[00:00.000 --> 00:00.700]  Bye.
[00:02.660 --> 00:06.620]  Ponte's hopes some of the kids he now mentors also get to go to space.
[00:07.080 --> 00:12.900]  But failing that, he said, at least through him, Brazilians know one of their own already has.
[00:13.860 --> 00:16.460]  Gabriel Elizondo, Al Jazeera, Sao Paulo.
[00:22.460 --> 00:29.200]  Thanks for listening to Al Jazeera English on the radio, broadcast exclusively by the Pacifica Radio Network, free speech radio.
[00:30.700 --> 00:32.560]  And you are listening to WBAI New York.
[00:32.740 --> 00:36.940]  The time is 7.01, time for a very special edition of Off the Hook.
[00:37.260 --> 00:41.100]  Mr. Speaker, the whole country has been appalled by the disclosures about phone hacking.
[00:41.400 --> 00:48.700]  The 7-7 victims, the parents of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman, and of course, the phone of Millie Dowler.
[00:49.180 --> 01:00.640]  That anyone could hack into her phone, listen to her family's frantic messages, and delete them, giving false hope to those parents, is immoral and a disgrace.
[01:02.640 --> 01:07.480]  Let us be clear, we are no longer talking here about politicians and celebrities.
[01:07.480 --> 01:13.100]  We're talking about murder victims, potentially terrorist victims, having their phones hacked into.
[01:13.340 --> 01:23.100]  It is absolutely disgusting what has taken place, and I think everyone in this house, and indeed this country, will be revolted by what they've heard and what they've seen on their television screens.
[01:28.500 --> 01:32.960]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[01:33.940 --> 01:38.520]  I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a cough.
[01:39.140 --> 01:41.300]  We couldn't get much worse.
[01:41.920 --> 01:43.840]  But if they could, they would.
[01:44.100 --> 01:46.740]  Bum-dilly-bum for the best, expect the worst.
[01:47.340 --> 01:49.240]  I hope that's understood.
[01:49.460 --> 01:50.240]  Bum-dilly-bum!
[02:23.970 --> 02:26.250]  And giving to everybody, the program is off the hook.
[02:26.390 --> 02:29.350]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Mike.
[02:29.610 --> 02:30.190]  You're here.
[02:30.370 --> 02:30.910]  Dot Rett.
[02:31.170 --> 02:31.390]  Hello.
[02:31.930 --> 02:32.370]  Voltaire.
[02:32.690 --> 02:33.330]  Rob T.
[02:33.510 --> 02:33.950]  Firefly.
[02:34.150 --> 02:34.450]  Good evening.
[02:34.730 --> 02:35.030]  Jim.
[02:35.290 --> 02:35.410]  Hello.
[02:35.710 --> 02:36.990]  And down in Philadelphia, Bernie S.
[02:37.810 --> 02:39.530]  Disgusted and revolted in Philadelphia.
[02:39.690 --> 02:41.150]  We're all disgusted and revolted, Bernie.
[02:41.330 --> 02:47.230]  Maybe you could explain to us why we were listening to, what was that, the British House of Lords decrying hacking?
[02:48.010 --> 02:55.290]  Yes, the Prime Minister himself and the leader of the opposition were just saying how disgusting and revolting phone hacking is.
[02:55.430 --> 02:57.290]  I love that sound they make when they all agree.
[02:57.830 --> 02:57.950]  You know?
[02:59.970 --> 03:01.150]  Where did that ever start?
[03:01.190 --> 03:01.950]  And why don't we do it?
[03:02.770 --> 03:04.490]  Okay, so let's talk about that story a little bit.
[03:04.530 --> 03:04.910]  I agree.
[03:05.830 --> 03:06.910]  It's revolting and disgusting.
[03:07.030 --> 03:08.390]  Well, maybe not revolting and disgusting.
[03:08.670 --> 03:11.610]  I mean, a lot of things that you should reserve for those particular words.
[03:11.610 --> 03:17.770]  But definitely not cool to be going into somebody's voicemail box who happens to be missing.
[03:18.190 --> 03:21.810]  And, well, they weren't clear as to what messages were being erased.
[03:21.970 --> 03:28.370]  Were there messages left by the missing girl, by her parents, by other people that found the phone number and were clogging up the mailbox?
[03:28.610 --> 03:35.170]  And why couldn't they simply expand the number of messages the mailbox could hold in the first place so it wouldn't fill up when they're looking for the poor kid?
[03:36.230 --> 03:37.250]  None of that was really clear.
[03:37.330 --> 03:37.610]  Mike, do you know?
[03:37.610 --> 03:41.670]  No, but did we say who they, the disgusting and revolting hackers are?
[03:41.990 --> 03:44.550]  No, because, well, no, we haven't gotten to that yet, actually.
[03:44.830 --> 03:46.750]  And they're not really hacker-hackers.
[03:47.330 --> 03:50.610]  They're people who used, I guess, a form of corporate espionage.
[03:51.570 --> 03:54.850]  It's News of the World, a tabloid newspaper in England.
[03:54.970 --> 03:56.050]  Owned by Rupert Murdoch.
[03:56.250 --> 03:59.510]  Yeah, but that doesn't mean he sat there telling people to hack into...
[03:59.510 --> 04:01.030]  I mean, yeah, he owns them, but doesn't...
[04:01.030 --> 04:01.310]  All right.
[04:01.990 --> 04:05.870]  I said owned by, not run on a day-to-day basis.
[04:05.870 --> 04:08.730]  If he's evil enough, he doesn't need us to finger him for this as well.
[04:08.810 --> 04:13.510]  This is just stupidity on the part of some idiot that was thinking they were onto a story.
[04:13.670 --> 04:14.790]  I've been hearing about this.
[04:14.870 --> 04:17.890]  Are these the same people that hacked into the royal family voicemail?
[04:18.070 --> 04:19.950]  Or is this the same newspaper?
[04:20.130 --> 04:20.930]  Same newspaper, yeah.
[04:21.030 --> 04:29.090]  So is this really a story about the newspaper doing this or about really, really bad security on the part of whatever company has all these voicemail accounts?
[04:29.090 --> 04:29.770]  Well, both.
[04:30.010 --> 04:30.170]  Uh-huh.
[04:30.590 --> 04:32.110]  So the way they hacked in...
[04:32.110 --> 04:35.330]  And maybe you know more about this, Bernie, is they bribed the phone company.
[04:36.150 --> 04:36.590]  Apparently.
[04:36.790 --> 04:47.470]  I mean, it seems not likely that they actually went through all the number combinations to actually hack into these voicemail boxes by guessing PIN codes.
[04:47.470 --> 04:49.530]  It would be much easier and more effective.
[04:49.710 --> 05:10.390]  And the reason they got in so quickly, I think, is pretty obvious that they probably hired some third-party private investigator, sleazy guy, to bribe somebody at the mobile phone carrier to give them the mobile number and the PIN code for these accounts so they could listen to the voicemail messages and get juicy tidbits for the news of the world,
[05:10.390 --> 05:12.310]  which is a Sunday tabloid there in London.
[05:12.450 --> 05:28.450]  It's also incredibly easy for anybody who works for any of these phone companies to just get access without a PIN code, just simply to listen to the messages on whatever computer they're stored upon or copy them, say, to a backup tape and simply listen off that and not even be detected that way.
[05:28.550 --> 05:31.030]  All kinds of ways that they could have done this.
[05:31.610 --> 05:32.830]  And people need to...
[05:32.830 --> 05:41.350]  This is one of the reasons why, when voicemail first came out, I was really more in favor of answering machines that had secure codes that you knew if somebody accessed them.
[05:41.450 --> 05:48.550]  Because when you trust your personal communications to be stored by the phone company, you know it's going to be abused at some point by somebody.
[05:49.070 --> 05:49.790]  How do you...
[05:49.790 --> 05:50.270]  Like the cloud.
[05:50.510 --> 05:50.870]  Yeah.
[05:50.870 --> 05:53.330]  How do you define the difference between voicemail and an answering machine?
[05:53.450 --> 05:55.670]  An answering machine is something that you actually have physical access to.
[05:55.830 --> 06:00.210]  It's plugged into your phone line and you can unplug it if you want.
[06:00.210 --> 06:03.790]  But you can see when somebody calls it and listens.
[06:03.790 --> 06:06.610]  You can hear them listening because it's on an actual audio tape.
[06:06.670 --> 06:07.990]  I know it sounds old-fashioned.
[06:08.110 --> 06:10.190]  It's probably people here who have never even seen an answering machine.
[06:10.570 --> 06:12.110]  But believe me, it was...
[06:12.110 --> 06:17.850]  Even with a two or three digit code, it was more secure than just putting it, as Bernie says, in the cloud.
[06:18.010 --> 06:18.150]  Rob?
[06:18.450 --> 06:24.750]  Yeah, the first answering machine I had back in the 80s had a two digit pin and I think the first digit was the same for all machines of that model.
[06:24.870 --> 06:25.490]  Was it a Panasonic?
[06:25.890 --> 06:26.690]  It may have been.
[06:27.010 --> 06:32.790]  Panasonic, they were the most fun because what you could do was, and I guess I could say this now because nobody has them anymore.
[06:33.090 --> 06:39.790]  You could simply go through, I guess, a list of numbers and you would get every single possible code a lot quicker.
[06:40.130 --> 06:43.010]  For instance, if you went 0, 1, 0, 2.
[06:43.590 --> 06:48.770]  Well, not only are you hacking the code 0, 1, you're also hacking the code 1, 0 because it's in that sequence.
[06:49.030 --> 06:55.250]  So if you just got the two digits in a row at some point, you could actually guess it pretty quickly.
[06:55.390 --> 06:56.730]  And the same thing for three digit codes.
[06:56.890 --> 06:57.470]  It wasn't that hard.
[06:57.730 --> 06:59.570]  But again, you would see when somebody was doing it.
[06:59.570 --> 07:02.270]  You would see a call coming in or you could simply unplug it.
[07:02.430 --> 07:04.110]  With voicemail, you never really know.
[07:04.470 --> 07:05.770]  And that's the thing here.
[07:05.930 --> 07:06.550]  But yeah, okay.
[07:06.630 --> 07:07.850]  So what's this going to lead to?
[07:08.490 --> 07:13.110]  It sounds like the House of Lords is ready to declare war on hackers.
[07:13.230 --> 07:15.810]  And it's great how hackers get blamed for this, no matter who does it.
[07:16.950 --> 07:17.550]  I don't know.
[07:17.550 --> 07:18.590]  What's the House of Lords?
[07:18.830 --> 07:19.810]  Where do they come from again?
[07:20.090 --> 07:23.770]  They're an independent football association, I think, in England.
[07:24.070 --> 07:24.270]  Okay.
[07:24.270 --> 07:31.070]  I'm not sure exactly what their purpose is, but they get together and they smoke and they drink and they agree with each other a lot and make that noise.
[07:31.310 --> 07:31.410]  Okay.
[07:31.410 --> 07:36.210]  I think for short, we'll just say that they are the upper house of the British legislature.
[07:36.650 --> 07:37.730]  But not the upper road.
[07:37.970 --> 07:41.510]  Yeah, but that implies that people might hear that and think they're elected or something.
[07:41.610 --> 07:42.390]  They're just rich?
[07:42.390 --> 07:45.390]  No, they were anointed by God himself, I think.
[07:45.490 --> 07:45.650]  Ah.
[07:45.790 --> 07:46.410]  Isn't that how it works?
[07:46.450 --> 07:47.070]  I thought it was King George.
[07:47.350 --> 07:51.130]  Well, you may scoff at this, but this is England we're talking about and we're going to get mail from them.
[07:51.430 --> 07:52.210]  Go ahead, Voltaire.
[07:52.390 --> 07:53.110]  They're born this way.
[07:53.910 --> 07:54.270]  Okay.
[07:55.050 --> 07:59.570]  And Voltaire's email address is, well, you can figure it out.
[07:59.650 --> 08:01.150]  It's O-T-H at 2600.com.
[08:01.250 --> 08:04.210]  Yeah, that gets to all of us, but we'll make an extra copy for him.
[08:04.510 --> 08:06.590]  Okay, so we're talking about stupid things this week.
[08:06.730 --> 08:11.410]  And here's another really stupid thing, monumentally stupid, Fox News.
[08:11.410 --> 08:13.150]  Okay, right away, monumentally stupid.
[08:13.270 --> 08:13.690]  We know that.
[08:13.830 --> 08:19.070]  But somebody managed to get access to their Twitter account.
[08:19.890 --> 08:21.370]  And I don't know how they did it.
[08:21.410 --> 08:22.710]  It's probably pretty easy.
[08:23.130 --> 08:27.230]  They probably have a password of Obama sucks or something like that.
[08:27.230 --> 08:27.590]  I don't know.
[08:27.750 --> 08:29.610]  It's probably very simple to figure it out.
[08:29.690 --> 08:41.750]  That's all you have to do is guess the password to someone's Twitter account or somehow spoof the email address so that you receive the reset your password email and then you can gain control of it that way.
[08:41.850 --> 08:47.950]  Well, somebody was able to do this somehow to one of the Fox News Twitter accounts.
[08:47.950 --> 08:49.890]  And people depend on these things.
[08:50.050 --> 08:55.390]  They actually have these go to their phones and people believe whatever is said on them.
[08:55.710 --> 09:04.530]  Well, somebody gained access and they reported that Barack Obama had been assassinated and sent a bunch of tweets, caused all kinds of panic.
[09:04.690 --> 09:09.330]  Six tweets were posted on the politics account early Monday morning.
[09:10.570 --> 09:12.270]  Reports were, of course, incorrect.
[09:12.730 --> 09:16.010]  The president was actually at a White House barbecue on July 4th.
[09:16.510 --> 09:18.970]  Fox News alerted the Secret Service to the tweets.
[09:19.290 --> 09:22.650]  And now, of course, they're working with the ongoing investigation.
[09:22.650 --> 09:23.050]  Why?
[09:23.170 --> 09:28.890]  Because when you mention the president being assassinated, it ups the ante just a little bit.
[09:28.990 --> 09:30.830]  It's no longer just a prank.
[09:30.950 --> 09:33.150]  Now, all of a sudden, it's treated as a threat.
[09:33.490 --> 09:36.530]  And you get all kinds of other agencies involved.
[09:37.150 --> 09:39.750]  I saw this as an incredible opportunity.
[09:39.950 --> 09:40.950]  Imagine gaining access.
[09:41.170 --> 09:42.230]  We've all dreamed about this.
[09:42.370 --> 09:48.250]  Gaining access to a major news feed on Twitter.com, something that people would believe.
[09:48.370 --> 09:58.510]  And being able to just subtly put out little stories that might get people to challenge the way things are or to just maybe believe it, but maybe not really believe it.
[09:58.590 --> 10:02.530]  But to do something stupid like this, it's a lot of bad publicity.
[10:02.530 --> 10:05.550]  It's just not a cool thing to do.
[10:05.790 --> 10:06.710]  And a wasted opportunity.
[10:06.830 --> 10:07.050]  Got right.
[10:07.710 --> 10:10.290]  No, you already said what I was just thinking of.
[10:10.430 --> 10:11.970]  But Voltaire looks like he has something to say.
[10:11.970 --> 10:12.110]  Yes.
[10:12.210 --> 10:16.870]  Whoever did this is completely incompetent because their first two tweets were at Barack Obama.
[10:17.050 --> 10:19.770]  So they started with at Obama.
[10:19.990 --> 10:20.770]  So they'd only...
[10:20.770 --> 10:21.850]  What do you mean they started with at Obama?
[10:22.210 --> 10:26.710]  The tweet itself started with the at I and then Obama's Twitter handle.
[10:26.890 --> 10:27.690]  Which means what exactly?
[10:27.690 --> 10:30.910]  Which means that only people that also follow Obama would see the tweet.
[10:30.910 --> 10:32.950]  So they were basically like cutting their...
[10:32.950 --> 10:35.670]  the amount of people that saw their hack and like 120.
[10:35.670 --> 10:37.690]  It might have been a test or something like that.
[10:37.810 --> 10:39.670]  They were testing to see if they actually gained control.
[10:40.290 --> 10:43.050]  Actually, the first tweet was, we've regained control of our account.
[10:43.230 --> 10:44.690]  And of course, they hadn't.
[10:44.790 --> 10:45.430]  They had...
[10:45.430 --> 10:48.250]  Well, these people had, but the Fox people hadn't.
[10:48.270 --> 10:49.630]  So it's kind of weird they would start that way.
[10:49.710 --> 10:49.850]  Rob?
[10:50.090 --> 10:53.050]  I think there's still a use to this sort of thing, no matter how silly or outlandish.
[10:53.190 --> 10:56.170]  Because yeah, these tweets were outlandish and unbelievable.
[10:56.510 --> 11:00.110]  Although a lot of people did believe it, judging by the scuttlebutt that was going on on Twitter at that point.
[11:00.910 --> 11:06.690]  But it's a nice little reminder, I think, to not only the people who follow Fox, but other people who hear about this.
[11:06.790 --> 11:10.610]  That maybe you should use a little judgment before you instantly believe anything you read.
[11:10.670 --> 11:11.830]  Even if you think you know the source.
[11:12.050 --> 11:12.770]  Even if you think you trust it.
[11:12.770 --> 11:14.330]  This kind of thing could have been funny.
[11:14.470 --> 11:19.630]  It could have been a well-intentioned nudge that, hey, your account's not secure.
[11:19.910 --> 11:21.870]  And here's a little April Fool's type joke.
[11:21.870 --> 11:28.590]  But instead they picked something really offensive and scary to a lot of people and turned it into a real big serious deal.
[11:28.590 --> 11:29.670]  But it didn't have to be.
[11:30.250 --> 11:38.210]  And I see that as a real wasted opportunity to have taught some good lessons and not stoke the fires even more.
[11:38.210 --> 11:44.970]  The thing that strikes me as strange is that these tweets remained up for 10 hours, at least.
[11:46.210 --> 11:46.930]  I didn't know that.
[11:46.950 --> 11:48.110]  I mean, I saw them when I went to bed.
[11:48.210 --> 11:50.990]  They were still there when I woke up, which maybe tells our listeners...
[11:51.270 --> 11:52.370]  You follow Fox News?
[11:52.610 --> 11:52.930]  No.
[11:53.110 --> 11:56.430]  But I follow other people who are like, ha-ha, look what happened to Fox News.
[11:56.750 --> 11:57.010]  Oh.
[11:58.050 --> 11:59.550]  Because they knew right away it was a hack.
[11:59.650 --> 12:00.710]  How did they know right away it was a hack?
[12:00.790 --> 12:01.690]  Did they panic themselves?
[12:01.690 --> 12:02.730]  I don't know.
[12:02.950 --> 12:03.250]  Uh-huh.
[12:03.250 --> 12:04.290]  You know, I didn't pay...
[12:04.290 --> 12:09.270]  I didn't, like, call everyone I knew and figure out exactly who found out first and how, but...
[12:09.270 --> 12:09.430]  Mm-hmm.
[12:10.270 --> 12:16.030]  Well, uh, I've, uh, I can't imagine what was going on at the Fox Newsroom when they saw what was going on.
[12:16.030 --> 12:17.170]  Apparently not much was going on.
[12:17.250 --> 12:17.470]  Yeah.
[12:17.850 --> 12:21.150]  That, uh, it was definitely a headline news story for this week.
[12:21.230 --> 12:33.870]  Well, the question I have about that approximately 10 hour, uh, you know, tweet staying up for that long is, did it take them that long to find out that someone had, uh, broken into their account or did it take them that long after they found out?
[12:34.570 --> 12:36.550]  Well, let's call Fox News and ask them.
[12:36.630 --> 12:37.890]  Well, we're not going to get the straight answer.
[12:38.170 --> 12:39.650]  They will decide on what they report.
[12:39.790 --> 12:40.410]  That's how they work.
[12:40.730 --> 12:52.970]  But, um, yeah, it's, uh, it's just another indication of how something that, uh, uh, you leave up in the, uh, in the cloud someplace, if somebody can figure out a way to access it or reset it, they can gain control over it.
[12:53.030 --> 12:59.270]  So never believe anything too seriously that's, uh, that's out there because it's very easy to, uh, to, to compromise.
[12:59.410 --> 13:00.450]  Bernie, what did you hear about this story?
[13:00.870 --> 13:11.590]  I, I agree with you completely on this, that there's a, there's, it was a huge wasted opportunity to do some very subtle satire, um, at Fox News's, uh, extent.
[13:11.970 --> 13:13.430]  Just, you know, give it to the yes men, for God's sake.
[13:13.510 --> 13:18.230]  Hey, yes men, we have the Fox News, uh, Twitter password, go crazy.
[13:18.550 --> 13:20.850]  Can you imagine there would have been a movie involved in this?
[13:21.490 --> 13:22.390]  Would have been great.
[13:23.330 --> 13:27.810]  Instead, we have, uh, Secret Service, uh, knocking on doors and asking all kinds of silly questions.
[13:28.470 --> 13:31.610]  Um, so yeah, that was, uh, that was, uh, the dumb thing of the week.
[13:31.870 --> 13:34.230]  Actually, there was something kind of cool that happened this week.
[13:34.330 --> 13:37.910]  Uh, again, involving our friends over at, uh, well, I don't know what to call them anymore.
[13:38.030 --> 13:38.870]  It was lullsec.
[13:39.290 --> 13:41.810]  Uh, then it became the anti-sec movement.
[13:41.810 --> 13:42.830]  And we'll talk about that a little bit.
[13:42.970 --> 13:47.670]  And now, I think it's just, um, generally anonymous, but everybody's saying they're anonymous.
[13:47.910 --> 13:54.090]  The people, um, who, who did this Twitter thing said they, they were anonymous, but, uh, didn't really strike me as, as their M.O.
[13:54.230 --> 13:57.850]  But this, um, this particular, we have it, uh, hung up here.
[13:57.950 --> 14:00.950]  This particular, um, um, YouTube feed.
[14:01.090 --> 14:01.330]  Yes.
[14:01.650 --> 14:04.970]  Uh, there's a YouTube clip of, of Charlie Chaplin from The Great Dictator.
[14:05.330 --> 14:07.290]  To make this life free and beautiful.
[14:07.690 --> 14:09.570]  To make this life a wonderful adventure.
[14:09.570 --> 14:12.970]  Then, in the name of democracy, let us use that power.
[14:13.250 --> 14:14.310]  Let us all unite.
[14:14.850 --> 14:16.670]  Let us fight for a new world.
[14:16.990 --> 14:18.090]  A decent world.
[14:18.310 --> 14:19.910]  That will give men a chance to work.
[14:20.150 --> 14:22.750]  That will give youth a future and old age a security.
[14:23.130 --> 14:26.090]  By the promise of these things, brutes have risen to power.
[14:26.290 --> 14:26.990]  But they lie.
[14:27.230 --> 14:28.830]  They do not fulfill that promise.
[14:29.110 --> 14:29.870]  They never will.
[14:30.250 --> 14:31.650]  Dictators free themselves.
[14:32.010 --> 14:33.550]  But they enslave the people.
[14:34.030 --> 14:36.850]  Now, let us fight to fulfill that promise.
[14:37.130 --> 14:39.350]  Let us fight to free the world.
[14:39.350 --> 14:41.310]  To do away with national barriers.
[14:41.730 --> 14:42.950]  To do away with greed.
[14:43.350 --> 14:44.810]  With hate and intolerance.
[14:45.270 --> 14:47.090]  Let us fight for a world of reason.
[14:47.470 --> 14:51.610]  A world where science and progress will lead to all men's happiness.
[14:52.530 --> 14:56.310]  Soldiers, in the name of democracy, let us all unite!
[15:11.020 --> 15:12.840]  We are Anonymous.
[15:13.220 --> 15:14.580]  We ask you to join us.
[15:14.800 --> 15:15.820]  We ask you to fight.
[15:16.100 --> 15:17.160]  This 4th of July.
[15:17.160 --> 15:19.540]  Do not only celebrate your freedoms.
[15:19.880 --> 15:22.740]  But let your pyrotechnics be the cause of free men.
[15:23.020 --> 15:24.860]  Free citizens of the world alike.
[15:25.220 --> 15:27.800]  The time has come to take our liberties back.
[15:28.080 --> 15:30.700]  To stand up and say, we are Legion.
[15:30.980 --> 15:31.920]  We do not forgive.
[15:32.260 --> 15:33.320]  We do not forget.
[15:33.680 --> 15:36.280]  And most importantly, we are here.
[15:39.620 --> 15:39.980]  Thank you.
[15:40.960 --> 15:42.480]  I thought that was awesome.
[15:42.580 --> 15:43.960]  Of course, you have to look at the video, too.
[15:44.180 --> 15:53.840]  Now, if you go to our Twitter feed, www.twitter.com slash 2600, and look at one of the posts we made over the weekend, you'll see a link to this YouTube piece.
[15:54.240 --> 16:00.600]  And I advise watching it because it's so well put together with the video and with the music and with Charlie Chaplin there.
[16:00.800 --> 16:03.600]  Not the Charlie Chaplin, yeah, lovable tramp from Silent Movie.
[16:03.720 --> 16:07.040]  It's Charlie Chaplin from The Great Dictator, a speaking role, a really amazing film.
[16:07.120 --> 16:16.340]  But just the message here is so enlightened and mature, and it's kind of instigating you to want to do something.
[16:16.480 --> 16:19.740]  And I just thought it was really kind of neat hearing that disembodied voice at the end.
[16:19.740 --> 16:28.680]  This is the kind of thing that I think governments all over the world will fear when they see this happening, a lot more than hacking into somebody's voicemail or Twitter account.
[16:29.340 --> 16:35.780]  This is the kind of thing that starts revolutions, that starts movements, that gets people realizing that they actually can make a difference.
[16:36.000 --> 16:46.600]  You know, one of the things that's interesting about this is that, of course, any of us who know, like been on like the forums where the anonymous tag comes under like, you know, 4chan or whatever.
[16:46.600 --> 16:49.500]  A lot of people, you know, consider it all a silly joke thing.
[16:49.640 --> 16:57.740]  But also, you have plenty of serious people who fly under this banner, and that kind of thing really could scare authorities because there isn't really a head to cut off.
[16:57.940 --> 17:02.880]  While anyone can put on this banner of anonymous, they can also try to say that whole we are legion thing.
[17:02.960 --> 17:05.200]  I think that's really funny that they use that exact phrase.
[17:05.360 --> 17:09.060]  Well, yeah, and this is the first time I heard the phrase and I said, yeah, right on.
[17:09.060 --> 17:11.240]  Yeah, but you know where that came from, right?
[17:11.680 --> 17:12.260]  Tell us.
[17:12.400 --> 17:13.800]  That came from the Bible.
[17:14.780 --> 17:15.660]  The Bible.
[17:15.920 --> 17:16.020]  The Christian Bible.
[17:16.280 --> 17:20.520]  Some person was possessed, and they said, what's your name?
[17:20.660 --> 17:23.840]  And the demons responded, we're legion, there's however many of us.
[17:23.940 --> 17:24.480]  Oh, my goodness.
[17:24.820 --> 17:26.000]  Wow, so they're Bible thumpers.
[17:26.260 --> 17:28.820]  But you don't want to take on that name.
[17:28.820 --> 17:31.360]  That's why I think it's funny that you're saying that you're this...
[17:31.360 --> 17:31.940]  Wow.
[17:32.120 --> 17:34.340]  No, they're taking on the name of the demon.
[17:34.620 --> 17:36.700]  So they're anti-Bible thumpers.
[17:36.700 --> 17:37.120]  Yeah.
[17:37.660 --> 17:41.180]  Okay, well, I guess we can let them speak for themselves in their anonymous droves.
[17:41.180 --> 17:42.780]  I don't know if we can find out whoever started that.
[17:42.800 --> 17:46.400]  Well, I just think it's good to see video production actually involved in this as well.
[17:46.400 --> 17:53.180]  It's not just a bunch of people screaming and, you know, anarchy and mayhem and things like that.
[17:53.280 --> 17:56.240]  It's actually something with some thought behind it.
[17:57.040 --> 18:04.060]  And also, in the world of Anonymous this week, they launched something rather interesting.
[18:04.060 --> 18:08.200]  They launched a WikiLeaks for hackers called HackerLeaks.
[18:08.380 --> 18:11.920]  And this comes from their Blogspot account.
[18:12.180 --> 18:24.280]  Despite countless WikiLeaks copycats popping up since the secret spelling site first dumped its cache of State Department cables last year, the new generation of leaking sites has produced few WikiLeaks-sized scoops.
[18:24.280 --> 18:32.120]  So, instead of waiting for insider whistleblowers, the hacker movement Anonymous hopes that a few outside intruders might start the leaks flowing.
[18:32.440 --> 18:49.020]  Earlier this week, members of the Hacker Collective, and specifically a subgroup known as the People's Liberation Front, launched two new leaking sites, Localeaks.tk, not to be confused with the similarly named Localeaks.com.
[18:49.540 --> 18:53.160]  And this one has two L's, not one L.
[18:53.300 --> 19:03.240]  And also, HackerLeaks.tk, both help to receive documents through an anonymous submissions channel, analyze them, and then distribute them to the press to get maximum exposure and political impact.
[19:03.240 --> 19:16.660]  But, while LocalLeaks aims to use WikiLeaks' model of insider sources to expose corruption on the local scale, HackerLeaks openly invites data thieves to upload documents through its submission system so that they can be analyzed and publicized.
[19:16.680 --> 19:27.540]  You download it, we'll disclose it for you, the site's homepage reads, listing potential booties such as databases, exploits, security flaws, documents, and email spools.
[19:27.920 --> 19:41.240]  On Tuesday, according to one of the hackers involved, it goes by the name Commander X, the leaking site got its first submission, a list of the personal details of Orlando officials, including addresses, home values, incomes, and other data.
[19:41.420 --> 19:51.880]  That leak, which Commander X says was submitted anonymously to HackerLeaks, but was posted confusingly on LocalLeaks, comes as Anonymous has been engaged in what it calls Operation Orlando.
[19:52.300 --> 20:01.800]  Since early Tuesday, hackers have been launching attacks on Orlando-based targets, including OrlandoFloridaGuide.com, and the websites of the Orlando Chamber of Commerce and Universal Studios.
[20:02.220 --> 20:10.300]  And this is in retaliation for arrests of Orlando workers for the non-profit Food Not Bombs, who lacked permits.
[20:10.540 --> 20:11.360]  Now, it's incredible.
[20:11.600 --> 20:14.080]  You'd have to be listening to Pacifica to even know that that happened.
[20:14.440 --> 20:18.760]  There's not very much mass media attention, but whoever's behind this really is paying attention.
[20:19.820 --> 20:24.760]  Commander X says these are the folks that wrote and are enforcing a very brutal law against very poor people.
[20:25.580 --> 20:37.160]  Commander X says he is serving as the current editor-in-chief of the two sites, and wrote to this particular poster, they themselves appear to be very rich, so we thought we would point that out.
[20:37.560 --> 20:42.780]  Why is a leaking site necessary for hackers, who have lately used sites like Pastebin to publish information on their own?
[20:43.120 --> 20:53.800]  Commander X argues that Anonymous and the PLF have already established connections to the media outlets that can better expose important data and that they hope to also provide unique and enlightening analysis.
[20:54.440 --> 20:54.740]  Interesting.
[20:54.980 --> 21:03.080]  And I know, Rob, you have some issues with this particular move by these people that have started HackerLeaks.
[21:03.300 --> 21:04.300]  Why, do you think it's not a good idea?
[21:04.880 --> 21:14.380]  Well, I think in practice you have things like WikiLeaks that started because they wanted to help people without the necessary means to spread info they wanted to disseminate on their own.
[21:15.560 --> 21:16.540]  But HackerLeaks, really?
[21:16.680 --> 21:32.660]  I mean, out of everybody, everybody in the world who finds themselves with information they want to safely, anonymously disseminate throughout the world as widely as possible, hackers are the least likely, I think, to want, need, or even trust some third party that just popped up to do their dirty work for them.
[21:33.280 --> 21:39.240]  I'm sure the bunch of us, if we brainstormed, we could come up with several ways to just go out and do that right now if we had some info.
[21:39.360 --> 21:42.120]  Isn't the dirty work actually getting information in the first place?
[21:42.440 --> 21:55.220]  And what does a lot of people in is when they share the information and people say, oh, you're the one that did it, if there was a way to simply give it to somebody else who would do that part, doesn't it sort of take the heat off the person that actually found the information in the first place?
[21:55.360 --> 21:59.340]  But then you're trusting that other third party to keep quiet about how you got it to them.
[21:59.460 --> 21:59.580]  True.
[21:59.660 --> 22:06.180]  And it just adds another step, another weak link in the chain and I don't think one that anyone really needs.
[22:06.180 --> 22:12.860]  Well, the big thing about WikiLeaks wasn't just that you were sending something to a publishing authority.
[22:13.160 --> 22:14.640]  It was, you know, that's easy to do.
[22:14.740 --> 22:20.280]  You can send information to any number of news or media organizations that you want to publish.
[22:20.460 --> 22:28.540]  The issue was, you know, being able to stay anonymous while sending this information out.
[22:28.540 --> 22:41.900]  But in terms of having a thing directed for hackers, real hackers, they'll know how that group in general is the least likely to need to worry about how do I keep myself anonymous while sending this to someone who can publish this out.
[22:41.980 --> 22:54.100]  You know, like Rob just said, we could easily brainstorm and come up with a dozen ways that we could keep ourselves anonymous while sending this information to CNN or some other big organization that could publish it.
[22:54.100 --> 23:00.960]  But there's also the immediate equating of the term hacker with data thieves, which I'm not too hot on in particular as well.
[23:01.160 --> 23:03.680]  Well, yeah, and that is a problem.
[23:03.760 --> 23:06.140]  A lot of people see that through the mainstream.
[23:06.860 --> 23:14.260]  There are all kinds of ways of hacking, obviously, just playing with machines and figuring out code, other ways of hacking, building machines and things like that.
[23:14.360 --> 23:15.460]  This is one element of it.
[23:15.640 --> 23:20.000]  But the question is, do hackers of all different backgrounds support this sort of a thing?
[23:20.000 --> 23:22.240]  And I think, for the most part, they do.
[23:22.380 --> 23:27.320]  I think they support people exposing information and sharing it with everybody.
[23:27.500 --> 23:28.920]  Yeah, I actually kind of disagree with you, Rob.
[23:29.000 --> 23:34.080]  I think that hacking is all about not data theft because you can't really steal data.
[23:34.080 --> 23:35.100]  You can only copy it.
[23:35.400 --> 23:38.480]  It's about data liberation and spreading the knowledge, spreading the data.
[23:38.660 --> 23:41.760]  That's what the hacker manifesto is all about.
[23:42.720 --> 23:53.680]  There's also the question of, who are the operators of these websites, and do we trust them to be able to maintain a truly anonymous infrastructure for leaking documents?
[23:54.360 --> 23:56.400]  And do we trust that they have actually done so?
[23:56.520 --> 23:58.800]  And these are questions that are hard to answer.
[23:58.960 --> 24:00.500]  But wouldn't you have the same questions for WikiLeaks?
[24:01.020 --> 24:01.680]  It's true.
[24:01.980 --> 24:04.540]  But WikiLeaks has been around for a while.
[24:04.540 --> 24:09.380]  Well, they have yet to, you know, reveal any of their sources.
[24:09.380 --> 24:13.420]  They have some good, you know, track record in that regard.
[24:13.580 --> 24:17.940]  If you contrast this with, say, for example, the Wall Street Journal, which set up a leaking site.
[24:18.160 --> 24:18.720]  I heard about this.
[24:18.720 --> 24:25.100]  But if you read the fine print of the Wall Street Journal's leaking site, they say, we'll tell law enforcement who you are if we have to.
[24:26.160 --> 24:26.860]  I mean...
[24:26.860 --> 24:29.000]  Yeah, not really that well done.
[24:29.000 --> 24:35.820]  If you want to leak stuff to the Wall Street Journal, the anonymous way to do it is stick it in a manila envelope and put it in the mail without a return address.
[24:36.100 --> 24:37.120]  And wearing gloves.
[24:37.340 --> 24:38.500]  Wearing gloves and all this stuff.
[24:38.500 --> 24:40.600]  And going to a different state from where you actually live.
[24:40.700 --> 24:41.480]  Okay, but...
[24:41.480 --> 24:42.980]  Putting a bag over your head for the cameras.
[24:43.240 --> 24:47.440]  But at least this way the Wall Street Journal doesn't know who you are, and that's, you know, a head start.
[24:47.720 --> 24:48.280]  Bernie, go ahead.
[24:48.960 --> 25:01.800]  Yeah, like Mike said, the only way to really ensure your anonymity is to know that the organization you're submitting the information to there's no way for them to know who you are.
[25:02.900 --> 25:10.660]  And we pretty much know that's the case with WikiLeaks, as Mike said, based on their track record and the people they had working on on that kind of infrastructure.
[25:10.960 --> 25:18.540]  We have no idea what these other people's infrastructure is, and especially, as Mike pointed out, with the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal or the Times.
[25:18.680 --> 25:20.920]  They're just going to rat you out if the government asks who they are.
[25:20.920 --> 25:24.680]  So what's the point of giving them anything that's worth leaking?
[25:25.340 --> 25:31.160]  It's interesting, too, that they would go such lanes to say that they'll tell the authorities who you are.
[25:31.360 --> 25:33.800]  You would think that newspapers would not say that.
[25:33.900 --> 25:35.860]  I don't think the Times would say that, would they?
[25:35.940 --> 25:38.120]  Would they say that we're going to report your name?
[25:38.280 --> 25:42.700]  I think they would at least pretend that they were going to protect the source.
[25:42.900 --> 25:44.300]  That's what they're somewhat known for.
[25:44.440 --> 25:44.640]  Rob?
[25:45.260 --> 25:55.060]  One thing we do know about their infrastructure is they're using Blogspot, which is a free blog service run by Google, and they're using .tk domains, which are free domains anybody could sign up for in the vein of geocities.
[25:55.300 --> 25:56.340]  And where is .tk?
[25:57.200 --> 25:58.200]  Where is .tk?
[25:58.780 --> 25:59.340]  It's in the Pacific.
[25:59.340 --> 25:59.900]  Tajikistan, isn't it?
[25:59.940 --> 26:00.280]  No, no, no.
[26:00.440 --> 26:00.540]  No?
[26:00.700 --> 26:01.020]  Turkmenistan?
[26:01.200 --> 26:01.700]  No, no, no.
[26:01.720 --> 26:02.140]  It's not in the Pacific.
[26:02.140 --> 26:03.020]  No, I can do this.
[26:03.020 --> 26:03.620]  I can do this.
[26:04.040 --> 26:04.960]  Well, it's not Taiwan.
[26:05.200 --> 26:06.060]  No, it's not Turkey.
[26:06.160 --> 26:07.440]  It's like Tuvalu or something.
[26:07.600 --> 26:08.200]  It's in the South Pacific.
[26:08.220 --> 26:08.540]  Tuvalu?
[26:08.620 --> 26:09.320]  No, that's TV.
[26:09.680 --> 26:10.000]  I know.
[26:10.220 --> 26:10.440]  Yeah.
[26:10.760 --> 26:13.040]  Different country, also in the South Pacific.
[26:13.500 --> 26:13.880]  All right.
[26:13.920 --> 26:14.380]  What's Turkey?
[26:15.640 --> 26:15.960]  TR.
[26:16.940 --> 26:17.440]  Of course, yes.
[26:17.840 --> 26:18.080]  All right.
[26:18.200 --> 26:18.680]  Yes, start right.
[26:19.180 --> 26:31.980]  Just in the vein with Mike and Bernie is that this WikiLeaks was designed by many people that we do, you know, consider to be hackers and others of that sort.
[26:32.280 --> 26:39.440]  And we do, you know, we have seen the system test and you almost could say, well, they already are the hacker leaks.
[26:40.600 --> 26:41.620]  Yeah, I suppose so.
[26:41.680 --> 26:45.780]  But not so much lately, though, because of all the craziness that's been going on.
[26:45.780 --> 26:51.540]  In fact, doesn't Julian have a hearing coming up in just a few days in England where they are going to decide what's happening with him?
[26:52.440 --> 26:55.480]  There hasn't been much being leaked that I've heard of.
[26:55.580 --> 27:00.500]  Maybe there is and it's being kept kind of quiet by the mass media or the internet in general.
[27:01.060 --> 27:02.620]  But it's not like last year.
[27:02.720 --> 27:04.480]  Last year when all kinds of things were being leaked.
[27:04.560 --> 27:06.460]  And I think there was a certain excitement there.
[27:06.460 --> 27:14.400]  Now that excitement is the anti-security movement, anti-sec, and low-sec, and anonymous, it seems to have sort of moved over to there.
[27:15.000 --> 27:17.780]  And I think it would be great if the two worlds combined more.
[27:17.960 --> 27:18.240]  Voltaire?
[27:18.360 --> 27:22.440]  Let's not forget OpenLeaks is going to have a presence at the Chaos Communication Camp.
[27:22.440 --> 27:25.760]  Okay, you know, and I'd like to ask them there, what have you guys done?
[27:25.760 --> 27:27.240]  I haven't seen any leaks come from OpenLeaks.
[27:27.360 --> 27:28.600]  They haven't even started yet.
[27:28.680 --> 27:30.220]  They said they're not going to start until...
[27:30.220 --> 27:33.280]  They're not even starting in quote-unquote beta mode until the camps.
[27:33.980 --> 27:36.800]  Okay, because they announced their launch months ago.
[27:36.980 --> 27:38.420]  They announced their pre-launch.
[27:38.660 --> 27:39.700]  What's a pre-launch?
[27:39.820 --> 27:41.040]  No, I don't blame them.
[27:41.140 --> 27:44.640]  I blame the media for saying like, oh, look at the new people named OpenLeaks.
[27:44.780 --> 27:47.520]  OpenLeaks was actually saying we're not ready for prime time yet.
[27:47.940 --> 27:50.920]  Well, someone had to make an announcement and say we exist, you know?
[27:51.000 --> 27:52.960]  It was a call for participation, basically.
[27:53.180 --> 27:56.040]  All right, well, hopefully they'll leak a whole bunch of stuff at CCC.
[27:56.040 --> 27:56.420]  We'll see.
[27:56.580 --> 28:01.600]  I do want to say that I think the concept of all these other leaking sites popping up is awesome.
[28:01.600 --> 28:15.260]  And I want to encourage people to do that who can do that because I think Wikileaks has already done the most important thing it's ever going to do, which is get the genie out of the bottle and start this sort of social movement going and show people that it can be done.
[28:16.000 --> 28:18.320]  I just don't think Hacker Leaks is quite the way to go.
[28:18.840 --> 28:19.020]  Okay.
[28:19.900 --> 28:26.240]  Mike, how do the people who are considering setting up these websites, how do you suppose they know if they can do it?
[28:26.480 --> 28:29.740]  Because there are a lot of people who think they can and a lot of them can't.
[28:29.740 --> 28:38.080]  See, that's actually the big problem is, I think we're all definitely for having more of these kinds of movements and sites popping up.
[28:38.380 --> 28:43.060]  The issue is it takes a lot to actually set up this kind of thing.
[28:43.200 --> 28:49.060]  And you're kind of putting yourself in between people who are leaking this stuff and the authorities who want to know who's doing it.
[28:49.160 --> 28:51.380]  Even if you don't know who it is, you become a target.
[28:51.640 --> 28:53.820]  It becomes a very intensive thing.
[28:53.900 --> 28:57.460]  Just look at like a lot of the issues swirling around Wikileaks.
[28:57.460 --> 29:02.360]  Now, on the subject of targets, this is an interesting story.
[29:02.440 --> 29:07.040]  One of these stories that you just have to check twice to see if it's even real comes from The Guardian over in the UK.
[29:07.860 --> 29:11.400]  British website owners could face extradition to the US.
[29:11.960 --> 29:20.040]  This is not for leaking so much as for piracy, for providing material that certain corporations here would rather they not provide.
[29:20.940 --> 29:37.960]  Extradition to the US on piracy charges, even if their operation has no connection to America and does something which is most probably legal in the UK, the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, known as ICE, is targeting overseas websites it believes are breaking US copyrights,
[29:38.020 --> 29:43.120]  whether or not their servers are even based in America or there's another direct US link.
[29:43.400 --> 29:48.560]  As long as the website's address ends in .com or .net, it is implicated.
[29:48.560 --> 29:55.520]  If it is implicated in the spread of pirated US-made films, TV, or other media, it is a legitimate target to be closed down or targeted for prosecution.
[29:56.180 --> 30:01.440]  While these web addresses are traditionally seen as global, all their connections are routed through VeriSign.
[30:01.540 --> 30:03.860]  That's an internet infrastructure company located in Virginia.
[30:04.420 --> 30:15.360]  And the agency actually believes that it's sufficient to seek a US prosecution and a free trip over to the United States for somebody not from here who has never been here before.
[30:15.420 --> 30:16.660]  I just find that amazing.
[30:16.660 --> 30:25.460]  Can you imagine if another country was making those kinds of proclamations about us saying, yeah, we're going to just grab you and bring you to our country because we believe that you violated some kind of law on the internet?
[30:25.680 --> 30:30.360]  The really troubling bit is that British courts are seeming to agree with this analysis.
[30:30.780 --> 30:31.180]  Really?
[30:31.280 --> 30:32.760]  They're just buying right into it.
[30:33.000 --> 30:34.320]  They're not stopping it.
[30:34.800 --> 30:41.340]  And I mean, if you're in Britain, let's be clear, if you're in Britain, unless you're really something, then the US won't come and just get you.
[30:41.440 --> 30:43.340]  They'll ask the British to send you over.
[30:44.420 --> 30:50.220]  So if the British people say, no, we will have none of this, there's a really effective way to stop it.
[30:50.340 --> 30:52.280]  Kind of like what they're going to do with Julian Assange.
[30:52.460 --> 30:56.160]  They'll ask them to send him over here to answer some questions.
[30:56.160 --> 31:02.180]  Well, there's this conspiracy theory that the whole prosecution in Sweden is because it's easier to send people from Sweden than from the UK.
[31:02.540 --> 31:09.360]  And stories like this show that it's not that hard for the US government to convince the British to send people over.
[31:09.360 --> 31:14.180]  A story like that, if that is possible, if something like that is actually true, then anything is possible.
[31:14.380 --> 31:20.940]  If the United States can simply say, yeah, because you have a .com address and you did something we don't like, we can simply bring you to our country and prosecute you.
[31:21.280 --> 31:21.640]  Wow.
[31:22.040 --> 31:25.540]  I mean, nothing else would top that as far as I'm concerned.
[31:25.760 --> 31:29.320]  Any other extradition moves that they make would just not be a surprising route.
[31:29.500 --> 31:35.740]  And the really central point of this is that they're doing things that are not necessarily illegal under British law.
[31:35.860 --> 31:38.940]  So we've basically gone into another country and said, hey, you're subject to our laws now.
[31:38.940 --> 31:41.880]  I think we've successfully invaded the UK on some level.
[31:42.020 --> 31:44.920]  Okay, that's something I'm not entirely clear about that.
[31:45.020 --> 31:48.240]  How is it not illegal in British law if it's piracy here?
[31:48.560 --> 31:50.500]  Is there an example of that?
[31:50.540 --> 31:52.100]  Well, it depends on what you're talking about.
[31:52.220 --> 31:54.120]  For instance, things like linking sites.
[31:54.480 --> 31:59.720]  You know, like, you know, a lot of people have gotten in trouble here for encouraging piracy in various ways.
[31:59.720 --> 32:01.700]  But it's not always...
[32:01.700 --> 32:04.580]  The same line in the sand isn't drawn in British law.
[32:04.680 --> 32:06.200]  There is piracy in both countries.
[32:06.580 --> 32:10.240]  The issue is the United States seems to be a bit more strict in that way.
[32:10.360 --> 32:11.240]  I encourage piracy.
[32:11.360 --> 32:12.180]  I think it's good for your health.
[32:12.320 --> 32:16.920]  Now, if I said that in England, would I be on the list now to be brought over here for encouraging it?
[32:17.040 --> 32:18.660]  I'm just curious how far this goes.
[32:18.880 --> 32:21.420]  The other thing to remember is that this is not new.
[32:21.560 --> 32:23.480]  It's not even new in the digital age.
[32:23.480 --> 32:34.980]  People will remember the case some years back of the Russian guy, Dmitry Sklarov, who created a software product in Russia, which was legal in Russia, and came to the U.S.
[32:35.260 --> 32:37.560]  for a conference or something and was promptly arrested.
[32:38.980 --> 32:43.160]  It's a lot harder to extradite people from Russia than it is from the U.K., so they couldn't do it that way.
[32:43.420 --> 32:47.640]  But this sort of extraterritorial reach of U.S.
[32:47.840 --> 32:48.280]  law...
[32:48.280 --> 32:52.760]  And I'm sure there are scholars who could find examples from hundreds of years ago.
[32:52.760 --> 33:06.320]  And the fact that they're just lying there and wait for somebody to actually come to our shores and give a talk about something and then pounce on him later means that they're probably planning a whole lot of potential scenarios for people that they consider to be inconvenient.
[33:06.700 --> 33:06.840]  Yeah.
[33:06.940 --> 33:23.640]  This is like a very interesting and disturbing thing to see the United States government doing where they're basically saying if there's some sort of tie to the United States, whether you're talking about a .com registered website, in which case the domain gets routed through the United States,
[33:23.640 --> 33:34.800]  or you're talking about a company that's transnational, they're going to impose the United States law, even if that person or entity is actually acting... wants to act based on the laws in the area where they are.
[33:35.180 --> 33:39.400]  But based on the fact of how the internet works, anything can be routed through anyone's machine.
[33:39.540 --> 33:40.920]  There's no way to control that, really.
[33:40.920 --> 33:48.460]  And so are any countries going to be able to pop up now and regulate anything they want on the internet just because something passes through?
[33:48.580 --> 33:56.160]  A country can actually figure out ways to route stuff through their own servers, even if the person didn't intend to go through their country.
[33:56.220 --> 34:02.540]  I think there have been cases of that where traffic has been routed through China, through the United States, and people had no idea it was going to go over there.
[34:02.640 --> 34:09.600]  And by routing it through those countries, all of a sudden, wow, you're under their legal system now, and you can get in trouble for things that you've done.
[34:10.320 --> 34:18.820]  I mean, I often do things on the internet that violate Chinese law, and I take comfort of the fact that China is very unable to come get me for it.
[34:20.220 --> 34:22.220]  But the US seems to think that it can.
[34:22.820 --> 34:24.960]  Yeah, this is a very big double standard.
[34:25.120 --> 34:35.080]  I'm pretty sure the United States would be very annoyed if some other country were to say, you know what, your citizen was doing something that's illegal under our law.
[34:35.080 --> 34:45.760]  And since the domain, the TLD that that website is under is, you know, for our country, we're going to take them over because, you know, because it routed through our country.
[34:46.140 --> 34:50.300]  You know, it seems almost like a cyber imperialism.
[34:50.740 --> 34:52.460]  Oh, that's a good catchphrase there.
[34:53.060 --> 34:53.720]  What's that, Bernie?
[34:54.200 --> 34:54.700]  Good term.
[34:54.800 --> 34:56.480]  I was trying to think of a good one for it.
[34:56.560 --> 34:57.740]  That pretty much says it.
[34:57.840 --> 34:58.660]  It's cyber imperialism.
[34:58.740 --> 35:00.040]  Cyber imperialism.
[35:00.040 --> 35:01.440]  Okay, would you hyphenate that?
[35:01.440 --> 35:02.740]  Or is that all one word?
[35:02.920 --> 35:04.480]  Well, write it out and see how it looks.
[35:05.240 --> 35:05.640]  All right, good.
[35:05.820 --> 35:06.480]  Good one there.
[35:06.720 --> 35:07.880]  Clearly, it starts with a hyphen.
[35:08.040 --> 35:11.280]  And then as the term comes into more common use, the hyphen goes away.
[35:11.380 --> 35:11.500]  Is that how it works?
[35:11.580 --> 35:12.440]  You lose the hyphen when it...
[35:12.440 --> 35:13.720]  Because email, I used to hyphenate.
[35:13.800 --> 35:14.680]  I don't hyphenate email anymore.
[35:14.880 --> 35:15.100]  Exactly.
[35:15.580 --> 35:15.840]  Wow.
[35:15.960 --> 35:17.820]  So there is rhyme and reason to it.
[35:18.540 --> 35:20.500]  Okay, well, this is on the subject.
[35:20.900 --> 35:22.100]  And we're going to be taking phone calls.
[35:22.140 --> 35:23.840]  212-209-2900.
[35:24.480 --> 35:28.780]  And let me remind people, we're in fundraising mode for the next three weeks after tonight.
[35:28.780 --> 35:32.220]  So if you want to call in, this might be your last chance this month to do that.
[35:32.620 --> 35:34.020]  212-209-2900.
[35:34.860 --> 35:38.620]  This is about how the Secret Service stalks cyber criminals.
[35:38.820 --> 35:39.500]  This was revealed.
[35:39.820 --> 35:48.440]  A top Secret Service official wound up spilling details about federal anti-hacker strategy at a relatively obscure federal hearing in Alabama.
[35:48.620 --> 35:52.200]  And this comes from a website called fastcompany.com.
[35:53.400 --> 35:57.180]  Basically, they're reporting on testimony given to the House Committee on Financial Services.
[35:57.800 --> 35:59.300]  Assistant Director Alvin T.
[35:59.560 --> 36:04.340]  Smith revealed just how involved the Secret Service is in federal investigations into cybercrime.
[36:04.500 --> 36:06.920]  Told some extremely cool stories in the process.
[36:07.200 --> 36:15.700]  He was a witness at a field hearing called simply Hacked Off, helping law enforcement protect private financial information.
[36:16.300 --> 36:17.380]  Wow, Hacked Off.
[36:17.460 --> 36:18.960]  I'm hearing that phrase more and more lately.
[36:20.100 --> 36:28.620]  At this hearing, he detailed how the Secret Service has infiltrated underground websites, including both hacker and cyber fraud sites, and bulletin boards.
[36:28.760 --> 36:41.600]  A 2008 investigation into criminals who stole credit and debit card numbers from Dave & Buster's OfficeMax, Sports Authority, and Barnes & Noble customers was largely accomplished thanks to accounts by undercover feds on illegal websites.
[36:42.380 --> 36:51.240]  Undercover Secret Service agents then, with the assistance of Turkish and other international investigators, traced the sale of stolen American credit card numbers to Russia and Eastern Europe.
[36:51.940 --> 37:02.600]  While the Guardian has previously revealed that the Secret Service has infiltrated hacker websites, this is one of the first times a federal official has spoken on the record about the extent of law enforcement penetration.
[37:04.000 --> 37:13.440]  Smith basically referred to Russian national Vladislav Horohin as one of the world's most notorious traffickers of stolen financial information.
[37:13.640 --> 37:22.400]  His testimony unveiled how the Secret Service simultaneously embedded itself with cyber fraud investigators across the federal spectrum and worked with international law enforcement.
[37:22.920 --> 37:29.760]  In testimony, he detailed how the Secret Service teamed up with Dutch law enforcement services to track a series of cyber attacks back in 2010.
[37:30.660 --> 37:37.120]  These cyber attacks included everything from brute force attacks to sophisticated spear phishing attacks aimed at specific users.
[37:37.120 --> 37:43.400]  Most importantly, the Secret Service has been embedding agents and staff at almost all levels of the federal government.
[37:43.560 --> 37:51.120]  The Secret Service has thoroughly melded handling what they call cyber investigations with the Department of Homeland Security and other government agencies.
[37:51.540 --> 37:59.520]  Secret Service agents are assigned on detail to, among others, the DHS's National Cyber Security and Office of Infrastructure Protection Divisions.
[37:59.520 --> 38:15.100]  Yeah, DHS's Science and Technology Directorate, Every Individual FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, the FBI's National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, the Treasury Department's Terrorist Finance and Financial Crime and Financial Crime Enforcement Network sections.
[38:15.700 --> 38:22.560]  My God, the DEA's Special Operations Division, the Department of Justice's International Organized Crime Division, it just goes on and on.
[38:22.740 --> 38:24.960]  They are in this up to their necks.
[38:24.960 --> 38:31.960]  And that's why we say things like, one in every four people is probably working for the government in some capacity.
[38:32.240 --> 38:32.660]  Wow.
[38:33.540 --> 38:34.800]  It boggles the mind.
[38:34.920 --> 38:36.040]  Bernie, are you surprised by this?
[38:36.340 --> 38:46.420]  Well, having dealt with the Secret Service before, it's a little alarming to me that they're infiltrating so many different other federal agencies, both in the United States and abroad.
[38:46.420 --> 38:48.100]  So it's like, they're everywhere.
[38:48.240 --> 38:48.640]  They're everywhere.
[38:48.900 --> 38:51.440]  And another case of cyber imperialism.
[38:51.900 --> 38:54.220]  Well, you know, let's not overuse the phrase here.
[38:54.420 --> 38:55.320]  It's a good phrase.
[38:55.460 --> 38:59.120]  We'll see if it, you know, is one of the trending topics after the show.
[38:59.760 --> 39:04.820]  Well, there is another storage, I don't know if we're getting into this week, which would be under that term.
[39:04.980 --> 39:14.600]  But just, I have one thing to say about this, this particular story is, why, oh why, are there so many basic...
[39:15.440 --> 39:17.520]  How come they're not sticking to...
[39:17.520 --> 39:20.300]  These agencies aren't sticking to specific specialities?
[39:20.300 --> 39:26.100]  We're ending up with, like, dozens upon dozens of federal law enforcement agencies.
[39:26.360 --> 39:32.860]  You know, whatever happened, I mean, an agency that, you know, served for protective this and immigration, that, they're all just going out.
[39:32.940 --> 39:34.140]  They're all arresting people overseas.
[39:34.140 --> 39:34.840]  It's silly.
[39:35.160 --> 39:36.060]  It's mission creep.
[39:36.960 --> 39:37.960]  Mission creep, yes.
[39:38.080 --> 39:38.260]  Okay.
[39:38.500 --> 39:38.940]  That's...
[39:39.500 --> 39:44.800]  And one other thing, and then we'll take some phone calls, and this is also a bit anonymous, more on the corporate level.
[39:44.800 --> 39:53.300]  A technology called Legal Intercept that Microsoft hopes to patent would allow the company to secretly intercept, monitor, and record Skype calls.
[39:53.620 --> 40:02.700]  Yeah, Microsoft's patent application for Legal Intercept was filed back in 2009, well before the company actually went out and bought Skype for $8.5 billion last May.
[40:03.180 --> 40:08.580]  The patent application, which is still being worked upon, was made public last week.
[40:08.580 --> 40:20.180]  Now, from Microsoft's description of the technology and its patent application, Legal Intercept appears similar to tools used by telecommunication companies and equipment makers to comply with government wiretap and surveillance requests.
[40:20.180 --> 40:26.460]  According to Microsoft, Legal Intercept is designed to silently record communications on VoIP networks such as Skype.
[40:26.740 --> 40:35.460]  Data associated with a request to establish a communication is modified to cause the communication to be established via a path that includes a recording agent.
[40:35.460 --> 40:41.700]  That recording agent... it's a term for software, not an actual federal agent there recording things, although it might as well be.
[40:42.160 --> 40:46.320]  The recording agent is then able to silently record the communication.
[40:46.600 --> 40:51.020]  When's the last time you heard something not silently record and beep every 15 seconds?
[40:52.160 --> 40:53.300]  Yeah, it used to be the case.
[40:53.400 --> 40:57.720]  Modification may include, for example, adding, changing, and or deleting data within the data.
[40:57.900 --> 41:03.220]  The data as modified is then passed to a protocol entity that uses the data to establish a communication session.
[41:03.220 --> 41:07.400]  Bernie, let me ask you, why would Microsoft want to record Skype conversations?
[41:07.560 --> 41:09.720]  For their own entertainment, or is this something for the government?
[41:10.140 --> 41:12.140]  Actually, I think this is a business model.
[41:13.800 --> 41:26.100]  Local exchange carriers have traditionally, in recent years, charged thousands of dollars per wiretap to local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.
[41:26.100 --> 41:36.140]  And now that they've purchased Skype, this could be a huge cash cow for Microsoft, because the government seem to can't get enough wiretaps lately.
[41:36.520 --> 41:44.700]  And if Microsoft can turn around and charge thousands of dollars per wiretap per Skype conversation, they're going to be raking in the dough.
[41:45.020 --> 41:48.020]  So I think this is a business model, frankly, at our expense.
[41:48.800 --> 41:49.240]  Wow.
[41:49.520 --> 41:49.760]  Okay.
[41:50.020 --> 41:54.440]  Well, for those of you who thought Skype was a secure way of communicating, think again.
[41:54.640 --> 42:01.020]  I have this other story about Microsoft, and I really wish we could spend the time on it that it deserves, but it relates to our earlier topic as well.
[42:01.200 --> 42:04.640]  So Microsoft is setting up a cloud service provider, whatever that means.
[42:05.020 --> 42:07.340]  And they're targeting businesses in Europe.
[42:07.340 --> 42:16.420]  And what's really interesting about this is that they'll, you know, for technical reasons, sometimes some of the data will get copied to computers in the US.
[42:16.420 --> 42:28.060]  And when that happens, it becomes accessible to US law enforcement, which is a violation of EU law, because you can't just give away people's data in the EU without EU process.
[42:28.660 --> 42:31.020]  So it's another sort of legal dilemma.
[42:31.220 --> 42:33.640]  And Microsoft's only sort of the bad guy this time.
[42:34.760 --> 42:36.980]  But people should check out the story in PC World.
[42:37.120 --> 42:37.660]  It has the details.
[42:37.840 --> 42:41.780]  It's not obvious why this is such an important story, but I think it is.
[42:42.160 --> 42:42.360]  Okay.
[42:42.460 --> 42:43.260]  How can people find out more?
[42:43.660 --> 42:45.040]  There's a story in PC World.
[42:45.240 --> 42:49.600]  The title is EU Upset by Microsoft Warning About US Access to EU Cloud.
[42:50.060 --> 42:50.420]  Okay.
[42:50.520 --> 42:51.960]  Well, certainly I'll look into that a bit more.
[42:52.040 --> 42:54.360]  Let's give our listeners a chance to weigh in on some of these things.
[42:54.520 --> 42:56.560]  212-209-2900.
[42:56.840 --> 42:57.560]  And good evening.
[42:57.740 --> 42:58.560]  You're on Off the Hook.
[43:00.100 --> 43:00.580]  Speak up.
[43:00.620 --> 43:02.740]  I've got a question for you, Mr. Emanuel.
[43:02.960 --> 43:03.320]  Go ahead.
[43:05.060 --> 43:10.220]  When you pick that moniker, did you really think things would get as bad as they did?
[43:10.380 --> 43:14.940]  I mean, when you pick the name, you see where I'm going?
[43:15.140 --> 43:17.060]  I'm having a hard time putting it to words.
[43:17.180 --> 43:19.100]  Did I see the writing on the wall is what you're asking?
[43:19.340 --> 43:19.540]  Yes.
[43:19.980 --> 43:26.020]  Well, it's interesting because I actually did start being owned as Emanuel back in 1984.
[43:26.340 --> 43:27.640]  And that was just a coincidence.
[43:27.920 --> 43:29.160]  It just sort of worked out that way.
[43:29.960 --> 43:32.300]  It just seemed appropriate at the time.
[43:32.880 --> 43:37.560]  And yeah, you can always sort of see things going down a particular path.
[43:37.560 --> 43:42.720]  And with the advent of high technology, mass communications, computers, that kind of thing.
[43:43.100 --> 43:53.560]  And of course, reading Orwell and various other works, you can sort of see where things might go if certain powerful entities have their way.
[43:53.720 --> 43:56.800]  So it wasn't that hard to really see it coming.
[43:57.280 --> 44:00.280]  And it's not a foregone conclusion yet.
[44:00.380 --> 44:02.500]  It's not... the final chapter has not been written.
[44:02.500 --> 44:03.560]  We still have a lot of power.
[44:03.660 --> 44:06.620]  We can make a lot of change and steer the ship in a better direction.
[44:06.800 --> 44:10.700]  But it's important to wake people up and say, yeah, we're not going to a good place right now.
[44:11.660 --> 44:11.860]  Yeah.
[44:11.980 --> 44:13.100]  Big brother's watching.
[44:13.260 --> 44:14.140]  We watch him back.
[44:14.420 --> 44:14.780]  Hopefully.
[44:15.060 --> 44:15.280]  Hopefully.
[44:16.440 --> 44:16.920]  All right.
[44:17.020 --> 44:17.520]  Good night, sir.
[44:17.560 --> 44:18.120]  Thanks for your call.
[44:18.960 --> 44:19.860]  And good evening.
[44:20.040 --> 44:20.740]  You're on Off the Hook.
[44:21.280 --> 44:21.940]  Oh, dear.
[44:21.940 --> 44:22.980]  You didn't wait long enough.
[44:23.200 --> 44:23.620]  Good evening.
[44:24.040 --> 44:24.980]  You are on Off the Hook.
[44:26.140 --> 44:27.140]  Go ahead.
[44:27.220 --> 44:27.520]  Speak up.
[44:28.120 --> 44:41.800]  Yeah, I think it's... I think an opposed, purloined letter in regard to all these detective police agencies out of Washington sniffing under every armpit in the world.
[44:42.220 --> 44:49.600]  And nobody from Wall Street in this financial wreck that destroyed the world has gone to jail.
[44:50.240 --> 44:52.340]  They're sitting in these guys' laps.
[44:52.540 --> 44:53.680]  They don't see it.
[44:53.820 --> 44:56.040]  Well, obviously, they don't choose to deal with it.
[44:56.600 --> 44:59.740]  And how does that relate to what we're discussing tonight?
[45:00.440 --> 45:05.460]  Well, I kept hearing about the secret police going into this agency, that agency.
[45:05.660 --> 45:06.520]  What are they looking for?
[45:07.020 --> 45:08.160]  They're looking for what?
[45:08.280 --> 45:09.060]  I don't understand.
[45:09.380 --> 45:11.040]  The big criminals are out there.
[45:11.200 --> 45:11.940]  They're right there.
[45:12.100 --> 45:13.340]  Nobody's doing anything about it.
[45:13.540 --> 45:14.780]  So what do we have police for?
[45:15.480 --> 45:15.700]  Mm-hmm.
[45:16.600 --> 45:17.060]  Good question.
[45:17.600 --> 45:18.100]  All right.
[45:18.180 --> 45:22.140]  Well, hopefully somebody out there has some kind of answer.
[45:22.140 --> 45:23.320]  To oppress the powerless.
[45:23.940 --> 45:24.280]  Okay, there.
[45:24.380 --> 45:24.940]  You have your answer.
[45:25.320 --> 45:25.960]  Good evening.
[45:26.080 --> 45:26.560]  You're on off the hook.
[45:27.900 --> 45:28.520]  Go ahead.
[45:29.380 --> 45:30.040]  Speak up.
[45:30.280 --> 45:30.720]  Hi.
[45:30.860 --> 45:31.040]  Hi.
[45:31.480 --> 45:38.740]  I actually just wanted to chime in about the current Skype thing that's going on right now.
[45:39.800 --> 45:40.380]  Go ahead.
[45:40.520 --> 45:41.040]  Let's chime in.
[45:41.720 --> 45:42.320]  Yeah.
[45:42.880 --> 45:48.640]  Actually, currently in China, they've got a system set up to where it's called TomSkype.
[45:48.760 --> 45:54.300]  And it's basically real-time interception of voice and actually typed in chat.
[45:54.620 --> 46:03.000]  And it's a really easy way for China to monitor sort of what they consider to be nefarious type activity and public dissent and things like that.
[46:03.900 --> 46:16.440]  So they may actually be bringing sort of a similar model, not necessarily in terms of law, but in terms of the capability of having to have that in case the federal government would like to do that.
[46:18.340 --> 46:18.700]  Okay.
[46:18.700 --> 46:19.120]  All right.
[46:19.200 --> 46:19.660]  Thanks for your call.
[46:21.300 --> 46:22.500]  212-209-2900.
[46:22.620 --> 46:22.860]  Good evening.
[46:22.980 --> 46:23.620]  You're on off the hook.
[46:25.840 --> 46:26.200]  Hello?
[46:26.500 --> 46:26.880]  Yes, go ahead.
[46:28.060 --> 46:28.880]  Am I on the air?
[46:28.920 --> 46:29.540]  You're on the air.
[46:29.640 --> 46:30.400]  Please go ahead.
[46:31.400 --> 46:33.440]  Well, I didn't want to speak on the air.
[46:33.580 --> 46:34.040]  I wanted...
[46:34.040 --> 46:34.960]  Well, you've got your wish.
[46:35.080 --> 46:35.240]  Okay.
[46:35.320 --> 46:35.660]  Good evening.
[46:35.840 --> 46:36.480]  You're on off the hook.
[46:36.480 --> 46:37.660]  Hopefully, you want to speak on the air.
[46:38.400 --> 46:38.720]  Yeah.
[46:39.100 --> 46:40.380]  I'd like to mention a flaw.
[46:40.440 --> 46:42.880]  Yeah, but you know, the other thing is that we didn't want you to speak on the air.
[46:42.980 --> 46:43.100]  Okay.
[46:43.120 --> 46:43.700]  Let's try this one.
[46:43.760 --> 46:44.060]  Good evening.
[46:44.180 --> 46:44.900]  You're on off the hook.
[46:45.460 --> 46:45.720]  Hello.
[46:46.040 --> 46:46.200]  Hi.
[46:46.480 --> 46:48.040]  This is a little off the subject.
[46:48.220 --> 46:49.320]  It has to do with phones.
[46:49.520 --> 46:57.760]  I found a cell phone in a wastebasket in the city called V, as in victory, tech.
[46:58.100 --> 46:58.740]  V-tech.
[46:58.900 --> 47:00.540]  The phone, not the wastebasket, it was called.
[47:01.160 --> 47:01.480]  Okay.
[47:02.200 --> 47:02.520]  Right.
[47:02.680 --> 47:02.940]  All right.
[47:03.100 --> 47:03.300]  The phone.
[47:03.700 --> 47:04.020]  Okay.
[47:04.100 --> 47:06.000]  It doesn't seem to have a battery in the back.
[47:06.000 --> 47:06.000]  Yeah.
[47:06.100 --> 47:07.880]  Number one, do you know who made this phone?
[47:07.940 --> 47:08.700]  What's it called again?
[47:09.720 --> 47:10.360]  V-tech.
[47:10.680 --> 47:11.100]  V-tech.
[47:11.340 --> 47:11.580]  Yes.
[47:11.640 --> 47:12.280]  That sounds familiar.
[47:12.580 --> 47:13.520]  Barney, do you know something about this?
[47:13.860 --> 47:15.120]  Yeah, it's not a cellular phone.
[47:15.200 --> 47:16.300]  It's a cordless phone.
[47:16.440 --> 47:17.560]  Oh, a cordless phone.
[47:17.680 --> 47:17.960]  What is that?
[47:18.100 --> 47:33.680]  So, you can't use it, obviously, without a battery, but also you can't use it without the matching base station, which then plugs into a telephone line, then you can probably go maybe a couple hundred feet away from the base station with that cordless hand set.
[47:33.800 --> 47:37.640]  Well, if our caller maybe checks other wastebasket baskets in the area, maybe he'll find the base station as well.
[47:37.940 --> 47:38.420]  Maybe.
[47:38.580 --> 47:39.300]  Thank you very much.
[47:39.300 --> 47:45.480]  I hope listeners will contribute toward the life of this program when the fundraising comes around.
[47:45.680 --> 47:46.920]  I hope you're one of them, too.
[47:47.080 --> 47:49.200]  And thanks very much for your call, and thanks for your support.
[47:49.420 --> 47:50.240]  And yes, that's right.
[47:51.140 --> 47:58.660]  Fundraising for the summer begins next week, and we hope to have all kinds of fun and raise money and keep the station going and keep this show going, so the discussion never ends.
[47:58.820 --> 47:59.200]  Good evening.
[47:59.320 --> 47:59.840]  You're on Off the Hook.
[48:01.140 --> 48:04.780]  Correct me if I'm wrong, but aren't there five regular polygons?
[48:06.460 --> 48:14.040]  There's a tetrahedra, octagon, square, cosahedra, and I believe it's a dacahedra.
[48:14.200 --> 48:15.260]  Have we weighed in on this?
[48:15.900 --> 48:19.720]  These are polyhedra, not polygons, but I don't remember how many...
[48:19.720 --> 48:20.160]  Are there five regular ones?
[48:20.380 --> 48:21.600]  I don't know how many there are.
[48:22.060 --> 48:23.880]  We've exhausted my knowledge on the topic.
[48:24.440 --> 48:26.200]  That happened in about half a second, too.
[48:27.140 --> 48:29.080]  We're just going to have to get back to you on that.
[48:29.080 --> 48:32.280]  I don't know how we even delved into that topic, but let's delve into another one.
[48:32.360 --> 48:32.560]  Good evening.
[48:32.700 --> 48:33.200]  You're on Off the Hook.
[48:33.640 --> 48:33.880]  Bye.
[48:34.000 --> 48:34.680]  I want to talk.
[48:35.280 --> 48:35.840]  Yeah, go ahead.
[48:35.900 --> 48:36.220]  You're talking.
[48:36.940 --> 48:42.880]  I'm talking about something else, about the Dominic Strasson, the IMFG.
[48:42.920 --> 48:44.700]  Does it have to do with telephones or computers somehow?
[48:45.500 --> 48:46.780]  No, I'm just driving.
[48:47.020 --> 48:49.860]  I'm just stopped right now, and I can talk.
[48:50.060 --> 48:50.760]  There's no noise.
[48:50.900 --> 48:55.340]  Okay, that's a relief, but I don't know if the subject actually ties into anything we're talking about.
[48:55.520 --> 48:58.340]  I'll give you a chance to tie it into hackers somehow.
[48:59.080 --> 49:10.760]  Okay, what I wanted to say is that this Dominic Strasson, when people are powerful, when they have money, they can buy anything, including the justice system.
[49:10.940 --> 49:22.540]  She abused, he raped a woman, and because he's an ex-IMF chief, they can live in a $50,000 tent house for a month, and month after month.
[49:22.540 --> 49:25.920]  They can just buy the justice system and get away with it.
[49:26.080 --> 49:30.700]  How does it play out with just the world and just the people who are not Dominican?
[49:31.300 --> 49:36.260]  I mean, why money and power has taken over all of our life?
[49:36.420 --> 49:38.440]  Isn't there something we can do about it?
[49:38.600 --> 49:55.180]  Well, okay, that's about the only tie-in that you've made here, that power and money does tend to dominate, but as far as the case, so we're not going to touch that because we don't know anything about it, and it's extremely volatile and not really related to what we're talking about.
[49:55.260 --> 50:01.400]  But yeah, money, power corrupts, and you got to keep an eye on it, and you have to constantly challenge it.
[50:01.520 --> 50:04.980]  So yeah, that's what we can agree on as far as that goes.
[50:05.540 --> 50:06.120]  Let's move on.
[50:06.120 --> 50:07.480]  John, good evening, you're on Off the Hook.
[50:09.080 --> 50:09.840]  Speak up, please.
[50:11.100 --> 50:12.580]  Okay, you got to speak up faster than that.
[50:12.640 --> 50:13.580]  Good evening, you're on Off the Hook.
[50:14.420 --> 50:15.000]  Go ahead.
[50:16.140 --> 50:26.100]  Hello, what could you tell me about Startpage, which is the company is Ixquik, and they advertise themselves as the most private search engine in the world?
[50:26.780 --> 50:27.740]  I never heard of them.
[50:27.860 --> 50:28.740]  Has anybody here heard of them?
[50:29.520 --> 50:30.600]  Where did you hear of them, sir?
[50:31.680 --> 50:33.160]  Well, I was looking up...
[50:33.160 --> 50:34.920]  I actually use them quite a lot.
[50:34.920 --> 50:39.540]  I don't use Google or anything anymore, because they say they don't report your IP address.
[50:39.760 --> 50:44.300]  So I've been using them for a few months, and I'm waiting for them to launch their email service.
[50:44.540 --> 51:02.440]  The company name is Ixquik.com, and I guess the American version or English version is Startpage, and they say they don't report their IP address, and they have some literature on there about how they're the safest and how they fight against privacy invasions,
[51:02.640 --> 51:06.720]  against people like you who you were speaking about, Bill Gates and the rest of those bananas.
[51:06.940 --> 51:08.560]  Do you know where they're based?
[51:09.980 --> 51:12.960]  Somewhere in Europe, more than likely, from what I've been reading.
[51:13.340 --> 51:16.240]  But, you know, all the information is on the page.
[51:16.420 --> 51:32.440]  And when they had that AOL, what is it, data invasion or email invasion or something like that a few years ago, they have that as one of their links, too, to show you how easy it is to invade the other search engine systems.
[51:32.620 --> 51:35.520]  And I was just wondering if you knew anything about it.
[51:35.620 --> 51:39.140]  Well, they've kept their presence rather quiet to us anyway, Rob.
[51:39.360 --> 51:43.420]  Yeah, obviously, if we haven't heard of them, they're doing a very good job of being the most private search engine out there.
[51:43.520 --> 51:45.840]  But now you've gone and mentioned them on the radio, so I think you've spoiled them.
[51:45.840 --> 51:47.700]  Could you spell their name for our listeners?
[51:48.800 --> 51:50.420]  It's StarPage.com.
[51:50.580 --> 51:52.100]  You're saying StarPage?
[51:52.400 --> 51:55.040]  Star, like, you know, like to start something.
[51:55.480 --> 51:55.920]  StartPage.
[51:56.860 --> 51:57.740]  StartPage.com.
[51:58.220 --> 51:59.740]  And the company name is PixQuick.
[52:00.120 --> 52:01.000]  I've heard of them.
[52:01.240 --> 52:01.740]  Oh, you have?
[52:01.800 --> 52:01.980]  Okay.
[52:02.540 --> 52:08.220]  Yes, supposedly they're a search engine that will not spy on you.
[52:09.160 --> 52:09.600]  Okay.
[52:10.060 --> 52:15.500]  Well, I mean, you know, I like to believe people when they say things like that, but how do we believe them exactly?
[52:16.040 --> 52:17.080]  Because they say so.
[52:18.160 --> 52:19.780]  You have a time with the information.
[52:20.040 --> 52:20.920]  I did some research on them.
[52:21.700 --> 52:23.920]  I can't figure out what their business model is.
[52:24.340 --> 52:34.460]  It looks like there's a couple of people that are working on the project that have a good track record, but I can't understand how they're going to be able to make money.
[52:35.600 --> 52:37.440]  Well, it's not always about making money, Bernie.
[52:37.540 --> 52:40.740]  Maybe they're just idealists that want to keep everybody happy.
[52:40.920 --> 52:41.720]  They just can't be...
[52:41.720 --> 52:44.520]  Unfortunately, they can't be sustainable unless they make money.
[52:45.180 --> 52:45.900]  Go ahead, Mike.
[52:46.140 --> 52:47.580]  There's an interesting software project.
[52:47.720 --> 52:48.780]  It's a plug-in for Firefox.
[52:49.000 --> 52:49.900]  It's called Google Sharing.
[52:50.240 --> 52:56.600]  And what it does is when you visit Google, it mixes up your cookies with other users of Google Sharing's cookies.
[52:56.600 --> 52:58.980]  So it has a harder time differentiating who's who.
[52:58.980 --> 53:00.840]  I had that happen to me once in Holland, man.
[53:00.900 --> 53:02.580]  They mixed everybody's cookies together.
[53:02.580 --> 53:05.120]  And boy, what a night that was.
[53:05.940 --> 53:07.400]  All these Germans were...
[53:07.400 --> 53:07.900]  Okay.
[53:08.060 --> 53:08.960]  Well, it's just...
[53:08.960 --> 53:10.940]  It was after Galactic Hacker Party.
[53:11.080 --> 53:15.600]  Anyway, I don't know what happened to you in Holland before Google was invented.
[53:15.900 --> 53:16.240]  It was epic.
[53:16.240 --> 53:16.480]  It was something, yeah.
[53:16.960 --> 53:18.920]  But it's interesting software.
[53:18.920 --> 53:25.560]  And it's interesting that people are trying to find ways to preserve their privacy even when interacting with these large companies.
[53:25.560 --> 53:34.120]  But the interesting thing about it is that it lets you take the privacy into your own hands as opposed to just trusting this other company that I never heard of before.
[53:35.000 --> 53:35.960]  But who knows?
[53:36.080 --> 53:36.240]  All right.
[53:36.320 --> 53:39.060]  Let's try and race through a couple more calls in the time we have left.
[53:39.100 --> 53:39.520]  Good evening.
[53:39.700 --> 53:40.480]  You're on Off the Hook.
[53:40.840 --> 53:41.200]  Yeah.
[53:41.540 --> 53:50.420]  Just to mention the ixquick.com website is where you go to automatically if you download the Tor browser bundle for a project.
[53:51.380 --> 54:04.520]  The other thing was, I was wondering if anybody was aware of what the current statutes are on liability for other people hooking into your wireless router, even if you have it protected.
[54:04.780 --> 54:07.440]  I understood that the customer is liable.
[54:08.860 --> 54:11.100]  Well, it depends who you talk to, I think.
[54:11.320 --> 54:13.600]  Yeah, I think it also depends wildly on where you are.
[54:13.720 --> 54:19.220]  I think every place has sort of different rules or none at all, depending on whether or not they've touched it in the local courts yet.
[54:19.220 --> 54:21.060]  So you'd have to check with your local experts.
[54:21.300 --> 54:30.280]  So this is not legal advice, but one thing you can do actually to reduce your liability is to open up the wireless, because then it's harder to prove that you knew who was on it.
[54:30.840 --> 54:35.180]  But of course, it's more likely that someone will do something that requires you to prove you don't know who it was.
[54:35.220 --> 54:36.380]  And you can still know who they were.
[54:36.660 --> 54:51.900]  Now, if you actually aren't going to do something over your connection that you're worried about being liable for, then you can lock down your network, use WPA, maybe even have your thing only allow certain computers, MAC addresses allowed on your network,
[54:51.940 --> 54:53.980]  and then just, you don't have to worry about that.
[54:54.160 --> 54:55.360]  Unless somebody gets in anyway.
[54:55.800 --> 54:55.980]  Yeah, that's true.
[54:55.980 --> 54:58.040]  All right, let's take one more phone call, and then that's it.
[54:58.140 --> 54:58.440]  Good evening.
[54:58.580 --> 54:59.240]  You're on off the hook.
[55:00.980 --> 55:01.680]  Speak up, please.
[55:02.780 --> 55:04.240]  Okay, you've got to speak faster than that.
[55:04.300 --> 55:04.480]  I'm sorry.
[55:04.540 --> 55:04.780]  Good evening.
[55:04.900 --> 55:05.440]  You're on off the hook.
[55:05.500 --> 55:05.760]  Go ahead.
[55:06.080 --> 55:06.260]  Yeah.
[55:07.040 --> 55:07.620]  Make it quick.
[55:08.080 --> 55:08.780]  Search engines.
[55:09.600 --> 55:11.300]  I do a lot of work on search engines.
[55:11.480 --> 55:11.660]  Okay.
[55:11.880 --> 55:12.660]  What would you recommend?
[55:14.480 --> 55:15.660]  Well, that's kind of open-ended.
[55:15.780 --> 55:18.080]  Maybe the next program can delve into that a little bit more.
[55:18.180 --> 55:18.880]  Volta, do you have something?
[55:19.560 --> 55:19.920]  DuckDuckGo.
[55:20.060 --> 55:21.100]  I was just thinking about it.
[55:21.140 --> 55:21.960]  Wait, what's this?
[55:22.700 --> 55:23.060]  DuckDuckGo.
[55:23.200 --> 55:23.900]  How do you spell that?
[55:24.460 --> 55:27.340]  D-U-C-K-D-U-C-K-G-O.
[55:27.740 --> 55:28.100]  DuckDuckGo.
[55:28.940 --> 55:29.300]  DuckDuckGo.
[55:29.540 --> 55:29.740]  Yeah.
[55:29.960 --> 55:30.320]  Okay.
[55:30.600 --> 55:33.520]  They're not that much better than Google, but if you're looking for something better...
[55:33.520 --> 55:41.840]  Well, we don't really have that much time to get into it, but you've left the show on a fascinating note that I guess we can investigate this a little bit more.
[55:42.820 --> 55:43.800]  That's it for us this week.
[55:43.920 --> 55:44.720]  Thanks, everybody, for calling in.
[55:44.780 --> 55:45.900]  Really full switchboard this week.
[55:46.040 --> 55:48.660]  You can write to us, O-T-H at 2600.com.
[55:48.920 --> 55:52.160]  I'm sure there are going to be all kinds of things in the news, all kinds of fun technology happening.
[55:52.740 --> 55:56.120]  Don't forget, next week, we have the first of a series of fundraising shows.
[55:56.200 --> 56:03.420]  It would be great to have you there to show up and pledge funds and keep us going, because that's the only reason we're on the air now.
[56:03.700 --> 56:06.640]  So, Manuel, for Off the Hook, we'll see you next time.
[56:06.640 --> 56:07.640]  Have a good night.
[56:58.670 --> 57:22.730]  I don't know who I am I don't know who you are But when I touch your hand I see shooting stars I see ferris wheels Curling walls of steel And light,
[57:27.530 --> 57:35.770]  we speak through satellites that hang like the stars at night.
[57:36.470 --> 57:38.750]  The sky,
[57:51.660 --> 57:58.560]  we speak through satellites that hang like the stars at night.
[57:59.800 --> 58:01.840]  In the sky.
[58:06.900 --> 58:08.980]  In the sky.
[58:14.620 --> 58:16.660]  In the sky.
[58:30.420 --> 58:33.720]  Beautiful skies here over New York, New York.