> 08:43.620]  I don't hear anyone.
[08:44.060 --> 08:44.240]  Yeah.
[08:44.460 --> 08:45.460]  Where are you, people?
[08:45.700 --> 08:48.620]  Something to do with the way the call is being sent out.
[08:48.620 --> 08:50.320]  Oh, oh, he hung up on us.
[08:50.480 --> 08:51.400]  Can you believe that?
[08:52.120 --> 08:52.420]  Yes.
[08:53.420 --> 08:55.840]  I must say, Kyle is very...
[08:55.840 --> 08:57.440]  He has a very appropriate language.
[08:57.560 --> 08:59.360]  I don't think your microphone's working at all.
[08:59.460 --> 09:00.500]  Why don't you use that one over there?
[09:01.140 --> 09:02.200]  Yeah, that's true.
[09:02.320 --> 09:03.600]  This place is really not set up...
[09:04.980 --> 09:09.680]  I was going to say, if that was me, I'd be swearing all over the place, and I'm kind of surprised.
[09:09.780 --> 09:11.840]  Not if that was you, and you knew you were going to be on the radio.
[09:11.980 --> 09:12.680]  You wouldn't be doing that.
[09:12.820 --> 09:14.680]  It sounded like he didn't know he was going to be on the radio.
[09:14.880 --> 09:17.980]  If I didn't know I was going to be on the radio, yeah, it would just be a...
[09:17.980 --> 09:19.260]  Mike, you went running out of here.
[09:19.480 --> 09:20.120]  What'd you learn?
[09:20.300 --> 09:24.220]  I learned that Stevie, who's one of the engineers here, says that Skype doesn't work in the studio.
[09:24.460 --> 09:25.340]  Well, then why?
[09:25.840 --> 09:26.480]  Pray tell.
[09:26.600 --> 09:29.740]  Was a big announcement sent out saying that Skype is now working in the studios?
[09:30.600 --> 09:32.580]  You have as much information as I have now.
[09:33.340 --> 09:36.680]  Boy, I feel embarrassed and red-faced with shame here.
[09:36.760 --> 09:40.860]  And just so our listeners know, this was not like a trick we did to make it fail.
[09:41.020 --> 09:41.880]  It really didn't work.
[09:41.980 --> 09:45.100]  This is what is known as a live demonstration.
[09:46.000 --> 09:48.520]  We didn't polish it all up and make it look nice.
[09:48.680 --> 09:54.280]  We did things to see if it worked, and you saw everything that happened as we saw it.
[09:54.320 --> 09:56.780]  So for some reason, for some reason, it didn't work.
[09:56.960 --> 09:59.740]  I think it's just a button that needs to be pressed, but I'm not sure which button.
[09:59.760 --> 10:00.540]  There's so many buttons.
[10:00.540 --> 10:05.660]  As you can see, hitting the wrong button resulted in chaos before.
[10:07.780 --> 10:08.500]  Maybe if...
[10:08.960 --> 10:10.940]  Do you think maybe that button that wasn't...
[10:10.940 --> 10:11.080]  No.
[10:11.320 --> 10:12.260]  The button that wasn't pressed...
[10:12.260 --> 10:13.500]  The button that takes you off the air?
[10:13.620 --> 10:13.840]  Yeah.
[10:14.000 --> 10:14.960]  I don't want to press that button.
[10:14.980 --> 10:16.340]  Well, maybe Kyle can hear me.
[10:16.520 --> 10:16.800]  Whoa.
[10:16.980 --> 10:17.520]  What's that?
[10:18.040 --> 10:18.940]  Someone's calling us.
[10:19.080 --> 10:20.120]  He's calling us.
[10:22.800 --> 10:23.360]  It's nice.
[10:23.500 --> 10:25.140]  I kind of don't want to answer because I like the sound.
[10:26.260 --> 10:26.620]  Kyle.
[10:26.840 --> 10:27.300]  Hello, Kyle.
[10:27.300 --> 10:29.260]  Well, this is cool, though.
[10:29.400 --> 10:30.640]  If he could hear us, it would be even cooler.
[10:33.620 --> 10:36.280]  Yeah, he obviously can't hear us, but we hear him.
[10:36.860 --> 10:38.580]  I'm going to just press a bunch of buttons.
[10:40.500 --> 10:41.540]  Now, he can't hear us there.
[10:41.700 --> 10:42.200]  He can't...
[10:42.800 --> 10:43.420]  That button.
[10:44.640 --> 10:45.920]  No, he can't hear us no matter what button.
[10:46.900 --> 10:48.240]  All buttons don't work.
[10:48.760 --> 10:49.620]  And he hung up on us.
[10:50.100 --> 10:50.500]  All right.
[10:50.580 --> 10:52.180]  We need to move on with the radio program.
[10:52.560 --> 10:53.400]  I'm sorry, folks.
[10:53.940 --> 10:56.140]  We were told this worked, but it doesn't work.
[10:56.240 --> 10:57.580]  At least not the way we're doing it.
[10:57.660 --> 11:01.100]  And there's something that remains to be seen.
[11:01.220 --> 11:02.340]  But what do you think of the sound quality?
[11:02.420 --> 11:03.220]  Bernie, what do you think of the sound?
[11:03.280 --> 11:04.840]  Well, you're on the phone, so it's going to sound the same to you.
[11:05.640 --> 11:06.560]  He sounded okay.
[11:06.740 --> 11:08.540]  And we've experimented with Skype before.
[11:08.540 --> 11:15.160]  I was using Skype, the Skype out service from Beijing.
[11:15.660 --> 11:18.660]  I guess it was fall before last.
[11:18.920 --> 11:19.220]  Mm-hmm.
[11:19.400 --> 11:21.040]  Two called into the studio.
[11:21.900 --> 11:23.440]  And that worked pretty well.
[11:23.580 --> 11:26.700]  I was using Skype, but then it would reach a point of presence in the U.S.
[11:26.760 --> 11:31.300]  and then it would have been public switch telephone network and then over to the WBA studio.
[11:31.640 --> 11:33.620]  So we know the audio quality can be quite good.
[11:34.320 --> 11:37.820]  Well, what do you guys in the studio think of the sound quality we just heard?
[11:37.820 --> 11:38.820]  It sounded good.
[11:39.180 --> 11:39.400]  Mm-hmm.
[11:39.540 --> 11:48.460]  Now, if we could maintain a conversation like that, having Bernie not on the crappy cell phone, having him actually come up on the board, I think it would be a big improvement.
[11:48.580 --> 11:49.980]  I personally have to agree.
[11:49.980 --> 11:52.820]  I think it sounds better than the quality of...
[11:53.440 --> 11:58.540]  Well, at least what we're hearing with Bernie's cell phone, which, you know, our listeners can compare the two.
[11:58.840 --> 11:59.140]  Mm-hmm.
[11:59.380 --> 12:08.020]  I'm curious whether the latency, the audio latency, is going to be greater with the cell phone connection or with Skype.
[12:08.260 --> 12:09.460]  Well, now, that depends.
[12:09.700 --> 12:11.660]  That really just does depend on the connection.
[12:11.820 --> 12:14.620]  From my experience, anyway, that can be a bit more variable.
[12:14.800 --> 12:19.480]  But in general, I've been able to have decent conversations.
[12:19.480 --> 12:34.700]  Actually, sometimes, when having conversations over cell phone, cell phone to cell phone, with people who don't know this about the technology, they get very confused when people start talking over each other and my listening, and I'll know that, oh, this is the delay,
[12:34.820 --> 12:37.180]  and they don't realize what's going on.
[12:38.280 --> 12:38.640]  Yeah.
[12:38.860 --> 12:40.700]  Well, hopefully that's the future.
[12:41.000 --> 12:47.460]  What we're going to do is we're going to try and get Kyle on the phone so that he can tell us what he experienced and then move on and do the rest of the program that way.
[12:49.280 --> 12:50.960]  He experienced no noise.
[12:52.400 --> 12:53.220]  That's all I have to say.
[12:53.480 --> 12:54.260]  You know, you really should.
[12:54.360 --> 12:55.240]  I was going to dial the phone.
[12:55.260 --> 12:56.060]  You should have more than that.
[12:56.500 --> 12:56.900]  Oh, all right.
[12:57.000 --> 12:59.780]  Well, yeah, he hit buttons, and then we'll find out.
[12:59.840 --> 13:00.480]  What do you think, Mike?
[13:00.800 --> 13:06.700]  Well, it's clear he couldn't hear us, and there was an error message that showed up on the screen that said, you know, your microphone's not plugged in.
[13:06.700 --> 13:16.780]  And so I guess there was nothing to be heard on his end, but we could hear him, and I guess we'll hear him and even have a conversation with him in just a moment.
[13:20.320 --> 13:21.140]  Hello, Kyle?
[13:21.300 --> 13:22.080]  Oh, you guys are really slick.
[13:22.360 --> 13:24.820]  Yeah, Kyle joins us now on the phone.
[13:25.080 --> 13:25.500]  Kyle, are you there?
[13:25.820 --> 13:25.920]  Yeah.
[13:26.620 --> 13:27.020]  Can you hear me?
[13:27.080 --> 13:27.520]  How you doing?
[13:27.820 --> 13:29.420]  So you couldn't hear us at all.
[13:29.500 --> 13:30.220]  Is that what happened?
[13:30.400 --> 13:31.280]  I couldn't, no.
[13:31.480 --> 13:32.380]  I did hear ringing.
[13:32.580 --> 13:33.700]  Like, my audio is working.
[13:33.700 --> 13:37.700]  I did hear ringing when I tried to call this BAI Skype person.
[13:39.740 --> 13:40.980]  So, I have audio.
[13:41.160 --> 13:47.220]  I don't know if it's something on your board or something that needs to be flicked on that we just don't know about yet.
[13:47.220 --> 13:48.300]  It's sort of odd.
[13:48.820 --> 14:01.020]  Well, you know, I think the way we did this in the past is we had a phone connection where you could, or not you, but the third person you could hear us, and then they spoke back on the board, so there wasn't a delay.
[14:01.080 --> 14:02.740]  But that's kind of a ridiculous way of having to do it.
[14:03.140 --> 14:09.600]  It kind of defeats the purpose of the magic of Microsoft IP blasphemy.
[14:09.800 --> 14:10.660]  See, I'm doing that right now.
[14:10.800 --> 14:11.340]  I'm calling you.
[14:11.700 --> 14:13.260]  And if you pick up...
[14:13.800 --> 14:15.020]  I don't have a mute button.
[14:15.020 --> 14:15.860]  And we turn...
[14:15.860 --> 14:19.940]  We're going to turn you down, and then you just pick up, and you can hear us down the phone line.
[14:20.340 --> 14:20.560]  All right.
[14:20.680 --> 14:21.800]  Three rings is polite, right?
[14:21.900 --> 14:22.620]  You have to pick up.
[14:22.780 --> 14:23.360]  Yeah, it's three rings.
[14:23.460 --> 14:23.960]  It's more than polite.
[14:26.300 --> 14:26.620]  Hello?
[14:27.160 --> 14:27.640]  Ah, okay.
[14:27.640 --> 14:28.060]  There you are.
[14:32.740 --> 14:34.660]  And, Bernie, does this answer your question about latency?
[14:35.790 --> 14:38.900]  Well, you should count to five or something so we can hear it.
[14:39.140 --> 14:40.080]  Can you do that, Kyle?
[14:41.560 --> 14:42.260]  Oh, man.
[14:43.160 --> 14:44.160]  Count to five?
[14:44.760 --> 14:45.340]  All right.
[14:45.960 --> 14:46.600]  I'll try.
[14:47.500 --> 14:47.900]  Wait.
[14:47.980 --> 14:50.100]  You mean just have him count to five, or have us...
[14:50.100 --> 14:50.120]  Wait.
[14:50.920 --> 14:51.640]  You can do...
[14:51.640 --> 14:53.100]  Why do I start counting?
[14:53.140 --> 14:54.500]  Everybody, stop talking at once.
[14:55.180 --> 14:56.140]  Bernie, what should we do?
[14:56.920 --> 14:59.720]  How about the old satellite latency test that we used to do?
[14:59.920 --> 15:00.400]  Uh-huh.
[15:00.820 --> 15:04.080]  I'll count down three, two, one, and he says one the same time as me.
[15:04.400 --> 15:04.760]  Yes.
[15:04.940 --> 15:05.360]  Okay, ready?
[15:06.160 --> 15:06.520]  Three.
[15:06.700 --> 15:07.020]  Three.
[15:07.380 --> 15:07.700]  No.
[15:08.120 --> 15:09.080]  It couldn't have been simpler.
[15:09.480 --> 15:10.980]  I count down three, two, one.
[15:11.080 --> 15:13.740]  When I get to one, you say one the same time I say one, okay?
[15:14.360 --> 15:14.680]  All right.
[15:14.680 --> 15:14.840]  Okay.
[15:15.260 --> 15:15.600]  Three.
[15:16.960 --> 15:17.880]  Voltaire, shut up.
[15:19.040 --> 15:21.280]  Three, two, one.
[15:21.400 --> 15:21.680]  One.
[15:22.080 --> 15:23.100]  It wasn't that bad.
[15:23.360 --> 15:23.880]  It wasn't that bad.
[15:23.880 --> 15:24.720]  No, not as bad as satellite.
[15:24.980 --> 15:25.240]  Okay.
[15:25.620 --> 15:26.160]  That's okay.
[15:27.580 --> 15:30.220]  Now, I'm going to turn Kyle down on the phone completely.
[15:30.220 --> 15:33.300]  So, we can just talk to him on Skype.
[15:33.580 --> 15:35.280]  And can you talk back to us now, Kyle?
[15:35.440 --> 15:35.980]  Oh, yeah, sure.
[15:36.180 --> 15:36.560]  See, okay.
[15:36.640 --> 15:38.400]  This is how it could work, I guess.
[15:38.540 --> 15:39.840]  But we'd have to have both connections.
[15:39.960 --> 15:40.820]  It kind of defeats the purpose.
[15:41.320 --> 15:41.620]  Right.
[15:41.620 --> 15:42.420]  This is a bit much.
[15:42.600 --> 15:42.800]  Mm-hmm.
[15:42.840 --> 15:43.820]  I'm not impressed here.
[15:43.940 --> 15:45.920]  And we can't hear Bernie at all because I turned down the phone.
[15:46.060 --> 15:47.180]  But that's just the way it is.
[15:47.260 --> 15:54.400]  Now, this would only work if, you know, something, whatever's on the board, actually is plugged into the computer and the computer could hear the microphone.
[15:54.520 --> 15:57.720]  Well, now, Mike, you said that there was an error saying our microphone was not plugged in.
[15:57.720 --> 16:00.340]  So, okay, that's the first time I became aware of that.
[16:00.420 --> 16:03.260]  So, it knows that we're not feeding into the computer.
[16:03.520 --> 16:07.640]  So, maybe if we figure out what has to be plugged into the computer, we can solve this problem.
[16:07.840 --> 16:10.600]  Yes, but I don't think we can do that and do a radio show at the same time.
[16:10.720 --> 16:12.440]  Well, no, that's probably very doubtful.
[16:12.840 --> 16:16.880]  Kyle, we do have something important to talk about on your end very quickly.
[16:17.120 --> 16:20.600]  And that's, I understand, Club Mate Day in Seattle is this weekend.
[16:20.600 --> 16:25.540]  In fact, you just took delivery of an entire pallet of Club Mate bottles.
[16:25.540 --> 16:26.000]  Is that correct?
[16:26.760 --> 16:40.520]  Well, no, what happened was I was walking around, as I do sometimes, in South Seattle down here, and I saw a guy in a truck, and he looked distressed, and he had a pallet.
[16:40.620 --> 16:45.680]  And I said, well, I'll take it, you know, and he just had me sign, and that's it.
[16:46.060 --> 16:49.420]  You know, things just sort of fall into your lap sometimes out there.
[16:49.420 --> 16:49.420]  Sure.
[16:49.880 --> 16:57.700]  So you got 800 bottles of Club Mate in the Pacific Northwest and a whole bunch of people chasing after you, wanting their cases.
[16:58.720 --> 17:05.920]  So I guess info on that can be found on our website, www.2600.com.
[17:05.920 --> 17:08.540]  Just look for the news story about Club Mate Day in Seattle.
[17:08.940 --> 17:11.380]  And that's going to be taking place all throughout the weekend.
[17:11.460 --> 17:15.620]  And we're going to do something similar here in New York, as we've done in the past, all kinds of fun things.
[17:15.620 --> 17:20.120]  We also have, I think, news in the future about Club Mate in Canada.
[17:20.740 --> 17:25.140]  We'll learn more about that as it happens, but there are all kinds of possibilities taking place.
[17:26.100 --> 17:28.440]  Anything else down on your end out there?
[17:29.440 --> 17:31.380]  Oh, I wanted to mention one thing.
[17:31.460 --> 17:37.660]  We talked about batteries in phones a while ago, and I wanted to mention that I had changed my habits a little bit.
[17:37.660 --> 17:47.250]  I previously used to discharge my phone all the time, and I actually started charging it whenever I felt like it, even to prevent it from going dead.
[17:47.380 --> 17:48.920]  And I've noticed it does something different.
[17:49.120 --> 17:50.290]  It doesn't discharge all the way.
[17:50.540 --> 17:52.200]  No, now it just dies.
[17:53.360 --> 17:54.460]  I'll need it.
[17:54.460 --> 17:56.660]  I'll be waiting for a call, and it'll die.
[17:56.660 --> 17:59.360]  It won't gracefully discharge all the way.
[17:59.440 --> 18:00.270]  So I did want to mention that.
[18:00.290 --> 18:01.510]  That was from a while ago.
[18:01.510 --> 18:10.200]  Now, I know that you were somewhat chastised, admonished on the radio by some of our people here about the way that you discharged your phone.
[18:10.360 --> 18:20.320]  You would go around, and your phone would slowly die, and there'd be maybe one day every 10 days where your phone just didn't work because you were waiting for it to discharge completely.
[18:20.440 --> 18:21.400]  Then you would recharge it.
[18:21.560 --> 18:24.060]  Yeah, it would take a day, and the radio would turn off and all of that.
[18:24.250 --> 18:27.880]  I don't want to get into this back and forth.
[18:27.880 --> 18:34.340]  I'm just reporting that there was a change, and it isn't quite the same experience I had when I was discharging it.
[18:34.540 --> 18:35.480]  I don't want to take sides.
[18:35.600 --> 18:36.380]  I just want to bring it up.
[18:36.440 --> 18:37.720]  Well, I think Dot Red has something to say to you.
[18:37.840 --> 18:38.540]  Yes, I do.
[18:39.630 --> 18:41.560]  One statement and a question to Kyle.
[18:42.200 --> 18:42.900]  First off...
[18:42.900 --> 18:43.900]  You'll have one follow-up, too.
[18:43.980 --> 18:44.300]  Yeah.
[18:45.490 --> 18:51.800]  Well, I did something similar because I obsessively would discharge my batteries even though I knew they were newer.
[18:52.100 --> 18:54.640]  So after our conversation, I decided to do the same thing.
[18:54.640 --> 19:03.840]  I haven't noticed a difference in the performance of my cell phone's battery, and I was curious if he knows what kind of battery he's using.
[19:03.920 --> 19:04.620]  You asked him directly.
[19:04.620 --> 19:05.380]  You're speaking right to him.
[19:05.530 --> 19:05.680]  Ah, yeah.
[19:05.680 --> 19:05.960]  Let's see.
[19:05.960 --> 19:07.860]  We said it on the air once before.
[19:07.860 --> 19:10.200]  I think it's a lithium polymer of some sort.
[19:11.700 --> 19:12.140]  All right.
[19:12.180 --> 19:14.800]  Now, I know that Bernie has something to say here.
[19:15.900 --> 19:17.580]  Well, I really didn't, but...
[19:17.580 --> 19:17.800]  Okay.
[19:17.920 --> 19:18.700]  I just figured you might.
[19:18.700 --> 19:29.180]  I'm not as familiar with lithium polymer batteries as I am with lithium-ion, but with lithium-ion batteries, it's really just the lifetime of the battery that affects its life.
[19:29.380 --> 19:38.660]  It's not, you know, discharging it or not, you know, discharging it frequently does not kill it, but is not necessary.
[19:39.200 --> 19:39.680]  Right.
[19:39.680 --> 19:47.040]  And it's also an old battery, so, I mean, I'm starting this new behavior with an old piece of hardware.
[19:47.180 --> 19:51.720]  I mean, it's three years old or two years old, so it's bound to be at the end of its life anyway.
[19:51.750 --> 19:53.140]  So I wouldn't disagree with that.
[19:54.540 --> 19:55.040]  Go ahead.
[19:55.180 --> 19:55.360]  Dot Red.
[19:55.580 --> 19:55.940]  Right.
[19:56.120 --> 20:03.040]  And just to, you know, then confirm what Bernie's saying, I'm using a lithium-ion battery, and that's what's been happening with that battery.
[20:03.270 --> 20:04.380]  Did you hurt yourself, Kyle?
[20:04.480 --> 20:05.180]  I heard someone fall.
[20:06.210 --> 20:06.790]  You all right?
[20:07.620 --> 20:09.840]  Oh, you know, I touched the computer.
[20:10.030 --> 20:10.510]  Don't do that.
[20:10.600 --> 20:11.530]  Don't touch the computer.
[20:12.600 --> 20:14.180]  Kyle, this is not good.
[20:15.010 --> 20:16.750]  These are not noises that should be made over the radio.
[20:17.920 --> 20:18.220]  Wow.
[20:18.360 --> 20:18.580]  Okay.
[20:18.940 --> 20:21.580]  So anything else that we have to say?
[20:21.680 --> 20:22.660]  Because we really can't...
[20:22.660 --> 20:28.790]  It's hard to talk to Bernie and Kyle at the same time, because if I bring Bernie up, then we hear feedback from Kyle's phone.
[20:29.100 --> 20:29.710]  And it's...
[20:30.260 --> 20:30.790]  Go ahead.
[20:30.960 --> 20:36.540]  How about we just shut off the Skype connection and just use telephone lines since the Skype isn't working properly, right?
[20:36.540 --> 20:37.820]  Yeah, welcome to the 1960s.
[20:37.900 --> 20:38.790]  All right, we could do that, I suppose.
[20:39.580 --> 20:41.160]  I got to say, since I am using both...
[20:41.160 --> 20:41.660]  Wait, wait, wait.
[20:41.680 --> 20:42.420]  I got to turn down your phone.
[20:42.510 --> 20:42.860]  Say that again.
[20:42.940 --> 20:43.030]  What?
[20:43.700 --> 20:49.700]  I got to say, since I am using both right now, I would prefer to use the handset on the landline.
[20:49.900 --> 20:53.080]  But hopefully, we'll get this sorted out in the future.
[20:53.080 --> 20:56.420]  And I'd love to hear you through Skype as well in the future.
[20:56.680 --> 20:57.010]  All right.
[20:57.060 --> 20:58.600]  Well, how about you hang up on us on Skype?
[20:58.700 --> 20:59.960]  That way I don't have to press any more buttons.
[21:01.490 --> 21:01.770]  Gladly.
[21:01.960 --> 21:02.220]  All right.
[21:06.540 --> 21:09.560]  I got to call on the other line, so I'll speak with you guys again.
[21:09.880 --> 21:11.980]  Okay, so you hang up on both of our connections.
[21:12.120 --> 21:12.290]  All right.
[21:12.560 --> 21:12.880]  Great.
[21:13.040 --> 21:13.860]  Well, do that then, too.
[21:14.480 --> 21:14.770]  Okay.
[21:14.880 --> 21:15.790]  Hey, have a good show.
[21:15.980 --> 21:16.300]  Thanks.
[21:16.660 --> 21:18.460]  Take care, and thanks for being part of this experiment.
[21:19.140 --> 21:21.360]  We're always trying to learn new things here at the radio station.
[21:22.300 --> 21:22.770]  All right.
[21:22.940 --> 21:27.840]  So now we move into some other matters that have been taking place.
[21:27.920 --> 21:29.900]  I believe we had some things to talk about.
[21:29.980 --> 21:31.320]  Mike, did you have something that you wanted to mention?
[21:31.620 --> 21:32.700]  Well, I have exciting news.
[21:32.700 --> 21:36.560]  On Monday, the Pentagon Papers are going to be declassified.
[21:36.880 --> 21:41.620]  Now, all right, correct me if I'm wrong, but weren't those already leaked a long, long time ago?
[21:41.680 --> 21:43.120]  Yes, but the U.S.
[21:43.220 --> 21:47.360]  government has decided that 40 years after that, they can now officially declassify them.
[21:47.700 --> 21:48.200]  Oh, good.
[21:48.300 --> 21:48.720]  Okay, so...
[21:48.720 --> 21:54.580]  The New York Times described this as a great case of locking the barn door after the horse artist.
[21:55.140 --> 21:59.600]  After the horse has been bed and buried and decomposed for a number of years.
[22:00.370 --> 22:03.120]  It's unlocking the barn door after the horse has done all those things.
[22:04.430 --> 22:04.860]  Unlocking it?
[22:05.060 --> 22:05.540]  Unlocking, yes.
[22:05.540 --> 22:07.000]  Okay, whatever analogy you want to draw.
[22:07.200 --> 22:11.300]  So there's really nothing... I understand there were something like 11 words that weren't released or something?
[22:11.300 --> 22:16.580]  No, there was going to be, but then they realized that people would just guess what those 11 words were, and it would be very exciting.
[22:16.780 --> 22:21.640]  So they decided to declassify the whole thing, and no one knows which were the 11 words in question.
[22:21.760 --> 22:22.800]  But we already know the 11 words, right?
[22:22.840 --> 22:25.820]  Because it got leaked, right, in the past, or were there parts that weren't leaked?
[22:25.920 --> 22:26.260]  Not...
[22:26.260 --> 22:27.720]  Apparently not the whole thing was leaked.
[22:27.720 --> 22:35.040]  There were some parts that Daniel Ellsberg decided not to release, and I guess some other parts that maybe just didn't get photocopied.
[22:35.420 --> 22:40.040]  Because every time I hear about the Pentagon Papers, I'm just in awe of how much work it was.
[22:40.700 --> 22:51.400]  At 40 years ago, Xerox machine was hard to find, so they had to sneak into the friend of someone who had a Xerox machine after hours, and it's much more complicated than leaking things is today.
[22:51.620 --> 22:52.640]  Yeah, that's definitely true.
[22:52.640 --> 23:07.860]  But the thing that I think is interesting about this is that the government is trying to set up this distinction between good leakers and bad leakers, and they're sort of retroactively putting Daniel Ellsberg in the good leakers category, even though they did no such thing at the time.
[23:08.480 --> 23:17.480]  And to his immense credit, Daniel Ellsberg is having none of it, and every article he's quoted in, he praises WikiLeaks, and it's great.
[23:17.480 --> 23:26.440]  Well, no, I'm definitely glad that he's not taking that at all, because that's silly, because obviously anyone that makes any leaks in the present, the government will not like.
[23:26.880 --> 23:29.300]  Therefore, they're only going to be talking happy about the past.
[23:29.420 --> 23:32.640]  They're not going to say, oh, thank you for leaking something we didn't want to tell anybody.
[23:33.100 --> 23:40.500]  That's not true at all, because most of the leaks that we have now are from government insiders that do leaks basically for spin.
[23:42.400 --> 23:43.420]  If you say so.
[23:44.560 --> 23:46.040]  All right, that's a great comeback.
[23:46.220 --> 23:46.380]  All right.
[23:47.440 --> 23:53.720]  We also have this answer to WikiLeaks from the 17th century.
[23:54.700 --> 24:05.340]  Yes, about 1.2 million pages of British government documents from the Stuart period, including secret reports of espionage and treason sent back from the courts and capitals of Europe have been scanned and made available on the web.
[24:05.760 --> 24:20.700]  Among the most intriguing papers is a letter sent to Queen Elizabeth I's spymaster, Sir Francis Walsingham, containing clandestine intelligence about how the king of Spain labored to get in with the king of Scots and to ruin the Protestant party of France.
[24:20.840 --> 24:22.240]  And a lot of those words are spelled wrong, too.
[24:23.460 --> 24:23.900]  Another...
[24:23.900 --> 24:24.900]  I know, spelled differently.
[24:25.000 --> 24:34.180]  Another letter sent by the Duke of Marlborough in September of 1710 records intelligence from a member of the Council of State in Brussels about a planned French attack on Scotland.
[24:34.180 --> 24:42.280]  It notes, if this proves true, the five regiments of the Isle of Wight should be moved northwards and a squadron be placed off Dunkirk.
[24:43.020 --> 24:50.720]  The manuscripts shine a light on the Stuart era's paranoia about internal rebellion and foreign invasion, just as the trove of classified U.S.
[24:50.880 --> 24:55.660]  diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks have painted a vivid picture of how Washington really sees the world.
[24:55.660 --> 25:00.060]  And I wonder if they're as upset over there about this being released now.
[25:00.220 --> 25:00.880]  Probably not.
[25:01.020 --> 25:01.780]  It's been out for a while.
[25:02.400 --> 25:04.680]  Is the name of this project Chamberpot Leaks?
[25:04.860 --> 25:06.000]  Very funny, very funny.
[25:06.140 --> 25:07.060]  Yes, dot red.
[25:07.580 --> 25:10.320]  I was just going to say, was there a URL given with that?
[25:12.360 --> 25:12.800]  No.
[25:13.960 --> 25:14.340]  No.
[25:14.520 --> 25:15.660]  Oh, actually, yeah, okay, here we go.
[25:16.740 --> 25:25.760]  State Papers Online, www.gale.cenge.co.uk.uk slash State Papers.
[25:26.060 --> 25:30.980]  But it's only available to institutions at this point, but hopefully it'll be available to everybody.
[25:30.980 --> 25:32.100]  This is from what century?
[25:32.540 --> 25:34.520]  This is from the 17th century.
[25:34.720 --> 25:36.540]  So this is 400 years after the fact.
[25:36.640 --> 25:36.840]  Yes.
[25:37.520 --> 25:38.040]  Well, more or less.
[25:38.060 --> 25:38.900]  So that makes the U.S.
[25:38.960 --> 25:39.560]  seem fast.
[25:39.900 --> 25:40.140]  Mm-hmm.
[25:41.160 --> 25:42.100]  Ten times faster.
[25:42.380 --> 25:42.780]  Absolutely.
[25:44.340 --> 25:48.300]  Okay, so any other leaks to talk about?
[25:48.420 --> 26:06.680]  There was the rally for Bradley Manning in Kansas took place this weekend, which a number of people attended, and I heard that went quite well and was a bit more positive than the ones that took place when he was being held in the military prison.
[26:06.880 --> 26:08.120]  Well, it's still a military prison.
[26:08.240 --> 26:09.020]  It's just a different...
[26:09.020 --> 26:13.220]  Yeah, yeah, but there wasn't as much of a hostile police presence from what I heard.
[26:13.560 --> 26:14.120]  Well, that's good.
[26:14.280 --> 26:14.880]  Yeah, so...
[26:14.880 --> 26:20.280]  Just to be clear, there are civilian prisons in Fort Leavenworth, but this is not one of those.
[26:20.460 --> 26:23.240]  This is a military prison that Bradley Manning is in.
[26:23.360 --> 26:23.620]  Mm-hmm.
[26:23.940 --> 26:24.300]  Absolutely.
[26:25.960 --> 26:30.320]  Okay, so there was a whole thing this last week.
[26:30.320 --> 26:32.120]  I don't know if... I'm sure you guys saw it.
[26:32.840 --> 26:37.640]  There is a story that appeared in The Guardian overseas.
[26:38.860 --> 26:40.100]  One in four U.S.
[26:40.200 --> 26:42.360]  hackers is an FBI informer.
[26:42.760 --> 26:43.380]  You all see this?
[26:43.380 --> 26:44.680]  That's a very precise figure.
[26:44.920 --> 26:46.340]  Yeah, it is a very precise figure.
[26:46.460 --> 26:49.220]  And I'd like to read you the story, or at least part of the story here.
[26:49.220 --> 26:59.360]  And then maybe go into a little bit of detail as to how stories are written, how quotes are gotten, and how they're processed, and various things like that.
[27:00.800 --> 27:02.060]  Okay, first, let's do this.
[27:02.080 --> 27:04.660]  Let's go to the archives.
[27:04.720 --> 27:11.700]  Let's go back to last July, when we had the informants panel at the Next Hope Conference here in New York City.
[27:12.160 --> 27:17.060]  And we made a couple of statements at the beginning of that particular panel.
[27:17.060 --> 27:19.380]  Here are those statements as they were made.
[27:21.840 --> 27:22.520]  All right.
[27:22.600 --> 27:27.800]  We have a couple more people that will be showing up on stage, but this is enough to start off with right now.
[27:28.280 --> 27:34.040]  This talk is called Informants, Villains, or Heroes.
[27:34.860 --> 27:44.000]  And we all have stories in our lives as to how informants have played a part one way or another.
[27:45.460 --> 27:47.320]  None of us are informants, are we?
[27:48.100 --> 27:48.740]  Not I.
[27:48.880 --> 27:53.660]  Well, the thing is, in the hacker world, the odds are, what is it, one in four, one in five?
[27:54.340 --> 27:55.760]  It's a ridiculous percentage.
[27:55.760 --> 28:03.540]  But the number of people who become informants or who are working for two different sides at the same time, it's extraordinarily high.
[28:03.700 --> 28:04.720]  This has always been the case.
[28:04.820 --> 28:13.640]  From the very beginning, back in the 1960s and 70s with phone freaks, you could bet that one in a handful of people would be ratting their friends out.
[28:14.040 --> 28:17.640]  And the question that I think we need to ask you today is, why do people do this?
[28:17.780 --> 28:18.640]  Why does this happen?
[28:18.640 --> 28:20.440]  What gets into someone's head?
[28:20.560 --> 28:21.980]  They'll do something like this.
[28:22.360 --> 28:24.660]  And what would you do in a similar situation?
[28:25.280 --> 28:29.700]  And can you judge somebody that you have not been in their shoes?
[28:30.540 --> 28:32.020]  Very quickly, I'll tell my story.
[28:32.160 --> 28:34.260]  And then these two will tell theirs.
[28:35.600 --> 28:36.400]  Back when...
[28:36.400 --> 28:37.740]  Okay, that's enough of that.
[28:37.840 --> 28:38.900]  We're not going to tell any stories here.
[28:39.000 --> 28:41.300]  But that's the statement that was made.
[28:41.460 --> 28:42.180]  So that's you talking.
[28:42.320 --> 28:43.080]  That was me talking, yeah.
[28:43.200 --> 28:44.900]  That was the intro to the informants panel.
[28:45.200 --> 28:46.960]  And Bernie, you were also on that panel.
[28:46.960 --> 28:49.860]  And I think the way it was presented at that time, this is just common knowledge.
[28:49.860 --> 28:51.500]  This is something that's been around for decades.
[28:51.580 --> 28:57.240]  People just know that one in a handful of people tends to rat out on their friends.
[28:57.360 --> 28:58.600]  You've experienced this yourself, correct?
[29:00.120 --> 29:00.860]  I have.
[29:01.080 --> 29:01.720]  You have, okay.
[29:02.060 --> 29:06.840]  And every case I've been involved in has something very similar to that.
[29:09.440 --> 29:13.140]  So it's kind of strange how the story got written.
[29:13.140 --> 29:20.660]  Because I received an email from this reporter, Ed Pilkington, from The Guardian.
[29:21.480 --> 29:22.540]  He wanted to speak to you.
[29:22.540 --> 29:23.860]  I believe he spoke to you as well, correct?
[29:25.200 --> 29:26.620]  I did not speak with this person.
[29:26.720 --> 29:26.960]  Okay.
[29:27.060 --> 29:28.900]  Well, I gave him your contact info.
[29:29.000 --> 29:30.160]  So it's interesting he didn't contact you.
[29:30.820 --> 29:37.400]  And then after giving him that, he basically asked, could you help me with the contact info for Bernie?
[29:37.460 --> 29:37.940]  I did that.
[29:37.940 --> 29:42.640]  But if you have any more thoughts about your one in four estimate, I'd love to hear them.
[29:42.800 --> 29:45.000]  And what I said was, this is everything I said to him.
[29:45.320 --> 29:49.520]  As for the one in four estimate, the number varies depending on who you talk to.
[29:49.620 --> 29:56.860]  But it's generally thought to be rather high, owing to the harsh penalties involved and the relative inexperience with the law that many hackers have, i.e.
[29:57.000 --> 29:59.120]  they're rather susceptible to intimidation.
[29:59.220 --> 30:02.060]  Anything that people would disagree with on that?
[30:02.360 --> 30:02.640]  No?
[30:02.960 --> 30:03.280]  No.
[30:03.280 --> 30:03.680]  Okay.
[30:04.680 --> 30:06.020]  So here's the story.
[30:06.820 --> 30:07.880]  One in four U.S.
[30:07.960 --> 30:09.220]  hackers is an FBI informer.
[30:09.320 --> 30:10.120]  The FBI and U.S.
[30:10.180 --> 30:14.820]  Secret Service have used the threat of prison to create an army of informers among online criminals.
[30:15.320 --> 30:20.500]  Now, how does me saying this, because they quoted me, I was the fundamental, the basic quote here.
[30:21.680 --> 30:30.320]  How does simply saying that, yeah, it's a high number of people tend to do this, they're intimidated easily, turn into an army of informers?
[30:30.800 --> 30:33.020]  The perception is just really incredible.
[30:33.620 --> 30:39.220]  The story begins, The underground world of computer hackers has been so thoroughly infiltrated in the U.S.
[30:39.240 --> 30:46.800]  by the FBI and Secret Service that it is now riddled with paranoia and mistrust, with an estimated one in four hackers secretly informing on their peers.
[30:47.440 --> 30:50.480]  A Guardian investigation has established.
[30:52.050 --> 31:04.980]  And, yeah, and basically, they give the quote, basically, they quote me as saying that 25% of hackers in the U.S.
[31:05.120 --> 31:07.620]  may have been recruited by the federal authorities to be their eyes and ears.
[31:07.800 --> 31:13.520]  The actual quote, owing to the harsh penalties involved and the relative inexperience with the law that many hackers have, they are as susceptible to intimidation.
[31:14.480 --> 31:27.140]  You know, in fact, that is the gist of what we were saying, that this is what you can expect when things hit the fan, that one in four, one in five people will talk to the authorities.
[31:27.140 --> 31:32.600]  It doesn't mean that we have an active ratting network existing before that happens.
[31:33.460 --> 31:34.820]  Is that confusing?
[31:35.520 --> 31:36.660]  Bernie, do you understand that?
[31:37.100 --> 31:38.560]  I think it's confusing.
[31:38.820 --> 31:40.700]  It doesn't seem to make sense.
[31:40.820 --> 31:54.280]  It seems like this article was very poorly researched from the standpoint of, you know, for them to say that they established, for the Guardian to say that they established that this was a fact is a real stretch.
[31:55.000 --> 32:00.120]  You know, being susceptible and actually working for the FBI are two different things.
[32:00.260 --> 32:04.120]  And I think that's what they failed to actually realize here, Mike.
[32:04.280 --> 32:07.800]  I'm also curious how sending one email counts as a Guardian investigation.
[32:08.180 --> 32:12.820]  Like, the Guardian's done a lot of good work over the years, but generally it takes more effort than that.
[32:12.860 --> 32:15.400]  Well, they talked to John Young, runs Cryptome as well.
[32:15.980 --> 32:20.200]  And basically, he kind of backed it up by saying it makes for very tense relationships.
[32:20.200 --> 32:24.580]  There are dozens and dozens of hackers who have been shopped by people they thought they trusted.
[32:25.000 --> 32:26.940]  This is just reality, a situation.
[32:27.020 --> 32:29.860]  It goes back to the 1960s when the early phone freaks began.
[32:30.080 --> 32:35.980]  It was basically thought that one in a handful of people worked for the phone company or gave them information.
[32:36.340 --> 32:43.000]  Thing is, when investigations start, when people feel they're under pressure, you never know how they're going to react.
[32:43.680 --> 32:48.680]  We learned that with the Adrian Lamo case when he turned in Bradley Manning.
[32:49.360 --> 32:54.100]  People might not have been able to predict that, and maybe we don't know who else might have done the same thing.
[32:54.620 --> 32:57.560]  People act strangely when pressure comes down.
[32:57.980 --> 32:58.140]  Voltaire.
[32:58.140 --> 32:58.460]  Emmanuel.
[32:59.420 --> 33:00.320]  Voltaire, then Bernie.
[33:00.460 --> 33:04.780]  The takeaway I mentioned here is that it's not a constant feeling of paranoia in the higher community.
[33:04.780 --> 33:07.280]  It's just when this stuff hit the fan.
[33:07.460 --> 33:07.560]  Right.
[33:07.620 --> 33:08.240]  It's not constant.
[33:08.400 --> 33:08.800]  It's not...
[33:09.500 --> 33:10.720]  It's sort of a reality.
[33:10.720 --> 33:12.300]  We have to just live with this fact.
[33:13.240 --> 33:18.880]  We don't want to give too much information to anybody because we don't know they're going to work for some major corporation.
[33:18.940 --> 33:20.120]  They're going to work for the government.
[33:20.600 --> 33:25.360]  They're going to feel susceptible to themselves and start volunteering information because they're afraid.
[33:25.500 --> 33:26.800]  You don't know what's going to happen.
[33:26.900 --> 33:29.060]  And this is true of just about any community.
[33:29.160 --> 33:29.320]  Bernie.
[33:29.840 --> 33:33.720]  I will give credit to the Guardian reporter, Ed Pilkington, to reaching out to me.
[33:33.860 --> 33:36.000]  I guess you gave him my contact info, which was fine.
[33:36.300 --> 33:40.460]  What he asked me was for a copy of a letter that I received while I was in prison.
[33:40.890 --> 33:44.040]  From the informant who contacted the U.S.
[33:44.100 --> 33:46.880]  Secret Service after he'd read in the newspaper that I'd been arrested.
[33:48.450 --> 33:50.140]  And I have that letter somewhere.
[33:50.140 --> 33:51.300]  It's in one of many boxes.
[33:51.300 --> 33:54.900]  And I spent some time looking for it, but then I got distracted by other things in my life.
[33:55.180 --> 33:57.740]  So, you know, I never got back to the guy because I couldn't find the letter.
[33:57.840 --> 34:01.340]  But, you know, he did make an attempt to reach out to me.
[34:01.680 --> 34:04.400]  But, you know, that's as far as that went.
[34:04.400 --> 34:12.360]  If you go to www.hope.net, you'll find an audio archive of all of the talks that took place last summer.
[34:12.700 --> 34:17.000]  If you go to the informants panel, you can hear the entire 90-minute talk.
[34:17.360 --> 34:18.320]  You'll hear my story.
[34:18.460 --> 34:19.540]  You'll hear Bernie's.
[34:19.640 --> 34:22.280]  You'll hear Fiberoptic, Kevin Mitnick, and Adrian Lama.
[34:22.900 --> 34:31.180]  But mostly, you'll hear stories about how people wind up turning on their friends and volunteering information.
[34:31.180 --> 34:32.300]  And it's a reality.
[34:32.440 --> 34:38.160]  And we try to explore how that happened, why that happened, what kinds of things you need to be on the lookout for.
[34:38.620 --> 34:40.020]  And that's really what it was all about.
[34:40.100 --> 34:42.400]  I find it interesting, though, that we said all this last July.
[34:42.400 --> 34:47.660]  It only becomes news now when a British newspaper prints it in June the next year.
[34:48.160 --> 34:51.060]  But, yeah, it's a topic that should be discussed.
[34:51.200 --> 34:54.540]  It has been discussed for many, many years and will continue to be.
[34:56.200 --> 34:57.400]  First thought red, then Bernie.
[34:57.800 --> 35:00.560]  There are two things about this story that really annoy me.
[35:00.680 --> 35:02.240]  One being the thing we've already touched on.
[35:02.340 --> 35:12.140]  They took some information and then they decide to, you know, just basically twist it to whatever the story this guy wanted to write.
[35:12.140 --> 35:21.760]  The other thing is that figure, even if in that particular context is true, is misleading because the whole of the hacker community is not in the underground.
[35:21.980 --> 35:25.820]  Lots of stuff happens in, I guess, the above ground, in the light.
[35:26.100 --> 35:34.100]  You know, there are many projects that come about or get discussed during 2600 meetings where you're not going to find rats because it's out in the open and there's nothing to be arrested for.
[35:34.100 --> 35:43.640]  And the other thing that touches upon is that the hacker community is unique because the mainstream accepts anyone who says they're a hacker as a hacker.
[35:43.900 --> 35:49.440]  You know, somebody who commits all kinds of horrible crimes online calls themselves a hacker.
[35:49.560 --> 35:51.000]  The media is going to refer to them as a hacker.
[35:51.980 --> 35:59.460]  And, you know, it's really hard to explain, well, this person is a hacker because of this, this person is because of that.
[36:00.680 --> 36:10.280]  So it's really hard to define when we say one in a handful is going to do this because you have to, first of all, define what a hacker is.
[36:12.000 --> 36:15.600]  And with the mass media especially, that becomes almost impossible.
[36:15.640 --> 36:15.860]  Bernie?
[36:16.440 --> 36:29.900]  Oh, I know we had an internal discussion about this before the show about, you know, whether it would even be conceivable that one, you know, one-fourth of any community was informants.
[36:30.040 --> 36:41.780]  I think, Dr. Gret, you had expressed some skepticism about that, that it would be such a broad societal infiltration that Orwell's scary vision of the world would be, so far along, would be obscene.
[36:41.780 --> 36:54.920]  But I think that that figure, about 25%, is not far off from that that the Stasi, the East German secret police, the German Democratic Republic, had achieved in their society over many years.
[36:55.040 --> 37:08.020]  And some of the techniques they used to get husbands to flip on wives, wives to flip on husbands, parents to inform on children and vice versa, and just really obscene stuff.
[37:08.020 --> 37:15.820]  There's historical precedent for governments achieving that level of snitchiness in their societies.
[37:16.060 --> 37:21.000]  And you just do something that's considered objectionable in society.
[37:21.180 --> 37:27.380]  Speak a little too critically of the government, or start visiting some webpages that might be seen as militant.
[37:27.440 --> 37:28.540]  Try that in your local library.
[37:28.700 --> 37:29.960]  Try both of those things in the local library.
[37:30.020 --> 37:34.400]  See how many people come forward and start reporting you for your activities.
[37:34.400 --> 37:39.780]  You'll find that it's a higher number than you think, and it makes you wonder why people are so afraid.
[37:39.780 --> 37:40.900]  But it happens all the time.
[37:41.340 --> 37:49.600]  Yeah, I mean, just the last thing I just want to say on this topic, then, would just be that, well, if you're talking about the underground, any underground, the number's probably extremely high.
[37:49.760 --> 37:52.780]  You know, you hear it, and it'll happen all the time.
[37:52.780 --> 38:03.980]  But in terms of just, say, general life, that's where I was having an issue with the number, because it does seem kind of strange.
[38:03.980 --> 38:11.940]  You know, if we're talking about what Bernie was talking about, well, this was an entire society that was conditioned for it.
[38:11.940 --> 38:17.420]  You know, there's, I mean, I think maybe our society might be starting to go towards it, like the examples Emmanuel is giving.
[38:17.800 --> 38:23.840]  But I don't think we're quite there yet in the mainstream public.
[38:24.060 --> 38:25.700]  I mean, I kind of hope we aren't.
[38:25.800 --> 38:27.180]  That would be very sad if we were.
[38:27.800 --> 38:30.520]  Well, in any event, this is how stories develop.
[38:30.700 --> 38:34.700]  This is how things get kind of misrepresented.
[38:34.700 --> 38:36.100]  I mean, the gist of it is right.
[38:36.240 --> 38:36.900]  The gist of it is right.
[38:36.900 --> 38:41.480]  But just the whole army of informants thing, that really kind of bugged me a lot.
[38:42.360 --> 38:48.100]  Okay, the other big story, of course, we talked about last week, and that's the continuation of Wienergate.
[38:48.380 --> 38:51.260]  And oh, my God, turns out he was lying.
[38:51.420 --> 38:53.720]  Turns out his account, his Twitter account was not hacked.
[38:53.800 --> 38:56.180]  And he actually did send a picture of his crotch to some woman in Seattle.
[38:56.860 --> 38:58.040]  Wow, what a story.
[38:58.220 --> 39:06.940]  What a complete waste of time that we're all fixated on and that the news headlines have completely focused on and ignored everything else.
[39:07.120 --> 39:13.260]  The thing that bugs me more than anything else is that the answer, when something goes wrong, is to always blame hackers.
[39:13.500 --> 39:15.120]  And I call.
[39:15.300 --> 39:21.440]  I know Representative Wiener is very busy right now and having to do a lot of repair work.
[39:21.700 --> 39:22.540]  But come on.
[39:22.620 --> 39:27.800]  I think you owe the hacker community a bit of an apology for saying that some hacker got into your account and was responsible for all this.
[39:28.320 --> 39:29.360]  He apologized to everybody.
[39:29.660 --> 39:33.320]  He apologized to all kinds of people, but he did not apologize to the hacker community.
[39:33.320 --> 39:40.820]  Yeah, so I think we should call on that because hackers are good people and we don't do things like that, not normally.
[39:41.000 --> 39:43.400]  Someone on the Twitters said that, you know, blaming hackers...
[39:43.400 --> 39:44.540]  Someone on the Twitters...
[39:44.540 --> 39:44.720]  Yes.
[39:44.820 --> 39:45.740]  Don't talk like that, Mike.
[39:45.900 --> 39:46.760]  I'll talk however I want.
[39:46.820 --> 39:50.120]  Well, then you can talk into a dead microphone if you're going to talk with these memes.
[39:50.400 --> 39:50.800]  Such threats.
[39:50.980 --> 39:51.320]  Someone on the Twitters.
[39:51.320 --> 39:56.360]  Anyway, someone said that blaming hackers is the new way to blame witches.
[39:57.220 --> 39:57.540]  Uh-huh.
[39:57.980 --> 39:58.500]  Well, okay.
[39:58.720 --> 40:01.880]  That's an intelligent remark, I think.
[40:02.080 --> 40:02.660]  Yes, go ahead, Bernie.
[40:03.340 --> 40:04.660]  Oh, I wasn't going to say anything.
[40:04.780 --> 40:05.540]  Okay, that's all right.
[40:05.920 --> 40:17.700]  Well, you know what we need is we need the FCC coming onto things like the Twitter and all these public forms of communication and saying to people, they can't say all these dirty words and have these dirty pictures.
[40:17.840 --> 40:19.960]  Then when they come out, no one will be insulted.
[40:20.460 --> 40:20.780]  Right.
[40:21.300 --> 40:25.860]  Okay, well, so that's that story and it's an incredible waste of time.
[40:25.860 --> 40:31.500]  Um, there's the other story that has been, uh, making its way throughout the, uh, uh, the networks.
[40:31.600 --> 40:34.720]  And that, of course, is the, um, the continued hacking of Sony.
[40:34.720 --> 40:36.340]  And we've all heard this.
[40:36.480 --> 40:37.060]  We've all heard this.
[40:37.140 --> 40:45.160]  A million, uh, uh, usernames or customer ID, uh, uh, private information, uh, was compromised, accessed.
[40:45.460 --> 41:02.500]  And, uh, it just seems one after another, uh, uh, these guys known as, as Losec are going around and, uh, exposing different, uh, different corporations, different entities for doing stupid things and, and having all kinds of private information out there that,
[41:02.500 --> 41:04.180]  uh, that, that people can access.
[41:04.380 --> 41:08.420]  The amazing thing is that Sony has any information left that hasn't already been compromised.
[41:08.640 --> 41:09.260]  I know.
[41:09.780 --> 41:11.360]  A million, a million customers.
[41:11.620 --> 41:13.400]  I mean, that's, uh, that's a good chunk right there.
[41:13.520 --> 41:17.360]  Who's, uh, who's left, uh, that's associated with Sony that has not yet been compromised.
[41:17.380 --> 41:24.480]  There was this really, uh, weird news item, uh, saying that someone from Losec had been arrested and then Losec said, no, we just came on IRC.
[41:24.620 --> 41:25.380]  We're all still here.
[41:25.600 --> 41:26.920]  So, yeah, it's interesting.
[41:27.160 --> 41:27.340]  Weird.
[41:27.340 --> 41:30.880]  We've actually been, uh, in contact with, uh, with, uh, uh, some of them.
[41:31.000 --> 41:49.420]  And, um, you know, I think this is sort of the, um, the traditional way of, um, of, of getting information, of hacking, of, of, uh, revealing security, um, uh, flaws, showing the world and, and basically kind of thumbing your nose at, at the people that,
[41:49.560 --> 41:51.420]  uh, that are supposedly in charge of security.
[41:52.080 --> 41:57.320]  And, um, they just keep being made fools of time after time because they can't win.
[41:57.320 --> 41:58.560]  They can't win the way they do things.
[41:58.720 --> 41:59.760]  And this is necessary.
[41:59.880 --> 42:00.840]  This is what has to happen.
[42:01.000 --> 42:08.480]  People need to be out there constantly trying to expose these companies for what they do or what they claim when it, especially when it's a lie.
[42:08.780 --> 42:10.740]  Sony is guilty of that in so many ways.
[42:10.740 --> 42:17.360]  We can just go on for hours with all the, the bad things Sony has been up to, uh, not even touching upon computer security.
[42:17.780 --> 42:30.240]  Um, I'm just, I'm worried that, uh, the full wrath of all kinds of corporate and governmental, um, anger is going to fall on, on, on these people, um, who I really think, uh, have their hearts in the right place.
[42:30.520 --> 42:42.900]  They might, they might seem a little, uh, I don't know, um, uh, full of themselves perhaps, or, uh, kind of, um, uh, I don't know, uh, maybe, uh, uh, overly mischievous, but, uh, uh, that's, that's necessary.
[42:43.000 --> 42:45.160]  That's necessary, uh, for growth, I, I believe.
[42:45.320 --> 42:48.980]  And, uh, I just hope they, they stay safe and, uh, continue to reveal things.
[42:49.100 --> 42:56.540]  This is so much better, in my opinion, this is so much better than just shutting down sites with denial of service attacks, which, uh, people have, have mistaken for hacking.
[42:56.740 --> 42:58.020]  This is what hacking is all about.
[42:58.840 --> 42:59.280]  Go ahead.
[42:59.620 --> 43:11.880]  Um, no, I, I just think, uh, when I look at what, what's going, what goes on with this little sec thing is this reminds me of, uh, stuff I used to see earlier in the nineties, where that kind of disappeared a lot, you know, a lot of people got, you know,
[43:12.160 --> 43:16.960]  uh, lawsuits or just other forms of, um, legal intimidation thrown at them.
[43:17.160 --> 43:22.980]  And, and this sort of thing has stopped, but, you know, uh, it's interesting to actually start seeing it pop up again, obviously.
[43:23.260 --> 43:25.540]  Yeah, it was, uh, it was kind of, uh, kind of funny.
[43:25.660 --> 43:27.680]  In fact, uh, we, we tweeted about this.
[43:27.820 --> 43:30.240]  Yes, 2600 does have a Twitter account, 2600.
[43:30.900 --> 43:36.940]  And, uh, we, we, we basically pointed out that, uh, wow, it's, uh, it's just like the 1990s.
[43:37.100 --> 43:39.560]  It really is because you have corporations being embarrassed.
[43:39.900 --> 43:47.360]  Uh, you have hacker groups, uh, uh, basically just, uh, proclaiming all these things and getting all this attention and, uh, hacked websites.
[43:48.220 --> 43:50.240]  And it's, um, it's kind of fun.
[43:50.380 --> 43:51.600]  It's kind of fun watching this.
[43:51.900 --> 43:59.540]  The important thing is that, uh, damage not be done, that people learn something in the process and, um, and that authority be challenged.
[43:59.740 --> 44:01.880]  I think that's, uh, those are, those are basic tenets.
[44:02.000 --> 44:02.560]  Do you agree, Bernie?
[44:03.100 --> 44:03.840]  I do.
[44:04.080 --> 44:21.920]  And there's a certain, uh, there's a certain satisfaction that some of us get from, well, I'll speak for myself, uh, since, you know, those of us who remember that far back in, way back in 2005, when Sony had, uh, uh, put some copy protection, uh, software on their audio CDs,
[44:22.120 --> 44:30.620]  their Sony BMG music division that, uh, basically installed a, uh, a root kit into people's, uh, PCs.
[44:31.100 --> 44:41.720]  And then, then their fix for that, uh, the people worse to install made it even worse and just really, really damaged people's, uh, um, the information on people's, uh, hard drives.
[44:42.080 --> 44:46.360]  Yeah, there's, there's a certain justice in, in Sony really looking like fools now.
[44:46.600 --> 44:49.940]  So, um, I, I just find that amusing.
[44:50.280 --> 44:52.160]  And it's not just, just Sony.
[44:52.480 --> 44:54.120]  It's, uh, investigative bodies.
[44:54.420 --> 45:01.760]  It's, uh, um, multinational corporations of all sorts because they, they tend to not really take certain things seriously.
[45:01.760 --> 45:03.520]  They don't take privacy seriously.
[45:03.840 --> 45:06.560]  Uh, they don't take their, their customers seriously.
[45:06.920 --> 45:10.240]  They, they are in it for the, for the profit and for the status quo.
[45:10.740 --> 45:15.700]  So it's always refreshing to see individuals challenge that and, and, and succeed.
[45:15.940 --> 45:18.220]  Well, they don't take their customers' privacy seriously.
[45:18.220 --> 45:20.660]  They take their own corporate privacy very, very seriously.
[45:21.180 --> 45:21.180]  Yeah.
[45:21.200 --> 45:21.320]  Yeah.
[45:21.440 --> 45:27.600]  Unfortunately, they, they protect that about as well as anything We have open phone lines, 212-209-2900.
[45:27.600 --> 45:37.000]  If you want to talk about anything that you've heard tonight or want to contribute any information, feel free to give us a call, 212-209-2900.
[45:38.320 --> 45:42.920]  And we'll be taking your calls for the remainder of the hour.
[45:42.920 --> 45:45.620]  Here's another interesting story.
[45:45.720 --> 45:52.240]  Nearly 180 passwords belonging to members of an Atlanta-based FBI affiliate have been stolen and leaked to the Internet.
[45:52.800 --> 45:55.700]  Stolen really isn't the right word because I imagine they still exist.
[45:55.860 --> 45:56.720]  They just have been copied.
[45:57.340 --> 46:04.600]  The logins belong to members of the local chapter of InfraGard, a public-private partnership devoted to sharing information about threats to U.S.
[46:04.680 --> 46:06.200]  physical and Internet infrastructure.
[46:06.640 --> 46:11.340]  Seems like they're just sharing information amongst a lot more people by copying that.
[46:11.340 --> 46:17.100]  Someone did compromise the website, according to InfraGard Atlanta Members Alliance President Paul Farley.
[46:17.860 --> 46:22.580]  We do not at this time know how the attack occurred or the method used to reveal the passwords.
[46:23.240 --> 46:26.200]  Copies of the passwords, which appear to include users from the U.S.
[46:26.320 --> 46:41.660]  Army, cybersecurity organizations, and major communications companies, were posted to the Internet by online hacking collective LULZ Security, L-U-L-Z Security, which has claimed credit for a string of attacks in the past week.
[46:41.940 --> 46:53.800]  In a statement, LULZ Security also claimed to have used one of the passwords to steal nearly 1,000 work and personal emails from the chief executive of Wilmington, Delaware-based Unvalence, LLC.
[46:54.420 --> 46:54.900]  Unvalence?
[46:54.980 --> 46:56.140]  Is that the opposite of surveillance?
[46:57.100 --> 46:57.580]  Unvalence?
[46:57.660 --> 46:58.300]  What an awful name.
[46:58.700 --> 46:59.460]  LULZ Security.
[46:59.620 --> 47:03.840]  It's really kind of funny to hear LULZ Security referred to over and over when they don't know who they are.
[47:03.840 --> 47:05.920]  They don't know if it's one person or 1,000 people.
[47:06.120 --> 47:08.180]  It's really kind of amusing.
[47:09.220 --> 47:16.680]  LULZ Security claimed it was acting in response to a recent report that the Pentagon was considering whether to classify some cyber attacks as acts of war.
[47:16.920 --> 47:17.860]  Very important.
[47:18.080 --> 47:19.280]  We talked about this last week.
[47:20.160 --> 47:26.560]  You invade a particular computer system and missiles could be sent to your country or home or whatnot.
[47:27.040 --> 47:28.900]  Actual real military response.
[47:29.140 --> 47:32.560]  It's a crazy way of thinking and it's something that does need to be challenged.
[47:32.560 --> 47:39.220]  The FBI said on Sunday it was aware of the incident and that steps were being taken to mitigate the damage.
[47:41.800 --> 47:45.120]  The collective appears to have had a busy week.
[47:45.380 --> 47:46.400]  LULZ Security, that is.
[47:46.720 --> 47:50.660]  Earlier Sunday, Nintendo said it had been targeted in a recent online data attack.
[47:51.660 --> 47:54.500]  Nintendo said no personal or company information was lost.
[47:54.500 --> 48:05.780]  And then last Thursday, LULZ Security boasted of a major breach which saw up to a million Sony users' details posted onto the internet or at least accessed.
[48:06.080 --> 48:15.240]  The group also claimed credit for defacing the PBS website after the public television broadcaster aired a documentary seen as critical of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange.
[48:15.360 --> 48:17.260]  I still think it was a decent documentary, but that's my opinion.
[48:17.260 --> 48:19.220]  All right, let's take some phone calls.
[48:19.320 --> 48:21.520]  212-209-29...
[48:21.520 --> 48:21.920]  What happened?
[48:22.380 --> 48:23.620]  We had a whole bunch of lines.
[48:23.960 --> 48:24.820]  Now they're all gone.
[48:25.120 --> 48:26.980]  This is not the week for us in telephones.
[48:27.020 --> 48:28.000]  We've been hacked.
[48:28.120 --> 48:30.560]  You see, we have to blame everything that goes wrong on hackers.
[48:30.720 --> 48:32.020]  That's the way to do things.
[48:32.220 --> 48:33.180]  All right, which one of you guys did it?
[48:33.320 --> 48:34.420]  Let's take this call over here.
[48:34.500 --> 48:34.780]  Good evening.
[48:34.780 --> 48:35.860]  You're on Off the Hook.
[48:37.180 --> 48:37.820]  Speak up.
[48:38.660 --> 48:39.200]  Oh, hi.
[48:39.300 --> 48:40.020]  Okay, there we go.
[48:40.100 --> 48:41.320]  Cell phone broke up a bit.
[48:41.340 --> 48:45.480]  I've got a comment on your Skype problem that you had earlier in the program.
[48:47.260 --> 48:50.800]  While using a cell phone, I love the irony there.
[48:50.900 --> 48:51.180]  Go ahead.
[48:51.440 --> 48:55.780]  Yeah, can we salute crashing codecs and things like that?
[48:55.860 --> 49:07.120]  But anyway, the reason I mentioned this is, number one, you've got to make sure that sometimes Skype will hijack your audio settings in your Windows mixer.
[49:07.120 --> 49:09.520]  I assume you've got it running out of Windows box there.
[49:09.640 --> 49:12.600]  And it will flip from line to mic input.
[49:12.600 --> 49:33.520]  And I assume, since I've worked with various broadcast consoles and interfacing Skype with it and things like that, you've got to probably switch it to line your input in the Windows mixer and make sure you send one of your mix minus outputs on your board so that you don't get feedback coming back through.
[49:33.740 --> 49:40.160]  And plus, you've got to also naturally bring Skype up on one of the pots on your board, which you obviously have done.
[49:40.160 --> 49:45.340]  But sometimes Skype will wreak havoc with your Windows mixer settings.
[49:45.340 --> 49:49.040]  And I think it's just a matter of implementing a line in.
[49:49.180 --> 49:58.240]  And, you know, you've got to keep impedances in mind and things like that when you're wiring sound cards into broadcast consoles and things like that.
[49:58.260 --> 50:05.460]  Unless you've got a professional-grade sound card with balanced inputs with XLR connectors and so on.
[50:05.500 --> 50:07.240]  But I don't want to put the audience to sleep.
[50:07.240 --> 50:14.000]  So I think, you know, Bernie particularly, who's sort of an RF guy, probably has a hand on what I've said.
[50:14.840 --> 50:15.700]  Well, we both do.
[50:15.780 --> 50:16.340]  We get it.
[50:16.440 --> 50:17.120]  Thanks for that info.
[50:17.280 --> 50:20.420]  We will pass it on to the WBAI engineer.
[50:20.720 --> 50:22.980]  Yeah, we assume that that had been done.
[50:22.980 --> 50:28.140]  So we're going to make sure that that's covered, if that's possibly what could be causing the problem.
[50:28.300 --> 50:28.840]  But thanks.
[50:28.920 --> 50:32.480]  By the way, when you guys at Dayton this year seem to have missed you.
[50:32.580 --> 50:34.540]  Yeah, I don't think any of us made it to Dayton this year, did we?
[50:35.080 --> 50:37.940]  We all just had conflicted schedules, so we couldn't make it.
[50:38.020 --> 50:39.040]  But we hope to make it next year.
[50:39.600 --> 50:39.800]  Okay.
[50:40.040 --> 50:40.800]  Ah, there you go.
[50:40.880 --> 50:47.060]  Just had the pleasure of shaking your hands last year and having a little Club Mate and shooting the breeze, etc.
[50:47.300 --> 50:48.060]  So that was fun.
[50:48.500 --> 50:50.020]  Okay, well, thanks for the info.
[50:50.680 --> 50:51.460]  Okay, take care.
[50:51.780 --> 50:53.900]  212-209-2900.
[50:54.280 --> 50:56.360]  Why are none of our phones lighting up?
[50:56.460 --> 50:58.840]  I mean, we've been talking about nothing but controversial things tonight.
[50:58.960 --> 50:59.780]  Does no one like us?
[51:00.000 --> 51:00.640]  I don't know.
[51:00.760 --> 51:03.500]  Maybe you are afraid to contact us now.
[51:03.500 --> 51:04.320]  From France.
[51:05.000 --> 51:06.340]  Which news story might that be?
[51:06.580 --> 51:12.520]  So apparently it is now not allowed for French news broadcasters to say, follow us on Twitter or find us on Facebook.
[51:12.760 --> 51:13.700]  You know, I heard this.
[51:13.800 --> 51:14.980]  In fact, I have the story right here.
[51:15.900 --> 51:20.640]  Yeah, French media, which is government-run, in all fairness.
[51:20.900 --> 51:21.700]  Not all of it.
[51:21.780 --> 51:24.660]  Well, I think commercial media can do whatever they want.
[51:24.660 --> 51:35.460]  But if you get a license from the government, if you get a broadcast license for free, that's how I heard it explained, then they expect you to follow certain rules, unlike in the United States where it's pretty much a free-for-all.
[51:35.860 --> 51:42.360]  And they feel that by saying contact us on Twitter or Facebook or whatever, that you're giving advertisements to these companies.
[51:42.380 --> 51:43.240]  And I can see that.
[51:43.260 --> 51:51.700]  I can sort of see how that could be seen if you use these as verbs rather than as corporate promotions.
[51:52.240 --> 51:55.340]  I mean, that's the logic behind it that I can see.
[51:55.520 --> 51:56.240]  I agree.
[51:56.360 --> 52:06.040]  But also, so they end up having to say convoluted things like, on our website, you can find links to follow us on social media, which is not as informative as, hey, we're on Twitter.
[52:06.640 --> 52:07.320]  Well, yeah.
[52:07.380 --> 52:10.320]  But if you're going to the website, it will become obvious pretty quickly.
[52:10.760 --> 52:16.340]  I actually like the policy because, A, it's not promoting, as you said, it's not promoting these proprietary companies.
[52:16.340 --> 52:26.200]  It just takes up less time to say, follow us on our various social media, on the usual social media places, or contact us by email.
[52:26.200 --> 52:29.260]  It's easier to say, like, oh, we're so hip, we're on Twitter and we're on Facebook.
[52:29.280 --> 52:30.880]  It just gets annoying after a while.
[52:30.940 --> 52:31.220]  It does.
[52:31.260 --> 52:32.180]  I'm kind of sick of it myself.
[52:32.540 --> 52:32.860]  Good evening.
[52:32.960 --> 52:33.440]  You're on Off the Hook.
[52:35.300 --> 52:35.880]  Go ahead.
[52:36.260 --> 52:36.900]  Speak up.
[52:38.180 --> 52:39.320]  Another hacked call.
[52:39.920 --> 52:40.200]  Go ahead.
[52:40.580 --> 52:46.780]  Yeah, I believe that it definitely is preferential, you know, the way it's used, turning these words into verbs and whatnot.
[52:46.860 --> 52:57.340]  But I think it's just going to continue because even if they don't use the words, are they actually going to be members of any other social networking sites, any other microblogging sites, or only Facebook and Twitter, that people go onto their website?
[52:57.360 --> 52:59.320]  Are there other social networking sites?
[52:59.580 --> 53:00.220]  Apparently not.
[53:00.420 --> 53:02.000]  Well, we never hear about them.
[53:02.140 --> 53:02.720]  We really don't.
[53:02.800 --> 53:02.980]  Go ahead.
[53:03.060 --> 53:08.460]  If there are, they won't be allowed to ask their viewers to follow them on those services either.
[53:08.620 --> 53:11.300]  I don't think this rule is specific to Facebook and Twitter.
[53:11.400 --> 53:12.840]  It's just you never hear the other ones.
[53:12.840 --> 53:14.340]  So it's kind of like a monopoly.
[53:14.580 --> 53:20.640]  Well, maybe if the other ones are non-commercial, then the government wouldn't feel so bad about them giving free advertisement.
[53:20.900 --> 53:22.520]  It raises some good points, I think.
[53:22.940 --> 53:26.860]  It might not be the perfect way to deal with the situation, but it does raise the question at least.
[53:26.880 --> 53:27.140]  Good evening.
[53:27.240 --> 53:27.780]  You're on Off the Hook.
[53:28.940 --> 53:31.840]  Hey, I'm just wondering about the undercover thing.
[53:32.040 --> 53:33.340]  I mean, not the NARC thing.
[53:33.460 --> 53:39.900]  When you guys first said one in four, when you first said that, I laughed out loud from my belly because I thought it was a joke.
[53:41.740 --> 53:46.300]  And basically, I just want to know, how can you guys not judge that?
[53:46.300 --> 53:52.960]  Because I was taught when I first started buying drugs, when I was a little, little girl.
[53:53.560 --> 54:02.440]  I mean, it was like, you are the scum of the earth if you ever tell anyone anything because how else are you going to get your drugs?
[54:02.460 --> 54:05.540]  We're putting our life on the line in order for you to have your drugs.
[54:05.540 --> 54:07.760]  I guess maybe just hackers don't get that schooling.
[54:07.760 --> 54:09.240]  Well, that's what's said.
[54:09.260 --> 54:13.060]  Because none of them do drugs, have ever done drugs, and so they don't know.
[54:13.060 --> 54:25.220]  Apart from the whole drug parallel, it's what's said in any community, but it's not necessarily what happens because people have their own private lives and they have their own conflicts and they want to look out for themselves, for their families.
[54:25.220 --> 54:27.100]  So it's a question of degree.
[54:27.340 --> 54:32.460]  Some people will completely go into a whole thing where they turn in everybody they know.
[54:32.600 --> 54:35.400]  Some will just help out in some small way.
[54:37.040 --> 54:41.280]  But there is definitely cooperation with what is considered the enemy.
[54:41.500 --> 54:42.960]  I do have a response to that.
[54:43.100 --> 54:46.660]  One, look at the hacker community's response to Adrian Lamo.
[54:46.800 --> 54:49.680]  He once was looked at favorably by a number of people.
[54:49.960 --> 54:52.540]  Now a lot of people want to poke him with pitchforks.
[54:52.940 --> 54:58.980]  And secondly, as Emmanuel said, people say one thing, but they don't necessarily go through with their ideals.
[54:59.120 --> 55:01.500]  Just look at, say, the mob.
[55:01.640 --> 55:06.320]  There used to not be as much ratting as there is now, but look at how it is now.
[55:06.460 --> 55:09.780]  How much of it was dismantled based entirely on narcs.
[55:10.000 --> 55:10.120]  Yeah.
[55:10.220 --> 55:23.920]  If you watch any of these documentaries or even dramatic programs about things like drug dealers or mob people or anyone who's involved in shady parts of the law, you'll see that informants are a major, major part of things.
[55:23.920 --> 55:31.480]  And preying on people's fears is definitely how you gain an advantage when you're running investigations.
[55:31.660 --> 55:33.620]  And you bring up the Adrian Lamo issue.
[55:33.780 --> 55:35.440]  And yeah, that's certainly true.
[55:35.680 --> 55:42.180]  But I maintain that while a lot of people do want to poke him with pitchforks, a lot of people also would have done the same thing.
[55:42.180 --> 55:44.460]  And they won't admit it because nobody wants to admit it.
[55:44.660 --> 55:46.900]  But I say, no, they would have.
[55:47.060 --> 55:50.280]  And nobody knows what they would do unless they're put in a situation like that.
[55:50.280 --> 55:58.580]  Right, but that goes to having the ideals of saying that people who snitch are horrible, yet they would have do it if they were put in that situation behind bars or whatnot.
[55:58.880 --> 55:59.820]  All right, let's take another phone call.
[56:00.280 --> 56:00.880]  Good evening.
[56:01.060 --> 56:01.920]  You're on Off the Hook.
[56:03.600 --> 56:04.300]  Speak up, please.
[56:04.300 --> 56:04.480]  Hello?
[56:04.680 --> 56:05.240]  Yes, go ahead.
[56:06.200 --> 56:06.620]  Good evening.
[56:06.860 --> 56:08.420]  Yeah, am I on the air?
[56:08.420 --> 56:11.240]  Yeah, but you sound so horrible that I'm not going to continue with that.
[56:11.320 --> 56:11.620]  Good evening.
[56:11.760 --> 56:12.700]  You're on Off the Hook.
[56:13.200 --> 56:13.480]  Hello?
[56:13.660 --> 56:14.080]  Go ahead.
[56:14.300 --> 56:14.500]  Yes.
[56:15.460 --> 56:15.940]  Hello, hello?
[56:16.140 --> 56:16.820]  Speak up, please.
[56:17.380 --> 56:17.740]  Oh, yes.
[56:18.060 --> 56:19.360]  Yeah, I just wanted to say, go Monroe.
[56:20.360 --> 56:20.680]  Huh?
[56:21.680 --> 56:22.300]  Oh, boy.
[56:22.760 --> 56:25.380]  All right, you know, I think the phones aren't doing it for us tonight.
[56:28.060 --> 56:32.860]  You could send us an email, OTH at 2600.com, and we'll read that and maybe even read it on the air.
[56:33.220 --> 56:36.280]  You know, just like people blame hackers for everything, we can blame the phone company for everything.
[56:36.340 --> 56:43.960]  We can say the phone company is now mad at us because we use Skype and they feel like, you know, they've been, I don't know, dissed in some manner.
[56:44.180 --> 56:44.900]  Should we take one more?
[56:44.980 --> 56:46.980]  Let's take one more call and then that's it, okay?
[56:47.140 --> 56:47.500]  Good evening.
[56:50.280 --> 56:50.540]  Speak up.
[56:51.240 --> 56:51.660]  Hello?
[56:52.020 --> 56:52.760]  Yes, go ahead, please.
[56:53.320 --> 56:56.240]  First of all, I just want to say you have a wonderful program.
[56:56.400 --> 56:56.660]  Thank you.
[56:56.700 --> 56:57.900]  I'm a long-time admirer.
[56:58.220 --> 57:06.700]  And I think I may have missed what you said about the documentary on Channel 13 on Manning.
[57:06.700 --> 57:08.180]  The Frontline documentary.
[57:08.820 --> 57:09.420]  Yes, yes.
[57:09.620 --> 57:25.420]  And I wondered, I couldn't get, I thought, it seemed to me, in part of an attempt to discredit him and present him as unstable and confused rather than as a dedicated idealist.
[57:25.620 --> 57:26.020]  So I...
[57:26.020 --> 57:27.100]  You're talking about Bradley Manning.
[57:27.200 --> 57:30.760]  And that is definitely something that a lot of people got out of that.
[57:30.860 --> 57:33.780]  A lot of people think that he was represented in that way.
[57:33.780 --> 57:40.040]  I don't necessarily agree, and I think a lot of people saw him as being a lot more human and sympathetic.
[57:40.320 --> 57:41.320]  I'd agree with the caller.
[57:41.540 --> 57:41.740]  Uh-huh.
[57:41.820 --> 57:42.440]  I know you would.
[57:42.560 --> 57:42.660]  Yeah.
[57:42.660 --> 57:45.620]  But there are lots of different ways.
[57:45.700 --> 57:47.360]  The important thing is it gets the discussion started.
[57:47.500 --> 57:48.680]  It gets people talking about these things.
[57:49.400 --> 57:50.620]  All right, we're out of time.
[57:50.880 --> 57:52.500]  Personal Computer Show coming up next.
[57:52.740 --> 57:54.000]  We'll be back again next week.
[57:54.340 --> 57:56.880]  Thanks, everybody, for calling in and for writing in.
[57:57.040 --> 58:00.520]  OTH at 2600.com is our email address.
[58:00.520 --> 58:04.040]  Remember to keep challenging, keep thinking, keep debating, and keep spreading information.
[58:04.240 --> 58:04.920]  We'll see you next week.
[58:05.040 --> 58:05.160]  Good night.
[58:18.120 --> 58:53.340]  What you gonna do Guess dropping on you We won't go away Cause we've come out to stay Stand there like part Cause if you want to We can force you to enjoy this music Take it or leave it We'll carry on regardless If you don't like it If you don't like it You don't have to use it It's up to you It's up to you It's up to you.
[58:55.660 --> 58:56.780]  It's up to you.
[59:13.100 --> 59:16.270]  Looks like a case of the blind, leave the deaf to me.
[59:16.540 --> 59:19.200]  You must be bored out of your pants.
[59:19.580 --> 59:22.120]  Take it I'll leave it, we'll carry on regardless.
[59:22.710 --> 59:25.440]  If you don't like it you don't have to dance.
[59:26.080 --> 59:27.120]  It's up to you.
[59:29.480 --> 59:30.580]  It's up to you.
[59:31.640 --> 59:32.310]  Fight!
[59:32.710 --> 59:34.000]  It's up to you.
[59:34.900 --> 59:35.580]  Unite!
[59:36.140 --> 59:38.040]  It's up to you.
[59:38.210 --> 59:38.770]  Fight!
[59:42.080 --> 59:45.500]  In London town you can hear the youth of them say.
[59:45.660 --> 59:46.960]  Take warning.
[59:47.900 --> 59:51.020]  It's up to you what you really want to do.
[59:52.060 --> 59:55.120]  For you are standing on the corner giving trouble.
[59:55.700 --> 01:00:00.220]  When the policeman comes he says you'll have to move on the double.
[01:00:00.960 --> 01:00:01.560]  Yeah!
[01:00:02.580 --> 01:00:05.740]  So stepping up the street with my little girl.
[01:00:06.040 --> 01:00:08.100]  With his neighbors who are anchors.
[01:00:08.980 --> 01:00:11.940]  It's up to her what she really want to do.
[01:00:12.320 --> 01:00:15.160]  It's up to you, you and strictly you and you.
[01:00:16.380 --> 01:00:18.480]  What you gonna do.
[01:00:19.500 --> 01:00:21.780]  When morons come for you.
[01:00:22.860 --> 01:00:25.120]  Then they won't go away.
[01:00:26.640 --> 01:00:29.360]  They want the whole world painted grey.
[01:00:29.880 --> 01:00:31.320]  It's up to you.
[01:00:35.210 --> 01:00:36.730]  All right, WBAI.
[01:00:37.370 --> 01:00:37.530]  WBAI.
[01:00:37.550 --> 01:00:37.670]  vlog day on WBAI.
[01:00:37.710 --> 01:00:38.370]  We will go away.
[01:00:38.390 --> 01:00:38.510]  открыance