[00:18.620 --> 00:21.480]  But I was alive tonight.
[00:22.740 --> 00:25.840]  Nobody's fooling, nobody is the way it goes.
[00:26.500 --> 00:29.460]  I'm sitting down here in the campfire light.
[00:30.940 --> 00:32.960]  The host of old time, Joe.
[00:33.260 --> 00:37.460]  And you're listening to Radio Station WBAI New York.
[00:37.600 --> 00:39.200]  It's 7 o'clock on a Wednesday night.
[00:41.640 --> 00:43.180]  Time for Off the Hook.
[00:53.880 --> 00:55.900]  I cut myself while shaving.
[00:56.380 --> 00:58.400]  Now I can't make a call.
[00:59.080 --> 01:01.240]  It couldn't get much worse.
[01:01.760 --> 01:06.670]  They would bum-diddly-bomb for the best, expect the worst.
[01:07.270 --> 01:09.190]  I hope that's understood.
[01:09.530 --> 01:10.290]  Bum-diddly-bomb.
[01:15.950 --> 01:18.290]  Somebody's struggling for a place to stay.
[01:18.470 --> 01:19.430]  I like this better, actually.
[01:22.180 --> 01:24.720]  For a decent child or a
[01:57.970 --> 01:58.710]  healthy...
[02:00.910 --> 02:01.930]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:02.030 --> 02:03.350]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:03.450 --> 02:05.810]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:06.510 --> 02:09.430]  And I'm joined tonight by Mike.
[02:09.690 --> 02:09.950]  Hello.
[02:10.410 --> 02:10.930]  Wait a minute, hold on.
[02:10.990 --> 02:11.470]  Say that louder.
[02:11.810 --> 02:11.970]  Hello.
[02:12.250 --> 02:13.170]  Yeah, Dot Red.
[02:13.510 --> 02:13.770]  Hello.
[02:14.230 --> 02:14.710]  Rob T.
[02:14.830 --> 02:15.270]  Firefly.
[02:15.530 --> 02:15.910]  Good evening.
[02:16.710 --> 02:17.610]  Jim over there.
[02:17.810 --> 02:18.010]  Hello.
[02:18.750 --> 02:19.470]  Bernie S.
[02:19.610 --> 02:20.330]  down in Philadelphia.
[02:20.750 --> 02:21.510]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:21.970 --> 02:23.290]  Sound a little dim there, Bernie.
[02:23.290 --> 02:26.250]  Bernie, we have an action-packed show for you tonight.
[02:26.270 --> 02:26.570]  That's not nice.
[02:27.130 --> 02:34.310]  No, I mean dim in loudness, but a lot of dials have to be recalibrated here.
[02:35.330 --> 02:36.250]  Okay, we're back.
[02:36.350 --> 02:36.650]  We're back.
[02:36.810 --> 02:38.690]  And all kinds of things to talk about.
[02:39.630 --> 02:40.070]  Yeah.
[02:40.950 --> 02:44.110]  All right, I guess I should point out the North Korean music in the background.
[02:44.310 --> 02:46.270]  That's a problem with the board that we're having.
[02:46.830 --> 02:54.310]  We don't know exactly where that's coming from, but it's been going on all day, and we can't seem to turn it off.
[02:54.390 --> 02:56.310]  So let's just try and bear with that.
[02:56.370 --> 03:03.410]  The good news is that the North Korean music seems to have replaced the squeal that we've been complaining about the last few weeks.
[03:03.510 --> 03:04.050]  Isn't that right, Bernie?
[03:04.830 --> 03:06.270]  I prefer it to the squeal.
[03:06.410 --> 03:07.550]  Yeah, but you still sound so dim.
[03:08.710 --> 03:11.210]  Yeah, I realize that could sound like an insult, but I'm not.
[03:11.450 --> 03:12.410]  I sound dim?
[03:12.530 --> 03:13.010]  Is that what you're saying?
[03:13.010 --> 03:14.050]  Well, what are you talking through?
[03:14.090 --> 03:15.470]  It sounds like you're talking through a tin can.
[03:15.470 --> 03:20.410]  Actually, I'm talking to you on a 45-year-old trim-line rotary phone.
[03:21.050 --> 03:29.670]  Well, you know, I think you need to do something to that phone, because why don't you bang it on the table a little bit, because that tends to loosen up the carbon element in it sometimes.
[03:29.930 --> 03:30.310]  Is it better?
[03:30.730 --> 03:31.370]  No, it's not better.
[03:31.390 --> 03:31.970]  You didn't do anything.
[03:32.110 --> 03:32.990]  I don't think it's...
[03:32.990 --> 03:33.590]  Any better now?
[03:33.850 --> 03:34.150]  No.
[03:34.770 --> 03:39.210]  You have to actually whack the thing against a brick wall or something to make it work better.
[03:39.330 --> 03:42.150]  Now I'm talking to you on a modern AT&T cordless phone.
[03:42.590 --> 03:43.610]  Well, this is...
[03:43.610 --> 03:45.310]  All right, well, we'll try and make do.
[03:45.470 --> 03:46.130]  We'll try and make do.
[03:47.450 --> 03:50.050]  Yeah, so good news.
[03:50.370 --> 03:51.210]  Some good news.
[03:51.410 --> 03:53.330]  Well, not really, but a little bit of good news.
[03:54.450 --> 03:55.590]  Let's talk about SOPA.
[03:56.710 --> 03:57.950]  It's been delayed, I understand.
[03:57.950 --> 03:58.770]  It's been delayed.
[03:58.950 --> 04:00.450]  We were talking about this last week.
[04:01.490 --> 04:02.290]  And the...
[04:03.570 --> 04:04.790]  Well, is it ended?
[04:05.210 --> 04:06.090]  No, it hasn't ended.
[04:06.690 --> 04:07.530]  I thought for a...
[04:07.530 --> 04:10.030]  Just a track change, I guess.
[04:10.990 --> 04:12.490]  Yeah, we talked about...
[04:12.490 --> 04:13.310]  What does it stand for, SOPA?
[04:13.770 --> 04:16.010]  The Stop Online Piracy Act.
[04:16.150 --> 04:16.350]  Right.
[04:17.930 --> 04:18.910]  And it was supposed to be...
[04:18.910 --> 04:19.490]  Should we explain what it is?
[04:19.550 --> 04:20.850]  Because it's not very clear from the name.
[04:20.870 --> 04:21.870]  It was supposed to be voted on last Thursday.
[04:21.870 --> 04:23.670]  We were in a panic last week.
[04:25.450 --> 04:28.630]  And we basically got some kind of a reprieve.
[04:28.750 --> 04:30.230]  But yeah, tell us a little bit about it.
[04:30.230 --> 04:32.910]  So this is the bill that will allow the U.S.
[04:33.290 --> 04:44.430]  government or private parties, like the copyright holders, to have websites shut down with allegations of copyright infringement.
[04:45.550 --> 04:47.790]  And this would extend U.S.
[04:48.190 --> 04:50.850]  copyright law to the whole world, or it would try to.
[04:52.230 --> 04:54.330]  And it would allow...
[04:54.330 --> 05:02.410]  You know, governments in foreign countries, like China, or I would say North Korea, but they don't really have the internet, use this sort of technology.
[05:02.410 --> 05:03.810]  Let's not say North Korea any more times.
[05:04.010 --> 05:04.670]  I don't know.
[05:05.130 --> 05:14.530]  They use this sort of technology, and people like Hillary Clinton criticize it because governments should not control what their citizens can view on the internet.
[05:14.530 --> 05:20.690]  But the recording industry and the motion picture industry and their friends in Congress want the U.S.
[05:20.790 --> 05:21.750]  government to have that power.
[05:22.330 --> 05:24.290]  So the bill is called SOPA.
[05:24.490 --> 05:26.950]  You can learn more about it at AmericanCensorship.org.
[05:27.070 --> 05:32.570]  But what happened on Thursday was that the House Judiciary Committee was supposed to vote on it.
[05:32.730 --> 05:33.930]  Now, why didn't they?
[05:34.050 --> 05:37.030]  Was it because of the outcry, the last-minute outcry?
[05:37.150 --> 05:37.830]  I mean, they're not saying.
[05:37.930 --> 05:39.050]  So it's been delayed.
[05:39.190 --> 05:40.470]  We're not out of the woods yet.
[05:40.470 --> 05:41.130]  It's been delayed.
[05:41.130 --> 05:47.830]  It's been delayed until the new year, which is good news because it means that there's some opposition that's somehow getting through to them.
[05:48.230 --> 05:52.510]  But during the hearing, a number of amendments were offered that would make the bill less bad.
[05:52.650 --> 05:55.110]  And every single one of those amendments was rejected.
[05:55.110 --> 06:00.130]  And then the bill sponsors would say things like, Well, you think there's problems with the bill?
[06:00.210 --> 06:02.190]  Why don't you suggest solutions to those problems?
[06:02.330 --> 06:04.430]  And then they would go reject those solutions.
[06:04.950 --> 06:10.710]  They would ignore everyone who knew anything about how the internet works in favor of their censorship agenda.
[06:11.310 --> 06:16.190]  But for some reason, at the end of all this bad news, they decided not to move forward yet.
[06:16.830 --> 06:19.410]  Wasn't it so much better when Congress didn't understand the internet at all?
[06:19.490 --> 06:21.490]  Well, they don't understand it still, but they think they do now.
[06:21.570 --> 06:23.150]  And that's so much worse.
[06:23.310 --> 06:25.470]  Some of them say, you know, I don't understand the internet.
[06:25.470 --> 06:26.210]  I don't need to.
[06:26.830 --> 06:28.430]  Yeah, but see, that's extremely dangerous.
[06:29.430 --> 06:45.190]  Well, that's extremely dangerous because what they're trying to propose will also decrease the security of the actual DNS system as a whole, which is where websites get their names from in the first place, which is what they're talking about having control over in terms of taking a website off the internet.
[06:45.690 --> 06:53.310]  And, you know, there's been lots of talk about the security updates to it and how this whole bill will totally throw that out the window.
[06:54.070 --> 06:58.430]  And as Congress has taught us, the internet is, of course, a series of tubes.
[06:58.690 --> 07:06.650]  But another thing this act would have done is basically remove the whole due process from copyright infringement.
[07:06.770 --> 07:08.050]  Copyright infringement is already a crime.
[07:09.230 --> 07:14.210]  And websites get taken down, you know, routinely because the people on them are violating copyrights.
[07:14.210 --> 07:20.830]  But what this would do would allow the copyright holders to just accuse you of infringing their copyright.
[07:20.950 --> 07:26.910]  And without giving you a chance to respond or defend yourself or claim fair use or anything else, you would lose your domain.
[07:27.250 --> 07:33.370]  I just have one... that was very clear, but I just have one correction, which is that copyright infringement is not always a crime.
[07:33.370 --> 07:34.870]  In fact, it's usually not a crime.
[07:34.970 --> 07:40.010]  And in most of the cases that people are concerned about, it's a civil violation.
[07:40.010 --> 07:44.590]  And yet the penalty for this thing, which is not a crime, is still being removed from the web...
[07:44.590 --> 07:46.710]  The penalty is that you get removed from the website.
[07:46.810 --> 07:47.250]  Yes, that's correct.
[07:47.250 --> 07:47.450]  From the internet.
[07:48.350 --> 07:50.930]  But you don't get removed from the streets, not yet, right?
[07:51.010 --> 07:51.490]  That's coming.
[07:51.970 --> 07:53.410]  Well, it's hard.
[07:53.490 --> 07:54.850]  It's hard because the U.S.
[07:54.970 --> 07:59.470]  government wants to assert this power over people not in its jurisdiction.
[08:00.270 --> 08:01.870]  And, you know, so the U.S.
[08:02.150 --> 08:08.710]  government does have a new and recent history of, you know, shooting people with drones who are outside of its jurisdiction.
[08:09.730 --> 08:13.350]  But I don't know that the plan is to extend that to people who infringe copyright.
[08:13.510 --> 08:14.250]  You know, I wish I had this story.
[08:14.530 --> 08:15.390]  I don't have it with me.
[08:15.530 --> 08:16.750]  I meant to bring it in.
[08:16.850 --> 08:18.290]  But there was a story about U.S.
[08:18.670 --> 08:20.630]  drones striking within the United States now.
[08:20.890 --> 08:22.370]  They're actually using them against...
[08:22.370 --> 08:24.150]  Are they using them to strike or just to observe?
[08:24.190 --> 08:24.790]  Well, to observe.
[08:24.970 --> 08:27.990]  But I consider that a strike, to actually use it to prosecute people.
[08:28.030 --> 08:30.010]  I think it was in Wisconsin or something like that.
[08:30.070 --> 08:32.390]  If I can find the story this hour, I'll discuss it.
[08:32.490 --> 08:34.870]  But, yeah, I mean, is anybody surprised by that?
[08:34.870 --> 08:37.130]  They use this technology overseas first.
[08:37.570 --> 08:38.990]  They use it on soldiers.
[08:39.010 --> 08:40.270]  They use it on prisoners.
[08:40.270 --> 08:41.530]  They use it on foreigners.
[08:41.770 --> 08:42.990]  Then they use it on us.
[08:43.130 --> 08:44.310]  It's not really that surprising.
[08:44.470 --> 08:45.370]  And that's how it works.
[08:45.670 --> 08:46.530]  I mean, let's be clear, though.
[08:46.590 --> 08:50.110]  There is a difference between using a drone to observe and using it to shoot people down.
[08:50.510 --> 08:50.870]  Well...
[08:50.870 --> 08:52.070]  They're both bad, okay.
[08:52.310 --> 08:55.950]  But, you know, I can tell you which one I prefer if I had to choose one.
[08:55.950 --> 08:56.610]  One is step one.
[08:56.710 --> 08:57.570]  One is step two.
[08:57.970 --> 08:59.410]  You know, it's basically...
[08:59.410 --> 09:02.710]  It's like any science fiction story where at first they look at you and then they attack you.
[09:03.210 --> 09:04.550]  You know, they learn first.
[09:04.730 --> 09:05.830]  They have to know what to attack.
[09:05.830 --> 09:06.550]  They adapt.
[09:06.790 --> 09:07.750]  Yeah, they adapt.
[09:07.870 --> 09:08.490]  They do.
[09:08.890 --> 09:13.590]  But I'd like to read a little bit from our friend Adam Savage talking about the SOPA bill.
[09:13.890 --> 09:20.850]  He says, Right now, Congress is considering two bills, the Protect IP Act and the Stop Online Piracy Act.
[09:21.070 --> 09:23.530]  That would be laughable if they weren't, in fact, real.
[09:23.530 --> 09:33.610]  Honestly, if a friend wrote these into a piece of fiction about government oversight gone amok, I'd have to tell them that they were too one-dimensional, too obviously anti-constitutional.
[09:34.550 --> 09:35.610]  Now, make no mistake.
[09:35.770 --> 09:37.470]  These bills aren't simply unconstitutional.
[09:37.470 --> 09:38.950]  They are anti-constitutional.
[09:38.950 --> 09:52.090]  They would allow for the wholesale elimination of entire websites, domain names, and chunks of the DNS based on nothing more than the good faith assertion by a single party that the website is infringing on a copyright of the complainant.
[09:52.090 --> 09:55.310]  The accused doesn't even have to be aware that the complaint has been made.
[09:55.490 --> 09:56.570]  I am not kidding.
[09:57.010 --> 10:08.810]  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the MCA, passed in 1998, which we're all well familiar with, is a lousy piece of legislation and a very useful lens through which to regard these two new pieces of legislation.
[10:09.050 --> 10:18.230]  Think of all the stories you've read over the past 14 years of people slapping the MCA takedowns of content that they didn't own just because they didn't like what it had to say.
[10:18.230 --> 10:27.590]  One that comes to mind is Uri Geller, the popular psychic who performed spoonbending and other tricks on TV in the 1970s.
[10:27.750 --> 10:38.010]  Using a DMCA claim, he had YouTube pull videos of him being humiliated during a 1973 appearance on The Tonight Show with Johnny Carson when he had no copyright claim to them at all.
[10:38.450 --> 10:40.410]  And this is exactly what will happen with...
[10:40.410 --> 10:41.510]  I want to see that video, by the way.
[10:41.570 --> 10:43.870]  If anyone can send it to us, oth at 2600.com.
[10:43.870 --> 10:44.890]  We'll spread it around.
[10:45.270 --> 10:47.650]  This is exactly what will happen with Protect IP and SOPA.
[10:47.650 --> 10:48.930]  We've seen it again and again.
[10:49.110 --> 10:52.710]  Give people a club like this and you can kiss the internet as you know it goodbye.
[10:52.790 --> 10:54.230]  It's really that bad.
[10:54.390 --> 10:56.890]  And it's a clear violation of our First Amendment right to free speech.
[10:56.990 --> 10:58.190]  Thank you, Adam Savage, for that.
[10:58.270 --> 10:59.850]  That's well said.
[11:00.390 --> 11:02.550]  And we've been given a slight reprieve.
[11:02.690 --> 11:03.830]  We need to take advantage of that.
[11:03.910 --> 11:16.010]  We need to educate people, get the word out about SOPA, about the Protect IP Act, about all these nonsensical pieces of legislation that are made by people who either don't understand the technology at all or understand it all too well.
[11:16.190 --> 11:16.550]  You're right.
[11:16.550 --> 11:26.570]  You know, we've seen it all too often that when a serious issue that people don't really like to see happen actually does come up, but it takes too long, people tend to forget about it and it might happen anyway.
[11:26.790 --> 11:28.650]  And this is a very serious problem.
[11:28.770 --> 11:30.330]  The internet is a very open...
[11:30.330 --> 11:33.430]  At least right now, it's still a fairly open medium.
[11:33.430 --> 11:41.570]  And if you take a website like YouTube, this sort of thing could lead to them living under the threat of the entire website being shut down for what a single user does.
[11:41.850 --> 11:46.930]  The whole model of having, you know, open user submitted content could end up going out the window.
[11:48.190 --> 11:49.010]  Yeah, absolutely.
[11:49.190 --> 11:51.170]  Now, do we have any websites people can actually...
[11:51.170 --> 11:54.010]  I know EFF, you can get some information on SOPA.
[11:54.010 --> 11:57.570]  So, I guess if you just type SOPA into a search engine, you'll get all kinds of things, right?
[11:57.730 --> 12:00.670]  Yeah, and then there's a group called Fight for the Future.
[12:00.890 --> 12:07.330]  Their website is AmericanCensorship.org and they have a lot of good information there, including information about what you can do.
[12:07.670 --> 12:11.430]  Okay, Bernie down in Philadelphia, has SOPA been talked about very much?
[12:11.950 --> 12:12.990]  Well, it's been talked about...
[12:12.990 --> 12:14.150]  Oh, the squeal is backed.
[12:14.610 --> 12:16.410]  I thought the North Koreans got rid of the squeal.
[12:16.490 --> 12:17.390]  No, the squeal is right there.
[12:17.490 --> 12:17.850]  Let's do that.
[12:17.990 --> 12:18.630]  Well, the North Koreans already hear that.
[12:18.750 --> 12:19.990]  Hey, I am not squealing.
[12:20.110 --> 12:21.070]  I want to make that very clear.
[12:21.070 --> 12:22.690]  Well, you're not squealing now, but...
[12:22.690 --> 12:24.050]  All right, well, go ahead.
[12:24.190 --> 12:26.090]  Tell us what you know while we can bear this around.
[12:26.130 --> 12:30.070]  Well, I had a question for Mike, who apparently has been researching SOPA pretty well.
[12:30.070 --> 12:52.410]  Are there any provisions in the SOPA legislation to prohibit or to allow private parties to take down .gov or .mil websites that might be violating someone's copyright?
[12:52.410 --> 12:53.170]  You've got to be kidding.
[12:53.270 --> 12:55.730]  You really want Mike to answer that question?
[12:55.850 --> 12:56.110]  Well...
[12:56.110 --> 12:57.050]  All right, Mike, have at it.
[12:57.130 --> 12:57.370]  Go ahead.
[12:57.370 --> 12:59.110]  The answer is I'm unaware.
[12:59.110 --> 13:09.090]  I haven't read the full legislation, but we all know that the law works differently for the powerful than for the weak, and I don't think you need me to draw out the conclusion here.
[13:09.270 --> 13:30.090]  Well, speaking purely technically, from what I remember of the bill, and also I have to say with him that I haven't read the entire thing, but he was basically talking about having control over IPs that are allocated from U.S.-based authorities and domains and domains in a similar sense.
[13:30.410 --> 13:40.170]  So just like .coms, .govs might be subject to it, but honestly, we all know who puts them up, and do we really think they'll impose the same restrictions on themselves?
[13:40.170 --> 13:56.450]  All right, moving on to another one of the stories that we've been focusing on the last few weeks, and that's the Carrier IQ controversy, and we had news come in over the last week that Sprint, Bernie, I believe that's your carrier, Sprint is no longer going to be using Carrier IQ.
[13:56.450 --> 14:05.890]  They're kicking them off the phones and their network and all of that, and I guess the question that keeps coming up is, is this really tackling the problem?
[14:05.930 --> 14:08.030]  Is it fair to the company known as Carrier IQ?
[14:08.050 --> 14:10.910]  Is it actually solving anything?
[14:11.190 --> 14:11.970]  What do you think, Bernie?
[14:12.750 --> 14:14.810]  No, it's not going to change anything, frankly.
[14:15.210 --> 14:26.330]  Carriers have been able to do, you know, log everything that, anyway, whether they had the Carrier 2 program or not, it just made it more convenient for them.
[14:26.450 --> 14:46.150]  The company that wrote Carrier 2 apparently had a provision in the software that would require the handset user to opt out of whether they wanted their information logged by this piece of software so that the carrier whose phone was on their network could use it for,
[14:46.150 --> 14:51.310]  you know, network monitoring and, you know, probably legitimate reasons.
[14:51.310 --> 15:05.730]  But the carriers all had that disabled, that feature, so that consumers would not be aware of their keystrokes and web domains that they were visiting and that sort of thing being logged.
[15:05.950 --> 15:16.430]  So it's, you know, the technology exists already for the carriers to monitor all this stuff, and ostensibly they do it for performance monitoring, but who knows what they do it for.
[15:16.430 --> 15:24.870]  Well, also, I should point out, there's a really good piece on the Electronic Frontier Foundation website that explains Carrier IQ and the complexities and all that.
[15:25.030 --> 15:35.150]  There are people who are adamantly arguing, saying that Carrier IQ is really not doing anything wrong, that it's just simply a symptom of the problem at best.
[15:35.150 --> 15:40.530]  And there are other people that are saying that Carrier IQ is, in fact, exactly what's wrong.
[15:40.650 --> 15:43.290]  But I think it's summed up really well in this paragraph.
[15:43.470 --> 15:48.550]  The complexities of the situation explain the apparent contradiction between claims by Carrier IQ, Inc.
[15:48.930 --> 15:59.490]  and researchers examining code written by the company, who have said that the company does not collect full keystroke data or the content of text messages, and others who say that they have observed this happening.
[15:59.490 --> 16:03.550]  People on all sides of this debate may be simultaneously correct.
[16:03.790 --> 16:04.750]  You ever heard of such a thing?
[16:05.230 --> 16:06.310]  It's crazy talk.
[16:06.430 --> 16:16.730]  It's crazy talk, but apparently it is possible, depending on how you interpret the information, for it to be not exactly true or false on either side.
[16:16.870 --> 16:17.850]  You mean things aren't black and white?
[16:17.850 --> 16:18.510]  Not black and white.
[16:18.570 --> 16:19.530]  Not in this particular case.
[16:19.670 --> 16:26.330]  So go to EFF.org and read some facts about Carrier IQ to get a better understanding as to what's going on here.
[16:26.350 --> 16:29.750]  And then decide for yourself, is Carrier IQ the sacrificial lamb here?
[16:29.870 --> 16:31.550]  Are they guilty of anything?
[16:33.490 --> 16:34.690]  And it's fascinating.
[16:34.690 --> 16:39.810]  It's good to see people caring about this, but it's kind of annoying that it takes this to get them to care.
[16:39.970 --> 16:42.270]  Because obviously things like this are going on.
[16:42.390 --> 16:45.270]  Obviously our privacy is completely being abused.
[16:45.450 --> 16:47.690]  And sometimes we're the ones handing it over.
[16:47.990 --> 16:49.030]  And we need to do better.
[16:49.570 --> 16:58.150]  Yeah, you know, I personally think that they aren't, you know, all innocent of everything going under Carrier IQ, I mean.
[16:58.990 --> 17:04.250]  They're catering to a pretty dark industry if you look at what the code in their program actually does.
[17:04.470 --> 17:07.350]  However, they can't be fully to blame for this.
[17:07.510 --> 17:14.690]  The mobile companies are the ones who were turning off the option to opt out, wasn't properly telling their customers about it.
[17:14.690 --> 17:21.950]  But, you know, so throwing Carrier IQ out the door seems kind of like a scapegoating, whereas they've already done a lot of this in the past.
[17:22.110 --> 17:30.490]  They'll probably continue doing this in the future unless customers are actually aware of what it is the companies they're going to actually does with their information.
[17:30.490 --> 17:32.350]  Well, I just think people should know what's on their phones.
[17:32.510 --> 17:32.930]  Well, yeah.
[17:33.170 --> 17:36.770]  I mean, obviously the companies, the phone companies are going to be spying as much as they can.
[17:36.910 --> 17:40.710]  And they're going to be collecting data and abusing it and selling and all kinds of things like that.
[17:40.790 --> 17:41.610]  Banks do the same thing.
[17:41.910 --> 17:43.910]  But on your actual phone, which you own.
[17:44.030 --> 17:46.030]  And I'm sorry, I don't care what they say, how they phrase it.
[17:46.130 --> 17:46.890]  You own that.
[17:46.890 --> 17:47.630]  It's in your pocket.
[17:47.690 --> 17:48.810]  You're carrying around all day long.
[17:49.450 --> 17:53.190]  They can say it's an agreement, a contract, that kind of thing.
[17:53.290 --> 17:53.930]  But you own it.
[17:53.970 --> 17:54.330]  It's yours.
[17:54.470 --> 17:55.450]  You should know what's on it.
[17:55.450 --> 17:55.970]  You should have permission.
[17:56.070 --> 17:56.730]  You should have access.
[17:56.850 --> 17:58.990]  You should be able to get root on your own damn phone.
[17:58.990 --> 18:09.050]  I just cannot understand people who buy things where you sign these agreements that say you don't actually have the right to play with your phone or learn how it works or get access to everything that's on it.
[18:09.070 --> 18:17.690]  Now, that's a whole other side of the issue that really bothered me about this entire thing, is that you had plenty of Android phones where people were saying this program was being hidden on their phones.
[18:17.690 --> 18:37.610]  And the one big hope I had when this operating system first came out was the hope that maybe with this semi-open operating system and then the ability to just replace the factory install with one that's not locked down, that you might actually see phones far more common that aren't,
[18:37.610 --> 18:42.390]  you know, software-wise locked down by the carriers.
[18:42.390 --> 18:50.310]  Whereas months down the line, we have people saying, oh, we didn't know this was on our Android phones, and other phones as well.
[18:50.430 --> 18:55.510]  But it just seems sad that people aren't taking a much more...
[18:55.510 --> 18:58.910]  Yeah, well, it turns out that the real Androids are the people walking around using them.
[18:59.470 --> 19:02.270]  Actually, that's an insult to Androids because they're more intelligent than that.
[19:02.470 --> 19:03.170]  Oh, snap.
[19:03.970 --> 19:04.570]  All right.
[19:04.670 --> 19:09.570]  Well, anyway, that's that as far as CarrierIQ for the moment.
[19:09.610 --> 19:11.030]  We'll keep updated on that.
[19:11.310 --> 19:12.270]  Some sad news.
[19:12.390 --> 19:13.470]  Some rather sad news.
[19:14.790 --> 19:26.690]  AT&T on Monday has ended its effort to buy T-Mobile USA, acknowledging that it could not overcome stiff opposition by the Obama administration to form the nation's biggest cell phone service provider.
[19:26.910 --> 19:33.590]  How dare the Obama administration prevent a supergiant cell phone company from being formed on our shores?
[19:33.930 --> 19:36.290]  Now, instead, we're going to have, what, two companies?
[19:36.570 --> 19:38.170]  Two companies competing with each other?
[19:38.470 --> 19:39.270]  What gives?
[19:39.370 --> 19:41.590]  I mean, this is not the America I'm used to here.
[19:41.590 --> 19:43.250]  We need our monopolies.
[19:43.670 --> 19:49.070]  And the Justice Department apparently is standing, has stood in the way of this.
[19:49.170 --> 19:53.290]  And now look, now look, the $39 billion takeover, it's ruined.
[19:53.470 --> 19:54.950]  It's ruined now for everybody.
[19:54.950 --> 19:56.510]  It would have been the biggest deal of the year.
[19:56.650 --> 19:58.290]  The biggest deal of the year.
[19:58.490 --> 19:59.830]  Don't we like good deals?
[19:59.950 --> 20:03.470]  Don't we like those amazing offers and fantastic deals?
[20:03.470 --> 20:05.250]  Well, it's a major setback for AT&T.
[20:05.730 --> 20:07.170]  You might be familiar with them.
[20:07.250 --> 20:08.810]  They only invented the telephone, didn't they?
[20:09.170 --> 20:09.550]  Yeah.
[20:09.710 --> 20:10.370]  No, no.
[20:10.550 --> 20:10.730]  What?
[20:10.910 --> 20:12.710]  This is not the company that invented the telephone.
[20:12.730 --> 20:13.310]  What, MCI invented the telephone?
[20:13.430 --> 20:13.910]  Is that what you're going to tell me?
[20:13.910 --> 20:18.290]  No, we've gone on this program before about the complicated history of AT&T.
[20:18.430 --> 20:21.890]  And the company now called AT&T is not the original AT&T.
[20:21.890 --> 20:23.970]  Well, they bought the three letters and the and sign.
[20:24.070 --> 20:24.470]  I don't know.
[20:24.650 --> 20:29.770]  Look, the important thing is you really ruin Christmas for them a lot.
[20:29.970 --> 20:40.550]  And Obama, I just hope that you can sleep at night knowing that the nation's, the very basic backbone of the nation's phone system is in a bad mood right now.
[20:41.150 --> 20:44.490]  They pinned their hopes for growth on that acquisition.
[20:44.490 --> 20:47.570]  The company wanted T-Mobile cellular airwaves or Spectrum.
[20:47.710 --> 20:48.910]  They wanted it so badly.
[20:48.910 --> 20:53.830]  They wanted it to relieve its congested network and offer faster service for data-hungry devices like the iPhone.
[20:53.990 --> 20:55.210]  You know, I got to tell AT&T something.
[20:55.470 --> 21:05.550]  If you're looking to acquire T-Mobile's cellular airwaves to help out your congestion, you're not getting much of a good deal there because there isn't much of a network.
[21:05.750 --> 21:09.130]  I can tell because it doesn't ever hold a connection for very long.
[21:09.410 --> 21:12.210]  It doesn't seem to have coverage in very many places.
[21:12.230 --> 21:13.730]  I don't know how much good it would have done you.
[21:13.850 --> 21:15.290]  That's because you don't have an Android phone.
[21:16.210 --> 21:18.390]  Yeah, I guess maybe that's the reason.
[21:18.390 --> 21:21.110]  But I've heard nothing about complaints about it.
[21:21.230 --> 21:23.090]  But no, competition is a good thing.
[21:23.390 --> 21:26.250]  I mean, that's my socialist view, I suppose.
[21:26.630 --> 21:26.990]  See, I don't know.
[21:27.210 --> 21:29.390]  Free, an equal competition?
[21:29.390 --> 21:31.370]  That sounds very socialist to me.
[21:31.530 --> 21:34.410]  Yeah, well, I don't know about equal competition, but at least some kind of competition.
[21:34.530 --> 21:34.890]  But anyway, yeah.
[21:34.890 --> 21:35.530]  Wait, I'm sorry.
[21:35.790 --> 21:38.010]  Did I miss the part where socialism meant capitalism?
[21:39.870 --> 21:43.170]  Apparently, anything that people don't like in this country is socialism.
[21:43.170 --> 21:45.770]  We've redefined all kinds of words have been redefined.
[21:45.910 --> 21:47.730]  You've got to keep up or you'll miss out.
[21:47.730 --> 21:49.510]  You're all a bunch of fascist anarchists.
[21:49.810 --> 21:52.410]  Now, Bernie, as a Sprint customer, how does this affect you?
[21:52.930 --> 22:07.350]  Well, it means Sprint's probably going to stay in business a little bit longer because if AT&T had successfully taken over, absorbed T-Mobile, Sprint would have been the smallest of the carriers and mobile carriers.
[22:08.330 --> 22:11.670]  But wouldn't AT&T have just then simply absorbed Sprint somehow?
[22:11.670 --> 22:15.050]  Well, no, that wouldn't happen because it was a totally different technology.
[22:15.330 --> 22:21.910]  Sprint and Verizon use CDMA, whereas AT&T and T-Mobile use GSM.
[22:22.130 --> 22:28.270]  But hasn't that happened before where a CDMA or GSM company has taken over a company with a different technology?
[22:28.510 --> 22:28.630]  Nope.
[22:28.630 --> 22:29.370]  And just forced...
[22:29.370 --> 22:31.890]  What about with Singular?
[22:32.050 --> 22:33.490]  Didn't they force everybody to get new phones?
[22:34.410 --> 22:35.110]  That was different.
[22:35.250 --> 22:42.170]  That was migrating from an older, like a TDMA technology over to...
[22:42.170 --> 22:47.070]  Not CDMA, that was TDMA, which is kind of like GSM, but that's a different scenario.
[22:47.750 --> 22:54.230]  But they did force everybody to get new phones, so isn't it sort of like doing the same thing to a GSM or to a CDMA company?
[22:54.330 --> 22:55.850]  You're kind of comparing apples and oranges, but...
[22:55.850 --> 22:56.170]  Sure.
[22:56.170 --> 22:56.910]  It wasn't a better example.
[22:56.910 --> 22:57.390]  Apples are better.
[22:57.750 --> 23:05.370]  What you just brought up, there was a good example that a few years ago when Sprint acquired with Nextel and tried to absorb that in there.
[23:05.610 --> 23:09.830]  Nextel used a unique Motorola technology called iDen.
[23:10.070 --> 23:12.310]  It wasn't GSM and it wasn't CDMA.
[23:12.630 --> 23:16.250]  And it's one of the reasons Sprint has had so much problems in the marketplace.
[23:16.450 --> 23:19.570]  They never fully integrated everything and have different handsets.
[23:19.990 --> 23:22.350]  They never integrated it and it was just a mess.
[23:22.930 --> 23:26.830]  So to answer your question, Sprint's going to be happy that this happened.
[23:27.010 --> 23:28.210]  And I'm happy that this happened.
[23:28.210 --> 23:29.570]  How about this scenario then?
[23:29.570 --> 23:32.710]  Couldn't AT&T create a CDMA division?
[23:33.010 --> 23:36.350]  I mean, AT&T was not in the cell phone business when they started out, right?
[23:36.590 --> 23:38.210]  And now they are.
[23:38.730 --> 23:41.310]  It would cost them untold billions.
[23:41.590 --> 23:43.110]  I'm happy that they have to...
[23:43.110 --> 23:50.930]  I'm kind of happy that AT&T Mobile has to give T-Mobile like $4 billion for reneging on this deal.
[23:51.090 --> 23:54.910]  Now, how much of that comes to me as a T-Mobile customer if they're getting $4 billion?
[23:54.910 --> 24:02.470]  That's a good question, but I think it'll result in T-Mobile being a stronger competitor now that they have an extra $4,000 in...
[24:03.010 --> 24:05.490]  It's got a combination of cash stock.
[24:05.510 --> 24:06.190]  $4,000?
[24:06.510 --> 24:07.710]  I mean, $4 billion.
[24:08.030 --> 24:08.410]  $4 billion.
[24:08.770 --> 24:10.570]  Yeah, I figure my cut of that's going to be that $4,000.
[24:10.870 --> 24:14.510]  Cash stock and Spectrum, I believe.
[24:14.550 --> 24:15.770]  Yeah, I don't really care about the network sometimes.
[24:15.890 --> 24:16.950]  I just want my percentage.
[24:17.190 --> 24:17.530]  Now, dot, right?
[24:17.530 --> 24:33.430]  No, if AT&T were to buy out T-Mobile, the people most likely to buy out Sprint would have been Verizon, as Verizon would have then been smaller than AT&T looking for a way to compete, and they have more compatible networks, not AT&T.
[24:33.650 --> 24:33.990]  All right.
[24:34.130 --> 24:35.350]  You know, we need another network.
[24:35.670 --> 24:43.530]  I kind of like the idea of all these different telecom companies sort of buying each other out until there's just one monopoly controlling the entire telecom industry in this country.
[24:43.630 --> 24:46.490]  I think that's something new and exciting, and we should try it once and see if it works.
[24:46.490 --> 24:51.070]  I'm waiting for one to buy itself by accident and not realize because of all the craziness going on.
[24:51.410 --> 24:58.790]  All right, Mike, you handed us all an FBI intelligence bulletin prior to the show.
[24:58.970 --> 25:00.290]  Yeah, well, by email.
[25:00.510 --> 25:00.870]  Well...
[25:00.870 --> 25:01.930]  I don't want to waste paper.
[25:02.390 --> 25:03.810]  Yeah, well, I wasted paper.
[25:03.870 --> 25:04.510]  I printed it out.
[25:04.630 --> 25:04.770]  Good.
[25:04.930 --> 25:05.770]  And I got it right here.
[25:05.910 --> 25:09.630]  Now, before I go into details here, I got to ask you a couple of questions.
[25:09.730 --> 25:14.290]  It says right here, restricted dissemination, and you seem to not care about that.
[25:14.290 --> 25:15.770]  You just basically handed it out.
[25:16.430 --> 25:19.050]  It's a restriction on FBI agents.
[25:19.170 --> 25:20.430]  They're not supposed to distribute it.
[25:20.510 --> 25:21.890]  It's not a restriction on private citizens.
[25:21.890 --> 25:25.370]  It does say unclassified, but unclassified for official use only.
[25:26.650 --> 25:27.490]  Yeah, it's very...
[25:27.490 --> 25:44.270]  So, the problem is that even though the government overclassifies, they classify all kinds of things, there are still enough rules that make it, like, sort of difficult occasionally to classify something that they invent new categories of things that they don't want to distribute that aren't the traditional classifications.
[25:44.270 --> 25:47.610]  I should also point out that this is dated August the 2nd of 2011.
[25:48.070 --> 25:53.750]  Aren't your sources a little bit quicker than this, that you can get it to us in a more timely manner in the future?
[25:53.910 --> 25:55.790]  I don't want to comment on my sources.
[25:55.950 --> 25:56.170]  All right.
[25:56.270 --> 25:58.590]  Well, let's give them a swift kick to...
[25:58.590 --> 26:00.390]  Because, you know, we might have missed some details here.
[26:00.390 --> 26:07.830]  Anyway, getting to the meat of the matter, this is a bulletin, intelligence bulletin, from the cyber intelligence section.
[26:07.830 --> 26:10.770]  Yes, there is a cyber intelligence section of the FBI.
[26:10.770 --> 26:11.730]  I want to visit them.
[26:11.970 --> 26:12.350]  I really...
[26:12.350 --> 26:13.390]  Let's send them a calendar.
[26:13.570 --> 26:13.890]  Let's...
[26:13.890 --> 26:14.730]  Yeah, come on.
[26:14.790 --> 26:15.430]  Let's do that, guys.
[26:15.590 --> 26:15.610]  Let's start a tour.
[26:16.110 --> 26:16.790]  Do they...
[26:16.790 --> 26:17.510]  Maybe we'll get a tour.
[26:17.650 --> 26:21.650]  Do they chat with the cyber idiocy division, which is much larger?
[26:22.110 --> 26:23.030]  That's not nice.
[26:23.490 --> 26:24.910]  We already sent them a calendar.
[26:25.670 --> 26:32.190]  Okay, so anyway, the bulletin says, law enforcement at risk for harassment and identity theft through doxing.
[26:32.350 --> 26:33.430]  Did I pronounce that right?
[26:33.590 --> 26:34.030]  Doxing.
[26:34.190 --> 26:36.110]  D-O-X-I-N-G.
[26:37.290 --> 26:38.170]  Is that...
[26:38.170 --> 26:40.310]  Rob, is that a phrase in the hacker world?
[26:40.410 --> 26:40.850]  Doxing?
[26:40.930 --> 26:43.330]  I mean, I've had my dox dropped.
[26:43.550 --> 26:45.090]  I've dropped plenty of dox in my time.
[26:45.190 --> 26:47.290]  I don't know if I've ever heard the verb doxing.
[26:47.390 --> 26:47.550]  Jim?
[26:47.830 --> 26:48.570]  Hello, hello, hello.
[26:48.870 --> 26:49.250]  Yeah, hello.
[26:49.770 --> 26:50.690]  A little, yeah.
[26:50.870 --> 26:51.070]  Yeah.
[26:51.410 --> 26:51.850]  Okay.
[26:52.130 --> 26:52.910]  Well, yeah.
[26:52.990 --> 26:54.890]  I mean, it's kind of like a thing that goes on.
[26:54.910 --> 27:05.050]  It goes back in the whole hacker lingo thing for, since before I was even born, taking a word and turning it in and adding other endings to turn it, uh, respectively into a verb or a noun.
[27:05.170 --> 27:06.130]  Well, there are no numbers in this.
[27:06.310 --> 27:08.030]  So you have dropping someone's dox, and then...
[27:08.030 --> 27:08.670]  I know about that, yeah.
[27:08.850 --> 27:13.470]  Yeah, you have a lead speak where they change the C-K-S into an X, and then you're doxing, so it's...
[27:13.470 --> 27:14.330]  Yeah, that's all Hollywood.
[27:14.550 --> 27:15.710]  They all did that.
[27:15.830 --> 27:17.910]  Anyway, getting to what's said here.
[27:17.970 --> 27:27.730]  The FBI assesses with high confidence, quote, that law enforcement personnel and hacking victims are at risk for identity theft and harassment through a cyber technique called doxing.
[27:28.070 --> 27:41.890]  Doxing is a common practice among hackers in which a hacker will publicly release identifying information, including full name, date of birth, address, and pictures typically retrieved from the social networking site profiles of a targeted individual.
[27:41.890 --> 27:56.510]  So, basically, if you go out and you find someone's name and their date of birth and their address, and you tell somebody else, and then you go on to Facebook or Twitter or whatnot and find some pictures and show those pictures as well, you, my friend,
[27:56.950 --> 27:57.490]  are a hacker.
[27:57.910 --> 28:00.410]  That's according to the FBI, anyway, because that's what hackers do.
[28:00.850 --> 28:05.670]  In response to law enforcement activities that have occurred against Anonymous and Lulsec...
[28:05.670 --> 28:15.530]  You know, isn't it great that Anonymous and Lulsec are just being referred to in these FBI, cyber intelligence section, intelligence bulletins, just, yeah, everybody knows who Anonymous and Lulsec are.
[28:16.550 --> 28:20.310]  Basically, these activities have occurred against them since January 2011.
[28:20.510 --> 28:27.450]  Members of these groups have increased their interest in targeting law enforcement in retaliation for the arrests and searches conducted.
[28:27.610 --> 28:33.410]  Hackers and hacktivists, which are hacktivists who commit a computer crime for communicating a socially or politically motivated message.
[28:33.630 --> 28:35.550]  Did you know all hacktivists are committing crimes?
[28:35.730 --> 28:36.510]  Did you know that, Mike?
[28:36.510 --> 28:38.590]  You can learn a lot by reading FBI reports.
[28:38.630 --> 28:38.890]  You really can.
[28:39.030 --> 28:44.090]  Yeah, hacktivists are hackers who commit a computer crime for communicating a socially or politically motivated message.
[28:44.350 --> 28:45.630]  It's one step away from terrorists.
[28:45.770 --> 28:48.890]  Well, so there's one bit of interesting analysis that can be done there.
[28:49.030 --> 28:49.690]  I didn't finish the sentence yet.
[28:49.770 --> 28:50.410]  Let me finish the sentence.
[28:50.870 --> 28:54.530]  These hackers and hacktivists have been openly discussing these activities, where?
[28:54.670 --> 29:01.390]  On Twitter, and posting information pertaining to law enforcement on their Twitter accounts and internet relay chat channels.
[29:01.470 --> 29:02.490]  Yes, IRC channels.
[29:02.550 --> 29:04.310]  Those are the places to learn all this.
[29:04.310 --> 29:13.450]  So if they define hacktivists as hackers who commit crimes for some purpose, then the implication is that they realize that not all hackers are committing crimes.
[29:13.490 --> 29:13.770]  Yes.
[29:14.610 --> 29:15.670]  Yeah, I suppose.
[29:15.690 --> 29:16.710]  So that's nice.
[29:16.830 --> 29:17.370]  I guess.
[29:17.650 --> 29:25.150]  Now, in June 2011, members of Anonymous and Lulsec discussed an identified FBI agent in the IRC channel, Pound Lulsec.
[29:25.450 --> 29:26.650]  Was that on our network?
[29:26.830 --> 29:29.510]  We have a Pound Lulsec on irc.2600.net.
[29:29.710 --> 29:30.450]  I'm not done.
[29:30.470 --> 29:31.610]  They were hanging out there for a while.
[29:32.250 --> 29:35.390]  All kinds of words being exchanged.
[29:35.750 --> 29:42.930]  The detailed information included when he or she started working for the FBI, training, assignments, and previous employment.
[29:43.470 --> 29:50.050]  FBI analysis suggests that this information was derived from a 2009 affidavit that was available on the Wired.com website.
[29:50.230 --> 29:52.570]  So again, it can all be traced back to Wired.
[29:52.750 --> 29:53.590]  They are the true criminals.
[29:53.750 --> 29:59.690]  They are the ones that are spreading information around, whether it be Bradley Manning's chat logs or FBI docs.
[29:59.930 --> 30:06.390]  So the problem here is that a journalist enterprise is spreading information.
[30:06.510 --> 30:08.030]  No, the problem is that somebody read it.
[30:08.250 --> 30:11.790]  Somebody read what a journalist said and told somebody else on an IRC channel.
[30:12.110 --> 30:12.450]  Now I understand.
[30:12.450 --> 30:22.330]  Continuing here, on July 26th of 2011, the Twitter account OpMonsanto, I'll spell that for you, O-P-M-O-N-S-A-N-T-O.
[30:22.890 --> 30:29.110]  Monsanto being, of course, the large agricultural company that makes a lot of genetically modified stuff.
[30:29.290 --> 30:34.690]  Yeah, but I suspect it was actually an IRC user and he wanted it to be opt, so he made an account that said OpMonsanto.
[30:35.170 --> 30:35.610]  Could be.
[30:35.750 --> 30:36.610]  Well, that's my theory.
[30:37.670 --> 30:43.810]  OpMonsanto, an account used by members of Anonymous, warned of the intention to dox FBI agents.
[30:43.950 --> 30:45.190]  You know, it's hard to say that sentence.
[30:45.310 --> 30:48.290]  They warned of the intention to dox FBI agents.
[30:48.290 --> 30:49.470]  You just feel like an idiot.
[30:49.830 --> 30:50.490]  D-O-X, yeah.
[30:51.110 --> 31:07.430]  Following the 19 July, July 19th, 2011, arrest of 16 individuals for their presumed role in Anonymous' activities, OpMonsanto said to any FBI agent involved in the continued unjust rating of peaceful Anons, because that's what you refer to them as, it's a proper noun,
[31:07.630 --> 31:09.630]  Anons, expect us.
[31:09.630 --> 31:11.610]  You are no longer entitled to your privacy.
[31:12.110 --> 31:12.670]  I don't expect us.
[31:12.810 --> 31:23.090]  Well, you know, if their privacy is so fleeting that the information is right there, if they sign their names on the arrest warrants or affidavits, yeah, that information should be shared.
[31:23.090 --> 31:27.690]  Just like when a cop is accused of a crime, the name should not be held back like it always is.
[31:27.870 --> 31:31.170]  People should know who's being accused of a crime, who allegedly did these things.
[31:31.370 --> 31:35.730]  When it's one of us, certainly the whole world knows about it, so the rules shouldn't be any different.
[31:36.150 --> 31:36.850]  That's a threat.
[31:36.970 --> 31:47.530]  I love how they talk about this, like it's some horrible crime that everyone needs to be aware of when all the information they're talking about is stuff you can get from a phone book and what someone puts out about themselves on sites like Facebook.
[31:47.530 --> 31:48.350]  Let me correct you, though.
[31:48.430 --> 31:49.930]  It's not something everybody should be aware of.
[31:49.970 --> 31:53.810]  It's something that people in the cyber intelligence section of the FBI should be aware of.
[31:53.810 --> 32:02.230]  I really feel for the FBI in this because, you know, I personally am terrified of people finding out things that I write on Twitter and post to the world.
[32:02.590 --> 32:08.030]  Yeah, I mean, if you can't have your privacy respected when you post something on Twitter, where can you have it respected?
[32:08.290 --> 32:08.410]  It's a shame.
[32:09.090 --> 32:18.530]  Okay, and finally, on July 31st of 2011, more than 70 law enforcement websites were hacked and large amounts of confidential data was exfiltrated.
[32:18.830 --> 32:19.710]  What a great word.
[32:19.710 --> 32:25.230]  These websites included state and local police departments that were not associated with the takedowns.
[32:25.370 --> 32:28.130]  The data consisted of email addresses.
[32:28.470 --> 32:30.710]  It's a very sensitive information there.
[32:31.530 --> 32:38.310]  Usernames, social security numbers, home addresses, phone numbers, password dumps, internal training files, informant lists.
[32:38.570 --> 32:40.390]  You're keeping informant lists on a website?
[32:40.690 --> 32:42.470]  Man, people should know this.
[32:42.630 --> 32:44.910]  People really should know that you're that incompetent.
[32:45.030 --> 32:47.710]  You're a law enforcement agency and you keep an informant list on a website.
[32:47.710 --> 32:51.230]  I don't care if you have a password that can stretch from here to China.
[32:51.370 --> 32:52.530]  That's not good enough.
[32:52.690 --> 32:56.190]  It should not have it on a site that can be accessed by anybody online.
[32:56.990 --> 32:57.630]  Anyway, continuing.
[32:57.950 --> 32:58.330]  It's not over yet.
[32:58.430 --> 32:59.510]  Jail inmate databases.
[33:00.030 --> 33:01.470]  Active warrant information.
[33:01.870 --> 33:11.650]  Yeah, Operation Anti-Sec claimed that the intrusion was in response to bogus trumped-up charges against the individuals associated with Anonymous' attacks on PayPal.
[33:11.650 --> 33:21.650]  I say if Anti-Sec or Lul-Sec or Anonymous can get this information, they have an obligation to get this information and show the rest of us just what's really going on out there.
[33:21.730 --> 33:23.150]  That's, it's fascinating.
[33:23.410 --> 33:24.910]  And this more or less confirms it.
[33:25.450 --> 33:28.330]  Now, recently, Anonymous members have also doxed...
[33:28.330 --> 33:29.090]  Oh, come on.
[33:29.150 --> 33:30.010]  I can't say that.
[33:30.590 --> 33:40.630]  Anonymous members have also doxed the employees of companies that were victims of their previous attacks who are perceived as working with law enforcement, et cetera.
[33:40.750 --> 33:42.090]  It just keeps going on and on and on.
[33:42.370 --> 33:44.930]  It's a fascinating document, Mike.
[33:45.430 --> 33:49.050]  Yeah, I think there's two especially fascinating things about it that are sort of hidden.
[33:49.270 --> 33:50.610]  Can I borrow that?
[33:50.830 --> 33:54.490]  So, the one thing is that there's endnotes, of course.
[33:54.710 --> 33:55.330]  They list their sources.
[33:55.330 --> 33:56.030]  Get my fingerprints off that, please.
[33:56.150 --> 33:58.810]  Yeah, I'll do that after I get...
[33:58.810 --> 33:59.430]  After I read it.
[34:00.530 --> 34:08.530]  But the source for some of this is there's something called the National Cyber Forensic and Training Alliance, which I never heard of before.
[34:08.670 --> 34:13.310]  But apparently, one of the things they do is log IRC channels because that's a source.
[34:13.870 --> 34:15.370]  And then, and so then...
[34:15.370 --> 34:20.610]  But can I just say that we, as IRC users, should not be surprised that people log IRC conversations.
[34:20.810 --> 34:23.030]  That's something that's obviously going to happen.
[34:23.230 --> 34:26.530]  So, we should, they shouldn't be surprised that their information gets out.
[34:26.530 --> 34:29.730]  We shouldn't be surprised if we're talking in a public forum that our information gets out.
[34:30.130 --> 34:33.590]  No, it's just nice to have it confirmed in a, you know, a semi-public document.
[34:33.770 --> 34:39.390]  And then, my favorite part of this is page six of the document, which is the FBI Customer Satisfaction Survey.
[34:39.590 --> 34:40.690]  Yeah, what's that all about?
[34:40.810 --> 34:48.470]  That you can fill out and return to someone in Washington rating how much this increased your knowledge or helped you decide.
[34:48.470 --> 34:49.430]  Who's the customer here, exactly?
[34:50.590 --> 34:51.030]  Customers.
[34:51.530 --> 34:53.630]  Satisfied or unsatisfied, it doesn't say.
[34:53.730 --> 34:55.070]  But they're FBI agents.
[34:55.070 --> 34:56.390]  They're the customers of the FBI.
[34:56.530 --> 34:59.890]  Well, maybe someone in another police department.
[35:00.190 --> 35:01.750]  Can you read us some of the questions?
[35:02.450 --> 35:03.390]  There's only three.
[35:03.770 --> 35:04.570]  Well, then you can read them all.
[35:04.710 --> 35:07.390]  Yeah, this product increased my knowledge of an issue or topic.
[35:07.410 --> 35:09.730]  And you can go from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
[35:10.470 --> 35:13.310]  This product helped me decide on a course of action.
[35:13.550 --> 35:16.290]  And this product was timely to my intelligence needs.
[35:16.550 --> 35:18.690]  I think the people of Anonymous can fill that out.
[35:18.790 --> 35:24.510]  And I think it will strongly influence their decision to take further action or learn more and things like that.
[35:25.010 --> 35:25.790]  Yes, go ahead, Bernie.
[35:26.970 --> 35:28.030]  This makes me laugh.
[35:28.210 --> 35:29.150]  I saw this thing, too.
[35:29.350 --> 35:35.870]  And the FBI is talking about this doxing term as if it's some kind of evil crime.
[35:35.870 --> 35:42.610]  And the vast majority of this seems to be just people publicizing open source public information.
[35:42.610 --> 35:49.590]  And this is exactly what law enforcement people do to people that they accuse of crimes before those people have even been convicted.
[35:50.070 --> 35:55.830]  They publish their names, addresses, all their pictures, all this stuff.
[35:56.170 --> 35:57.570]  It's just gross hypocrisy.
[35:57.770 --> 36:07.710]  But, you know, it's hardly surprising from law enforcement who seems to be more concerned about having sunlight shined on them than they are about finding and arresting real criminals.
[36:08.230 --> 36:10.530]  This is like the FBI should have better things to do.
[36:10.750 --> 36:18.690]  Well, it's not gross hypocrisy, Bernie, if you simply think of law enforcement and intelligence officers and people like that as superhuman.
[36:19.090 --> 36:20.090]  That's all you have to do.
[36:20.570 --> 36:23.010]  And then they're entitled to much more protection.
[36:23.170 --> 36:25.430]  They're entitled to full anonymity no matter what they do.
[36:25.750 --> 36:27.690]  And they can run red lights at will.
[36:28.330 --> 36:29.010]  They do.
[36:29.190 --> 36:31.970]  If they're superhuman already, they shouldn't need all these advantages.
[36:32.330 --> 36:33.030]  Well, that's true.
[36:33.230 --> 36:34.070]  That is true.
[36:34.170 --> 36:34.490]  Good point.
[36:35.430 --> 36:38.970]  Speaking of anonymous and law second, all that kind of thing.
[36:39.150 --> 36:48.830]  FBI special agents last week arrested a Connecticut man who was charged with waging a denial of service attack against... are you ready for this?
[36:49.330 --> 36:52.050]  Gene Simmons of the band KISS.
[36:52.590 --> 36:53.190]  Yeah.
[36:53.630 --> 36:58.030]  It's a website opened by the front man for the rock band KISS.
[36:58.310 --> 36:59.490]  GeneSimmons.com.
[37:00.690 --> 37:03.170]  Of all the things to get caught for.
[37:04.330 --> 37:04.930]  Yeah.
[37:05.210 --> 37:09.210]  Basically, this guy used the screen name Spider 101, I believe.
[37:09.370 --> 37:13.530]  It was taken into custody without incident, as if there weren't enough incidents already.
[37:14.430 --> 37:29.790]  At the federal courthouse in Hartford, his initial appearance was made in the United States District Court where a judge ordered him release on a $10,000 bond and ordered him to appear in a federal court in Los Angeles on a date that has yet to be...
[37:29.790 --> 37:30.490]  Los Angeles?
[37:30.750 --> 37:31.830]  He's from Connecticut.
[37:31.830 --> 37:35.350]  He gets a trip across the country because he attacked KISS?
[37:35.510 --> 37:40.750]  I don't think being flown across the country by the U.S.
[37:40.890 --> 37:43.150]  government prisoner people is pleasant.
[37:43.530 --> 37:46.050]  Well, no, I didn't say it was pleasant, but still, it's a free trip.
[37:46.330 --> 37:46.690]  Anyway.
[37:46.970 --> 37:51.010]  I think it's well worth the cost of commercial airfare to avoid such a thing.
[37:51.070 --> 37:58.970]  Not to make light of this, a federal grand jury in Los Angeles returned an indictment that accused this guy of being affiliated with the Anonymous Hacking Group.
[37:59.050 --> 38:00.770]  I'm not sure how you accuse somebody of that exactly.
[38:01.070 --> 38:08.390]  The indictment specifically charges him with two counts, conspiracy and unauthorized impairment of a protected computer.
[38:09.290 --> 38:10.510]  Now, what does that mean?
[38:10.610 --> 38:11.870]  What is a protected computer?
[38:11.870 --> 38:13.450]  Bernard, do you know what a protected computer is?
[38:13.690 --> 38:14.870]  I have read the law on this.
[38:15.050 --> 38:19.650]  Basically, it's this anti-computer that you weren't supposed to have access to.
[38:19.790 --> 38:21.070]  It was considered a protected computer.
[38:21.370 --> 38:33.370]  This kid, it looks like all he did, it looks like, from the excerpt of the indictment, he's one of the people that's downloaded this application called the Low Orbit Ion Cannon.
[38:33.410 --> 38:33.950]  Remember that?
[38:34.030 --> 38:35.130]  It's a denial of service tool.
[38:35.210 --> 38:36.870]  Right, he downloaded this tool.
[38:36.870 --> 38:48.930]  He did, like, lots of people download this tool and, like, you just put in a domain name in it or an IP address and it'll go, you know, it'll just automatically launch a denial of service tag.
[38:49.070 --> 38:50.810]  Looks like this is just one of these many people.
[38:50.970 --> 38:55.890]  They, oh, I'll download this and attack Gene Simmons' website because I don't like him for maybe good reason.
[38:56.070 --> 39:08.730]  Well, you know, I've yet to hear a comment from Gene Simmons on this, but basically the indictment says that he and others linked to Anonymous, and that's why I'm wondering how they're able to differentiate this one person from others allegedly tied to a group of anonymous people.
[39:09.070 --> 39:25.130]  They basically conducted a distributed denial of service attack against Simmons' computer systems, sending tons of thousands, I'm sorry, tens of thousands, of electronic requests designed to overload the computer server and render the website useless.
[39:25.430 --> 39:27.910]  This kind of thing happens to us every week, I think.
[39:27.910 --> 39:36.150]  And how do we get people flown cross-country and held on $10,000 bail and have their names put in the paper because they sent some packets our way?
[39:36.190 --> 39:41.270]  Every time we complain about this to anybody, we're told, yeah, that's just the way the internet works.
[39:41.510 --> 39:45.390]  But apparently, though, if you're the front man for KISS, it works a little bit differently.
[39:45.910 --> 40:00.410]  Now, according to the indictment, he used a favorite software tool of the Anonymous Collective, a low-orbit iron cannon, which is a computer program that is used to send extremely large numbers of packets or requests over a network in an attempt to overwhelm a target computer.
[40:00.590 --> 40:10.790]  And if convicted of these two accounts of taking down the website, he faces a statutory maximum penalty of 15 years in federal prison.
[40:10.890 --> 40:14.430]  Now, you know, taking down a website is not nice, granted.
[40:14.690 --> 40:17.430]  But 15 years in jail for taking down a website...
[40:17.430 --> 40:26.970]  I mean, the amount of people we could put in prison that have taken down websites that we're affiliated with over the years because they're controversial or because they rub people the wrong way, wow, we could fill a prison with people.
[40:27.230 --> 40:29.170]  It's not the right way to handle the situation.
[40:29.330 --> 40:32.030]  There are other, maybe more technical ways of dealing with it.
[40:32.110 --> 40:41.990]  And what about if, you know, some event happens and the whole group of people are interested in going on this one website and they accidentally DDoS the website just by simply visiting it?
[40:41.990 --> 40:45.430]  Does that mean that this entire audience must be arrested?
[40:45.570 --> 40:48.890]  So every time Justin Bieber tickets are announced, a whole bunch of teenage girls...
[40:48.890 --> 40:49.990]  All the fans have to be arrested and charged with 15 years...
[40:49.990 --> 40:53.990]  A whole bunch of teenage girls can go to federal prison and be in the slammer for the next 15 years.
[40:53.990 --> 40:54.070]  Wow.
[40:54.190 --> 40:56.550]  That's quite a concept there.
[40:56.790 --> 40:59.830]  The best news in all of this is that the guy's first name is Kevin.
[41:00.050 --> 41:02.350]  We have a whole lot of free Kevin stickers left over.
[41:02.750 --> 41:06.250]  There might be something in the cards for all this.
[41:06.390 --> 41:06.590]  Wow.
[41:06.730 --> 41:08.310]  That's quite a story.
[41:08.630 --> 41:09.950]  Also, this is interesting.
[41:09.950 --> 41:19.550]  This came from New York Magazine and literally the title of this, Verizon scares the crap out of New Jersey subscribers.
[41:19.790 --> 41:21.770]  I could not make this up.
[41:22.410 --> 41:33.750]  Verizon texted subscribers in three New Jersey counties a terrifying message on a week ago Monday to take shelter before 1.24 p.m.
[41:33.830 --> 41:35.430]  because of a civil emergency.
[41:36.070 --> 41:36.450]  Yeah.
[41:36.630 --> 41:39.590]  It turns out it was just a text message despite the extreme alert label.
[41:40.330 --> 41:41.590]  Verizon apologized for the...
[41:41.590 --> 41:44.190]  Why would anyone send a message like that?
[41:44.830 --> 41:46.190]  My guess is they messed up.
[41:46.430 --> 41:46.570]  Yeah.
[41:46.610 --> 41:48.730]  But what was the point of the message in the first place?
[41:48.890 --> 41:49.810]  Obviously, they messed up.
[41:49.870 --> 41:50.530]  But what was...
[41:50.530 --> 41:52.310]  If they hadn't messed up, what would have happened?
[41:53.510 --> 41:54.250]  Nothing would have happened.
[41:54.250 --> 41:55.610]  They wouldn't have typed the message, obviously.
[41:55.710 --> 41:56.110]  But why?
[41:56.250 --> 41:56.950]  Who typed the message?
[41:56.950 --> 42:00.310]  I mean, so obviously they have some sort of system for use in emergencies.
[42:00.690 --> 42:05.370]  And I guess someone was playing with it and pressed enter when they didn't mean to or something.
[42:05.590 --> 42:10.810]  They might have a bunch of preset messages and someone might have accidentally set one That's a preset message?
[42:11.090 --> 42:11.270]  Maybe?
[42:11.270 --> 42:12.770]  Take shelter before 1.24 p.m.?
[42:13.310 --> 42:16.710]  The time might have been some added value, but...
[42:16.710 --> 42:23.830]  If this is a system that's in place, I mean, I have never heard of this system or been told to expect this sort of thing to come in on my phone.
[42:23.830 --> 42:32.530]  So, like, you know, we have things like the emergency alert system where you hear the beeps and this is only a test and everything, but we know about that and we expect it and we know what's going on when it happens.
[42:32.730 --> 42:32.990]  Mm-hmm.
[42:33.030 --> 42:36.270]  So there was no, I think, prior knowledge of this system in the public.
[42:36.390 --> 42:36.490]  Yeah.
[42:36.630 --> 42:40.410]  I kind of wish I was still a Verizon customer because I like to get messages like this just for the fun.
[42:40.430 --> 42:49.050]  I got about a thousand messages when Kim Jong Il died, you know, a warning of all the things that are about to happen because I'm on the alert for that, but not this.
[42:49.150 --> 42:49.310]  Not this.
[42:49.310 --> 42:50.390]  Here's a novel theory.
[42:50.390 --> 42:50.630]  Yeah.
[42:50.850 --> 42:55.490]  Maybe, maybe someone at the company Verizon has a sick sense of humor.
[42:56.110 --> 42:56.630]  Maybe.
[42:56.630 --> 42:58.490]  Well, to work for Verizon, you would not...
[42:58.490 --> 42:59.470]  Okay, I'm not even going to go there.
[43:00.050 --> 43:02.470]  Here's something else, though, that is of concern.
[43:02.670 --> 43:14.930]  City of London police have sparked controversy by producing a brief, which is not classified, in which the Occupy London movement is listed under domestic terrorism slash extremism threats to city businesses.
[43:14.930 --> 43:22.570]  This document was given to protesters at their Bank of Ideas base on Sun Street, which is a former site of financial corporation UBS.
[43:22.830 --> 43:36.970]  City police have stepped up an effort to quell the movement since they occupied the building on November 18th, with a document stating it is likely that activists aspire to identify other locations to occupy, especially those they identify with capitalism.
[43:38.510 --> 43:45.010]  Intelligence suggests that urban explorers are holding a discussion at the Sun Street squat.
[43:45.370 --> 43:51.610]  This may lead to an increase in urban exploration activity at abandoned or high profile sites in the capital.
[43:51.730 --> 43:51.870]  Yeah.
[43:52.370 --> 43:52.510]  Yeah.
[43:52.630 --> 43:54.650]  Urban exploration is now tantamount to terrorism.
[43:54.870 --> 44:03.910]  The Occupy movement is listed alongside threats posed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia and Al-Qaeda and Belarusian terrorists.
[44:04.270 --> 44:04.410]  Yeah.
[44:05.010 --> 44:05.190]  Wow.
[44:05.710 --> 44:07.110]  Didn't take long, did it?
[44:07.270 --> 44:13.250]  All you got to do is just show up in the street and chant a few times and take over some buildings and you're right up there with Al-Qaeda.
[44:13.950 --> 44:17.030]  Just the words themselves are enough to deceive the public opinion.
[44:17.030 --> 44:19.350]  And this is what we see at the moment.
[44:20.010 --> 44:27.770]  It said, Spyro Van Lemon, who speaks for Occupy, we are clearly nothing to do with extremists or a terrorist.
[44:27.770 --> 44:28.810]  We are a peaceful group.
[44:28.810 --> 44:30.910]  We do not use direct action to raise our point.
[44:31.610 --> 44:34.750]  We do use direct action to raise our point, but definitely not terrorism.
[44:34.990 --> 44:37.410]  The building has been abandoned for a good few years now.
[44:37.510 --> 44:40.630]  And we think it is crazy for a bank to have it empty and not used.
[44:40.750 --> 44:44.230]  And we know at the same time, there are so many family homes that have been repossessed.
[44:44.410 --> 44:48.250]  Occupying that building and giving it back to the community is definitely not a terrorist act.
[44:48.250 --> 44:51.430]  Well, it depends on what your definition of terrorism is, I suppose.
[44:51.710 --> 45:01.110]  If upsetting the status quo and turning people's heads around and making them believe in things that they didn't believe in before isn't terrorism, I don't know what is.
[45:01.330 --> 45:14.850]  I mean, that's precisely the problem is that terrorism is basically a meaningless word so that governments use it to create terror in their citizenry and then charge people with silly crimes for not doing very much.
[45:15.370 --> 45:15.930]  All right.
[45:16.050 --> 45:18.230]  Also, other than you, it's a very busy week this week.
[45:18.510 --> 45:19.990]  This week, Bradley Manning was seen.
[45:20.270 --> 45:24.730]  He actually showed up in court in Fort Meade, Maryland, home of the NSA.
[45:25.590 --> 45:35.250]  And I believe Adrian Lama was also in court explaining just why he turned him in a couple of years ago, almost a couple of years ago.
[45:35.390 --> 45:36.990]  A number of interesting things about this.
[45:36.990 --> 45:49.490]  So the good news is that after 19 months, 19 months after being arrested, finally there's this, it's a sort of preliminary hearing, but finally something is going on where he'll have eventually a chance to defend himself.
[45:49.810 --> 45:50.790]  That's good news.
[45:52.010 --> 46:04.890]  The bad news is, of course, that there's all these witnesses that are being paraded against him and the officer who's leading the hearing does not appear to be very friendly to any of the procedural things that the defense is trying to do.
[46:04.890 --> 46:05.910]  This is the equivalent of a judge.
[46:06.150 --> 46:06.410]  Yeah.
[46:06.650 --> 46:15.750]  So it's the equivalent of a judge, but the interesting thing is that in the military system, the judge is a military officer, which is kind of, I would call it a conflict of interest.
[46:15.790 --> 46:17.910]  Isn't everybody in that building a military officer, though?
[46:18.350 --> 46:23.430]  I mean, Bradley Manning's a military officer, and Adrian Lama is now a military officer, I believe.
[46:23.570 --> 46:25.670]  Well, he's a confidential informant.
[46:25.770 --> 46:29.250]  This is one thing that is interesting that we learned from this hearing,
[46:34.890 --> 46:39.110]  a few months ago, he says, and the government has paid some of his travel expenses.
[46:39.110 --> 46:43.330]  And one of the places that we know that Adrian Lama has traveled to in this time is Hope.
[46:43.570 --> 46:46.430]  So it's not clear if he was on government business at that time.
[46:46.570 --> 46:46.850]  Interesting.
[46:47.070 --> 46:50.650]  Well, you know, I would say anybody who works for the government is always on government business.
[46:50.930 --> 46:51.910]  It doesn't surprise me.
[46:51.910 --> 46:52.730]  Well, he hasn't been paid.
[46:52.830 --> 46:54.310]  He's only has his expenses paid.
[46:54.310 --> 46:58.170]  So, you know, I guess sometimes he could do other things than inform for the government.
[46:58.510 --> 47:00.670]  But, you know, who knows?
[47:00.770 --> 47:02.690]  Did we learn anything from these hearings?
[47:02.890 --> 47:04.210]  Well, it was a series of hearings, right?
[47:04.210 --> 47:05.890]  It was one hearing that spread over several days.
[47:06.070 --> 47:06.230]  Right.
[47:06.350 --> 47:13.950]  It's an article, I forget the number, article something hearing, which apparently is like a preliminary hearing in civilian law, but I don't know what that is either.
[47:14.210 --> 47:14.450]  Uh-huh.
[47:16.450 --> 47:18.950]  The government basically gets to present its case.
[47:18.950 --> 47:23.330]  The defense is not supposed to present its case so much.
[47:23.470 --> 47:27.010]  So there may be more defense-driven evidence coming in future hearings.
[47:27.010 --> 47:36.750]  One thing that did come out in the stories, when Adrian Lima was testifying, he said that he had worked on occasion with 2600 as a journalist.
[47:36.750 --> 47:44.450]  And I just want to make that clear that he was not, at any time, working as a reporter for 2600 when he was talking with Bradley Manning.
[47:44.450 --> 47:48.810]  And if he represented himself as that, it was certainly not true.
[47:48.990 --> 47:53.390]  And obviously he took the story to Wired anyway, so it had nothing to do with us.
[47:53.530 --> 48:00.910]  But he was somebody who was running our Facebook page, which I still don't even know how it works.
[48:02.750 --> 48:11.330]  And basically has a 2600.com account and things like that, based on past articles written and things like that.
[48:11.330 --> 48:14.130]  But definitely not representing the magazine.
[48:14.830 --> 48:18.450]  So in case anyone got that feeling from the stories.
[48:18.990 --> 48:20.210]  Interesting story, though, it continues.
[48:20.370 --> 48:21.230]  What's the next step?
[48:22.270 --> 48:24.690]  I'm not sure if the hearing is over or if it continues.
[48:25.250 --> 48:29.510]  Eventually there will be a trial, of course, but that's not in the immediate future.
[48:30.670 --> 48:32.150]  Bernie, your thoughts on this?
[48:32.430 --> 48:32.830]  Yeah.
[48:33.270 --> 48:35.810]  There was really two interesting things that came out of this trial.
[48:36.010 --> 48:55.630]  As Mike pointed out, and I want to elaborate on it a little bit, the so-called judge in this case apparently has also been working for the Department of Justice, which has convened a grand jury apparently in the Department of Justice's case against the WikiLeaks volunteers.
[48:56.490 --> 48:58.230]  Mike subpoenaed their Twitter record.
[48:58.450 --> 48:59.810]  We talked about this in the show before.
[48:59.950 --> 49:01.670]  It's clear conflict of interest here.
[49:01.670 --> 49:11.490]  And the defense attorney for Bradley Manning is saying, well, it's obvious conflict of interest here because Bradley Manning is accused of turning this information over to WikiLeaks.
[49:11.790 --> 49:14.310]  But apparently that didn't fly.
[49:14.570 --> 49:26.370]  The next thing is at least one of these hearings was held in secret because information that WikiLeaks released was low-level classified.
[49:26.370 --> 49:31.350]  And, of course, we can't reveal that in an open court, even though it's all over the Internet.
[49:31.750 --> 49:35.670]  So whatever happened in that hearing, we don't get to know.
[49:35.830 --> 49:40.770]  Even though the information they said was classified that they can't let anybody know, everybody already knows.
[49:41.150 --> 49:42.510]  So it's very confusing.
[49:42.930 --> 49:45.030]  Yeah, we'll expect more of that in the future.
[49:45.190 --> 49:45.650]  And, of course, we'll be...
[49:45.650 --> 49:46.190]  They're going to use that.
[49:46.350 --> 49:47.250]  They're going to use that again.
[49:47.410 --> 49:49.290]  Believe me, there's going to be some other hearing.
[49:49.390 --> 49:50.450]  They don't want people to hear stuff.
[49:50.990 --> 49:52.270]  It's already all over the Internet.
[49:52.510 --> 50:01.430]  And they're going to use this technique again to close public hearings because they say, well, there's classified information, which the whole world already knows.
[50:01.810 --> 50:02.170]  Watch.
[50:02.310 --> 50:02.830]  It's going to happen.
[50:03.010 --> 50:03.250]  All right.
[50:03.310 --> 50:04.530]  We'll be watching for sure.
[50:05.050 --> 50:05.530]  Mike, go ahead.
[50:05.670 --> 50:11.470]  Bernie, you're saying this like it's some sort of shocking prediction, but what you're describing is exactly what they've done from day one of this.
[50:11.670 --> 50:11.830]  Sure.
[50:11.830 --> 50:12.950]  And, of course, they're going to continue.
[50:13.170 --> 50:13.330]  Yeah.
[50:13.730 --> 50:14.090]  Yeah.
[50:14.390 --> 50:15.850]  It works for them, I guess.
[50:16.870 --> 50:17.370]  All right.
[50:17.370 --> 50:20.830]  Oh, this is one of my favorites, actually, is this North Korean song in the background.
[50:23.310 --> 50:23.770]  All right.
[50:23.890 --> 50:24.210]  Well, whatever.
[50:24.330 --> 50:25.190]  We're going to take some phone calls.
[50:26.170 --> 50:28.650]  212-229-2900 is our telephone.
[50:28.750 --> 50:29.850]  Feel free to call us out.
[50:29.850 --> 50:31.230]  We can't turn the North Korean music off.
[50:31.290 --> 50:31.810]  We don't know how.
[50:32.110 --> 50:34.550]  It's just something that's been going over the radio.
[50:34.850 --> 50:38.810]  And I guess, you know, analysts can figure out what that means.
[50:38.950 --> 50:41.470]  There's some sort of hidden agenda happening here.
[50:42.450 --> 50:43.730]  Yeah, we'll figure it out.
[50:44.290 --> 50:45.890]  One final story, then we'll take some phone calls.
[50:45.890 --> 50:47.110]  It's 212-209-2900.
[50:47.710 --> 50:52.330]  Movie studios apparently have been caught pirating movies, according to our friends at Gizmodo.
[50:52.490 --> 50:59.870]  The same copyright barons pushing SOPA, the awful internet, are enormous hypocrites.
[51:00.050 --> 51:05.150]  According to Torrent Freak, they want the law as a means of stopping online piracy.
[51:05.150 --> 51:07.250]  But maybe they should start with their own employees.
[51:07.570 --> 51:14.790]  A Russian BitTorrent tracking firm traced pirated movies and television show downloads back to IP addresses from Sony, Fox, and NBC.
[51:15.290 --> 51:20.790]  These are the same companies who want to disconnect people from the internet after they've been caught sharing copyrighted material.
[51:20.790 --> 51:22.870]  Now, this shouldn't surprise anyone.
[51:22.870 --> 51:28.750]  When studios push fascist copyright law, they're speaking on behalf of their shareholders, not the thousands of people they employ.
[51:29.010 --> 51:36.610]  Those people are ordinary people who, yes, sometimes pirate albums, movies, shows, and games, like millions of other ordinary people around the world.
[51:36.730 --> 51:38.630]  But the hypocrisy is more than superficial.
[51:38.630 --> 51:45.570]  We shouldn't ever let companies that can't control their own miscreant employees shape federal legislation for all of us.
[51:45.710 --> 51:46.970]  It sort of goes with the music, doesn't it?
[51:47.570 --> 51:52.070]  I think there might be a more simple explanation for this.
[51:52.190 --> 51:57.230]  I think this is how they find out that the movies are up on BitTorrent in the first place by downloading them themselves.
[51:57.530 --> 52:02.870]  I mean, so there's a long history, of course, of the big firms violating the copyright.
[52:02.870 --> 52:17.870]  In the lawsuit against YouTube, it turns out that some of the allegations where Viacom was saying, hey, you've got to take that down, was something that a Viacom employee had, in fact, posted in order to create buzz for whatever it is in question.
[52:18.270 --> 52:20.050]  These people try and have it always.
[52:21.190 --> 52:21.830]  Now, look at this.
[52:21.890 --> 52:22.750]  We have a full switchboard.
[52:22.890 --> 52:25.190]  I can't recall the last time I've seen a full switchboard like this.
[52:25.350 --> 52:31.550]  And it's unfortunate we have this horrible squeal on the air for all the phone calls, but we're going to deal with that anyway and take some phone calls.
[52:31.550 --> 52:33.810]  You know, I wanted to get into the whole cell phone controversy.
[52:34.010 --> 52:38.490]  We had a lot of mail from people that were attacking me for insisting on talking to my cell phone while I drive.
[52:38.590 --> 52:40.350]  Some other week, we'll deal with that controversy.
[52:40.490 --> 52:42.410]  Let's hear what listeners have to say now, though.
[52:42.490 --> 52:42.790]  Good evening.
[52:42.930 --> 52:44.250]  You're on Off The Hook.
[52:45.710 --> 52:46.070]  Yes.
[52:47.190 --> 52:48.630]  I read an article today.
[52:49.650 --> 52:56.050]  Facebook had gone through Ireland's privacy committee review.
[52:56.050 --> 53:04.330]  Why don't we have a privacy committee in the government here?
[53:04.780 --> 53:16.650]  Instead of trying to take down piracy and all this bull, you know, why can't we raise our voices and have our privacy looked at on a government level?
[53:17.530 --> 53:23.410]  Well, I think that's what we should do, and hopefully that's what we're doing right now is raising our voices and getting people to pay attention.
[53:23.610 --> 53:24.450]  But thanks for the suggestion.
[53:24.870 --> 53:25.390]  Good evening.
[53:25.590 --> 53:26.330]  You're on Off The Hook.
[53:27.410 --> 53:27.730]  Hello?
[53:27.950 --> 53:28.350]  Yes, go ahead.
[53:28.650 --> 53:30.110]  Yeah, go to Cuba, you commies.
[53:30.950 --> 53:31.630]  All right, all right.
[53:31.830 --> 53:32.510]  Must have been the music.
[53:32.690 --> 53:33.210]  We'll get there.
[53:33.290 --> 53:33.710]  We'll get there.
[53:34.070 --> 53:36.210]  You know, I wish we had some Cuban music coming across.
[53:36.830 --> 53:37.350]  Maybe someday.
[53:37.390 --> 53:37.650]  Good evening.
[53:37.730 --> 53:38.350]  You're on Off The Hook.
[53:39.230 --> 53:39.750]  Good evening.
[53:40.030 --> 53:41.190]  I'm from Bulgaria.
[53:41.330 --> 53:41.650]  Bulgaria.
[53:41.950 --> 53:44.070]  Again, the best connection comes from Bulgaria.
[53:44.070 --> 53:45.350]  What's on your mind?
[53:45.670 --> 53:46.390]  Sorry about that.
[53:46.490 --> 53:51.010]  Well, I've been enjoying the show that you've been having so far.
[53:51.190 --> 53:56.890]  Thanks for mentioning IRC, even though from a dubious source, shall we say.
[53:57.150 --> 54:02.010]  What is the exact IRC channel that people can log into if they want to be part of the conversation?
[54:03.310 --> 54:08.390]  Off The Hook at IRC2600.net, is it?
[54:08.550 --> 54:12.170]  Okay, IRC.2600.net and pound off the hook, one word.
[54:12.170 --> 54:13.170]  Pound off the hook.
[54:14.150 --> 54:14.230]  Okay.
[54:14.370 --> 54:16.790]  And yeah, that's where many of us are.
[54:17.970 --> 54:18.490]  And...
[54:18.490 --> 54:20.670]  All right, Bobson, we have about 1,000 calls.
[54:21.090 --> 54:23.550]  Can you sum up in about 20 seconds?
[54:23.550 --> 54:24.250]  What's on your mind?
[54:24.910 --> 54:26.270]  I was curious.
[54:26.530 --> 54:31.150]  You mentioned the name towards the end of the FBI document of Spyro Von Lemon, was it?
[54:31.750 --> 54:32.590]  Okay, yes.
[54:32.990 --> 54:35.810]  Who names their kid Spyro Von Lemon?
[54:36.910 --> 54:40.330]  Well, I imagine the Von Lemon part is something they really didn't have a choice about.
[54:40.490 --> 54:41.030]  But Spyro?
[54:41.210 --> 54:42.690]  Well, maybe Agnew was a big hero.
[54:42.890 --> 54:43.490]  I don't know.
[54:44.170 --> 54:44.850]  I don't know.
[54:44.910 --> 54:45.750]  It's a very good question.
[54:45.830 --> 54:46.490]  Okay, have a great night.
[54:46.630 --> 54:46.750]  Thanks.
[54:46.870 --> 54:47.390]  All right, thanks.
[54:47.570 --> 54:48.270]  Good to hear from you.
[54:48.630 --> 54:49.030]  Take care.
[54:49.290 --> 54:49.750]  Good evening.
[54:49.910 --> 54:50.750]  You're on Off The Hook.
[54:50.850 --> 54:51.070]  Go ahead.
[54:51.450 --> 54:52.390]  Hi, this is New Line.
[54:52.510 --> 54:53.370]  I have three questions.
[54:53.770 --> 54:55.770]  One, can I buy tickets to the next hope?
[54:56.070 --> 54:57.770]  Two, can I buy a case of Club Monte?
[54:58.010 --> 54:58.870]  And three, how's your foot?
[54:59.410 --> 55:01.250]  Okay, well, first of all, my foot is...
[55:01.250 --> 55:02.910]  It still hurts a little bit, but I'm not limping anymore.
[55:02.910 --> 55:04.790]  So thank you for asking about that.
[55:05.210 --> 55:12.010]  Club Monte, yes, in fact, we've just received, as you know, because it landed on my foot, we received a bunch of pallets of that.
[55:12.230 --> 55:17.850]  Go to clubmate.us, C-L-U-B-M-A-T-E.us for information on that.
[55:19.470 --> 55:20.830]  And what was the first question?
[55:21.530 --> 55:23.210]  Oh, he wanted to buy tickets to the next hope.
[55:23.510 --> 55:25.810]  Yeah, unfortunately, the next hope took place in 2010.
[55:26.270 --> 55:27.890]  So you need a time machine to do that.
[55:27.890 --> 55:32.790]  You want to go to hope number nine, probably, in 2012, and just keep checking our website.
[55:33.410 --> 55:43.250]  We've actually sold out the super discounted tickets, but we're going to have more on sale after the new year, and that'll be the bulk of them, I think.
[55:43.350 --> 55:44.430]  Thanks for your interest.
[55:45.030 --> 55:47.430]  Okay, let's quickly go through a couple more.
[55:47.470 --> 55:47.770]  Good evening.
[55:47.910 --> 55:48.670]  You're on off the hook.
[55:49.190 --> 55:49.890]  Hey, good evening.
[55:50.150 --> 55:50.970]  Hi, what's on your mind?
[55:51.230 --> 55:51.730]  How you doing?
[55:51.910 --> 55:53.130]  I'm retired law enforcement.
[55:53.230 --> 55:53.830]  My name is Nick.
[55:54.070 --> 55:54.550]  Hi, Nick.
[55:54.750 --> 55:55.150]  How are you?
[55:55.270 --> 55:55.950]  Pretty good, pretty good.
[55:55.950 --> 55:56.930]  Are we on the air right now?
[55:56.970 --> 55:58.490]  You're on the air, and you only have about 30 seconds.
[55:58.670 --> 56:01.470]  Okay, I just want to tell you, don't take this very lightly.
[56:01.650 --> 56:09.930]  We're about to lose our Bill of Rights, and I spent 27 years protecting the Constitution of the United States, only to see it go down the toilet.
[56:10.430 --> 56:12.010]  And what are we losing the Bill of Rights to?
[56:12.210 --> 56:14.570]  Well, the Defense of America Act.
[56:14.850 --> 56:15.090]  Uh-huh.
[56:15.230 --> 56:18.330]  That's Bill 1867 in the Senate, Section 1031.
[56:18.330 --> 56:19.810]  I encourage you to read it.
[56:19.930 --> 56:20.150]  Okay.
[56:20.530 --> 56:21.290]  And weep.
[56:21.670 --> 56:25.750]  All right, I'll set aside some time for crying a little bit later on.
[56:26.070 --> 56:26.830]  Thanks, Nick, for your call.
[56:26.910 --> 56:29.430]  And please call again, and maybe we can have a longer conversation.
[56:29.870 --> 56:30.310]  You know what?
[56:30.350 --> 56:31.530]  That's going to do it for us tonight, folks.
[56:31.590 --> 56:32.770]  I'm sorry for all the people calling in.
[56:33.170 --> 56:33.750]  Write to us, please.
[56:34.310 --> 56:35.990]  OTH at 2600.com.
[56:36.110 --> 56:37.530]  We'd love to hear from you.
[56:38.810 --> 56:42.610]  And the personal computer people, maybe they can figure out how to get the North Korean music off the air.
[56:42.610 --> 56:47.330]  The show will be on again next week, next Wednesday, 7 o'clock.
[56:47.810 --> 56:49.750]  Again, OTH at 2600.com.
[56:49.890 --> 56:50.810]  That's our website.
[56:50.890 --> 56:51.890]  That's our email address.
[56:52.070 --> 56:52.630]  And yes, Rob?
[56:52.850 --> 56:54.210]  And happy holidays were available.
[56:54.430 --> 56:55.190]  Yes, definitely.
[56:55.190 --> 56:55.870]  Happy holidays.
[56:56.150 --> 56:57.290]  And we'll see you next week.
[56:57.290 --> 56:59.070]  We're going out with another Occupy Wall Street song.
[56:59.190 --> 57:03.070]  This is from Dress and Jurobi from Tribe Called Quest.
[57:03.410 --> 57:04.410]  Pardon the interruption.
[57:04.410 --> 57:05.410]  Y'all.
[57:23.680 --> 57:24.340]  Y'all.
[57:24.880 --> 57:25.940]  Disturbing the function.
[57:26.240 --> 57:27.380]  Part of the interruption.
[57:27.740 --> 57:28.440]  But it's done.
[57:28.680 --> 57:30.740]  Come on one with more gold and gumption.
[57:30.860 --> 57:31.940]  More heat than Hades.
[57:32.120 --> 57:33.740]  More rap than your dysfunction.
[57:34.060 --> 57:35.440]  It's rabies for your consumption.
[57:36.040 --> 57:37.080]  Threads the black sheep.
[57:37.260 --> 57:39.200]  I'm cracked streets with anthem, you beat.
[57:39.360 --> 57:41.940]  When I take hot beats and stem from dopeness.
[57:42.240 --> 57:43.940]  So the party people can hope less.
[57:44.000 --> 57:47.120]  For real hip hop, when I stop, I flow just gnarly.
[57:47.260 --> 57:49.060]  A mix of just ice and molly.
[57:49.060 --> 57:51.660]  I levitate when I elevate the party.
[57:51.980 --> 57:54.300]  I move the crowd to walk cloud to cloud.
[57:54.480 --> 57:56.760]  And make the type of noise to make a b-boy crowd.
[57:56.960 --> 57:58.040]  I must over-lift.
[57:58.260 --> 57:59.600]  The name stands for Shreff.
[57:59.840 --> 58:02.020]  D-R-E-S to be the tightest of guilt.
[58:02.380 --> 58:03.980]  Most likely to lift your spirits.
[58:04.040 --> 58:05.380]  So slam in the back.
[58:05.520 --> 58:07.240]  The regular schedule programming.
[58:07.420 --> 58:09.280]  I am a horse for the people that I
[58:22.970 --> 58:23.130]  breathe.
[58:23.230 --> 58:24.170]  They call me criminal.
[58:24.350 --> 58:25.950]  Cause I oppose corruption.
[58:26.150 --> 58:27.270]  So part of me is corruption.
[58:27.650 --> 58:28.150]  So my emotion.
[58:28.170 --> 58:29.230]  The death of a nation.
[58:29.570 --> 58:30.550]  The birth of salvation.
[58:30.670 --> 58:31.970]  I know the revolutions.
[58:32.970 --> 58:34.270]  Evacuation of Wall Street.
[58:34.430 --> 58:36.370]  It's the street where I spit my flout.
[58:36.590 --> 58:39.110]  New York police poor but won't police them.
[58:39.250 --> 58:44.230]  So it's we who stand that rep the one troop.
[58:44.730 --> 58:45.170]  Overseers.
[58:45.490 --> 58:46.990]  They just slaves that broke ranks.
[58:47.050 --> 58:48.410]  And every city's like my city.
[58:48.510 --> 58:49.690]  So we break a city bank.
[58:49.790 --> 58:50.270]  Head crack.
[58:50.450 --> 58:50.990]  I implore.
[58:51.090 --> 58:52.130]  Come to even the score.
[58:52.290 --> 58:53.530]  And globally shut it down.
[58:53.630 --> 58:54.910]  I put a nail in the door.
[58:55.110 --> 58:56.330]  Yo, we won't be a whore.
[58:56.390 --> 58:57.590]  Till the system as is.
[58:57.730 --> 59:00.250]  We the masses standing up to the greedy asses.
[59:00.370 --> 59:00.930]  Money sluts.
[59:01.030 --> 59:02.870]  Wipe their butts with the last of the paper.
[59:02.990 --> 59:04.630]  Then hide in the dark like a road.
[59:04.630 --> 59:05.430]  This guy's for
[59:11.700 --> 59:12.160]  the people.
[59:12.340 --> 59:13.380]  And I lay it on the beat.
[59:13.520 --> 59:15.870]  Each word dying to me.
[59:15.950 --> 59:16.890]  They call me criminal.
[59:17.070 --> 59:18.590]  Cause I oppose corruption.
[59:18.850 --> 59:25.440]  So part of me is corruption.
[59:27.780 --> 59:30.480]  So part of me is corruption.
[59:31.020 --> 59:31.700]  So my emotion.
[59:32.060 --> 59:33.160]  Motherf*cker police.
[59:33.420 --> 59:34.460]  No justice, no peace.
[59:34.500 --> 59:37.220]  I be the ulcer in the stomach and the belly of the beast.
[59:37.360 --> 59:38.640]  All I'm free, Jesus.
[59:38.780 --> 59:40.260]  Wall Street and I, and I.
[59:40.400 --> 59:42.260]  Can't eat to live if I starve and die.
[59:42.420 --> 59:43.760]  They one is looking for a shepherd.
[59:43.900 --> 59:45.120]  Feeling lost as a whore.
[59:45.280 --> 59:46.300]  Yo, there is no middle class.
[59:46.300 --> 59:47.760]  Either you're rich or you're poor.
[59:47.880 --> 59:49.040]  And it's perfectly flawed.
[59:49.160 --> 59:50.420]  Let my words suggest it.
[59:50.620 --> 59:51.780]  Respect to the vested.
[59:51.960 --> 59:52.360]  Salute.
[59:52.660 --> 59:55.560]  Arrested as I raise my fist to the real well-wish.
[59:55.600 --> 59:58.140]  I let my middle finger rise for the real selfish.
[59:58.380 --> 59:59.760]  Shake a walk in my wallabies.
[59:59.900 --> 01:00:00.980]  And gasp at the quantity.
[01:00:01.360 --> 01:00:03.460]  Only I'm balling my fist to hold hands of the quality.
[01:00:03.460 --> 01:00:06.140]  I'll give a horse from the people and I'll lay it on the feet.
[01:00:06.260 --> 01:00:06.480]  Each
[01:00:17.550 --> 01:00:19.110]  one to live to occupy Wall Street.
[01:00:19.290 --> 01:00:20.190]  They call me criminal.
[01:00:20.190 --> 01:00:21.870]  T-t-t-t-t-t-t-t.
[01:00:22.090 --> 01:00:22.530]  Hey!
[01:00:23.110 --> 01:00:27.110]  8 o'clock here at WBAI 99.5 FM.