[00:00.000 --> 00:13.520]  A BAI buddy is someone who signs up to make a recurring monthly donation to WBAI using either a credit card, debit card, or by electronic fund transfer from your bank account.
[00:13.640 --> 00:15.620]  It's safe, secure, and easy.
[00:15.680 --> 00:20.500]  And it helps keep our unique, alternative, and diverse programming on the air.
[00:20.660 --> 00:24.560]  You'll get a WBAI membership card and other goodies.
[00:24.860 --> 00:25.860]  Sign up online.
[00:25.860 --> 00:29.020]  Go to WBAI.org and click on Donate.
[00:29.020 --> 00:30.680]  All the details are right there.
[00:31.100 --> 00:32.220]  The WBAI buddy.
[00:32.460 --> 00:33.660]  Be one today.
[00:37.630 --> 00:39.710]  Some of us are BAI buddies all the time.
[00:40.170 --> 00:46.870]  Well, straight out of the hacker underground, it is time for Off the Hook here on WBAI New York.
[01:05.260 --> 01:10.480]  But the best is back from worst.
[01:11.240 --> 01:12.980]  I hope that's understood.
[02:24.840 --> 02:26.260]  And a very good evening for everybody.
[02:26.380 --> 02:27.320]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:27.400 --> 02:29.700]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Mike.
[02:29.840 --> 02:30.000]  Hello.
[02:30.280 --> 02:30.520]  Jim.
[02:30.780 --> 02:30.980]  Hello.
[02:31.540 --> 02:32.520]  That's it for the studio.
[02:32.740 --> 02:34.460]  It's getting smaller every week.
[02:34.680 --> 02:34.800]  Yeah.
[02:35.100 --> 02:36.840]  Wow, so much space to move around it.
[02:36.960 --> 02:39.160]  And down somewhere in Pennsylvania, Bernie S.
[02:39.160 --> 02:40.600]  Greetings from Pennsylvania.
[02:40.920 --> 02:46.180]  We, uh... I mean, the purge continues, I guess, but we should maybe expand in other areas.
[02:46.280 --> 02:49.100]  Maybe we could have people coming in by satellite or something.
[02:49.440 --> 02:50.000]  You know?
[02:50.820 --> 02:55.240]  It's because the studios just keep getting, I guess, more unpleasant to be in.
[02:55.600 --> 02:56.040]  Is that it?
[02:56.120 --> 02:57.020]  They fixed the air conditioning.
[02:57.060 --> 02:57.580]  Yeah, they fixed it.
[02:57.640 --> 02:58.660]  It's nice and cool now.
[02:58.840 --> 02:59.560]  And, uh...
[02:59.560 --> 03:01.980]  Well, there's all this extra space, so I'll take it up.
[03:02.120 --> 03:03.180]  No question there.
[03:03.560 --> 03:04.820]  Um, all right.
[03:04.900 --> 03:07.920]  If you would like to be a co-host on Off the Hook, uh, send us email.
[03:08.120 --> 03:09.720]  O-T-H at 2600 dot com.
[03:09.980 --> 03:11.760]  Apparently, there's many openings now.
[03:11.900 --> 03:14.040]  It all started when Red Hack went to California, you know.
[03:14.140 --> 03:16.500]  He, he, he, he brought all the talent with him.
[03:16.600 --> 03:17.760]  Everybody's going over there now.
[03:18.400 --> 03:19.900]  Um, but unfortunately...
[03:19.900 --> 03:20.840]  They're all in California?
[03:21.040 --> 03:21.300]  Yeah.
[03:21.700 --> 03:23.860]  It's, it's not quite working out like, like they thought.
[03:24.480 --> 03:25.780]  Um, anything new going on?
[03:25.880 --> 03:28.340]  It just won't take long, I guess, since there's only a couple of us.
[03:28.820 --> 03:38.020]  I think our, uh, our friend Aaron Swartz, who was on the show a few weeks ago, uh, is, uh, now, uh, got more federal crosshairs on his head.
[03:38.520 --> 03:39.920]  Yeah, uh, talk about being purged.
[03:40.080 --> 03:41.500]  Uh, he's, uh, he's being targeted.
[03:41.640 --> 03:42.620]  What, what, what, what's that all about?
[03:43.100 --> 03:46.420]  Well, um, it goes back to that case from a couple of years.
[03:46.900 --> 03:48.300]  Jeez, how many years ago was it, Mike?
[03:48.400 --> 03:49.600]  It was, I guess it was like two years.
[03:49.880 --> 03:50.700]  Yeah, about that.
[03:50.700 --> 03:53.180]  And we covered the case at the time, but I, I apologize.
[03:53.180 --> 03:54.260]  I didn't make the connection.
[03:54.600 --> 03:56.380]  We, we should have asked him about it when he was here.
[03:56.560 --> 03:58.200]  Well, I didn't bring it up because it's an open case.
[03:58.360 --> 03:59.700]  I don't think he was allowed to talk about it.
[03:59.920 --> 04:02.740]  We didn't want to make him uncomfortable talking about it, but we can talk about it.
[04:02.760 --> 04:03.980]  Yeah, behind his back.
[04:04.120 --> 04:05.340]  I'm sure he'll appreciate that, yeah.
[04:05.560 --> 04:14.380]  Back in, I think it was early 2011, um, he, uh, uh, downloaded, um...
[04:14.380 --> 04:16.500]  Shouldn't you say allegedly downloaded, Bernie?
[04:16.660 --> 04:18.840]  Well, he admits to having done it, but we'll...
[04:18.840 --> 04:20.480]  He allegedly admitted to having done it.
[04:20.540 --> 04:21.700]  Yes, we'll say allegedly.
[04:21.920 --> 04:27.740]  He allegedly downloaded, um, many, many thousands of, uh...
[04:27.740 --> 04:28.080]  Alleged.
[04:28.080 --> 04:29.120]  Academic journals.
[04:30.020 --> 04:30.860]  Allegedly academic.
[04:31.280 --> 04:31.340]  Mm-hmm.
[04:31.700 --> 04:35.520]  Which are on a, on a, a database called, uh, JSTOR.
[04:35.680 --> 04:43.380]  It's a not-for-profit company that, uh, provides, uh, digitized copies of academic journals that are normally inaccessible to the public.
[04:43.700 --> 04:49.640]  But he, uh, he was, uh, he was a fellow at MIT at the time, and he had free access to these documents.
[04:50.100 --> 04:54.720]  And the general public has charged a lot of money for these things, but he was allowed to download them.
[04:55.260 --> 04:59.980]  And these aren't, you know, he downloaded a, a boatload of these things.
[05:00.120 --> 05:02.320]  I mean, I don't know, millions and, you know, a lot of them.
[05:02.680 --> 05:16.520]  He also allegedly downloaded, I don't know if this is part of the current case, he allegedly downloaded, um, uh, a whole lot of federal case files from, uh, uh, a service called PACER, which is available to anybody, but you have to pay a little bit per,
[05:16.520 --> 05:17.380]  per federal document.
[05:17.480 --> 05:18.580]  This is for, like, federal cases.
[05:18.860 --> 05:26.520]  Like, if we wanted to look up Aaron Schwartz's case, we could look up dockets and, and case history for his case and my case and everybody else had a federal case.
[05:27.140 --> 05:38.700]  Um, but, uh, he found a, a federal, um, courthouse, uh, law library that was doing an experiment allowing members of the public to go in there and download, uh, those documents for free.
[05:38.700 --> 05:51.660]  Well, he figured out a way to do that en masse, and he downloaded a gazillion of them, and he, I think he posted them up on, uh, uh, uh, Amazon, uh, uh, cloud server for a lot of people to access.
[05:51.840 --> 05:57.120]  So, anyway, um, he's not accused of, uh, of stealing any documents.
[05:57.340 --> 06:07.440]  He's accused of, uh, allegedly, uh, access to them in ways that, that the providers didn't think people would be accessing them through, and it kind of annoyed them.
[06:07.440 --> 06:14.560]  But the feds, they charged him, like, four counts last year or two ago, and they just piled nine more felony counts on him.
[06:14.900 --> 06:20.020]  And, uh, isn't, uh, what he's alleged to have downloaded, isn't this all available now for free anyway?
[06:20.240 --> 06:20.520]  Yes.
[06:20.940 --> 06:31.220]  So, this is shades of Kevin Midnick all over again, where, uh, he's accused of, of downloading something worth a great amount of money, and it turns out that it's, uh, it's, it's freely available to anybody who wants it.
[06:31.220 --> 06:34.880]  But, uh, they apparently are just really, the feds are really annoyed that he did it in a clever way.
[06:35.320 --> 06:44.280]  And, uh, when he sort of outsmarted them, and they were sort of, the feds are sort of, like, allowing people to have these documents just in small quantities for free.
[06:44.280 --> 06:48.520]  But there was no, like, legal thing that said you couldn't download a lot of them.
[06:48.720 --> 06:57.620]  He, like, he did some tricks, like, allegedly changed the Mac address of the computer he was using, because, uh, MIT locked out his Mac address.
[06:57.780 --> 07:02.180]  But anybody can change the Mac address of their, of their computer's, uh, network card.
[07:02.280 --> 07:04.140]  Well, anybody can commit murder, too, Bernie.
[07:04.340 --> 07:05.520]  Well, okay.
[07:05.820 --> 07:07.380]  Anybody can do it without hurting anybody.
[07:07.380 --> 07:13.980]  And it's never, as far as I know, it's never been used in a case before to, uh, to criminally charge someone for just changing their Mac ID.
[07:14.160 --> 07:18.340]  Well, get ready for the 21st century, because all sorts of things are going to become crimes that we're not used to.
[07:18.740 --> 07:26.700]  The good news is Aaron does, I believe, because he was involved in the creation of Reddit, um, which was sold for a lot of money to Condonast, I believe.
[07:26.940 --> 07:29.140]  Good news is, I think he has some financial resources.
[07:29.440 --> 07:33.740]  Oh, so the good news is he gets to waste his hard-earned money on something that's nonsensical like this.
[07:33.740 --> 07:44.760]  Well, it's going to be a, it's going to be a really worthwhile case, because it's going to test the limits of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which, um, the feds are trying to use it in ways that was never intended.
[07:45.340 --> 07:58.560]  Um, and I think there was a case, wasn't it, Mike, wasn't this the case a few years ago, where that woman, uh, uh, violated, uh, Terms of Service on some, some, some, some, was it Facebook or MySpace or something, and convinced them that they were, uh,
[07:59.700 --> 08:02.480]  a boyfriend of somebody, and the girl committed suicide, and then...
[08:02.480 --> 08:03.460]  Oh, we did cover that.
[08:03.620 --> 08:06.840]  Yeah, that was a, it was like the mother, a mother of, of someone?
[08:07.180 --> 08:09.080]  A mother of a girlfriend of a girl.
[08:09.340 --> 08:11.420]  Yeah, the mother taunted some, some kid.
[08:11.620 --> 08:11.980]  Yeah, okay.
[08:12.160 --> 08:22.040]  Yeah, made her think, no, made the mother, pretended she was a boy who, uh, was attracted to, uh, the target, uh, girl, and then the girl ended up killing herself.
[08:22.320 --> 08:29.420]  And anyhow, she was, the woman was charged under, I believe, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for violating the Terms of Service, but she was charged criminally.
[08:29.520 --> 08:35.340]  It's the first time the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act had been used, uh, to charge somebody criminally simply for violating the Terms of Service.
[08:35.500 --> 08:41.820]  You know, that's that long, like, 10-page thing that everybody scrolls through and never reads when they click OK, when they use some online service.
[08:42.180 --> 08:47.140]  That was the first time we used criminal, and she was found, and it was, the case was dismissed, and she was not, found not guilty.
[08:47.300 --> 08:54.160]  I think it was just dismissed, because it was, it was just an abuse of that law, um, that, using a computer fraud...
[08:54.160 --> 09:03.380]  Well, you just have to, you know, the way it tests these laws is to simply, uh, uh, hold them up to real-life parallels and say, would this have been a crime if there wasn't a computer involved?
[09:03.700 --> 09:04.560]  I agree with you.
[09:04.720 --> 09:13.960]  So if she had walked up to this, uh, person and said, by the way, I'm a boy, and I'm attracted to you, even though I'm, I'm really a middle-aged housewife, uh, would that have been something that you could wind up in prison for saying?
[09:14.220 --> 09:15.620]  Well, I, probably not.
[09:15.800 --> 09:25.020]  But anyhow, this is the second time I know of that the, that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is being used by the federal prosecutor to charge somebody with simply for violating terms of service.
[09:25.240 --> 09:28.580]  So this is going to be a really interesting test of the boundaries of that.
[09:28.780 --> 09:40.480]  And, uh, I don't know anybody smarter or, um, has the financial resources than Aaron, who can probably put up an effective challenge to this, uh, abuse of the law by our federal government.
[09:40.600 --> 09:41.980]  Well, we certainly wish him luck on that.
[09:42.140 --> 09:51.600]  And, uh, we'll be keeping people updated, of course, and hopefully we'll have him on the show again, uh, to, uh, talk about this firsthand when he, when he hopefully wins and, um, establishes some precedent.
[09:51.820 --> 10:02.400]  But I gotta tell you, you know, the whole copyright and, uh, um, uh, corporate control of, uh, of everything we do on the internet and on our computers is getting out of hand.
[10:02.580 --> 10:06.660]  I mean, it's gotten out of hand already, but it's, it's going to continue unless people fight back.
[10:06.980 --> 10:16.680]  Uh, I, I've just been learning about, uh, the stranglehold that, um, that, uh, the recording industry and the movie industry have on, uh, services like YouTube, for instance.
[10:17.220 --> 10:18.640]  Uh, why haven't you been paying attention?
[10:18.820 --> 10:20.320]  Well, so much to pay attention to.
[10:21.040 --> 10:26.560]  And, uh, you know, we've been, we've been uploading our, um, our conference audio, uh, to, uh, various services.
[10:26.560 --> 10:29.580]  As you know, uh, we have, uh, the first four, uh, up.
[10:29.620 --> 10:39.200]  But we, we recently started, uh, putting them up on YouTube because they, uh, they had a 15-minute limit and that wasn't really good for us because our, our talks tend to go at least an hour.
[10:39.640 --> 10:43.440]  Uh, they changed that and now it's, uh, it, it, it's pretty wide open.
[10:43.660 --> 10:50.300]  Uh, so if you go to channel 2600 of, uh, youtube.com, you'll be able to find all of those, uh, conferences.
[10:50.580 --> 10:52.420]  you just press the clicker up arrow?
[10:52.560 --> 11:01.960]  Well, if you have a channel tuner, if you have the channel tuner from YouTube, you could do that or you could simply type channel 2600 after the slash when you type youtube.com on your internet browser.
[11:02.500 --> 11:03.780]  That sounds awfully complicated.
[11:03.920 --> 11:04.960]  Your choice, Mike, how you do it.
[11:05.040 --> 11:10.860]  But point is, uh, we've been uploading these things and, uh, we had no issue at all with Blip, Blip.tv.
[11:11.060 --> 11:12.060]  Still a great service to use.
[11:12.300 --> 11:17.440]  Uh, but, uh, YouTube also reaches a lot more people that, that we don't reach, uh, by default.
[11:17.760 --> 11:25.080]  Uh, but what we found out was that, uh, YouTube has this, um, uh, this, I guess it's an algorithm or some kind of, uh, a process that runs.
[11:25.160 --> 11:30.080]  It's similar to that process, you know, where you hold your iPhone up to a speaker to find out what song it is.
[11:30.420 --> 11:33.320]  Well, they do that for every single video that you upload.
[11:33.660 --> 11:43.580]  And they can tell almost instantly if someone's song is in there and if someone's song is in there, if, if, if, if something's playing in the background someplace, they will tell you.
[11:43.800 --> 11:45.180]  And they could do a bunch of different things.
[11:45.280 --> 11:46.360]  They could block your video.
[11:46.580 --> 12:01.100]  Uh, they could, uh, just tell you that, uh, that you have, um, uh, matching content on there and stick an ad for the band or the person who's, uh, whose work you're supposedly, um, um, putting on your, your video.
[12:01.280 --> 12:02.180]  They can do that.
[12:02.540 --> 12:08.640]  Uh, and, um, it's interesting that we had a couple of things like this happen for videos that are almost 20 years old.
[12:08.920 --> 12:18.260]  Uh, there was one case where our video wound up being blocked in every country except for, I think, Yemen and South Sudan, which I thought was really kind of interesting.
[12:18.340 --> 12:19.320]  Bastions are free speech.
[12:19.380 --> 12:22.280]  That's where you're supposed to go if you want to watch videos without worrying about this.
[12:22.360 --> 12:23.440]  But just think about it.
[12:23.600 --> 12:27.260]  Do you think the artist is getting a single penny of any of that?
[12:27.560 --> 12:38.800]  No, it's, it's basically, uh, uh, the, the recording industry saying that, uh, if you even listen to this song, we're going to, uh, we're going to take something from your pocket, uh, because that belongs to us.
[12:38.800 --> 12:45.340]  If you whistle this tune and people are buying into it, people are, are believing that this is normal and it's not.
[12:45.440 --> 12:46.100]  It really is not.
[12:46.260 --> 12:49.480]  I think certain very wealthy artists are getting some money.
[12:49.600 --> 12:53.440]  They're the ones with the, uh, power to negotiate their contracts very carefully.
[12:53.440 --> 12:54.180]  Well, they're the ones who need it.
[12:54.240 --> 12:55.120]  Yeah, they're the ones who have to.
[12:55.400 --> 12:57.100]  But, uh, I think the average artist is not.
[12:57.260 --> 13:13.840]  Well, just to, just to tell you how crazy it is, we had Jello Biafra give a talk at, uh, at one of our conferences and the audio from that talk was used for an album and we were notified that we were violating, we were violating, um, the, the recording industry because it came from that album,
[13:13.960 --> 13:16.020]  even though it came from us to get on the album in the first place.
[13:16.400 --> 13:19.840]  And, uh, you know, we were in agreement with Jello and all that, but it doesn't matter.
[13:19.900 --> 13:22.620]  We can get a written note from him saying, yes, it's perfectly okay.
[13:22.820 --> 13:31.080]  It won't make a bit of difference because the recording industry is this monolithic beast that will say, no, you have to, you have to either give us money or give us credit or something like that.
[13:31.080 --> 13:36.920]  Another instance, and this one is going to get rather interesting, we had Mark Hosler from Negative Land speaking.
[13:37.260 --> 13:40.460]  And we were told that that violates copyright.
[13:40.800 --> 13:45.300]  And I know that Negative Land is very much into sharing their audio.
[13:45.840 --> 13:49.120]  So we're going to see how that works out.
[13:49.120 --> 13:59.740]  If Negative Land is actually saying that you cannot reproduce audio that we presented in front of a lot of people, I know for sure.
[13:59.740 --> 14:03.060]  I've had personal conversations where I know for sure that is not their stance.
[14:03.200 --> 14:10.500]  But their record company, the recording industry, might take a different stance, and they will be powerless to override that, even though it's their work.
[14:10.620 --> 14:12.100]  Don't they have their own recording company?
[14:12.860 --> 14:13.420]  Jello does.
[14:13.420 --> 14:19.920]  I think they do now, but for an older album, it might fall under the control of some other entity.
[14:20.020 --> 14:20.080]  Oh, okay.
[14:20.960 --> 14:21.880]  Yeah, it's crazy.
[14:21.960 --> 14:25.680]  But, you know, we're going to play with this, because that technology, you can use it yourself.
[14:26.240 --> 14:33.720]  So we're going to actually install it and play with it ourselves and see if anybody else uploads material that we deem to be ours.
[14:33.720 --> 14:40.300]  We're not going to threaten anybody or anything like that, but we're going to see how quickly it works and see just what the options are.
[14:40.300 --> 14:42.080]  That way we can report from the inside as well.
[14:42.340 --> 14:43.560]  So stay tuned.
[14:43.660 --> 14:44.060]  Listen to that.
[14:44.420 --> 14:45.500]  It'll be interesting.
[14:45.720 --> 14:49.880]  And I understand that videos from The Fifth Hope will be going up in October.
[14:49.980 --> 14:52.160]  I think October 9th they're all going up.
[14:52.240 --> 14:53.220]  So right now we have the first four.
[14:53.360 --> 14:54.140]  It's very precisely scheduled.
[14:55.320 --> 14:56.080]  We've gotten good.
[14:56.180 --> 14:57.040]  We really have gotten good.
[14:57.280 --> 14:59.580]  It's been quite a project, let me tell you.
[14:59.900 --> 15:10.800]  Going back in time, Kyle did a lot of the work on this, as far as just going through all the videos, saving them, because they can get lost very easily, especially in old formats, especially when tape degrades.
[15:11.400 --> 15:16.360]  But it's just great to have them all in a place where you can watch them and see things from the past.
[15:16.460 --> 15:17.300]  A lot of history there.
[15:17.420 --> 15:21.200]  And we're going to expand beyond that, beyond just the videos from The Hope Conference.
[15:21.260 --> 15:24.740]  So if anyone has ideas for things that we can do, please let us know.
[15:25.080 --> 15:27.420]  Our address, OTH at 2600.com.
[15:28.040 --> 15:31.140]  Now, staying with the subject of YouTube and Google.
[15:31.320 --> 15:32.480]  Google owns YouTube, right?
[15:32.840 --> 15:33.040]  Yeah.
[15:33.180 --> 15:33.500]  Yeah, okay.
[15:33.500 --> 15:35.240]  They bought it some years ago.
[15:35.440 --> 15:36.140]  They did, yes.
[15:36.260 --> 15:36.800]  But they don't...
[15:36.800 --> 15:39.320]  It doesn't say Google on it, does it, when you go to YouTube?
[15:39.420 --> 15:40.700]  Does it say Google on the front page?
[15:40.800 --> 15:42.100]  They're slowly integrating.
[15:42.440 --> 15:46.820]  Now, when you sign into YouTube, it really wants you to sign in and link your Google identity.
[15:47.360 --> 15:48.380]  Oh, that I know.
[15:48.500 --> 15:54.100]  Because we had a YouTube ID, which stopped working because we had to make it a Google ID.
[15:54.220 --> 15:56.180]  It got so complicated and ridiculous.
[15:56.400 --> 16:00.820]  It took us three days to get into our YouTube account because we were signing into the wrong domain.
[16:01.560 --> 16:03.220]  You should be ashamed of yourself, really.
[16:03.220 --> 16:06.180]  I'm pretty ashamed, but it really was an ordeal.
[16:06.780 --> 16:07.820]  But here's the thing.
[16:08.020 --> 16:15.320]  This whole latest thing with raging mobs in various parts of the world, of course, YouTube is in the middle of that yet again.
[16:16.000 --> 16:21.140]  It's funny because YouTube was in the middle when those raging mobs were taking down governments.
[16:21.360 --> 16:28.260]  And now that those raging mobs, different raging mobs are trying to take down YouTube, are trying to take down the U.S.
[16:28.260 --> 16:29.860]  or various other entities.
[16:30.040 --> 16:31.700]  There may be some overlap in the raging mobs.
[16:31.700 --> 16:33.980]  Well, raging mobs tend to have overlap, yeah.
[16:34.140 --> 16:36.640]  You tend to be able to merge from one to the other pretty easily.
[16:36.900 --> 16:43.880]  But Google is now refusing a White House request to take down an anti-Muslim clip on YouTube.
[16:44.580 --> 16:48.620]  But it is restricting access to that video in certain countries.
[16:48.640 --> 16:54.720]  Of course, we're referring to the anti-Prophet Muhammad film or film clip.
[16:54.740 --> 16:56.220]  I don't even know if there's a real film.
[16:56.220 --> 16:59.180]  It just seems to be like a five, ten-minute clip, right?
[16:59.340 --> 17:00.280]  That appears to be enough.
[17:00.500 --> 17:02.140]  Yeah, it really does appear to be enough.
[17:02.180 --> 17:07.620]  And the thing is, nobody would have even known about this had it not been broadcast on television in various countries.
[17:07.620 --> 17:09.940]  And I think that was done just to incite mobs.
[17:10.520 --> 17:12.240]  It really is pretty amazing.
[17:12.340 --> 17:14.440]  And I'm not sure about this White House request.
[17:14.660 --> 17:21.160]  Now, the White House basically said it had asked YouTube to review whether the video violated its terms of use.
[17:21.160 --> 17:23.000]  I don't know if that's a request to take it down.
[17:23.160 --> 17:26.680]  It's basically, are you sure this falls within your terms of...
[17:26.680 --> 17:29.820]  Well, it's kind of a hint what decision they would like them to reach.
[17:29.880 --> 17:32.040]  Yeah, well, it would make life, I guess, a bit easier.
[17:32.280 --> 17:38.080]  I don't think the White House is, like, calling up randomly, like, are you sure that funny cat video complies with their terms of use?
[17:38.220 --> 17:44.720]  No, but if there is a raging mob, you know, a raging pro-cat right mob, yeah, that would be something.
[17:44.720 --> 17:46.060]  Maybe the White House would take an interest in.
[17:46.120 --> 17:47.300]  Maybe that's what we need.
[17:48.300 --> 17:56.600]  But basically, YouTube said in a statement on Friday, the video is widely available on the web, is clearly within our guidelines, and so will stay on YouTube.
[17:56.800 --> 18:07.940]  And I just think it's funny that, you know, we're getting notices that, you know, we have Jello Biafra's audio in our videos, but these people are not getting any kind of notices, and they're well within the guidelines.
[18:08.120 --> 18:09.420]  And rightfully so, they are.
[18:09.540 --> 18:10.680]  There's no question about that.
[18:10.680 --> 18:18.020]  That it's freedom of speech, and sometimes offensive speech is the kind of speech you need to protect.
[18:18.160 --> 18:22.940]  And that's something that I think is maybe a little too unique in this country.
[18:23.160 --> 18:26.720]  It's unfortunate it's not normal throughout the rest of the world.
[18:26.780 --> 18:30.520]  Well, I mean, so what's interesting is that Google is complying here with the U.S.
[18:30.540 --> 18:31.160]  law, and U.S.
[18:31.180 --> 18:36.740]  law is written by people who have lots of money in the U.S., which is to say, in part, the copyright industry.
[18:36.840 --> 18:37.840]  It takes money to write laws.
[18:37.840 --> 18:38.180]  Yeah.
[18:39.040 --> 18:40.200]  A lot of it, apparently.
[18:40.800 --> 18:42.080]  Although, less than you would think.
[18:42.200 --> 18:46.760]  But anyway, in other countries, there are laws against, you know, blasphemy.
[18:47.840 --> 18:55.320]  And Google is not currently doing business in enough of those countries that it feels compelled to take down these videos, but one day it will be.
[18:55.480 --> 19:00.920]  Well, no, I think they are doing business in those countries, and they've taken down videos in various places.
[19:00.920 --> 19:08.420]  I believe they've taken it down in Libya, in Egypt, I think Indonesia or Malaysia, one of those.
[19:09.100 --> 19:12.360]  But various... yeah, Indonesia and India as well.
[19:13.640 --> 19:17.120]  So, and that's because of laws that they have in those countries.
[19:17.360 --> 19:20.900]  So, in those countries, having the video up, apparently, would violate the law.
[19:20.900 --> 19:22.400]  So, they took it down there.
[19:22.520 --> 19:24.600]  But in this country, it does not violate the law.
[19:24.600 --> 19:29.460]  So, it's a tough position to hold on to.
[19:29.660 --> 19:36.540]  I guess it would be fairly easy for them to just deny access to these people for putting up the video in the first place.
[19:38.140 --> 19:40.500]  But it's an important line to draw.
[19:41.660 --> 19:46.140]  So, anyway, the short film, Innocence of Muslims, denigrates Islam and the Prophet Muhammad.
[19:46.140 --> 19:48.580]  It played a role in igniting mob violence against U.S.
[19:48.660 --> 19:50.120]  embassies across the Middle East.
[19:50.260 --> 19:51.480]  It's caused countless lives.
[19:51.480 --> 19:54.200]  Or, I shouldn't say the film has caused countless lives.
[19:54.400 --> 19:55.100]  Indirectly, it has.
[19:55.240 --> 19:59.260]  But, of course, the angry mobs have been the ones to wind up killing people.
[19:59.980 --> 20:01.780]  And some terrorist acts as well.
[20:02.580 --> 20:06.140]  Now, it has been blamed for playing a role in violence in Libya, where the U.S.
[20:06.240 --> 20:08.380]  ambassador and three others were killed during the...
[20:08.380 --> 20:10.140]  through the exact cause...
[20:10.140 --> 20:13.860]  though the exact cause of the attacks is still under investigation.
[20:14.140 --> 20:17.200]  By the way, that was the first time since 1979 that a U.S.
[20:17.580 --> 20:20.100]  ambassador was killed in the line of duty.
[20:20.100 --> 20:41.380]  And that year, that year marked the end, I think, of five ambassadors being killed within a decade, a little bit more than a decade, which is interesting that that period of time was so turbulent that so many ambassadors from Guatemala to various parts of the Mideast and other regions in the world were affected.
[20:41.640 --> 20:44.460]  Well, there's the change in worldwide turbulence.
[20:44.620 --> 20:46.420]  And also, like, have you tried to go to a U.S.
[20:46.700 --> 20:47.040]  embassy recently?
[20:47.040 --> 20:51.500]  There's a lot of armed people preventing you from getting anywhere near the ambassador most of the time.
[20:51.700 --> 20:56.200]  Yeah, but that tends to have happened within the last maybe 10, 15 years.
[20:56.680 --> 20:58.420]  I wouldn't say the last 30 years.
[20:59.220 --> 21:03.180]  So I think a lot of things have changed more recently.
[21:04.020 --> 21:05.780]  Even in countries you wouldn't expect.
[21:05.940 --> 21:18.340]  I was, I guess it was about eight years ago, I was in Prague in the Czech Republic with Laszlo, and we were walking down some street up on a hill, and there was this massively armed compound.
[21:18.480 --> 21:19.900]  We're like, what the heck is going on here?
[21:19.960 --> 21:21.020]  And it was the U.S.
[21:21.120 --> 21:21.400]  embassy.
[21:21.640 --> 21:26.060]  It was like the only building we saw in the whole country that was so heavily fortified.
[21:26.500 --> 21:34.640]  Yeah, well, when Carl and I were in Bosnia, in Sarajevo, that was the place that you could not get near, was the U.S.
[21:34.760 --> 21:40.980]  embassy, which was still under construction, but it was like a compound that was unbelievably impregnable.
[21:41.720 --> 21:52.080]  And when I was in Estonia a bunch of years ago, that was, I was able to take pictures of everything, except when I tried to take a picture of the U.S.
[21:52.380 --> 21:53.600]  embassy in Estonia.
[21:53.860 --> 21:57.580]  And it was, I was threatened with arrest by an American.
[21:57.760 --> 22:03.640]  I just thought it was amazing that I was traveling all throughout the world, and the only person to threaten me with arrest was an American in a foreign country.
[22:03.640 --> 22:05.560]  So if you were arrested, would the U.S.
[22:05.620 --> 22:07.600]  then offer you consular assistance?
[22:07.920 --> 22:08.300]  I doubt it.
[22:08.400 --> 22:09.480]  I doubt it very much.
[22:09.920 --> 22:12.500]  I would have sought refuge in Estonia somewhere.
[22:13.360 --> 22:18.680]  Okay, continuing with what's going on in the rest of the world, this is kind of interesting.
[22:19.340 --> 22:32.200]  Foreign journalists in Beijing have been targeted by two very similar malware attacks in just over two weeks, and this is in the lead up to China's once-in-a-decade leadership transition.
[22:32.200 --> 22:34.460]  Do they do this once a decade, like clockwork?
[22:34.600 --> 22:35.200]  Is that...
[22:35.200 --> 22:36.180]  Well, the U.S.
[22:36.280 --> 22:37.600]  does it every four or eight years.
[22:38.020 --> 22:38.220]  That's true.
[22:38.400 --> 22:39.860]  China does it every ten, apparently.
[22:40.040 --> 22:41.540]  Okay, well, the emails...
[22:41.540 --> 22:43.180]  I mean, a very different process, but...
[22:43.180 --> 22:44.020]  A bit different, yes.
[22:44.340 --> 22:59.820]  The emails, one appearing to come from a Beijing-based foreign correspondent, and the other from a Washington-based think tank, both contained an attachment with the same type of malware, and that's according to an independent cyber security expert.
[22:59.820 --> 23:10.740]  Malware attacks on foreign correspondents in China, Chinese dissidents or academics researching China tend to spike in the periods leading up to politically sensitive events for China.
[23:11.240 --> 23:19.300]  Previous spikes occurred ahead of the Beijing Olympics in 2008, and the 60th anniversary of the Communist Party rule in 2009.
[23:20.080 --> 23:22.420]  It's kind of interesting.
[23:22.660 --> 23:28.480]  What's the point exactly of sending malware in advance of something major in China?
[23:28.480 --> 23:29.900]  I'm trying to figure out the...
[23:29.900 --> 23:39.200]  I guess they want to know what people are saying about it, and if they're corresponding with any dissidents, they want to know about that, and they'd just like to know what's going on in the Chinese government.
[23:39.500 --> 23:44.500]  Well, a government spokesman warned against jumping to conclusions about who was responsible, Mike.
[23:45.180 --> 23:47.040]  China manages the Internet...
[23:47.040 --> 23:51.360]  All right, then the anti-Chinese government forces who are sending malware, whoever's doing it.
[23:51.380 --> 23:53.180]  He's still jumping to different conclusions, though.
[23:53.660 --> 23:55.520]  China manages the Internet...
[23:55.520 --> 23:56.340]  Did you know that?
[23:56.460 --> 23:58.420]  They manage the internet, according to this guy.
[23:59.140 --> 24:08.100]  China manages the internet according to law, and has engaged in cooperation with the international community to promise internet security... to promise internet security.
[24:08.620 --> 24:10.740]  I'm sorry, not promise.
[24:11.300 --> 24:13.960]  Internet security is a complicated issue.
[24:14.160 --> 24:17.860]  That's according to Hang Li, a foreign ministry spokesman.
[24:18.260 --> 24:20.540]  China is also a victim of internet attacks.
[24:20.540 --> 24:23.820]  The source of these internet attacks is very difficult to determine.
[24:24.400 --> 24:30.800]  Reaching conclusions without sufficient evidence or fair and thorough investigations is just not serious.
[24:31.040 --> 24:31.440]  He says.
[24:31.680 --> 24:33.380]  He said that, yes, allegedly.
[24:34.460 --> 24:37.560]  Okay, meanwhile, let's go over to Holland now.
[24:39.720 --> 24:51.560]  The court of Amsterdam has decided that publishing hyperlinks to copyrighted content is, under certain circumstances, a copyright infringement.
[24:52.220 --> 24:52.620]  Wow.
[24:52.800 --> 24:53.160]  Here we go.
[24:53.320 --> 24:53.720]  Here we go.
[24:53.820 --> 24:57.520]  So this is basically the law as it's alleged to exist in the United States.
[24:57.960 --> 25:00.540]  And now it's going to be that way in the Netherlands as well.
[25:00.600 --> 25:02.120]  Well, does it exist like that here?
[25:02.200 --> 25:03.180]  Or is this something that...
[25:03.180 --> 25:03.400]  I don't know.
[25:03.460 --> 25:06.080]  They keep trying to fly people over who do it in other countries.
[25:06.460 --> 25:06.780]  True, true.
[25:06.780 --> 25:09.580]  I assume if you did it in the United States, they wouldn't have to fly you over.
[25:09.720 --> 25:10.960]  You'd get in trouble all the quicker.
[25:11.500 --> 25:13.280]  Now, Bernie, do you know something about this?
[25:13.400 --> 25:17.960]  If you link to copyrighted content in this country, is that a crime?
[25:19.360 --> 25:20.080]  Weren't you...
[25:20.080 --> 25:21.140]  Didn't you have a whole court case?
[25:21.160 --> 25:22.500]  I had a whole court case about that.
[25:22.600 --> 25:23.380]  But that was only me.
[25:23.480 --> 25:26.720]  I'm the only one that's not allowed to link to something, to DECSS.
[25:26.960 --> 25:28.080]  But other people apparently can.
[25:28.220 --> 25:28.440]  Bernie?
[25:28.600 --> 25:33.480]  Yeah, I was just going to mention, Mike beat me to the punches back in 2000, I guess it was.
[25:33.480 --> 25:44.840]  It was a federal court, district court, ordered 2600 to stop linking to a piece of software that wasn't even copyrighted, as far as I know.
[25:45.000 --> 25:45.760]  Maybe it was...
[25:45.760 --> 25:47.660]  Maybe it was...
[25:47.660 --> 25:49.740]  That was might have been before Creative Commons.
[25:49.900 --> 25:51.560]  Do you remember our response to that, Bernie?
[25:51.560 --> 25:52.220]  Oh, yeah.
[25:52.800 --> 25:56.040]  I think we posted lists of URLs.
[25:56.360 --> 25:57.100]  Yeah, we just made it...
[25:57.100 --> 25:58.300]  We made it not a link.
[25:58.440 --> 26:01.100]  We just printed the URL, which is not a link.
[26:01.240 --> 26:03.920]  If you cut and paste it, though, you can very easily get there.
[26:04.020 --> 26:11.020]  But the reason for that was we wanted them to go that extra step and say, no, you cannot even speak the name of the site.
[26:11.520 --> 26:13.620]  And we would have kept pushing it to see how far.
[26:13.720 --> 26:15.220]  But they never challenged that.
[26:15.220 --> 26:16.780]  We were able to keep the list up.
[26:17.600 --> 26:18.920]  So maybe this new...
[26:18.920 --> 26:23.200]  Maybe that should be the new model for people, just putting up lists.
[26:23.520 --> 26:28.760]  And there could be some app for your plugin for your browser that will turn URLs into links.
[26:28.840 --> 26:30.580]  Oh, well, that sounds like conspiracy, Bernie.
[26:30.580 --> 26:32.240]  And I don't think we should be promoting that.
[26:32.340 --> 26:33.540]  But, yeah, I do think...
[26:33.540 --> 26:43.420]  How about if all the pirate sites, the alleged pirate sites, that is, instead of printing hyperlinks to alleged copyrighted material, simply print lists.
[26:43.460 --> 26:44.620]  And let's see what happens.
[26:44.620 --> 26:47.880]  You know, maybe that'll stop all the nonsense.
[26:48.180 --> 26:51.320]  I forgot to mention at the top of the hour, today is Talk Like a Pirate Day.
[26:51.580 --> 26:52.120]  So maybe...
[26:52.120 --> 26:52.380]  Is it really?
[26:52.500 --> 26:52.700]  Yeah.
[26:53.120 --> 26:54.660]  Oh, God, I hate that day.
[26:55.160 --> 26:55.800]  I do.
[26:55.920 --> 26:56.600]  Because everyone...
[26:56.600 --> 26:58.860]  Yeah, everyone's just going around, going arg all the time.
[26:58.960 --> 26:59.620]  And this really...
[26:59.620 --> 27:00.360]  It gets annoying.
[27:00.900 --> 27:01.700]  Well, I don't know.
[27:01.780 --> 27:02.140]  It gets annoying very quickly.
[27:02.140 --> 27:05.040]  I don't know how to say Link like a pirate, so...
[27:06.280 --> 27:06.960]  Okay, thanks.
[27:07.100 --> 27:08.680]  Thanks for that little tidbit of information.
[27:08.960 --> 27:09.980]  Why does it have to be today?
[27:10.100 --> 27:11.320]  Why does it have to be the day we're on the air?
[27:12.740 --> 27:14.300]  You can learn that, I guess, from the...
[27:14.300 --> 27:15.880]  Is that on the hacker calendar?
[27:15.900 --> 27:16.620]  I think it is.
[27:17.000 --> 27:18.180]  International Talk Like a Pirate Day.
[27:18.280 --> 27:20.380]  We couldn't keep that off the hacker calendar.
[27:20.520 --> 27:22.680]  The pirates just pirated it in.
[27:23.000 --> 27:23.400]  Yeah.
[27:24.060 --> 27:26.060]  Okay, and now let's go over to Poland.
[27:26.060 --> 27:27.000]  This is a fun story.
[27:27.120 --> 27:28.000]  Everyone will enjoy this.
[27:28.540 --> 27:34.440]  Two weeks before unveiling its next generation iPhone, which I believe happened.
[27:34.440 --> 27:36.880]  I wasn't paying any attention, but I do think it happened.
[27:36.880 --> 27:39.400]  And ultra-thin, wafer-thin.
[27:39.520 --> 27:43.180]  In fact, some people have tried to eat theirs, and that has not turned out well for them.
[27:44.260 --> 27:49.560]  Apple was, in the meantime, busy filing a lawsuit against a Polish grocery site.
[27:50.380 --> 27:53.640]  Their website was A.PL.
[27:54.020 --> 27:59.280]  Now, PL, of course, is a top-level domain for Poland, and A was...
[27:59.280 --> 28:00.900]  A letter in the Polish alphabet.
[28:00.900 --> 28:02.480]  It's a letter, but is that the name of the store?
[28:02.620 --> 28:03.480]  Is the store called A?
[28:03.700 --> 28:04.900]  I think it's called A.PL.
[28:04.900 --> 28:05.620]  I'm not sure.
[28:06.240 --> 28:08.260]  Well, is the store called A.PL?
[28:08.460 --> 28:09.500]  Is that really...
[28:09.500 --> 28:09.980]  It's allowed.
[28:10.200 --> 28:11.040]  I'm just looking at the story.
[28:11.040 --> 28:14.420]  Well, I mean, it may or may not be allowed, but I guess there's a lawsuit to find out.
[28:14.840 --> 28:15.060]  Okay.
[28:17.720 --> 28:22.680]  Polish news outlet Telepolis.
[28:23.460 --> 28:34.900]  Apple is railing against the online deli site because its title is just a little too reminiscent of the Apple brand.
[28:35.620 --> 28:41.680]  A.PL, which advertises straight-to-your-door delivery, goes by the full name A.PL Internet S.A.
[28:43.020 --> 28:46.700]  And, of course, PL is, as we said, Poland's countrywide domain.
[28:47.040 --> 28:52.560]  Apple is arguing a trademark issue demanding that the Polish Patent Office cancel the site's trademark.
[28:52.560 --> 28:58.160]  The main allegations are the likeness of characters and the use of Apple's reputation.
[28:59.640 --> 29:09.500]  Yeah, you know, this is a reason why you don't buy Apple products because people who behave like this are evil and a threat to freedom everywhere.
[29:09.760 --> 29:17.120]  How in the world does a grocery site remind anybody of computers and telephones and whatever else that Apple is manufacturing these days?
[29:17.280 --> 29:18.660]  Are they going to go after the fruit next?
[29:18.880 --> 29:20.400]  I mean, you know, I think it's in danger.
[29:20.400 --> 29:27.120]  It even has the same, you know, that logo of Apple's with the...
[29:27.120 --> 29:30.440]  It looks like one of the other apples that grow on trees.
[29:30.760 --> 29:31.940]  It's confusingly similar, perhaps.
[29:31.940 --> 29:32.700]  It's very similar.
[29:33.400 --> 29:34.640]  How do they get away with that?
[29:34.760 --> 29:42.580]  How is it that Apple growers everywhere can't sue Apple the computer people for using their logo, which is actually the fruit?
[29:42.780 --> 29:46.220]  You know, of course, about the lawsuit with Apple Records, the Beatles.
[29:46.420 --> 29:47.320]  Yeah, there's that too.
[29:47.420 --> 29:53.580]  There's that too because they weren't supposed to get into the music business because that was Apple Records, but somehow they did that anyway, you know?
[29:53.760 --> 29:56.060]  I don't understand how Donald Trump gets away with it.
[29:56.160 --> 30:02.100]  He's able to use his name in relation to card games, which has nothing to do with his name.
[30:02.340 --> 30:03.420]  You know, Trump is...
[30:04.660 --> 30:06.100]  What game is that, anyway?
[30:06.660 --> 30:07.360]  Lots of games.
[30:07.480 --> 30:08.140]  It's in lots of games.
[30:08.320 --> 30:09.360]  Yeah, Jim, you are a card expert.
[30:09.440 --> 30:09.940]  You should know this.
[30:10.300 --> 30:10.820]  Isn't that...
[30:12.560 --> 30:13.420]  It's for hearts.
[30:13.720 --> 30:14.080]  Lots of games.
[30:14.520 --> 30:15.800]  Yeah, Trump is just a...
[30:15.800 --> 30:16.520]  Maybe not hearts.
[30:16.660 --> 30:16.940]  I don't know.
[30:16.940 --> 30:25.220]  But regardless, he's involved in gambling and he uses that to his advantage, but if anybody says Trump in anything, you can't even say, what, you're fired without him getting angry.
[30:25.340 --> 30:26.880]  Why are we talking so much about Donald Trump?
[30:26.880 --> 30:30.000]  I'm just saying he's an example of what's wrong.
[30:30.380 --> 30:32.260]  And it's just...
[30:32.260 --> 30:32.960]  Yeah.
[30:33.240 --> 30:36.660]  Too many people want too much control.
[30:36.960 --> 30:38.380]  Bridge is the name of the card game.
[30:38.540 --> 30:38.820]  Okay.
[30:39.060 --> 30:42.460]  And can you say bridge or is that owned by somebody?
[30:42.460 --> 30:47.560]  You could say the term, you know, like you could say the term like three-no-Trump.
[30:47.720 --> 30:50.860]  I don't know what that means because I only play bridge once and I forget how to play it.
[30:51.780 --> 30:54.940]  I know there's a character called a dummy in bridge.
[30:55.100 --> 30:55.740]  I know that much.
[30:55.880 --> 30:57.580]  I think I played that character in that game.
[30:57.580 --> 31:00.580]  Yeah, that's why I don't play the game because I always wound up being that character.
[31:02.020 --> 31:03.080]  Okay, moving on.
[31:03.420 --> 31:05.840]  If our listeners know how to play bridge, you can tell us.
[31:06.020 --> 31:06.160]  I'm sure.
[31:06.420 --> 31:07.600]  OTH at 2600.com.
[31:07.620 --> 31:09.300]  We'll get a ton of mail now about bridge.
[31:09.300 --> 31:10.440]  This is always what we wanted.
[31:10.440 --> 31:14.660]  More about lawsuits though and copyright and all kinds of fun things like that.
[31:14.760 --> 31:24.000]  Now, before Facebook investors can pursue their court fight, they're fighting over the social network's problematic stock market debut.
[31:24.000 --> 31:24.580]  Remember that?
[31:25.080 --> 31:31.080]  A panel of federal judges now have to decide whether to put the cases under one roof and if so, where.
[31:31.360 --> 31:43.240]  The judicial panel on multi-district litigation is due to hear arguments in Manhattan federal court tomorrow actually over how several dozen investor and shareholder lawsuits can proceed.
[31:43.580 --> 31:55.200]  The cases are widely expected to go to a judge here in New York, although some investors whose cases are in California want the litigation to remain in San Francisco near Facebook's home turf so that they can have easy access.
[31:55.820 --> 32:00.980]  A few cases were also filed in federal courts in Florida, District of Columbia, and California State Court.
[32:01.320 --> 32:18.620]  Now, investors sued Facebook after its May 18th initial public offering, which was marred, ironically enough, by technical glitches at the Nasdaq exchange and accusations that the company selectively disclosed unflattering information about its business prospects to privileged investors.
[32:19.340 --> 32:28.640]  The lawsuits, which are seeking unspecified damages, could cost Facebook millions of dollars to defend as it strives to put the disastrous IPO behind it.
[32:29.080 --> 32:34.480]  Facebook stock tumbled as much as 50% after its debut at $38 per share.
[32:34.720 --> 32:38.300]  It was trading at $22.63 earlier.
[32:39.500 --> 32:48.920]  And in at least 33 lawsuits seeking class action status, investors have asked courts to hold the company and its underwriters responsible for causing their losses.
[32:49.240 --> 32:56.000]  Facebook has said it did not violate any rules and that Nasdaq was to blame for trading glitches on the day of the offering.
[32:56.360 --> 32:58.980]  Representatives for Facebook declined to comment.
[32:59.100 --> 33:06.240]  An attorney for Nasdaq, which is also facing a number of lawsuits, didn't respond to a request for the comment, for any comment.
[33:08.080 --> 33:13.920]  Grouping cases together keeps similar lawsuits from proceeding in the same time in different courts.
[33:14.220 --> 33:23.480]  And I think the quote of the day goes to Stanford University law professor Joseph Grunfest who says it's a burden and waste on the judicial system.
[33:23.860 --> 33:26.940]  Why have 50 judges decide the same thing 50 times?
[33:27.600 --> 33:28.860]  I guess that makes sense, right?
[33:29.620 --> 33:30.280]  I guess.
[33:30.440 --> 33:33.580]  So I hate this case because it makes me defend Facebook.
[33:34.020 --> 33:37.860]  But it's really hard to see how the investors were duped here.
[33:38.000 --> 33:39.220]  Like, everyone knew.
[33:39.400 --> 33:41.060]  Like, Facebook doesn't have any income.
[33:41.140 --> 33:42.400]  Of course, they're not making any money.
[33:42.580 --> 33:48.940]  Of course, their IPO didn't go up and these people bought it anyway and I don't really feel that sorry for them.
[33:49.740 --> 33:52.460]  Yeah, I just don't understand anything having to do with stocks.
[33:52.680 --> 33:58.220]  So, you know, if you lose money after investing in something, yeah, that does happen.
[33:58.220 --> 33:58.660]  I know.
[33:58.780 --> 34:01.460]  I know that's very naive and uninformed.
[34:01.920 --> 34:03.140]  But I don't have much sympathy.
[34:04.180 --> 34:04.760]  Me either.
[34:04.900 --> 34:05.200]  All right.
[34:05.440 --> 34:05.920]  Well, good.
[34:05.940 --> 34:07.900]  I'm glad we're united on that.
[34:09.140 --> 34:10.080]  Now, this is interesting.
[34:10.200 --> 34:12.480]  This is a story I don't really know if I understand.
[34:12.480 --> 34:14.220]  And maybe you guys can help me with this.
[34:14.320 --> 34:20.940]  This has to do with a phonetic attack on bank phone lines.
[34:21.020 --> 34:23.540]  I'm not sure if this is even accurate the way it's being described.
[34:23.540 --> 34:34.940]  A security researcher has demonstrated a series of attacks capable of disabling touchtone and voice-activated phone systems or forcing them to disclose sensitive information.
[34:35.260 --> 34:40.800]  In one test, a phone system run by an unnamed Indian bank had dumped customer pins.
[34:41.460 --> 34:50.280]  Now, attacks include blind SQL injection and buffer overflows, which could be served to almost any interactive voice response phone system.
[34:50.280 --> 34:55.340]  That's according to Rahul Sassi, a security researcher with iSight Partners.
[34:55.660 --> 35:03.500]  He said the attacks could take down critical phone systems, cutting off banking services or the ability of call centers to field customer inquiries.
[35:03.640 --> 35:08.360]  If someone can crash a banking app from anywhere in the world, that's critical, he said.
[35:08.700 --> 35:18.320]  No banks or organizations are testing IVRs, that's the interactive voice response system, because they think the systems are secure, but in reality, they are not.
[35:18.320 --> 35:25.580]  No firewall or captures, those are the things that you have to type to prove you're a human, that does not monitor voice traffic.
[35:25.820 --> 35:35.280]  Now, the attacks were limited to the characters available on touchtone keypads, which could include numbers and letters, but not special characters such as backslashes.
[35:36.200 --> 35:39.540]  In demonstrations at the recent Hack in the Box conference...
[35:40.260 --> 35:40.860]  Sorry, go ahead.
[35:40.980 --> 35:43.060]  How do you type a letter on a touchtone?
[35:43.160 --> 35:48.080]  It doesn't have the little letters on top that you can say enter someone's last name in a voice response system.
[35:48.080 --> 35:50.960]  I mean, it's the same tone as a 2 or a 3.
[35:51.160 --> 35:54.140]  I've never had to enter a name on a voice response system.
[35:54.160 --> 35:54.780]  You're kidding, really?
[35:55.040 --> 35:56.820]  By touching it on the keypad?
[35:56.940 --> 35:57.140]  Yeah.
[35:57.800 --> 35:58.560]  Incredibly painful.
[35:58.740 --> 36:02.500]  You've never gone into a corporate phone system of any sort.
[36:02.720 --> 36:07.040]  Oh, I've looked up a name, but it still only goes 1 through 9 or 2 through 9 usually.
[36:07.260 --> 36:07.880]  Yeah, but every letter...
[36:07.880 --> 36:08.340]  Look at your phone.
[36:08.400 --> 36:10.200]  Every letter is represented.
[36:10.480 --> 36:10.680]  Well, except for Q.
[36:10.960 --> 36:11.940]  No, Q's on there too.
[36:12.040 --> 36:14.420]  Q should be over the 0, right?
[36:14.560 --> 36:15.860]  Bernie, you're on a cell phone now, right?
[36:16.040 --> 36:16.820]  Can you look at your phone?
[36:17.160 --> 36:18.060]  I'm looking at myself.
[36:18.260 --> 36:19.400]  I'm not on that cell phone.
[36:19.400 --> 36:21.220]  I'm on a cordless phone to connect to a landline.
[36:21.340 --> 36:22.700]  But yes, the Q is on there.
[36:22.760 --> 36:28.540]  But on the older touchtone keypads, there was no Q or O, I think.
[36:28.760 --> 36:39.700]  But the bottom line is to clarify this article, the story, these interactive voice response systems where like you say something and the computer recognizes what you say, they use text to...
[36:39.700 --> 36:41.860]  They use speech to text algorithms.
[36:42.100 --> 36:43.880]  They convert what you say into text.
[36:43.880 --> 36:49.400]  And there were any attack you could do with a keyboard or at least some attacks you could do with a keyboard.
[36:49.940 --> 36:53.380]  Now security researchers are finding that you could use the human voice.
[36:53.520 --> 37:00.620]  You could actually say things and do like an SQL injection attack just using your voice.
[37:00.840 --> 37:01.760]  How would you do that?
[37:01.760 --> 37:02.740]  That's what I'm trying to understand.
[37:02.920 --> 37:10.160]  What kinds of commands would you say to, you know, like AT&T's voice processing system when you call up customer service?
[37:10.280 --> 37:12.020]  What could you say to crash that system?
[37:12.140 --> 37:12.800]  I'd like to know.
[37:12.800 --> 37:13.600]  I was actually looking...
[37:13.600 --> 37:16.480]  I was actually seeing if I could find a recording because this was demonstrated at a conference.
[37:16.600 --> 37:21.100]  I've tried to find a recording of that talk because I wanted to hear what this was myself.
[37:21.340 --> 37:22.660]  It'll probably come out at some point.
[37:22.680 --> 37:24.440]  If we can find it, it'd be kind of fun to play on the air.
[37:24.720 --> 37:27.540]  But it's really an interesting development.
[37:27.540 --> 37:29.920]  I've always thought that there probably is a way to do this.
[37:29.920 --> 37:31.620]  I just never really tried hard myself.
[37:32.320 --> 37:35.540]  I've played around with those systems, but I never really went far with it.
[37:35.600 --> 37:39.060]  But these people really went whole hog and they found some problems.
[37:39.060 --> 37:50.740]  Okay, so your understanding is that I could call, say, an 800 number of some corporation and where it says press or say one or whatever, I could say something else and wind up causing the entire system to crash?
[37:50.920 --> 37:54.140]  Well, maybe not make it crash, but make it do something it wasn't intended to do.
[37:54.260 --> 37:57.780]  And ultimately, if you said the right thing at the right time, you know, it's like that song.
[37:57.880 --> 38:00.600]  If you said the right thing at the right time, I could make it crash.
[38:00.880 --> 38:01.380]  Isn't that how it goes?
[38:01.520 --> 38:02.560]  I don't know that song.
[38:09.280 --> 38:17.320]  So, yes, you can say certain things to certain IVR systems to make them do what they weren't intended to do, even crash.
[38:17.760 --> 38:23.280]  Well, I'm very interested in this because I'm all about making systems do things that they're not intended to do.
[38:23.800 --> 38:28.500]  I just didn't know that there was that much... It sounds like something very easy to turn off, though.
[38:29.100 --> 38:30.920]  Is there a reason they can't do that?
[38:31.280 --> 38:40.160]  Well, they just need to use better filtering and, like, just use better filtering to not allow it to recognize that you said certain things.
[38:40.680 --> 38:42.240]  But how do you put a semicolon?
[38:42.340 --> 38:44.560]  You usually need a semicolon for these sorts of things.
[38:44.620 --> 38:46.160]  Maybe you can just say the word semicolon.
[38:46.640 --> 38:48.260]  Oh, I think we need to learn more about this.
[38:48.320 --> 38:51.560]  I had no idea you could just say things like that to a voice response system.
[38:51.700 --> 38:55.040]  I didn't think it was intelligent enough to be able to interpret anything you said.
[38:55.040 --> 38:58.200]  I thought it was limited to a certain amount of phrases.
[38:58.560 --> 39:02.800]  Well, apparently some of them aren't well protected, and this is what is being discovered now.
[39:03.300 --> 39:12.580]  Well, my first target will be the MTA voice response system because I've had many a run-in with that one that has left me stranded, and revenge is in order.
[39:14.080 --> 39:15.080]  Okay, let's see.
[39:15.200 --> 39:20.820]  We have... we're going to take phone calls in just a moment, but first I'd just like to focus on a bit of surveillance.
[39:21.440 --> 39:25.820]  We mentioned the hacker calendar, and, of course, the theme for 2013 is surveillance.
[39:26.180 --> 39:31.600]  And I think the theme for mankind throughout the world is going to be surveillance.
[39:32.320 --> 39:36.200]  In fact, that might be the permanent theme for the rest of all time.
[39:36.820 --> 39:38.820]  Um, let's see.
[39:38.900 --> 39:39.840]  Where do we start here?
[39:40.060 --> 39:42.120]  Uh, there's a Facebook camera.
[39:42.260 --> 39:43.720]  This is a story we got some time ago.
[39:44.000 --> 39:53.640]  Uh, shoppers could soon be automatically, uh, recognized when they walk into a shop using a controversial new camera called FaceDeals.
[39:53.900 --> 39:59.840]  What it does, it uses photos uploaded to Facebook to recognize people as they walk in.
[40:00.400 --> 40:01.260]  Oh, boy.
[40:01.660 --> 40:13.060]  Shoppers who agree to use the system, and eventually people who don't agree to use the system, uh, will be offered special deals, and then at some point not offered anything anymore because it'll just be the norm.
[40:13.740 --> 40:16.640]  Um, and apparently this has not been developed with Facebook.
[40:16.880 --> 40:23.940]  They supposedly have nothing to do with it, but, um, I'm sure it'll become integrated into, uh, their system pretty, pretty easily.
[40:24.780 --> 40:35.260]  Uh, a promotional video, uh, created to promote the concept, uh, shows drinkers entering a bar and then being offered cheap drinks as they are recognized.
[40:35.500 --> 40:36.520]  Oh, wow.
[40:37.160 --> 40:49.380]  Um, Facebook check-ins are a powerful mechanism for businesses to deliver discounts to loyal customers, yet few businesses and fewer customers have realized it's a Nashville-based advertising agency, Red Pepper.
[40:49.660 --> 40:53.720]  Uh, they are already trialing the scheme and firms close to their office.
[40:54.140 --> 40:57.920]  Um, basically, uh, yes, go ahead, um, Mike.
[40:58.260 --> 41:06.000]  So, I, I used to work at a, of a coffee shop fairly regularly, and they, they didn't need any technology to recognize me as a regular.
[41:06.240 --> 41:09.900]  It was just that I went in every day and they saw me every day and...
[41:09.900 --> 41:10.920]  Yeah, but those were humans.
[41:11.140 --> 41:12.280]  You had humans working there.
[41:12.560 --> 41:17.200]  This way, when the humans don't work there anymore, how are the machines going to recognize you?
[41:17.320 --> 41:17.760]  It's true.
[41:17.900 --> 41:23.260]  Sometimes when there was a new human working there, it would take them, you know, a week or two to recognize me, but that's not the end of the world.
[41:24.460 --> 41:25.880]  Well, uh, yeah, get used to that.
[41:26.000 --> 41:38.420]  I guess that's going to be the future, where, uh, you're recognized, not just in stores, but as you walk down the street, as you, uh, go to school, as you go to your, your, your job, it'll be kind of like, uh, you know, punching in, in, in various places.
[41:39.480 --> 41:40.160]  So, yeah.
[41:40.360 --> 41:41.000]  What do you think, Barney?
[41:41.580 --> 41:52.820]  Well, it's kind of like that bar named Friends where everybody knows your name, except now it'll be every TV camera knows your name and your face, and, and, uh, you won't be able to go anywhere with, uh, feeling anonymous.
[41:53.320 --> 41:54.200]  Right, right.
[41:54.520 --> 41:56.100]  Uh, and everybody knows your face now.
[41:56.360 --> 41:58.020]  Not necessarily your name, but certainly your face.
[41:58.260 --> 42:11.980]  Well, they know your, they recognize your face, and they know your name, and they know wherever you go, and when you go there, and how often, and how much you spend, and what you buy, and who you, and, and, and the faces and names of the people you associate with.
[42:12.340 --> 42:13.600]  And, shall I go on?
[42:13.820 --> 42:14.940]  No, no, please stop.
[42:15.600 --> 42:18.780]  Uh, yeah, I don't understand, um, all these loyalty cards.
[42:18.920 --> 42:21.060]  We talked about this before for various, uh, stores.
[42:21.740 --> 42:29.540]  Um, you know, I, I, I go to various, uh, supermarkets and department stores sometimes, and they ask me if I have a card, and I always say no, and I don't want one.
[42:29.720 --> 42:30.560]  Please leave me alone.
[42:31.160 --> 42:37.440]  Sometimes they, they, they punch in their own little code, because, I don't know, they, they like the way I look or something, and they give me the discount anyway.
[42:38.240 --> 42:49.520]  Uh, and you know, one time, I was actually, I was at Pathmark, and they typed in a phone number to give me the discount, and I went in, next time, I remembered the phone number, and I typed it in myself, and the whole system hung.
[42:50.080 --> 42:55.200]  So, I don't know if, if you type in a particular number, and they don't recognize your face, or something like that.
[42:55.340 --> 42:56.200]  Uh, I'm gonna try it again.
[42:56.360 --> 42:57.520]  I, I will try it several times.
[42:57.700 --> 43:01.300]  So, so what's crazy is that They don't even need these loyalty cards anymore.
[43:01.460 --> 43:03.440]  If you pay by credit card, they can just match on that.
[43:03.520 --> 43:03.880]  Well, true.
[43:04.060 --> 43:07.800]  But my other point was, lots of times, you don't even get a discount.
[43:08.180 --> 43:11.520]  They ask you if you have a loyalty card, and you tell them.
[43:12.160 --> 43:16.460]  And I was with a friend who's doing this, and they gave him his phone number.
[43:17.360 --> 43:18.800]  And I looked at the receipt.
[43:18.880 --> 43:19.600]  There was no discount.
[43:19.800 --> 43:21.040]  What's the point in that?
[43:21.560 --> 43:23.300]  And the point is to track what you buy.
[43:23.520 --> 43:24.620]  But why help them?
[43:24.700 --> 43:25.880]  Why give them information?
[43:25.880 --> 43:30.340]  Why even have a card if you're not going to benefit from it in the first place?
[43:30.520 --> 43:31.900]  You can give them a fake phone number.
[43:31.920 --> 43:33.640]  You can give them a phone number to the White House.
[43:33.900 --> 43:34.340]  Right.
[43:34.400 --> 43:43.060]  We could just take out a card ourselves and have everybody give us credit for buying all these things and create some mega person who buys everything, and who knows?
[43:43.320 --> 43:43.480]  They did that in Germany.
[43:43.680 --> 43:45.620]  The Big Brother Project, I think, did that.
[43:45.720 --> 43:52.540]  And they won valuable prizes because one person, supposedly, ended up buying millions of dollars in groceries at the supermarket chain.
[43:52.540 --> 43:58.340]  And all they did is they published the barcode and the loyalty card for all their members to use.
[43:58.380 --> 44:00.640]  And they won all the prizes.
[44:00.840 --> 44:02.340]  There was no restriction in the rules.
[44:02.500 --> 44:03.400]  It was a loophole.
[44:04.320 --> 44:04.720]  Wow.
[44:05.320 --> 44:05.500]  Okay.
[44:05.760 --> 44:09.680]  Staying with cameras for just a moment, and this comes down to your neck of the woods, Bernie.
[44:10.400 --> 44:16.060]  There are hundreds of television channels, or actually there are more than hundreds of television channels out there.
[44:16.060 --> 44:22.420]  But in one Bucks County community, there could soon be another television channel.
[44:22.600 --> 44:29.500]  This one, people will be able to watch a video feed of a police security camera from their couch.
[44:29.500 --> 44:29.960]  Yes.
[44:30.140 --> 44:34.080]  We finally arrived at this particular stage of human development.
[44:35.180 --> 44:52.540]  What they're trying to do, what Bristol Borough Council members are considering, is a proposal that would allow regular people, like you and me, to watch a vacant building at Pond and Wilson Streets, which is currently owned by the borough.
[44:52.720 --> 44:57.840]  Now, I don't know why they picked this particular place, but apparently they want to have it.
[44:57.840 --> 45:10.800]  I can't get BBC World on DirecTV, but they want to put an abandoned building and take up a channel, you know, put Al Jazeera English or something else of worth on there that people can benefit from.
[45:10.920 --> 45:19.240]  Anyway, if the proposal is passed, residents could keep an eye on the building via their local government access channel.
[45:19.240 --> 45:21.520]  I guess it beats watching local government in action.
[45:22.420 --> 45:30.600]  It's not really a high crime area in Bristol Borough, so I don't see the significance of letting the community look at the building, said one person.
[45:31.120 --> 45:36.800]  When you have an abandoned building, it's good to know what's going on over there, said another person, who apparently has way too much time on their hands.
[45:37.400 --> 45:42.200]  The idea is that the public could watch video surveillance and report a crime as it's happening.
[45:42.760 --> 45:58.000]  You know, I think, and I think where this is going, where this is going is one day we will have on our entertainment systems the ability simply to select any surveillance camera we want so that we can keep an eye on our neighbors or on streets or whatever,
[45:58.000 --> 46:04.860]  and we could just tie into all of that, and Big Brother won't be necessary because we'll just be a bunch of little brothers.
[46:05.400 --> 46:05.840]  Emmanuel?
[46:06.040 --> 46:06.180]  Yes?
[46:06.340 --> 46:11.200]  I actually proposed this in Philadelphia about six, seven years ago to the Philadelphia Police Department.
[46:11.200 --> 46:12.040]  Wait, this is your idea?
[46:12.200 --> 46:12.620]  Well, no, no.
[46:12.680 --> 46:22.000]  They were proposing to put all these cameras around my neighborhood, and they said, well, this is a deterrent, and I was sort of arguing with, like, well, this really isn't a deterrent.
[46:22.160 --> 46:25.060]  There's no case has been proven this is, these cameras are deterrent.
[46:25.160 --> 46:28.780]  They just, the crime just moves out of the camera range, or people don't even think there's a camera.
[46:28.880 --> 46:29.740]  They just do the crime anyway.
[46:29.920 --> 46:31.200]  It might be useful for crime solving.
[46:31.560 --> 46:32.860]  But, and I asked about oversight.
[46:32.860 --> 46:35.120]  Who's going to watch the people who are watching the cameras?
[46:35.200 --> 46:38.700]  How do we know people aren't going to be following, the police aren't, who are watching the cameras
[46:45.080 --> 46:45.920]  So I said,
[47:00.240 --> 47:01.760]  no, I guess it wouldn't be.
[47:01.960 --> 47:02.440]  I don't know.
[47:02.560 --> 47:04.160]  I thought it was a good idea, but they didn't go for it.
[47:04.260 --> 47:08.600]  So I thought, Bernie, that's a stupid idea when you had it, and it's a stupid idea when Buck...
[47:08.600 --> 47:09.400]  What county has it?
[47:09.440 --> 47:11.520]  No, I want to see what the police are looking at.
[47:12.640 --> 47:16.180]  You want to watch only the few that the police are watching at the moment?
[47:16.960 --> 47:19.320]  Yeah, the police that control the cameras that move around.
[47:19.880 --> 47:21.600]  How much time do you have on your hands, Bernie?
[47:21.600 --> 47:23.320]  I think the public can have a right to see what they're zooming in on and that kind of stuff.
[47:23.360 --> 47:24.900]  Well, I want to see what you're looking at, Bernie.
[47:25.020 --> 47:25.920]  So how do I do that?
[47:26.160 --> 47:28.720]  I'm going to see whatever the police are pointing the cameras at.
[47:28.780 --> 47:32.020]  Well, then you're going to be looking at a lot of pornography, because I think that's what they look at most of the time.
[47:32.120 --> 47:36.160]  There should be some public oversight of our public servants, so we can see what they're watching.
[47:36.160 --> 47:42.020]  And it would be an even bigger deterrent if more people knew what the police and everybody else, the police were watching.
[47:42.040 --> 47:42.620]  I don't know.
[47:42.940 --> 47:46.020]  I was sort of making fun of their argument that this is a deterrent.
[47:46.100 --> 47:47.520]  I knew they'd say no to the suggestion.
[47:47.760 --> 47:50.040]  But I thought it was worth making.
[47:50.560 --> 47:51.080]  All right.
[47:51.140 --> 47:53.040]  Well, we're always about causing trouble.
[47:53.040 --> 47:55.500]  And I think you might have succeeded in that particular case.
[47:55.660 --> 47:58.460]  Let's take some phone calls speaking about causing trouble.
[47:58.640 --> 48:02.200]  212-209-2900 is our phone number.
[48:02.200 --> 48:10.240]  I don't know if you guys saw the article in the New York Times on Monday, but this is why WBAI is such an amazing place and why radio is so magical.
[48:10.780 --> 48:19.240]  Anyone listening to this show must have heard at some point, in addition to all the calls from Rebel, calls from somebody who kept telling us to go to Cuba.
[48:19.240 --> 48:34.640]  Well, apparently, the guy that was telling almost everybody in the station to go to Cuba turned out to be a fan of the station who actually came up here on Saturday, met some folks from the Irish show that we have on Saturday.
[48:34.640 --> 48:39.820]  And that's something people really should listen to, along with so many other programs on this particular station.
[48:39.820 --> 48:43.580]  And they actually came into the studio here and another guy.
[48:43.740 --> 49:03.920]  They turned out to be a volunteer or actually, I guess, not volunteer firemen if they're in New York City, but firemen who responded on 9-11 and basically have served in many noble capacities and wound up just taking phone calls and being a part of the whole BAI process.
[49:04.520 --> 49:12.240]  And the article in the New York Times, which appeared on Monday, under the headline, Cuba Boys, Radio Callers Who Taunted WBAI Come Forward.
[49:12.880 --> 49:13.840]  Look that up.
[49:13.920 --> 49:21.160]  Look that up online and learn something about the magic of listener radio, listener-sponsored radio.
[49:21.640 --> 49:28.820]  And sometimes people can, as I say in the article, torture various radio stations with their phone calls.
[49:28.820 --> 49:34.700]  But in the end, it turns out that we're all sharing the experience and we're all a part of the story.
[49:34.700 --> 49:37.920]  And it's a very moving, very touching story as well.
[49:38.260 --> 49:45.220]  And I believe the archive on WBAI.org will still have that program online for Saturday afternoon.
[49:45.440 --> 49:48.520]  So, yeah, that's something about the magic of radio.
[49:48.960 --> 49:50.060]  And you can be part of it.
[49:50.160 --> 49:54.680]  Call us, 212-209-2900 and tell us what's on your mind.
[49:54.680 --> 49:58.920]  And here's an email from a listener who was asking about a premium.
[49:59.160 --> 50:01.480]  I played this WBAI using my Visa card.
[50:01.620 --> 50:08.340]  Minutes after you announced the 20 sets of Hope 9 DVDs will be available as premiums, here it is 10 weeks later and no premium.
[50:08.340 --> 50:15.740]  And basically the rest of the letter is kind of asterisks and percentage signs and a picture of Saturn there.
[50:16.820 --> 50:19.000]  Thank you, Donald, for that letter.
[50:19.000 --> 50:21.640]  And a few days later, Donald wrote us saying, thank you.
[50:22.660 --> 50:24.460]  I've received my premiums now.
[50:24.840 --> 50:28.540]  Folks, I must urge that we continue to be patient.
[50:28.660 --> 50:30.640]  Thank you very much for your patience so far.
[50:31.800 --> 50:33.780]  It took us a long time to print those.
[50:34.860 --> 50:41.080]  We basically had 20 sets of well over 100 DVDs each.
[50:41.220 --> 50:42.940]  And that took our robot a very long time.
[50:43.020 --> 50:45.060]  It took it over a month to print all of these.
[50:45.180 --> 50:47.100]  So it took time to get it to the radio station.
[50:47.100 --> 50:49.640]  We're still behind on a couple of premiums.
[50:49.780 --> 50:51.780]  We're doing much better than we were in the past.
[50:51.920 --> 51:04.740]  But a few pledged in the past for any of the Yes Men paraphernalia, the spy cameras and pens, the lockpicking material, or the WYSIWYG books, those are still on their way.
[51:04.800 --> 51:06.340]  So you haven't been forgotten.
[51:06.560 --> 51:07.940]  It just takes a little bit of time.
[51:08.160 --> 51:12.300]  And of course, we thank everybody for their support in keeping WBAI going.
[51:12.680 --> 51:15.420]  All right, let's hear from some of our listeners.
[51:15.420 --> 51:17.720]  There's 212-209-2900.
[51:17.900 --> 51:18.180]  Good evening.
[51:18.400 --> 51:19.280]  You are on Off the Hook.
[51:20.200 --> 51:20.920]  Hello, man.
[51:22.040 --> 51:23.260]  Art, by the way.
[51:23.480 --> 51:24.120]  Oh, thank you for that.
[51:24.180 --> 51:25.400]  Hey, I wanted to talk about...
[51:25.900 --> 51:29.820]  You guys touched on what happened in Libya to the U.S.
[51:30.120 --> 51:30.560]  ambassador.
[51:31.140 --> 51:36.220]  And the video, of course, that isn't going to be removed, apparently, by Google.
[51:36.220 --> 51:49.260]  But some years back, I remember I watched a video when I was a little kid of the whole Iran-Contra ordeal that took place way before my time, Oliver and Norris and all that.
[51:49.840 --> 51:51.720]  And here's an interesting thing.
[51:51.820 --> 51:54.600]  For some reason, I guess the U.S.
[51:54.720 --> 52:01.760]  government or whatever claimed copyright on the video, and they removed the audio from the video.
[52:01.760 --> 52:02.960]  But the video was still up.
[52:03.080 --> 52:05.860]  How could they claim copyright on a government hearing?
[52:06.000 --> 52:07.060]  That doesn't sound right.
[52:07.820 --> 52:08.980]  I don't know.
[52:09.120 --> 52:10.020]  I really don't know.
[52:10.120 --> 52:12.220]  I don't know what our government is doing.
[52:13.080 --> 52:17.400]  It scares me what the government does and what they get away with.
[52:17.660 --> 52:28.120]  My guess is that it's not the government that holds a copyright, but probably some television channel or something that may have not been telling the truth when they claimed copyright.
[52:28.260 --> 52:29.760]  It's not C-SPAN, that's for sure.
[52:29.760 --> 52:32.420]  It couldn't be them, but it could be another network.
[52:32.420 --> 52:35.640]  Maybe there was something that belonged to that network in there.
[52:35.780 --> 52:37.740]  But I have recordings of this.
[52:38.240 --> 52:43.100]  I'm going through all of my recordings of various television events.
[52:43.360 --> 52:47.060]  And one day, when I finally get through all of it, I'll post that and see what happens.
[52:47.260 --> 52:51.080]  So there's an interesting thing about C-SPAN, which is that the only portion...
[52:51.080 --> 52:52.400]  C-SPAN is not part of the government.
[52:52.540 --> 52:53.320]  It's a private company.
[52:53.860 --> 53:01.440]  The only portion of their work that they have any copyright on is the C-SPAN logo and the lower thirds that tell you who's speaking.
[53:01.760 --> 53:10.540]  So there are websites that record C-SPAN, block out the C-SPAN logo, and then the footage is returned to the public domain.
[53:10.560 --> 53:14.520]  They really take you to court if you use that particular part of the screen.
[53:14.740 --> 53:16.140]  Is it really that fiercely protected?
[53:16.160 --> 53:16.280]  They might.
[53:16.480 --> 53:23.600]  This only holds, by the way, for congressional hearings, sometimes C-SPAN actually sends a camera somewhere, and then they have the copyright like anyone else.
[53:23.600 --> 53:27.140]  But for Congress, you've got to block out the C-SPAN logo.
[53:27.420 --> 53:27.680]  Interesting.
[53:28.060 --> 53:30.400]  Interestingly, the C-SPAN does not control the cameras.
[53:30.960 --> 53:36.220]  The majority of the House controls the cameras.
[53:36.600 --> 53:40.300]  But that's so you don't see all the House members who are not there.
[53:40.520 --> 53:40.820]  Right.
[53:41.000 --> 53:41.440]  Exactly.
[53:42.220 --> 53:42.500]  Yeah.
[53:42.680 --> 53:44.520]  It's an empty chamber a lot of the times.
[53:44.580 --> 53:46.480]  And if you don't believe that, go down to D.C.
[53:46.520 --> 53:46.800]  yourself.
[53:46.800 --> 53:52.080]  You can easily get in and witness what goes on in the House and the Senate.
[53:52.080 --> 53:55.600]  And you'll see that very often, there aren't very many people there paying any attention.
[53:55.840 --> 53:57.920]  And the people who are there probably aren't paying attention either.
[53:58.120 --> 53:59.360]  Let's take another phone call.
[53:59.760 --> 54:00.480]  And good evening.
[54:00.480 --> 54:01.780]  You are on Off the Hook.
[54:02.320 --> 54:02.700]  Hi.
[54:03.080 --> 54:10.220]  I was wondering if you knew anything about the government competition for a new cryptographic hashing algorithm, the SHA-3.
[54:10.700 --> 54:12.000]  Do you know when they're going to announce the winner?
[54:12.120 --> 54:14.040]  It was supposed to be, I think, this month.
[54:14.580 --> 54:18.140]  They don't tell me anything in advance of announcing anything.
[54:18.560 --> 54:19.500]  Is anybody on that list?
[54:19.700 --> 54:20.800]  I know they have a list, sir.
[54:20.800 --> 54:22.920]  Why don't you tell us something about it?
[54:23.200 --> 54:26.140]  What could somebody get from this?
[54:26.660 --> 54:38.700]  The government's standardizing on a new cryptographic hashing algorithm because, I guess, advancements in technology have made the other ones susceptible, I guess, to massive computer power.
[54:39.020 --> 54:39.480]  Uh-huh.
[54:40.260 --> 54:40.820]  So...
[54:40.820 --> 54:43.020]  And the government is doing this?
[54:43.160 --> 54:44.180]  Are they the right people?
[54:44.440 --> 54:51.180]  Well, they're standardizing on the hashing algorithm for them to use or, you know, up-the-top-secret clearances for all the federal agencies to use.
[54:51.440 --> 54:51.740]  Okay.
[54:52.760 --> 54:59.080]  They did this some years ago with encryption algorithms, and they chose what became AES, formerly known as Reindahl.
[54:59.160 --> 55:00.040]  This is about 10 years ago.
[55:00.200 --> 55:07.280]  And I guess they're working on a hash algorithm, selecting a hash algorithm, but I don't know any more than that.
[55:07.300 --> 55:14.000]  Yeah, there's five finalists, and they said they'd be announcing the winner soon, so I guess we'll all wait with, beat it, encrypted breath.
[55:14.620 --> 55:14.820]  All right.
[55:14.880 --> 55:16.880]  Well, thanks for that information.
[55:17.040 --> 55:19.460]  Kind of interesting there, and we'll pay attention to that.
[55:19.560 --> 55:20.220]  Now, let's take one more call.
[55:20.280 --> 55:20.560]  Good evening.
[55:20.680 --> 55:21.560]  You aren't off the hook.
[55:22.020 --> 55:22.340]  Yes.
[55:22.780 --> 55:24.100]  Tom from the Bronx here.
[55:24.240 --> 55:25.380]  Hey, Tom, we haven't heard you in a while.
[55:25.620 --> 55:25.940]  Okay.
[55:26.540 --> 55:42.400]  I'd like to say that, obviously, we live in the times where the government can just can do anything or change laws at whim at will, and I guess we just have to be resigned to it.
[55:42.480 --> 55:42.960]  I don't know.
[55:43.220 --> 55:43.420]  Yeah.
[55:43.640 --> 55:46.380]  No, that's good words to end on, and we're out of time, unfortunately.
[55:47.120 --> 55:51.580]  But write to us, OTH at 2600.com, if you have anything that you'd like to share with us.
[55:52.060 --> 55:57.020]  This listener, Glenn, shared this particular information with us that we're going to close with.
[55:57.480 --> 56:08.240]  He mentioned a band, well, we mentioned a band called Tesla, and when we did the Tesla show a few weeks ago, I mentioned that band and said I couldn't find anything appropriate by them.
[56:08.360 --> 56:25.960]  However, he checked a little further and found a song called Edison's Medicine by the band Tesla, which mentions specifically Tesla's relationships with Steinmetz, Marconi, Edison, and Twain, his love of the number three, and basically pays tribute to him as a man out of time.
[56:25.960 --> 56:30.940]  So let's close with that particular piece from the band Tesla, and we'll see you next week.
[56:30.980 --> 56:31.320]  Good night.
[57:11.730 --> 57:38.790]  You're guilty of time in the first degree Second and third as well My jury find you'll be serving your time When you go straight to hell Cause he was sort of the lightning You're socially brightening But never out to sell The Nichols and Pits meant more than any sense.
[57:38.950 --> 57:41.750]  And not the sense of a thing.
[57:42.450 --> 57:46.010]  Look at the man at a time, man at a time.
[57:46.550 --> 57:49.570]  But you was crazy, you was one of a kind.
[57:50.070 --> 57:53.090]  Man at a time, man at a time.
[57:53.790 --> 57:56.270]  All the love of a song.
[57:57.090 --> 57:58.330]  You was right.
[58:04.280 --> 58:08.080]  All that he saw, all he could see.
[58:08.440 --> 58:10.840]  They just could not believe.
[58:12.100 --> 58:15.560]  Stymons and Twain were friends who remained.
[58:16.300 --> 58:18.320]  Alone with number three.
[58:18.820 --> 58:23.120]  He was a little magnetic, completely connecting.
[58:23.820 --> 58:25.960]  The Wizard of the West.
[58:26.420 --> 58:30.480]  But they swindled and whined, and he wasn't kind.
[58:30.480 --> 58:33.320]  And said this and this.
[58:33.740 --> 58:37.600]  He was a man at a time, man at a time.
[58:38.140 --> 58:41.160]  Thought you was crazy, you was one of a kind.
[58:41.580 --> 58:44.620]  Man at a time, man at a time.
[58:45.160 --> 58:47.340]  Said you was out of your mind.
[58:48.440 --> 58:51.700]  You took a shot, and then did you win.
[58:53.640 --> 58:54.780]  Innocent's medicine.
[58:55.840 --> 59:01.940]  You played your cards, but you could say it's medicine.
[59:02.770 --> 59:03.440]  Ooh!
[59:07.600 --> 59:08.280]  Ooh!
[59:12.240 --> 59:12.920]  Ooh!
[59:15.260 --> 59:15.300]  Ooh!
[59:15.920 --> 59:16.600]  Ooh!
[59:19.020 --> 59:19.200]  Ooh!
[59:19.200 --> 59:19.380]  Ooh!
[59:19.500 --> 59:19.500]  Ooh!
[59:19.500 --> 59:19.500]  Ooh!
[59:56.050 --> 59:56.570]  Ooh!
[59:56.570 --> 59:56.790]  Ooh!
[59:56.790 --> 01:00:00.390]  You spent 12 years of hard time.
[01:00:00.930 --> 01:00:04.410]  More like the best years of her life.
[01:00:04.730 --> 01:00:11.590]  Never heard or read a single word about the man and his wicked mind.
[01:00:11.590 --> 01:00:14.570]  They'll tell you I'm not funny.
[01:00:16.150 --> 01:00:18.090]  Familiar not funny.
[01:00:18.590 --> 01:00:20.750]  I gotta stay down, Tesla.
[01:00:21.990 --> 01:00:27.650]  Man, they come up with some great music here at, you know, WBAI.
[01:00:28.110 --> 01:00:30.250]  Off the hook, 2600.com.
[01:00:30.390 --> 01:00:30.890]  But you know what?
[01:00:30.970 --> 01:00:34.770]  It's 8 o'clock here at WBAI New York 99.5 FM.
[01:00:34.830 --> 01:00:34.870]  .
[01:00:34.870 --> 01:00:34.890]  .
[01:00:34.890 --> 01:00:34.910]  .
[01:00:34.910 --> 01:00:34.930]  .
[01:00:34.930 --> 01:00:34.950]  .
[01:00:34.950 --> 01:00:34.970]  .
[01:00:35.310 --> 01:00:35.350]  .
[01:00:35.350 --> 01:00:35.370]  .
[01:00:35.370 --> 01:00:35.390]  .
[01:00:35.390 --> 01:00:35.410]  .