[00:34.460 --> 00:38.600]  And the time is just about 7 o'clock p.m.
[00:38.800 --> 00:48.060]  You are listening to WBAI 99.5 FM New York, and it's just about time for another exciting edition of Off the Hook.
[00:58.540 --> 01:03.180]  I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a cough.
[01:03.920 --> 01:11.380]  We couldn't get much worse from Diddley Bump, but the best is back from worst.
[01:11.940 --> 01:14.980]  I hope that's understood from Diddley Bump.
[02:15.050 --> 02:16.590]  Very good evening to you.
[02:16.890 --> 02:18.530]  The show is Off the Hook.
[02:19.490 --> 02:23.030]  And it's an unusual day today.
[02:23.030 --> 02:29.550]  Anyway, as you may have heard, if you follow us on Twitter at 2600, or if you follow Hope No.
[02:29.630 --> 02:32.370]  9, we've had some computer difficulties.
[02:32.790 --> 02:35.290]  But we're on our way back from those.
[02:35.510 --> 02:40.990]  Right now, our regular host, Emmanuel, last I saw of him, he was headed toward the colo with a large shovel.
[02:41.550 --> 02:43.970]  But so today, this is Rob T.
[02:44.070 --> 02:44.810]  Firefly here with you.
[02:45.010 --> 02:46.570]  I am joined in the studio by Mike.
[02:46.790 --> 02:47.070]  Hello.
[02:47.610 --> 02:49.130]  And by Jim.
[02:49.510 --> 02:49.830]  Ha ha.
[02:49.830 --> 02:50.750]  There you are.
[02:50.950 --> 02:53.450]  And on the phone, we should have Bernie S.
[02:53.590 --> 02:54.470]  from somewhere in Pennsylvania.
[02:54.870 --> 02:55.950]  Greetings from Pennsylvania.
[02:56.870 --> 02:57.670]  Greetings, Bernie.
[02:58.450 --> 03:00.070]  Did you cause this computer crash?
[03:00.610 --> 03:01.050]  No.
[03:01.350 --> 03:08.770]  I'm partly wondering if it could be the powers that be trying to sabotage the Hope Conference, which is coming up in just a couple of weeks.
[03:08.910 --> 03:11.810]  But, you know, it could be just one of those entropy things.
[03:12.430 --> 03:13.910]  Or human error.
[03:13.990 --> 03:15.790]  Yeah, I heard it was caused by a sysadmin.
[03:16.370 --> 03:17.950]  I didn't know if that was you or not.
[03:17.950 --> 03:18.730]  It was not me.
[03:18.890 --> 03:21.670]  I am not the sysadmin who caused that problem.
[03:22.530 --> 03:24.070]  But I'm glad I'm not, too.
[03:24.830 --> 03:26.710]  I would have lots of egg on my face.
[03:27.870 --> 03:34.850]  So for people who don't know, I guess the main 2600 server crashed and it can't be rebooted or something.
[03:35.270 --> 03:39.630]  So you can still go to the website if you remember to type all these Ws, perhaps.
[03:40.010 --> 03:43.210]  www.hope.net works for some people.
[03:43.850 --> 03:49.810]  We are working... well, not we because we're on the radio, but Emanuel and others are working to bring it back up.
[03:49.810 --> 03:53.410]  Because the Hope Conference is just like, what, a week and a half away?
[03:53.570 --> 03:54.130]  Two weeks away?
[03:54.290 --> 03:55.330]  Something crazy like that.
[03:55.470 --> 03:56.750]  It's creeping up on us.
[03:57.030 --> 03:59.450]  July 13th, 14th, and 15th.
[03:59.490 --> 04:00.790]  Yeah, but how many weeks away is that?
[04:01.230 --> 04:05.750]  Well, I guess it's, what, like 10 days or something?
[04:05.970 --> 04:06.470]  I don't know.
[04:06.730 --> 04:07.690]  That's way too soon.
[04:07.710 --> 04:08.810]  It's two weeks and change.
[04:09.530 --> 04:13.490]  It's soon enough that our ability to do math has already been shot.
[04:13.490 --> 04:15.670]  But pre-registration is still open.
[04:15.990 --> 04:29.830]  If you have trouble getting to our own sites, you can always go to store.2600.com, which is hosted elsewhere, and click the Hope number 9 button, and you will still be able to pre-register in the very limited amount of time that you have left to do so.
[04:32.650 --> 04:33.230]  All right.
[04:33.410 --> 04:35.230]  What are you working on for Hope, Bernie?
[04:35.710 --> 04:37.830]  Anything in particular news this week?
[04:37.830 --> 04:49.010]  I'm not doing any talks this year, but I'm, along with yourself and others, we have arranged about 100 different talks with some really good speakers.
[04:49.250 --> 04:50.810]  It's insane how many we have.
[04:51.030 --> 04:51.670]  It's nuts.
[04:51.850 --> 04:53.170]  I think it's more than ever, isn't it?
[04:53.530 --> 04:54.530]  I think so, yeah.
[04:54.750 --> 04:57.470]  I mean, the talks are starting at 10, and they're going past midnight.
[04:57.470 --> 04:58.010]  I don't know.
[04:58.430 --> 05:02.070]  Well, I know no one could possibly see them all because there's three going on at a time.
[05:02.350 --> 05:05.390]  But it's insane how much stuff we have.
[05:05.390 --> 05:11.090]  It is an intellectual content smorgasbord.
[05:12.550 --> 05:24.030]  And it's like everything you wanted to know but were afraid to ask or didn't know who to ask about all kinds of aspects of our community.
[05:24.310 --> 05:35.050]  Hacking, freaking, surveillance, counter-surveillance, lockpicking, security, politics, censorship, you name it.
[05:35.430 --> 05:48.910]  I actually got an email this week from our friends at the Electronic Frontier Foundation encouraging me to go to HOPE, which was thoughtful of them, but highlighting all the talks that the EFF or EFF staffers will be giving at HOPE.
[05:48.990 --> 05:49.910]  And there's like six of them.
[05:50.810 --> 05:51.670]  I'm impressed.
[05:51.790 --> 05:52.910]  That is a huge showing.
[05:53.070 --> 05:57.970]  EFF has been a big supporter of us over the years.
[06:03.350 --> 06:05.690]  So a great, great lineup of talks.
[06:05.830 --> 06:24.830]  EFF, as maybe not all of our listeners know, are at EFF.org, is a group of attorneys and other technologists who basically fight for our digital rights, our rights online, our rights pertaining to technology, privacy, censorship, that sort of thing.
[06:24.830 --> 06:30.410]  And they do a really good job with not a ton of money.
[06:30.570 --> 06:34.610]  I think the ACLU is going to be at this year's conference also giving a talk.
[06:35.570 --> 06:37.270]  Only one talk from the ACLU.
[06:37.270 --> 06:37.690]  There's one talk, right.
[06:37.850 --> 06:57.270]  But it's really good to see people from the legal community who get it, that understand this confluence of technology and our rights and how some of those rights are just getting trampled because law enforcement or legislators don't understand what's really going on.
[06:57.370 --> 07:00.190]  Or maybe they do understand and they don't care.
[07:01.090 --> 07:01.530]  Yeah.
[07:01.690 --> 07:04.450]  And there's just such an insane mix of different subjects.
[07:04.570 --> 07:05.990]  It's not all hardcore legal stuff.
[07:06.150 --> 07:07.130]  There's some fun stuff, too.
[07:07.230 --> 07:08.610]  And you can see the schedule.
[07:08.930 --> 07:12.830]  Last I checked, the site was still up, hopenumbernine.net.
[07:14.010 --> 07:29.490]  And you can check out the schedule there, which was recently posted and made public, the full schedule, you can also consider that there is a fourth track that is unscheduled that people who just turn up to the conference and want to give a talk can sign out a block of time for.
[07:29.730 --> 07:34.310]  So that track, we don't even know what's going to be in it, but there will be things there.
[07:34.530 --> 07:38.530]  And so come for the scheduled talks, stay for the unscheduled talks.
[07:38.910 --> 07:40.570]  And we have workshops.
[07:40.970 --> 07:41.990]  We've got workshops.
[07:42.230 --> 07:45.970]  We've got all sorts of craziness in the works.
[07:45.970 --> 07:48.770]  And I think it's going to be really cool.
[07:50.710 --> 07:51.710]  It's kind of insane.
[07:51.890 --> 07:59.950]  I mean, I was talking with a friend this weekend whose son has autism, and we have a talk about autism.
[07:59.950 --> 08:01.650]  So I was very excited to see that talk.
[08:01.910 --> 08:08.610]  It's, you know, I don't know a lot about the topic, but, you know, the friend does.
[08:08.830 --> 08:14.510]  And it was saying it's very unusual that you have a talk about autism with actual people with autism on it.
[08:14.510 --> 08:17.630]  That's apparently not the done thing in some circles.
[08:17.670 --> 08:20.790]  And I think that's really a theme of our conference.
[08:20.810 --> 08:24.690]  We have a talk about X by people who are doing X.
[08:25.370 --> 08:27.530]  We have a talk about the law from lawyers.
[08:27.690 --> 08:30.630]  We have a talk about autism from people with autism.
[08:30.630 --> 08:33.510]  We have a talk about security from security researchers.
[08:33.510 --> 08:34.690]  We have several such talks.
[08:34.870 --> 08:36.190]  And it just goes on.
[08:36.430 --> 08:44.210]  Down the list, you have this huge variety of topics, all from people who are, or mostly from people who are doing it.
[08:45.130 --> 08:45.530]  Yeah.
[08:45.790 --> 08:47.710]  And that's really one of the special things about Hope.
[08:47.830 --> 08:53.070]  It's just a product of so many eclectic people in all these walks of life coming together to do this.
[08:53.570 --> 08:57.270]  A bit more about what we've got coming up at Hope in a short while.
[08:57.670 --> 09:00.010]  I'd like to touch on some news that's happened this week.
[09:01.230 --> 09:16.370]  First things first, we all know about the O'Dwyer case, where a young man from the United Kingdom is being threatened with extradition to the United States for running a website which linked to copyrighted material on other sites.
[09:17.070 --> 09:29.930]  And the big news in that this past week was that Jimmy Wells, the founder of Wikipedia, has started a petition asking for the extradition to be fought and struck down.
[09:30.610 --> 09:34.310]  And last I checked, there were about 80,000 signatures on it after, I think, a day or two.
[09:35.970 --> 09:38.790]  We, of course, had...
[09:38.790 --> 09:39.590]  Julia.
[09:39.730 --> 09:40.730]  Julia O'Dwyer.
[09:40.850 --> 09:41.230]  Thank you, Bernie.
[09:41.570 --> 09:45.110]  We had Julia O'Dwyer as a guest on the show some time ago.
[09:45.290 --> 09:49.350]  And Emmanuel and Kyle also visited with Julia when they visited the UK recently.
[09:50.970 --> 09:58.410]  She is a great source online, if you're interested in this case, of course, all the news and stuff that's going on with it.
[09:58.490 --> 10:01.510]  If you're on Twitter, you can follow her at J.R.O'Dwyer.
[10:01.590 --> 10:04.090]  That's J-R-O-D-W-Y-E-R.
[10:06.610 --> 10:07.410]  Well, that's...
[10:07.950 --> 10:11.530]  So, the petition, I guess, no news, though, just petitions.
[10:11.830 --> 10:13.030]  Yeah, just the petition.
[10:13.270 --> 10:18.170]  It's on change.org, and it's on their front page, and it's, I think, one of their larger petitions at the moment.
[10:18.170 --> 10:34.810]  I think a member of parliament, British parliament, someone from, a member of parliament from the Labour Party has also voiced his concern and is asking that his government not allow this extradition to take place.
[10:35.050 --> 10:44.370]  And I think The Guardian, a renowned newspaper in the UK, has just published an editorial opposing this extradition as well.
[10:44.370 --> 10:50.510]  Mind you, this guy did not violate any laws in his country.
[10:51.530 --> 10:51.890]  Right.
[10:51.990 --> 11:05.850]  And it would be a very dangerous precedent if countries can start reaching across other countries' borders and charging them with violating laws that happened in a foreign country.
[11:05.850 --> 11:06.870]  It's insane.
[11:07.290 --> 11:15.590]  I mean, I'm sure there's a lot of laws in other countries against things that are perfectly legal in the United States, and we don't want that to happen either.
[11:15.730 --> 11:19.850]  So, this is important to everybody in the world, I think.
[11:20.850 --> 11:21.410]  Absolutely.
[11:21.670 --> 11:21.950]  Absolutely.
[11:22.610 --> 11:26.090]  I have other British legal news, which is...
[11:26.090 --> 11:28.930]  Yeah, there seems to be a lot coming out of Britain this week.
[11:29.030 --> 11:29.510]  What else have we got?
[11:29.830 --> 11:40.030]  Two people from Lulzsac have pled guilty to what this newspaper describes as a slew of computer crimes on Monday.
[11:40.330 --> 11:47.290]  This is the latest blow against online miscreants whose exploits have grabbed headlines and embarrassed governments around the world.
[11:48.690 --> 11:50.550]  So, they pled guilty...
[11:50.550 --> 11:52.190]  It doesn't say what they pled guilty to.
[11:53.590 --> 11:57.130]  They pled guilty to conspiring with other inmates of...
[11:57.130 --> 12:02.750]  Other members of Lulzsac to attack government media and law enforcement websites last year.
[12:02.910 --> 12:05.230]  This is according to an official at the Crown Court.
[12:06.150 --> 12:09.570]  So, a slew of acts...
[12:09.570 --> 12:14.050]  Is a slew a legal term of art, like an ounce or a gram?
[12:14.270 --> 12:15.570]  It's like a flock of sheep.
[12:15.570 --> 12:17.470]  Ah, okay.
[12:17.810 --> 12:18.550]  I'm wondering how many...
[12:18.550 --> 12:22.550]  Just a single slew, or was it multiple slews they were alleged to have...
[12:22.550 --> 12:23.930]  This is just crazy.
[12:24.890 --> 12:31.570]  So, these folks who were quite young, I believe, are...
[12:32.290 --> 12:33.130]  What are they?
[12:33.770 --> 12:34.730]  They're just barely adults.
[12:34.730 --> 12:36.290]  They're 20 and 19 years old.
[12:36.470 --> 12:36.710]  Yeah.
[12:37.290 --> 12:41.430]  They're looking at potentially years in federal prison.
[12:42.090 --> 12:43.230]  Crown prison.
[12:43.610 --> 12:44.610]  Yes, yes.
[12:45.870 --> 12:46.630]  Crown prison.
[12:46.990 --> 12:48.210]  Whatever they call it over there.
[12:48.310 --> 12:48.430]  Yeah.
[12:48.970 --> 12:49.610]  And of course then...
[12:49.610 --> 12:50.770]  They're going to get crowned.
[12:50.950 --> 12:51.350]  Yeah.
[12:51.550 --> 12:56.570]  And they'll get crowned, all right, especially if they then get extradited to the United States as well.
[12:57.450 --> 13:01.490]  So, I guess what they're accused of doing is actually a crime in the UK, maybe.
[13:01.810 --> 13:04.470]  Or at least they pled guilty to a crime in the UK.
[13:04.650 --> 13:09.130]  So, there's some sense in charging them in the UK.
[13:09.130 --> 13:16.270]  Who knows if they've actually done it or if they just pled guilty to avoid further trouble.
[13:16.530 --> 13:24.650]  There's two more defendants, one who's 25 and one who's 17, who have pled not guilty and they're going to face a trial next April.
[13:25.870 --> 13:27.870]  I believe we have a manual now on the line.
[13:29.410 --> 13:30.350]  Fantastic guest, Mike.
[13:30.390 --> 13:31.750]  Yeah, I am calling in.
[13:33.290 --> 13:34.930]  I have not been able to hear the radio.
[13:34.930 --> 13:39.270]  I have not been able to even participate in most things going on in the world.
[13:39.270 --> 13:43.050]  So, is there anything I should know, other than me not being there?
[13:43.970 --> 13:47.710]  We've already started several fires in the studio, but we probably got them in hand.
[13:48.150 --> 13:48.870]  Okay, good, good.
[13:48.970 --> 13:50.730]  Well, that's somehow reassuring.
[13:51.650 --> 13:53.990]  What did you tell the folks as far as why I wasn't there?
[13:54.810 --> 13:56.870]  We told them it was because you were in federal prison.
[13:57.850 --> 13:58.750]  Okay, all right.
[13:59.050 --> 14:00.130]  What was that story then?
[14:00.310 --> 14:00.430]  Yeah.
[14:00.710 --> 14:01.970]  You're probably in a cage right now.
[14:02.610 --> 14:03.350]  I'm sorry, Bernie?
[14:03.510 --> 14:07.510]  I said you probably are in a cage right now if you're at a co-location.
[14:07.670 --> 14:08.490]  Are you in a cage?
[14:08.490 --> 14:10.010]  Okay, so you told them that much.
[14:10.050 --> 14:10.450]  Good, okay.
[14:10.650 --> 14:12.770]  I stepped out of the cage to give the update.
[14:13.190 --> 14:16.950]  Basically, I'm going to be blunt here as far as what happened.
[14:17.030 --> 14:18.690]  This is not anything to be blamed on Verizon.
[14:18.950 --> 14:20.690]  This was completely on our side.
[14:22.070 --> 14:38.830]  Basically, sometimes what happens is you have system administrators who don't think too much about the consequences of their actions, and they move forward with an update before checking to see if everything is stable and checking to see if everything is compatible.
[14:39.530 --> 14:46.590]  And sometimes you get this kind of arrogance where someone says, oh, I know what I'm doing, and whatever anybody else is working on, it doesn't matter.
[14:46.850 --> 14:48.230]  That's kind of what happened here.
[14:48.590 --> 14:54.590]  One of our assist admins, who is not going to be a assist admin anymore, did this.
[14:54.610 --> 15:01.050]  And without regard for what users were doing, without regard for the system stability, system crashed, did not come back up.
[15:01.670 --> 15:05.870]  We spent the last basically 24 hours frantically trying to figure out why not.
[15:06.490 --> 15:09.750]  And finally, fiber optic is here with me.
[15:10.390 --> 15:15.570]  We came into the colo, and we have the machine back.
[15:15.750 --> 15:21.790]  We were able to get it back, and now we're just trying to figure out what went wrong and how to prevent it from happening again.
[15:21.790 --> 15:29.230]  So we apologize to anybody who's trying to communicate with us, and we apologize to anybody else that might have been affected by this one way or another.
[15:29.350 --> 15:39.030]  That goes, everybody on the highways today that I was, like, very angry at, or everybody I passed in the street, or just my friends that I have not been communicating very positively with.
[15:39.850 --> 15:48.290]  It's extremely frustrating when we've got this conference coming up, and we can't talk to anybody, or we can't access the things that we need to access.
[15:49.510 --> 15:54.830]  So we have the situation under control now, and we're going to take steps to make sure it doesn't happen again.
[15:54.870 --> 15:59.830]  But I apologize, everybody, for the inconvenience and the craziness that's been going on.
[15:59.930 --> 16:03.350]  It's a good thing, Emmanuel, that you didn't have your hands full with anything else when this happened.
[16:03.770 --> 16:14.490]  Yeah, that's really funny, Bernie, because, you know, if you had plotted, if you had thought it's the best time to really screw somebody over to do this, you would have picked exactly almost to the minute when this happened.
[16:15.530 --> 16:24.710]  You know, a word to system administrators, when you have a major project coming up, not the time to start messing around with the system and seeing what will happen if you install this particular program.
[16:24.870 --> 16:33.410]  So we're going to establish some ground rules where we think more about the users and the bigger projects before we think about experimenting with EOS.
[16:33.690 --> 16:42.050]  Well, I think our listeners would be interested in a post-mortem on some future off the hook as to exactly what happened, so that they can avoid making the same mistake.
[16:42.890 --> 16:53.330]  I'm not going to get violent, I'm not going to kill them, I'm just going to basically restrict the access so that, you know, he or she does not have the ability to do this again.
[16:53.770 --> 16:58.090]  I didn't mean a biological post-mortem, but anyway.
[16:58.710 --> 17:02.870]  Oh, you missed the situation, yeah, of course, we'll let people know what happened with the actual system.
[17:02.890 --> 17:06.190]  Maybe we'll talk about it at the conference, maybe it'll be an interesting little side note.
[17:06.190 --> 17:18.910]  Hey, Emanuel, one of our former guests on this show, you may remember him, Ryan Harris, he went by the hacker named Dur Angle, he published a book called Hacking the Cable Modem.
[17:19.110 --> 17:19.850]  I do remember.
[17:20.390 --> 17:29.830]  Yeah, yeah, and in fact we had him on a guest during a fundraiser show back in 2006, in October, I think, and we offered copies of his book as a premium to our supportive listeners.
[17:31.330 --> 17:35.710]  And we also gave away a galley copy of his book a few months earlier at Hope No.
[17:35.830 --> 17:36.130]  6.
[17:36.730 --> 17:58.090]  And today, he was charged a couple years ago by the FBI for showing people how to hack their cable modems, how to uncap them, because Comcast was found to be throttling people's internet speeds, like when they're doing peer-to-peer protocol, that kind of stuff.
[17:58.090 --> 18:01.870]  And they got caught and fined by the federal government for that.
[18:01.950 --> 18:11.730]  At the same time, people like Ryan were allowing cable modem users to circumvent these illegal restrictions that Comcast was putting on them.
[18:12.070 --> 18:21.470]  Well, Ryan took his case to trial a few months ago, and he was found guilty of these unauthorized access.
[18:21.470 --> 18:33.670]  And today, he was sentenced to three years in federal prison, plus three years of supervised release, plus over $200,000 in restitution and fines.
[18:33.930 --> 18:35.230]  I'm sorry, what did he do?
[18:37.210 --> 18:41.570]  His actual charges I have here in front of me...
[18:41.570 --> 18:43.490]  Yeah, legalese is fun, but what did he do?
[18:43.490 --> 18:59.130]  Well, he made available tools, software and hardware, for people to hack their cable modems, basically change the MAC address, and basically change the firmware in their cable modems.
[18:59.230 --> 19:11.290]  This isn't like so you could steal cable modem servers, necessarily, but just so you could take control of your cable modem and prevent any tapping or throttling of it.
[19:11.290 --> 19:21.790]  Or if you wanted to have a cable modem in two different locations, and you're still paying your bill, and you didn't want to have to physically move the cable modem from one address to another, that's considered fraud, apparently.
[19:22.770 --> 19:25.090]  And he was charged with...
[19:26.970 --> 19:27.830]  Let's see here.
[19:28.290 --> 19:29.470]  I have it right here.
[19:29.590 --> 19:30.990]  But he cost $200,000.
[19:32.270 --> 19:35.010]  Did he steal $200,000 from the cable company?
[19:35.290 --> 19:43.230]  Well, the press release from the feds has not come out yet, because he was just sentenced to a couple, three hours ago, but he was...
[19:43.230 --> 20:04.310]  I guess what the feds do is they calculate how much fraud could have occurred with all the hardware and software he had made available to people, and then they extrapolate it, and then they probably multiply it by some factor, the speed of light, and then they come up with a dollar figure that you have to pay back.
[20:05.450 --> 20:07.890]  So, you know, that's what it came down to.
[20:07.970 --> 20:18.210]  But three years in federal prison, three more years of parole-like conditions on top of that, $50,000 in fines, and $152,000 in change that he's got to pay Comcast.
[20:18.450 --> 20:21.670]  He was not alleged to have stolen any cable modem service.
[20:21.930 --> 20:23.450]  So that's the main point.
[20:24.130 --> 20:24.610]  That's...
[20:24.610 --> 20:25.610]  I mean, it's kind of clever.
[20:25.610 --> 20:35.530]  If I wanted to, like, cause $200,000 worth of damage, I feel like I would have to actually take, you know, maybe at least half that from someone, or just break something large.
[20:35.890 --> 20:42.510]  If he did that, he'd probably get away with it, because taking tangible things is almost encouraged.
[20:43.290 --> 20:50.070]  So anyway, I'll announce his address over the air once we know where he's going to be imprisoned, but that's not a joke.
[20:50.070 --> 20:59.010]  Now, he was charged with conspiracy, wire fraud, and computer fraud.
[20:59.530 --> 21:00.410]  Those are the charges.
[21:00.670 --> 21:11.110]  And someone who worked with him on this project, a co-conspirator, was asked by the FBI to testify against Ryan, and was granted...
[21:11.110 --> 21:12.150]  Guys, we need to talk about this morning.
[21:12.290 --> 21:15.950]  I actually need to get back into the co-lo, because we have a bit of a crisis I've got to deal with right now.
[21:15.950 --> 21:16.510]  All right, I'll let you go.
[21:16.590 --> 21:18.570]  I just want to update the folks, and have a good show.
[21:18.570 --> 21:20.830]  And I'll be back next week.
[21:20.970 --> 21:22.170]  Okay, thank you for the updates, Emanuel.
[21:22.490 --> 21:23.350]  I'll wrap this up quick.
[21:23.510 --> 21:30.270]  Basically, the co-defendant was asked by the FBI to testify against Ryan Harris in exchange for full immunity.
[21:31.250 --> 21:38.430]  And the co-conspirator did so, and walked away scot-free without any charges or fines or anything.
[21:38.870 --> 21:42.610]  So that's how it works in the judicial system here in this country.
[21:42.610 --> 21:48.890]  So we've lost Emanuel, but we do have on the phone Lisa Shea, who's going to be one of our speakers at Hope.
[21:49.150 --> 21:49.810]  Are you there, Lisa?
[21:50.090 --> 21:50.610]  Yes, I am.
[21:51.310 --> 21:57.210]  So the title of your talk is Countermeasures, Proactive Self-Defense Against Ubiquitous Surveillance.
[21:57.210 --> 21:58.950]  What does that mean for our listeners?
[21:59.530 --> 22:16.830]  Well, what my co-researcher, Greg Conti, and I have been looking at is this amazing network of ubiquitous sensors that are just all around us today, from sensors we carry on our person to ones that are in our homes, to ones that are in our communities,
[22:16.890 --> 22:20.510]  and ones that are in place at, say, airports.
[22:20.510 --> 22:33.950]  And it seems like everywhere you go, there are... you encounter sensors, and they provide a variety of benefits, but our concern is that these systems could be networked together.
[22:34.250 --> 22:47.070]  And the idea of having network surveillance systems with potentially unfettered expansion could have some really frightening second-order effects that could threaten our privacy.
[22:47.070 --> 23:17.090]  So our talk is to expose the audience to these kinds of sensor networks that are either in place or coming, and then talk about ways that individuals could protect themselves, and also the audience at the HOPE Conference have unique skills and knowledge and experiences that could help them... that could help deflect the trajectory of some of these systems and influence policy and decision-makers
[23:17.090 --> 23:24.590]  so that we have systems that benefit society without adverse effects on our privacy and our free way of life.
[23:24.890 --> 23:25.210]  And Lisa?
[23:25.710 --> 23:25.870]  Yes.
[23:26.110 --> 23:27.690]  This is Bernie in Pennsylvania.
[23:27.690 --> 23:34.090]  I just wanted to point out, if it wasn't clear to our listeners, that these aren't just sort of sensors that are out there somewhere, you don't know where they are.
[23:34.650 --> 23:39.250]  Probably most of our listeners are carrying around these sensors with them most of the time.
[23:39.250 --> 23:50.350]  Obviously, everything from your smartphone to a portable electronic device to... many of us have smart cards that we use to access our places of work.
[23:50.770 --> 23:54.170]  Or just think about... I live in New York.
[23:54.170 --> 23:56.370]  I travel across a variety of bridges.
[23:56.370 --> 24:03.430]  I've got a very convenient E-ZPass system in my car that allows me to quickly go through toll booths.
[24:03.430 --> 24:05.430]  But that's a sensor network.
[24:06.250 --> 24:19.430]  We actually did a little study that basically from the moment you wake up until the moment you go to bed, just an average person experiences dozens of these sensors just in our daily lives.
[24:19.910 --> 24:20.170]  Wow.
[24:20.890 --> 24:26.130]  And most of these sensors are linked to our identities, aren't they?
[24:26.170 --> 24:27.490]  I mean, you can't buy an E-ZPass.
[24:27.490 --> 24:28.610]  I checked into this recently.
[24:28.810 --> 24:32.710]  You cannot buy an E-ZPass anonymously with cash.
[24:32.710 --> 24:37.390]  It has to be tied not only to your identity, but to the registration of your motor vehicle.
[24:38.350 --> 24:45.210]  Cell phones, for the most part, are tied to your identity when you get a contract, a cell phone contract.
[24:46.390 --> 24:54.170]  So these are not... these are not... these are directly tied to who we are and our location and what we're doing.
[24:54.370 --> 24:57.890]  And it's something I'm glad you're making people aware of.
[24:57.890 --> 25:01.710]  And that's where the concern can come in.
[25:02.090 --> 25:21.350]  Because if our physical location, because many of our cell phones have GPS, so not only is our identity known, but our location is known, that can be tied to our credit cards through the database of the cell phone companies.
[25:21.610 --> 25:39.490]  So there's potential for third parties to know a great deal about us and about just the things that we do on a daily basis without us realizing it or being aware that other people might have access to it.
[25:39.950 --> 25:43.350]  And we live... we value a free society.
[25:43.910 --> 25:56.130]  And we just want to make sure that as these systems become more and more prevalent, that the people who emplace these systems think about what can they be used for?
[25:56.190 --> 25:57.290]  What are their vulnerabilities?
[25:57.850 --> 26:07.770]  And what regulatory mechanisms should we put in place to protect people's... protect people's identity or protect people's free way of life?
[26:07.770 --> 26:12.350]  And Lisa, I would... I'd like to ask, what sparked your interest in this subject?
[26:13.130 --> 26:15.130]  Well, I'm... I'm an academic.
[26:15.330 --> 26:16.790]  I'm an electrical engineer by trade.
[26:17.130 --> 26:23.190]  I've studied wireless networks and sensor networks just in an academic setting.
[26:23.190 --> 26:34.630]  And I have a colleague, Greg Conte, who's done a lot of research and, in fact, has spoken at previous HOPE conferences about security and privacy, especially in the computer field.
[26:35.370 --> 26:37.730]  Greg even wrote a book about Googling security.
[26:38.230 --> 26:39.950]  And he's just down the hall from me.
[26:40.030 --> 26:51.250]  And so one day, we just started talking about my interest and knowledge in sensors and his interest in knowledge in networks and privacy and the erosion of privacy.
[26:51.530 --> 26:57.570]  And we thought, gee, this is an area that hasn't been discussed enough, hasn't been studied enough.
[26:57.670 --> 27:01.290]  And there are some real concerns that we want to make people aware of.
[27:02.230 --> 27:06.270]  And Lisa, this isn't just some academic talk you're going to be giving at the HOPE conference.
[27:06.590 --> 27:20.010]  I understand you're going to be... you're going to be... you and Greg are going to be offering specific practical techniques for defeating or degrading this sorts of tracking with sensors and monitoring.
[27:20.190 --> 27:20.590]  Isn't that right?
[27:21.070 --> 27:21.850]  Well, yes.
[27:22.530 --> 27:25.510]  We look at it from the perspective of an individual.
[27:25.510 --> 27:41.110]  There are some common sense things that you can do to protect yourself that are just sort of best practices that, you know, if we think about owning computers, you know, once upon a time, we didn't think much about antivirus software.
[27:41.410 --> 27:45.350]  We didn't think much about keeping systems patched and updated.
[27:45.810 --> 27:47.010]  And now we do.
[27:47.210 --> 28:05.330]  And we're kind of at that new era in this ubiquitously networked sensor environment that, you know, what are things that you want to do just to protect yourself so that if you are giving away information, you're doing it consciously and you're knowing,
[28:05.690 --> 28:07.210]  you're understanding what the tradeoffs are.
[28:07.390 --> 28:21.650]  I'm curious what you think the balance is or should be between things that we do as individuals to protect our own privacy and things that the people who set up these sensor networks do or ought to be doing on their part.
[28:22.050 --> 28:26.710]  Well, that's, that's an area that we're, we're actively studying and discussing.
[28:26.910 --> 28:29.430]  That's, that's certainly not a solved problem.
[28:29.430 --> 28:32.550]  That's something that we want to have public discourse with.
[28:32.790 --> 28:51.510]  We've, we actually did a, um, a talk in April at a conference called We Robot in, in Miami at the University of Miami Law School, where Greg and I collaborated with a lawyer, uh, Woody Hartzog and a couple other colleagues of ours from West Point looking at automated law enforcement systems and,
[28:51.770 --> 28:54.050]  you know, what is the balance?
[28:54.230 --> 29:07.850]  Are there legal and, and ethical and policy, um, regulations that should be put in place to, to prevent us living in a dystopia?
[29:07.990 --> 29:09.550]  We, we certainly want to avoid that.
[29:09.750 --> 29:16.270]  And so it's, it's not an issue that has a, a clear and defined answer.
[29:16.470 --> 29:20.430]  It depends a lot on which systems we're talking about.
[29:20.590 --> 29:26.570]  I mean, certain ones, we, we value having the ability to communicate everywhere, having cell phones.
[29:26.730 --> 29:29.550]  We like having cameras on all our cell phones.
[29:29.710 --> 29:37.910]  We like having GPS in our cell phones so that if we do get in an accident or an emergency, the 911 system can find us.
[29:38.030 --> 29:41.650]  So there's certainly benefits to, to, to all of this technology.
[29:42.010 --> 29:54.330]  But we do want to, to raise the question of, okay, as this technology goes forward and it becomes more networked and more linked, what, what are the dangers?
[29:54.810 --> 29:56.610]  What can we do to prevent them?
[29:57.130 --> 30:11.250]  And can we, can we design for safety and design these systems with privacy and protections built in rather than fixing them after the fact?
[30:11.870 --> 30:17.910]  And Lisa, I think it's not just an issue of, uh, well, nobody thought that this stuff could have been abused ahead of time.
[30:18.090 --> 30:30.810]  Um, I remember quite a few years ago when, uh, there was a, uh, you know, a lot of arguments from the law enforcement community that, uh, you know, cell phones should all be, uh, E911 compliant.
[30:30.850 --> 30:39.330]  In other words, be able to be tracked within a very, to a very close location because, you know, you could always get locked in, in the trunk of your car by a kidnapper.
[30:39.530 --> 30:46.950]  And if you call 911, um, then the 911 center would know exactly where you are, which obviously it happens all the time.
[30:47.170 --> 30:50.170]  And so that was, that was, uh, those were the arguments.
[30:50.650 --> 30:57.370]  And, um, so then cell phones were required by FCC regulations to be equipped with a GPS.
[30:57.910 --> 30:58.090]  Yes.
[30:58.450 --> 31:07.770]  Um, and other, and other tracking mechanisms by, like, triangulating through cell sites and so forth, but it wasn't turned off, um, when you weren't making a 911 call.
[31:08.090 --> 31:08.250]  Right.
[31:08.330 --> 31:11.010]  So it wasn't just the 911 calls that were being tracked.
[31:11.190 --> 31:15.710]  It was all the calls, locations being tracked, and your location even when you weren't making calls.
[31:16.290 --> 31:17.630]  And so...
[31:17.630 --> 31:18.470]  Absolutely, yes.
[31:18.610 --> 31:23.690]  So this, it's like this mission creep thing is happening, not just with that, with E-ZPass.
[31:24.010 --> 31:38.790]  There's a, there's a reason why the E-ZPass needs to be able to, I guess, when I tried to buy one the other day without, with anonymously, just for research purposes, uh, I was told that, uh, it had to be tied to your motor vehicle, uh, license plate number,
[31:39.190 --> 31:53.190]  because if the thing malfunctions, they, they always take a picture of your, of your license plate when you go through the toll booth, and then they'll know where to send, uh, where to send the fine to and the, and the, and the charges if, if the E-ZPass malfunctions.
[31:53.730 --> 31:56.370]  So then I'm like, well, gee, what do they do with all that data?
[31:56.370 --> 32:04.890]  With every single car going through every toll booth, if they have optical character recognition cameras, are they using that only for, for toll enforcement?
[32:05.170 --> 32:07.050]  Or what are they also using it for?
[32:07.210 --> 32:08.310]  Who, who makes these decisions?
[32:08.610 --> 32:10.630]  And I think this is really important stuff to discuss.
[32:11.710 --> 32:12.190]  Absolutely.
[32:12.470 --> 32:20.810]  You've, you've hit the nail right on the head, because we have these systems in place right now that have a multitude of, of uses.
[32:21.030 --> 32:24.790]  Many of them are, are absolutely legitimate and, and definitely beneficial.
[32:24.790 --> 32:30.810]  I, I like not having to wait in line at the bridge to pay my $1.50 to go across the river.
[32:30.950 --> 32:41.310]  But on the other hand, that's all that I want that service for, not for tracking my comings and goings on a daily basis.
[32:41.770 --> 32:53.810]  We're speaking with Lisa Shea, who is presenting on countermeasures proactive self-defense against ubiquitous surveillance at the hope number nine conference, uh, coming up in a couple of weeks, um, more information on hope.net.
[32:54.150 --> 32:59.030]  Um, Lisa, if I may ask, um, both you and Greg Conti, uh, come from a military background.
[32:59.510 --> 33:06.950]  And, um, I was wondering if you could tell us a bit about what, uh, what you might think that, uh, that experience might lend to your insight on this particular subject.
[33:06.950 --> 33:15.630]  Well, Greg, Greg and I both teach at West Point, which is a accredited four-year institution.
[33:15.910 --> 33:21.590]  And one of the great benefits of being faculty members at West Point is that, that we have academic freedom.
[33:21.770 --> 33:31.610]  And so we are free to investigate and explore areas of research that we find interesting and compelling and important.
[33:32.130 --> 33:43.450]  And so we're, we're looking at this really from, you know, an academic perspective as what is the, what is the, the nature of these systems?
[33:43.710 --> 33:45.210]  Where are they located?
[33:45.830 --> 33:48.830]  Who, who emplaces them and why?
[33:49.190 --> 33:54.810]  And are the people who that emplace these systems, the end users, or are there other end users?
[33:55.250 --> 33:58.790]  Um, and how secure is the system as a whole?
[33:59.010 --> 34:03.590]  Because fundamentally, these are, these are networks of computer systems.
[34:03.590 --> 34:12.590]  And we all know that those have vulnerabilities, especially if the, the thought of security wasn't designed into the systems to begin with.
[34:12.890 --> 34:15.910]  So that's, that's the way we're approaching the topic.
[34:16.150 --> 34:21.150]  I wonder if it's almost, uh, overstating the case to call some of these privacy problems vulnerabilities.
[34:21.470 --> 34:23.490]  Some of them are, are certainly by design.
[34:24.270 --> 34:25.510]  Well, well, sure.
[34:25.750 --> 34:26.210]  Absolutely.
[34:26.510 --> 34:33.470]  I mean, we can, we look at the motivations of the organizations that put these systems in place.
[34:33.710 --> 34:41.570]  And, you know, certainly there's, there's an increased awareness of, of security after 9-11.
[34:41.930 --> 34:46.710]  Um, they're, they're in place for, for public safety and for national security.
[34:47.610 --> 34:54.670]  So there's, there's, there's a variety of motives that go into, in placing these systems.
[34:55.230 --> 35:09.050]  And we just believe that the more transparency there is, if people sign up for systems knowing what they're used for, then, then they're making a, a judgment based on reason.
[35:09.290 --> 35:21.730]  If they sign up for other systems, say, easy pass or whatever, um, without full disclosure of where that information is being used, um, that's, that's a situation that we want to avoid.
[35:22.670 --> 35:33.090]  Wouldn't there be an interest in some of, in some of the, uh, some of the entities and organizations that, uh, that offer or, um, compel people to, uh, to use some of these systems?
[35:34.010 --> 35:39.230]  Um, don't some, aren't, aren't there some, aren't there some competing interests here?
[35:39.470 --> 35:49.930]  Uh, for instance, if you're, if you're trying to track, uh, criminals and terrorists, you don't want them to know how, how exactly they are being tracked.
[35:50.270 --> 35:56.770]  So isn't this sort of a, uh, uh, uh, a social security versus privacy argument?
[35:57.170 --> 35:58.270]  Oh, absolutely.
[35:58.590 --> 36:00.890]  There is, there are many competing interests.
[36:00.890 --> 36:08.430]  If you think about, um, just track, tracking your vehicle, you want to, to know where you are.
[36:08.550 --> 36:15.250]  So you have a GPS system, um, but your insurance company might want to know how safe you, safely you drive.
[36:15.670 --> 36:20.490]  And the law enforcement agencies want to know if you ran that red light or if you're speeding.
[36:20.710 --> 36:25.030]  So there are absolutely a multitude of competing interests.
[36:25.030 --> 36:28.470]  And that's what makes these problems so challenging, but also so interesting.
[36:28.670 --> 36:46.550]  And that's why we find them worthy of discussion at, at major conferences like this so that the, the more we have public discourse and the more we have rationed, rational arguments about them, arguments in, in the positive sense of, of laying out the pros and cons,
[36:46.630 --> 36:58.450]  the costs and benefits, then, then we can strike a balance because fundamentally many, many aspects of our life are our balances in that regard.
[36:58.450 --> 37:10.650]  I read an article this week about, uh, the internet provider in the bay area, sonic.net, which, uh, reviewed it, it's log keeping policies basically for the first time in its history.
[37:11.070 --> 37:17.850]  And they, what they discovered was that, uh, you know, there's use for their sysadmins to keep logs for a couple of weeks.
[37:18.010 --> 37:23.930]  And occasionally they get a request, uh, you know, from law enforcement to help find a kidnapping victim or something.
[37:24.410 --> 37:34.570]  But the logs they were keeping longer than that were basically only useful to, uh, copyright trolls who wanted to embarrass people by suing them and claiming they had, uh, uh, pirated pornography or something.
[37:34.750 --> 37:37.970]  So they said, we have done the analysis.
[37:38.230 --> 37:44.250]  We have figured out here is the optimum, uh, trade-off between privacy and, uh, and other interests.
[37:44.430 --> 37:47.010]  We will keep logs henceforth for 14 days.
[37:47.390 --> 37:57.190]  And it's sort of amazing that they're, I don't know that they're the first internet service provider, but they're certainly one of the very few to have made this analysis in their customers' interests.
[37:58.090 --> 38:00.510]  And, uh, I hope that other people will start to do it.
[38:00.810 --> 38:01.630]  Oh, excellent.
[38:01.790 --> 38:02.030]  Yes.
[38:02.190 --> 38:18.730]  I mean, that's, that's great news to hear because certainly there's information collected about all of us on the internet and there's very little, uh, transparency about how long that data is kept and for what purposes it might be used.
[38:18.870 --> 38:28.290]  And then there's the whole issue of if, if a company goes out of business, what happens to all the data that it had collected, say, on, on its customers?
[38:29.010 --> 38:31.290]  Um, so that's, that's wonderful news.
[38:31.410 --> 38:47.210]  And perhaps having more publicity about organizations like that will motivate others or, or motivate the public to, um, to request that other ISPs follow suit on, on that sort of thing.
[38:47.570 --> 38:51.850]  How do you, uh, how do you feel about where we're, uh, where we seem to be headed with all this?
[38:51.930 --> 38:59.670]  Uh, we have another, uh, frequent speaker at our, at our conferences, Steve Rambam, whose, uh, tagline is usually privacy is dead, um, and get over it.
[39:00.130 --> 39:11.750]  So, um, do you, do you think we're, uh, we're, we've, we're reaching, or perhaps have already reached, uh, such a point where it's really, um, not worth it to even bother anymore to just, um, give things up?
[39:11.870 --> 39:13.150]  Or do you think we still have a chance?
[39:13.150 --> 39:18.430]  Uh, Greg and I certainly don't think that the, that it's worth just giving up.
[39:18.590 --> 39:26.650]  I mean, certainly there are people who have very different views on privacy and to some extent it's, it's a little bit generational.
[39:26.870 --> 39:33.410]  The people, my kids who've grown up with Facebook put a lot more out on the internet than I would ever be comfortable doing.
[39:33.570 --> 39:40.210]  But we certainly don't think that that's, that's a position that society as a whole ought to take.
[39:40.290 --> 39:42.430]  And certainly we don't, we don't feel that way.
[39:43.310 --> 39:48.310]  Um, there's, there's definitely very different views on, on privacy.
[39:48.510 --> 40:01.470]  Daniel Solove wrote a very cogent article on the misunderstandings of privacy and the, the idea that, well, if, if you've got nothing to hide, then you shouldn't, you shouldn't be worried about privacy.
[40:01.730 --> 40:06.050]  But we believe fundamentally that, that this is more than just that.
[40:06.210 --> 40:14.210]  It's, it's about free will and it's about what it means to be living in a free society as opposed to a police state.
[40:15.110 --> 40:15.550]  Yeah.
[40:15.670 --> 40:26.430]  And it's interesting you mentioned the generational thing, because we are now seeing the first generation of kids who grew up from the start, um, giving all their information willy-nilly to Facebook and social networks and things like that.
[40:26.530 --> 40:35.250]  And it becomes part of the routine to just, uh, post photos of where you are and what you're eating for dinner and, um, just be comfortable with it as a, as a, as a fact of life.
[40:35.750 --> 40:43.270]  Whereas, um, some, some of us older than that generation, you know, we meant, we might not have even used our own name on the internet as a kid if we were on the internet at all.
[40:43.390 --> 40:57.790]  So, um, with, uh, with this new scale that's facing, uh, like kids in particular, but, uh, but, you know, younger people and all of us, um, do you think it's a, do you think it's more of a matter of public education where we, where people might not understand how much they're giving up by,
[40:57.790 --> 40:59.930]  um, choosing to post as much as they do?
[41:00.430 --> 41:01.370]  Oh, absolutely.
[41:01.650 --> 41:05.850]  We, we try, uh, we are, Greg and I are both educators.
[41:06.090 --> 41:30.350]  We, we both teach and we, we definitely bring that out in, in our classes to our students that you have to be very cognizant of, of what information you're giving up to whom and why, because, you know, there's, there's certainly been lots of, lots of horror stories of people who've been burglarized because they posted that they were going on vacation or people who have been,
[41:30.350 --> 41:44.290]  been kidnapped or molested or all sorts of, uh, of other terrible things that happened to people because of information they posted without perhaps thinking more deeply about who has access to this information.
[41:44.670 --> 42:00.410]  And we're starting to see more, more attention being paid to privacy policies for these different organizations, but there's still, there's still mostly an, an opt out model, not an opt in model.
[42:00.910 --> 42:08.190]  And there's not as much public awareness or, or discourse as we feel there should be on this topic.
[42:09.830 --> 42:20.430]  Lisa, there's a, there's a lot of overlap between, uh, the whole privacy versus security versus technology, uh, uh, interests, uh, at the hope conference.
[42:20.710 --> 42:35.510]  Uh, one of our other speakers, uh, Eben Moglin is going to be, uh, talking about, uh, applying, uh, I don't know if you're a science fiction fan, but I know a lot, a lot of our listeners are, uh, applying, uh, Isaac Asimov's first law of robotics to smartphones,
[42:36.070 --> 42:52.670]  arguing that, uh, um, you know, in the, in the, you know, in the 1960s, uh, science fiction visionaries, uh, wrote that around the middle of the first quarter of the 21st century, we'd be living, uh, contemporarily with robots.
[42:53.150 --> 43:05.350]  And, uh, at kind of, kind of the case now, maybe not, uh, autonomous robots, but these cell phones we carry around, see everything, they're where, where we are, what our relationships are to other people and other devices.
[43:05.970 --> 43:17.030]  Uh, and they mediate us, an information stream about us that allows other people to predict and know our conduct and intentions and capabilities maybe even better than we could predict ourselves.
[43:17.430 --> 43:29.730]  So, um, you're going to be in some good company and, uh, all of our, all of our speakers are going to be in good company because there's a, there's just a confluence of really interesting conversations going on at the HOPE conference.
[43:29.890 --> 43:32.730]  I think your talk is on Sunday at 10 o'clock.
[43:32.890 --> 43:33.110]  Yes.
[43:33.370 --> 43:41.550]  And, um, I urge our listeners who are coming to the HOPE conference to, uh, check out your, your, your panel discussion with you and Greg Conti.
[43:41.610 --> 43:42.530]  We know Greg's a good speaker.
[43:42.530 --> 43:44.530]  We can tell you're a good speaker already on the phone here.
[43:44.710 --> 43:45.470]  Thank you very much.
[43:45.650 --> 43:59.310]  But, uh, this is some really practical, important information for all our listeners on WBAI off the hook and who come to the HOPE conference because it really concerns our future and what we value as a society as being important.
[44:00.350 --> 44:01.270]  Oh, absolutely.
[44:01.570 --> 44:04.150]  And Greg and I were, we're very pleased.
[44:04.150 --> 44:07.530]  We were honored that we were chosen to be speakers at this conference.
[44:07.530 --> 44:24.650]  Greg, as I said, has spoken before and has just rave reviews of the experiences that he's had at, at previous conferences, both the, the discussions, the questions and answers after his talk and the discussions that he's had in the conference rooms with the other speakers and with the other attendees.
[44:24.930 --> 44:27.150]  And it's, we are really looking forward to it.
[44:27.250 --> 44:28.930]  It should be a very exciting and interesting time.
[44:30.250 --> 44:37.350]  Greg, Lisa, I want to thank you very much for, uh, joining us tonight and, uh, talking a little bit about, uh, uh, uh, what you plan to do at, uh, at HOPE number nine.
[44:37.530 --> 44:39.310]  Um, I'd like to take some listener phone calls.
[44:39.510 --> 44:42.490]  Um, if you're able, you're, um, welcome to stick around for those.
[44:42.770 --> 44:43.070]  Okay.
[44:43.830 --> 44:45.110]  Um, give us a call.
[44:45.250 --> 44:49.270]  The phone number is 1-2-1-2-2-0-9-2-9-hundred.
[44:49.910 --> 44:54.210]  And, uh, let us know what's on your mind, um, regarding today's subjects and guests.
[44:54.410 --> 44:56.410]  Well, we, uh, wait for the people to give us a call.
[44:56.630 --> 45:05.010]  Uh, I saw this story about a jail in Fulton County, which is near Atlanta, who are asking the inmates to try and break out of their own cells.
[45:05.290 --> 45:12.130]  And apparently if you successfully do that, you will get, uh, free food and personal hygiene items from the commissary.
[45:14.730 --> 45:20.570]  Um, the, the backstory is I guess they have some locks currently that don't work very well.
[45:20.730 --> 45:23.930]  Uh, people can just pop them open, I guess.
[45:24.050 --> 45:28.070]  So they are spending, uh, $6 million to replace the locks.
[45:28.290 --> 45:30.970]  And before they do that, they want to make sure they work.
[45:31.670 --> 45:32.290]  That's good.
[45:32.370 --> 45:36.630]  They are encouraging prisoners to do, uh, uh, lock hacking.
[45:36.790 --> 45:44.430]  We're gonna, we're gonna have a whole, whole lock picking village at the HOPE conference where you can come and learn how to, how to pick and manipulate locks.
[45:44.550 --> 45:50.930]  We're gonna have a really good talk about master keys and the master keying systems and how, how they work and how to exploit them.
[45:51.570 --> 45:55.030]  Um, so, uh, if you're sitting in locks, come to the HOPE conference for that.
[45:55.270 --> 46:05.570]  It, it makes me remember really quick when I was, uh, when I was in federal prison years ago, I noticed that the, the great big keys that, uh, the guards carried around, um, they were like great big warded keys.
[46:05.750 --> 46:09.730]  They were like, like about an, an inch wide and three or four inches long.
[46:10.030 --> 46:11.370]  And they had not just cut in them.
[46:11.470 --> 46:12.010]  But guess what?
[46:12.130 --> 46:17.590]  There were, there were these little sleeves that, that, that fell down that would cover all the notches.
[46:17.750 --> 46:19.350]  And I wondered, oh, that's really clever.
[46:19.450 --> 46:22.290]  Because I wanted to see how the keys were cut just by looking at them.
[46:22.510 --> 46:25.170]  And they had that, uh, countermeasure to prevent people.
[46:25.250 --> 46:33.750]  Cause I, I'd heard that, uh, someone had, had figured out how to take pieces of plexiglass from the shop at the prison and cut their own keys and escape their cells.
[46:33.930 --> 46:37.190]  So, you know, countermeasures, it's all, it's all good.
[46:37.310 --> 46:47.570]  And I, I commend this prison warden for offering, uh, food and hygiene, hygiene product privileges at the, at the commissary for successfully hacking the prison locks.
[46:47.850 --> 46:48.150]  Yeah.
[46:48.210 --> 46:53.870]  I'm sure those people that, uh, that broke out of their cells all that time ago, they didn't get free food and, uh, soap for doing it.
[46:53.970 --> 46:55.090]  No, they might've gotten freedom though.
[46:55.170 --> 47:01.650]  You never know, but you know, I think they should offer more of an incentive, like time off their sentence, but you know, that probably wouldn't fly.
[47:02.450 --> 47:02.850]  Okay.
[47:03.070 --> 47:05.250]  Uh, 2 1 2 2 0 9 2 900.
[47:05.530 --> 47:06.270]  Uh, give us a call.
[47:07.050 --> 47:08.670]  We got, uh, hello, you're on the air.
[47:10.450 --> 47:10.850]  Hello.
[47:11.810 --> 47:12.210]  Yeah.
[47:12.810 --> 47:20.310]  Uh, the, uh, internet service provider with the, uh, 14 day, uh, uh, 14 day, uh, retention policy.
[47:20.530 --> 47:21.190]  Which one was that?
[47:21.470 --> 47:22.870]  That is, uh, sonic.net.
[47:23.090 --> 47:24.770]  They're out in the Bay area in California.
[47:24.950 --> 47:30.530]  I don't think you can get them here, but, uh, maybe someone else knows of someone here who has a similar policy.
[47:31.410 --> 47:31.690]  Okay.
[47:31.690 --> 47:32.810]  Am I on the air at this moment?
[47:32.970 --> 47:33.330]  You are.
[47:33.410 --> 47:33.610]  Yes.
[47:34.050 --> 47:34.650]  Oh, okay.
[47:35.410 --> 47:36.610]  Uh, yeah.
[47:36.630 --> 47:37.650]  Some things to point out.
[47:37.810 --> 47:43.730]  I think it's that Congress required the, uh, GPS, uh, wasn't just an FCC regulation.
[47:43.970 --> 47:47.350]  Congress, uh, stuck that in there and we, and it was before nine 11.
[47:47.850 --> 47:54.010]  Uh, I remember fighting against that, writing lots of letters to Congress saying, I didn't want that in my cell phone.
[47:54.810 --> 48:00.010]  And, uh, basically the Congress does whatever the law enforcement community asks them to do.
[48:00.370 --> 48:03.290]  And the FCC does whatever Congress tells them to do.
[48:03.630 --> 48:08.410]  And, and the cell phone companies do whatever the FCC tells them they have to do for the most part.
[48:08.490 --> 48:13.190]  So that's, that's kind of how the chain of interests, that's the arc of that process.
[48:13.330 --> 48:19.690]  Bernie, the voters should, uh, raise their voices a little louder on that sort of thing.
[48:19.850 --> 48:24.510]  We did shoot down before nine 11, most of the contents of the Patriot Act.
[48:24.670 --> 48:40.770]  So that's not one of them that we got shot down, but, uh, we did manage every time Bill Clinton would put one of these, uh, restrictions on our freedom up, uh, the letters would pour in like the spy on your customer banking regulations and they would get shot down in Congress.
[48:40.770 --> 48:55.630]  And then when nine 11 came along, um, uh, everything went through in three days, uh, or maybe even three weeks, but it, it was like, uh, the bill went up and people had, the Congress had 48 hours to vote against it or for it.
[48:55.750 --> 48:57.370]  And it was called the Patriot Act.
[48:57.450 --> 49:03.610]  So you had to vote for it because we just come under attack and everything that Bill Clinton failed to do.
[49:04.150 --> 49:11.970]  And I thought he was a terrible president because he tried to do it, but I, in retrospect, he seems like a much better president because he did fail to do it.
[49:12.130 --> 49:14.290]  And Bush was the worst president because he succeeded.
[49:14.810 --> 49:19.210]  Um, Obama being even worse because he made things even worse.
[49:19.490 --> 49:19.850]  Okay.
[49:19.970 --> 49:21.310]  Well, thank you very much for your phone call.
[49:21.930 --> 49:24.350]  Um, 212-209-2900.
[49:24.610 --> 49:35.110]  You know, Bernie, I want to say the really insane thing is that the, uh, the cell phone companies and other companies like them even go beyond what the law requires in violating our privacy.
[49:35.110 --> 49:37.690]  And I think that's almost the really nefarious bit.
[49:37.870 --> 49:39.990]  Well, it's a, it's a huge profit center for them.
[49:40.150 --> 49:46.230]  They make hundreds of millions of dollars a year on providing surveillance services to law enforcement agencies.
[49:46.890 --> 50:06.650]  Um, just, uh, I think a few years ago, someone who, uh, uh, reported from a cellular, uh, conference, a cellular security, a wiretapping conference said that, uh, somebody from Sprint was giving a talk and said that they had done something like, like 8 billion ping requests in one year,
[50:06.930 --> 50:09.110]  a GPS ping request on cell phones.
[50:09.230 --> 50:11.090]  That doesn't mean 8 billion people, obviously.
[50:11.290 --> 50:12.350]  There aren't that many people on the planet.
[50:12.470 --> 50:19.990]  But when, when, when the law enforcement agency orders ping, a GPS ping request, it's usually hundreds or thousands of pings or even more on a target.
[50:20.230 --> 50:26.710]  So like you said, there's, there, they have a profit interest in, uh, in, in exploiting our privacy.
[50:27.190 --> 50:30.230]  And, uh, that's where a lot of this comes from, a profit incentive.
[50:31.230 --> 50:31.550]  Yeah.
[50:31.610 --> 50:32.830]  It's, uh, it's very important to know.
[50:32.970 --> 50:38.430]  I'm, I'm sure, uh, I'm sure Lisa has, uh, has, um, some more information on this, which, uh, she'll be sharing at the conference.
[50:38.790 --> 50:45.990]  Um, but yeah, it's, it's really important to notice that, uh, this is not just the government, uh, spying on you to get more information on what you're up to.
[50:46.170 --> 50:47.670]  Your information is very, very valuable.
[50:47.830 --> 50:48.470]  It's worth a lot of money.
[50:48.610 --> 50:50.530]  And there are a lot of companies who went in on that money.
[50:52.250 --> 50:52.730]  All right.
[50:52.830 --> 50:54.290]  Let's, uh, take another phone call.
[50:54.290 --> 50:54.910]  You're on the air.
[50:55.570 --> 50:55.830]  Hello.
[50:56.230 --> 50:56.670]  Hello.
[50:57.890 --> 50:58.710]  Speak up, please.
[50:59.030 --> 50:59.410]  Uh, yes.
[50:59.650 --> 51:02.830]  I just had a couple of questions regarding cell phone privacy as well.
[51:03.330 --> 51:10.310]  Just wanting to know to what degree, uh, these companies are storing our data and permanently recording it or the NSA, that kind of thing.
[51:11.410 --> 51:13.630]  Um, Lisa, do you have any thoughts on that?
[51:14.690 --> 51:19.110]  I, I don't have any specific, specific data on that.
[51:19.390 --> 51:23.130]  Um, I'm suspect that it varies from company to company.
[51:23.250 --> 51:30.110]  Just as we see here, there's one ISP as a 14 day retention policy, whereas many of us have ISPs with much longer.
[51:30.390 --> 51:31.070]  So I think it...
[51:31.070 --> 51:39.890]  Were there any requirements within the Patriot Act that required companies to store information for extended periods, just in case kind of thing?
[51:41.690 --> 51:43.330]  I, I don't know.
[51:43.450 --> 51:47.130]  I'm, uh, I'm not a lawyer and I'm, I'm not an expert on the Patriot Act.
[51:47.270 --> 51:52.510]  There's probably many other speakers at the HOPE conference who are much better in place to answer that question.
[51:52.510 --> 51:52.990]  One more time.
[51:53.010 --> 51:54.890]  Could you say when and where is the HOPE conference?
[51:55.150 --> 51:55.470]  Sure.
[51:55.530 --> 52:03.070]  The HOPE conference will be, uh, July 13 through 15, which is, uh, Friday through Sunday at the Hotel Pennsylvania, right across the street from Penn Station.
[52:03.390 --> 52:03.690]  Okay.
[52:03.890 --> 52:04.110]  Yes.
[52:04.110 --> 52:05.570]  More information on hope.net.
[52:06.390 --> 52:06.790]  Okay.
[52:07.110 --> 52:07.450]  All right.
[52:07.590 --> 52:08.550]  Thanks for that call.
[52:08.710 --> 52:09.950]  Let's, uh, take another one.
[52:10.350 --> 52:11.130]  You're on the air.
[52:12.050 --> 52:12.430]  Hello?
[52:13.370 --> 52:13.690]  Yeah.
[52:13.810 --> 52:14.110]  Hi.
[52:14.350 --> 52:17.570]  Um, I noticed that when I, can you hear me?
[52:17.570 --> 52:18.270]  Yes, we can.
[52:18.750 --> 52:19.170]  Yeah.
[52:19.390 --> 52:32.700]  I, I noticed that when I stayed in hotels last year and I didn't take it off on my income tax, the charges that the hotel for phones, for water, and they didn't even pay it.
[52:32.760 --> 52:37.340]  And the English people that were staying there said, why are we paying all these taxes?
[52:37.860 --> 52:42.380]  And besides that, I get calls when I give information to 311.
[52:42.980 --> 52:46.320]  All kinds of junk companies call me.
[52:47.040 --> 52:49.040]  I don't know where they got my information.
[52:49.320 --> 52:57.380]  They're trying to sell me new cell phones, uh, senior crap, some other kind of crap, trap of fixing things.
[52:57.940 --> 52:59.440]  How do they get my number?
[52:59.620 --> 53:01.640]  And I can't eliminate these calls.
[53:01.840 --> 53:03.000]  Can you tell me what to do?
[53:03.600 --> 53:07.780]  Oh, I don't know if, uh, if the calls, your calls are 311 or, or a public...
[53:07.780 --> 53:09.320]  Yeah, I did call 311.
[53:09.320 --> 53:11.700]  And after that, I get all these solicitations.
[53:11.920 --> 53:14.580]  My point is, it may not have been a cause and effect with you calling 311.
[53:14.580 --> 53:16.380]  No, but I'm suspecting it could be.
[53:16.520 --> 53:17.160]  That's my point.
[53:17.220 --> 53:18.560]  There's a way, there is a way around it.
[53:18.620 --> 53:20.580]  In Philadelphia, we have a 311 system, too.
[53:20.820 --> 53:25.820]  But there's a number you can call, instead of 311, you can call a local, a local phone number.
[53:26.580 --> 53:28.020]  Well, I can't stop them.
[53:28.220 --> 53:30.040]  No matter what I do, I get new ones.
[53:30.180 --> 53:30.280]  Right.
[53:30.560 --> 53:31.960]  Diabetes, the sicknesses.
[53:32.060 --> 53:35.280]  You can try to put yourself on the, uh, on the do not call list if you, uh...
[53:35.280 --> 53:36.100]  How do you do that?
[53:36.280 --> 53:37.580]  Well, do you have access to the internet?
[53:37.960 --> 53:38.320]  No.
[53:38.660 --> 53:44.140]  All right, well, find a friend who does have access to the internet, and they can look up do not call list.
[53:44.380 --> 53:44.740]  Oh.
[53:44.740 --> 53:47.960]  It's an FCC thing, and, uh, or I think it might be a Federal Trade Commission thing.
[53:48.020 --> 53:54.840]  Anyhow, it's a list you can get on that telemarketers are supposed to follow, um, not calling you if you're on that list.
[53:55.020 --> 53:58.160]  It doesn't mean all of them follow that rule, but a lot of them do.
[53:58.380 --> 54:01.740]  And I've done it for other people, and their number of calls have dropped dramatically.
[54:02.200 --> 54:02.560]  Oh, really?
[54:02.560 --> 54:02.560]  Yeah.
[54:02.820 --> 54:06.600]  The other thing you can do is call the Better Business Bureau and report...
[54:06.600 --> 54:07.600]  Yeah, that I can do.
[54:07.820 --> 54:08.220]  All right.
[54:08.340 --> 54:08.660]  Thank you.
[54:08.680 --> 54:09.020]  Yes, indeed.
[54:09.160 --> 54:09.780]  Thank you for that call.
[54:10.460 --> 54:13.000]  Uh, let's try, uh, over here.
[54:13.180 --> 54:13.840]  You're on the air.
[54:15.280 --> 54:15.640]  Hello?
[54:16.760 --> 54:17.120]  Hi.
[54:17.320 --> 54:17.580]  Hi.
[54:17.780 --> 54:23.120]  Um, I have, hope, nine tickets that I can't use, and I wanted to make them available at cost.
[54:23.140 --> 54:24.300]  What's the best way to do that?
[54:26.340 --> 54:28.160]  Um, I don't know the answer to that.
[54:28.260 --> 54:28.860]  Bernie, do you know?
[54:28.860 --> 54:29.980]  There's a forum.
[54:30.240 --> 54:32.360]  I think it's talk.hope.net.
[54:32.500 --> 54:35.240]  And again, the server's down right now, but it probably should be up in a few hours.
[54:35.500 --> 54:39.200]  There's a forum, hope.talk.hope.net.
[54:39.500 --> 54:40.680]  If you go on there...
[54:40.680 --> 54:41.340]  The forum's up, actually.
[54:41.640 --> 54:42.840]  Yeah, the forum is up again.
[54:43.100 --> 54:43.420]  Awesome.
[54:43.920 --> 54:47.420]  Well, go to talk.hope.net and offer them there.
[54:47.580 --> 54:52.120]  Or, um, or if you're free that weekend, you could just try to scalp them in front of the hotel.
[54:52.620 --> 54:53.580]  Well, that's the problem.
[54:53.760 --> 54:54.400]  I'm not.
[54:54.500 --> 54:56.060]  So let me make them available to somebody at cost.
[54:56.140 --> 54:56.820]  I don't want to do that.
[54:56.820 --> 54:57.140]  Okay.
[54:57.240 --> 54:59.940]  Well, go on that forum and you can make arrangements with someone there.
[55:00.360 --> 55:04.260]  Um, it's not exactly eBay, but you could probably find somebody there.
[55:04.360 --> 55:04.660]  No, that's right.
[55:04.720 --> 55:06.340]  I'm not trying to start a bidding war.
[55:06.660 --> 55:06.780]  Right, right.
[55:06.780 --> 55:08.560]  I just want to help support the community.
[55:08.760 --> 55:09.240]  I can't make it.
[55:09.380 --> 55:10.500]  It sounds like it would be fantastic.
[55:10.760 --> 55:11.460]  We appreciate that.
[55:11.500 --> 55:13.040]  Sorry, uh, sorry you can't make it.
[55:14.120 --> 55:14.680]  All right.
[55:14.900 --> 55:19.380]  Uh, we've just got a couple of minutes left, but we can probably squeeze another call or two in.
[55:19.740 --> 55:20.960]  Uh, good evening.
[55:21.140 --> 55:21.640]  You're on the air.
[55:23.200 --> 55:24.000]  Yeah, WBAI.
[55:24.120 --> 55:25.280]  Thank you so much for taking my call.
[55:25.720 --> 55:26.420]  You're very welcome.
[55:26.420 --> 55:27.080]  What's on your mind?
[55:28.200 --> 55:29.160]  Uh, am I on the air?
[55:29.320 --> 55:29.960]  Yes, you are.
[55:30.800 --> 55:31.480]  Oh, all right.
[55:31.580 --> 55:32.580]  First of all, my name is John.
[55:32.720 --> 55:33.600]  I'm calling from Long Island.
[55:33.920 --> 55:35.360]  I don't want to make this too long.
[55:35.480 --> 55:36.500]  I'm going to have to be brief.
[55:36.700 --> 55:41.680]  Um, I just wanted people to know that I've had this confirmed from a police officer.
[55:41.980 --> 55:45.740]  This was being done to me because I was driving with a suspended license.
[55:46.140 --> 55:49.760]  They're pinging P-I-N-G, people's cell phones.
[55:50.180 --> 55:50.580]  All right.
[55:50.680 --> 55:52.640]  And they're watching you on their laptops.
[55:53.040 --> 55:56.240]  I know this because it was admitted to me in addition to that.
[55:56.340 --> 55:58.380]  I mean, this is what cops are doing now.
[55:58.660 --> 56:10.580]  And I know people who have had their cell phones pinged just because they were under suspicion because they were a black belt and somebody got beat up and then detectives were knocking on their door at 11 o'clock at night.
[56:10.860 --> 56:12.940]  I don't know if people know what's going on.
[56:13.360 --> 56:24.840]  But police officers now, and this happened to me, once with the Department of Environmental Conservation and once with Suffolk County PD, they watch you on their laptops.
[56:25.320 --> 56:27.940]  Everything is done on a laptop, and they watch you.
[56:28.040 --> 56:29.180]  And it's been done to me.
[56:29.560 --> 56:30.200]  Trust me.
[56:30.280 --> 56:31.280]  I'll come down to the station.
[56:31.280 --> 56:32.260]  I'll give you all the proof.
[56:32.560 --> 56:41.580]  Besides that, my ex-girlfriend's brother, right now, there's a big surge on Long Island in the hot bug industrial park with jobs.
[56:41.820 --> 56:48.260]  He's working on UAVs, unmanned aerial vehicles, because they've gotten a lot of contracts.
[56:48.560 --> 56:50.040]  And these things are for real.
[56:50.360 --> 56:51.920]  These things are being worked on.
[56:52.040 --> 56:53.480]  And he tells me this.
[56:53.680 --> 56:54.540]  So, you know what?
[56:54.660 --> 56:58.340]  All those people out there who are like, ah, you know, they're just talking.
[56:58.480 --> 56:59.480]  No, they're not just talking.
[56:59.660 --> 57:00.420]  It's here.
[57:00.580 --> 57:01.240]  It's now.
[57:01.500 --> 57:02.200]  It's happening.
[57:02.200 --> 57:07.700]  Well, the unmanned drones are an interesting subject, because we'll be having a couple of those at HOPE, apparently.
[57:08.080 --> 57:12.400]  So if you've ever wanted to meet one of those in person, come on down to HOPE.
[57:12.900 --> 57:15.600]  And okay, let's see what else we can get.
[57:16.260 --> 57:19.240]  There's a lot of interesting things to talk about.
[57:20.840 --> 57:24.380]  We've got just briefly time for this last call.
[57:25.400 --> 57:33.280]  I wanted to talk to you tonight, and good evening, gentlemen, about the extra legal cell phone records.
[57:33.920 --> 57:45.760]  Apparently, and you can, again, anyone who wants to check, just checking support records, especially civil suits involving maybe motor vehicle accidents and other agencies.
[57:45.980 --> 57:54.980]  Apparently, some lawyers have found a way around the restrictions that only law enforcement personnel can get this kind of data.
[57:55.420 --> 58:03.720]  And they get this kind of data, and then they go into court, and they get a court order to retroactively make it legal and introduce this evidence.
[58:04.280 --> 58:04.760]  Interesting.
[58:05.000 --> 58:06.560]  Okay, well, thank you very much for that phone call.
[58:07.180 --> 58:09.240]  I'd like to thank our guest, Lisa Shea.
[58:09.480 --> 58:14.060]  Come see her speak at HOPE number nine coming up this July.
[58:14.320 --> 58:15.520]  And hundreds of other people.
[58:15.620 --> 58:16.580]  And hundreds of other people.
[58:16.880 --> 58:20.240]  And just come meet a great community and check out a great conference.
[58:20.880 --> 58:21.000]  Okay.
[58:21.720 --> 58:23.640]  For off the hook, this is Rob T.
[58:23.760 --> 58:24.060]  Firefly.
[58:24.360 --> 58:26.460]  Send us an email, OTH at 2600.com.
[58:27.360 --> 58:28.180]  Can you do that?
[58:28.620 --> 58:28.900]  Yes.
[58:29.080 --> 58:34.760]  And if you've sent us an email over the past couple of days, send it again, because we haven't been able to get all our mail.
[58:35.540 --> 58:35.900]  Okay.
[58:36.840 --> 58:37.520]  Have a good night.
[58:48.250 --> 58:49.650]  Bye.
[58:49.930 --> 58:49.950]  Bye.
[59:00.710 --> 59:00.730]  Bye.
[59:08.250 --> 59:08.470]  Bye.
[59:15.610 --> 59:15.750]  diabetes.
[59:15.770 --> 59:19.490]  The poison oysters hear it up all eager for the tree.
[59:19.770 --> 59:23.290]  Now comes of us, that makes a wash their shoes were clean of need.
[59:23.670 --> 59:27.150]  And this was odd because you know they hadn't any feet.
[59:27.570 --> 59:30.870]  The uncontrollable oysters followed them, and yet another thought.
[59:31.310 --> 59:35.050]  As big and pass they came and launted m workforce and more and more and more.
[59:35.050 --> 59:38.630]  All hopping through the sloppy waves and scrambling to the shore.
[59:39.050 --> 59:42.430]  The walrus and the carpenter walked on a mile or so.
[59:42.610 --> 59:46.170]  An Then they rested on a rock, conveniently low.
[59:46.530 --> 59:49.850]  And all the little oysters stood and waited in a row.
[59:50.430 --> 59:53.850]  It's time to scout the war that's set to talk of many things.
[59:54.190 --> 59:57.630]  Of shoes and ships and sealing wax of cabbages and kings.
[59:58.090 --> 01:00:01.450]  Oh, why the sea is boiling hot and weather pigs have wings.
[01:00:01.830 --> 01:00:05.410]  Oh, oysters, oysters, come and walk with us.
[01:00:06.090 --> 01:00:09.070]  Oysters, oysters, come and walk with us.
[01:00:16.770 --> 01:00:20.570]  But wait a minute, the oysters cried before we have our chat.
[01:00:20.790 --> 01:00:24.210]  For some of us are out of breath and all of us are fat.
[01:00:24.670 --> 01:00:28.110]  No hurry, said the carpenter, they thanked him much for that.
[01:00:28.470 --> 01:00:32.010]  A loaf of bread, the walrus said, is what we cheaply need.
[01:00:32.010 --> 01:00:35.550]  Pepper, a filling of a size, are very good indeed.
[01:00:36.030 --> 01:00:39.450]  Now if you're ready, oysters, dear, we can begin to feed.
[01:00:39.790 --> 01:00:43.170]  But not on us, the oyster cried, turning a little blue.
[01:00:43.610 --> 01:00:47.110]  After such kindness, that would be a dismal thing to do.
[01:00:47.570 --> 01:00:50.830]  The night is fine, the walrus said, do you admire the view?
[01:00:51.090 --> 01:00:54.890]  It was so kind of you to come, and you were very nice.
[01:00:55.130 --> 01:00:58.690]  The carpenter said nothing but cut us another slice.
[01:00:58.690 --> 01:01:04.650]  I wish you were not quite so chained, the walrus said.
[01:01:04.730 --> 01:01:06.230]  To play them such a trick.
[01:01:06.530 --> 01:01:10.170]  After we've brought them out so far, it made them shot so quick.
[01:01:10.430 --> 01:01:13.830]  The carpenter said nothing but the butter spread too thick.
[01:01:14.310 --> 01:01:17.790]  Oh, oysters, oysters, come and walk with us.
[01:01:18.430 --> 01:01:21.390]  Oysters, oysters, come and walk with us.
[01:01:21.390 --> 01:01:25.410]  I said, Oysters, Oysters, come and walk with us.
[01:01:26.070 --> 01:01:29.150]  Oysters, Oysters, come and walk with us.
[01:01:29.390 --> 01:01:33.010]  I weep for you, the walrus said, I deeply sympathise.
[01:01:33.250 --> 01:01:36.790]  With sobs and tears he sorted out those of the largest size.
[01:01:37.010 --> 01:01:40.530]  Holding his pocket handkerchief before his screaming eyes.
[01:01:40.930 --> 01:01:44.090]  Oh Oysters, said the carpenter, you've had a pleasant run.
[01:01:44.490 --> 01:01:48.150]  So we'd be trotting home again, but answer came then on.
[01:01:48.150 --> 01:01:51.730]  And this was Scarf Leon, because they'd eaten every one.
[01:01:52.350 --> 01:01:52.570]  Woo!
[01:01:53.890 --> 01:01:59.230]  Oh man, I love the music from that show, Off the Hook.
[01:01:59.750 --> 01:02:02.610]  Fantastic as usual, always different.
[01:02:02.610 --> 01:02:06.910]  And that's what I like about them, just like WBAI, always different.