[00:00.000 --> 00:03.640]  Her elderly mother, Emma Hernandez, was injured slightly.
[00:03.940 --> 00:09.180]  Their truck was a different make, model and color from the truck Dorner was reported to be driving.
[00:09.460 --> 00:13.280]  The settlement still has to be approved by the Los Angeles City Council.
[00:13.880 --> 00:15.980]  And that's Headlines for FSRN.
[00:16.200 --> 00:18.460]  From Eugene, Oregon, I'm Jess Burns.
[00:30.490 --> 00:33.870]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:34.070 --> 00:35.150]  Sorry, we were caught off guard there.
[00:35.610 --> 00:40.450]  It's 7 o'clock time once again for Off the Hook.
[01:05.780 --> 01:08.560]  I hope that's understood, but make me know.
[02:05.980 --> 02:07.560]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:07.680 --> 02:08.450]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:08.540 --> 02:09.500]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you.
[02:09.830 --> 02:11.280]  Joined tonight by Mike.
[02:11.480 --> 02:11.720]  Hi.
[02:11.880 --> 02:12.100]  Rob.
[02:12.510 --> 02:13.180]  Good evening.
[02:13.330 --> 02:13.780]  Bernie S.
[02:14.100 --> 02:15.480]  Greetings from Pennsylvania.
[02:16.000 --> 02:16.420]  All right.
[02:17.320 --> 02:18.320]  And here we are.
[02:19.380 --> 02:21.320]  We're flying by the seat of our pants, but we are here.
[02:21.570 --> 02:27.300]  And, well, it happened kind of like I feared it would happen with the events up in Boston.
[02:27.300 --> 02:38.240]  And, um, basically now, uh, the concept of surveillance looks like something so many of us are embracing because it saved our asses, didn't it?
[02:39.900 --> 02:43.380]  So, uh, I guess, I guess what we need to talk about is, uh, what do we do now?
[02:43.600 --> 02:43.710]  Yeah.
[02:44.210 --> 02:55.920]  We're, um, uh, basically we have, uh, um, a nation, a world that watched, uh, the, um, uh, the suspects were identified, uh, a week ago tomorrow, um, via surveillance cameras.
[02:56.500 --> 03:04.200]  Um, how do we, uh, how do we counter the demand now for more surveillance everywhere so that these kinds of things can be prevented?
[03:04.200 --> 03:05.760]  It's very, uh, it's a very tricky argument.
[03:05.880 --> 03:07.020]  Anyone want to jump in on this?
[03:07.260 --> 03:08.760]  Well, I mean, it doesn't work.
[03:08.900 --> 03:10.580]  This event wasn't prevented.
[03:10.820 --> 03:15.600]  It wasn't prevented, but, um, you can't say that you would have ever caught the guys without the surveillance cameras.
[03:15.830 --> 03:19.040]  So how, how do you, uh, how do you argue against more surveillance?
[03:19.940 --> 03:20.380]  Right.
[03:20.740 --> 03:32.120]  I would suggest, I, I've seen a lot of the pictures of these suspects online and it appears to me that the vast majority of those were not taken by, uh, corporate or government surveillance cameras.
[03:32.220 --> 03:32.580]  Oh, absolutely.
[03:32.780 --> 03:33.260]  By individuals.
[03:33.600 --> 03:33.820]  Right.
[03:34.200 --> 03:42.700]  But, but it's the first one that, uh, that pinpointed and, in a, in a very, uh, uh, uh, clever way it pinpointed these guys were unusual.
[03:42.700 --> 03:45.720]  These guys were doing something different and it was, it was dead on.
[03:45.840 --> 03:45.920]  Yeah.
[03:45.940 --> 03:52.100]  They were doing something different and that wasn't caught by, um, uh, by individual cameras that was caught by surveillance on the street.
[03:52.560 --> 03:58.200]  Uh, and I don't think, unless somebody was filming with their own cameras, everybody walking around, you wouldn't have gotten that from individuals.
[03:58.200 --> 04:08.420]  Now, once, once you got the, uh, the images of the people, then it was, uh, uh, it was easy for people to, um, uh, to submit their own photos and add to it from there.
[04:08.500 --> 04:12.000]  But the initial, the initial identification, uh, came from that.
[04:12.160 --> 04:22.440]  So, uh, this is what's bugging me because, uh, uh, it's, it's become very difficult to, uh, to argue against, um, something London style all throughout, uh, Boston, New York, every city in America.
[04:22.560 --> 04:28.220]  Of course, I guess the best argument is that, uh, it simply moves the crime to someplace else.
[04:28.520 --> 04:35.410]  Uh, it's, uh, it's, it's a false sense that, uh, uh, by having surveillance, uh, you're always going to catch people because there won't be surveillance everywhere.
[04:35.560 --> 04:43.340]  And then I fall into that trap of saying, well, okay, then we need more surveillance every place then, in, in the country, in the city, in the malls, in the churches.
[04:43.980 --> 04:48.860]  Um, so I think we need to come up with a, with, with, uh, some good arguments as to why this is a bad thing.
[04:48.880 --> 04:50.260]  And I haven't really heard any yet.
[04:50.460 --> 04:52.020]  I mean, it doesn't work.
[04:52.150 --> 05:01.200]  It, I, I don't have the statistics in front of me, but no one has told me, and I'm sure someone would that, that London is now crime free or that every crime in London now gets solved.
[05:01.620 --> 05:02.640]  It doesn't work.
[05:03.260 --> 05:03.620]  Yeah.
[05:03.670 --> 05:07.880]  But you know, that's a bad argument for this week because, uh, that's how they caught the guys.
[05:07.980 --> 05:09.270]  They caught them through a surveillance camera.
[05:09.440 --> 05:10.600]  So you can't say it doesn't work.
[05:10.770 --> 05:10.880]  Yeah.
[05:10.960 --> 05:11.720]  It doesn't prevent the crime.
[05:11.840 --> 05:12.120]  I agree.
[05:12.410 --> 05:15.670]  But it does work as far as catching people in certain situations.
[05:15.670 --> 05:16.530]  And this is one of them.
[05:16.640 --> 05:18.260]  But I would get a better argument.
[05:18.440 --> 05:24.170]  I would argue that, uh, we have a couple of hundred years of history in this country of catching criminals before surveillance cameras were a thing.
[05:24.270 --> 05:31.060]  We'll never be able to say, um, for certain that we, oh, we would never have caught these guys had there not been secure, uh, security cameras there or surveillance cameras there.
[05:31.160 --> 05:32.460]  Well, they weren't kind of daft.
[05:32.560 --> 05:33.560]  I mean, I'll give you that.
[05:33.740 --> 05:41.340]  It wasn't like, uh, they were, uh, but as soon as their pictures became known, that's, that's when they sort of freaked out and started shooting and driving cars fast.
[05:41.740 --> 05:46.220]  Uh, but, um, I think there have been a lot of criminals that have gotten away with crimes in the past.
[05:46.520 --> 05:49.840]  And, um, I think they might've, they might've, uh, gotten away with it.
[05:49.960 --> 05:54.120]  Uh, if, if people had not seen their faces or noticed them, unless someone was very observant.
[05:54.440 --> 05:57.980]  I don't like saying these things, but this is, uh, this seems to be the reality today.
[05:58.100 --> 05:59.980]  But there, there really aren't easy answers to this.
[06:00.080 --> 06:02.460]  What, uh, we have to consider now is, is it worth it?
[06:02.660 --> 06:04.980]  Um, we caught these guys in a short amount of time.
[06:05.260 --> 06:06.860]  Um, one of them has been murdered.
[06:06.980 --> 06:19.500]  The other one is, uh, now maimed and in custody, but, uh, is it, is it worth it to give up what we would be giving up, putting in more security, more surveillance, more, uh, more big brother when, you know, what are, what are we defending then?
[06:20.340 --> 06:20.900]  Well, okay.
[06:21.000 --> 06:22.960]  That's, that's a, a better way to approach it.
[06:23.060 --> 06:26.360]  What, uh, what does it turn us into to have a surveillance state?
[06:26.700 --> 06:27.440]  Um, all of it.
[06:27.460 --> 06:41.660]  I mean, my wish, my wish for next year, which I know is not going to come true, was for the Boston Marathon to take place with not a single bit of extra ad security, just to show the world, uh, however naive I might, uh, hope the world, uh, however naive I hope we would be,
[06:41.780 --> 06:54.520]  uh, or however naive I am for thinking that we are greater than we are, uh, to show that we, um, uh, don't fear this kind of thing, that we are fine the way we are, or maybe it could be better with a little less of this.
[06:54.980 --> 06:59.880]  Uh, but, um, instead we're hearing now talk about next year, they're going to have drones.
[07:00.180 --> 07:00.300]  Yeah.
[07:00.420 --> 07:03.560]  Drones are going to be flying around, uh, watching everybody.
[07:03.780 --> 07:10.260]  Now, I don't know if these are the kind of drones that can, uh, lob bombs at people, uh, or, uh, or, or take people out in various other ways.
[07:10.260 --> 07:11.860]  If not now, then maybe in the future.
[07:11.980 --> 07:20.920]  But, okay, you look at the path that we're taking, you look at the direction that we're going, and that's something to, to show people and say, this is the wrong path to be on.
[07:21.380 --> 07:31.360]  Uh, but I, I just don't think, um, uh, we're going to get far if we say that, uh, it doesn't work because, um, I think all of Boston will disagree with you today that, uh, yeah, it did work.
[07:31.420 --> 07:33.160]  And, uh, they caught the guys because of this.
[07:33.340 --> 07:36.560]  And it's unrealistic to, uh, to, uh, argue that point.
[07:36.740 --> 07:40.640]  The, the trouble is, um, what we give up is precious and there's no way to get it back when it's gone.
[07:40.780 --> 07:49.060]  Um, when September 11th happened, uh, here in town, um, we were told, uh, very soon after that, that we're going to be searching bags and, uh, backpacks and things on the subway.
[07:49.200 --> 07:59.920]  And this was a temporary measure, you know, just give up this freedom for a little while because, uh, we're all afraid now and this will make a dozen years later and it's routine and accepted and we're still, uh, opening up our backpacks for people.
[08:00.120 --> 08:01.860]  I've yet to open my backpack for anybody.
[08:02.080 --> 08:02.900]  Is that still a thing?
[08:03.180 --> 08:06.020]  I haven't seen them in a while, but I don't take the subway as much as I used to.
[08:06.120 --> 08:08.180]  It is still a thing and they still make the announcements regularly.
[08:08.480 --> 08:15.280]  Yeah, they make the announcements and those announcements are a little bit misleading because they say that, uh, that if you're on the subway, you're subject to random search and that's not the case.
[08:15.320 --> 08:21.020]  The case is if you walk into a subway station, you're subject to being asked to open your bag and you're free to leave.
[08:21.360 --> 08:27.460]  Once you're in the system itself, I've never heard of a A case where people are randomly searched on a train or on a platform or anything like that.
[08:27.580 --> 08:28.840]  If I'm wrong, someone please tell me.
[08:29.400 --> 08:34.980]  And I think that's indicative of New Yorkers holding on to their rights and saying, you're not going to do that to us.
[08:35.040 --> 08:37.710]  You're not going to turn us into that kind of a society.
[08:38.260 --> 08:40.340]  But there is a danger that that could happen.
[08:40.340 --> 08:54.040]  And I think that's where we really have to focus our attack, is to defend those freedoms, the ones that are left, and realize that there are some things we're probably not going to get back, unfortunately.
[08:54.420 --> 08:54.660]  Yes, Bernie.
[08:55.380 --> 09:12.580]  Along the lines of your argument there, I think one argument that might resonate with a lot of people is the one that the terrorists are winning if they are successful in changing our way of life.
[09:13.740 --> 09:29.690]  And frankly, if the terrorist's intention is to make us more afraid of, trade, and to change our way of life, and to make us give up a lot of the freedoms we still enjoy in this country, then I think they are winning.
[09:30.040 --> 09:32.360]  And that might resonate with some people.
[09:32.520 --> 09:36.840]  But you also have to ask yourself, at what point is your way of life changed?
[09:37.170 --> 09:47.340]  Today, you have metal detectors at schools, you have cameras every place, you've got all kinds of surveillance that you did not have before.
[09:47.840 --> 09:51.540]  And I think that boat might have sailed, that our life might be changed.
[09:51.720 --> 09:56.780]  And to go back to the way it was, that would be a change in our way of living.
[09:57.670 --> 09:59.400]  And I'd like to go back to that.
[09:59.540 --> 10:03.340]  But that's one hell of a battle when you're dealing with news stories like this.
[10:03.790 --> 10:10.170]  So, I mean, Obama went on television and said that we won't let the terrorists change our way of life or something like that.
[10:10.480 --> 10:22.200]  But also, the city of Boston and some of the surrounding communities shut themselves down voluntarily for a day, refused to let anyone go outside.
[10:22.760 --> 10:26.220]  They shut down the public transit and the taxi network.
[10:27.200 --> 10:33.240]  And none of this... So, except... And this sounds like a bad cop joke, but it's literally true.
[10:33.360 --> 10:37.420]  They let the Dunkin' Donuts remain open, uh, because that's a critical service.
[10:38.020 --> 10:46.310]  Um, but... So this thing, they did this thing, this lockdown, and I guess people wouldn't have, you know, stood for it for another day.
[10:46.520 --> 11:00.940]  Uh, so I guess we still have some limits as a society, but basically, as soon as the thing was over, um, some guy went outside for a smoke and, and that's how the, the, the suspect was found by a citizen, not by the police, not by the lockdown.
[11:00.940 --> 11:03.460]  So, it's really weird.
[11:04.000 --> 11:09.300]  Well, I mean, I'm not gonna go on and say that we know how to do a better job of it than, than the way they did it.
[11:09.400 --> 11:14.540]  And I also think that, uh, if you asked around, the vast majority of people were quite content staying inside their homes that day.
[11:15.100 --> 11:17.760]  Um, so it's, um, I don't know.
[11:17.880 --> 11:22.520]  It's, it's kind of dodgy ground as far as, um, um, figuring out how it should have been done.
[11:23.020 --> 11:26.060]  Um, and it was a, it was an unprecedented, uh, situation.
[11:26.220 --> 11:35.780]  What bugs me is that, uh, other, other, other crimes that have far more victims aren't treated with this level of, uh, of seriousness, uh, mass shootings, for instance.
[11:35.920 --> 11:40.080]  Now you're calling these guys, these guys are called, uh, enemy combatants by many politicians.
[11:40.960 --> 11:49.220]  Um, ultimately, um, the, the surviving, uh, the guy was not, um, uh, charged in that manner, but there was a, there was a strong call for that.
[11:49.260 --> 12:06.040]  And, uh, why, uh, what, why is it that, that, uh, these people who are, um, by all, um, uh, by all evidence so far, uh, acting alone and acting within this country, not being, not being, uh, helped by people outside this country, uh, they are immediately,
[12:06.040 --> 12:13.960]  um, uh, seen as enemy combatants or, or terrorists, whereas people who go on shooting sprees, um, and, and kill more people are not.
[12:14.260 --> 12:15.460]  Uh, what, what's the difference?
[12:15.700 --> 12:17.080]  I'm, I'm just trying to figure this out.
[12:17.280 --> 12:25.720]  And, uh, you know, I'd like to see, uh, more seriousness, uh, as far as stopping that kind of a thing, in addition to stopping this kind of a thing in the first place.
[12:25.880 --> 12:27.400]  Would you like me to answer that question?
[12:27.540 --> 12:28.060]  Well, why not?
[12:28.160 --> 12:29.260]  I think there are two reasons.
[12:29.400 --> 12:32.280]  One is that they didn't use a gun and we love guns in America.
[12:32.680 --> 12:35.920]  And the second and probably more important reason is that they're Muslims.
[12:37.000 --> 12:38.520]  Well, yeah, well, here's the other thing.
[12:38.740 --> 12:46.120]  And this is something that, um, um, I want to talk about social media a little bit and how this was a disaster for social media as well.
[12:46.280 --> 12:54.160]  Uh, basically they were looking for dark skinned people for a long, long time and, uh, Arab people, neither one of which turned out to be true.
[12:54.320 --> 13:02.080]  There were names spread around through, uh, Twitter and Facebook and God knows what else of two people who had nothing to do with this.
[13:02.280 --> 13:06.260]  One, in fact, unfortunately, uh, had gone missing about a month or so earlier.
[13:06.640 --> 13:17.340]  Um, and, um, this is something that if you looked on the internet, you saw this, these names being bandied about everywhere, uh, along with accusations that the mass media was covering this up for some reason.
[13:17.820 --> 13:26.740]  And, um, basically a lot of people were put through hell because of rumor mongering, uh, mongering and, um, and, and spreading a false information.
[13:27.320 --> 13:33.520]  And it wasn't until the actual photos came out that, uh, people stopped looking for dark skinned people.
[13:33.780 --> 13:43.180]  And it wasn't until the actual journalists who were covering the story named the people that actual information got out, accurate information got out.
[13:43.460 --> 13:52.880]  Um, and, um, you just have to be really, really, um, um, suspicious of, um, of, of just what you read on the internet.
[13:52.880 --> 14:01.020]  Uh, you, you can't simply farm this out to the masses and expect that anything is going to go through, uh, um, uh, you know, with, with accuracy.
[14:01.380 --> 14:06.460]  I think we saw a lot of bad information being passed around and it was, uh, it was pretty shocking, I think, Rob.
[14:06.640 --> 14:17.460]  And that's, um, that's the trouble with the current, uh, atmosphere of social media and everything, because whenever something like this would happen, you would have people like throwing around their theories, uh, you know, just chit chatting about who it might be and,
[14:17.460 --> 14:19.020]  uh, you know, who should we be afraid of?
[14:19.040 --> 14:19.680]  Who should we be blaming?
[14:19.800 --> 14:21.080]  Who should I, who should I be angry at?
[14:21.380 --> 14:31.300]  And this used to happen just, you know, on front lawns and around water coolers, but now it's happening over the entire world with, with, you know, everything interconnected and, uh, no fact checking going on.
[14:31.480 --> 14:40.300]  So you have things like, um, and it's even bleeding out into the mass media where you had the New York post publish a front page photo of a couple of guys who turned out to be just some kids who were totally innocent.
[14:40.460 --> 14:40.540]  Yeah.
[14:40.640 --> 14:41.800]  Well, that's the New York post.
[14:41.960 --> 14:45.960]  I, I, I really hesitate to call them, uh, journalists in any sense.
[14:45.960 --> 14:46.800]  I always have.
[14:46.980 --> 14:52.760]  In fact, uh, I guess the post is the equivalent of Twitter on paper because, uh, that's, that's really what, uh, Wait a minute.
[14:52.800 --> 14:57.620]  I mean, I know I read your Twitter feed last, last week and you were making up all kinds of stuff.
[14:57.800 --> 15:00.400]  Well, yeah, but I wasn't passing myself off as a news source.
[15:00.480 --> 15:00.840]  Now was I?
[15:01.300 --> 15:05.220]  I'm just saying that, uh, I'm trying to find it.
[15:05.400 --> 15:06.940]  Oh, you're going to read my tweets on the air.
[15:07.040 --> 15:07.540]  Okay, fine.
[15:07.640 --> 15:08.060]  Go for it.
[15:08.140 --> 15:16.660]  I mean, this is a low for us, I guess, but, uh, I'm just saying people, people like to talk about this stuff and, uh, people, yes, people like to talk about this stuff.
[15:16.780 --> 15:20.100]  They are not sources of information unless they're part of the actual incident.
[15:20.280 --> 15:24.280]  But now in, in the current media environment, we're in, we've got this 24 hour news cycle.
[15:24.420 --> 15:32.540]  We've got three or four huge organizations trying to each fill up time with, uh, things that will get eyeballs in, get people talking, get people, uh, to stay tuned.
[15:32.880 --> 15:37.300]  And so they're, they're throwing things around that aren't facts, that aren't news, that are just like random things.
[15:37.400 --> 15:42.560]  They're reading, you know, the, um, you know, the evening news reads people's tweets on the air these days with regularity.
[15:42.780 --> 15:45.940]  Um, it may be a new low for us, but, uh, they do it all the time.
[15:45.940 --> 15:53.960]  They read Facebook comments and this is all, um, just to fill up time because really there is no information, but they're not going to come out on TV and say, we don't know any more than you do.
[15:54.040 --> 15:55.460]  Well, they didn't have to fill time last week.
[15:55.540 --> 16:00.640]  There was plenty, plenty of stuff to focus on and to keep people entertained for, for days on end.
[16:00.920 --> 16:06.360]  Uh, but I guess that really what comes out of this, don't believe what you see on the net or on Twitter.
[16:06.500 --> 16:10.420]  And especially yesterday when the Associated Press's Twitter feed got hacked.
[16:10.720 --> 16:12.540]  Yeah, this was something, wasn't it?
[16:13.040 --> 16:16.700]  Um, basically somebody got into, uh, their, their Twitter account.
[16:17.060 --> 16:19.220]  Uh, the Twitter account is called AP two letters.
[16:19.380 --> 16:19.480]  Yeah.
[16:19.820 --> 16:22.680]  Maybe their password was only two letters to all you need to do.
[16:22.840 --> 16:23.080]  Oh yeah.
[16:23.200 --> 16:24.140]  And folks, you can do this now.
[16:24.140 --> 16:25.140]  Twitter.com.
[16:25.320 --> 16:25.540]  All right.
[16:25.760 --> 16:29.720]  Uh, enter as username AP password, guess anything you want.
[16:29.820 --> 16:32.660]  And if you guess it right, you can put out news stories.
[16:32.800 --> 16:39.860]  Although if you do put out news stories, spell the words, right, try to imitate the Associated Press's style so that people will believe you.
[16:40.280 --> 16:42.840]  And, uh, and, and maybe you'll actually get away with it for a little while.
[16:43.040 --> 16:48.580]  If I had done it, if I had done it, I would have put as the news story, AP Twitter account hacked.
[16:49.300 --> 16:50.660]  And that would have been a true story.
[16:50.800 --> 16:51.760]  I wouldn't have even been lying.
[16:51.940 --> 16:53.080]  They couldn't have denied it.
[16:53.220 --> 16:53.780]  What would they have done?
[16:54.560 --> 17:01.140]  Um, but instead, uh, this actually, uh, uh, went out that there was an attack at the white house and that Obama was, was injured.
[17:01.340 --> 17:06.920]  The stock market plunged on this news and then went right back up as soon as it was announced that it was a hoax.
[17:07.380 --> 17:12.220]  Uh, maybe that would have been my story that the stock market plunged because then the stock market would have plunged, would have been self-fulfilling.
[17:12.510 --> 17:26.880]  Um, that you could have had all kinds of fun with this, but the, the real, the real fact is people should not, or my opinion is that you should not, uh, trust what you read on Twitter, even if it comes from what you believe is a reliable source, because these things are not secure one password and you're in,
[17:27.030 --> 17:28.680]  they need to build a better platform.
[17:28.680 --> 17:38.050]  If they want, uh, only authenticated people that, uh, you know, going back and forth, um, uh, you know, basically confirming this is that person.
[17:38.240 --> 17:39.780]  Um, they're not there yet.
[17:39.940 --> 17:41.780]  So, uh, really, this can happen to anybody.
[17:42.010 --> 17:44.470]  It happened to, uh, 60 minutes and 48 hours last week.
[17:44.800 --> 17:47.780]  Uh, so it happens to all kinds of different entities.
[17:48.160 --> 17:48.280]  Emmanuel.
[17:48.460 --> 17:48.640]  Yes.
[17:49.140 --> 18:10.160]  Um, along the lines of, uh, media hoaxes this past week, um, you probably, I don't know if you heard the story of New York Post, uh, some, some, some accuracy in journalism activists purchased a whole bunch of copies of New York Post in Manhattan and inserted a flyer purportedly written by the New York Post apologizing for all the reporting errors and,
[18:10.160 --> 18:19.320]  and sloppy journalism that they, uh, uh, engaged in over the past week or so, and put this flyer in all the papers and just, and distributed them free on the streets.
[18:19.760 --> 18:20.960]  And it went viral.
[18:21.780 --> 18:29.660]  And the, uh, the Post was kind of, uh, kind of caught with egg on its face because they couldn't really deny it because everything in the flyer was true.
[18:30.070 --> 18:30.320]  Wow.
[18:30.820 --> 18:35.700]  Well, that's, that's exactly the kind of activism, uh, we need to see people taking measures into their own hands like that.
[18:35.860 --> 18:38.300]  I'm just surprised the flyer was able to fit inside the paper.
[18:38.760 --> 18:40.380]  Uh, I'm surprised it wasn't bigger than the paper.
[18:41.080 --> 18:44.460]  That was just a normal size sheet of paper that people stuck in there.
[18:44.720 --> 18:50.860]  And, uh, apparently they only did it to maybe several hundred copies, but they handed them out in the street and it went viral.
[18:50.940 --> 18:56.030]  And then they used the New York Post writing style and logo on the, on the flyer that was inserted in the papers they bought.
[18:56.660 --> 18:57.470]  I'm all for that.
[18:57.640 --> 18:59.900]  They didn't do anything illegal and they made their point.
[19:01.010 --> 19:01.440]  All right.
[19:01.470 --> 19:11.640]  I'd like to get back to, um, the issue of drones though, because this is something we're going to have to deal with, uh, uh, with increasing frequency in this city, uh, throughout America, throughout the world, uh, drones of different, uh, sorts.
[19:11.720 --> 19:15.490]  This is what the police commission of Boston, Ed Davis says, drones are a great idea.
[19:15.660 --> 19:25.760]  I don't know that would be the first place I'd invest money, but certainly to cover an event like this and have an eye in the sky, that would be much cheaper to run than a helicopter is a really good idea.
[19:26.030 --> 19:35.140]  Uh, he says it's envisioning a partnership between the city and businesses to buy a monitor, lower mounted cameras, uh, position more strategically to, uh, capture people's faces.
[19:35.360 --> 19:40.510]  Uh, he said he has no cost estimate and he's not sure whether he will request additional money or find it within the budget.
[19:40.590 --> 19:46.380]  I'm sure, uh, fear can be a very motivating factor here and, um, and he'll get whatever it is he, he, he wants.
[19:47.240 --> 19:55.110]  Um, the thing that's interesting here, uh, is, um, facial recognition did not play a part in, in capturing these guys.
[19:55.240 --> 19:56.780]  That's something that I think is significant.
[19:57.030 --> 20:00.760]  Uh, it was basically releasing an image, having people jump on that image.
[20:00.820 --> 20:03.240]  And as soon as they did, they were able to find out a lot more information.
[20:03.530 --> 20:14.470]  You didn't need this whole, uh, um, uh, culture of, uh, everybody instantly being identifiable, uh, because, uh, there are enough people around with their own images to figure it out on their own.
[20:14.860 --> 20:15.700]  And I think that's...
[20:15.700 --> 20:33.340]  Well, if, uh, are you saying though that this isn't going to be an argument used that, uh, by government that now we need all this, uh, facial identification, facial recognition stuff and driver's plate, uh, reading automatic driver's license card, driver's plate readers,
[20:33.530 --> 20:35.550]  and all that other stuff, because there's terrorism.
[20:36.240 --> 20:44.360]  What, what, what I think right now, what's realistic is to say that we don't need anything more than what there is right now, you know?
[20:44.490 --> 20:52.240]  And, uh, because what there is right now caught the guys at, at, at, at the minimum, we, we don't need drones.
[20:52.240 --> 20:57.800]  We don't need additional surveillance because how much better a job could you have possibly done?
[20:58.470 --> 20:59.660]  That's, that's what I'd like to know.
[21:00.030 --> 21:00.280]  Anyone?
[21:00.510 --> 21:02.610]  But the, the abuse of power though is self-sustaining.
[21:02.880 --> 21:05.970]  When you have enough power to grant yourself more power, you want it.
[21:06.070 --> 21:07.990]  It's basic human nature and you're going to use it.
[21:08.090 --> 21:10.220]  And once you've got that power, it will be abused.
[21:11.820 --> 21:12.220]  Yeah.
[21:12.490 --> 21:12.680]  Yeah.
[21:12.840 --> 21:13.640]  No, that's, that's a given.
[21:13.780 --> 21:14.030]  I know.
[21:14.380 --> 21:15.940]  We, we need more funding for OSHA.
[21:16.780 --> 21:17.970]  See, this is what bugs me.
[21:18.320 --> 21:28.420]  Uh, this, uh, university of Tennessee law professor, uh, who is a, a critic of, uh, government surveillance as, as we all are, uh, Glenn Reynolds, uh, he said that, um, uh, the police commissioner might be giving cameras too much credit.
[21:28.550 --> 21:31.550]  The record of cameras and catching terrorists has been pretty lousy.
[21:32.050 --> 21:35.640]  If in fact, they caught these guys through the cameras, it's pretty much the first time.
[21:36.140 --> 21:39.110]  Again, I just think that's a bad argument because, um, well, okay.
[21:39.340 --> 21:42.140]  Uh, most of the time terrorists blow themselves up anyway.
[21:42.760 --> 21:44.960]  Uh, so there's not much catching to do at that point.
[21:45.140 --> 21:47.400]  Uh, people certainly have been caught with cameras before.
[21:47.470 --> 21:51.680]  And, uh, if this is the first time people are going to say, wow, okay, well it's, it's proven itself.
[21:52.180 --> 22:06.660]  Uh, I, I really think that we need to be looking at, uh, at the additional, uh, surveillance that's being planned and, uh, and the abuses that are going on with existing technology rather than trying to say that something that obviously did do the job doesn't work.
[22:06.860 --> 22:07.180]  Yes, Bernie.
[22:07.180 --> 22:10.980]  Uh, Mike started to bring up a point about we need more funding for OSHA.
[22:11.140 --> 22:29.240]  I saw an interesting statistic that, uh, Mike might have seen also over the past week that everybody who's died in the United States from terrorist attacks since before 9-11, including 9-11, including those people in the past 12 years or so, um, 20 times more people have died in America,
[22:29.420 --> 22:33.360]  in North America, as a result of workplace accidents.
[22:34.260 --> 22:50.280]  Um, so if we're going to, if our society is going to invest money in making us safer, wouldn't it be more sensible and a better use of that money to spend it on workplace safety and save far more people's lives than all the surveillance stuff can possibly do?
[22:50.420 --> 22:53.570]  Are you including mass shootings and, and, and those terrorist, uh, statistics?
[22:53.980 --> 22:55.860]  Uh, yeah, yeah, yeah.
[22:55.900 --> 22:57.570]  Your figures might get a little skewed if you do.
[22:57.720 --> 23:01.440]  Well, it depends on, I mean, it's, it's kind of foggy in what you determine is a terrorist thing.
[23:01.440 --> 23:06.480]  And I think, I think things that were, were included were, were, were mass shootings.
[23:06.680 --> 23:23.090]  I don't think individual, uh, killings by guns were included, but, but mass shootings were, and frankly, even that number is relatively small, um, compared to, it's a small number compared to the, the, the tens of thousands, something like, something like,
[23:23.200 --> 23:27.800]  uh, you know, tens of thousands of people have died in workplace accidents in the past dozen years.
[23:28.220 --> 23:34.460]  And, you know, OSHA is clearly underfunded and money could be better spent saving Americans' lives that way.
[23:34.640 --> 23:37.610]  People just work too much, I think, but, uh, that's, that's just me.
[23:37.800 --> 23:44.420]  But again, you know, if, if you say this is a terrorist event, then why on earth was Columbine not considered a terrorist event?
[23:44.640 --> 23:46.140]  You had basically the same thing.
[23:46.320 --> 23:52.110]  You had, uh, a couple of alienated people that lashed out at those around them for God knows what reasons.
[23:52.360 --> 23:55.400]  And, uh, yeah, as, as, as Mike will say, it's because they're Muslim.
[23:55.780 --> 24:05.700]  Uh, but, um, you know, we, we need to also think a little, um, a little bigger as far as, uh, how we define terrorism in the first place, you know?
[24:05.820 --> 24:08.040]  So, so I don't think terrorism is a very useful category.
[24:08.260 --> 24:14.540]  It, it basically means, uh, you know, it's a political judgment, not a, uh, how many people are dead judgment.
[24:14.980 --> 24:24.070]  Um, but I think that, uh, like, I, I wonder why we're spending so much, uh, and, and I know why.
[24:24.160 --> 24:35.200]  So to say, I wonder is really disingenuous, but it's curious that we're spending so much attention and effort on this case in Boston and almost none in the case in Texas in which more people died.
[24:35.400 --> 24:38.420]  Uh, that was also a violation of many laws.
[24:38.700 --> 24:42.000]  I don't even know if they're going after the people who ran the plant.
[24:42.000 --> 24:44.300]  They're certainly not going to be threatened with the death penalty.
[24:45.070 --> 24:48.070]  And, uh, it's really, it's really interesting.
[24:48.260 --> 24:49.780]  Do they know how that fire even got started?
[24:50.070 --> 24:57.920]  Because I thought it was kind of weird that, uh, 20 years almost to the day after Waco, uh, a fertilizer plant explodes right next to Waco.
[24:58.180 --> 24:58.340]  Yeah.
[24:58.340 --> 24:59.900]  I just think that's kind of an odd coincidence.
[25:00.200 --> 25:00.200]  Yeah.
[25:00.240 --> 25:01.540]  I mean, they, I don't know the details.
[25:01.610 --> 25:06.050]  I don't have them in front of me, but the, the answer is basically they were storing large amounts of chemicals on Safely.
[25:06.540 --> 25:06.840]  Yeah.
[25:07.020 --> 25:07.110]  Yeah.
[25:07.220 --> 25:11.090]  And there's laws that define what Safely is and those laws were violated.
[25:11.360 --> 25:13.200]  But again, how did the fire get started?
[25:13.340 --> 25:15.940]  That's something I, I have not heard an answer to, and I would like to know that.
[25:16.500 --> 25:21.460]  Um, and the other aspect to this whole, uh, Boston incident, um, has to do with, uh, technology.
[25:21.880 --> 25:32.720]  And, uh, Bernie, you shared a very interesting article with us, uh, the other day, uh, as far as, uh, wireless, uh, how the wireless system or, or the, uh, cellular system up in Boston completely collapsed.
[25:32.960 --> 25:47.090]  And this seems to be something that, um, that we see every time there's some kind of an, an, an incident, whether it be a storm or an attack or just something that involves, uh, lots of people using the phone at the same time.
[25:47.920 --> 25:51.480]  Um, and is there anything else you can point to?
[25:51.590 --> 25:52.940]  That was, uh, that was a problem here.
[25:53.180 --> 26:09.920]  Well, it just comes to, it just comes down to the economics and the fact that, uh, cell phone companies are not mobile, mobile telecoms are not regulated like landline carriers were for a long time, uh, to provide a certain, what's called the term of art called grade of service.
[26:10.180 --> 26:15.880]  You know, back in the day with the dial tone, it was how long it would take for you to get a dial tone when you pick the phone off the hook.
[26:16.420 --> 26:18.340]  And typically it was measured in milliseconds.
[26:18.700 --> 26:27.520]  Now, nowadays I have sometimes waited a whole minute to get, uh, get a call through on a cell phone in a, in a crowded area or more, if it's just, it's just hosed and it's too crowded.
[26:27.780 --> 26:40.610]  There's, there's no incentive for the, for the mobile phone companies to provide, uh, the, the level of service that's necessary in the rare instances when there's a whole bunch of people needing to make a call right away.
[26:41.200 --> 26:50.000]  And they make so much money, billions and billions of dollars a year, that they can funnel some of these obscene profits into lobbying to prevent themselves from being regulated.
[26:50.460 --> 27:02.640]  So we end up with this perverse situation where just when we need our mobile phones the most, such as people needed them in Boston, um, right after these explosions, they can't get their calls through.
[27:02.900 --> 27:06.570]  There's just no reason the phone companies are going to do it.
[27:06.660 --> 27:09.300]  And they don't care about people's welfare.
[27:09.500 --> 27:10.420]  They care about making money.
[27:10.540 --> 27:15.200]  That's their responsibility as corporations to make as much possible money as they can for their shareholders.
[27:15.460 --> 27:18.550]  But that conflicts with what's in the public interest.
[27:18.920 --> 27:20.700]  So, um, let me get this straight.
[27:20.960 --> 27:35.940]  Um, regular phone companies, uh, the ones like Verizon or in the old days, New York telephone and 9x, uh, were required, uh, by government regulation to maintain a certain standard of service that was available to everybody.
[27:36.610 --> 27:40.160]  And there's no such, um, guarantee with cellular phone companies, correct?
[27:40.400 --> 27:40.780]  That's right.
[27:40.940 --> 27:50.180]  In fact, the, uh, all the telcos that provide landlines are, uh, regulated by state public utilities commissions, but state public utility commissions have no, no say.
[27:50.380 --> 27:53.540]  They don't, they don't, they don't regulate, um, mobile carriers.
[27:53.680 --> 28:11.020]  The FCC has sort of a, a very loose hand in regulating some aspects of, uh, mobile telecoms, but, uh, uh, uh, mobile telecoms basically pay people in Congress, uh, pay lobbyists to lobby Congress and Congress tells the FCC what to do.
[28:11.160 --> 28:13.220]  And then the FCC tells the mobile telcos what to do.
[28:13.340 --> 28:17.820]  So as a result, you had the situation where the mobile telcos don't really have to do much they don't want to do.
[28:18.090 --> 28:27.380]  So, uh, Bernie, I don't know exactly how it works, but they're, they're required to provide a certain grade of service, but it's still not, uh, the maximum possible service.
[28:27.720 --> 28:33.570]  Um, I remember on nine 11, you couldn't make a landline call either because those networks were also congested.
[28:33.780 --> 28:37.800]  So it's a higher grade of service, but it's not like a, an infinitely high one.
[28:38.640 --> 28:39.040]  Yes.
[28:39.320 --> 28:40.540]  It's a huge difference.
[28:40.860 --> 28:45.840]  Like the only reason I couldn't make a landline call on nine 11 was because all the pay funds were broken and not maintained.
[28:45.980 --> 28:56.040]  Uh, but you know, in certain situations, uh, in, in a crisis with a landline, you have to maybe wait a minute to get a dial tone because a dial tone is actually an indication that yes, you can dial, you have a circuit of some sort.
[28:56.320 --> 29:01.500]  Uh, but, um, uh, and I actually was able to make a cell phone call on nine 11 too, but it took quite a few attempts.
[29:02.050 --> 29:08.000]  But you know, I, I think in this particular case, there is less capacity and there are more people trying to use it all at the same time.
[29:08.880 --> 29:09.400]  That's right.
[29:10.000 --> 29:12.820]  Uh, plus, you know, it's also a lot easier to turn off.
[29:13.020 --> 29:15.800]  It's a lot easier to control these kinds of networks.
[29:15.840 --> 29:24.400]  Look at Egypt, look in, in, in, in various other countries, uh, where, uh, crowds got out of hand and then, and basically a switch was thrown and all of a sudden people couldn't communicate anymore.
[29:24.940 --> 29:29.040]  Um, it's not quite as simple to do that with, uh, with, with landline communications.
[29:29.380 --> 29:30.000]  Why not?
[29:30.320 --> 29:31.480]  I don't know why not.
[29:31.640 --> 29:35.160]  It's, it's, I mean, you, you can still call Verizon and they can flip the switch.
[29:35.260 --> 29:40.760]  It's, it's not all centralized in, in, in one small area, like, uh, like, like a cell phone transmitter.
[29:40.860 --> 29:45.460]  There's all kinds of, uh, of, uh, circuits and wires spread out through a large area.
[29:45.680 --> 29:47.980]  And, um, it's, it's harder to just turn off.
[29:48.110 --> 29:53.160]  We have not seen that happen in the past and in, in, in various, uh, uprisings throughout the, uh, the decades.
[29:53.610 --> 29:59.420]  I mean, the, the Egyptian government, in addition to, uh, shutting down cell phones, they, they shut down wired internet.
[29:59.720 --> 30:02.300]  Well, they, they, they, yeah, they cut lines.
[30:02.480 --> 30:08.840]  They, they turn off, uh, um, access to the internet, uh, for various, um, um, ISPs and things like that.
[30:08.940 --> 30:12.610]  But to actually shut down the phone company, first of all, they use the phone company themselves.
[30:13.070 --> 30:15.540]  So they'd be cutting themselves off at the same time.
[30:15.800 --> 30:21.760]  Uh, you can't just target, uh, other than cutting individual lines, can't target certain, certain people.
[30:22.170 --> 30:24.240]  Uh, it's, it's just, it's more difficult.
[30:24.380 --> 30:33.700]  But another, another aspect to all this, which I thought was kind of, uh, almost, almost humorous, um, is, is basically what happens, uh, to the way we think.
[30:33.820 --> 30:38.960]  Now, uh, according to this article, which appeared in, uh, the Atlantic, uh, the Atlantic cities.com is the website.
[30:39.280 --> 30:44.800]  Uh, our smartphones keep our complicated lives choreographed across the sprawling metropolitan areas.
[30:44.940 --> 30:49.960]  We inhabit psychologists and sociologists have found that we think of these devices as extensions of our bodies and minds.
[30:50.090 --> 31:03.180]  And in Boston, this was all too apparent, even when runners whose mobile batteries had been drained after the long run, which is the whole other issue, uh, when they were able to locate a phone, they couldn't recall what numbers to dial having long ago,
[31:03.440 --> 31:08.020]  given up memorizing phone numbers in favor of their smartphones, electronic address book.
[31:08.160 --> 31:09.340]  And that's, you know, something like that.
[31:09.440 --> 31:11.070]  We've got nobody to blame, but ourselves.
[31:12.000 --> 31:24.570]  And, uh, yeah, I, I think basically we can, uh, we can make use of all kinds of different technology, but when we become dependent on one particular type, uh, there are all sorts of things that we risk, that we risk giving up.
[31:24.720 --> 31:26.520]  And, uh, we see this time and time again.
[31:27.300 --> 31:32.920]  Um, I'd like to take phone calls from our, from our listeners on, on, on these particular issues and things like that.
[31:33.020 --> 31:34.140]  Is there anything else in the news?
[31:34.280 --> 31:35.090]  A CISPA update.
[31:35.610 --> 31:48.550]  Um, I understand that CISPA was, uh, was passed by the, uh, the House of Representatives, but now, uh, according to, um, uh, to various, uh, news organizations, it's, uh, stalled in the Senate, as, as things tend to do.
[31:49.220 --> 31:50.200]  So don't count on it.
[31:50.300 --> 31:50.960]  They'll call your Senator.
[31:51.420 --> 31:52.660]  Uh, probably they will.
[31:52.880 --> 31:53.000]  Yeah.
[31:53.180 --> 32:01.300]  But, um, right now, right now, I don't think that, um, uh, that it's going anywhere, but that's not a reason to, uh, to think that the, uh, the battle is over.
[32:01.440 --> 32:02.220]  The battle is certainly not over.
[32:02.340 --> 32:08.220]  In fact, here's an editorial that appeared on, uh, some, some website called redstate.com.
[32:08.640 --> 32:11.880]  Um, this is why we need to pass CISPA.
[32:12.440 --> 32:16.540]  It, uh, it, it reads, uh, we're at war online.
[32:16.720 --> 32:22.160]  Iran, North Korea, and Russia are the sources of sustained attacks on our government and our economy.
[32:22.340 --> 32:26.680]  They steal from us, they disrupt our operations, and they're no better than the pirates of old.
[32:27.040 --> 32:31.760]  On the sea, such attacks would eventually mean war, but on the internet, they get a pass.
[32:32.420 --> 32:44.020]  Individuals do tend to get nabbed out to the fact as they build massive botnets for credit card fraud and Bitcoin mining, but it's not enough to sit back, uh, passively and wait to get attacked before doing anything.
[32:44.020 --> 32:45.380]  We need to be proactive.
[32:45.380 --> 32:50.200]  And that means putting together all the information we can about attacks, past, present, and future.
[32:50.400 --> 32:55.480]  We need to be able to deal with attacks before the spin up fully, right?
[32:55.500 --> 32:57.700]  We need to pass along warnings before it's too late.
[32:57.700 --> 33:02.570]  And that means we need legislation to prevent trial lawyers from making a mess of all this.
[33:02.840 --> 33:05.340]  So that's why it's time to pass CISPA.
[33:06.110 --> 33:09.640]  And if that hasn't convinced you that it's a bad idea, here's, here's some more.
[33:10.070 --> 33:11.940]  Uh, inaction isn't going to fly as an answer here.
[33:12.070 --> 33:18.540]  Uh, if we do not find a way to use government in a legitimate role as national security provider, then the Democrats will try again.
[33:18.700 --> 33:26.780]  The last few times they've tried, they went with a high regulatory approach, giving the president emergency dictatorial powers over private property and internet infrastructure.
[33:27.070 --> 33:38.340]  These bills have gone as far as the internet kill switch plans, letting the president order that American internet connections to the rest of the world be shut down and be given power over the private employees who have the ability to do that.
[33:38.500 --> 33:49.400]  It is important that we can improve the situation and get us moving in the right direction with a light touch, a clearing house for voluntary information sharing, aggregating data in industry standard ways.
[33:49.400 --> 33:52.280]  It's about the lightest possible touch we're going to have here.
[33:52.660 --> 33:53.550]  Amendments are possible.
[33:53.680 --> 34:05.320]  There are surely ways we can tweak the language of the law to find just the right balance between private privacy agreements and the need to address the pressing national security threat, address those in the Senate.
[34:05.550 --> 34:08.660]  But nebulous privacy concerns are not an argument in themselves.
[34:08.820 --> 34:12.400]  Improving this bill is something that must be done in a constructive way.
[34:12.550 --> 34:20.320]  In particular, we must dismiss entirely the left libertarian radicals who keep screaming that this bill has anything to do with copyright or SOPA.
[34:20.540 --> 34:32.480]  The anarchists, freeloaders, pirate party types, anontards, and associated scum want to sink this bill because they oppose greater cyber security.
[34:32.740 --> 34:35.700]  The online bomb throwers don't want us to be better protected.
[34:35.960 --> 34:38.300]  Let the normal legislative process move forward.
[34:38.400 --> 34:42.640]  Amend CISPA into the best practical bill we can make it and make it into law.
[34:42.920 --> 34:44.140]  Well, guys, what do you think?
[34:44.520 --> 34:46.040]  Are we going to sign up now?
[34:46.280 --> 34:49.780]  I think I feel measurably stupider for hearing that whole thing through.
[34:50.280 --> 34:52.070]  So... Redstate.com, that's a...
[34:52.070 --> 34:54.760]  So I was having trouble understanding the argument there.
[34:55.110 --> 34:58.220]  I don't know if you... I know you read it, but didn't write it.
[34:58.320 --> 35:01.000]  Maybe you understand it a little more, having read it more than once.
[35:01.440 --> 35:11.760]  They are arguing for greater government power to spy on us because that is consistent with a small government philosophy.
[35:12.070 --> 35:16.700]  Well, a small government philosophy as long as it's doing what they want it to do.
[35:17.240 --> 35:26.740]  So as soon as, say, a state disagrees with them, then state power goes straight out the window and you need the federal government to step in and put that state in line.
[35:26.960 --> 35:28.840]  So it's... Yeah, there's so much hypocrisy here.
[35:28.940 --> 35:29.940]  You can make a sandwich out of it.
[35:30.440 --> 35:32.360]  But it's... Yeah.
[35:33.120 --> 35:34.800]  Basically, CISPA is a threat.
[35:34.920 --> 35:38.600]  Maybe we'd be better off telling people why CISPA is a threat.
[35:38.860 --> 35:39.900]  Anybody want to tackle that?
[35:39.900 --> 35:44.240]  I just... I especially like the bit in that rant about how trial lawyers are going to mess this up.
[35:44.380 --> 35:49.760]  So basically, we need CISPA because the system of due process needs to be put to a stop.
[35:50.960 --> 35:51.480]  Yeah, okay.
[35:51.540 --> 35:53.160]  But that didn't address why CISPA is a threat.
[35:53.580 --> 35:54.500]  Does anybody want to try that?
[35:54.540 --> 36:01.010]  CISPA is a threat because it basically opens up... It basically opens up you being...
[36:02.980 --> 36:03.740]  I don't wear this.
[36:03.920 --> 36:16.640]  It opens up a great deal of potential for surveillance in an abusive manner because of things that are not illegal, because of... Because you break some company's terms of service, which they can put anything they want in, and interpret it any way they want,
[36:16.720 --> 36:17.780]  and then decide you've broken it.
[36:18.400 --> 36:29.020]  It gives the power to private companies to swap information with each other and the government without due process, without warrants, because... Just because they feel like they want to.
[36:30.460 --> 36:31.580]  Bernie, anything to add to that?
[36:31.800 --> 36:32.240]  Well, yeah.
[36:32.520 --> 36:53.300]  And even if, under CISPA, if I'm not mistaken, if corporations can say they feel that their networks are at risk, they can not only spy on us in a manner that would be in violation of our Fourth Amendment rights, if it was the government doing it, and provide that information to the government,
[36:53.440 --> 37:00.460]  who I'm sure would never ask them for this information, without any accountability.
[37:00.460 --> 37:01.720]  You can't sue them.
[37:01.860 --> 37:03.080]  They're given full immunity.
[37:03.300 --> 37:19.980]  Moreover, under CISPA, I believe, corporations are actually able to go on the offensive and hack into other people's or other companies' computers if they say they feel that they're threatened by these other organizations.
[37:19.980 --> 37:35.500]  We all remember the Sony Rootkit hack years ago, where consumers' computers were basically infiltrated by Sony, who were trying to enforce some crazy copyright.
[37:35.680 --> 37:37.320]  This was not the low-sec hack.
[37:37.400 --> 37:41.160]  This was Sony actually acting against individual people.
[37:41.400 --> 37:41.940]  Right, right.
[37:42.140 --> 37:50.360]  And this will provide... CISPA will provide corporations with immunity to do this really wantonly, without any accountability.
[37:51.040 --> 37:53.360]  It's just dangerous in so many ways, in my opinion.
[37:53.360 --> 37:53.900]  All right.
[37:54.040 --> 38:02.580]  It's the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, which we abbreviate as CISPA, CISPA, passed the House last week, 288 to 127.
[38:03.140 --> 38:04.840]  So our work is cut out for us.
[38:05.040 --> 38:11.040]  Obama has said he will veto this in its current standing, and has not made it through the Senate yet.
[38:11.040 --> 38:17.120]  So there is time, but go to EFF.org and help them, because they're the ones in the front lines.
[38:17.220 --> 38:17.340]  Mike?
[38:17.340 --> 38:26.660]  I mean, what's crazy about this bill is that even casual listeners of our show will know it's really not that hard for the government to get all the data it wants about everything it wants data about.
[38:27.040 --> 38:29.160]  Already, under current law, they do it all the time.
[38:29.160 --> 38:31.060]  We talk about it on the show all the time.
[38:32.260 --> 38:36.040]  Corporations already have almost total immunity from spying on you.
[38:37.260 --> 38:52.440]  When the stars align in just such a way that a company actually gets fined for violating someone's privacy, you get these billion-dollar corporations with thousand-dollar judgments against them, and they just write it off as a cost of doing business.
[38:52.760 --> 39:01.880]  And yet, somehow, this total lack of regard for your privacy is not a large enough lack of regard for certain players.
[39:02.060 --> 39:04.280]  And I just don't get what they want.
[39:04.320 --> 39:07.760]  Well, no, I think the theme that we're focusing on tonight is that it's never enough.
[39:07.760 --> 39:11.180]  If you have enough surveillance, you always want more.
[39:11.360 --> 39:14.760]  If you have enough laws, you always want an additional law.
[39:15.140 --> 39:16.340]  That never stops.
[39:16.500 --> 39:17.520]  It never will stop.
[39:17.680 --> 39:20.280]  And that's why it's important for us to say enough already.
[39:20.920 --> 39:22.580]  Let's look at if we have too much.
[39:22.640 --> 39:24.500]  Let's look at if this is working at all.
[39:24.900 --> 39:30.020]  And let's stop adding more fuel to the fire and making things even worse.
[39:30.400 --> 39:31.980]  All right, we're going to take some phone calls.
[39:32.220 --> 39:36.560]  The phone number is 212-650-5782.
[39:37.020 --> 39:40.220]  But first, a couple of news updates.
[39:41.180 --> 39:52.080]  A former LOSEC member who went on a hacking spree in the Sony Pictures website and database has received a one-year federal prison sentence for his actions.
[39:52.260 --> 39:55.960]  Corey Kretzinger, 25-year-old from Decatur, Illinois.
[39:56.460 --> 39:57.420]  Is that how you say it, Bernie?
[39:57.560 --> 39:57.960]  Decatur?
[39:58.480 --> 39:58.880]  Yes.
[39:59.100 --> 39:59.300]  Okay.
[39:59.440 --> 39:59.880]  Wasn't sure.
[40:01.060 --> 40:11.900]  He used the online alias Recursion when he was a member of the hacker group LOSEC to breach the Sony site and leak customer data that included names, addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses.
[40:12.320 --> 40:19.080]  He was arrested in September 2011 and pled guilty to computer hacking charges in relation to the Sony Pictures leak.
[40:19.880 --> 40:25.340]  LOSEC is an associated act of international hacking group Anonymous.
[40:25.740 --> 40:27.240]  Interesting way of describing them.
[40:28.560 --> 40:37.620]  And again, I've expressed my opinion on this before, that this kind of thing really is not tantamount to a crime in my eyes.
[40:37.800 --> 40:39.440]  This information was already there.
[40:39.620 --> 40:42.060]  It was on their website, for God's sake.
[40:42.180 --> 40:47.660]  It was something that was not protected properly and had no business being there.
[40:47.860 --> 40:51.360]  So this guy goes to jail for a year, has to pay $600,000 in restitution.
[40:51.800 --> 40:53.080]  This seems like a waste.
[40:53.240 --> 41:06.380]  And also in Australia, the alleged leader, a so-called leader, a self-proclaimed leader of that same hacking group, and I didn't know the leader was in Australia, has been charged in connection with an attack on a government website in early April.
[41:06.380 --> 41:08.280]  That's according to Australian police officials.
[41:08.560 --> 41:19.620]  In their news release, which was posted on their website today, the Australian federal police said the man was a 24-year-old internet technology professional from Point Clare, which is a suburb on the New South Wales coast.
[41:19.800 --> 41:27.160]  He's charged with two counts of unauthorized modification of data and one count of unauthorized access to or modification of restricted data.
[41:27.280 --> 41:32.220]  He faces 10 years for the first two charges and up to two years on the third charge.
[41:32.300 --> 41:37.620]  They did not release his name, but they said he worked for a company that did work for government agencies.
[41:38.540 --> 41:42.480]  And the release called him the self-proclaimed leader of the hacking group.
[41:42.600 --> 41:48.880]  It's interesting how you can be a leader of an anonymous group of people, but the media keeps identifying people in that way.
[41:50.020 --> 41:58.520]  And again, we have to look at these things in context as to what it is that actually took place, what actually happened, what harm was caused.
[41:58.700 --> 42:18.240]  For instance, this whole Twitter thing, which I got a good laugh out of yesterday and the one last week with 60 minutes and 48 hours, are they actually, actually going to open up an investigation and waste taxpayer dollars and law enforcement time to track down somebody using a Twitter account without permission?
[42:18.960 --> 42:21.060]  Bernie, do you think they're actually going to go that path?
[42:21.060 --> 42:25.280]  It wouldn't surprise me because, uh, you know, you'll probably get the FBI and law enforcement involved.
[42:25.540 --> 42:34.980]  And, um, I don't think that's a good use of tax dollars to be protecting, uh, corporation, social network, social networking, corporations, sloppy security.
[42:35.640 --> 42:37.800]  It's only social networking.
[42:37.800 --> 42:39.360]  For God's sake, people get a grip.
[42:39.780 --> 42:43.420]  All right, you know, as that noise, that annoying noise will tell us we are getting phone calls.
[42:43.680 --> 42:45.920]  So, uh, we should probably, uh, take them.
[42:46.060 --> 42:49.860]  212-650-5782 is our telephone number.
[42:50.000 --> 42:50.400]  And good evening.
[42:50.580 --> 42:51.460]  You're on off the hook.
[42:52.460 --> 42:52.860]  Why?
[42:53.240 --> 42:53.640]  Why?
[42:53.860 --> 42:54.960]  Why do they do that?
[42:55.760 --> 42:57.820]  212-650-5782.
[42:58.040 --> 42:59.160]  Let's take this phone call.
[42:59.220 --> 42:59.560]  Good evening.
[42:59.720 --> 43:00.660]  You're on off the hook.
[43:01.160 --> 43:01.380]  Wow.
[43:01.540 --> 43:02.900]  I get really good luck with this.
[43:03.140 --> 43:03.360]  Yes.
[43:03.360 --> 43:04.540]  Well, you got through and no one else did.
[43:04.680 --> 43:04.740]  Okay.
[43:04.840 --> 43:07.400]  Well, I just actually happened to run into Rob T.
[43:07.620 --> 43:10.380]  Firefly on the A-Train and we had an interesting little discussion.
[43:11.120 --> 43:11.840]  Hope you didn't hurt him.
[43:12.740 --> 43:23.200]  Pertaining to what occurred in Boston, I would really love you guys to have Steve Rambam or someone like that as a guest to discuss, well, how does this process actually occur?
[43:23.460 --> 43:25.620]  You have, you know, you're looking for suspects.
[43:25.620 --> 43:28.720]  You notice some suspicious activity in a camera feed.
[43:28.920 --> 43:30.900]  You start following the trail.
[43:30.900 --> 43:34.280]  You see someone leave a bag, which is apparently the explosive device.
[43:34.440 --> 43:36.740]  Then does that get sent into a database?
[43:36.740 --> 43:40.060]  And is that database, uh, run by the NSA?
[43:40.400 --> 43:42.360]  Is it run by a private security firm?
[43:42.540 --> 43:45.180]  Are there multiple firms with the facial recognition database?
[43:45.820 --> 43:52.520]  Uh, you know, I'm wondering is how, you know, how, what links all of these cameras that are all over the place?
[43:52.540 --> 43:57.580]  Is there a guy in some sort of mothership on the moon who's getting all of these feeds all at once?
[43:58.100 --> 44:14.320]  Or, you know, I'm just wondering, basically, using the tragedy of what occurred in Boston, what is the trail, the digital trail, so to speak, by which they would go about pursuing individuals after, you know, identifying them through facial recognition?
[44:14.540 --> 44:19.980]  Well, you just make me wish that Steve was here right now so we could get an answer to that because, yeah, he'd be the person to talk to.
[44:20.140 --> 44:27.840]  And, uh, I, I can tell you, he's going to have one hell of a talk at, uh, at, at, at Hope in, uh, in, in, in 2014, but, uh, I don't want to wait that long.
[44:28.880 --> 44:29.840]  Yeah, Bernie, go ahead.
[44:30.240 --> 44:43.240]  Uh, in, in this case, uh, I've read, if you can believe, uh, news media reports that it was at a, it was a, uh, a retail stores, a camera system that caught, that had the pictures that were, uh, that were initially used to, uh, identify that these guys look suspicious.
[44:43.460 --> 44:43.800]  Okay.
[44:43.900 --> 44:53.860]  So, so what you're saying is that the, uh, the, the shots we all saw of them walking down the sidewalk, that was from an independent entity, that was from a store that was not from some kind of, uh, citywide surveillance or, or government surveillance.
[44:54.260 --> 44:59.680]  Does law enforcement have access to that in, or do they have to, do they have to get access to those people?
[44:59.960 --> 45:00.640]  It depends where they are.
[45:00.820 --> 45:14.020]  In, in this case, I believe they actually caught, and I've seen this happen in murder cases in Philadelphia, where the police actually have to go to the retail store and say, hey, we need to look at your DVR and download the information at it and we'll make a copy of it and we'll take it.
[45:14.160 --> 45:32.800]  However, as I noted on a recent show, uh, in Philadelphia and other cities, uh, local governments who are being funded by the Department of Homeland Security to subsidize the installation of, uh, of commercial, uh, closed-circuit TV cameras, uh, in, in exchange for having real-time access to the feeds.
[45:33.260 --> 45:41.840]  So, um, it depends where it is, but we're moving slowly towards a situation where even the commercial feeds are going to be accessible by government agencies.
[45:42.060 --> 45:50.680]  You see, in this particular case, this is a good example of, you know what, it worked fine with, uh, with an independent entity such as a store having its own surveillance system.
[45:50.740 --> 45:54.480]  And this, this harkens back to, uh, what Kyle and I went through in, in, in Sweden.
[45:54.520 --> 45:56.820]  And we talked to the person who ran the watch store.
[45:57.100 --> 46:03.460]  Uh, I think it was a watch store that, uh, happened to capture images of this terrorist who blew himself up and nobody else.
[46:03.780 --> 46:08.700]  And then that store was penalized for having a surveillance system in the first place, which I thought was kind of ridiculous.
[46:09.180 --> 46:19.300]  Uh, but, uh, you have a situation here where a store is running their own surveillance and they give that to the police because, uh, an investigation is, is going on.
[46:19.400 --> 46:20.480]  And that is all you need.
[46:20.560 --> 46:23.420]  All you need is independent people doing their own thing.
[46:23.480 --> 46:24.260]  You don't need more than that.
[46:24.380 --> 46:28.800]  You don't need the government stepping in and monitoring every single street because that is enough.
[46:28.920 --> 46:30.940]  And I think that's, that's what we should focus on.
[46:31.040 --> 46:35.640]  Yes, it worked, but it worked because of the way it was set up outside of, of government influence.
[46:35.820 --> 46:38.260]  And they did not need real time access to this.
[46:39.000 --> 46:39.320]  Right.
[46:39.500 --> 46:39.820]  Seem fair?
[46:39.860 --> 46:40.440]  Thank you guys.
[46:41.200 --> 46:41.520]  All right.
[46:41.640 --> 46:41.840]  Thanks.
[46:42.100 --> 46:42.820]  Uh, thanks for your call.
[46:42.960 --> 46:44.240]  And let's see if, uh, we can get some more.
[46:45.350 --> 46:47.020]  212-650-5782.
[46:47.660 --> 46:50.220]  Um, well, of course we can hear the calls coming in now.
[46:50.520 --> 46:51.420]  So let's take this one.
[46:52.240 --> 46:52.660]  Turn off the hook.
[46:54.140 --> 46:54.680]  Speak up.
[46:54.940 --> 46:55.760]  Did you hang up?
[46:56.040 --> 46:56.700]  They hung up.
[46:56.740 --> 46:57.260]  Can you believe that?
[46:57.880 --> 46:58.160]  All right.
[46:58.300 --> 46:59.100]  Well, that's... No, they don't.
[46:59.200 --> 47:00.160]  Emmanuel, they're not hanging up.
[47:00.260 --> 47:02.100]  They have 40 seconds for their call to be answered.
[47:02.120 --> 47:04.280]  Yeah, but I picked up the call as soon as it started coming in.
[47:04.340 --> 47:05.080]  Here it is now.
[47:05.240 --> 47:06.760]  I think, don't think 40 seconds has gone by.
[47:06.860 --> 47:07.140]  Good evening.
[47:07.280 --> 47:08.120]  You're on off the hook.
[47:09.100 --> 47:09.780]  Speak up, please.
[47:10.520 --> 47:11.180]  Yes, go ahead.
[47:11.940 --> 47:16.780]  Um, so facial recognition was not used here from my understanding of the... Correct.
[47:16.780 --> 47:17.360]  Yes.
[47:17.540 --> 47:18.580]  Facebook had nothing to do with it.
[47:20.600 --> 47:32.400]  You know, and there's an interesting article on SoPo's security or whatever their website is, um, talking about, uh, how facial recognition, you know, in, like, the movies and stuff like that is kind of way off at this point.
[47:32.540 --> 47:35.220]  We don't have, like, the bandwidth and technology to really pull it off.
[47:35.300 --> 47:39.200]  But it is going to get better, and it's going to be all-encompassing, and that's what we have to look out for.
[47:39.200 --> 47:39.940]  Yeah, exactly.
[47:40.160 --> 47:44.080]  Like, long-term, yeah, it's, you know, something that we should be aware of.
[47:44.120 --> 47:49.020]  But, uh, at this point in time, it's not like, you know, it's being imminently used.
[47:49.180 --> 47:50.060]  So, anyway, thanks.
[47:50.740 --> 47:51.440]  Okay, thanks.
[47:51.560 --> 47:52.160]  Thanks for that call.
[47:52.320 --> 47:53.260]  I thought there was going to be more of a point.
[47:53.760 --> 47:57.240]  Uh, 2-1-2-6-5-0-5-7-8-2.
[47:57.360 --> 47:57.520]  Mike.
[47:57.680 --> 48:12.120]  So, it wasn't automated, but the, uh, according to the affidavit from the, the FBI, they did, uh, pull up the driver's license photo of the suspect to compare it to the, um, to the, to the photographs from the surveillance cameras.
[48:12.300 --> 48:13.620]  So, there's a database involved.
[48:13.820 --> 48:16.480]  It's not automated yet, but I'm sure they, they want it to be.
[48:16.480 --> 48:18.540]  Well, wait, they got, had to get, they got his name, right?
[48:18.540 --> 48:22.440]  Once they had the name, they, they were like, oh, well, yeah, that, that might indeed be the guy.
[48:22.700 --> 48:23.000]  Okay.
[48:23.180 --> 48:27.200]  So, um, yeah, that's not anything really that amazing that they were able to do that.
[48:27.980 --> 48:36.340]  I'm not amazed, but, uh, but, uh, you know, they're thinking that there's a database with your photograph in it, and it's only a matter of time before they hook it up to a computer.
[48:36.340 --> 48:36.380]  Sure.
[48:37.240 --> 48:37.440]  Okay.
[48:37.980 --> 48:38.920]  Uh, let's take another phone call.
[48:39.120 --> 48:39.520]  Good evening.
[48:39.680 --> 48:40.620]  You're on off the hook.
[48:41.340 --> 48:41.660]  Okay.
[48:41.740 --> 48:41.880]  Yeah.
[48:41.880 --> 48:43.000]  At that time, I did wait a while.
[48:43.180 --> 48:43.340]  All right.
[48:43.400 --> 48:43.680]  I'm sorry.
[48:44.160 --> 48:46.580]  212-650-5782.
[48:46.760 --> 48:50.820]  We only have one line right now, so it takes a little bit of time for us to, uh, get to everybody.
[48:50.820 --> 48:51.240]  Good evening.
[48:51.380 --> 48:52.120]  You're on off the hook.
[48:53.440 --> 48:53.940]  Speak up.
[48:54.400 --> 48:54.720]  Yep.
[48:55.100 --> 49:05.520]  Uh, you know, uh, when, I was just thinking about it with the, uh, the three differences between, like, let's say a meteor, a meteoroid, and a meteorite, uh, a meteor is...
[49:05.520 --> 49:05.700]  Okay.
[49:05.740 --> 49:07.780]  Wait, is this of anything to do with what we're talking about?
[49:08.200 --> 49:10.700]  Well, yeah, well, I'm, I'm getting into it, but then when...
[49:10.700 --> 49:11.560]  Now, now, get to it now.
[49:11.680 --> 49:13.900]  Tell us, please tell us what this has to do...
[49:13.900 --> 49:14.580]  What do you have against rocks?
[49:14.840 --> 49:15.160]  Huh?
[49:15.820 --> 49:17.120]  What do you have against rocks?
[49:17.120 --> 49:19.180]  Uh, well, I don't like talking to them.
[49:19.460 --> 49:22.580]  212-650-5782.
[49:22.840 --> 49:24.660]  For God's sake, people, let's stay on subject here.
[49:24.800 --> 49:25.540]  It's not that hard.
[49:25.660 --> 49:25.980]  Good evening.
[49:26.160 --> 49:27.100]  You're on off the hook.
[49:28.360 --> 49:29.140]  Speak up, please.
[49:30.700 --> 49:31.100]  Hello.
[49:31.260 --> 49:31.620]  How are you?
[49:31.780 --> 49:32.460]  Yes, I'm good.
[49:32.720 --> 49:33.040]  Go ahead.
[49:33.940 --> 49:35.080]  Hey, this is Greg from Bernie.
[49:35.260 --> 49:45.360]  I got a question about how y'all feel about, um, FBI possibly taking over, um, technology such as, uh, Samsung Galaxy being able to do face recognition.
[49:45.360 --> 49:46.560]  Oh, I'm all for that.
[49:46.640 --> 49:46.920]  No, wait.
[49:47.060 --> 49:47.740]  I'm not all for that.
[49:47.840 --> 49:50.140]  No, uh, Bernie, uh, how about you?
[49:50.320 --> 49:51.280]  Do you have an opinion on this?
[49:51.520 --> 49:53.760]  I, uh, taking over a phone?
[49:54.020 --> 50:07.260]  I, I, what do you, I don't, you mean, okay, you're saying that the FBI might have the ability to hack into a particular model phone and view through its camera and then identify people automatically that way?
[50:07.300 --> 50:07.960]  Is that what you're saying?
[50:08.420 --> 50:15.820]  It's possible that the Galaxy, um, the Galaxy 3 or 4 has that technology right now that possibly could be manipulated?
[50:16.220 --> 50:26.960]  Well, if a phone has that feature and if the phone is compromised, uh, I suppose people could, uh, you know, illicitly or covertly use that feature remotely to identify who's near the phone.
[50:27.460 --> 50:33.100]  Um, I don't know of any, any criminal cases where that's happened yet, but I guess that's an eventual possibility.
[50:33.940 --> 50:34.340]  All right.
[50:34.480 --> 50:35.240]  Thanks for your reply.
[50:35.360 --> 50:35.480]  Take care.
[50:35.480 --> 50:35.680]  All right.
[50:35.720 --> 50:35.920]  Thanks.
[50:35.940 --> 50:36.700]  Uh, thanks for that call.
[50:36.900 --> 50:39.980]  212-650-5782.
[50:40.320 --> 50:46.240]  I wasn't aware that particular phone had anything, uh, uh, additional as far as, uh, uh, being open to that sort of a thing.
[50:47.430 --> 50:49.780]  Um, and I also don't know why I can't get this light to go off.
[50:49.900 --> 50:50.080]  Okay.
[50:50.580 --> 50:53.360]  212-650-5782 is our telephone.
[50:53.440 --> 50:56.640]  I'm getting a lot of calls, but again, we only have one line, so we have to wait for them to come in.
[50:56.880 --> 50:57.420]  Good evening.
[50:57.660 --> 50:58.460]  You're on off the hook.
[50:59.840 --> 51:00.380]  Speak up.
[51:01.200 --> 51:02.120]  They, yes, are you there?
[51:02.240 --> 51:02.680]  Oh, boy.
[51:03.020 --> 51:03.500]  Can you believe that?
[51:03.580 --> 51:05.260]  They hung up a second time or someone else hung up.
[51:05.500 --> 51:07.140]  I think we have another call coming in immediately.
[51:07.900 --> 51:08.720]  No, I heard a noise.
[51:08.820 --> 51:09.120]  There it is.
[51:11.420 --> 51:12.200]  And good evening.
[51:12.480 --> 51:13.380]  No, it's not working.
[51:14.680 --> 51:15.000]  Okay.
[51:15.120 --> 51:16.980]  You know, I think someone's picking up a phone somewhere else.
[51:17.140 --> 51:17.420]  Good evening.
[51:17.600 --> 51:18.260]  Is anybody there?
[51:18.720 --> 51:20.400]  Yeah, but let me just finish it.
[51:20.500 --> 51:21.280]  The media, right?
[51:21.500 --> 51:22.300]  No, no, no, no, no.
[51:22.400 --> 51:23.140]  I can't have this.
[51:23.300 --> 51:25.800]  212, it's like rebel times two.
[51:26.280 --> 51:28.660]  212-650-5782.
[51:28.700 --> 51:29.400]  Good evening.
[51:29.560 --> 51:30.440]  You're on off the hook.
[51:31.700 --> 51:32.060]  212.
[51:32.560 --> 51:32.940]  All right.
[51:33.020 --> 51:35.720]  You know, uh, we don't have to take phone calls.
[51:35.800 --> 51:36.460]  We don't have to do that.
[51:37.060 --> 51:37.640]  Good evening.
[51:37.820 --> 51:39.240]  You're on off the hook and you're the last chance.
[51:39.620 --> 51:42.580]  I thought you guys were running out of money like you're going broke.
[51:42.700 --> 51:44.700]  Now you act like everything's peachy keen.
[51:44.940 --> 51:46.780]  Oh, we never act like everything is peachy keen.
[51:47.220 --> 51:49.140]  I don't know where, who, who's acting?
[51:49.420 --> 51:49.820]  You're going broke.
[51:49.880 --> 51:52.140]  You're like, I'm ready to go off the freaking air.
[51:52.380 --> 51:54.360]  Well, we were not on off the air.
[51:54.500 --> 51:57.120]  We will be, um, asking for money again in a couple of weeks.
[51:57.520 --> 52:01.760]  So I'm sure, uh, I'm sure that'll be, uh, pleasing to you to see that happen.
[52:02.120 --> 52:02.520]  Mike.
[52:02.720 --> 52:08.180]  That is probably the first telephone call in the, in the history of public radio to complain that we don't fundraise enough.
[52:09.000 --> 52:09.700]  Yeah, definitely.
[52:09.920 --> 52:10.240]  Good evening.
[52:10.400 --> 52:11.100]  You're on off the hook.
[52:12.440 --> 52:13.900]  Let's just listen to this for a little while.
[52:14.060 --> 52:14.860]  It's kind of pleasing.
[52:15.700 --> 52:16.060]  Yeah.
[52:17.080 --> 52:17.540]  All right.
[52:17.640 --> 52:23.100]  Anyone out there who has something sane to say or something related to what we're talking about, please call us.
[52:23.280 --> 52:26.360]  2-1-2-6-5-0-5-7-8-2.
[52:26.580 --> 52:27.440]  Patience wearing thin.
[52:27.540 --> 52:27.860]  Good evening.
[52:28.180 --> 52:29.040]  You're on off the hook.
[52:29.220 --> 52:29.600]  Yes.
[52:29.800 --> 52:30.060]  Hi.
[52:30.580 --> 52:31.920]  It's Tom from the Bronx.
[52:31.980 --> 52:32.340]  I know.
[52:32.460 --> 52:34.640]  And I'm happy to hear your voice because I know you'll be on topic.
[52:36.320 --> 52:38.180]  Oh, I like that.
[52:38.500 --> 52:39.160]  That's good.
[52:39.280 --> 52:39.660]  That's good.
[52:40.240 --> 52:41.260]  Straight from the Bronx.
[52:41.260 --> 52:48.680]  And I, I, I, I think that, uh, this situation, you know, I just give you some disturbing thought.
[52:49.180 --> 52:54.400]  No one, no one said that we're, maybe we're going back to the Oswald era.
[52:54.720 --> 52:56.300]  And what is the Oswald era?
[52:56.660 --> 53:04.460]  Meaning that, that this thing could be, uh, could have, uh, elements of the Oswald story in it.
[53:05.400 --> 53:07.300]  The, uh, Lee Harvey Oswald story?
[53:07.400 --> 53:07.600]  Yeah.
[53:07.740 --> 53:07.920]  Okay.
[53:08.720 --> 53:10.120]  Uh, how, how so exactly?
[53:10.380 --> 53:20.260]  Well, meaning that, that they need, uh, the, the, prove to the American public, somebody needs to prove that we need them constantly.
[53:20.400 --> 53:22.240]  We could never live without them.
[53:22.800 --> 53:23.260]  Mm-hmm.
[53:23.360 --> 53:27.680]  We're putting up all these, uh, uh, cameras and everything.
[53:27.940 --> 53:35.460]  Well, I mean, that, that's, that's the case of any authority figure is to, uh, convince somebody that they are needed and necessary and you can't possibly survive without them.
[53:35.540 --> 53:38.800]  And I think that's, that's something that is practiced to perfection in this country.
[53:38.980 --> 53:43.040]  Well, I wonder if someone put them, uh, these rats up to doing this situation.
[53:43.560 --> 53:44.540]  Well, I, I don't know.
[53:44.660 --> 53:49.220]  I, I think they're, they, they basically, uh, a bunch of imbeciles that decided to do this on their own.
[53:49.340 --> 53:50.080]  That's my personal opinion.
[53:50.240 --> 53:57.060]  But, uh, you know, it doesn't take much to get people to do things like that or just wait for people to do things like that and then spring into action.
[53:57.280 --> 54:11.620]  And I don't think it's much of a stretch to say that this is really what a lot of people in power wanted to happen so that they could pounce just like they did with the Patriot Act and get more freedoms restricted, more of those pesky freedoms that get in the way of,
[54:11.620 --> 54:19.280]  uh, of, of surveillance and law enforcement and, uh, and basically stomp all over the Constitution and, uh, and, and, and not care about the consequences.
[54:19.400 --> 54:21.980]  Well, it's, you know, it's, it's just a thought I've got.
[54:22.140 --> 54:28.960]  I can't prove anything, but it seems they always go back to the 9-11 story.
[54:29.200 --> 54:30.440]  And to me, it goes back further.
[54:31.180 --> 54:31.640]  All right.
[54:31.760 --> 54:33.200]  Well, uh, thanks again for your call.
[54:33.360 --> 54:36.080]  And, uh, let's try and get a couple more to come in.
[54:36.300 --> 54:39.280]  2-1-2-6-5-0-5-7-8-2.
[54:39.780 --> 54:40.320]  And good evening.
[54:40.460 --> 54:41.320]  You're on Off the Hook.
[54:41.960 --> 54:43.380]  Yeah, you got the same caller here, mate.
[54:43.500 --> 54:44.380]  I do a great show.
[54:44.520 --> 54:46.020]  Unfortunately, there's a lot of idiots out there.
[54:46.240 --> 54:48.300]  I, you know, I thought you said you were the same caller.
[54:48.460 --> 54:49.780]  You said you were a same caller.
[54:50.080 --> 54:51.060]  Okay, that's good.
[54:51.140 --> 54:51.500]  That's good.
[54:51.540 --> 54:52.560]  You scared me for a second.
[54:52.560 --> 54:56.740]  Yeah, but I like Tom from the Bronx, and that voice is indistinguishable.
[54:57.300 --> 55:01.340]  Sometimes he goes off a little bit, but, uh, his voice is distinguishable.
[55:01.480 --> 55:02.060]  Oh, yes, yes.
[55:02.380 --> 55:02.700]  Yes.
[55:03.040 --> 55:04.360]  We have many distinguishable listeners.
[55:05.040 --> 55:05.360]  Yes.
[55:05.660 --> 55:08.820]  Uh, and he talks to a lot of different radio stations.
[55:08.840 --> 55:10.820]  I hear him on a lot of different, uh, stations.
[55:10.820 --> 55:13.320]  And, you know, I think Tom from the Bronx calls on a landline.
[55:13.440 --> 55:14.140]  I just want to say that.
[55:14.200 --> 55:17.120]  It sounds like he's calling on a landline, and you, sir, I think you're calling on a cell phone.
[55:17.920 --> 55:19.140]  Yeah, but can you hear me now?
[55:19.260 --> 55:20.680]  It's a Verizon destroyed phone.
[55:20.820 --> 55:21.920]  It should be top quality.
[55:22.220 --> 55:27.980]  Well, uh, I don't, I'd go back to them with that bill of goods, and, uh, and it's not quite, but yeah, it's, it's fine.
[55:28.080 --> 55:29.180]  It's, it'll suffice for now.
[55:29.660 --> 55:29.940]  Right.
[55:30.140 --> 55:31.360]  And, uh, okay.
[55:31.720 --> 55:33.940]  The surveillance is a double-edged sword.
[55:34.160 --> 55:39.280]  I understand what you're saying about Big Brother and, and, and constantly being monitored.
[55:39.820 --> 55:45.400]  But at the same time, if we didn't have all this cell phone technology, we wouldn't have gotten a picture of these guys.
[55:45.800 --> 55:49.380]  And literally, what do you do when somebody is this crazy?
[55:49.580 --> 55:50.960]  You have to have security.
[55:51.200 --> 55:57.940]  I mean, an eight-year-old kid is blown away because this guy is some radical, you know, Islamic terrorist.
[55:58.300 --> 55:59.340]  I mean, this is crazy.
[55:59.780 --> 56:05.840]  But, I mean, things like this have happened in, in, uh, throughout history, and you will never be able to stop them completely.
[56:06.280 --> 56:13.660]  Um, and, uh, that's an unfortunate reality, but I don't think increased surveillance is going to be the answer to keep something like that from happening.
[56:14.600 --> 56:16.420]  I mean, they'll just figure out something else.
[56:16.900 --> 56:17.140]  Well, okay.
[56:17.440 --> 56:26.440]  Well, the problem is, though, if this does happen, the fact that cell phone technology, we, first of all, it's beyond the shadow of a doubt that these are the guys.
[56:26.580 --> 56:33.340]  I don't know who thinks that these, they show them with a backpack, they show them without a backpack, is an eyewitness, but a camera does not lie.
[56:33.720 --> 56:35.720]  And I understand what you're saying about the Constitution.
[56:35.920 --> 56:37.680]  There's plenty of other things about the Constitution.
[56:38.200 --> 56:46.880]  I mean, Barack Obama and his wife are a little hypocritical when they talk about organic farming, and they put in this thing for Monsanto not to be sued for genetic engineering.
[56:47.180 --> 56:49.140]  There's a lot of things about the Constitution.
[56:49.380 --> 56:50.540]  Don't get me wrong about this.
[56:50.920 --> 56:52.020]  There's scary things happening.
[56:52.420 --> 56:57.540]  9-11 and the Patriot Act, and without, uh, you know, trial and stuff like that.
[56:57.660 --> 57:03.560]  There is some things you do have to be concerned, but at the same time, we have these guys on a surveillance video.
[57:03.720 --> 57:05.020]  We have their backtacks.
[57:05.080 --> 57:05.880]  We have their image.
[57:06.040 --> 57:07.040]  We know it's them.
[57:07.220 --> 57:09.380]  It's, it's, there's no way that they could get out of this.
[57:09.680 --> 57:10.000]  Right, right.
[57:10.080 --> 57:16.400]  Actually, we have to wrap this up, but, uh, I, I think the point is that, uh, existing technology seems to have worked.
[57:16.560 --> 57:19.880]  And yeah, cell phone technology helped as well in, in some regards.
[57:20.040 --> 57:25.160]  We don't need to have all-encompassing governmental live action surveillance all the time.
[57:25.640 --> 57:27.020]  I'd like to be able to talk to this more.
[57:27.200 --> 57:28.580]  I wish, uh, his caller had called earlier.
[57:28.740 --> 57:33.920]  If you want to add to the discussion, please, uh, give us, um, a shout via email.
[57:34.580 --> 57:39.340]  And, uh, that address is O-T-H at 2600.com.
[57:39.500 --> 57:40.740]  O-T-H at 2600.com.
[57:40.900 --> 57:41.260]  Off the hook.
[57:41.400 --> 57:43.080]  We'll be back again next week.
[57:43.240 --> 57:47.160]  Till then, have yourselves a good night and stay tuned for the personal computer show.
[57:50.580 --> 57:56.180]  You run your ass off into the subway, um, to get to your job.
[58:00.080 --> 58:03.660]  Cause you want to buy a coat you're a house.
[58:05.480 --> 58:08.400]  They only-They own everything.
[58:10.040 --> 58:26.010]  They own-They own everything,
[58:30.350 --> 58:31.250]  brother.
[58:32.430 --> 58:38.530]  Black brother, pink brother, yellow brother, white brother.
[58:39.190 --> 58:40.870]  They own
[58:56.900 --> 58:59.140]  They own everything.
[59:05.820 --> 59:07.720]  They own everything.
[59:22.850 --> 59:24.930]  They own everything.
[59:32.200 --> 59:35.100]  They own everything.
[59:35.740 --> 59:37.140]  They own you.
[59:44.260 --> 59:46.280]  They own everything.
[59:47.300 --> 59:48.060]  Everything.
[59:48.620 --> 59:49.860]  In Russia.
[59:50.320 --> 59:51.320]  In America.
[59:51.840 --> 59:53.000]  In France.
[59:53.460 --> 59:54.680]  In South Africa.
[59:55.280 --> 59:57.920]  They own everything!
[01:00:05.270 --> 01:00:07.910]  They own everything!
[01:00:08.910 --> 01:00:11.190]  They own the property.
[01:00:11.710 --> 01:00:13.670]  They own the TV stations.
[01:00:14.150 --> 01:00:15.970]  They own the radio stations.
[01:00:16.530 --> 01:00:18.010]  They own the musicians.
[01:00:18.570 --> 01:00:19.810]  They own the artists.
[01:00:20.330 --> 01:00:21.710]  They own everything!
[01:00:30.980 --> 01:00:33.520]  They own everything!
[01:00:53.840 --> 01:00:57.200]  Wow, that was something that was interesting.
[01:00:57.200 --> 01:00:58.660]  It ended just like that.
[01:00:58.780 --> 01:00:59.960]  And I said, what happened?
[01:01:00.340 --> 01:01:03.360]  He says, oh, it's supposed to end like that.
[01:01:03.560 --> 01:01:04.880]  Oh, isn't that great?