[00:00.000 --> 00:01.940]  Hello, I am Melissa.
[00:02.520 --> 00:05.880]  I am in New York, and I am listening to WBAI.
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[00:34.080 --> 00:36.220]  Let's celebrate each other.
[00:39.020 --> 00:46.080]  Hi, I'm Rosie Perez, and this is WBAI, listener-supported, non-commercial radio in New York.
[00:46.480 --> 00:48.640]  And it's exactly 7 o'clock.
[00:48.780 --> 00:50.740]  Time, once again, for Off the Hook.
[00:55.820 --> 01:00.340]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[01:01.300 --> 01:05.900]  I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a cough.
[01:06.500 --> 01:11.200]  We couldn't get much worse, but if they could, they would.
[01:11.480 --> 01:14.100]  Bum-dee-le-bom for the best, expect the worst.
[01:14.720 --> 01:16.620]  I hope that's understood.
[01:16.900 --> 01:17.700]  Bum-dee-le-bom!
[01:46.640 --> 01:48.240]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[01:48.320 --> 01:49.260]  The program is Off the Hook.
[01:49.360 --> 01:51.560]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[01:51.720 --> 01:53.380]  Joined tonight by Mike.
[01:53.660 --> 01:53.860]  Hello.
[01:54.140 --> 01:54.640]  Rob T.
[01:54.800 --> 01:55.200]  Firefly.
[01:55.420 --> 01:55.760]  Good evening.
[01:56.760 --> 01:57.400]  Bernie S.
[01:57.680 --> 01:58.080]  somewhere.
[01:59.760 --> 02:00.500]  Bernie S.
[02:00.520 --> 02:00.760]  Oh, wait.
[02:00.820 --> 02:01.060]  Hang on.
[02:01.120 --> 02:01.820]  I didn't press the right button.
[02:01.920 --> 02:03.680]  Say whatever you just said again, Bernie.
[02:03.920 --> 02:04.940]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:04.940 --> 02:05.460]  All right.
[02:05.680 --> 02:05.800]  Great.
[02:06.040 --> 02:13.360]  And this is actually the first day that it's really warm, and we discovered that there's no air conditioning in our new studios up here in Harlem.
[02:13.540 --> 02:19.320]  But we're going to try and cram as many people in here as possible to see just how hot it actually gets.
[02:19.480 --> 02:20.620]  We've got some special guests.
[02:20.700 --> 02:21.640]  Mitch Altman joins us.
[02:21.840 --> 02:22.120]  Hello.
[02:22.820 --> 02:24.160]  And Andrew Zon is here.
[02:24.980 --> 02:25.760]  Hi, everyone.
[02:26.200 --> 02:28.700]  And our friend Alex returns after years.
[02:29.120 --> 02:29.440]  Hello.
[02:30.360 --> 02:32.480]  Well, let's catch up, first of all.
[02:32.620 --> 02:38.520]  Alex, since people might be familiar with your voice, and if they're not, maybe I should go back about 10 years and listen to some of the other shows.
[02:38.680 --> 02:39.580]  What have you been up to?
[02:40.460 --> 02:41.160]  Quite a bit.
[02:41.460 --> 02:45.580]  I think the last time I was here, we were talking about Shepard Ferry.
[02:46.020 --> 02:47.060]  I don't even know what that is.
[02:47.260 --> 02:49.060]  He was the guy who made the Obama image.
[02:49.200 --> 02:50.260]  You've got to talk into the microphone.
[02:50.380 --> 02:51.020]  That has to change.
[02:51.180 --> 02:51.180]  Oh, very good.
[02:51.360 --> 02:51.500]  Yeah.
[02:51.820 --> 02:52.180]  Excellent.
[02:52.680 --> 02:55.340]  Well, I've been doing some interesting stuff.
[02:55.600 --> 02:57.740]  I took a year off practicing law.
[02:58.360 --> 03:04.440]  Went over to Oxford, finished another law degree, came back to New York, spent about five years in private practice.
[03:04.480 --> 03:05.480]  Well, you're a lawyer now.
[03:05.600 --> 03:06.380]  I am, indeed.
[03:06.620 --> 03:09.140]  Well, we could use you for a few things.
[03:10.080 --> 03:13.780]  You remember all the trouble we used to get into, and we still do on occasion.
[03:13.780 --> 03:14.120]  Absolutely.
[03:14.120 --> 03:14.360]  Okay.
[03:14.620 --> 03:15.800]  We'll talk after the show.
[03:16.020 --> 03:18.360]  But what kinds of things do you specialize in?
[03:18.520 --> 03:20.460]  Well, I've been doing a lot of internet governance law.
[03:20.700 --> 03:28.060]  I actually specialize in internet security and IT law now, but we're doing a fair amount of commercial bits, privacy, data security.
[03:28.340 --> 03:32.120]  The usual stuff, a former hacker with 2600 would probably do.
[03:32.200 --> 03:33.760]  That disturbs me when you say former hacker.
[03:33.880 --> 03:34.460]  I agree.
[03:34.460 --> 03:35.500]  I regretted that.
[03:35.560 --> 03:36.880]  I regretted it as I said it.
[03:37.000 --> 03:37.440]  I regretted it.
[03:37.440 --> 03:38.880]  I knew you were about to harp on it.
[03:39.260 --> 03:41.840]  So, yeah, retraction is a do.
[03:42.000 --> 03:44.000]  Well, that's what lawyers are good, as retracting statements.
[03:44.700 --> 03:51.820]  But, all right, we'll definitely be asking your opinions on a lot of issues we talk about tonight and probably in the future as well.
[03:52.260 --> 03:54.000]  Mitch, it's been a while since we've seen you.
[03:54.180 --> 03:57.060]  Are you on one of your epic travel journeys again?
[03:57.380 --> 03:58.280]  I am.
[03:58.480 --> 04:04.520]  I'm in New York for a week after recharging 2000 TV Be Gone Pro batteries in New Jersey.
[04:05.020 --> 04:07.320]  How do you recharge 2000 batteries?
[04:08.480 --> 04:11.080]  Hopefully with the help of a few friends, which I had.
[04:11.320 --> 04:18.960]  And I have to make sure they don't go too low so that they stay nice for end users to be able to recharge them.
[04:19.100 --> 04:25.620]  And they're all ready for people to use and turn off TVs every way they go from 100 meters away.
[04:26.120 --> 04:29.920]  So, yeah, so I did that.
[04:30.040 --> 04:42.240]  And in a week, I'm going to go to the UK and do a bunch of workshops and talks, including the UK Maker Faire, which, by the way, does not take military money, and at hackerspaces around the UK.
[04:42.540 --> 04:44.320]  So, let me see if I understand this.
[04:44.520 --> 04:50.040]  You don't participate in the Maker Faire in the United States because they take military money, but the Maker Faire in the UK does not.
[04:50.260 --> 04:51.840]  Yeah, they're separate organizations.
[04:52.220 --> 04:52.600]  Interesting.
[04:52.700 --> 04:56.440]  Is that true of Maker Faires everywhere, like Japan and various other countries?
[04:56.680 --> 05:04.000]  Yeah, there's... well, there's... I'm not actually sure, but there's at least three different O'Reilly's that are loosely affiliated.
[05:04.180 --> 05:06.740]  There's one in the US, O'Reilly Media, there's...
[05:06.740 --> 05:07.740]  O'Reilly owns Make.
[05:07.740 --> 05:09.820]  Yeah, they own Make Magazine.
[05:10.000 --> 05:11.860]  They also publish a lot of really cool geek books.
[05:12.460 --> 05:15.800]  And until recently... well, actually, O'Reilly doesn't own Make anymore.
[05:15.800 --> 05:16.720]  They split off.
[05:16.880 --> 05:22.360]  It's Maker Media that owns Make and Maker Faire now, as of a few months ago.
[05:22.580 --> 05:24.820]  Well, when you split off, this always confuses me.
[05:25.000 --> 05:27.620]  A company owns another company, and they split off.
[05:27.900 --> 05:29.160]  Don't they still own that company?
[05:29.340 --> 05:30.540]  They just aren't saying it?
[05:30.840 --> 05:36.280]  Like, if Time and Warner split off again, wouldn't they still somehow be affiliated with each other?
[05:36.840 --> 05:40.820]  Well, I am not a lawyer, so I don't know.
[05:41.080 --> 05:44.000]  I think it depends on the agreement that they have.
[05:44.000 --> 05:45.340]  They can be totally split.
[05:45.620 --> 05:46.400]  I don't know.
[05:46.680 --> 05:53.060]  The Maker Media people and O'Reilly people haven't told me under the scenes what's going on, so I don't know.
[05:53.460 --> 05:53.720]  All right.
[05:53.800 --> 05:55.620]  Well, interesting things to talk about.
[05:55.720 --> 05:57.560]  Well, hopefully, we'll have time to get into that a little bit more.
[05:58.060 --> 06:00.200]  Andrew Zahn joins us as well.
[06:00.200 --> 06:01.240]  Andrew Zahn.
[06:01.240 --> 06:01.260]  Hello.
[06:01.460 --> 06:06.900]  You gave some presentations at the last HOPE conference, not the last HOPE conference, HOPE No.
[06:06.980 --> 06:08.780]  9, last year.
[06:09.300 --> 06:18.760]  And one of the things that you just brought in today is the long-awaited book that some of our listeners pledged for in a recent Fun Drive.
[06:19.420 --> 06:22.960]  It's an art-based book having to do with hackers.
[06:23.240 --> 06:27.880]  It's called Hack, a Technology-Based Design and Art Exhibition.
[06:27.980 --> 06:29.260]  It looks really, really cool.
[06:29.540 --> 06:31.800]  How would you describe this on the radio?
[06:32.220 --> 06:36.300]  I see lots of photography here, and it's very well laid out.
[06:36.660 --> 06:46.940]  Well, it's kind of an exhibition catalog for this exhibition that I organized last year for Philly Tech Week.
[06:47.140 --> 06:50.060]  And we're doing it again this year, and it's called Hack Philly.
[06:50.400 --> 07:05.160]  I'm kind of trying to pull away the word Philly from it because we opened it up to people outside of Philly, where last year it was really specific to Philadelphia, hackers and artists and technology-based artists and stuff like that.
[07:05.400 --> 07:24.620]  And so this book is basically kind of like trying to legitimize hacker artists and kind of pull them into the mainstream art world somehow, or at least that was my kind of, you know, some kind of reason for doing this.
[07:25.200 --> 07:27.020]  And I don't know if that's a good or bad thing.
[07:27.180 --> 07:30.160]  But, so, you know.
[07:30.640 --> 07:32.120]  We'll leave history to judge that, I suppose.
[07:32.560 --> 07:33.460]  Bernie, you're in Philadelphia.
[07:33.900 --> 07:35.340]  Are you familiar with this event?
[07:36.020 --> 07:37.460]  I am very familiar with it.
[07:37.580 --> 07:41.380]  And it was connected with the Hacktory, which I've been involved with here in Philly.
[07:42.080 --> 07:47.620]  And several of the artists involved with the Hack exhibition I'm familiar with.
[07:48.000 --> 07:51.740]  And it was a really good... I wasn't at the event.
[07:51.840 --> 07:52.780]  I was tied up out of town.
[07:52.960 --> 07:54.460]  But I heard it was a good event.
[07:54.640 --> 08:04.840]  And it's just a coincidence here that Mitch and I went to the Philadelphia Free Library, where they were having a big meeting on how to put hackerspace in the Free Library there.
[08:05.100 --> 08:06.540]  And that's where we met Andrew.
[08:06.760 --> 08:08.040]  And the rest is history.
[08:09.300 --> 08:09.780]  Exactly.
[08:10.100 --> 08:10.340]  Indeed.
[08:10.660 --> 08:10.840]  Okay.
[08:11.040 --> 08:16.040]  Well, Andrew, hopefully we'll see you next year when we do another Hope Conference, as yet unnamed.
[08:16.900 --> 08:21.640]  But tell us, do you plan on doing more hacker art type things?
[08:22.120 --> 08:22.580]  Yes.
[08:23.220 --> 08:30.980]  Actually, so in a couple weeks on April 27th in Philly, if you go to hackphilly.com, you can find out about it.
[08:31.220 --> 08:36.980]  It's the second... It's Hack 2.0, which I was trying to be as creative as possible.
[08:37.100 --> 08:37.960]  I'm thinking of that name.
[08:38.580 --> 08:47.960]  And so this year, it's... There's actually the kind of big deal hacker artists that are in the show this year are actually from New York.
[08:48.120 --> 08:49.280]  They're called Lovid.
[08:49.920 --> 08:54.640]  And it's a husband and wife kind of video art duo.
[08:55.560 --> 08:56.800]  And they're in the show.
[08:56.800 --> 08:58.740]  And there's a bunch of other people.
[08:58.960 --> 09:00.160]  And it should be really good.
[09:00.580 --> 09:00.940]  So...
[09:00.940 --> 09:01.240]  All right.
[09:01.340 --> 09:02.980]  Well, I'm glad so many people are here.
[09:03.100 --> 09:04.180]  It's like old times.
[09:04.200 --> 09:07.700]  And we can prove that we actually can fit a lot of people into the studio.
[09:08.660 --> 09:11.060]  So hopefully, we'll have many more such discussions.
[09:11.260 --> 09:12.920]  And hopefully, we'll have more to talk about today.
[09:13.100 --> 09:22.140]  But right now, it's important that we look at what's been going on, which certainly has a technological bent to it.
[09:22.140 --> 09:27.140]  And of course, I'm talking about the events that happened in Boston a couple of days ago.
[09:28.060 --> 09:30.280]  Very tragic, unfortunate events.
[09:30.580 --> 09:37.020]  And technology is certainly going to be used in interesting ways.
[09:37.040 --> 09:39.040]  And we have to kind of analyze that.
[09:39.040 --> 09:43.680]  First, I wanted to know if anyone saw this headline in today's Telegraph from the UK.
[09:44.000 --> 09:46.700]  Apparently, Barack Obama is sending letters with ricin.
[09:46.960 --> 09:50.180]  It says, Barack Obama sent letter containing ricin.
[09:51.160 --> 09:55.460]  Yeah, isn't that weird that he's the one doing it, apparently, according to this newspaper.
[09:55.780 --> 09:56.600]  I think you know a guy.
[09:56.800 --> 09:57.020]  Yeah.
[09:57.340 --> 09:59.500]  No, actually, it's just, I guess, a different way of phrasing it.
[09:59.580 --> 10:02.140]  He was sent a letter containing ricin, supposedly.
[10:02.340 --> 10:06.980]  But again, you know, with the media, what they say one day will be refuted the next day.
[10:07.120 --> 10:18.080]  We've seen so many facts that turned out not to be facts as far as this whole bombing thing, how many packages there were, what was happening, what wasn't happening today.
[10:18.580 --> 10:21.920]  We heard in the mass media that they had found the person who did it.
[10:22.040 --> 10:25.280]  Then they had to correct that and say, no, actually, they didn't find anybody.
[10:26.160 --> 10:30.220]  You have to wonder how the media gets their information in the first place.
[10:30.240 --> 10:33.160]  Are they just going on Twitter or something or social media?
[10:33.340 --> 10:34.800]  And that's what they're doing.
[10:35.200 --> 10:43.400]  You see, there was an interesting article from the mass media talking about how social media basically was sending out all these fake stories.
[10:43.640 --> 10:51.600]  But what they really didn't focus on was that the mass media was believing it and spreading it around and really doing most of the work as far as this goes.
[10:52.600 --> 10:55.480]  Stories like this, you have to do some fact checking.
[10:55.680 --> 10:56.420]  There's no shortcuts.
[10:56.420 --> 11:00.500]  And I think that's what we learn every time there's a crisis like this.
[11:00.620 --> 11:09.000]  So when you hear something, you can never believe it until it's been investigated thoroughly, backed up, and confirmed.
[11:09.740 --> 11:11.700]  Bernie, anything that stands out for you?
[11:12.520 --> 11:15.260]  I thought it was pretty... well, the events were tragic.
[11:15.440 --> 11:33.500]  I was following what was going on and I was intrigued to hear the Associated Press is reporting that the cell phone networks around the Boston area were shut down purposely to prevent additional bombs from being detonated using cell phones.
[11:33.720 --> 11:35.220]  And again, that was not true.
[11:35.360 --> 11:36.420]  That actually did not happen.
[11:37.100 --> 11:37.460]  Exactly.
[11:37.760 --> 11:37.840]  Yeah.
[11:38.560 --> 11:49.520]  And later that day, and they even quoted an unnamed law enforcement official who said he was in a federal law enforcement briefing about what was going on.
[11:49.680 --> 11:51.120]  And it turned out not to be true at all.
[11:51.240 --> 11:53.740]  The carriers retract said, no, that didn't happen at all.
[11:53.840 --> 11:59.580]  People weren't able to get their calls through because so many people are trying to make calls, which just happens all too often because they don't have enough capacity.
[12:00.300 --> 12:02.480]  And so that wasn't true.
[12:02.820 --> 12:09.180]  And well, let's just address that for a second as far as because this is always reported when there are situations like this.
[12:09.360 --> 12:13.720]  What is the connection between cell phones and exploding bombs?
[12:14.020 --> 12:14.840]  Is there a connection?
[12:15.620 --> 12:18.040]  It's only really theoretical as far as I know.
[12:18.180 --> 12:28.760]  I mean, there were cell phones reportedly used at some of the subway bombings, maybe in Barcelona or maybe the ones in London, I forget which, where the cell phone timers were used.
[12:29.020 --> 12:35.040]  You know, you could set an alarm, like go off like an hour or something, and that was set to turn on a relay that would set off the explosive.
[12:35.460 --> 12:51.640]  But somehow this has been sort of misinterpreted or twisted into thinking that cell phones were being used to remotely detonate bombs, which really wouldn't be very reliable because based on my experience with cell phones, especially in subways where they don't work at all most of the time.
[12:52.160 --> 13:04.500]  So it's just, it's kind of a bogus, it's much more likely, you could easily use a wristwatch or an egg timer or an alarm clock.
[13:05.240 --> 13:08.360]  You're saying it's just the timing mechanism that's on a cell phone.
[13:08.540 --> 13:11.100]  You don't even have to be connected to a network for that to actually work.
[13:11.840 --> 13:16.620]  I've tried to follow this use of cell phone story for a long time since, since 9-11.
[13:16.880 --> 13:27.320]  And, and all the, all the times where cell phones were reported having been used, it was the timer feature that was being used in them, not like calling it to set it, set it off from another place.
[13:27.580 --> 13:33.380]  So you'd have to have a cell phone attached to the explosive that the timer would count down and...
[13:33.380 --> 13:43.680]  I'd have a couple of wires attached, I don't want to go into too much detail, but you'd have a couple of wires attached to the speaker that would set off a relay when the alarm went off, or to the, to the vibrator motor or something like that.
[13:43.840 --> 13:46.280]  I mean, this isn't something that anybody can't look up on the internet already.
[13:46.720 --> 13:50.480]  Um, but it's, it's just sort of a, it's a, it's an overreactionary thing.
[13:50.500 --> 13:53.980]  If anything, people need to be able to communicate in these kinds of situations.
[13:54.700 --> 13:55.060]  Right.
[13:55.060 --> 14:06.140]  Well, the reason, the reason I'm interested in this and the reason that we're focusing attention on it is because when, when there's a situation like this, when there's an emergency of any sort, when your public safety is, is, uh, at risk, people are more liable to say,
[14:06.320 --> 14:10.160]  yes, by all means, turn, turn off the cell phone networks because that'll keep us safe.
[14:10.320 --> 14:12.900]  And in actuality, uh, we're being fed misinformation.
[14:12.900 --> 14:23.560]  It seems yet again, that there doesn't seem to be an actual instance of the cell phone network being used somehow, uh, to, uh, trigger an explosive unless there's, there's something that we're missing here.
[14:24.000 --> 14:31.920]  I have never read or heard of a confirmed report of a cell phone being used, uh, to set off a bomb remotely in any terrorist type of attack.
[14:32.120 --> 14:32.380]  Okay.
[14:32.540 --> 14:40.260]  If, if any of our listeners know otherwise, if you've been involved in such things, let us know because, uh, we'd like to, uh, we'd like to have some, some facts on our side, Rob.
[14:40.480 --> 14:48.080]  And the reason something like that is believable though, I think is because a cell phone is something that everyone has and most people don't know much about it, like on a technical level.
[14:48.080 --> 14:53.780]  So if you say something like, okay, the cell phones are, the cell phones are the cause of this or the cell phones are letting this happen.
[14:54.120 --> 14:57.900]  People are more likely to look at that and go, well, okay, they must be, there must be something to this.
[14:57.980 --> 15:01.200]  I mean, you know, 50 years ago, it might've been transistor radios or something like that.
[15:01.220 --> 15:08.240]  And it's just, uh, something widespread that I think they can cause a little, uh, uh, cause a little consternation with.
[15:08.420 --> 15:15.880]  It could be all sorts of things that are, that are, um, defined as dangerous, such as dissent, uh, you know, saying, saying too much or thinking too much.
[15:15.880 --> 15:25.940]  And in situations like this, where everybody is scared and concerned, you're more liable to rein yourself in and think that, yeah, that's the right thing to do.
[15:26.020 --> 15:28.160]  In actuality, it's precisely the wrong thing to do.
[15:28.740 --> 15:29.900]  So, yeah.
[15:29.980 --> 15:33.820]  And the other thing, obviously, that we need to focus upon is surveillance.
[15:34.260 --> 15:39.940]  Because this could be checkmate for people that want more surveillance in our cities.
[15:39.940 --> 15:42.520]  I want every move to be scrutinized.
[15:42.520 --> 15:44.540]  Now, Bernie, I'm going to pose this question to you.
[15:45.120 --> 15:48.320]  We have a situation now where they're looking for the guy that did this.
[15:48.460 --> 15:51.120]  And they're relying on surveillance to find him.
[15:51.520 --> 15:57.500]  Now, how would you say that we're going to find somebody like this without putting up more cameras and more facial recognition?
[15:58.460 --> 16:05.060]  Well, I would argue that it doesn't make us any safer to have more surveillance because it doesn't prevent anybody from doing anything.
[16:05.700 --> 16:09.300]  Maybe it might be helpful after the fact to find somebody who did it.
[16:09.680 --> 16:11.300]  And then it's kind of a long shot.
[16:12.520 --> 16:25.560]  Well, the reports I'm hearing is most of the video and pictures that are being used and looked at are by people who were taking the pictures, like reporters and amateur journalists, just people taking pictures around there and videos because it was the Boston Marathon.
[16:25.760 --> 16:28.600]  There were probably thousands of people taking videos and pictures.
[16:28.700 --> 16:30.380]  And that's what the FBI is mostly coming through.
[16:30.640 --> 16:34.360]  Now, yeah, a lot of businesses have, like ATM machines, have cameras in them.
[16:34.360 --> 16:41.020]  And they have been used to try to find perpetrators of crimes, but people happen to be walking by a camera or something.
[16:41.300 --> 16:51.380]  But I don't buy that more surveillance and other technologies, like facial identification, that can be tied into closed-circuit TV cameras, I don't buy that it makes us safer.
[16:51.660 --> 16:54.780]  It might help investigating it after the fact.
[16:54.960 --> 17:01.980]  Well, don't you think that's enough for most people, that they really want to know who this guy is, and that with that technology, that makes it possible?
[17:02.560 --> 17:06.520]  I think it's a good question, but I really would not feel any safer.
[17:06.700 --> 17:12.660]  I would feel more paranoid if there were more cameras pointing everywhere, identifying who I am, where I go.
[17:13.280 --> 17:14.760]  It's just a real slippery slope.
[17:14.860 --> 17:18.540]  It raises some good questions that I'm glad we're talking about in here.
[17:18.600 --> 17:21.000]  But it doesn't make us safer in the end.
[17:21.000 --> 17:22.080]  I don't believe that at all.
[17:22.500 --> 17:26.740]  Well, I mean, yeah, you're not going to prevent somebody from doing this in a variety of places.
[17:27.020 --> 17:33.120]  But again, I'm wondering if that's going to be enough to argue against installing more surveillance cameras.
[17:33.320 --> 17:44.400]  If people are told that the only reason they finally catch this guy is because of the surveillance, it's going to be really, really difficult to say, yeah, we're better off without it.
[17:44.880 --> 17:45.280]  Mike?
[17:45.460 --> 17:46.960]  I mean, it's not just surveillance cameras.
[17:46.960 --> 17:47.520]  Microphone, Mike.
[17:47.520 --> 17:56.020]  Mike, in this case, the people who are not from or have been to Boston might not understand.
[17:56.160 --> 18:01.720]  Like, Boston really cares about people running in a straight line for 26 miles.
[18:01.940 --> 18:03.040]  It's a major event.
[18:03.140 --> 18:06.900]  There are a lot of cameras of all types at the finish line.
[18:07.300 --> 18:09.560]  And so I don't know.
[18:09.720 --> 18:18.480]  The footage they finally found may not be from surveillance cameras, maybe just from someone who happened to be filming at the time or from a television crew or whatever.
[18:18.720 --> 18:25.360]  So it's not even clear that this is a victory for surveillance if you want to allow such a thing to exist.
[18:27.140 --> 18:28.620]  Well, it would be interesting.
[18:28.960 --> 18:39.740]  But, you know, again, even if it's not something they find through surveillance cameras, even if it's something they find through people's iPhones, the argument would be made that, well, we could have done better if we had more surveillance cameras.
[18:39.740 --> 18:49.400]  You know, I just think we need to be prepared for this because this is something where surveillance is really going to be held up high as our savior.
[18:49.980 --> 18:51.440]  And I've seen this in London.
[18:51.660 --> 18:57.860]  I've seen this in London where you can't walk a foot without being on some kind of camera.
[18:58.060 --> 18:58.740]  Alex, you've seen that.
[18:58.920 --> 19:00.260]  You were over in the U.K.
[19:00.260 --> 19:00.780]  for a while.
[19:01.240 --> 19:03.680]  Yeah, in fact, it's actually a bit of a funny story.
[19:03.680 --> 19:19.540]  I was... when I was over at New College at Oxford a few years ago, I was tasked with an old school kind of thing, escorting around the former chief justice of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, this guy Theodore Mehron.
[19:19.740 --> 19:21.340]  He was a professor at NYU.
[19:21.820 --> 19:26.140]  And so I had to escort him to have tea at All Souls College.
[19:26.140 --> 19:31.900]  And we were walking through the famous... walking past the famous Radcliffe camera in Oxford.
[19:31.960 --> 19:37.580]  And I was talking to Professor Mehron and about how, you know, there are CCTV cameras all over Oxford now.
[19:37.880 --> 19:42.180]  And I said, as an indication, I said, look at those beautiful light posts up there.
[19:42.300 --> 19:44.380]  Those kind of old school looking light posts.
[19:44.540 --> 19:46.840]  It was really, you know, probably from the 19th century.
[19:46.920 --> 19:48.320]  He said, yeah, those are very nice.
[19:48.520 --> 19:49.900]  I said, those are actually cameras.
[19:50.620 --> 19:52.060]  And here was the chief justice...
[19:52.060 --> 19:52.820]  From the 19th century?
[19:52.820 --> 19:53.500]  No, no.
[19:54.400 --> 19:57.760]  They were made to look like lights from the 19th century.
[19:57.800 --> 20:02.400]  But they just had CCTV cameras installed basically to watch the Radcliffe camera.
[20:02.740 --> 20:04.280]  And he was appalled.
[20:04.480 --> 20:05.740]  I mean, absolutely appalled.
[20:05.860 --> 20:13.580]  But it was nice to see a real jurist, you know, in the ICT wall, I mean, completely appalled by this type of thing.
[20:13.580 --> 20:14.360]  Okay, but he's appalled.
[20:14.380 --> 20:15.660]  But the cameras aren't coming down.
[20:15.780 --> 20:17.020]  Once those are put up, they stay.
[20:17.720 --> 20:18.740]  I imagine they do.
[20:18.880 --> 20:20.400]  And I've seen situations.
[20:20.400 --> 20:27.120]  I think Philadelphia might have been one of them, Bernie, where citizens demand more cameras because they think that makes their neighborhood safe.
[20:27.340 --> 20:29.160]  Why hasn't our neighborhood gotten more cameras?
[20:29.340 --> 20:31.880]  Why only the well-to-do neighborhoods?
[20:32.380 --> 20:32.720]  And it's...
[20:32.720 --> 20:33.400]  I don't really...
[20:33.400 --> 20:35.020]  I was in some of the community meetings about that.
[20:35.100 --> 20:36.680]  The citizens were not demanding more cameras.
[20:36.820 --> 20:38.240]  The police were demanding more cameras.
[20:38.240 --> 20:39.120]  Well, it depends where you go.
[20:39.220 --> 20:42.860]  It depends what channels you watch because they do show people demanding more cameras.
[20:42.860 --> 20:48.400]  Yes, the police were demanding more cameras and more money for them with the promise that it would make people safer.
[20:48.560 --> 20:51.160]  And people were like, yes, we want cameras because the police state will make us safer.
[20:51.440 --> 20:53.920]  But they really weren't getting made safer.
[20:54.100 --> 20:57.140]  So, yes, people were clamoring on it based on misinformation.
[20:57.540 --> 20:59.340]  And that's what we have to be on guard for.
[21:00.000 --> 21:00.780]  All right.
[21:00.860 --> 21:04.360]  There's also a somewhat related story involving the FBI.
[21:04.360 --> 21:19.320]  A team of privacy advocates and experts is launching a lawsuit against the FBI for refusing to provide information to the public about its new next-generation identification system, which the federal agency says is in demand for its biometric database of Americans.
[21:19.920 --> 21:20.440]  Yeah.
[21:20.720 --> 21:23.180]  The lawsuit filed against the FBI in Washington, D.C.
[21:23.240 --> 21:33.680]  by our friends at the Electronic Privacy Information Center is asking for a court order that information about the program's contracts with private companies and its technical specifications be made available.
[21:34.040 --> 21:37.200]  It's not asking to stop it, just asking for information about it.
[21:37.600 --> 21:43.900]  Epic said that the NGI system, upon completion, will be the largest biometric database in the world.
[21:43.900 --> 21:53.740]  will include files of fingerprints, DNA profiles, iris scans, palm prints, voice identification profiles, photographs, and other identifying information already collected by states, counties, and even schools.
[21:53.960 --> 22:02.160]  The FBI will use facial recognition to match images in the database against facial images obtained from CCTV and elsewhere, according to Epic.
[22:02.720 --> 22:10.160]  The complaint explains that the FBI announced in 2009 the NGI system was being created to record, analyze, and use biometrics of U.S.
[22:10.480 --> 22:18.600]  citizens, whether they know that their details have been recorded or not, using an estimated 30 million spy cameras across the United States.
[22:18.640 --> 22:22.080]  It's boggling to the mind to hear these kinds of things.
[22:22.400 --> 22:24.740]  So, I mean, we're seeing here what we've seen so many times.
[22:24.900 --> 22:30.240]  It's almost not fair to call it a double standard, because it's really two completely separate and unrelated standards.
[22:30.440 --> 22:39.580]  One standard is what the powerful people want to be able to know about us, which is everything, and what they want us to know about them, which is quite literally nothing.
[22:39.580 --> 22:42.540]  They would probably prefer if we didn't even know the system exists.
[22:43.080 --> 22:54.820]  We talked about this before with the giant data center that the NSA is building in Utah, which they... I mean, it's such a big thing that it's fairly obvious that it exists.
[22:54.960 --> 23:09.980]  But anyone who tries to get any information about what they're going to do with it, not necessarily the content contained therein, maybe there's a reason to keep that secret, but just the basic capabilities of the system, who or what is the... at the highest level,
[23:10.320 --> 23:12.060]  the NSA going to be spying on.
[23:12.220 --> 23:14.240]  And they don't want us to know even that.
[23:14.340 --> 23:16.280]  They don't want Congress to know even that.
[23:16.640 --> 23:20.660]  And this is the pattern that we're seeing over and over again.
[23:20.800 --> 23:23.000]  And I really wish I knew how to stop it.
[23:24.060 --> 23:26.100]  That's something I think a lot of us wish.
[23:26.200 --> 23:26.440]  Alex?
[23:27.300 --> 23:36.400]  Another thing that I think is interesting, and building on what Mike had said, is that the whole purpose of this program appears to be to collect personally identifying information.
[23:36.560 --> 23:42.320]  And this is information that most forward-looking legal systems require the consent of the individual to obtain.
[23:42.520 --> 23:49.280]  And then most forward-looking legal systems also require that information to be carefully safeguarded and used for only proper purposes.
[23:49.280 --> 23:54.180]  It seems like the FBI has an exemption to this.
[23:54.300 --> 24:07.120]  I mean, why should we trust them any more than we would trust Google, or Yahoo, or Microsoft, or anybody, or your local grocer with personally identifying information of this sort?
[24:07.220 --> 24:08.300]  I mean, it seems very, very dangerous.
[24:08.300 --> 24:19.520]  So your use of the word forward-looking, forward-thinking legal systems seem to be deliberately chosen to exclude the United States?
[24:19.780 --> 24:21.720]  Yeah, to an extent, to an extent.
[24:21.900 --> 24:29.360]  I mean, the state-by-state privacy laws can be, you know, varying, and some of them are quite a bit different from others.
[24:29.560 --> 24:35.580]  But for the most part, you know, Europe has really led the charge when it comes to privacy-related legislation.
[24:36.300 --> 24:40.260]  I'm glad you brought up Google, because there's interesting development.
[24:40.640 --> 24:41.540]  Not really a development.
[24:41.740 --> 24:46.140]  This is something that isn't all that new, but it's becoming a little bit more evident and obvious.
[24:46.400 --> 24:48.080]  Maybe people will wake up a little bit.
[24:48.340 --> 24:56.500]  But this whole thing known as CISPA, the Cyber Intelligence Security Protection Act, there's a battle raging around that.
[24:56.600 --> 25:00.660]  But it turns out that, well, certain organizations support it.
[25:00.660 --> 25:04.340]  They support this invasion of our privacy.
[25:04.600 --> 25:08.860]  And among them, Microsoft, Yahoo, and our friends at Google.
[25:09.320 --> 25:10.080]  Absolutely.
[25:11.240 --> 25:32.100]  TechNet, the bipartisan policy and political network of technology CEOs that promotes the growth of the innovation economy, commend you for your work on cybersecurity and rights to express our support of CISPA, said Ray Ramsey, who is the president of a lobbying group that includes Google,
[25:32.280 --> 25:33.600]  Microsoft, and Yahoo.
[25:34.880 --> 25:42.320]  Now, CISPA is... Basically, you'll be hearing more about that in the news, but there's a lot of opposition to it.
[25:42.460 --> 25:46.520]  It doesn't seem to be as organized as the opposition against SOPA.
[25:47.340 --> 25:48.740]  Bernie, have you noticed the same thing?
[25:49.500 --> 25:49.940]  Yes.
[25:50.160 --> 25:51.860]  SOPA was very well organized against.
[25:52.120 --> 26:06.480]  And I'm a little concerned because we've lost some people, like Aaron Schwartz, who were very, very key in fighting against such negative legislation.
[26:07.280 --> 26:16.840]  So... And I'm also disturbed that Google seems to have been making a bad face in the CISPA legislation before they were... If they weren't against it, they weren't on board with it.
[26:17.080 --> 26:19.700]  And now they're on board with it and bringing others on board with them.
[26:19.780 --> 26:20.920]  So this is not a good trend.
[26:22.560 --> 26:36.400]  I've seen it mentioned in a number of times, a number of occasions, that Google was key in stopping SOPA because Google came out against it.
[26:36.920 --> 26:42.560]  And that since they're not coming out... In fact, let me read from this story here.
[26:42.660 --> 26:46.100]  The protest against CISPA isn't nearly as unified as the protest against SOPA.
[26:46.800 --> 26:56.120]  Some of the sites that played a key role in SOPA protests, like Reddit and Craigslist, have urged their visitors to oppose CISPA, but they're not joined by Google this time.
[26:56.240 --> 26:57.360]  And that could make the difference.
[26:57.820 --> 27:05.120]  Some SOPA lobbyists, like the Motion Picture Association of America, have indicated they feel Google alone was responsible for SOPA's defeat.
[27:06.080 --> 27:09.420]  It's really kind of crazy that Google is determining all.
[27:09.500 --> 27:12.940]  And it does seem like they are determining what will pass and what will not.
[27:13.100 --> 27:18.240]  But they have a ton of money and a lot of support from people and a lot of people blindly follow them.
[27:19.200 --> 27:19.760]  Mike?
[27:19.880 --> 27:21.720]  I think that really oversimplifies.
[27:22.040 --> 27:27.040]  I think in the world of the MPAA, there is only large entities.
[27:27.320 --> 27:35.420]  So there is the Motion Picture Studios, and they can sort of understand the existence of Google, which is a giant corporation which doesn't care about people.
[27:36.220 --> 27:42.600]  They want to believe, and they must believe that the opposition cannot be ordinary folks.
[27:43.580 --> 27:50.020]  And what's worrying, what compounds this difficulty is that, like, the rest of us have lives.
[27:50.260 --> 27:57.680]  Like, we fought SOPA and we're like, all right, we're going to take a year off and not worry about this for a little while.
[27:57.860 --> 28:04.000]  But the lobbyists for the people who want control, they have nothing else to do.
[28:04.100 --> 28:08.220]  If they took a year off, they wouldn't be able to do anything.
[28:08.500 --> 28:12.140]  So they are trying all the time to make new bad laws.
[28:12.220 --> 28:16.500]  And the rest of us can only try some of the time to prevent new bad laws.
[28:16.620 --> 28:18.780]  And that's where the problem is coming.
[28:18.780 --> 28:19.500]  I don't accept that.
[28:19.580 --> 28:20.080]  I'm sorry.
[28:20.160 --> 28:21.140]  We don't take time off.
[28:21.240 --> 28:24.340]  I think people who are awake are always paying attention.
[28:24.460 --> 28:26.200]  It's just a question of which one do you focus on?
[28:26.240 --> 28:28.200]  I think there's too many to focus on.
[28:28.320 --> 28:33.260]  But CISPA has been front and center as far as bad things to oppose.
[28:33.440 --> 28:37.580]  Now, just so people know what CISPA is all about, and anyone please jump in if you have further details.
[28:37.760 --> 28:48.820]  It's a proposed law here in the good old USA that allows for the sharing of all kinds of internet traffic information between the U.S.
[28:48.920 --> 28:52.420]  government, certain technology and manufacturing companies, according to Wikipedia.
[28:53.160 --> 28:55.200]  The stated aim of the bill is to help the U.S.
[28:55.300 --> 28:59.820]  government investigate cyber threats and ensure the security of networks against cyber attack.
[29:00.500 --> 29:07.740]  Problem is that by having this kind of monitoring, you're not monitoring just the bad guys.
[29:07.740 --> 29:09.100]  You're monitoring everybody.
[29:09.460 --> 29:15.600]  And that seems to be fine and good with companies like Facebook and Google that already collect all this information on everybody.
[29:16.400 --> 29:28.020]  And I think too many people just think that's too much to oppose, that so many people are voluntarily giving all this information away.
[29:28.200 --> 29:29.900]  So maybe they don't see the threat.
[29:30.040 --> 29:31.960]  That's what worries me, that people don't see this as a threat.
[29:32.040 --> 29:32.200]  Alex?
[29:32.680 --> 29:51.960]  I think what can account for some of the reluctance by private industry to oppose the CISPA bill are the, and I don't remember the exact details of them off the top of my head, but the immunity provisions that it contains, namely that if you give certain data to the government and you cooperate with this program,
[29:52.200 --> 29:55.460]  if there is some kind of breach, you will not have liability.
[29:55.500 --> 29:56.460]  You'll have immunity.
[29:56.460 --> 30:02.320]  So that, you know, this liability for data breaks and things could really amount to an incredible amount of money.
[30:02.460 --> 30:07.180]  So they have an incentive not to oppose this bill in the manner that they did with SOPA.
[30:07.180 --> 30:10.640]  In that sense, the House was very, very smart in the way it crafted it.
[30:10.780 --> 30:22.280]  It gave financial incentives for companies to support it, not only to not oppose it, but, and if I recall correctly, I think it passed a House committee vote this past Thursday.
[30:22.860 --> 30:27.360]  Well, interesting development too, is that the White House is threatening to veto it.
[30:27.680 --> 30:30.860]  And I'm curious what our reaction to that might be.
[30:31.480 --> 30:34.100]  Yesterday, the White House threatened to veto against CISPA.
[30:35.140 --> 30:39.460]  Basically, as we said, it's intended to improve cybersecurity through information sharing.
[30:40.040 --> 30:46.380]  The White House warned lawmakers the president won't sign the measure unless changes are made to protect privacy and civil liberties.
[30:47.460 --> 30:59.140]  The bill would free companies and the federal government to swap data about cyber threats, giving them a broader role, giving the federal government a broader role in helping banks, manufacturers, and other businesses protect themselves.
[30:59.340 --> 31:09.320]  But the White House, echoing privacy advocates, said the bill fails to require irrelevant personal information to be removed before data is sent to the government or other companies.
[31:09.940 --> 31:14.560]  I'm always dubious of good news, but this sounds like good news.
[31:14.800 --> 31:17.380]  Anyone care to dispute that this is a good development?
[31:17.640 --> 31:18.040]  Rob?
[31:18.040 --> 31:21.880]  Yeah, I mean, this move on the part of the administration infuriates me because...
[31:21.880 --> 31:23.820]  Wait, no, this sounds kind of okay, actually.
[31:23.820 --> 31:24.900]  Yeah, that's what I wanted to say, too.
[31:24.960 --> 31:25.640]  I wasn't expecting that.
[31:25.800 --> 31:26.500]  I didn't know.
[31:26.680 --> 31:28.660]  This doesn't... Yeah, they really care?
[31:28.840 --> 31:30.200]  Or there's something else here.
[31:30.300 --> 31:30.500]  Mitch?
[31:31.520 --> 31:34.460]  Yeah, well, I'm always skeptical when I hear something like that.
[31:34.700 --> 31:46.520]  I kind of wonder if it's just they're threatening to veto it because of other aspects of the bill, and they're just saying that so they can get points from people who are into civil liberties.
[31:46.640 --> 31:47.680]  I guess there's a few of us.
[31:47.680 --> 31:48.880]  Yeah, how many?
[31:49.040 --> 31:49.460]  I'd like to know.
[31:49.540 --> 31:49.660]  Mike?
[31:49.780 --> 31:53.540]  So here's a few ways to maybe focus your skepticism, Mitch.
[31:56.100 --> 32:06.540]  I'm wondering if they're setting themselves up so that some tiny concession will be made and they can say, hey, we watched out for your civil liberties while the overall evil in the bill still passes.
[32:06.860 --> 32:23.560]  And the other thing to worry about is that even if this bill is vetoed, there'll be another president, we can't rely on the veto of the president, who has in general not shown himself to be a huge fan of civil liberties, to keep ourselves safe.
[32:25.320 --> 32:25.880]  All right.
[32:25.980 --> 32:34.780]  Well, again, according to the White House here, citizens have a right to know that the corporations will be held accountable and not granted immunity for failing to safeguard personal information adequately.
[32:35.960 --> 32:37.380]  And I say amen to that.
[32:37.520 --> 32:40.220]  I say amen if that is in fact what they mean when they say that.
[32:40.300 --> 32:40.580]  Yes, Bernie.
[32:41.260 --> 32:51.100]  I would like to point out that our President Obama also came out against telecom immunity during that whole NSA spying thing.
[32:51.320 --> 32:53.060]  Geez, it was like, what, five years ago?
[32:53.520 --> 32:58.320]  And he did in a complete about-face and then voted in the U.S.
[32:58.380 --> 33:00.480]  Senate for telecom immunity.
[33:00.780 --> 33:03.800]  But now he's about-faced again, so he's facing the same way?
[33:04.820 --> 33:05.840]  He's turned in a circle?
[33:06.060 --> 33:08.280]  I guess he's done a 360 now.
[33:08.400 --> 33:09.660]  He's probably getting dizzy at this point.
[33:09.660 --> 33:33.480]  So, you know, it's hard for me to take this administration at face value when they have in the past, in similar instances, said that they're against huge corporations being held-not being held liable for violating privacy laws and then having no problem with it later.
[33:35.260 --> 33:38.680]  It's just really hard for me to take it with a grain of salt.
[33:39.360 --> 33:41.080]  Well, let's see if it actually happens.
[33:41.240 --> 33:45.300]  If it does happen, then we can say that's a good thing, and we need more good things like that.
[33:46.080 --> 33:46.760]  Fingers crossed.
[33:46.940 --> 33:57.420]  Okay, our friends at the Internal Revenue Service apparently believe that their agents don't need warrants to read people's emails, text messages, and other private electronic communications.
[33:57.420 --> 34:03.780]  That's according to internal agency documents obtained by the ACLU through a Freedom of Information Act request.
[34:04.320 --> 34:15.220]  In a 2009 handbook, the IRS said the Fourth Amendment does not protect emails because internet users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such communications.
[34:15.920 --> 34:17.220]  Now, I find that interesting.
[34:17.420 --> 34:25.520]  Now, does that mean that any time, say, a hacker gets into someone's computer system and reads emails, no crime is committed because there's no expectation of privacy, right?
[34:25.520 --> 34:28.100]  I mean, it's got to work both ways, right?
[34:28.700 --> 34:32.360]  I want to see, Alex, will a lawyer use that as a defense, maybe?
[34:33.260 --> 34:34.760]  It sounds reasonable to me.
[34:34.960 --> 34:42.820]  I mean, I wonder what caused them to come up with this crazy idea in a 2009 handbook.
[34:42.960 --> 34:43.560]  It's very interesting.
[34:43.820 --> 34:44.500]  It's their God complex.
[34:44.500 --> 34:45.400]  It must be.
[34:45.480 --> 34:46.000]  It must be.
[34:46.120 --> 35:01.260]  I mean, maybe they were looking at this exception to privacy, which is known as the business records exception, and reading that into email, which essentially is the same exception that allows people to access your library records and video store rentals,
[35:01.320 --> 35:06.960]  remember those, is that these are business records in the possession of a third party or your telephone records.
[35:07.140 --> 35:13.840]  So you don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because you've already essentially waived it by giving these records to a third party.
[35:14.260 --> 35:20.380]  Maybe somehow they've extended that reasoning to emails because they reside on a server somewhere.
[35:20.700 --> 35:26.180]  But I mean, it just flies in the face of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since Al Gore invented the internet.
[35:26.360 --> 35:26.780]  Well, yes.
[35:27.220 --> 35:35.560]  They are using the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, ECPA from 1986, something that we're rather familiar with.
[35:36.060 --> 35:45.660]  According to that, in their eyes, government officials only need a subpoena issued without a judge's approval to read emails that have been opened or that are more than 180 days old.
[35:45.820 --> 35:56.380]  But organizations like the ACLU argue that the Fourth Amendment provides greater privacy protections than the ECPA and that officials should need a warrant to access all emails and other private messages.
[35:56.880 --> 36:02.200]  So yeah, that's the battle of minds that's going on in the legal world.
[36:02.320 --> 36:02.460]  Mike?
[36:02.620 --> 36:13.160]  I mean, so people who remember who've been on the internet a long time, the way the email used to work is that you would download all your email to your computer and you would read it on your computer.
[36:13.160 --> 36:20.460]  And so that if they tried to get your email from your internet service provider, it wouldn't be there anymore.
[36:20.740 --> 36:23.480]  For most people these days, that's not the way they use email.
[36:23.640 --> 36:27.900]  The email just stays on Google or Yahoo or whoever it is forever.
[36:28.420 --> 36:33.820]  And so this law, which was like sort of moderately bad when it was written, is really terrible now.
[36:34.660 --> 36:35.160]  All right.
[36:35.240 --> 36:39.140]  Bernie, I think I might have disconnected you and hopefully this is Bernie that called back.
[36:39.420 --> 36:40.240]  Yeah, yes, it is.
[36:40.240 --> 36:41.120]  I'm sorry about that.
[36:41.280 --> 36:58.740]  I heard Mike starting to bring up something that I was, and I guess you mentioned that this would only really, if the IRS's theory is even correct, which I don't think it is legally correct, it could be limited just to emails that are on a server somewhere as opposed to those that are on your personal hard drive,
[36:58.900 --> 37:03.180]  in your computer, in your home, that would clearly be retracted under the Fourth Amendment.
[37:05.920 --> 37:06.360]  Yes.
[37:06.360 --> 37:06.800]  Okay.
[37:07.140 --> 37:07.960]  All right.
[37:08.300 --> 37:09.920]  We're going to take phone calls.
[37:10.620 --> 37:18.980]  But first, I want to know if anybody had heard about this Boston bombing-related incident involving a television show known as Family Guy.
[37:19.760 --> 37:31.720]  Fox Television has pulled a recent episode of the animated series from TV and internet sites after unrelated clips that were edited together to depict the bombing at the Boston Marathon went viral on the web.
[37:31.840 --> 37:36.900]  And good luck finding that now because, well, Google controls YouTube and pretty much everything else.
[37:37.200 --> 37:44.220]  And you can't watch it anywhere because it's basically been deleted unless you taped it yourself.
[37:44.540 --> 37:50.060]  So another indication why it's a bad idea to depend on the cloud for things that you want to see.
[37:50.360 --> 38:00.920]  Now, according to a Fox spokesperson, they said the network pulled a Turban Cowboy episode of the satirical series Family Guy from Fox.com and Hulu.com and everywhere else.
[38:01.520 --> 38:04.960]  And they have no plans on rebroadcasting it ever.
[38:05.800 --> 38:08.680]  It's not known who posted them as if that was a crime.
[38:09.580 --> 38:19.180]  Basically, I think it falls under fair use to edit something together in a, albeit tasteless way, but somewhat unique and creative.
[38:19.420 --> 38:30.080]  The edited video shows two separate clips fused together, uh, from that episode, which aired back in March, uh, in which the lead character drunkenly drives over runners in order to win the Boston Marathon.
[38:30.560 --> 38:39.280]  Uh, but later in the episode, an unconnected storyline of that same character unknowingly becomes friends with an extremist who gives him a cell phone, which, uh, he then calls and explosions are hurt.
[38:39.380 --> 38:47.020]  So I think in that same exact scenario, here it is again, where cell phones are detonating things, but you know, all done in, um, in a comedic way.
[38:47.280 --> 38:52.920]  Uh, but it's funny that the people who put out the show don't think it's funny now, um, because someone else did something tasteless.
[38:53.320 --> 39:00.420]  You know, it's, there's going to be tasteless remarks and jokes and all sorts of things after this tragic event, as well as beforehand.
[39:00.880 --> 39:07.780]  Uh, what concerns me here is, um, is controlling, uh, how we see things and saying, you're not allowed to watch this.
[39:07.860 --> 39:09.640]  You're not allowed to have this, you know, to do this.
[39:10.080 --> 39:24.800]  And, um, just, it gets more and more complete, you know, year after year, uh, it gets to the point where if something is ruled too controversial for us, you won't be able to find it anywhere because those entities control virtually every way that you are able to get it.
[39:25.020 --> 39:32.000]  We may not be there yet, but I think maybe in another five years, it'll be completely impossible to post this, even on your own site.
[39:32.460 --> 39:33.320]  We'll have to see.
[39:34.060 --> 39:35.920]  Um, so we're going to open up the phones.
[39:36.020 --> 39:38.600]  212-650-5782.
[39:39.180 --> 39:40.820]  I see someone's already online.
[39:41.160 --> 39:42.680]  So let's, um, answer the phone.
[39:42.800 --> 39:43.080]  Good evening.
[39:43.180 --> 39:43.740]  You're on off the hook.
[39:44.820 --> 39:45.360]  Oh, wow.
[39:45.400 --> 39:47.100]  That's what happens when you call so early, you get disconnected.
[39:47.120 --> 39:47.940]  It does happen.
[39:48.140 --> 39:49.120]  That's what Verizon does.
[39:49.240 --> 39:50.340]  They disconnect you after a few rings.
[39:50.540 --> 39:52.660]  We only have one incoming, um, line.
[39:52.820 --> 39:56.160]  So I have to babble a bit while you're waiting for the, uh, there it is.
[39:56.620 --> 39:57.980]  And we can hear the phone ringing still.
[39:58.060 --> 39:58.360]  Good evening.
[39:58.500 --> 39:59.180]  You're on off the hook.
[39:59.720 --> 40:00.400]  Hello guys.
[40:00.540 --> 40:00.660]  Hi.
[40:00.740 --> 40:02.400]  Pleasure to listen to you as always.
[40:02.400 --> 40:11.040]  Um, I wanted to say, I think that there was an instance, um, where a cell phone itself was used as a bomb against a Palestinian.
[40:11.960 --> 40:16.520]  I don't know if it was an activist leader, what have you, but like over 10 years ago.
[40:16.620 --> 40:16.720]  Yeah.
[40:16.800 --> 40:17.420]  The Israeli government.
[40:17.780 --> 40:17.960]  Right.
[40:18.280 --> 40:18.420]  Yeah.
[40:18.880 --> 40:20.940]  It was in the early, it was in the early, it was in the early nineties.
[40:21.060 --> 40:27.320]  It was a PLO, uh, uh, some top guy in the PLO that the Israelis put the explosives inside his cell phone.
[40:28.000 --> 40:33.340]  Uh, uh, like there was part of the battery pack and they put the variable to swap his cell phone battery out.
[40:33.680 --> 40:35.380]  And then they called him and blew his head off.
[40:36.600 --> 40:37.420]  So yeah, wait.
[40:37.440 --> 40:40.560]  So was, was the call what triggered the explosive?
[40:41.800 --> 40:44.100]  Yes, but the bomb was in the phone itself.
[40:44.420 --> 40:47.300]  It was highly, it's something only the Mossad would have come up with.
[40:48.000 --> 40:50.020]  How did they give him the phone in the first place?
[40:50.940 --> 40:57.720]  It was, it was, it was his, it was his own phone, but they got some infiltrator to come in and swap out the battery in the cell phone.
[40:58.200 --> 41:05.220]  And the new battery was part battery and part bomb that could detect when it received the next call.
[41:05.400 --> 41:07.740]  Well, how about when he pushed the button that said talk?
[41:07.880 --> 41:09.520]  Maybe that was a button that said blow up.
[41:10.360 --> 41:14.860]  Well, no, I don't think you can do that just by replacing the battery, but in any case, they called him and blew his head off.
[41:15.080 --> 41:17.100]  But yeah, there, that is one exception.
[41:17.280 --> 41:19.900]  You could argue though, that that wasn't a terrorist event.
[41:20.140 --> 41:22.740]  I'm sure the Israelis would argue it was not a terrorist event.
[41:23.340 --> 41:25.760]  It was a military operation from their point of view.
[41:25.760 --> 41:26.100]  Exactly.
[41:26.260 --> 41:26.700]  There you go.
[41:26.700 --> 41:26.900]  Yeah.
[41:27.440 --> 41:44.180]  But I, and on, on the general discussion, I really, this is a really, really, really important, really fascinating discussion in terms of, um, surveillance, the implications of it, the harm it does, the good it can do in attempting to find a, you know,
[41:44.280 --> 41:48.020]  a perpetrator, such as what occurred tragically in Boston a few days ago.
[41:48.680 --> 42:07.320]  Um, and you know, all the positives and negatives need to really be fleshed out because I'm totally against surveillance and totally, you know, against this notion of, you know, the, the state playing God with all of their facial recognition technology and cameras on every corner.
[42:07.840 --> 42:12.140]  However, you know, it's not something that could just be kind of swept to the side.
[42:12.140 --> 42:16.280]  The question of, well, how do you go about catching a perpetrator of something like this?
[42:16.500 --> 42:21.480]  If you don't have the digital forensics, so to speak, to follow up on.
[42:21.820 --> 42:34.800]  So, you know, I mean, I'm very distrustful of big brother, but it's just, it's just a very deep thing that I, you know, I hope one of the guys from your community writes a book about it or something because it's, it's, it's never endingly deep.
[42:35.480 --> 42:42.040]  Well, I think the other thing to remember also is that you can never stop this kind of thing from happening in the first place.
[42:42.220 --> 42:48.780]  You will never be able to completely get rid of, uh, or even remotely get rid of a number of people that want to blow things up.
[42:48.900 --> 42:50.380]  If a lot of people want to blow things up.
[42:50.720 --> 42:58.220]  And we're fortunate that not many people want to do that, that this is the first time in, uh, I can't remember how long something like this has happened back in the 1970s.
[42:58.320 --> 43:02.720]  People were blowing things up a lot more than they, they, they are now in New York city even.
[43:02.920 --> 43:05.960]  And, and, you know, it wasn't, I have a tape recordings as a kid.
[43:06.020 --> 43:14.660]  I recorded the, the all news station and, uh, yeah, somebody blew up an airport terminal or a bag in an airport terminal and it was the top story.
[43:15.000 --> 43:17.120]  But after five minutes, they went on to another story.
[43:17.360 --> 43:18.900]  It wasn't even that big a deal.
[43:19.200 --> 43:20.360]  Not saying it's not a big deal.
[43:20.480 --> 43:23.680]  I'm saying that, uh, certain things don't change over time.
[43:23.820 --> 43:26.240]  There's always going to be crazy people and you can never stop that.
[43:26.320 --> 43:34.880]  What you can do though, you can destroy your society and you can become, uh, uh, people who are in fear constantly and, uh, controlled by, by the government.
[43:34.880 --> 43:39.960]  I mean, it should be pointed out that the U S government blows things up on a, on a very regular basis.
[43:40.000 --> 43:46.040]  Not usually in our streets, but not, not usually in the U S they, they usually do it overseas, but, uh, they're pretty good at it.
[43:46.160 --> 43:46.580]  So yeah.
[43:46.580 --> 44:00.600]  And that's another thing to, to consider too, that, you know, the fear that people are, are, um, are, uh, experiencing now, uh, is something that many people in the world experience on a daily basis and with much, much, uh, uh, bigger numbers.
[44:01.060 --> 44:03.160]  And, uh, it, it doesn't make anything right.
[44:03.360 --> 44:11.160]  It doesn't justify anything, but it's just something to consider that that's actually a step closer to reality than the peace that we live in every single day.
[44:11.560 --> 44:11.940]  All right.
[44:11.980 --> 44:12.680]  Let's take another phone call.
[44:12.880 --> 44:14.520]  212-650-5782.
[44:14.660 --> 44:14.920]  Good evening.
[44:15.040 --> 44:15.580]  You're on Off the Hook.
[44:16.240 --> 44:17.860]  Why are people calling with dial tones?
[44:18.080 --> 44:20.540]  Or maybe this calling really, and letting the phone ring a long time.
[44:20.720 --> 44:20.920]  I'm sorry.
[44:21.680 --> 44:24.340]  Um, 212-650-5782.
[44:24.480 --> 44:24.700]  Good evening.
[44:24.840 --> 44:25.700]  You're on Off the Hook.
[44:26.500 --> 44:26.900]  Hi.
[44:27.420 --> 44:27.660]  Uh, yes.
[44:27.940 --> 44:38.240]  Um, regarding, uh, the marathon end and why they may have a shut off the cell phones, uh, it may not have been because the cell phone, per se, would detonate a bomb.
[44:38.400 --> 44:42.440]  But if you've ever been around construction sites, they always say turn off cell phones.
[44:42.540 --> 44:48.020]  Maybe because of stray RF, possibly accidentally setting off something unstable.
[44:48.600 --> 44:48.740]  Okay.
[44:48.820 --> 44:49.240]  Interesting point.
[44:49.320 --> 44:50.160]  Bernie, what do you think about that?
[44:50.680 --> 44:51.520]  Uh, actually, no.
[44:51.660 --> 44:55.920]  The, the, the RF energy emitted by a cell phone is, is very, very tiny.
[44:56.060 --> 45:03.840]  It was true back in the day, you know, decades ago with, with, with, uh, explosives, they used dynamiting for, for like quarries and things like that.
[45:03.960 --> 45:06.420]  You'd see signs, uh, don't use two-way radios.
[45:06.680 --> 45:09.100]  But back, you know, those are radios that were like several watts.
[45:09.360 --> 45:13.580]  Your current cell phone, typically in a metropolitan area, only emits a few tens of milliwatts.
[45:13.720 --> 45:19.800]  It's really not enough to induce enough electrical energy into wires to set off a, a blasting cap or something.
[45:19.920 --> 45:23.020]  But do they still tell you to turn off your cell phone if you're near a place like that?
[45:23.180 --> 45:26.380]  Well, by people that don't know what they're talking about, maybe.
[45:27.000 --> 45:34.500]  Well, well, I was, well, why did, with airports, airplanes still impose a ban on, upon takeoff and landing, uh, they've been operating an AM FM radio.
[45:34.900 --> 45:39.400]  Uh, I've seen one, one double-A battery actually interfere with some other appliance nearby.
[45:39.940 --> 45:42.260]  So, uh, it seems tiny, and it is.
[45:42.460 --> 45:48.260]  But it may be, uh, uncertain, with certain unstable, um, explosives, possibly try not to recall you.
[45:48.420 --> 45:51.040]  It might be enough, theoretically, to do something.
[45:51.240 --> 45:54.240]  I don't know how, you know, or, or navigation in a plane.
[45:54.400 --> 46:04.340]  And we also heard a similar, uh, um, um, rumor about cell phones and gas stations that they could ignite, uh, a gas pump to explode or something like that.
[46:04.360 --> 46:07.820]  I believe Mythbusters dispelled that particular, uh, uh, rumor.
[46:08.000 --> 46:10.860]  But, uh, maybe we need, uh, we need people to dispel this one as well.
[46:10.860 --> 46:11.420]  Yeah.
[46:11.620 --> 46:11.840]  Okay.
[46:12.160 --> 46:13.380]  Thanks, uh, thanks for your call.
[46:13.660 --> 46:16.360]  2-1-2-6-5-0-5-7-8-2.
[46:16.520 --> 46:23.440]  We're talking about the Boston bombing and, uh, the role of technology and privacy issues, surveillance, all that fun stuff.
[46:23.600 --> 46:23.960]  Good evening.
[46:24.360 --> 46:25.580]  You are on Off the Hook.
[46:26.340 --> 46:33.800]  Yes, um, I think this kind of ridiculous statement by the IRS that people don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy is great.
[46:34.380 --> 46:40.360]  Because now we get to define reasonable expectation of privacy as getting to encrypt everything.
[46:40.740 --> 46:42.880]  And that does not mean we're up to something wrong.
[46:43.060 --> 46:45.760]  It means, hey, I have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
[46:46.220 --> 46:49.140]  So, you know, the next push is going to be to outlaw encryption.
[46:49.400 --> 46:51.020]  This is a great line in the sand.
[46:51.560 --> 46:58.060]  Well, it would be nice if, um, if it was made so simple that everyone's grandmother could do it without any fuss.
[46:58.540 --> 46:59.820]  I don't think we're there yet.
[46:59.820 --> 47:09.200]  And I, I, I call on hackers everywhere to develop something that is transparent, easy to use and effective in, uh, in, in keeping prying eyes from, from, from reading.
[47:09.460 --> 47:10.100]  Uh, what's that, Mitch?
[47:10.560 --> 47:12.300]  And comes to fault in Firefox.
[47:12.940 --> 47:13.340]  Uh-huh.
[47:13.640 --> 47:13.920]  Yes.
[47:14.660 --> 47:15.780]  I'm not sure what that means exactly.
[47:16.100 --> 47:23.440]  Oh, you know, so you just, you download Firefox, you install it, and it's automatically encrypted, you know, and, uh, same with Thunderbird and, uh...
[47:23.440 --> 47:24.660]  You mean the webpages you visit?
[47:25.040 --> 47:32.600]  Webpages and your email, you know, if it's automatically encrypted, you know, like most websites are HTTP, not, um, secure.
[47:32.980 --> 47:36.800]  Uh, there's no reason why they can't all be HTTPS secure.
[47:36.940 --> 47:50.020]  Well, I mean, when you, when you, um, um, um, conduct sales transactions on, uh, online, um, by default, they are encrypted, they, uh, they are protected, but the same does not hold true for, for email that is sent.
[47:50.140 --> 47:55.240]  It can be read in a variety of places as it passes from the sender to the receiver.
[47:55.780 --> 47:58.600]  And that's something that I think really we need to make priority number one.
[47:58.860 --> 47:59.020]  Alex?
[47:59.500 --> 48:16.000]  And to go back to the original point of the caller about outlawing encryption, I think what's important to note, well, use of encryption is not outlawed, but it is important to note that the export of encryption over a certain strength is, in fact, regulated as a munition.
[48:16.420 --> 48:19.640]  So that can, quite frankly, be illegal to export.
[48:19.760 --> 48:20.440]  Well, okay, fine.
[48:20.440 --> 48:22.260]  So, uh, we don't export it.
[48:22.620 --> 48:29.660]  Other countries can make their own encryption, but I'm talking about using it here domestically with our own citizens who don't use it nearly enough or at all.
[48:30.380 --> 48:31.060]  Um, okay.
[48:31.180 --> 48:31.720]  Let's take another phone call.
[48:31.820 --> 48:33.520]  212-650-5782.
[48:33.700 --> 48:33.940]  Good evening.
[48:34.080 --> 48:34.740]  You're on off the hook.
[48:35.640 --> 48:36.480]  Hey, how are you today?
[48:37.060 --> 48:37.380]  All right.
[48:37.440 --> 48:37.680]  How are you?
[48:37.840 --> 48:38.100]  Go ahead.
[48:38.220 --> 48:38.320]  Good.
[48:38.340 --> 48:39.340]  I was just enjoying your show.
[48:39.460 --> 48:41.780]  What I, I just wanted to go back a couple of callers back.
[48:41.780 --> 48:45.560]  He was talking about, uh, you know, private, well, you guys are all talking about privacy.
[48:45.720 --> 48:58.640]  I just, I'm also not a huge fan with the idea that the government's going to be looking over my shoulder and seeing everything, but we live in a society now where, you know, from a governmental point of view, they're trying to balance and I'm, I'm not trying to play the government side here.
[48:58.880 --> 49:03.840]  Cause I'm not, I'm not worried about the government from a conspiracy point of view, but it's a slippery slope as they take away freedoms.
[49:03.940 --> 49:04.720]  We lose them.
[49:04.820 --> 49:05.580]  We sort of give them up.
[49:05.640 --> 49:09.000]  Everybody gives all their stuff on Facebook and stuff like that and gives it up.
[49:09.080 --> 49:13.040]  So we've gotten used to giving it up inappropriately in my opinion, but that's, that's a personal opinion.
[49:13.300 --> 49:19.900]  But we also, you know, a bomb like this goes off or something happens and everybody's screaming for somebody's head, why didn't you protect us?
[49:19.980 --> 49:26.980]  So the government puts in more, more controls and more video cameras and more trying to get on more privacy because they're trying to do the appropriate job.
[49:27.700 --> 49:35.780]  And, and when, you know, what it comes down to is if we want to keep our freedoms, then we have to also allow the fact that, like you said, you can't protect against everything.
[49:35.920 --> 49:37.440]  And sometimes tragedies are going to occur.
[49:37.680 --> 49:44.340]  I think looking towards Norway and how they dealt with that tragedy over there, it didn't change their society.
[49:44.660 --> 49:48.980]  As far as I can see, they didn't get paranoid and have barriers built.
[49:49.100 --> 49:51.080]  They still try to live the same way they did.
[49:51.180 --> 50:02.600]  And I think there'd be no greater victory than to have twice as many people show up to the Boston Marathon next year without a single bit of added security to show that we're not afraid and that this security is not going to change anything.
[50:02.600 --> 50:04.160]  It's just going to take away more freedoms.
[50:04.380 --> 50:06.640]  But thanks very much for that point and for your call.
[50:07.040 --> 50:10.520]  212-650-5782 is our telephone number.
[50:10.660 --> 50:15.460]  And we only have a few minutes left while we wait for that phone to ring again.
[50:15.540 --> 50:15.980]  There it is.
[50:16.260 --> 50:17.080]  And good evening.
[50:17.080 --> 50:18.160]  You're on Off the Hook.
[50:18.460 --> 50:18.760]  Yes.
[50:18.820 --> 50:19.120]  Hello.
[50:19.640 --> 50:20.640]  It's Tom from the Bronx.
[50:20.780 --> 50:21.100]  How are you?
[50:21.220 --> 50:21.400]  Yeah.
[50:21.640 --> 50:23.040]  I'd like to say this.
[50:23.420 --> 50:29.280]  It's interesting you brought up the story of the family guy.
[50:30.520 --> 50:35.700]  Because when the tragedy happened in the college, what was that, Virginia?
[50:36.120 --> 50:36.980]  Virginia Tech.
[50:37.240 --> 50:37.620]  Yeah.
[50:38.140 --> 50:43.080]  There was an episode of the new Knight Rider.
[50:43.260 --> 50:44.940]  Did you ever see the new Knight Rider?
[50:44.940 --> 50:45.960]  Regrettably, no.
[50:46.340 --> 50:48.180]  Well, it was around for a while.
[50:48.560 --> 51:02.260]  They had an episode that there was somebody that got into their headquarters and was killing the agents in the headquarters.
[51:02.900 --> 51:07.960]  And it mirrored the story of what happened in Virginia Tech.
[51:08.540 --> 51:11.220]  Now, I don't know whether anybody ever brought that up.
[51:11.260 --> 51:13.580]  Well, what was similar to this, the fact that somebody was killing other people?
[51:13.580 --> 51:13.580]  Oh.
[51:14.540 --> 51:24.100]  In other words, the way the individual had gotten into the installation of the headquarters, it was different than the old Knight Rider.
[51:24.660 --> 51:26.140]  I can imagine, yeah.
[51:26.440 --> 51:31.860]  And it mirrored the story of the true life.
[51:32.340 --> 51:35.480]  In other words, you'd have to see it to believe it.
[51:36.440 --> 51:37.100]  Well, okay.
[51:37.360 --> 51:39.880]  One day, maybe I'll see it, and maybe another day I'll believe it.
[51:39.980 --> 51:41.200]  But thanks for your call.
[51:41.600 --> 51:43.960]  212-650-5782.
[51:44.180 --> 51:45.240]  We only have a couple minutes left.
[51:46.100 --> 51:47.080]  Let's take this phone call.
[51:47.180 --> 51:47.480]  Good evening.
[51:47.620 --> 51:48.340]  You're on Off the Hook.
[51:48.760 --> 51:49.540]  Thanks for your call.
[51:49.740 --> 51:50.640]  Hey, great show, guys.
[51:50.800 --> 51:51.060]  Thank you.
[51:51.460 --> 51:52.080]  What's on your mind?
[51:52.160 --> 51:52.300]  Hello?
[51:52.620 --> 51:53.260]  Yes, you're on the air.
[51:53.340 --> 51:53.560]  Go ahead.
[51:53.860 --> 51:54.360]  Okay, great.
[51:55.620 --> 51:58.920]  You guys are for surveillance or you're not for surveillance?
[51:59.080 --> 52:00.540]  Yeah, it's not clear, is it?
[52:00.780 --> 52:02.860]  It seems like if you have nothing to hide, it wouldn't be a problem.
[52:03.420 --> 52:08.540]  If you're on a video camera like what you brought up in England, what's the big deal?
[52:08.660 --> 52:17.240]  If you're not doing anything illegal, but God forbid something like this happens, at least there's some type of video trail that people... Well, that's the question I was asking Bernie before, you know?
[52:17.520 --> 52:24.840]  Okay, so if you didn't have this surveillance, how would you ever find the person who did this?
[52:24.900 --> 52:27.360]  Through people's individual cameras?
[52:27.600 --> 52:28.980]  Through very good memory?
[52:29.680 --> 52:31.160]  We need an answer to that.
[52:31.260 --> 52:33.680]  Otherwise, we're going to see more surveillance cameras everywhere.
[52:34.180 --> 52:35.460]  Anyone want to take a stab?
[52:35.560 --> 52:35.700]  Mike?
[52:35.880 --> 52:42.500]  I mean, so I don't... I'm not a policeman, in case anyone couldn't guess, but like crimes were solved before the invention of CCTV.
[52:43.180 --> 52:43.580]  Uh-huh.
[52:43.720 --> 52:48.340]  So it's clearly possible to solve... It's possible, but it's also possible that crimes won't get solved.
[52:48.420 --> 52:59.860]  A lot of crimes don't get solved, but when you have every single movement under surveillance, the camera shows a guy putting a knapsack down in a garbage can, you wouldn't see that without the camera.
[53:00.440 --> 53:00.820]  Right.
[53:00.900 --> 53:03.420]  And a lot of people were executed before DNA evidence.
[53:03.580 --> 53:09.440]  Now that DNA evidence has come with the scientific, and this is science, it's the science of technology.
[53:10.100 --> 53:18.860]  You know, if you have nothing to hide, I mean, of course, the government with Big Brother is dangerous, but when these guys use a pressure cooker, I mean, talk about a recipe for disaster.
[53:19.080 --> 53:20.220]  I mean, who is this?
[53:20.360 --> 53:31.960]  I even heard that somebody was mad because possibly the New York Marathon was canceled, and the way Bloomberg went about this, with people spending all the money to come in, and then they canceled it, maybe it was revenge against the New York Marathon.
[53:32.020 --> 53:34.720]  I mean, who cares why a person would do this?
[53:35.860 --> 53:38.820]  Is that really a theory because of the hurricane?
[53:39.640 --> 53:41.420]  That's the silliest theory I've ever heard.
[53:41.920 --> 53:42.560]  No, no, no, no.
[53:43.300 --> 53:44.100]  Think about it.
[53:44.160 --> 53:48.600]  If the person is mentally ill enough to do this, if that was his reason, does it really matter?
[53:48.700 --> 53:50.480]  People are like, well, why would somebody do this?
[53:50.680 --> 53:51.820]  Well, there could be any reason.
[53:51.940 --> 53:53.180]  Obviously, they're mentally ill.
[53:53.440 --> 53:55.500]  Well, yeah, then it could be because the guiding light got canceled.
[53:55.620 --> 53:55.920]  Who knows?
[53:56.160 --> 53:57.460]  But thanks for that call.
[53:57.880 --> 53:58.460]  Bernie, go ahead.
[53:59.180 --> 54:04.560]  I do want to say, I really have a hard time understanding why people are afraid of getting blown up by terrorists.
[54:05.040 --> 54:10.560]  The risk assessment, if you look at it, more people died in Boston that day in random car accidents.
[54:11.000 --> 54:17.620]  Probably more people were maimed in Massachusetts that day from car accidents and other things than that one incident.
[54:18.000 --> 54:34.080]  The chances of anybody getting harmed or killed in a terrorist incident is so infinitesimal that it's not worth investing hundreds of billions of dollars for these technologies to supposedly keep it safer, which really aren't going to keep it safer and will only hurt our privacy.
[54:34.240 --> 54:42.700]  While what you say is true, I think the way of saying it is not really going to convince a lot of people, and we need to think of a better way to say that.
[54:43.320 --> 54:53.320]  Yes, when you look at all the people who didn't get blown up in that area alone, okay, fine, but it's not much comfort to a lot of people who are witnessing it.
[54:53.480 --> 54:54.420]  Let's take a phone call.
[54:54.500 --> 54:54.780]  Good evening.
[54:54.900 --> 54:55.640]  You're on Off The Hook.
[54:56.280 --> 54:57.180]  Oh, another one.
[54:57.300 --> 54:57.440]  Wow.
[54:57.580 --> 54:59.160]  The dial tone seems to call more than anybody.
[54:59.700 --> 55:01.420]  212-650-5782.
[55:01.420 --> 55:04.200]  Only have time for maybe one or two more phone calls.
[55:04.940 --> 55:12.060]  And Bernie, I'm sorry, I can't expand on this more because every time you start talking, someone calls and we can hear the phone ringing like that.
[55:12.340 --> 55:13.580]  So let's take that phone call.
[55:13.660 --> 55:13.960]  Good evening.
[55:14.080 --> 55:14.720]  You're on Off The Hook.
[55:15.340 --> 55:15.680]  Hello?
[55:15.900 --> 55:16.100]  Hi.
[55:16.120 --> 55:16.600]  What's on your mind?
[55:16.920 --> 55:17.780]  I'm on Off The Hook.
[55:17.780 --> 55:18.880]  You are on the air now.
[55:19.440 --> 55:19.920]  Oh, okay.
[55:20.280 --> 55:24.380]  Just want to say I didn't appreciate the sexist, ageist comment.
[55:25.140 --> 55:25.840]  The which?
[55:26.120 --> 55:28.000]  The sexist and ageist comment.
[55:28.100 --> 55:29.580]  Who made the sexist, ageist comment?
[55:30.680 --> 55:42.600]  Whoever it was who was speaking, I mean, I'm enjoying your show very much, but, well, there was a comment made that, okay, well, that would be great if everybody's grandmother knew how to do it.
[55:42.600 --> 55:45.380]  Well, how is that a sexist, ageist comment?
[55:45.380 --> 55:57.640]  I'm talking about people's relatives, people who might not have the same experience with technology as someone who's a teenager, which I suppose is another ageist comment.
[55:59.160 --> 55:59.600]  I...
[55:59.600 --> 56:01.300]  I'll say grandfather, okay?
[56:01.380 --> 56:02.860]  That'll get me 50% off the hook.
[56:02.880 --> 56:03.260]  How's that?
[56:04.060 --> 56:04.380]  No.
[56:04.620 --> 56:05.780]  Anyway, what else is on your mind?
[56:05.840 --> 56:05.980]  Sorry.
[56:06.280 --> 56:06.920]  That's it.
[56:07.080 --> 56:08.280]  That's all I wanted to say.
[56:08.380 --> 56:08.660]  Okay.
[56:08.860 --> 56:09.620]  Just watch your language.
[56:09.760 --> 56:09.940]  Thanks.
[56:10.100 --> 56:10.940]  Watch my language.
[56:11.080 --> 56:12.420]  Yeah, the language police are everywhere.
[56:13.340 --> 56:15.720]  Let's see if we can get one more call in.
[56:16.220 --> 56:17.760]  Oh, no, I hung up on Bernie again.
[56:17.920 --> 56:18.920]  I'm sorry, Bernie.
[56:19.000 --> 56:21.540]  This phone system is not doing what I want it to do.
[56:21.720 --> 56:22.920]  But let's take a call over here.
[56:22.980 --> 56:23.280]  Good evening.
[56:23.400 --> 56:24.300]  You're on off the hook.
[56:25.140 --> 56:25.540]  Hi.
[56:25.920 --> 56:26.100]  Hi.
[56:26.360 --> 56:48.200]  I wanted to mention sort of the hypocrisy that I see in the government, you know, wanting to keep tabs on us, and at the same time, you know, not passing the gun control laws because people don't want background checks.
[56:48.460 --> 56:49.560]  It just seems kind of absurd.
[56:49.660 --> 56:51.500]  Well, that's a whole show in and of itself.
[56:51.780 --> 56:55.440]  And, yeah, I'm sure you'll hear more about that here on this radio station.
[56:55.580 --> 56:59.160]  We're out of time, and apologies to Bernie for hanging up on him a second time.
[56:59.680 --> 57:02.680]  I guess I didn't have a certain button pressed that would have prevented that.
[57:02.840 --> 57:03.500]  I'll learn.
[57:03.660 --> 57:03.860]  I will.
[57:04.980 --> 57:07.700]  Alex, Andrew, Mitch, thanks for stopping by.
[57:07.940 --> 57:08.800]  Hopefully, we'll see you again.
[57:09.100 --> 57:09.120]  Thank you.
[57:09.120 --> 57:11.080]  We'll definitely see you at future HOPE conferences.
[57:11.660 --> 57:15.380]  You can write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[57:15.460 --> 57:17.080]  That is our email address.
[57:17.360 --> 57:21.560]  And please say whatever is on your mind because it's certainly an interesting topic.
[57:22.160 --> 57:23.180]  OTH at 2600.com.
[57:23.240 --> 57:24.280]  Manuel Goldstein for Off the Hook.
[57:24.400 --> 57:24.940]  Have a good night.
[57:28.430 --> 57:30.770]  Your name is Big Brother.
[57:33.030 --> 57:38.050]  You say that you're watching me on the telly.
[57:39.190 --> 57:42.230]  You see me going nowhere.
[57:46.960 --> 57:49.240]  Your name is Big Brother.
[57:51.460 --> 57:56.200]  You say that you're tired of me protesting.
[57:56.200 --> 58:00.880]  I see my children dying every day.
[58:05.050 --> 58:07.670]  My name is nobody.
[58:08.670 --> 58:14.830]  But I can't wait to see your face inside my door.
[58:23.610 --> 58:25.830]  Your name is Big Brother.
[58:28.130 --> 58:32.890]  You say that you got me all in your notebook.
[58:34.550 --> 58:37.490]  Writing it down every day.
[58:42.100 --> 58:45.560]  Your name is I'll see you.
[58:45.560 --> 58:51.980]  I'll change if you vote me in as a place.
[58:52.780 --> 58:55.820]  There's a den of your toll.
[59:00.380 --> 59:02.700]  I live in the ghetto.
[59:04.060 --> 59:10.120]  You just come to visit me around election time.
[59:10.120 --> 59:11.300]  I
[59:14.730 --> 59:25.630]  live in the ghetto.
[59:29.390 --> 59:32.210]  Someday I'll bloom.
[59:33.150 --> 59:39.510]  I live in the ghetto.
[59:40.870 --> 59:43.330]  Someday I'll bloom.
[59:43.330 --> 59:47.350]  I'll move on my feet to the other side.
[59:55.530 --> 59:57.830]  My name is secluded.
[01:00:00.210 --> 01:00:05.310]  We live in a house the size of a matchbox.
[01:00:06.430 --> 01:00:09.410]  We'll just live with us one-to-one.
[01:00:14.200 --> 01:00:16.360]  You've killed all our leaders.
[01:00:18.680 --> 01:00:23.440]  I don't even have to do nothing to you.
[01:00:24.620 --> 01:00:27.740]  You've caused your own country to fall.
[01:00:27.740 --> 01:00:27.780]  Zuha
[01:00:47.170 --> 01:00:56.650]  Bueno, I wish I could let that play a little bit more because it was a fantastic song by none other than Stevie Wonder And this is the second one.
[01:00:57.110 --> 01:00:57.410]  Now let's see...