[00:00.000 --> 00:06.660]  Instead of speakers and music on a stage, authors Chris Williams and Alice Slater will discuss nuclear power and weapons in WBAI.
[00:06.900 --> 00:12.040]  Minori Nakamura will talk about Indian Point on Fukushima and the Raging Grannies will be performing live music.
[00:12.500 --> 00:25.060]  That's Tuesday, June 12th, 7.30pm at Tompkins Square Park and 8pm right here on WBAI New York, 99.5 FM and WBAI.org.
[00:25.220 --> 00:26.080]  Bring new radio.
[00:26.280 --> 00:27.040]  Be mobile.
[00:27.420 --> 00:28.540]  No more nukes.
[00:31.860 --> 00:34.760]  And you're listening to Radio Station WBAI New York.
[00:34.920 --> 00:36.140]  The time is 7 o'clock.
[00:36.220 --> 00:37.300]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[01:01.390 --> 01:03.230]  I hope that's understood.
[01:38.300 --> 01:39.680]  And a very good evening here.
[01:39.780 --> 01:40.840]  The program is Off the Hook.
[01:40.940 --> 01:43.220]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[01:43.460 --> 01:44.980]  Joined tonight by Mike.
[01:45.150 --> 01:45.380]  Hello.
[01:45.650 --> 01:46.040]  Red Hack.
[01:46.380 --> 01:46.520]  Hello.
[01:46.760 --> 01:47.160]  Rob T.
[01:47.500 --> 01:47.980]  Firefly.
[01:48.480 --> 01:49.180]  Dot Red.
[01:49.540 --> 01:49.680]  Hello.
[01:50.220 --> 01:50.700]  Kyle.
[01:51.180 --> 01:51.360]  Hi.
[01:51.800 --> 01:52.150]  Jim.
[01:52.500 --> 01:52.900]  Yes.
[01:53.280 --> 01:55.020]  And down in Philadelphia, Bernie S.
[01:55.300 --> 01:56.520]  Greetings from Pennsylvania.
[01:56.820 --> 01:58.930]  Should I just stop saying Philadelphia and start saying Pennsylvania?
[01:58.930 --> 02:00.000]  Because every week you say...
[02:00.000 --> 02:00.160]  Well, actually, no.
[02:00.360 --> 02:03.060]  Because all those times I say Pennsylvania, I'm not in Philadelphia.
[02:03.060 --> 02:04.200]  But I am in Pennsylvania.
[02:05.440 --> 02:05.680]  All right.
[02:05.740 --> 02:07.220]  So from now on, I'll just say...
[02:07.220 --> 02:08.150]  And Bernie S.
[02:08.360 --> 02:09.220]  Down in Pennsylvania.
[02:09.500 --> 02:09.720]  You can say whatever you want.
[02:09.760 --> 02:10.740]  I'll just correct you.
[02:10.760 --> 02:12.040]  Well, then I'll say Bernie S.
[02:12.260 --> 02:12.820]  Over in Pakistan.
[02:12.820 --> 02:14.180]  And you can correct me up for that.
[02:14.240 --> 02:14.660]  Or how's that?
[02:14.820 --> 02:15.440]  Oh, okay.
[02:15.700 --> 02:15.960]  All right.
[02:15.960 --> 02:16.180]  Fine.
[02:16.320 --> 02:18.180]  I just would hope a drone wouldn't just bomb me.
[02:18.660 --> 02:20.700]  As long as it starts with the letter P, it's also...
[02:20.700 --> 02:21.520]  That's the important thing.
[02:21.700 --> 02:21.800]  Yeah.
[02:30.430 --> 02:31.280]  We're still trying.
[02:31.380 --> 02:34.940]  We're trying to get our own drones to be around the city and do all kinds of fun things.
[02:35.080 --> 02:40.900]  We're not going to shoot at anybody, but just kind of spy on things and take nice pictures and stuff like that.
[02:41.240 --> 02:45.260]  Though we should add that if any drones show up to the registration desk, they'll have to buy a ticket like everyone else.
[02:45.460 --> 02:45.700]  Yeah.
[02:45.860 --> 02:46.380]  It's only fair.
[02:46.760 --> 02:47.440]  It's only fair.
[02:47.680 --> 02:49.760]  Any updates on Hope?
[02:49.800 --> 02:52.900]  I know we have exciting keynote news coming up in the next few days.
[02:53.060 --> 02:54.240]  Nothing more I can say right now.
[02:54.360 --> 02:57.700]  But we do have some more announcements to make.
[02:57.700 --> 03:00.600]  Look, the speaker deadline has passed.
[03:01.460 --> 03:09.980]  So if you have not yet submitted a talk to speakers at hope.net, well, if you email that address, you'll get a response saying that the deadline has passed.
[03:10.140 --> 03:11.600]  So if you want to see that, go ahead and email it.
[03:11.620 --> 03:12.680]  But that's pretty much all you're going to get.
[03:12.840 --> 03:13.700]  I'm going to do that right now.
[03:13.820 --> 03:13.960]  Yeah.
[03:14.020 --> 03:14.280]  Go ahead.
[03:14.720 --> 03:15.520]  Knock yourself out.
[03:16.200 --> 03:16.820]  But you...
[03:16.820 --> 03:17.100]  The good news.
[03:17.260 --> 03:17.760]  The good news.
[03:17.820 --> 03:18.460]  What is the good news?
[03:18.560 --> 03:18.980]  Is that good news?
[03:18.980 --> 03:21.960]  Well, the good news is we received hundreds of submissions, if I recall.
[03:22.260 --> 03:22.500]  Yeah.
[03:22.560 --> 03:29.500]  That's good news for us because we get to stay up for many nights basically trying to figure out how to cram the best ones into the schedule.
[03:30.460 --> 03:31.260]  And we will.
[03:31.520 --> 03:33.180]  We have got some real dandy talks.
[03:33.440 --> 03:33.600]  Right.
[03:33.640 --> 03:41.780]  But the good news is of hundreds of submissions, the hope attendees get to enjoy the cream of the crop.
[03:42.040 --> 03:42.240]  Yeah.
[03:42.440 --> 03:43.080]  So to say.
[03:43.260 --> 03:55.920]  And those of you who either come and can't be in three or four places at the same time or those who can't come at all, well, there'll be DVDs later on and there'll be all kinds of ways that you can see these things.
[03:56.080 --> 04:03.100]  But of course, the best ways to be there in person and experience the magic that goes on at the talks and at all the other parts of the conference as well.
[04:03.460 --> 04:07.680]  And of course, if you submitted a talk and haven't heard back from us yet, we're still pouring through them.
[04:07.860 --> 04:08.820]  So don't lose heart yet.
[04:08.820 --> 04:14.800]  But yeah, we've announced some of them, but that's only a fraction of what we're going to have eventually.
[04:15.000 --> 04:24.320]  And if you wind up not getting accepted, and a lot of people won't get accepted, don't take it personally, you will still have the opportunity to give a talk.
[04:24.440 --> 04:32.560]  We have unscheduled tracks, which means that basically you show up at the conference and pencil your name in and let people know, publicize it yourself.
[04:32.760 --> 04:36.320]  And that's how a lot of speakers get the word out sometimes.
[04:36.320 --> 04:41.600]  Um, I wish we could have a dozen conference rooms where we could have talks going all the time, but we don't.
[04:41.850 --> 04:46.820]  We only have, uh, three or four, uh, we have three, three plus one.
[04:47.060 --> 04:47.320]  Yeah.
[04:47.560 --> 04:49.970]  And, uh, you know, there's, there's breakout sessions in other places too.
[04:50.080 --> 04:52.410]  We have workshops and other parts of the hotel.
[04:52.500 --> 04:55.080]  I would just want to say that that auto reply was fast.
[04:55.220 --> 04:55.800]  I got it already.
[04:55.960 --> 04:56.260]  All right.
[04:56.440 --> 04:57.640]  And it was like I said, right.
[04:57.920 --> 05:01.080]  Uh, the submissions for hope number nine talks and panels are now closed.
[05:01.200 --> 05:01.360]  Yeah.
[05:01.560 --> 05:01.660]  Yeah.
[05:01.780 --> 05:06.120]  We're not kidding around when we say this, uh, June 1st was the deadline and it's now June 6th though.
[05:06.320 --> 05:07.700]  Uh, you're well past the deadline.
[05:08.060 --> 05:11.100]  Um, but, um, you can find it all kinds of other information.
[05:11.140 --> 05:22.260]  If you go to www.hope.net, uh, there are ways of participating, uh, and volunteering, um, being part of, um, uh, oh, I don't know everything from security to, uh, to network.
[05:22.600 --> 05:26.000]  Um, and, and, uh, I, I believe we also have space for vendors.
[05:26.000 --> 05:36.580]  If there's something that, uh, you wish to, uh, sell or peddle or, or share with people, uh, uh, uh, write to vendors at hope.net and, uh, uh, space there is filling up as well.
[05:36.760 --> 05:41.520]  We do have, uh, Mike, do you know any particular vendors that, uh, will be there for sure?
[05:43.460 --> 05:50.140]  Um, I, I don't want to play favorites by, by saying only the ones I remember, but, uh, there's a good number so far.
[05:50.300 --> 05:53.280]  We still have a few spaces left, but those, as you said, are filling up.
[05:53.280 --> 05:56.800]  Maybe you could tell us what kind of vendor we have without giving a specific name.
[05:57.000 --> 05:58.420]  Uh, we have people who sell books.
[05:58.600 --> 06:00.060]  We have, uh, books.
[06:00.300 --> 06:01.180]  You may have heard of that.
[06:01.360 --> 06:03.940]  Well, speaking of books, you know that, uh, Ray Bradbury died today.
[06:04.060 --> 06:05.420]  He wrote, uh, Fahrenheit 451.
[06:05.580 --> 06:07.360]  So, uh, that's all about burning books.
[06:07.600 --> 06:08.480]  He died yesterday.
[06:08.660 --> 06:09.300]  I think it was yesterday.
[06:09.800 --> 06:10.840]  Well, I found out about it today.
[06:11.000 --> 06:11.080]  Huh?
[06:11.240 --> 06:11.660]  How about that?
[06:11.660 --> 06:12.960]  Yeah, I think the news came out today, but...
[06:12.960 --> 06:14.220]  Well, I read it electronically.
[06:14.560 --> 06:16.520]  Maybe if I had a book, it would be different, but, um...
[06:16.520 --> 06:17.000]  You'll get it.
[06:17.100 --> 06:18.060]  You'll get it in six weeks.
[06:18.160 --> 06:18.700]  Yeah, yeah.
[06:18.800 --> 06:21.420]  They're easier to, they're much easier to burn when they're electronic books.
[06:21.840 --> 06:22.760]  Uh, that day is coming.
[06:23.280 --> 06:23.500]  Yes.
[06:23.780 --> 06:25.660]  Uh, so, okay, so people sell books.
[06:25.680 --> 06:26.400]  People sell books.
[06:26.560 --> 06:32.160]  People who, uh, make hardware, various types of hardware, 3D printers, uh, electronics kits.
[06:32.600 --> 06:34.700]  Uh, we have some security companies.
[06:34.700 --> 06:38.180]  We have people who, who want to hire you, who are running a table.
[06:38.320 --> 06:38.340]  Me?
[06:38.340 --> 06:38.420]  Really?
[06:38.600 --> 06:39.180]  Well, maybe not you.
[06:39.180 --> 06:39.800]  Who wants to hire me?
[06:39.900 --> 06:40.220]  No one.
[06:40.380 --> 06:42.360]  But, but maybe they want to hire someone else.
[06:43.160 --> 06:43.760]  Same decision.
[06:44.500 --> 06:45.880]  Uh, Redhack, looks like you have something to say.
[06:46.300 --> 06:47.440]  No, I'm just, I'm just listening.
[06:47.560 --> 06:47.880]  You're listening.
[06:48.300 --> 06:49.840]  Okay, you're just leaning over so close.
[06:49.840 --> 06:52.640]  I'm trying to hear a Bernie S, because through Mike's headphones.
[06:52.640 --> 06:53.400]  Oh, I see.
[06:53.480 --> 06:55.780]  Okay, we don't have enough headphones for the massive crowd that showed up tonight.
[06:56.500 --> 07:06.900]  Um, okay, so, uh, basically, uh, uh, people who sell, uh, books of interest to the hacker community, um, uh, and I guess all kinds of other publications or, uh, activist organizations or...
[07:06.900 --> 07:10.940]  Yeah, we'll, we'll say the EFF is going to have a table, because we like them enough to get special treatment.
[07:11.140 --> 07:12.520]  Okay, so you are playing favorites then.
[07:12.640 --> 07:13.040]  All right, fine.
[07:13.180 --> 07:13.700]  Yeah, they're my favorite.
[07:13.840 --> 07:21.240]  All right, well, uh, so anyway, if you, if you want to be a vendor, um, vendors at, uh, hope.net, and it's, uh, uh, it's quite competitive.
[07:21.400 --> 07:25.840]  We're not going to give out prices or anything like that, but, uh, uh, it's the best way to reach a whole lot of people.
[07:26.140 --> 07:28.860]  All the other vendors are awesome, and they're tied for second favorite.
[07:29.200 --> 07:31.640]  I don't, I don't want to make people think I don't like them.
[07:36.900 --> 07:37.400]  A lot of network stuff.
[07:37.580 --> 07:38.600]  I know we were talking about this earlier.
[07:39.280 --> 07:41.600]  Um, yeah, I did want to talk a little bit about the network.
[07:41.780 --> 07:43.400]  Um, so we're going to have a network.
[07:43.800 --> 07:44.280]  Oh, good.
[07:44.880 --> 07:45.100]  Yeah.
[07:46.060 --> 07:46.700]  And, uh...
[07:46.700 --> 07:47.660]  There was some doubt.
[07:47.860 --> 07:50.000]  Is it going to be connected to the outside world?
[07:50.360 --> 07:51.860]  Well, actually, Mike, I was just getting to that.
[07:52.020 --> 07:54.300]  Um, this network will be connected to the internet.
[07:54.960 --> 07:55.460]  Which now?
[07:55.700 --> 07:56.260]  The what?
[07:56.400 --> 07:57.160]  The internet.
[07:57.360 --> 07:57.620]  Okay.
[07:57.820 --> 07:57.900]  What is that?
[07:58.120 --> 07:58.800]  Well, no, I'm sorry.
[07:58.820 --> 07:59.920]  It'll be connected to internet.
[08:00.280 --> 08:03.180]  For, for, for our listeners who may not be familiar with that, what is it?
[08:04.000 --> 08:05.320]  Um, it's a lot of...
[08:05.360 --> 08:06.880]  There might be some listeners who aren't familiar with that.
[08:06.880 --> 08:08.680]  Yeah, it's a lot of other networks.
[08:09.060 --> 08:09.600]  Uh-huh.
[08:09.880 --> 08:11.260]  That aren't in the same building.
[08:11.740 --> 08:13.780]  Let's move past this and, uh, okay.
[08:13.940 --> 08:14.180]  All right.
[08:14.320 --> 08:16.940]  No, no, we, we are seriously, we're, we're going to have a really nice network.
[08:17.180 --> 08:18.940]  We're still kind of designing it.
[08:19.100 --> 08:23.220]  Um, and, uh, yeah, we'll have a, a pretty, uh, nice internet connection.
[08:23.660 --> 08:27.560]  And, um, uh, a pretty substantial, uh, local network.
[08:27.760 --> 08:34.570]  We'll have, uh, wireless, um, probably including, I think, 802.11, uh, BG and probably N.
[08:34.720 --> 08:35.810]  I'm not sure about that.
[08:35.810 --> 08:41.220]  But those are, uh, if you don't know, those are different, uh, wireless protocols, pretty modern ones on a lot of, like, new devices.
[08:41.430 --> 08:46.960]  So, you can bring all your, like, uh, you know, wireless things if, if that's how you prefer to use internet or local networks.
[08:47.310 --> 08:50.860]  We're also going to have, uh, like a hack lounge, a place where people can sit.
[08:50.860 --> 08:52.900]  There'll be, obviously, tables and stuff like that.
[08:53.080 --> 08:57.880]  It'll be, like, um, hardware hacking areas where you'll be able to access wired, wired internet if you'd like.
[08:58.260 --> 09:01.280]  Um, we're also going to have, uh, a cage as we've had in the past.
[09:01.430 --> 09:06.960]  And, and what a cage is, is like a place where you can bring a device that you kind of want to leave in the network operations center.
[09:07.450 --> 09:10.420]  And we'll have, uh, a gigabit, uh, wired link for you.
[09:10.560 --> 09:14.720]  We'll have gigabit links, uh, wired links elsewhere, like in the, the hack lounge I referred to.
[09:14.720 --> 09:16.880]  But we'll have a cage where you can sort of leave it.
[09:16.940 --> 09:19.640]  And can I point out right now that this cage is not for your children?
[09:19.880 --> 09:21.120]  If you have toddlers, don't bring them.
[09:21.220 --> 09:22.220]  It's not a daycare center.
[09:22.360 --> 09:23.120]  It's for machines.
[09:23.380 --> 09:33.580]  But if you have a, if you have a, uh, a supercomputer made out of Legos and you're a child, you can bring your computer and we'll put it in the cage, even if it's made out of Legos.
[09:33.900 --> 09:34.980]  Oh, that's, yeah.
[09:35.100 --> 09:36.580]  Find any other conference that'll do that.
[09:36.900 --> 09:41.640]  I, I, I understand you can't put children in the cage, but I'm just wondering if I can go in the cage if I want to like avoid people.
[09:41.740 --> 09:44.640]  If you want to go in the cage, Mike, you might not leave the cage until Sunday.
[09:44.720 --> 09:59.800]  At any rate, we're really encouraging people to bring extra stuff, like equipment, like servers, anything extra that you think might be helpful for a gigabit and higher network speeds.
[09:59.800 --> 10:01.020]  That would really help us a lot.
[10:01.280 --> 10:10.220]  We're always looking to expand, but it's an odd thing because in New York City, you would think that it would be an easy job to just get as much connectivity as possible.
[10:10.220 --> 10:14.830]  It's actually a lot easier in remote parts of Europe to get high bandwidth.
[10:15.500 --> 10:19.660]  Here in New York City, getting connected to fiber is the real trick.
[10:20.100 --> 10:29.600]  A lot of buildings aren't wired into the Fios or fiber of any sort, so you have to rely on, I believe, microwavelinks or things like that.
[10:29.760 --> 10:31.500]  Yeah, that's kind of the struggle with the hotel.
[10:31.600 --> 10:34.560]  It's a very old building, although it may be renovated and remodeled.
[10:34.620 --> 10:40.140]  I know they're doing a lot of improvements internally to the network, but they still don't have any sort of physical connectivity to the outside.
[10:40.220 --> 10:46.140]  that isn't sort of in a demarcation area or something that's already, like, spoken for as far as...
[10:46.140 --> 10:49.380]  But we're leapfrogging over that by using all kinds of other technology to bypass.
[10:49.900 --> 10:50.800]  Right, right, exactly.
[10:50.800 --> 10:58.160]  So we have to set up our own link and then basically use our own infrastructure within the hotel to create this network.
[10:59.360 --> 11:05.860]  And, yeah, we sort of deal with those challenges and we're still sort of designing it and getting ready to build it up.
[11:05.860 --> 11:07.740]  But it's going to work, I think.
[11:07.900 --> 11:11.000]  And like I said, I really encourage people to bring things.
[11:11.120 --> 11:18.840]  If you want to bring, like, a public FTP server, if you want to bring, like, a computer, maybe you just built a computer and you want to see if it's robust.
[11:19.080 --> 11:22.480]  There's going to be plenty of people that will test that for you if you put it on the network.
[11:22.920 --> 11:30.640]  Maybe you have a film or, like, a whole production company that's got tons of movies you've just made in, like, 2K or 4K.
[11:30.640 --> 11:36.180]  And it's, like, huge files and you want to distribute them, bring those and we can help distribute them around the world.
[11:36.180 --> 11:39.800]  You say if you have large files of various sources that you'd like to transfer and share with other people.
[11:39.900 --> 11:40.160]  Exactly.
[11:40.160 --> 11:43.140]  If you're a producer, if you're an artist, that kind of stuff's really cool.
[11:43.160 --> 11:47.960]  If you have a supercomputer and it runs at, like, incredibly high speeds, we might be able to accommodate you.
[11:47.960 --> 11:48.400]  You're not kidding, right?
[11:48.440 --> 11:51.820]  You really are inviting people with supercomputers to come to the conference and bring them.
[12:00.640 --> 12:02.060]  You can write to us here at the radio station, OTH.
[12:02.060 --> 12:04.360]  We might be able to help you if you have a supercomputer.
[12:04.600 --> 12:08.820]  OTH at 2600.com is the address for the radio show.
[12:08.960 --> 12:09.040]  Right.
[12:10.040 --> 12:13.160]  Well, Greg Newby, our friend, has Arctic supercomputers.
[12:13.240 --> 12:13.780]  Can he bring them?
[12:14.280 --> 12:17.120]  If he can get them into the building, maybe.
[12:17.320 --> 12:20.260]  But, yeah, we basically want to accommodate as much as we can.
[12:20.660 --> 12:22.440]  You might have to transport them by sled dog.
[12:22.880 --> 12:23.140]  Uh-huh.
[12:23.960 --> 12:24.900]  Get it out of your system.
[12:25.040 --> 12:25.120]  He has those, too.
[12:25.340 --> 12:26.000]  Yeah, all right.
[12:26.760 --> 12:27.400]  Anything else?
[12:27.480 --> 12:28.740]  Any other Alaska jokes?
[12:28.980 --> 12:28.980]  No?
[12:29.940 --> 12:31.140]  There's not a whole lot to make.
[12:31.200 --> 12:31.320]  All right.
[12:31.640 --> 12:34.580]  Well, no, every year, though, the network gets better.
[12:34.720 --> 12:35.020]  Yeah.
[12:35.160 --> 12:36.340]  And it's a challenge.
[12:36.480 --> 12:37.000]  It really is.
[12:37.060 --> 12:41.880]  Like I said, New York City, it's like being further away than the wilderness in some ways.
[12:41.880 --> 12:46.720]  If you have a nice modern building, yeah, okay, you might be tied into the most modern network equipment.
[12:46.820 --> 12:47.640]  We have to build it.
[12:47.720 --> 12:49.980]  And that's why we need hacker know-how.
[12:50.240 --> 12:58.940]  And if you're out there and you have some kind of connection or equipment or just ideas, we want to hear from you because that's the fun.
[12:59.080 --> 13:02.880]  That's part of the fun of the whole conference is that it's not just given to us on a silver platter.
[13:02.980 --> 13:04.260]  We have to construct it ourselves.
[13:04.600 --> 13:05.600]  And you can be a part of that.
[13:05.720 --> 13:10.660]  So by all means, write to either projects at hope.net or othat2600.com.
[13:11.080 --> 13:16.600]  Tell us what you'd like to do, what you can do in that regard, and anything having to do with the conference as well.
[13:16.720 --> 13:18.080]  Yeah, that's basically what I was saying.
[13:18.080 --> 13:27.000]  And I wasn't just meaning to solicit for sort of people that want to contribute hardware or bring stuff or maybe have ideas of the ways they could help with hardware.
[13:27.240 --> 13:36.920]  Honestly, we would love to, you know, if you're a young person and you want to learn about certain types of networking protocols or how to design or build or install a network, this is the kind of event that might be for you.
[13:37.040 --> 13:45.420]  And I know you can check out hope.net or hopenumber9.net and get more information about volunteering because that's also a big part of how the network happens.
[13:45.420 --> 13:47.360]  Not to blame New York too much, though.
[13:47.480 --> 13:51.360]  People's demands for bandwidth have increased in leaps and bounds over the past 10 years.
[13:51.500 --> 13:56.700]  And, you know, I'm sure you used to be able to get whatever was necessary, the best possible over the phone network.
[13:56.860 --> 14:02.560]  But now, you know, telephone lines can't handle that kind of bandwidth, which is why you have to jump through all these hoops.
[14:02.660 --> 14:07.300]  And of course, New York is hard to go and start running wires from building to building.
[14:07.500 --> 14:07.700]  Right.
[14:07.760 --> 14:09.140]  It's not always wires.
[14:09.340 --> 14:11.080]  Sometimes it's through the air.
[14:11.300 --> 14:15.380]  Sometimes it's just different ways of doing the same thing.
[14:15.700 --> 14:18.060]  And that's what we're going to experiment with.
[14:18.060 --> 14:18.380]  Yeah.
[14:18.500 --> 14:26.380]  What people may or may not realize is that the wiring as far as it goes in New York City is like a lot of it goes through, you know, pipes underground.
[14:26.420 --> 14:28.780]  A lot of it has to go through physical things.
[14:28.940 --> 14:31.660]  We don't have telephone poles that are at least not in Manhattan.
[14:32.180 --> 14:34.900]  So it's very difficult to upgrade.
[14:35.220 --> 14:40.640]  You have to... if you have an old building, it can't just easily be rewired.
[14:41.520 --> 14:44.520]  It just for a single event and we end up having to...
[14:44.520 --> 14:45.260]  Except we do that.
[14:45.440 --> 14:47.860]  We rewire the building for a single event.
[14:48.220 --> 14:50.120]  We add our own extra wiring.
[14:50.300 --> 14:55.720]  And then as you mentioned before, we leapfrog over the infrastructure to another facility that has better infrastructure.
[14:56.140 --> 15:03.160]  You know, it's just a very difficult, even though New York has the most bandwidth out of all the cities in the country.
[15:03.300 --> 15:07.620]  We have spools of fiber optic cable that we like to play with and experiment with.
[15:07.800 --> 15:18.780]  And I think this particular conference, we're going to have internal speeds far greater than anything we've ever had before, in addition to a decent speed outside as well.
[15:18.920 --> 15:23.340]  But, you know, again, it all depends on how much work we put into it, how many network people are running around.
[15:24.300 --> 15:26.200]  Regardless, it's going to work one way or another.
[15:27.100 --> 15:28.640]  Bernie, anything you have to say on this?
[15:29.600 --> 15:39.040]  I've always wondered why... I haven't always... I've just recently wondered why the Hotel Pennsylvania doesn't run fiber into it from a Madison Square Garden, which clearly has...
[15:39.040 --> 15:43.060]  must have fiber there for all the, you know, all the shows and things.
[15:43.060 --> 15:49.700]  We were actually talking about getting fiber from a Madison Square Garden, stringing it across 7th Avenue into the building.
[15:50.300 --> 15:52.780]  But that's, you know, high enough so that a truck wouldn't hit it.
[15:52.860 --> 15:55.360]  But, you know, that's a hacker solution.
[15:55.580 --> 15:59.580]  And even for us, I think that might be a bit of a stretch.
[16:00.200 --> 16:05.020]  But there are ingenious solutions that we have to think of.
[16:05.040 --> 16:05.640]  How would you get it there?
[16:05.700 --> 16:06.200]  Bow and arrow?
[16:06.520 --> 16:07.280]  How would I get what?
[16:07.560 --> 16:08.800]  The fiber across 7th Avenue.
[16:08.840 --> 16:10.400]  Well, how would you string it?
[16:10.400 --> 16:10.880]  That's a good question.
[16:11.060 --> 16:12.380]  Bow and arrow actually does work.
[16:12.380 --> 16:14.500]  You know, it's been... With, like, fishing line.
[16:14.660 --> 16:17.820]  And then on the other end of the fishing line, then you hoist it up with the fishing line.
[16:17.820 --> 16:19.580]  You have to think outside the box sometimes.
[16:19.860 --> 16:20.540]  People laugh.
[16:20.640 --> 16:23.240]  People laugh at our solutions, but they sometimes turn into real solutions.
[16:23.500 --> 16:27.860]  And we honestly looked into a lot of different options many, many months in advance.
[16:27.920 --> 16:31.320]  And we've really, you know, wanted to check in on, like, what is the status?
[16:31.500 --> 16:36.300]  Where is New York at as far as, like, getting physical infrastructure to the building?
[16:36.320 --> 16:37.900]  It's still incredibly difficult.
[16:38.380 --> 16:45.580]  It feels like we're pulling New York into the present or into the future because it does get slow sometimes.
[16:45.580 --> 16:46.340]  It really does.
[16:46.500 --> 16:47.740]  And we want to be a lot faster.
[16:48.120 --> 16:50.780]  And I think we've succeeded in doing that to a degree.
[16:50.960 --> 17:00.080]  I mean, some of the things, some of the improvements at the hotel are because of us, because we've been there setting things up and they've basically made that the norm.
[17:00.460 --> 17:01.680]  And I think we can keep doing that.
[17:01.760 --> 17:08.120]  Now that it looks like the hotel's not going to be torn down anytime in the near future, uh, maybe, uh, maybe we can bring them into the 21st century.
[17:08.290 --> 17:11.580]  But again, uh, folks out there, you might have more connections than we do.
[17:11.680 --> 17:12.710]  You might have more hardware.
[17:12.900 --> 17:15.470]  You might have all kinds of things that, uh, we can only dream about.
[17:15.580 --> 17:17.100]  And that's part of what being a hacker is.
[17:17.360 --> 17:19.030]  It's dreaming about things that are impossible.
[17:19.230 --> 17:20.250]  Did you try a laser?
[17:20.750 --> 17:21.380]  Uh, for what?
[17:21.540 --> 17:22.380]  You can have lasers.
[17:22.380 --> 17:23.530]  So they have this technology.
[17:23.530 --> 17:24.880]  It's called free space optics.
[17:25.100 --> 17:26.730]  It's like fiber optics without the fiber.
[17:27.010 --> 17:29.210]  And you just shine a laser across the street.
[17:29.250 --> 17:30.730]  Dot Red, you're waving your hand frantically.
[17:30.920 --> 17:31.120]  Go ahead.
[17:31.120 --> 17:39.900]  I forget the exact conversation about this, but this was something we discussed a couple conferences ago, like the, the, the previous, uh, hope and for various reasons.
[17:39.900 --> 17:40.560]  There was no such thing.
[17:40.560 --> 17:41.620]  You mean the next hope, right?
[17:41.730 --> 17:43.060]  The previous hope hasn't happened yet.
[17:43.440 --> 17:44.460]  There's a problem with that.
[17:44.530 --> 17:45.320]  For various reasons.
[17:45.500 --> 17:47.240]  Oh, Bernie, Bernie already has a problem with this.
[17:47.320 --> 17:47.720]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[17:47.940 --> 17:48.140]  Yes.
[17:48.290 --> 17:51.820]  Someone could launch a, uh, a pigeon denial of service attack.
[17:52.140 --> 17:55.460]  Just, you know, just like it was in pigeons and they would fly it into the beam and...
[17:55.460 --> 18:00.400]  We have some, some, some falcons that are working for us in the midtown area that would, uh...
[18:00.400 --> 18:07.160]  If you can get a pigeon to hover precisely in the beam of this laser for the entire duration of the conference, then you deserve...
[18:07.160 --> 18:07.920]  Or our drones.
[18:08.380 --> 18:09.160]  That's what I was about to say.
[18:09.360 --> 18:10.270]  Drones could take care of this.
[18:10.320 --> 18:11.600]  Another reason we should have drones.
[18:11.790 --> 18:22.960]  They all have many pros and cons, but for various reasons to listen, to not bore the audience that I won't go into, it was, uh, thrown down in favor of things like microwave, which is also just more conventional.
[18:23.360 --> 18:23.820]  All right.
[18:23.900 --> 18:30.080]  Well, um, if you have ideas, of course, we want to hear from you, uh, ongoing updates at www.hope.net.
[18:30.490 --> 18:32.400]  Um, and, uh, it's going to be a lot of fun.
[18:32.500 --> 18:38.100]  July 13th, 14th, and 15th at the Hotel Pennsylvania in New York City, right across the street from Penn Station.
[18:38.600 --> 18:39.380]  It's going to be awesome.
[18:39.530 --> 18:41.270]  All kinds of people showing up from all around the world.
[18:41.700 --> 18:45.240]  Um, any, any other words on hope before we move on to other subjects?
[18:45.980 --> 18:46.160]  No?
[18:46.660 --> 18:46.960]  Okay.
[18:46.960 --> 18:47.290]  Hope on a rope.
[18:47.500 --> 18:47.700]  Surprises.
[18:48.080 --> 18:48.660]  Uh, yeah.
[18:48.900 --> 18:50.000]  A lot of surprises coming up.
[18:50.000 --> 18:54.800]  Uh, okay, uh, in the news, um, all sorts of things, as always, are happening.
[18:55.380 --> 19:05.270]  Um, well, you know, I've been getting these emails for as long as I can remember about somebody who has sent me an invitation to join their damn network on LinkedIn.
[19:06.000 --> 19:17.360]  And, uh, today, uh, the ultimate, uh, attempt by that organization to get me to, uh, log into my account is that all their passwords were leaked and I should log into the account to change my password because the whole system is insecure now.
[19:17.620 --> 19:18.740]  It's not going to work, folks.
[19:18.820 --> 19:19.880]  I'm still not going to log in.
[19:19.880 --> 19:20.530]  I don't care.
[19:20.740 --> 19:22.540]  I have no interest in being on LinkedIn.
[19:22.820 --> 19:24.160]  They're the most annoying people in the world.
[19:24.540 --> 19:36.040]  Uh, and, um, uh, well, apparently if you use them now, uh, all of your, all of your contacts are the property of, uh, well, according to the newspapers, it's a hacker that did this, but, uh, you know, how do you know who did this?
[19:36.180 --> 19:40.660]  Uh, how do you know who was it accessed, uh, because of some insecure system?
[19:40.800 --> 19:47.800]  Uh, but 8 million leaked passwords, uh, connected both to LinkedIn and some dating website, uh, have, uh, have been compromised.
[19:47.800 --> 19:52.360]  This is only one of two, uh, security related announcements from LinkedIn this week.
[19:52.530 --> 19:59.880]  The other is that if you use their iPhone app, apparently it was transmitting your entire calendar to LinkedIn and they won't say why.
[20:00.620 --> 20:01.640]  Oh, that's fascinating.
[20:01.770 --> 20:01.900]  Really?
[20:02.640 --> 20:03.040]  Unbelievable.
[20:03.340 --> 20:05.180]  Which is, you know, completely unnecessary.
[20:05.360 --> 20:09.040]  Uh, and so I guess they can like spam you when you have a meeting with someone.
[20:09.160 --> 20:11.120]  I don't know, but, uh, I don't know.
[20:11.140 --> 20:11.770]  I don't trust them.
[20:11.900 --> 20:14.660]  Or suggest that you link in with them.
[20:14.820 --> 20:22.400]  Um, just a note for anyone who, any of our listeners who use LinkedIn, um, the, I believe that the username that they use is your email address.
[20:22.400 --> 20:32.840]  So if you have a LinkedIn, you know, if your account was compromised, um, and you use that password for other, uh, accounts on the internet, you should probably change that.
[20:33.290 --> 20:37.770]  One, you shouldn't be using the same password across, uh, multiple different accounts if you can help it.
[20:37.860 --> 20:47.200]  But two, um, if one, if, if, you know, your password is compromised on one site, um, there are times, uh, people that will take that compromised password and try plugging it into other sites.
[20:47.200 --> 20:48.460]  So just be aware of that.
[20:48.660 --> 20:59.030]  So don't use the same password you use for LinkedIn for say, uh, uh, uh, Google plus or, uh, or Gmail or, uh, or Facebook or something else.
[20:59.270 --> 21:00.740]  So it's your, your computer or the defense department.
[21:01.440 --> 21:01.620]  Yeah.
[21:01.680 --> 21:02.400]  How many people do that?
[21:02.440 --> 21:03.860]  How many people use the same password for everything?
[21:04.750 --> 21:08.700]  I use, you know, I have a few passwords, but I don't have like one password per service.
[21:09.510 --> 21:11.860]  So you, you do use the same password for multiple things.
[21:12.030 --> 21:12.160]  Yeah.
[21:12.290 --> 21:12.540]  All right.
[21:12.620 --> 21:12.840]  All right.
[21:12.840 --> 21:21.080]  This is a very common thing and, uh, Redhack is very right to make, uh, to put out a bit of a warning to anyone who might use LinkedIn because this is a very commonly used thing.
[21:21.100 --> 21:34.960]  So if, if, uh, someone who cracks a particular website gets a list of email addresses and passwords, uh, they're very likely to have some sort of script that'll, that'll try, uh, using that to log into these other services with the same passwords and variations thereof.
[21:35.160 --> 21:38.740]  Also link, also LinkedIn are just terrible people anyway, and you shouldn't be using their service.
[21:39.540 --> 21:44.400]  But even if you stop using your, their service, if you have the same password, your password is still out there.
[21:44.680 --> 21:44.860]  Yeah.
[21:45.480 --> 21:45.790]  All right.
[21:45.900 --> 21:52.380]  Well, um, there are all kinds of ways that you can protect yourself, but again, if the, uh, system doesn't protect itself, you could still be compromised.
[21:52.440 --> 21:58.360]  And that's part of the problem of, of entrusting all of your data to, uh, to some of these organizations.
[21:58.520 --> 21:59.780]  Facebook being another example.
[21:59.900 --> 22:03.720]  And this is interesting news, uh, that I just read about today.
[22:04.080 --> 22:05.880]  Facebook is apparently taking heat from U.S.
[22:05.880 --> 22:11.240]  lawmakers after reports that the company is exploring ways to let children under 13 onto a social network.
[22:11.600 --> 22:12.000]  Yes.
[22:12.180 --> 22:14.400]  We could now have eight year old friends on Facebook.
[22:14.680 --> 22:17.760]  You know, I don't think the conversation level would go down at all.
[22:18.080 --> 22:22.960]  Uh, in fact, I think it might give it, uh, some, uh, some spark of life that is, uh, desperately needed.
[22:22.960 --> 22:32.060]  Uh, but the, uh, co-chairman of the Bipartisan Congressional Privacy Caucus, uh, Texas Republican, uh, Joe Barton and Massachusetts Democrat, Edward Markey.
[22:32.440 --> 22:33.400]  Oh, I know him.
[22:33.580 --> 22:46.880]  Uh, sent a letter to Facebook chief executive officer, Mark Zuckerberg yesterday, asking him to provide details in the company's plans for allowing access to children under age 13 who fall under stricter regulations around online privacy.
[22:47.100 --> 22:54.760]  Uh, now Facebook is looking at ways to let younger children use its website, though the, uh, the company hasn't made a final decision on whether or how to give them access.
[22:55.160 --> 23:05.240]  That's according to a person familiar with the matter who asked, please don't identify me because these discussions are private and they've already, uh, uh, betrayed people by even admitting that they exist.
[23:05.380 --> 23:14.340]  Now, while the move would expand Facebook's user base, it would also invite further scrutiny over privacy and security on the world's largest social network.
[23:14.560 --> 23:22.080]  Now, the two representatives said in the letter, we strongly believe that children and their personal information should not be viewed as a source of revenue.
[23:22.840 --> 23:29.300]  Uh, you know, I, I find it so hard to believe that I said this with a straight face, that children and their personal information is not viewed as a source of revenue.
[23:29.300 --> 23:36.280]  When you think of all the marketing that takes place in this country aimed primarily at kids and all of the, uh, all the, I'm sorry, Bernie, go ahead.
[23:36.700 --> 23:37.640]  Can you say Disney?
[23:38.280 --> 23:42.600]  Yeah, Disney is one, uh, or just Saturday morning cartoons or whatever it is.
[23:42.760 --> 23:46.740]  They did say, and their personal, they did say, and their personal information.
[23:46.740 --> 23:57.640]  I don't know how much personal information Disney has when marketing to, to, I mean, you know, if, if you're airing an ad on, on some Saturday morning cartoon and you're, you're clearly marketing to children, but you're not marketing to them personally.
[23:57.800 --> 23:59.720]  You don't have personal information about them.
[23:59.780 --> 24:02.880]  You just have an idea of that, that, you know, who's watching.
[24:03.040 --> 24:06.860]  Well, I think that, uh, they, they're able to get personal information in a number of ways.
[24:06.860 --> 24:14.280]  I've seen, uh, kids' names taken, uh, you know, everything from, from ice cream, uh, stores to, uh, to, I think Disneyland itself.
[24:14.580 --> 24:19.900]  Uh, there's all kinds of ways that kids are, are kept track of and letters sent to them and various things like that.
[24:20.180 --> 24:29.960]  So, so the reason that children under 13 aren't allowed on Facebook now is because there's, uh, a law in the United States that you have to respect the privacy of children under the age of 13.
[24:30.220 --> 24:33.020]  The 1998 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act.
[24:33.220 --> 24:33.680]  Yeah, that one.
[24:33.680 --> 24:36.500]  And Facebook is incapable of respecting anyone's privacy.
[24:36.720 --> 24:41.280]  So their solution is to say, all right, just don't come on our service at all because we won't be able to comply with this law.
[24:41.560 --> 24:47.280]  Uh, so what happens a lot of the time is that, uh, people under 13, uh, go on Facebook anyway.
[24:47.420 --> 24:52.320]  They lie and, and say they're 13, uh, sometimes with their parents' help, sometimes without.
[24:52.820 --> 24:54.660]  And Facebook goes and sells their data.
[24:54.880 --> 25:01.480]  So there's, uh, some potential that their data would actually be more protected if they can, if they start to comply with the law.
[25:01.480 --> 25:06.560]  So I would like them to respect the privacy even of adults, but that's not going to happen anytime soon.
[25:06.720 --> 25:16.880]  Well, you know, yeah, we can say this, uh, but, you know, I think it also comes down to us as users respecting our own privacy and not, uh, uh, plastering our own personal lives everywhere.
[25:17.020 --> 25:20.240]  And then being surprised when it gets spread around, of course, it's going to get spread around.
[25:20.300 --> 25:21.580]  I mean, yeah, yeah, you're right.
[25:21.920 --> 25:24.900]  There, there's definitely a lot that users can do to protect their own privacy.
[25:24.900 --> 25:35.400]  But Facebook employs teams of, of behavioral scientists to figure out how to get you to engage with their service, how to give up your privacy, and then how they can sell that on.
[25:35.740 --> 25:37.900]  So they're good at what they do.
[25:38.040 --> 25:40.300]  And, and what they do is invade people's privacy.
[25:40.600 --> 25:46.240]  Uh, there's definitely some blame on the users, but it's, it's not fair to place all of it there.
[25:46.560 --> 25:47.980]  Well, you have to go to Facebook.
[25:48.120 --> 25:48.900]  They don't come to you.
[25:48.900 --> 25:53.000]  So you have to go to their website, you have to give them information, you have to start using their service.
[25:53.720 --> 26:01.140]  And, um, yeah, you know, it's, uh, it's funny because I, I went onto Facebook the other day just, uh, because somebody said there was a picture or something I had to see.
[26:01.560 --> 26:11.080]  And as soon as I, uh, looked at the picture, I got an email saying, welcome back to Facebook from, I thought that was annoying enough that they were monitoring and immediately sending out email as soon as I got back.
[26:11.160 --> 26:13.660]  And they were aware of the fact that I was away for so long.
[26:13.980 --> 26:16.420]  Um, and that kind of thing really doesn't make me want to come back.
[26:16.580 --> 26:17.380]  You know, it's...
[26:17.380 --> 26:25.220]  What's also amusing is if you try to close your account or disable it or whatever it is, it shows you pictures of random, uh, friends of yours and says that so-and-so will miss you.
[26:27.560 --> 26:27.920]  Wow.
[26:28.320 --> 26:28.900]  What a way to...
[26:28.900 --> 26:32.000]  And of course, I mean, you know, it's randomly generated based on your list of friends.
[26:32.100 --> 26:37.340]  So I have two, uh, Facebook test accounts that I use for, for work and they're, they're only friends with each other.
[26:37.520 --> 26:43.400]  And like each one gets an email saying that the other one is waiting for them to come back to Facebook and, and interact.
[26:44.240 --> 26:56.520]  Well, if that gets you through the day, I guess that's, uh, that's a bit of fun to have there, but, um, you know, it's, it's, I think we all have the, the obligation to give as much fake information as possible to these organizations and to encourage others to do the same.
[26:56.700 --> 27:05.420]  Uh, obviously saying that, uh, people under 13 can't use Facebook isn't solving a thing because anybody can simply lie and say they're over 13 when they're not.
[27:05.420 --> 27:07.200]  I mean, I, I knew how to do that when I was a kid.
[27:07.480 --> 27:13.040]  Uh, so, um, it's, it's, it's not going to prevent anything by, by making regulations like that.
[27:13.180 --> 27:19.460]  What, uh, what I think is most effective is to educate people and to what they should keep private and what they shouldn't keep private.
[27:19.680 --> 27:23.800]  Uh, you shouldn't post your class schedule on Facebook, for instance, and everybody does that.
[27:24.120 --> 27:27.140]  You know, why do, why do total strangers and total strangers do see it?
[27:27.300 --> 27:29.260]  Uh, why do they need to have that information?
[27:29.360 --> 27:41.700]  If you're in touch with people that need to know what room you're going to be in at a certain time, you, you can tell them via email or in person, if you still actually have conversations with them, uh, people post travel information of all sorts, which is insane.
[27:42.300 --> 27:47.880]  Um, you know, it's good to know when you're going to be in a certain place, but, uh, do you really need to know, uh, someone's seat number on an airplane?
[27:48.240 --> 27:49.440]  And I think that's a bit much.
[27:49.560 --> 28:02.840]  And that's why, um, it's not, it's not really what people in this country tend to want to hear, but when it comes to children and the internet, um, like anything else, it's down to the individual parent to sort of regulate and, uh, educate their own, their own children on the use of the internet.
[28:03.000 --> 28:08.560]  No company whose, uh, business is, um, collecting and selling your information is going to babysit your kids for you.
[28:09.160 --> 28:11.000]  Yeah, Rob makes a very good point there.
[28:11.160 --> 28:24.440]  Uh, if Facebook was really, uh, dedicated to protecting the privacy of children, they would actually be in a very interesting, uh, situation compared to other websites in the past where they just had an account and supposedly someone emailed them pretending to be someone's parents saying they,
[28:24.640 --> 28:30.140]  you know, give whatever permission you could actually have, uh, parents creating accountants, you know, having various settings go.
[28:30.500 --> 28:37.480]  But as far as privacy goes in general, the big problem with Facebook is they don't have a default, everything closed and you open up whatever it is you want to be open.
[28:37.640 --> 28:42.440]  It's everything is broadcast to the world and they change the settings all the time and people can't keep up with it.
[28:42.600 --> 28:43.520]  They do it on purpose.
[28:43.860 --> 28:56.640]  Um, I also saw an article earlier this week, I think it was in the Guardian, um, about, uh, there's something like every 40 seconds, I think it was only in the UK too, uh, a crime was committed last year that was somehow tied back to Facebook.
[28:56.840 --> 29:04.840]  So there were like 13,000 crimes, uh, in the UK that were related to Facebook somehow, perhaps people posting, um, oh, I'm going to be out or out of town or whatever.
[29:04.960 --> 29:11.200]  And someone burglarized their house or, or, uh, you know, it's, I don't like to say people deserve it, but boy, how stupid can you get?
[29:11.320 --> 29:16.720]  We basically tell people that your house is going to be unoccupied and, uh, for this amount of time.
[29:16.880 --> 29:18.580]  So yeah, it, it, it opens the doors.
[29:18.920 --> 29:19.260]  Sorry.
[29:19.380 --> 29:20.880]  Every 40 minutes, not every 40 seconds.
[29:21.060 --> 29:21.240]  All right.
[29:21.840 --> 29:29.140]  The one thing I heard recently, um, about Facebook, like somebody, uh, a couple was expecting and they'd register an account.
[29:29.320 --> 29:33.640]  As soon as they had the name for their child, they'd register the account, um, to park it basically.
[29:33.820 --> 29:35.840]  So nobody else took their child's account.
[29:35.980 --> 29:42.640]  Cause they, you know, certainly every unborn child wants to be a member of Facebook, which to me is, it's just the craziest thing.
[29:42.720 --> 29:45.880]  Like someone actually talks like they were actually concerned about that.
[29:45.940 --> 29:49.860]  Like as a parent expecting, don't you have myriad of other concerns?
[29:49.860 --> 29:50.880]  Like that's just crazy.
[29:50.980 --> 29:55.060]  We should just use it as a global identification system, replace passports with it.
[29:55.060 --> 30:00.680]  I'm surprised someone hasn't figured out a way for like an embryo to tweet the progress inside the womb and things like that.
[30:00.880 --> 30:03.460]  When your Facebook account is created is as good as your birth certificate.
[30:04.240 --> 30:07.920]  You know, it, it might be, it might've saved Obama some trouble too, if he had a Facebook account.
[30:08.280 --> 30:11.800]  There, there was a, there was another stupid Facebook story about a week ago, I think.
[30:11.900 --> 30:19.820]  And I think this was also in the UK where some girl was counting her grandmother's life savings with her in cash and posted a picture of the cash on Facebook.
[30:20.080 --> 30:25.200]  And of course, soon enough, uh, there were burglars at the door with masks and bats and things demanding to know where the money was.
[30:25.520 --> 30:25.920]  Wow.
[30:26.100 --> 30:29.580]  Also, with regards to Obama, someone would have just claimed that they used a proxy to create the account.
[30:29.740 --> 30:31.340]  So it would have, it just...
[30:31.340 --> 30:35.980]  Well, the, the, again, these are things that people quite often do tell their friends.
[30:35.980 --> 30:40.140]  I'm going on a trip or I did this with my grandmother and nothing bad.
[30:40.420 --> 30:43.820]  No, I hope, uh, in general ever really happens as a result of this.
[30:43.900 --> 30:45.860]  If you don't have a thousand friends, yeah, nothing bad usually happens.
[30:46.180 --> 30:49.560]  That's the real point is not all these people are real friends.
[30:49.560 --> 30:55.860]  And a lot of times these privacy settings, which are default to very, very open, anyone on the internet, uh, quite often can see this.
[30:55.940 --> 30:58.000]  And these people don't realize this.
[30:58.000 --> 31:00.480]  You see, I take a different, I take a different stand here.
[31:00.560 --> 31:07.720]  I think Facebook needs to be as evil as possible because I think that's the way that we learn how to, how to protect our privacy.
[31:07.960 --> 31:20.360]  So if you have this, this huge corporation out there that has stated that they intend to take all your child's personal information and spread it throughout the entire internet, that's a great opportunity for you to say, Hey, junior, sit down.
[31:20.500 --> 31:30.840]  I'm going to teach you how to keep information secret and how to, uh, to prevent these, these, uh, huge international corporations from making you something that's a statistic of some sort.
[31:31.260 --> 31:36.260]  You know, it's, uh, when you have, when you have evil, you can point to, I think it's a, it's a valuable learning lesson.
[31:36.380 --> 31:46.440]  I might've agreed with you at one time, but, uh, if, if, if there's anything from what I would have seen with these websites, uh, shows me is it's just a complete breakdown in the, in what's supposedly supposed to happen with the free market.
[31:46.620 --> 31:49.400]  People aren't choosing, people aren't going somewhere else when they see something bad.
[31:49.520 --> 31:50.780]  They're all just giving into it.
[31:50.860 --> 31:53.240]  I don't think whether they said good or bad, it'd be any different.
[31:53.640 --> 32:01.240]  And you think this way, and I think this way, but I think a lot of people don't think this way, that they don't see it as an invasion of privacy or they don't care about it.
[32:01.520 --> 32:01.780]  Right?
[32:01.960 --> 32:05.100]  So you can say that, let Facebook be as evil as possible.
[32:05.220 --> 32:07.440]  And then people will point to it and say, don't, don't do that.
[32:07.540 --> 32:09.120]  But I don't think that's actually what will happen.
[32:09.440 --> 32:10.840]  But in the end, they're the ones doing it.
[32:10.940 --> 32:11.520]  That's the point.
[32:11.640 --> 32:18.060]  They're the ones giving the information and freely to this organization and watching in horror as it gets spread throughout the entire planet.
[32:18.180 --> 32:21.160]  A lot of times they're not in horror because they don't understand what it is they're giving.
[32:21.300 --> 32:27.260]  Someone says, okay, I'm giving my... people know I'm going to the barber here and on this website people know I'm doing this there.
[32:27.520 --> 32:43.700]  They don't realize how these little bits of information can aggregate into a much bigger picture and how computer programs with very smart people programming them and various historical methods that we've learned over the years, what we're able to employ to infer even more,
[32:43.820 --> 32:52.440]  it's... we understand this because we've seen this for quite some time, but other people, it's hard to even tell someone some of these things that we can use with that information.
[32:52.500 --> 33:03.220]  Well, when they see their entire lives displayed for all to see, they become the examples that we use to point to other children and people that have not yet made the mistake, don't let this happen to you.
[33:03.500 --> 33:09.280]  You know, we can use them as... it's unfortunate, but there have to be people that make horrible mistakes for us to learn by.
[33:09.280 --> 33:09.280]  Yeah.
[33:09.460 --> 33:18.980]  I'm really curious about your claim that Facebook should become more evil because what you really mean is that they should be more transparent about the evil they already do, and that would make them in a way less evil.
[33:19.950 --> 33:29.320]  And they... and they... and it's fun to pick on Facebook, but there's other companies, Google and all these other ones that do the same thing, you know, to more or less degrees of competence.
[33:29.320 --> 33:48.380]  But they... you know, there are people employed at Facebook whose job it is to make you think that you're doing the right thing, and it's really not fair to blame the end user for being taken in by people who are very, very good at what they do.
[33:48.500 --> 33:59.540]  Well, can you give an example of how somebody who is reasonably intelligent might be fooled by these really evil people at Facebook that are very good at what they do, that get them to... to go against their instincts?
[34:00.720 --> 34:03.400]  No, they... they... they go with their instincts.
[34:03.620 --> 34:03.680]  Okay.
[34:03.740 --> 34:05.800]  Facebook manipulates their user interface.
[34:06.060 --> 34:07.860]  And again, other companies do this as well.
[34:07.940 --> 34:09.100]  It's just fun to pick on Facebook.
[34:09.830 --> 34:21.850]  But Facebook manipulates their interface so that your natural human instincts, you know, through years of evolution, will cause you to do what Facebook wants you to do.
[34:22.040 --> 34:22.270]  Mm-hmm.
[34:22.540 --> 34:26.220]  And can you give me an example of what... something Facebook wants you to do that you really shouldn't do?
[34:26.480 --> 34:38.950]  They want you to post your vacation photographs on there so that other people... and then they want other people to come on and look at these photographs so that they can sell advertisements while this is going on.
[34:39.040 --> 34:52.100]  And Facebook knows that if the photographs are from someone of a different gender, then that will affect the likelihood that you'll go and look at it and they'll promote those photos more or less heavily based on what their algorithms tell them.
[34:53.060 --> 34:54.430]  And... and it... and it goes on.
[34:54.540 --> 34:58.620]  And they're probably... no human even understands everything they do, not even at Facebook.
[34:59.460 --> 35:01.330]  So the solution is to post them on Flickr?
[35:02.150 --> 35:02.560]  Sure.
[35:03.600 --> 35:06.370]  Is it until Facebook buys Flickr or did they already do that?
[35:06.450 --> 35:07.080]  I don't even know.
[35:07.690 --> 35:07.980]  Yeah.
[35:08.120 --> 35:08.850]  Yahoo owns...
[35:08.850 --> 35:10.120]  Yahoo owns Flickr.
[35:10.250 --> 35:13.170]  And they're... they seem to be kind of too unconfident to do any of this.
[35:13.600 --> 35:13.710]  Yeah.
[35:13.710 --> 35:15.620]  Not for lack of trying, just for lack of confidence.
[35:15.690 --> 35:15.890]  Right.
[35:15.950 --> 35:17.450]  We'll get into them maybe a little bit later.
[35:18.460 --> 35:18.830]  Okay.
[35:19.430 --> 35:20.150]  Anything else?
[35:20.290 --> 35:24.020]  Of course, in case you can't tell, we all lost a fortune on Facebook's IPO.
[35:24.910 --> 35:26.460]  And we're kind of bitter about that.
[35:26.950 --> 35:27.330]  No, seriously.
[35:27.450 --> 35:28.480]  Does anybody know what happened?
[35:28.670 --> 35:30.910]  I mean, I was overseas when...
[35:30.910 --> 35:31.430]  I'm sorry.
[35:32.250 --> 35:37.950]  The one thing I love about WBAI is the rareness which with the stock market is talked about.
[35:38.040 --> 35:39.080]  And I think we should maintain that.
[35:39.080 --> 35:40.600]  Why can't we mock the stock market?
[35:40.650 --> 35:41.850]  I mean, there's only a few doors down.
[35:41.850 --> 35:43.540]  We should be able to do that when...
[35:43.540 --> 35:43.730]  Okay.
[35:43.870 --> 35:44.870]  I read, you know something about this.
[35:45.000 --> 35:45.120]  Yeah.
[35:45.190 --> 35:46.730]  I'll just keep it very short.
[35:46.910 --> 35:50.370]  Very simply, everyone was thinking, oh, it's these tech companies.
[35:50.370 --> 35:51.410]  They're doing great.
[35:51.430 --> 35:53.060]  And they're making lots of money.
[35:53.170 --> 35:57.460]  And this is the future of the economy and money making in the country.
[35:58.020 --> 35:59.930]  And they thought they were the next Google.
[36:00.170 --> 36:03.810]  And the only problem is they don't have the same sort of revenue that Google has.
[36:04.800 --> 36:07.480]  And they overpriced their stocks and...
[36:08.060 --> 36:09.600]  Zuckerberg went to the bank, man.
[36:10.400 --> 36:13.040]  He had his IPO and he was like, all right, I'm good.
[36:13.210 --> 36:14.560]  I'm going to sell this right now.
[36:14.600 --> 36:16.060]  As soon as it went public.
[36:16.230 --> 36:16.890]  All right, I'm done.
[36:17.060 --> 36:19.000]  So glad I worked on that for like three months.
[36:19.000 --> 36:19.690]  He's done.
[36:19.770 --> 36:22.460]  Yeah, he made out okay, didn't he?
[36:22.620 --> 36:23.540]  He didn't do too badly.
[36:23.540 --> 36:25.170]  I think he lost $5 billion already.
[36:25.600 --> 36:26.040]  He did.
[36:26.120 --> 36:26.580]  I heard he did all right.
[36:26.580 --> 36:28.210]  But he's got like 15 left.
[36:28.600 --> 36:29.270]  Right, but he's...
[36:29.930 --> 36:30.890]  It wasn't money.
[36:31.000 --> 36:31.950]  He was selling shares.
[36:32.250 --> 36:33.210]  He was like, I'm done with this.
[36:33.210 --> 36:34.350]  This project's good.
[36:34.500 --> 36:35.100]  I'm out.
[36:35.310 --> 36:39.450]  He didn't buy $15 billion worth of Facebook stock.
[36:39.460 --> 36:41.040]  He just had it already.
[36:41.210 --> 36:42.540]  And then it was valued at whatever it is.
[36:42.690 --> 36:44.310]  And thus, what he has become...
[36:44.310 --> 36:45.170]  Suddenly, it has value.
[36:45.750 --> 36:46.100]  Interesting.
[36:46.290 --> 36:47.370]  Anyway, let's not talk about the stock market.
[36:47.390 --> 36:49.060]  Yeah, well, I don't understand any of it, to be honest.
[36:49.190 --> 36:50.730]  And I don't really want to understand any of it.
[36:51.350 --> 36:56.310]  But okay, so that's that as far as Facebook and various social media.
[36:57.080 --> 36:58.430]  And the end of these go.
[36:59.580 --> 37:03.450]  There's a story that comes out of the Telegraph over in England.
[37:03.690 --> 37:07.790]  The digital right to be forgotten will be made into EU law.
[37:08.560 --> 37:18.690]  This apparently means a social network such as Facebook or Twitter will have to comply with users' requests to delete everything they have ever published about themselves online.
[37:18.980 --> 37:28.870]  It'll also mean that consumers will be able to force companies that hold data about them, such as for Tesco's Clubcard, which is, I guess, a British thing, to remove it.
[37:29.410 --> 37:39.710]  The changes, which could take more than two years to implement, also include a new EU power to fine companies up to 2% of their global turnover if they breach the rules.
[37:39.730 --> 37:40.810]  What do you guys think about this?
[37:40.810 --> 37:50.730]  I think that's going to be really hard to implement or at least to do retroactively because a lot of companies will back up the data onto other formats so that it's not necessarily sitting on their servers.
[37:50.930 --> 37:53.310]  It might be in a stack of tape somewhere.
[37:53.460 --> 37:55.370]  And so it's actually impossible to delete.
[37:55.370 --> 37:57.270]  See, this is the power of law.
[37:57.410 --> 38:00.520]  The law can say, I don't care if it's so difficult for you.
[38:00.750 --> 38:02.910]  You must respect our citizens' privacy.
[38:03.100 --> 38:04.040]  Do it anyway.
[38:04.390 --> 38:07.600]  And this is the kind of... I haven't looked at this specific law.
[38:07.730 --> 38:10.910]  I don't know if it's any good or not, but this is the kind of thing that we need globally.
[38:11.170 --> 38:11.770]  Two things.
[38:11.980 --> 38:14.100]  On the surface, this seems great.
[38:16.750 --> 38:21.690]  Lawmakers, at least in the EU, pushing to protect their citizens' privacy in some ways.
[38:21.910 --> 38:26.350]  But on the other hand, what RedHack said is also a very interesting point.
[38:26.430 --> 38:29.290]  A lot of these companies share their data with other companies.
[38:29.430 --> 38:43.450]  So if a company like Facebook is required to delete all their information about a user, if the user deletes their account in a specified manner, chances are they'll have more than one way of doing it, like shutting down an account, but there's some obscure way to properly delete it.
[38:43.520 --> 38:45.620]  And they'll try to hide it in their interface.
[38:45.790 --> 38:51.520]  But either way, if they really want to hold on to the information, they would be selling it off to other companies.
[38:51.830 --> 38:55.560]  And then Facebook could delete everything, but these other aggregators would still have it.
[38:55.770 --> 38:58.910]  Yeah, it's not just the social network or whatever in question.
[38:58.910 --> 39:02.450]  It's the fact that once something's on the internet, it's really copyable, no matter what.
[39:02.520 --> 39:03.870]  That's the nature of the technology.
[39:04.080 --> 39:06.620]  So something you post to Facebook, anybody could save that.
[39:06.730 --> 39:07.650]  Anybody could repost that.
[39:07.750 --> 39:19.750]  And there are so many sites, as if you've ever done a web search for something you saw on Twitter, you might notice that there are like hundreds of domains that all just repost things that are posted on Twitter, just to aggregate these things and get in and get in web heads.
[39:20.000 --> 39:25.960]  So like in that sort of example, there's really no way to make the internet delete something.
[39:26.210 --> 39:27.210]  The internet does not forget.
[39:27.450 --> 39:33.020]  It's just, you know, even if you could legislate it off of one site, it's already out there and beyond your control.
[39:33.450 --> 39:37.480]  You say that the internet doesn't forget, and that's true to a degree.
[39:37.710 --> 39:42.650]  But I've had instances where things have become very hard to find.
[39:42.980 --> 39:47.670]  You know, historical bits of news or personal data, things like that.
[39:47.810 --> 39:58.290]  It just, as the years go by, and we move on from one version of software to another, it tends to get further and further away, so that it does become almost impossible to find.
[39:58.430 --> 40:01.080]  So things do get lost in obscurity at some point.
[40:01.350 --> 40:10.770]  Well, that's why we're trying... there's been a big movement to standardize more of the file formats, and old things that are falling out of favor to port them over to other formats.
[40:10.980 --> 40:17.450]  But what is remembered by the internet, if we kind of anthropomorphize it a little bit, is it's asymmetric.
[40:17.620 --> 40:22.040]  Some stuff is remembered for decades upon decades.
[40:22.150 --> 40:24.210]  Other things are forgotten after a year.
[40:24.670 --> 40:28.890]  You know, a case in point with being remembered forever is Usenet.
[40:28.960 --> 40:32.430]  No one thought that the posts from the very beginnings of Usenet would be around.
[40:32.730 --> 40:38.980]  Yet, you know, that you could go back a very long time on, you know, just Google searches for it.
[40:39.040 --> 40:46.150]  Meanwhile, there's other websites which they, you know, they disappeared and they weren't picked up by sites like Archive, you know, the Archive Project.
[40:46.350 --> 40:49.060]  And, you know, it really does depend.
[40:49.410 --> 40:50.230]  Yes, definitely.
[40:50.520 --> 40:52.230]  Yeah, and so you can never be sure.
[40:52.430 --> 40:55.080]  You can never be totally sure that I want this particular data off the net.
[40:55.080 --> 40:55.560]  It's gone.
[40:56.480 --> 40:57.060]  All right.
[40:57.310 --> 41:00.190]  Now, of course, this story is also making the rounds.
[41:00.350 --> 41:02.830]  Mitt Romney, apparently, is being dogged by an email hacker.
[41:03.450 --> 41:05.710]  Yeah, this brings back memories of Sarah Palin, doesn't it?
[41:06.500 --> 41:09.210]  Yeah, it was Samus.
[41:09.460 --> 41:10.410]  How do you say that name?
[41:10.540 --> 41:11.350]  S-E-A-M-U-S?
[41:11.520 --> 41:11.850]  Seamus?
[41:12.450 --> 41:13.060]  Anybody know?
[41:13.170 --> 41:13.310]  Okay.
[41:13.430 --> 41:15.020]  I never had a dog named Seamus.
[41:15.250 --> 41:15.650]  Seamus.
[41:15.770 --> 41:16.520]  I'm going to say Seamus.
[41:16.600 --> 41:17.370]  I think that sounds better.
[41:17.560 --> 41:21.150]  He was the weather-worn family dog of Republican candidate Mitt Romney.
[41:21.600 --> 41:34.430]  And he was also the key to Romney's personal email account because on Tuesday, an anonymous gawker, tipster, you know, if we went back in time, 15 years, people would have no idea what we were talking about with his crazy words.
[41:34.980 --> 41:46.850]  Yeah, a gawker tipster bragged that she had gained access to the presumptive GOP nominee's Hotmail and Dropbox accounts and changed his passwords by simply guessing the answer to the security question, what is your favorite pet?
[41:47.190 --> 41:54.460]  The claim came without any visual proof, such as screenshots of the account's content, but it does bring to mind how easy it is to do this kind of thing.
[41:54.950 --> 42:00.190]  Romney's Hotmail email address, the fact that he uses Hotmail alone speaks volumes, but I won't get into that.
[42:00.770 --> 42:08.950]  His Hotmail email address was most recently made public in a story in the Wall Street Journal detailing behind the scenes efforts by Romney and his aides to pass his state health care bill.
[42:09.250 --> 42:12.960]  The Wall Street Journal got his emails through a public records request.
[42:14.270 --> 42:24.950]  So basically, this is said, according to chief technology officer at TeleSign, says it's a little bit of an indictment on the password recovery process.
[42:25.600 --> 42:28.770]  The whole secret question series is fairly broken.
[42:28.890 --> 42:30.670]  Of course, it's not just public figures who are vulnerable.
[42:30.910 --> 42:40.450]  Many of us are naively publishing information about ourselves online that people with nefarious intentions can use, like an unlabeled set of keys to try to pick our accounts.
[42:40.960 --> 42:54.080]  Now, it's interesting because basically, someone like Mitt Romney can simply lie about who his favorite pet is, and that's an easy way around that.
[42:54.190 --> 42:59.690]  But then, you have somebody running for president who lies, and that will get out.
[42:59.950 --> 43:02.040]  And how do you recover from something like that?
[43:02.150 --> 43:03.650]  You know, it's a no-win situation.
[43:03.850 --> 43:07.560]  Either you tell the truth about your favorite pet, or you become a liar.
[43:07.950 --> 43:10.250]  Either way, I don't think you're fit to be president.
[43:10.250 --> 43:13.730]  When you mentioned Mitt Romney, I thought this was going to be about his iPhone app.
[43:14.060 --> 43:15.230]  No, tell me about that.
[43:15.370 --> 43:27.270]  So, Mitt Romney apparently made an, or not him personally, but he contracted out for an iPhone app where you could like take your picture or your friend's picture and you could like stamp it with like, I'm with Mitt and send it to your friend.
[43:27.520 --> 43:33.390]  Except that in one of these stamps, Mitt Romney supporting stamps, they spelled the word America wrong.
[43:34.910 --> 43:36.830]  How do you spell America wrong?
[43:36.830 --> 43:38.310]  You spell it a-mercia.
[43:39.540 --> 43:39.980]  Lovely.
[43:40.370 --> 43:41.920]  And it wasn't in fine print too.
[43:42.040 --> 43:48.730]  It was like in, in like, you know, huge bold type across the app and America was spelled wrong.
[43:49.440 --> 43:52.190]  E, how do we know that Seamus is really his favorite pet?
[43:52.250 --> 43:53.230]  I think he's lying already.
[43:53.790 --> 43:56.400]  Well, you know, we're gonna have to dig deeper into this whole thing.
[43:56.540 --> 43:57.600]  Let's be honest.
[43:57.650 --> 44:09.560]  If he actually lost access to his accounts, you know, that we're talking about a very big public figure, he could very easily have one of his aides or something and contact the people at, you know, one of these companies and have it all straightened out,
[44:09.800 --> 44:11.270]  unlike the rest of us.
[44:11.360 --> 44:15.520]  Yeah, but the problem is that, you know, if there was data that was compromised, then that's already compromised.
[44:15.520 --> 44:17.300]  Like we said before, the internet doesn't forget...
[44:17.800 --> 44:23.520]  Well, this wasn't necessarily data being compromised because this was a security question thing.
[44:23.600 --> 44:24.980]  And I was talking about the password reset.
[44:25.000 --> 44:35.880]  A lot of services have a thing where if you get the question right, it'll reset the password, but the user, you know, could end up having trouble because the password they expect is no longer valid.
[44:36.020 --> 44:39.900]  But meanwhile, the actual so-called hacker didn't actually gain access at all.
[44:40.230 --> 44:41.290]  But they have the...
[44:41.290 --> 44:48.900]  Well, I see what you're saying, but I believe in this case, it sounds like since the person was able to change the passwords that they were able to have access to the account, I assume.
[44:49.380 --> 44:52.250]  But also, would you really put your favorite pet on the roof of your car?
[44:52.460 --> 44:53.820]  Is that something...
[44:53.820 --> 44:54.500]  I don't know.
[44:54.620 --> 44:55.980]  Let's move on, though.
[44:56.120 --> 44:59.750]  There's other things to talk about, including this, which I think is a really important story.
[45:00.100 --> 45:01.940]  We've talked about Stuxnet.
[45:02.540 --> 45:14.880]  Stuxnet being the internet worm, is it, that was used to cripple the Iranian nuclear, I guess, computer system, various...
[45:14.880 --> 45:21.440]  Well, the centrifuges themselves, where they spin to process the metals, they were made to break.
[45:21.560 --> 45:26.520]  They were made to break through a worm that was sent on the internet.
[45:26.520 --> 45:35.320]  I still can't believe that's even possible, but it has been revealed to nobody's real surprise that this was developed by the United States and by Israel.
[45:36.670 --> 45:38.340]  How did this actually come out?
[45:38.400 --> 45:41.920]  Because I see the story everywhere, but who was it who admitted to it?
[45:43.440 --> 45:44.900]  Anonymous administration officials.
[45:45.080 --> 45:45.800]  Why would they do that?
[45:45.980 --> 45:47.100]  Because that's what they...
[45:47.100 --> 45:47.690]  That's how you...
[45:47.690 --> 45:51.340]  That's the kind of leak that's allowed in this country, is leaks to the New York Times.
[45:51.340 --> 45:51.790]  Uh-huh.
[45:52.060 --> 46:07.250]  Well, anyway, President Obama decided the cyber attacks against Iran should proceed, and in the weeks following that decision, the plant in a city called Natanz was hit by newer versions of the computer worm, and then another after that.
[46:07.360 --> 46:19.380]  The last of that series of attacks, a few weeks after Stuxnet was detected around the world, temporarily took out nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 centrifuges that Iran had spinning at the time to purify uranium.
[46:20.250 --> 46:21.190]  Now, you know, this is amazing.
[46:21.290 --> 46:37.770]  At a time when we're covering a story where a kid in England is being extradited to the United States because he had a website that linked to pirated movies and it wasn't even a crime in the UK, how is it that people in this country, including the president,
[46:37.980 --> 46:47.500]  get away with this kind of a thing against another country, and should there be extradition requests being filed right now for obviously a crime against Iran?
[46:47.690 --> 46:51.520]  National defense, and I assume that we wouldn't honor anything from Iran.
[46:52.040 --> 47:00.080]  I just want to clear... Yeah, I know we're not going to honor it, but I'm saying in the global theater, it seems only fair, and you know, national defense that can be claimed for almost anything.
[47:00.380 --> 47:07.170]  Right, I'm just saying that that's what makes it not a crime in the eyes of whatever... I'm curious what the rest of the world thinks.
[47:07.420 --> 47:14.880]  But in terms of what you said about the Stuxnet thing, it may have been able to travel across the internet, but it also could travel on other mediums.
[47:15.000 --> 47:18.600]  So, you know, it could go onto USB drives, et cetera, et cetera.
[47:18.690 --> 47:27.120]  And so, I believe that the actual machines that were connected to the centrifuges weren't connected to the internet, but they would have been transmitted by, say, some removable media.
[47:27.320 --> 47:35.730]  And at which point, then the virus itself said, hey, I'm connected to one of these controllers that I recognize that is used to control the centrifuges, now I'm going to destroy them.
[47:35.730 --> 47:46.600]  You know, this particular kind of situation really does worry me because it will lead to the, what they call the balkanization of the internet and probably just the cyber world in general.
[47:46.790 --> 47:53.920]  Because, you know, we don't just have this grand open realm of cyber-ness where anything just happens.
[47:53.920 --> 48:02.170]  It's machines that are allowing data to pass through them, you know, whether it's, you know, it's been designed to do such or has been hacked in some way.
[48:02.170 --> 48:10.230]  And, you know, this kind of, these kinds of attacks, as they increase in prevalence, we're going to see the internet, you know, just start seeing walls going up all over the place.
[48:10.360 --> 48:16.060]  And, you know, countries firewalling themselves off and even within, it's a very worrying development.
[48:16.230 --> 48:29.580]  It should be noted that, apparently, if I read the story correctly, this worm was supposed to be just attacking the system at the nuclear power facility, but it got out because an employee had hooked up their laptop at work and then brought it home.
[48:29.580 --> 48:32.770]  So, and that's how it, that's how it got out onto the open internet.
[48:32.980 --> 48:39.000]  And so, not only are apparently our government and the Israeli government responsible for this, but we botched the job.
[48:39.340 --> 48:40.520]  Oh, that's not surprising.
[48:40.650 --> 48:44.420]  Hey, listen, we want to take some phone calls because we only have a few minutes left and we do want to hear from our listeners.
[48:44.540 --> 48:46.540]  And we haven't been able to in the last few weeks because we've been fundraising.
[48:46.710 --> 48:51.040]  212-209-2900 if you have anything you want to weigh in on this.
[48:51.190 --> 48:51.790]  Red Hat, you had something?
[48:52.290 --> 48:52.360]  No?
[48:53.020 --> 48:58.040]  Well, ironically, that is how many viruses actually get out from even the most competent people.
[48:58.040 --> 49:05.480]  It's one of the most, it's one of the biggest dangers in designing viruses or slash worms of any kind is that they accidentally get out.
[49:06.170 --> 49:06.560]  Okay.
[49:06.670 --> 49:08.060]  Let's, uh, let's go to the phones.
[49:08.190 --> 49:08.560]  Good evening.
[49:08.900 --> 49:09.120]  I'm sorry.
[49:09.210 --> 49:09.500]  Good evening.
[49:09.670 --> 49:10.620]  You are on off the hook.
[49:11.270 --> 49:11.670]  Hello.
[49:12.290 --> 49:12.820]  Go ahead.
[49:13.900 --> 49:18.150]  Yeah, I'm, uh, I'm concerned that we didn't just botch.
[49:19.250 --> 49:19.750]  Yeah.
[49:19.790 --> 49:19.960]  Hi.
[49:20.020 --> 49:20.400]  How you doing?
[49:20.520 --> 49:21.120]  Speak up, please.
[49:21.480 --> 49:22.320]  Yes, I'm right here.
[49:22.520 --> 49:25.540]  I'm concerned that we didn't just botch our hack.
[49:26.060 --> 49:31.290]  We botched our whole gift that the United States of America was originally.
[49:31.560 --> 49:33.880]  And it's never ever going to be the same.
[49:33.880 --> 49:35.150]  And I would like it to be.
[49:35.270 --> 49:36.170]  So I'm not being negative.
[49:36.670 --> 49:43.580]  I'm calling the malicious government of the United States of America on it.
[49:44.340 --> 49:46.170]  Uh, quick before they jam you.
[49:47.670 --> 49:48.230]  Okay.
[49:48.540 --> 49:48.880]  All right.
[49:49.270 --> 49:58.250]  Some of what we do is for good, but you know, I personally knew Charles, uh, who's in the movie missing that's missing.
[49:58.840 --> 50:03.520]  And, uh, what the one that took place in Chile and that's what we do to people.
[50:04.120 --> 50:04.690]  Okay.
[50:05.250 --> 50:07.290]  That's not the movie with Tommy Lee Jones.
[50:07.560 --> 50:08.600]  Look at the movie missing.
[50:08.770 --> 50:09.320]  That's America.
[50:09.320 --> 50:10.000]  Wait, which missing?
[50:10.100 --> 50:11.820]  We're talking about the one in Chile or somewhere else?
[50:11.920 --> 50:12.150]  Yes.
[50:12.250 --> 50:12.420]  Chile.
[50:12.520 --> 50:12.650]  Yeah.
[50:12.730 --> 50:12.860]  Okay.
[50:12.860 --> 50:13.360]  That's a good movie.
[50:13.480 --> 50:13.710]  Definitely.
[50:13.840 --> 50:15.300]  That's got Sissy Spacek in it, doesn't it?
[50:15.380 --> 50:15.650]  Yes.
[50:15.820 --> 50:16.060]  Yeah.
[50:16.580 --> 50:16.820]  All right.
[50:16.920 --> 50:17.100]  Definitely.
[50:17.190 --> 50:17.320]  Yeah.
[50:17.400 --> 50:18.460]  Definitely worth checking out.
[50:18.580 --> 50:19.710]  And that does, it's an education.
[50:19.710 --> 50:20.290]  That's for sure.
[50:20.690 --> 50:21.320]  Thanks for your thoughts.
[50:21.440 --> 50:22.300]  We have a bunch of calls.
[50:22.420 --> 50:22.980]  Let's go over here.
[50:23.000 --> 50:23.340]  Good evening.
[50:23.480 --> 50:24.320]  You're on off the hook.
[50:25.960 --> 50:26.460]  Speak up.
[50:26.940 --> 50:27.320]  Oh, yes.
[50:27.500 --> 50:30.210]  Um, I'm going to be bringing cup telephones to hope.
[50:30.800 --> 50:32.620]  Um, What kind of telephones?
[50:32.920 --> 50:33.320]  Cup telephones.
[50:33.440 --> 50:35.150]  I did this once at one of the whole companies.
[50:35.400 --> 50:40.900]  Like, you know, like, remember the, the, the, the ones with the Dixie cups and the, I'm going to be teaching people how to make cup telephones.
[50:40.900 --> 50:43.690]  You're going to basically have two Dixie cups with a piece of string between them?
[50:43.800 --> 50:45.400]  Well, I mean, maybe I'll be selling them.
[50:46.400 --> 50:48.440]  And, uh, I want to see who buys them, Rebel.
[50:48.620 --> 50:50.080]  Thanks very much for sharing that.
[50:50.120 --> 50:51.440]  I look forward to this more than anything.
[50:52.250 --> 50:52.920]  Good evening.
[50:52.960 --> 50:54.120]  You're on off the hook.
[50:55.300 --> 50:56.100]  Speak up, please.
[50:56.100 --> 50:57.320]  Yeah.
[50:57.900 --> 51:04.600]  Uh, a possible solution for, uh, compromised passwords is, uh, security tokens.
[51:04.770 --> 51:10.710]  I know that PayPal recently, uh, came out with one for their customers.
[51:11.270 --> 51:11.900]  Okay.
[51:11.980 --> 51:12.650]  Well, how does that work?
[51:13.360 --> 51:33.360]  Uh, basically they'll, it's a hardware device that you have to carry around and it synchronizes with, uh, uh, foreign, uh, uh, uh, a third party, uh, to, uh, to, uh, provide authentication.
[51:34.260 --> 51:34.620]  Okay.
[51:35.060 --> 51:35.420]  All right.
[51:35.480 --> 51:35.800]  Well, thanks.
[51:35.920 --> 51:36.320]  Uh, thanks for that.
[51:36.340 --> 51:37.960]  By the way, people, please turn down your radio.
[51:38.080 --> 51:39.100]  You're gonna get very, very confused.
[51:39.320 --> 51:41.540]  Uh, let's make this quick right back because I want to take these tokens.
[51:41.790 --> 51:43.670]  Generally, actually what it is is there's a shared secret.
[51:43.670 --> 51:49.820]  So there'll be some secret that was, um, uh, preloaded onto the token that, uh, PayPal knows and the token knows.
[51:49.820 --> 51:52.580]  And, and that's how, uh, you would be able to authenticate.
[51:52.670 --> 51:54.420]  So it's actually not synchronizing with anyone.
[51:54.560 --> 51:56.580]  It's just that both sides know some secret already.
[51:56.770 --> 52:03.290]  And there are other, uh, companies out there that provide similar, uh, extra level of authentication for, for their service.
[52:03.340 --> 52:03.500]  Okay.
[52:03.800 --> 52:04.690]  Let's take some more phone calls.
[52:04.790 --> 52:05.980]  212-209-2900.
[52:06.290 --> 52:06.900]  Good evening.
[52:07.060 --> 52:07.750]  You're on off the hook.
[52:09.520 --> 52:10.210]  Oh dear.
[52:10.500 --> 52:10.730]  Okay.
[52:10.800 --> 52:11.790]  Let's try a different one.
[52:12.100 --> 52:12.500]  Good evening.
[52:12.670 --> 52:13.340]  You're on off the hook.
[52:14.000 --> 52:14.620]  Speak up.
[52:15.120 --> 52:15.340]  Yes.
[52:15.480 --> 52:15.690]  Hello.
[52:16.000 --> 52:18.940]  I was just watching the Brian Lair CUNY show.
[52:19.190 --> 52:29.520]  And he had a guy from ours, um, Technica and a, a writer saying that, uh, the, uh, Stux something stint, it sounds like.
[52:29.540 --> 52:30.300]  Stuxnet, yes.
[52:30.770 --> 52:33.790]  How they disabled the, uh, computer for Iran.
[52:34.500 --> 52:45.920]  And, uh, this fellow was saying that it's not a good idea when so many people are working night and day and, uh, spending all that money at high salaries.
[52:46.290 --> 52:52.380]  And it's, uh, it looks like it's full speed ahead and nobody knows who's controlling it.
[52:53.230 --> 52:54.560]  Uh, what do you think?
[52:54.650 --> 52:55.400]  Who's controlling what?
[52:55.730 --> 53:04.210]  Oh, the many technicians that are working on the two forms of cyber, uh, inter, uh, what do you call that?
[53:04.290 --> 53:05.820]  What you guys always call hacking.
[53:06.060 --> 53:20.060]  All these people hacking, this writer was saying car, C-A-R-R, that they're earning very much money and it just seems to be proliferating and it's difficult to keep a handle on how it's growing.
[53:20.360 --> 53:24.210]  And in the next few years, he just sees it being way out of hand.
[53:24.420 --> 53:24.790]  Yeah.
[53:24.820 --> 53:31.270]  I think, uh, a lot of what, uh, came out of Stuxnet is people were concerned about copycats because it did, uh, get out onto the open internet.
[53:31.270 --> 53:35.040]  And because it was so sophisticated, people were able to look at it and learn.
[53:35.250 --> 53:39.230]  And what happens is that things like that get repurposed and cause more damage.
[53:39.230 --> 53:40.880]  And that's, that's something that's been going around.
[53:40.960 --> 53:44.920]  I don't know if that speaks to what you're, you're talking about, but, uh, that's something definitely that came out of Stuxnet.
[53:45.340 --> 53:45.420]  Okay.
[53:45.420 --> 53:46.560]  Let's try to take some more phone calls.
[53:46.690 --> 53:47.340]  Thanks so much for that.
[53:47.340 --> 53:48.230]  Uh, that one there.
[53:48.320 --> 53:48.960]  Let's go over here.
[53:49.040 --> 53:49.320]  Good evening.
[53:49.440 --> 53:50.400]  You're on off the hook.
[53:53.540 --> 53:54.860]  Rebel, you're not kidding anybody.
[53:55.400 --> 53:56.250]  Not even yourself.
[53:56.400 --> 53:56.730]  Good evening.
[53:56.860 --> 53:57.500]  You're on off the hook.
[54:00.440 --> 54:00.770]  Okay.
[54:01.000 --> 54:01.860]  A spade is a spade.
[54:01.960 --> 54:02.460]  Thanks for that.
[54:02.560 --> 54:03.250]  That's a good evening.
[54:03.420 --> 54:04.150]  You're on off the hook.
[54:04.460 --> 54:04.960]  I'm sorry.
[54:05.040 --> 54:06.080]  I just don't like catchphrases.
[54:06.300 --> 54:06.960]  Uh, go ahead.
[54:07.900 --> 54:08.480]  Speak up.
[54:08.480 --> 54:08.880]  Hi.
[54:09.150 --> 54:09.480]  Hi.
[54:09.500 --> 54:09.860]  Hi.
[54:09.920 --> 54:10.270]  How are you?
[54:10.380 --> 54:10.650]  Wow.
[54:10.790 --> 54:12.900]  The phone call quality is really improving, isn't it?
[54:14.520 --> 54:15.020]  All right.
[54:15.080 --> 54:17.540]  What's, uh... I'm in a dead area, probably.
[54:17.860 --> 54:20.060]  Well, it sounds like you're in some kind of wind tunnel, but go ahead.
[54:20.600 --> 54:21.040]  Okay.
[54:21.290 --> 54:22.100]  That's just my car.
[54:22.400 --> 54:24.670]  I think you guys might have missed the story.
[54:24.790 --> 54:36.150]  Uh, the, uh, the situation with Obama was that the, this latest virus uses a fake Microsoft certificate.
[54:37.170 --> 54:43.340]  And when Obama was told this, he asked, should we proceed?
[54:43.340 --> 54:44.420]  Should we proceed?
[54:44.600 --> 54:51.420]  Because this is obviously a threat to every Microsoft machine that's out there with the automatic updates.
[54:52.270 --> 55:04.840]  So, uh, I think the irony is that he said, let's go ahead with the, with this latest, uh, uh, virus, to continue with the objective against Iran.
[55:05.480 --> 55:10.120]  So, um, maybe somebody can verify that, but I think that's the big story here.
[55:10.460 --> 55:10.650]  Yeah.
[55:10.770 --> 55:14.900]  There was some vulnerability in a piece of, uh, Microsoft software that basically allowed it.
[55:14.980 --> 55:24.000]  And I assume that they must've included some signing code with it, but basically it allowed, um, a third party to sign code as Microsoft.
[55:24.380 --> 55:26.730]  Um, and I guess that was put to use in the, in the virus.
[55:26.860 --> 55:28.440]  Maybe that was the flame virus.
[55:28.600 --> 55:29.170]  Is that that place?
[55:29.440 --> 55:37.840]  Well, I guess again, uh, inept coding, uh, that in some ways tied to Microsoft has to do with some sort of security vulnerability on the internet.
[55:38.000 --> 55:38.790]  Very big news.
[55:39.020 --> 55:39.150]  Okay.
[55:39.170 --> 55:40.150]  Let's take another phone call.
[55:40.360 --> 55:41.040]  And good evening.
[55:41.230 --> 55:42.520]  You aren't off the hook.
[55:43.000 --> 55:43.540]  Speak up.
[55:44.900 --> 55:45.580]  Oh, I'm sorry.
[55:45.770 --> 55:46.150]  My fault.
[55:46.290 --> 55:47.060]  I didn't have the thing turned up.
[55:47.120 --> 55:47.300]  Go ahead.
[55:47.400 --> 55:47.650]  Speak up.
[55:49.730 --> 55:50.730]  Speak up more though.
[55:50.900 --> 55:52.080]  It's you're maxed out here.
[55:52.980 --> 55:53.670]  Yes, go ahead.
[55:53.770 --> 55:55.080]  Speak louder because you're very low.
[55:55.730 --> 55:55.860]  Okay.
[55:56.460 --> 56:01.270]  Um, number one, uh, 80% of the government software ran on Microsoft at one time.
[56:01.360 --> 56:01.980]  Is that still true?
[56:02.100 --> 56:03.000]  I got a couple of them.
[56:03.340 --> 56:05.400]  One, uh, when is that hacker?
[56:05.710 --> 56:07.230]  Uh, when is that, uh, hope conference?
[56:07.900 --> 56:10.710]  Uh, that's on July 13th, 14th, and 15th here in New York city.
[56:11.150 --> 56:11.440]  Right.
[56:11.580 --> 56:13.960]  You know, uh, Vernado back down from those plans.
[56:14.100 --> 56:26.920]  Is that permanent or they're still in limbo whether they're going to really last we heard as of, I believe, December was that Vernado is, is reconsidering the idea of, uh, of constructing an office tower and destroying the hotel because of the state of the economy,
[56:27.020 --> 56:29.210]  the state of that part of the, uh, uh, the neighborhood.
[56:29.480 --> 56:32.960]  And, uh, well, it just seems like a profitable hotel might be a good thing to hang on to.
[56:33.620 --> 56:33.980]  Right.
[56:34.270 --> 56:42.800]  What was the evils of, uh, Facebook and, uh, you know, Zuckerberg and if you replace, you know, we got zucked, that's like the F word, right?
[56:42.900 --> 56:44.360]  I mean, that could be a new.
[56:44.900 --> 56:45.270]  Yeah.
[56:45.500 --> 56:48.080]  And secondly, why is it so bad to talk about Wall Street?
[56:48.230 --> 56:49.000]  You should absolutely be.
[56:49.040 --> 56:52.580]  If you're talking about Iran and everything else, what's, why is Wall Street so safe?
[56:52.580 --> 56:54.150]  I don't, I don't think there's anything wrong with it.
[56:54.270 --> 56:55.320]  We're on Wall Street after all.
[56:55.440 --> 56:57.500]  And I think we could provide a unique perspective to it.
[56:57.540 --> 57:04.250]  And I, I would actually welcome a, a daily business show, uh, from the perspective of the people here at BAI all about Wall Street.
[57:04.270 --> 57:10.000]  And I think it'd be very entertaining and, and, and fun, not just Occupy Wall Street, but, uh, what the people are doing inside the buildings.
[57:10.420 --> 57:15.170]  You've got to admit though, with this Occupy Wall Street, who made the decision for BAI to come down there?
[57:15.250 --> 57:17.600]  If anybody wants to volunteer, there's no public transportation.
[57:17.880 --> 57:20.170]  That place on 35th and 8th was a perfect place.
[57:20.170 --> 57:20.340]  All right.
[57:20.400 --> 57:23.860]  You know, these are issues we're going to have to get into at a different time, because we're out of time right now.
[57:24.270 --> 57:25.900]  And, uh, that's going to have to do it for us.
[57:25.940 --> 57:29.290]  If you want to write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[57:29.600 --> 57:30.710]  We'll see you next week.
[57:37.480 --> 57:38.860]  I check your status.
[57:39.900 --> 57:41.380]  I like your likes.
[57:41.580 --> 57:45.300]  And I reposted the links you posted about recyclable bikes.
[57:45.480 --> 57:49.900]  Then I met you at a party, and it went downhill from there.
[57:53.860 --> 57:56.680]  I know it sounds weird to say.
[57:57.140 --> 58:01.200]  I blame it on the weird state of the world today.
[58:01.520 --> 58:03.040]  But I like you better.
[58:03.340 --> 58:04.920]  Oh, I like you better.
[58:05.280 --> 58:06.820]  Yeah, I like you better.
[58:07.720 --> 58:09.140]  On Facebook.
[58:10.300 --> 58:12.920]  I like you better on Facebook.
[58:14.140 --> 58:16.660]  I like you better on Facebook.
[58:18.290 --> 58:20.460]  I like you better on Facebook.
[58:22.370 --> 58:24.380]  You were smug and annoying.
[58:24.800 --> 58:26.940]  A big pretentious fart.
[58:27.180 --> 58:30.920]  And you looked nothing like your photos from that trip in March.
[58:31.140 --> 58:35.680]  I had to leave the party without finishing my beer.
[58:39.520 --> 58:42.280]  I don't want it to end this way.
[58:42.840 --> 58:46.540]  I want to see where you tagged me yesterday.
[58:47.060 --> 58:48.620]  Cause I like you better.
[58:48.920 --> 58:50.520]  Oh, I like you better.
[58:50.880 --> 58:52.500]  Yeah, I like you better.
[58:53.380 --> 58:54.700]  On Facebook.
[58:55.980 --> 58:58.500]  I like you better on Facebook.
[58:59.780 --> 59:02.280]  I like you better on Facebook.
[59:23.480 --> 59:25.280]  Now I can't stand you.
[59:25.520 --> 59:27.660]  And yet you're still my friend.
[59:27.660 --> 59:31.360]  Because you frequently leave comments about my comments.
[59:31.360 --> 59:36.500]  And you always post insightful links for state and local news.
[59:40.130 --> 59:43.010]  I know it sounds weird to say.
[59:43.410 --> 59:47.450]  I guess we're all getting pretty weird nowadays.
[59:47.910 --> 59:49.350]  But I like you better.
[59:49.690 --> 59:51.210]  Oh, I like you better.
[59:51.590 --> 59:53.050]  Yeah, I like you better.
[59:53.050 --> 59:54.910]  I like you better.
[59:54.970 --> 59:56.850]  I like you better.
[59:57.150 --> 59:58.710]  I like you better.
[59:58.970 --> 01:00:00.690]  I like you better.
[01:00:04.450 --> 01:00:05.890]  I like you better.
[01:00:30.510 --> 01:00:33.270]  And you're tuned to WBAI in New York.
[01:00:33.430 --> 01:00:37.870]  And the preceding program, Off the Hook, or as I like to call it, the Computer Criminal Show.
[01:00:37.950 --> 01:00:41.070]  was brought to you live with portions on recording.