[00:00.000 --> 00:05.420]  Nappy G, Seoul Central Station's Tony Ryan, and of course, Jeanne Hopper.
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[00:29.260 --> 00:31.100]  See you on the dance floor.
[00:34.690 --> 00:38.390]  And the time is just about 7 p.m.
[00:38.570 --> 00:43.430]  You're listening to 99.5 FM, and it's WBAI New York.
[00:43.610 --> 00:46.250]  And it's time for another exciting edition of Off The Hook.
[00:49.750 --> 00:54.270]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[00:55.170 --> 00:57.210]  I cut myself while shaving.
[00:57.850 --> 00:59.830]  Now I can't make a cough.
[01:00.610 --> 01:02.590]  We couldn't get much worse.
[01:05.490 --> 01:08.030]  Diddly Bump for the best, expect the worst.
[01:08.790 --> 01:10.550]  I hope that's understood.
[01:10.890 --> 01:11.610]  But diddly Bump!
[01:39.610 --> 01:41.170]  And a very good evening to you.
[01:41.390 --> 01:42.490]  The show is Off The Hook.
[01:43.130 --> 01:43.690]  Rob T.
[01:43.810 --> 01:44.570]  Firefly here with you.
[01:44.690 --> 01:45.830]  I'm joined in the studio by Mike.
[01:46.070 --> 01:46.350]  Hello.
[01:46.510 --> 01:47.010]  Happy May Day.
[01:47.210 --> 01:47.970]  Happy May Day.
[01:48.290 --> 01:50.350]  And on the phone, I believe we have Bernie S.
[01:51.130 --> 01:52.550]  Happy May Day from Philadelphia.
[01:53.330 --> 01:53.950]  I'm sorry.
[01:54.130 --> 01:54.850]  Try that again, Bernie.
[01:55.610 --> 01:57.430]  Happy May Day from Philadelphia.
[01:58.230 --> 01:59.270]  Happy May Day indeed.
[01:59.810 --> 02:02.190]  Emanuel is on a train which is apparently broken.
[02:02.450 --> 02:07.490]  And we haven't confirmed yet that it's his fault, but more on this as it develops.
[02:07.490 --> 02:09.590]  Some things you don't have to confirm, Rob.
[02:12.010 --> 02:14.410]  Yeah, but so we're kind of scrambling here.
[02:15.610 --> 02:18.490]  So Bernie, what's going on in the world?
[02:19.370 --> 02:38.630]  Well, I heard a story today that President Obama picked a new FCC commissioner to take over the reins from Julian Janikowski, who's been doing that job for quite a few years.
[02:39.990 --> 02:47.730]  Tom Wheeler, who I can remember from back in the 80s as a really strong...
[02:47.730 --> 02:51.210]  He was head of the Cellular Telephone Industry Association.
[02:51.490 --> 02:53.950]  In fact, I met him once at a cellular phone conference.
[02:54.550 --> 03:09.910]  He was never against anything that wasn't about giving freebies to the cellular industry as far as more radio spectrum, government subsidies, that sort of thing.
[03:09.990 --> 03:15.290]  So he's a very strong proponent for the cellular phone industry.
[03:15.290 --> 03:16.770]  And now he's going to be in charge of the FCC.
[03:17.570 --> 03:31.390]  So I think we will be seeing some changes in the not-too-distant future with regards to the FCC's handling of cellular phone companies, in that it will give them what it wants, what they want.
[03:31.570 --> 03:33.550]  How does that differ from the current policy?
[03:35.870 --> 03:43.930]  Well, I do think the FCC has not been giving the cellular industry everything it wants on a silver platter.
[03:43.930 --> 03:59.470]  However, it has required mobile carriers to provide a certain amount of independence with regard to hardware that consumers can use.
[03:59.830 --> 04:08.590]  It has not been giving away the public spectrum to phone companies, making them pay for them.
[04:08.750 --> 04:14.570]  Of course, the phone companies just turn around and charge consumers like us more for using what they have to pay for.
[04:14.830 --> 04:28.030]  But the bottom line is, when you have a lobbyist for a particular industry that's going to be in charge of a government agency that regulates that industry, it seems to be a clear conflict of interest to me.
[04:29.570 --> 04:30.130]  Right.
[04:30.350 --> 04:31.730]  So, what kind of...
[04:33.210 --> 04:33.930]  I'm sorry.
[04:34.090 --> 04:35.370]  So, you're saying it's going to get worse?
[04:36.270 --> 04:36.810]  Yeah.
[04:37.130 --> 04:38.210]  Well, at least...
[04:38.210 --> 04:48.690]  I think the cellular industry will get more of what it wants than it has with the previous FCC commissioner or chairperson.
[04:49.710 --> 04:50.990]  Now that the head of the...
[04:50.990 --> 04:57.870]  The person who is in charge of the lobby for this industry for many years is now in charge of the commission that regulates that lobby.
[04:57.950 --> 05:05.590]  So, it's another example of the revolving door we have between regulatory agencies and the industries that they regulate.
[05:05.590 --> 05:06.250]  And it's...
[05:06.250 --> 05:11.210]  I was really disturbed to hear that that was chosen in person for the new FCC commissioner.
[05:12.290 --> 05:13.130]  I mean...
[05:13.130 --> 05:14.030]  I like...
[05:14.030 --> 05:26.550]  I wish I couldn't believe what you were saying, but it's the case in almost all the regulatory agencies that the people who are deemed to have the most expertise in these areas are the people who previously worked for large corporations in these areas.
[05:26.690 --> 05:31.790]  They hardly ever choose, you know, consumer advocates to work in these bodies.
[05:31.790 --> 05:33.950]  And the whole lobbyist thing is...
[05:34.770 --> 05:35.290]  Well, that's really...
[05:35.290 --> 05:35.650]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[05:36.410 --> 05:38.570]  I was going to say, and that's really unfortunate, Mike, too.
[05:38.790 --> 05:49.990]  I think consumers have a lot to say about how the industries that they rely on and use and are consumers of should be regulated.
[05:50.290 --> 05:55.770]  It would be a very refreshing surprise to see someone appointed to a regulatory...
[05:55.770 --> 06:01.830]  even a lower role in a regulatory agency that was a consumer advocate.
[06:01.990 --> 06:03.770]  We did kind of see that with this consumer...
[06:04.330 --> 06:06.490]  What is this new Consumer Financial Protection Agency?
[06:07.110 --> 06:11.610]  Obama tried to appoint someone who was really a true consumer advocate, but that kind of got shot down.
[06:11.750 --> 06:13.230]  And now she's running for U.S.
[06:13.250 --> 06:13.450]  Senate.
[06:13.710 --> 06:16.070]  She is, in fact, the senator from Massachusetts.
[06:16.410 --> 06:16.810]  That's right.
[06:16.910 --> 06:17.950]  She got that position.
[06:17.950 --> 06:23.890]  So that was kind of backfired, I think, on the industry.
[06:24.050 --> 06:25.830]  Now she's in a more powerful position, I think.
[06:26.530 --> 06:45.090]  So sometimes if a consumer advocate is in the running for a regulatory position and then they're shot down, I think that's a good model, that they should use that publicity they got to run for office so they'd have more power.
[06:45.090 --> 06:55.670]  But on the other hand, we have somebody like a lobbyist who, for a living, tried his best to influence the legal process in favor of his employers, now being put in actual charge of things.
[06:55.930 --> 06:58.910]  And I don't think that's good for anyone, really.
[06:59.210 --> 07:11.850]  And of course, being a regulator is actually not that well-paid a position, but these people are able to work there for a few years and then sort of parlay those connections into making more money as a lobbyist after they leave.
[07:11.990 --> 07:13.070]  And it's really amazing.
[07:13.910 --> 07:24.910]  Oh yeah, he'll bounce back to the mobile phone or cable TV industry after he leaves the FCC in a few years and probably reap millions of dollars more.
[07:25.050 --> 07:30.790]  And he'll be the point man for that industry, for sure.
[07:32.890 --> 07:33.410]  Indeed.
[07:33.630 --> 07:35.410]  What other stories are there?
[07:35.410 --> 07:47.410]  Hey, I don't know if you saw this story, Bernie, but Mozilla, which is the nonprofit that makes Firefox, is suing this company, Gamma, which makes the software FinFisher.
[07:47.510 --> 07:48.390]  Have you heard of FinFisher?
[07:48.390 --> 07:49.930]  Oh, I have.
[07:50.150 --> 08:01.610]  Isn't that the software that is sold to intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies around the world to spy on people's internet usage and other things?
[08:01.610 --> 08:02.930]  Exactly.
[08:03.690 --> 08:07.410]  And there's 36 countries identified in this document.
[08:07.670 --> 08:17.110]  And what Mozilla is really angry about is that apparently FinFisher, also known as FinSpy, is masquerading as Firefox.
[08:17.110 --> 08:26.090]  So if you look in your running programs list, sometimes you will see Firefox.exe, and it will not be the browser that you know and may love.
[08:26.150 --> 08:32.190]  But it will be software that your government has chosen to use to spy on you, or someone else's government.
[08:33.210 --> 08:53.030]  I would be hopping mad if I wrote an application and some other company used that same name of that application, of that executable, to masquerade as my program, when in fact it was spying on users of the program that I wrote.
[08:53.210 --> 08:54.050]  That's just evil.
[08:54.050 --> 08:54.990]  Right.
[08:55.170 --> 08:59.530]  So it doesn't even matter if you actually are a Firefox user for it to masquerade as Firefox.
[08:59.690 --> 09:02.090]  Of course, it would be more effective if you are.
[09:03.930 --> 09:19.950]  And the group that did the research called Citizen Lab found three cases where it was pretending to be Firefox, one in Bahrain, one in Malaysia, and also in a promotional demo produced by Gamma, which is the company that makes this software.
[09:19.950 --> 09:26.830]  So it's pretty clear that this is not some, like, rogue law enforcement agency, but this is an actual tactic used by this company.
[09:28.510 --> 09:34.650]  And, you know, Mozilla is really one of the entities on the internet that I at least trust the most.
[09:34.790 --> 09:44.030]  They are a nonprofit, and they don't get everything right, but they seem really to have their users and the internet's best interest at heart in most of what they do.
[09:44.030 --> 10:01.390]  And so for this company to sort of trade on that goodwill and pretend to be Firefox, a software package of which, you know, you should trust, or at least consider trusting, and it's actually spying on you, it's really worrying.
[10:02.150 --> 10:06.590]  I think that's what they call in the intelligence community a false flag.
[10:07.190 --> 10:12.290]  And I'm wondering if Mozilla was likely to have trademarked the name Firefox.
[10:12.750 --> 10:13.330]  They have.
[10:13.330 --> 10:23.090]  And whether they have any legal recourse against this spy software manufacturer that is favored by so many governments around the world.
[10:23.810 --> 10:31.170]  They have a trademark, and they have sent a cease and desist letter yesterday, or it was revealed yesterday, anyhow.
[10:31.550 --> 10:35.210]  And if there's a response, it hasn't been seen yet.
[10:35.330 --> 10:38.370]  But I hope the response is that they stop doing it.
[10:38.450 --> 10:42.190]  I really hope the response is that they stop spying on people, but that's just wishful thinking.
[10:42.410 --> 10:42.950]  That's crazy, Tom.
[10:42.950 --> 10:43.950]  We know that's not going to happen.
[10:45.010 --> 10:51.330]  So I would accept they stop pretending to be anything but spyware as a sort of nice interim step, maybe.
[10:52.330 --> 11:02.030]  It's been a common tactic of malware, though, since time immemorial, for an evil application to masquerade itself as something that you would want to run.
[11:02.390 --> 11:12.570]  So this is now going on on a large corporate-backed commercial software scale rather than just random bits of malware that you'd pick up wherever.
[11:12.910 --> 11:18.190]  Right, so these mysterious Russian credit card number thieves, if they're even real people, have been doing this.
[11:18.190 --> 11:21.790]  But 30-some-odd governments are using this software.
[11:21.970 --> 11:25.370]  This is not just, you know, some backyard project.
[11:26.930 --> 11:33.990]  Hey, Mike, on this topic of spyware, governments using software to spy on people's internet usage...
[11:33.990 --> 11:35.090]  It's a broad topic, Ernie.
[11:35.090 --> 11:36.550]  Yeah, very broad.
[11:37.750 --> 11:40.910]  All too... becoming all more common, unfortunately.
[11:41.270 --> 11:52.990]  Did you hear this story about a federal judge actually rejecting for change the FBI's attempt to use spyware to infiltrate an unknown suspect's unknown computer?
[11:54.010 --> 11:56.530]  That sounds very vague, but I don't think I heard about it.
[11:56.590 --> 12:01.430]  I so rarely hear any news of anyone putting a stop to any of this.
[12:01.950 --> 12:14.030]  Yeah, well, there's a federal magistrate judge in Texas that denied an FBI request, which is really unusual when a federal judge denied an FBI request.
[12:14.390 --> 12:35.310]  But in this case, Judge Houston, Texas magistrate, federal magistrate Judge Steven Smith, said he would not approve what he called an extremely intrusive tactic because the FBI did not know the location or the identity of the suspect and could not guarantee the spy software would not end up targeting innocents,
[12:35.850 --> 12:38.090]  he wrote in a 13-page memorandum.
[12:38.390 --> 12:48.410]  So basically, the FBI was saying that this unnamed suspect could be on a computer, and they weren't sure where they were going to be.
[12:48.550 --> 13:02.170]  And the judge was asking in his 13-page memorandum, what if the target was located in a public library or in a cafe or a workplace where other people used the computers?
[13:02.570 --> 13:04.850]  Or if the computer was used by family or friends?
[13:05.090 --> 13:07.190]  Did they say, Bernie, how they know?
[13:07.510 --> 13:09.690]  Like, this is such a vague warrant.
[13:09.690 --> 13:12.570]  We want to put spyware on someone's computer.
[13:12.990 --> 13:15.350]  Did they narrow it down a little bit?
[13:16.790 --> 13:17.570]  Apparently not.
[13:17.570 --> 13:21.010]  It just seems like the FBI forgot completely about the Fourth Amendment.
[13:21.190 --> 13:27.910]  Not that it really thinks about it much anyway, but my recollection of the Fourth Amendment is that it requires...
[13:28.530 --> 13:32.910]  I'm going to have to paraphrase it, but you have to specify in the...
[13:32.910 --> 13:33.890]  We get a search warrant.
[13:33.890 --> 13:40.170]  You have to specify specifically the place to be searched and what you're looking for and who the target is.
[13:40.930 --> 13:43.650]  And the FBI didn't do that in all of this.
[13:43.650 --> 13:44.310]  They just had...
[13:44.310 --> 13:47.610]  They didn't know who the suspect is or what computer they'd be using.
[13:47.930 --> 13:49.610]  So it was really weird.
[13:49.610 --> 13:53.410]  And I'm glad that this judge just didn't rubber stamp it, because it would have been...
[13:53.410 --> 13:59.650]  Maybe there's just a test by the FBI to see if a judge would grant this and then use it as a precedent in future cases.
[13:59.870 --> 14:02.930]  It's like, oh, we don't have to specify who we're targeting or what computer we're going to be using.
[14:03.230 --> 14:07.210]  But fortunately, if that was their plan, then they failed.
[14:08.910 --> 14:09.650]  Sounds like fun.
[14:09.690 --> 14:10.890]  Do they say what the person did?
[14:12.850 --> 14:13.750]  Let me see here.
[14:13.830 --> 14:14.470]  I'm reading the story.
[14:14.950 --> 14:16.070]  Or allegedly did.
[14:16.310 --> 14:23.510]  I mean, we've talked about in the past, the government tries to get these processes which don't involve a judge.
[14:23.650 --> 14:30.430]  And we say on the air when the government tries to get these policies, the judges hardly ever reject anything the government wants to do.
[14:30.490 --> 14:31.290]  What's the problem here?
[14:31.570 --> 14:40.090]  And the problem for the government is they want this power to be able to install spyware on unknown people's computers doing unknown activities for unknown reasons.
[14:40.430 --> 14:43.430]  And just every once in a while, a judge says no.
[14:43.430 --> 14:45.290]  And I'm glad it's happening in this case.
[14:45.290 --> 14:51.490]  But it really shows you why some level of check is actually useful.
[14:52.310 --> 15:07.990]  In this case, to answer your question, Mike, the FBI wanted to use the software to identify a person responsible for allegedly violating computer security laws and commuting federal bank fraud and identity theft.
[15:09.830 --> 15:22.250]  And in the warrant, supposedly the suspect is said to have infiltrated the email of a Texas man and later tried to steal a sizable amount of money from his bank by transferring it to a foreign account.
[15:22.390 --> 15:33.570]  But it's not what this person might be charged with that could justify such a vague, unconstitutionally vague warrant, search warrant request.
[15:34.010 --> 15:47.670]  It's like, you know, the FBI always goes after, always like uses the more evil-sounding cases like child pornographers, that kind of stuff, to roll over people's rights.
[15:48.730 --> 15:55.050]  You know, it's the kind of rights that need to be protected for everybody.
[15:55.270 --> 15:58.330]  You know, it's not just we have to protect innocent people's rights.
[15:58.430 --> 16:02.370]  We have to protect everybody's rights, or we're not going to have any rights at all, eventually.
[16:02.690 --> 16:04.670]  Hey, Bernie, did you hear some knocking earlier?
[16:06.530 --> 16:06.970]  Um...
[16:06.970 --> 16:08.290]  Just a moment ago.
[16:08.570 --> 16:09.890]  It wasn't knocking, Mike.
[16:09.950 --> 16:12.470]  It was me hitting my head against the door that you locked.
[16:12.470 --> 16:13.430]  All right?
[16:13.610 --> 16:15.030]  We don't know how to unlock this door.
[16:15.030 --> 16:21.810]  You unlock it by sticking something in the door so that when people run into the studio because they're late, they don't injure themselves.
[16:22.210 --> 16:23.090]  I thought we had nice.
[16:24.330 --> 16:24.750]  No.
[16:25.050 --> 16:25.690]  Not yet.
[16:26.410 --> 16:27.330]  I'm sorry, folks.
[16:27.410 --> 16:28.310]  I apologize.
[16:28.670 --> 16:30.070]  But, you know, I learned something today.
[16:30.170 --> 16:35.190]  As long as the city has the MTA, Al Qaeda can't possibly hurt us any more than they do.
[16:35.750 --> 16:36.250]  We were...
[16:36.250 --> 16:37.030]  Alex, welcome.
[16:37.250 --> 16:37.830]  You're here, too.
[16:37.930 --> 16:40.150]  You're with me on the subway rides from hell.
[16:40.490 --> 16:41.210]  Hello, everyone.
[16:41.550 --> 16:44.150]  No less than three different trains broke down.
[16:44.310 --> 16:47.470]  And, of course, there's no announcements, and all the signs give the wrong information.
[16:47.610 --> 16:51.270]  You know, there's nice little signs that say a train coming in zero minutes, a train approaching platform.
[16:51.650 --> 16:53.750]  They just disappear, and there's no train.
[16:53.790 --> 16:56.490]  You don't know what happened to it, and no one tells you anything.
[16:56.630 --> 16:58.750]  That sounds accurate under the circumstances.
[16:59.250 --> 17:01.270]  Yeah, but, you know, an explanation would have been nice.
[17:01.470 --> 17:04.910]  It just would have made things a lot easier, and we would have taken a different way if we had known.
[17:05.710 --> 17:07.590]  But, you know, without...
[17:08.510 --> 17:09.830]  Information is power, all right?
[17:10.310 --> 17:13.450]  Knowing what's going on is key to all this.
[17:13.610 --> 17:19.690]  And when you're trapped down below the ground like a bunch of rats who actually aren't trapped, they can get out.
[17:19.810 --> 17:20.130]  It's very frustrating.
[17:20.130 --> 17:22.210]  Yeah, it's very frustrating.
[17:22.290 --> 17:24.210]  So I'm sorry for the chaos.
[17:24.510 --> 17:28.710]  Now, what have you guys talked about since I wasn't able to hear and I don't want to go over the same ground?
[17:28.710 --> 17:32.410]  We were having a really good conversation before you intruded, Emmanuel.
[17:32.610 --> 17:33.470]  I'm sorry, I'm sorry.
[17:34.210 --> 17:36.030]  My head really hurts, all right?
[17:37.650 --> 17:49.050]  We were talking about a couple of stories related to government use of software to spy on people's internet usage.
[17:49.610 --> 17:52.930]  And there were a couple of related stories, and they're pretty interesting.
[17:53.250 --> 17:53.290]  Okay.
[17:53.430 --> 17:56.330]  Mike mentioned the Mozilla Foundation.
[17:56.330 --> 17:58.510]  Well, you don't have to go over it again because the listeners have heard it already.
[17:58.670 --> 18:01.210]  I just wanted to not go over the same ground a second time.
[18:02.010 --> 18:05.710]  So government spying on people, that's probably most of the stories we have prepared.
[18:05.710 --> 18:12.910]  Well, yeah, or people wanting to yield their remaining privacy in the wake of being a little bit scared about various things.
[18:13.070 --> 18:14.750]  We've seen all kinds of instances.
[18:14.950 --> 18:17.590]  I'd like to start, if I may, by reading some letters.
[18:17.730 --> 18:19.770]  We got some mail, and it's always great to get mail from our listeners.
[18:20.030 --> 18:22.930]  It means people are actually out there listening, and that's what it's all about.
[18:23.370 --> 18:26.030]  OTH at 2600.com is our email address.
[18:27.450 --> 18:35.410]  Okay, here are a couple of pieces of mail that sometimes I think people only hear what they don't want to hear sometimes.
[18:35.750 --> 18:36.250]  You know what I mean?
[18:36.330 --> 18:38.370]  It's basically you assume the worst.
[18:38.730 --> 18:50.190]  And I've been talking about this for the last several weeks now, and I don't think people are understanding what I'm saying as far as my position on the whole surveillance issue and how we have to be realistic about it.
[18:50.290 --> 18:53.110]  That's not supporting surveillance, but people seem to think it is.
[18:53.110 --> 18:55.870]  Let's listen to a couple of remarks from people.
[18:56.370 --> 19:07.030]  Dear Emmanuel, I was a bit flustered by your remarks on the other radio show, Off the Wall, and I assume also on Off the Hook, where you seem to be in favor of the lockdown-slash-house-to-house search saying it seemed to be the right idea.
[19:07.390 --> 19:12.690]  I believe what I said was that people there believed it was the right idea.
[19:12.690 --> 19:22.450]  It seemed to be at the time when people were scared and there was a maniac on the loose, then they were happy to stay in their homes and happy to even let the police in when they knocked, assuming they knew it was the police.
[19:23.070 --> 19:34.350]  And that's just something we have to deal with and not say, well, it's evil for them to be in the area at all and that there shouldn't be any surveillance because you're not going to win and you're going to have a lot of people that would normally be on your side saying you're crazy.
[19:35.030 --> 19:40.510]  Anyway, continuing with the letter, have you given any thought to the future civil liberties consequences setting a precedent like this could have?
[19:40.510 --> 19:44.110]  This show of deference to authority seems to be out of character for you.
[19:44.170 --> 19:44.710]  Signed, Brian.
[19:45.350 --> 19:54.790]  Well, Brian, you know, I think there's a way of battling these things, which is a long-term method where you basically say, okay, this is where we are.
[19:54.870 --> 19:55.990]  This is reality right now.
[19:56.070 --> 19:58.790]  We have this amount of surveillance currently existing.
[19:59.250 --> 20:07.890]  How do we prevent that from becoming all-encompassing and really infringing on our privacy like nothing we've ever imagined?
[20:08.570 --> 20:14.290]  The way to do that is not to simply say, especially after a situation like this, all surveillance is bad.
[20:14.430 --> 20:14.890]  It must be dismantled.
[20:15.750 --> 20:19.950]  And cops have no right to knock on your door and ask to search your house if there's a maniac on the loose.
[20:20.190 --> 20:21.130]  Wrong time to do it.
[20:21.210 --> 20:22.330]  You're not going to get much support.
[20:22.490 --> 20:23.010]  All right.
[20:23.010 --> 20:24.490]  Any comments?
[20:24.590 --> 20:24.730]  Anyone?
[20:25.630 --> 20:25.990]  No?
[20:26.170 --> 20:27.070]  I mean, it's tricky.
[20:27.510 --> 20:28.730]  Yeah, it's tricky.
[20:28.790 --> 20:34.150]  But, you know, you got to sort of know how to have the dialogue in the first place.
[20:34.710 --> 20:36.170]  And we believe in certain things.
[20:36.270 --> 20:41.370]  Yes, I'd be thrilled in the world with no surveillance cameras, but I'm looking at surveillance cameras right now.
[20:41.510 --> 20:42.030]  They're everywhere.
[20:42.430 --> 20:44.130]  We can't just yank them out of the wall.
[20:44.550 --> 20:44.950]  Can we?
[20:45.370 --> 20:45.850]  No, don't do that.
[20:46.230 --> 20:46.990]  We're guests here.
[20:47.050 --> 20:48.410]  We shouldn't be yanking things out of the wall.
[20:48.730 --> 20:51.830]  But I'm saying, you know, it's a reality of our lives.
[20:51.830 --> 20:53.150]  How do we keep it from getting worse?
[20:53.290 --> 20:57.730]  How do we stop from yielding real privacy issues?
[20:57.910 --> 21:00.270]  And there are so many ways that we're yielding our privacy.
[21:01.530 --> 21:03.010]  And it's sickening.
[21:03.090 --> 21:04.150]  But we'll get into that in a moment.
[21:04.550 --> 21:05.210]  Here's another letter.
[21:05.290 --> 21:13.390]  As a fan of Emanuel's and a strong supporter of 2600 for over two decades, I was very disappointed in Emanuel's remarks about the implementation of blanket surveillance and its effectiveness.
[21:13.930 --> 21:17.110]  Clearly, the terrible attacks in Boston were not prevented by surveillance.
[21:17.110 --> 21:18.850]  And I believe we said that.
[21:19.270 --> 21:24.750]  While it's possible that surveillance helped lead in part to the identification of the suspects in the bombings, possible it did.
[21:24.910 --> 21:25.390]  Okay, let's...
[21:25.390 --> 21:26.350]  This is an example.
[21:26.610 --> 21:27.350]  It's true.
[21:27.590 --> 21:30.170]  Surveillance definitely found those guys.
[21:30.350 --> 21:36.690]  They saw people out of the ordinary walking in a weird way, carrying bags, and they were able to nail them based on that surveillance.
[21:36.810 --> 21:38.850]  We have to yield that fact because it is a fact.
[21:39.210 --> 21:39.570]  All right?
[21:40.230 --> 21:40.670]  Anyway...
[21:40.670 --> 21:40.870]  Emanuel.
[21:40.870 --> 21:41.210]  Yes.
[21:41.970 --> 21:43.630]  You need to clarify that fact.
[21:43.750 --> 21:44.690]  It was not government surveillance.
[21:44.690 --> 21:46.070]  Let me get to that, Bernie.
[21:46.250 --> 21:47.130]  You're jumping the gun.
[21:47.230 --> 21:49.290]  Let me get to what kind of surveillance it was.
[21:49.690 --> 22:00.770]  While it's possible that surveillance helped lead in part to the identification of the suspects in the bombings, all intelligent people can agree that this is only because the bombers made absolutely no attempt to disguise their identities or avoid being seen.
[22:01.590 --> 22:09.050]  I think even if they had disguised themselves, it would have been harder, but I think every little bit of information was helpful in that particular way.
[22:09.050 --> 22:13.110]  I mean, the other thing is catching dumb criminals is sometimes useful.
[22:13.350 --> 22:13.790]  Mm-hmm.
[22:16.430 --> 22:18.330]  And they're good at what they do.
[22:18.490 --> 22:31.130]  Forensics already is at a stage where it's scary, but it can be used for good, as this is an example of, but it can also be used for far more evil things than we've even started to talk about.
[22:31.790 --> 22:41.150]  If your argument is that we should implement 24-hour blanket surveillance of all citizens so that lazy amateurish aggressors have a slightly better chance to be caught after they commit their crimes is a very weak argument indeed.
[22:41.370 --> 22:50.490]  How does somebody pen a sentence like that when I don't think anybody ever in the history of this radio station has ever hinted that that was acceptable?
[22:50.730 --> 22:51.550]  Blanket surveillance.
[22:51.670 --> 22:53.650]  24-hour blanket surveillance of all citizens.
[22:54.490 --> 23:01.770]  I mean, play back every show we've ever done and see if anyone has ever hinted that that was something that was at all desirable.
[23:01.990 --> 23:02.050]  Rob?
[23:02.190 --> 23:05.930]  Wait, so just to make this clear, you're saying you're not in favor of blanket surveillance.
[23:05.950 --> 23:06.810]  It's not clear, is it?
[23:06.930 --> 23:07.730]  I'm just...
[23:07.730 --> 23:08.830]  Are you sure we haven't...
[23:08.830 --> 23:09.230]  ...butting the waters?
[23:09.230 --> 23:11.750]  Maybe like on an April Fool's show, we said we were in favor.
[23:11.750 --> 23:13.250]  I don't think even then we did that.
[23:13.670 --> 23:23.230]  Anyway, an intelligent and moral approach would be to advocate eliminating all surveillance as a testament to our commitment to freedom, to serve as a beacon for the world to emulate rather than an evil empire to bring down.
[23:23.350 --> 23:23.450]  Okay.
[23:23.730 --> 23:35.350]  And I think the first week after the bombing, what I suggested was next year at the Boston Marathon, we have not one single bit of additional surveillance than what we have right now.
[23:35.470 --> 23:41.090]  To say, let's get rid of all surveillance, do you really think anyone is going to sign on for that?
[23:41.170 --> 23:44.230]  They'll just dismiss anything you say beyond that point.
[23:44.330 --> 23:53.930]  And that's what I'm trying to avoid because as we have witnessed in this city and in many others, there is an increased fervor now for more of this kind of surveillance.
[23:54.050 --> 23:55.090]  And we have to stop that.
[23:55.290 --> 24:01.150]  And you're not going to stop that by saying, let's get rid of what we have already, which people now overwhelmingly believe is effective.
[24:01.470 --> 24:03.370]  So that's definitely not the way to go.
[24:03.670 --> 24:04.030]  Mike?
[24:04.150 --> 24:08.610]  I'm sure you saw our esteemed NYPD commissioner quoted in the press recently.
[24:08.810 --> 24:09.030]  Oh, yes.
[24:09.050 --> 24:09.770]  I was going to get to him.
[24:09.870 --> 24:11.470]  I have a whole story about that.
[24:11.590 --> 24:12.810]  But we'll give him...
[24:12.810 --> 24:12.910]  All right.
[24:12.950 --> 24:14.170]  I don't want to give him...
[24:14.170 --> 24:15.250]  Let him jump the gun.
[24:15.490 --> 24:16.330]  We'll give him his moment.
[24:16.330 --> 24:16.990]  People...
[24:16.990 --> 24:20.650]  But your hope is, unfortunately, clearly not going to come to pass.
[24:20.750 --> 24:20.870]  Yeah.
[24:20.990 --> 24:21.950]  I see that.
[24:22.110 --> 24:31.310]  But I think that's a worthy fight to prevent the drones from going up in the sky, to prevent all sorts of government surveillance and mining of data and things like that.
[24:31.790 --> 24:32.990]  There are all kinds of threats.
[24:33.390 --> 24:34.430]  Anyway, finishing up this letter.
[24:34.510 --> 24:42.050]  As long as we live in anything that resembles a free society, innocent people will always be vulnerable to those who would seek to do them harm, as per the MTA.
[24:42.050 --> 24:42.430]  Yeah, yes.
[24:42.570 --> 24:45.570]  What we should do as a people is seek to re...
[24:45.570 --> 24:48.890]  I'm sorry, my toner is running out and I can barely read this.
[24:49.870 --> 24:50.310]  To...
[24:50.310 --> 24:56.870]  What we should do as a people is seek to marginalize, that's the word, and reduce the support for those who seek to attack us with...
[24:57.510 --> 24:57.950]  Humble?
[24:58.430 --> 25:04.590]  Humble and fair treatment of all people, rather than swell the ranks of our enemies with our endless bombings and invasions.
[25:04.790 --> 25:15.170]  Those who seek to bomb and attack us are bad people, but those on our side who inspire hatred around the world with their bombing and attacks are just as bad, and deserve just as much, if not more, condemnation, for we share responsibility for their actions.
[25:15.270 --> 25:15.590]  Signed, Mike.
[25:15.670 --> 25:16.810]  Mike, thanks very much for the thoughts.
[25:17.250 --> 25:18.630]  And you raised many good points.
[25:18.950 --> 25:24.590]  But again, you know, calling attention to the evil that we do in the rest of the world, it's a valid point.
[25:24.590 --> 25:32.390]  It's not going to win any support for what we're trying to do here, which is to prevent more of this intrusion of our daily lives.
[25:32.570 --> 25:37.710]  Now, okay, moving on to what's being proposed here in New York City.
[25:39.170 --> 25:42.810]  Now, the police commissioner basically is saying that privacy is off the table.
[25:42.930 --> 25:43.970]  Was that a quote of his?
[25:44.070 --> 25:44.770]  Did he actually say that?
[25:44.830 --> 25:46.110]  I was hoping you have it in front of you.
[25:46.190 --> 25:46.890]  I do somewhere.
[25:47.130 --> 25:47.770]  I'm flustered.
[25:47.890 --> 25:49.470]  I just ran in here and hit my head on the door.
[25:49.690 --> 25:49.750]  He actually...
[25:50.210 --> 25:50.570]  Emmanuel?
[25:50.810 --> 25:51.010]  Yes.
[25:51.630 --> 26:01.710]  He was actually quoted as bloating by saying, quote, I think the privacy issue has really been taken off the table.
[26:03.550 --> 26:03.950]  Yeah.
[26:04.350 --> 26:05.550]  I mean, and this is the thing.
[26:05.690 --> 26:07.930]  He wants it off the table.
[26:08.150 --> 26:08.650]  Of course.
[26:08.750 --> 26:10.350]  Any government official wants it off the table.
[26:10.550 --> 26:12.290]  Well, every once in a while you get a nice one.
[26:12.410 --> 26:14.030]  But not the head of the NYPD.
[26:14.110 --> 26:15.230]  Never one in power.
[26:15.390 --> 26:21.410]  Because anybody in power wants more power, wants more surveillance, wants to be able to see everything we're doing and everything...
[26:21.410 --> 26:29.790]  You know, I said this many, many years ago on this show, that if it was possible to read people's thoughts, the government would say they need to be able to do that to protect us.
[26:30.130 --> 26:32.190]  And, you know, maybe one day it will be possible to do that.
[26:32.450 --> 26:36.190]  And they will fight for the ability to read our thoughts in real time.
[26:36.810 --> 26:37.990]  So, keep that in mind.
[26:38.150 --> 26:39.650]  Anything that they can get, they will.
[26:39.770 --> 26:40.070]  They will try.
[26:40.070 --> 26:40.530]  They try.
[26:40.530 --> 26:41.730]  They try to read our thoughts.
[26:41.850 --> 26:48.070]  They have these TSA people who are supposed to find evildoers by looking at them, and it doesn't seem to work very well.
[26:49.050 --> 26:52.010]  So, despite the fact that it is impossible, they're trying to read our thoughts.
[26:52.010 --> 26:54.290]  If it were possible, well then, of course, they would do it.
[26:54.750 --> 26:58.730]  And it doesn't matter of routine agencies like the NYPD, the TSA and stuff.
[26:58.810 --> 27:01.630]  The powers that they have now are routinely abused.
[27:01.910 --> 27:04.690]  So, and they want more and they're saying they won't abuse them.
[27:04.970 --> 27:05.810]  That doesn't figure.
[27:05.810 --> 27:06.290]  All right.
[27:06.370 --> 27:08.850]  I found the story saying privacy is off the table.
[27:08.970 --> 27:12.110]  New York City Police Commissioner demands more surveillance cameras.
[27:12.330 --> 27:21.050]  Now, this is basically the point that you were making earlier, Bernie, is that the surveillance that got these guys in the first place was not government surveillance.
[27:21.090 --> 27:24.510]  It was private surveillance from a department store.
[27:25.230 --> 27:25.430]  Yeah.
[27:25.730 --> 27:26.630]  Lord and Taylor.
[27:27.150 --> 27:30.230]  Whoever would have guessed, Lord and Taylor would be leading the fight against terrorists.
[27:30.870 --> 27:31.350]  Right.
[27:31.350 --> 27:40.110]  But yes, you know, and basically also the eyes of people, people noticing things, people sharing information, unlike what they do in the subway system here.
[27:40.490 --> 27:41.990]  People knowing what's going on.
[27:42.130 --> 27:45.030]  That's how you gain advantages.
[27:45.750 --> 27:47.730]  Not by having the government watching everything you do.
[27:47.870 --> 27:51.370]  You know, London has more surveillance cameras than any city in the world.
[27:51.650 --> 27:53.550]  And that crime has not gone down.
[27:53.770 --> 27:55.550]  You know, it really hasn't.
[27:56.970 --> 28:01.370]  So, it doesn't really have that much of an effect as far as preventing things.
[28:01.490 --> 28:01.930]  We know that.
[28:02.090 --> 28:02.470]  Yes, Alex.
[28:03.030 --> 28:12.310]  And in terms of surveillance, I think one of the things that we have to remember here, too, is that our privacy rights are subject to a reasonableness standard.
[28:12.650 --> 28:20.230]  And the more we get used to surveillance and the more we get used to invasions in our privacy, the less reasonable it is for us to expect that we have any privacy rights.
[28:20.230 --> 28:24.950]  So, to go back to the points made in the various letters, what can we do?
[28:25.030 --> 28:33.250]  We certainly can't make the argument, I think, a rational argument, to remove all surveillance cameras all the time right now.
[28:33.250 --> 28:34.630]  It's just not the time to do it.
[28:34.710 --> 28:37.850]  And it's completely infeasible, in my opinion, as well.
[28:38.230 --> 28:41.610]  But what you can do is continue to voice your opposition to this.
[28:41.790 --> 28:52.410]  Continue to voice your support for amendments to things like CISPA that include privacy protections and make sure that privacy remains an issue for your legislators and for your government officials.
[28:52.890 --> 28:56.290]  Because then it will be reasonable to expect that you have a privacy right.
[28:56.450 --> 29:03.230]  The more we lay down, the more we let this happen without any fight, the less expectation of privacy we're going to have.
[29:03.490 --> 29:12.570]  And the thing that gets me about this is you have cities like London that have begun programs of massive surveillance, more surveillance than any place.
[29:12.570 --> 29:13.750]  It's been going on for years.
[29:13.890 --> 29:18.750]  And we have the data to look at to prove that it has not significantly decreased crime.
[29:18.910 --> 29:20.190]  It hasn't prevented crime.
[29:20.330 --> 29:21.910]  It hasn't acted as that sort of deterrent.
[29:22.050 --> 29:28.990]  So a city like ours has that data to look at to see, well, if we put all the money and all the energy into making this happen, it's not going to decrease crime.
[29:29.010 --> 29:30.450]  And they're still pushing for it anyway.
[29:30.590 --> 29:32.310]  So why are they really pushing for this?
[29:32.610 --> 29:41.810]  Well, Commissioner Ray Kelly, as we mentioned, dismisses critics who argue that increased cameras threaten privacy rights, giving government the ability to monitor people in public spaces.
[29:41.810 --> 29:43.430]  I mean, he can't have it both ways.
[29:43.610 --> 29:47.510]  Either they threaten privacy rights and he doesn't care or they don't threaten privacy rights.
[29:47.690 --> 29:49.410]  He can't, you know, he has to pick.
[29:50.070 --> 29:51.430]  Yeah, well, he hasn't yet, I guess.
[29:51.590 --> 29:57.790]  He says the people who complain about it, I would say, are a relatively small number of folks because the genie is out of the bottle.
[29:57.950 --> 30:01.370]  People realize that everywhere you go now, your picture is taken.
[30:02.050 --> 30:04.870]  And that might be so, you know, your picture might be taken everywhere you go.
[30:04.990 --> 30:17.010]  It doesn't mean that there's some bureaucrat somewhere in some office building monitoring where you go, what you say, who you're going to meet with, what your email says, who you're calling on your phone, what you're texting.
[30:18.010 --> 30:20.990]  And that's all possible with the kind of surveillance that is being pushed for.
[30:21.010 --> 30:23.010]  Now they're not going to tell us this at the very beginning.
[30:23.130 --> 30:24.250]  They're not going to say this is what we want.
[30:24.250 --> 30:26.930]  We want total control to be able to watch everybody at all times.
[30:27.310 --> 30:29.150]  But it's moving in that direction.
[30:29.190 --> 30:39.490]  And as technology improves, and as we give more and more of our information out to all kinds of corporations and social networks, it makes it so much easier for them.
[30:39.770 --> 30:40.030]  Alex.
[30:40.350 --> 30:48.350]  You know, another thing, well, a corollary to this point that, you know, well, surveillance doesn't necessarily affect our privacy rights if taken as valid.
[30:49.170 --> 30:53.030]  What that doesn't actually mention is what about our other rights?
[30:53.030 --> 30:54.330]  What about our first amendment rights?
[30:54.490 --> 31:00.890]  What about the unintentional but foreseeable consequences that surveillance has on things like your freedom of association?
[31:01.310 --> 31:19.370]  And forgive me if we're treading ground that we've gone through before, but think about the issue of, you know, if we are constantly under surveillance and we know this, are we going to be more or less likely to organize and to unionize and to have things like,
[31:19.550 --> 31:23.070]  you know, occupy whatever it is that we want to occupy.
[31:23.930 --> 31:25.810]  Think about it in this context as well.
[31:25.970 --> 31:36.210]  You know, if we had surveillance 24 hours a day, seven days a week in the 18th century, would Thomas Paine have been so likely to distribute something like common sense?
[31:37.170 --> 31:46.290]  Maybe it's not as relevant today, but I think that, you know, we have those rights for a reason and we have to think about all those threats, you know, from various angles to those various rights.
[31:46.290 --> 31:48.850]  See, governments don't stay nice.
[31:49.310 --> 31:57.350]  If we, excuse me, if we think our government is nice right now, and many people don't, but those of you who do, governments change over time.
[31:58.050 --> 32:05.470]  And something that you might trust them with today, you might not trust them with in the future, but you can't take it away once you give it to them.
[32:05.750 --> 32:07.170]  I'm sorry, what do I trust them with?
[32:07.390 --> 32:08.610]  Well, you don't trust them with anything.
[32:08.830 --> 32:10.190]  And many people don't.
[32:10.190 --> 32:11.490]  Emmanuel.
[32:11.610 --> 32:11.790]  Yes.
[32:12.250 --> 32:21.190]  I think the people that composed and signed the Declaration of Independence and our U.S.
[32:21.290 --> 32:29.030]  Constitution, I think they realize this very keenly, that governments were to be scrutinized.
[32:29.030 --> 32:39.410]  And the citizens should be protected against their own government with all these rights that we were given in our Constitution and Bill of Rights.
[32:40.710 --> 32:46.110]  So this isn't like some new concept that we should be afraid, we should really be suspicious of our government.
[32:46.310 --> 32:51.990]  This is the foundation of our country, that we should be suspicious of our own government.
[32:51.990 --> 32:55.310]  Well, I think lots of people are suspicious of our own government.
[32:56.330 --> 32:58.790]  And they go about it in completely the wrong way.
[32:59.010 --> 33:06.250]  And just basically stockpile weapons and start militias and things like that, which can be a good thing in certain situations.
[33:06.250 --> 33:10.410]  But I didn't see much opposition rising to George W.
[33:10.550 --> 33:13.810]  Bush in his eight years involving armed encampments and things like that.
[33:15.430 --> 33:21.970]  But I think a healthy skepticism of what any government is up to, assuming you're being lied to all the time, is necessary.
[33:22.150 --> 33:24.050]  And I think that's what the Founding Fathers had in mind.
[33:24.050 --> 33:28.770]  And that's something that I think we've dropped the ball on as Americans.
[33:29.770 --> 33:33.370]  Here's another letter that we also got, which touches upon a different point.
[33:34.250 --> 33:40.630]  I think that things like CISPA, that take away our right to privacy and the rights in general.
[33:40.710 --> 33:43.550]  By the way, CISPA, I believe, is dead now in the Senate.
[33:43.670 --> 33:44.510]  Can we say that?
[33:44.750 --> 33:46.850]  It's not going anywhere right now.
[33:46.850 --> 33:51.230]  But, you know, give it six months and they'll call it something else and try it again.
[33:51.470 --> 33:54.590]  Or, you know, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act is what CISPA stands for.
[33:54.770 --> 34:05.230]  It allows governments to monitor in real time by sharing with corporations if somebody, say, hacks into a particular organization or company or whatnot.
[34:05.950 --> 34:06.630]  So that's...
[34:06.630 --> 34:10.230]  And when I say, by the way, give it six months and they'll try again, this is not speculation.
[34:10.770 --> 34:11.870]  No, this is how it works.
[34:11.870 --> 34:20.290]  This is... there's an article in the Washington Post that I was just looking at, explaining exactly what the FBI wants and what they're going to do to try and get it.
[34:20.390 --> 34:22.970]  And eventually they will convince people that, yes, this is necessary.
[34:22.970 --> 34:29.590]  I saw a poll that just came out today saying 40% of Americans are perfectly willing to give up some civil liberties in order to fight terrorism.
[34:29.750 --> 34:30.530]  Only 40%?
[34:30.730 --> 34:32.270]  Yeah, I guess that was kind of encouraging, wasn't it?
[34:32.270 --> 34:32.290]  Yeah.
[34:33.630 --> 34:39.350]  But, you know, also, the word terrorism is used in all kinds of bizarre ways.
[34:39.930 --> 34:41.350]  It's used in the Boston case.
[34:41.350 --> 34:44.490]  It's not, for some reason, used in the Rice and Letters case.
[34:44.710 --> 34:51.370]  All the stories I read about that, even though someone is mailing deadly substances to political figures, that's not considered terrorism.
[34:51.590 --> 34:53.590]  Someone shoots a congresswoman, that's not considered terrorism.
[34:53.590 --> 35:02.030]  There was a person arrested just a couple weeks ago for carrying explosive devices on New Jersey Transit and was released on his own recognizance.
[35:02.150 --> 35:04.830]  And guess what race the person is from the information I've given you?
[35:05.970 --> 35:06.530]  Okay, wait.
[35:06.610 --> 35:07.330]  This is going to be...
[35:07.330 --> 35:09.770]  I'm going to go out on a limb and say that he's white.
[35:09.930 --> 35:10.870]  How did you guess?
[35:13.090 --> 35:15.570]  You know, I'm asking you after the show what that was all about.
[35:15.810 --> 35:17.270]  I don't know if that's a normal thing in New Jersey.
[35:17.530 --> 35:18.330]  I don't think it is.
[35:18.430 --> 35:19.490]  But let's continue with this letter.
[35:20.490 --> 35:25.990]  Things like CISPA take away our right to privacy and rights in general, and they'll continue to be approved under the radar.
[35:26.650 --> 35:32.070]  There is a lot of political, quote-unquote, magic going on, and we are asked to watch one hand while the other hand tricks us.
[35:32.230 --> 35:34.510]  I'm glad you guys are staying on top of what's going on.
[35:34.570 --> 35:37.610]  In some ways, you're my only pipeline to these types of issues.
[35:37.750 --> 35:39.450]  Well, I'm sure there are plenty of pipelines out there.
[35:39.490 --> 35:40.490]  You just got to look for them.
[35:41.450 --> 35:50.010]  My second comment is that I agree that there is no valid argument for more security cameras or drones, just as there is no real argument for stop and frisk to prevent crime.
[35:50.010 --> 35:59.910]  That's a whole other thing in this city that is insane and which way too many people just allow to happen and allowing it to happen by not objecting to it, whether or not it happens to you.
[36:00.610 --> 36:08.830]  From where I sit, a lot of crimes are solved or terrorists are caught because citizens provide some information or come forward.
[36:08.830 --> 36:16.650]  The powers that be want us to maintain a state of perpetual fear, fear of terrorists, fear of hackers, fear of gun-toting crazies.
[36:17.010 --> 36:19.730]  Well, yeah, you kind of have to fear the gun-toting crazies.
[36:20.090 --> 36:22.630]  So anyway, we will agree to give up our rights.
[36:23.330 --> 36:26.610]  I mean, seriously, how long has this war on terror been going on?
[36:26.730 --> 36:33.830]  After the Boston bombing, they beefed up security here in New York and on the news they showed cops arbitrarily checking garbage cans in Times Square.
[36:34.310 --> 36:35.270]  How stupid is that?
[36:35.370 --> 36:36.950]  That's supposed to prevent the bomb from going off?
[36:36.950 --> 36:40.190]  The sad thing is most people said they feel safer seeing them around.
[36:40.370 --> 36:40.950]  It's just ridiculous.
[36:41.150 --> 36:42.190]  And yes, it's true.
[36:42.330 --> 36:44.430]  It's the same thing that you see at airport security.
[36:44.890 --> 36:53.890]  Silly things like not being allowed to take shampoo onto the airplane with you makes people feel safe even though it's completely ridiculous and absurd and there are so many ways around this in the first place.
[36:54.310 --> 36:56.170]  Fortunately, most criminals aren't that intelligent.
[36:56.530 --> 37:02.010]  And I think that speaks volumes that things aren't blowing up every day because they certainly could be.
[37:02.210 --> 37:03.870]  Well, most people don't want to blow things up.
[37:04.030 --> 37:04.330]  Exactly.
[37:04.430 --> 37:05.150]  That's the point.
[37:05.230 --> 37:06.410]  I mean, it's really amazing.
[37:06.410 --> 37:08.490]  Look in other parts of the world, there were things...
[37:08.490 --> 37:17.470]  I mean, we have seen so many suicide bombings in the last three weeks in other parts of the world that make the numbers here that three people who tragically died in Boston dwarfed by comparison.
[37:17.610 --> 37:19.390]  We're talking hundreds, if not more.
[37:19.970 --> 37:24.610]  And a lot of that is on us for starting the trouble there in the first place.
[37:24.610 --> 37:29.610]  So, yeah, again, you know, one does not replace the other.
[37:30.250 --> 37:36.270]  Condemning actions doesn't mean you should allow certain things to happen in this country, but it puts things in perspective.
[37:36.510 --> 37:39.110]  Anyway, let me finish this one last letter.
[37:39.490 --> 37:43.570]  My last comment is that Google is an extremely dangerous part of this.
[37:43.570 --> 37:52.170]  Not in the case of the accused Boston Marathon bombers, but the fact that Google is the driving force behind much of the technology that monitors us.
[37:52.430 --> 37:55.230]  Google is in our phones, in our email.
[37:55.230 --> 38:05.450]  If you have an account, they're recognizing our faces, and now that they've taken over YouTube, they're forcing members to connect to Google Plus so that they can connect and follow everything you do on the net.
[38:06.950 --> 38:14.890]  I don't get a chance to listen as often as I wish, but if you haven't already, I wish you guys would report on Google and the danger of it at some point in the near future.
[38:15.070 --> 38:17.890]  Maybe it's just me, but they really scare me.
[38:18.170 --> 38:20.870]  And thank you very much for that letter.
[38:21.590 --> 38:25.990]  Black Butterfly is the name of the author of that particular feedback.
[38:26.210 --> 38:32.790]  And yeah, you know, it's not so much Google as it is us, trusting all these entities with all this information.
[38:32.790 --> 38:35.150]  Facebook, Twitter, Google, you name it.
[38:35.290 --> 38:40.670]  Telling people where you are, what you're doing, it's too much information to be giving out.
[38:40.790 --> 38:41.830]  No, so I disagree.
[38:42.210 --> 38:44.250]  These companies know what they're doing.
[38:44.450 --> 38:50.130]  These companies hire psychologists to figure out ways to trick you into giving more personal information.
[38:50.450 --> 39:01.830]  And it's not really fair to say that the average person should spend as much time figuring out what these companies are up to as the companies spend figuring out what you're up to.
[39:01.830 --> 39:02.770]  I don't think it takes a lot of time.
[39:02.910 --> 39:13.390]  I think you just have to have some common sense, where you don't tell where you are at all times, where you don't give out your address, where you don't give your phone number out to anyone who just asks.
[39:14.170 --> 39:24.810]  There are so many ways that I see people just blindly giving out their information or trusting it to some distant entity, and then being surprised when it comes back to bite them.
[39:24.810 --> 39:32.910]  So I really do think we need to educate ourselves more, because companies like Google and all the others are going to be around, and technology is going to improve.
[39:33.050 --> 39:38.190]  I see way too many people embracing these things and jumping headlong into a surveillance state.
[39:38.650 --> 39:40.950]  So we have to accept that responsibility.
[39:41.190 --> 39:44.290]  It's corporations, governments, and us.
[39:44.490 --> 39:48.150]  Those are the three biggest culprits as far as giving away all of our privacy.
[39:49.150 --> 39:49.590]  Alex?
[39:49.890 --> 39:50.070]  Yeah.
[39:50.590 --> 39:59.590]  You know, on the same point, I remember seeing maybe a few months ago a blog post from a former Googler who said that one of the reasons...
[39:59.590 --> 39:59.990]  A former Googler?
[39:59.990 --> 40:00.550]  What does that mean?
[40:00.630 --> 40:05.210]  A former Googler, someone who used to work for Google and now does not currently work for Google.
[40:05.310 --> 40:05.530]  Okay.
[40:05.690 --> 40:06.910]  So that would be a former Googler.
[40:07.090 --> 40:07.350]  Uh-huh.
[40:07.870 --> 40:24.830]  And he had mentioned that he left because he felt like the mission of Google was changing, and it was changing from being a real innovator to basically being a human, behavioral, tracking, big data acquisition system that essentially feeded an advertising engine.
[40:25.050 --> 40:26.210]  And when you think about it, really...
[40:26.210 --> 40:26.630]  Of course.
[40:27.470 --> 40:29.010]  They're tracking more and more data.
[40:29.250 --> 40:36.030]  The more they know about human behavior, the more they know about what our next move is, the more targeted their advertisements become, and the more valuable their advertisements become.
[40:36.250 --> 40:36.950]  It's all about advertising.
[40:37.050 --> 40:38.210]  It's all about advertising.
[40:38.410 --> 40:40.810]  It always has been, and it probably always will be.
[40:41.030 --> 40:43.790]  And it becomes all the more scary when you have something like this.
[40:44.130 --> 40:44.770]  What do you mean it always has been?
[40:45.550 --> 40:49.910]  The advertising industry is probably not even 100 years old.
[40:50.070 --> 40:52.950]  Well, advertising is all about tracking human behavior, right?
[40:53.010 --> 40:54.190]  They want to know what your next move is.
[40:54.250 --> 40:55.430]  They want to know what motivates you.
[40:55.750 --> 40:56.750]  What's going to make you click?
[40:56.850 --> 40:58.530]  What's going to make you buy that pack of cigarettes?
[40:58.650 --> 41:00.350]  What's going to make you buy that bar of soap?
[41:00.530 --> 41:03.550]  I absolutely agree with you, but this is a very new phenomenon.
[41:04.070 --> 41:07.050]  The big data phenomenon is new, but I think the concept is the same.
[41:07.690 --> 41:17.610]  Well, regardless, if we plunge headlong into it without thinking, we'll be paying the price for a much longer time than this has existed because, as I said, it's going to be very difficult to dismantle this kind of a thing.
[41:17.690 --> 41:21.650]  But the reason we plunge into this stuff so willingly is because we love the bells and whistles that we get.
[41:21.730 --> 41:22.570]  We like using YouTube.
[41:22.730 --> 41:24.130]  We like using social networks.
[41:24.290 --> 41:26.950]  We like all this stuff that we're apparently being given for free.
[41:27.090 --> 41:35.630]  But someone called Blue Beetle posted the best summation of the situation that I'd seen, which is if you're not paying for the product, then you're not the customer.
[41:35.630 --> 41:36.750]  You're the product being sold.
[41:37.070 --> 41:41.750]  And in this case, you show Google the pictures of everything that you take.
[41:41.750 --> 41:42.710]  You tell Google where you are.
[41:42.710 --> 41:45.770]  You tell Google where you go, what you look for, what you search for, what you buy.
[41:45.970 --> 41:54.250]  And Google takes all this information and runs it through this big data network, runs it through, you know, sells it to their clients, which are in the advertising industry.
[41:54.410 --> 42:05.050]  And that's what's paying for you to be able to just use your Twitter or your whatever, whenever you like, to put more of yourself out there without thinking about the consequences.
[42:05.430 --> 42:06.510]  So, yes, you're right.
[42:06.510 --> 42:07.970]  And the person you quoted is right.
[42:08.090 --> 42:11.410]  But it's worse than that because it's always worse than that.
[42:11.410 --> 42:14.250]  But there are many companies that do both.
[42:14.410 --> 42:16.210]  They take your money and they sell your data.
[42:16.870 --> 42:21.630]  They're, you know, do you trust T-Mobile with your data?
[42:21.910 --> 42:22.830]  I sure don't.
[42:23.810 --> 42:29.390]  They're probably not as good as Google at violating your privacy just because they, you know...
[42:29.390 --> 42:31.170]  Well, you mean as far as using a phone?
[42:31.350 --> 42:34.670]  Because if you're using a phone, obviously there's data that they're going to get.
[42:34.890 --> 42:35.090]  Right.
[42:35.090 --> 42:38.750]  But so your text messages that T-Mobile keeps for you.
[42:39.810 --> 42:40.210]  Yeah.
[42:40.330 --> 42:41.130]  They keep the text...
[42:41.130 --> 42:44.070]  You know, I don't text things that are sensitive.
[42:44.630 --> 42:48.410]  You know, I basically have sensitive conversations face-to-face away from the cameras.
[42:48.950 --> 42:50.450]  Well, good for you.
[42:50.590 --> 42:50.730]  Yeah.
[42:50.730 --> 42:52.650]  But away from the cameras you can see.
[42:53.050 --> 42:53.410]  Exactly.
[42:53.610 --> 42:53.750]  Yeah.
[42:54.230 --> 43:01.690]  Well, the thing is just to be aware of what the potential violations for your privacy are, where they might be.
[43:01.890 --> 43:04.130]  And just keeping an eye out doesn't mean that you're up to something.
[43:04.190 --> 43:06.110]  It just means that you're aware of what's going on around you.
[43:06.330 --> 43:13.270]  And that's another danger of something like CISPA, where it's taking this whole private data industry that exists and putting it at the disposal of the government.
[43:13.610 --> 43:18.970]  So in that case, you wouldn't just be telling Google and all their advertising cronies what you do all the time.
[43:18.970 --> 43:23.630]  You'd just be... you'd basically functionally be telling the government where you are everywhere, everyone.
[43:24.050 --> 43:26.090]  And that's what makes it so dangerous.
[43:26.290 --> 43:30.750]  Now, you know, they rounded up a couple more people in Boston today.
[43:30.830 --> 43:33.930]  I think three more people that were friends of the bombers.
[43:35.510 --> 43:37.850]  And they're not involved in the actual bombing.
[43:37.990 --> 43:47.650]  What they're involved in is basically trying to protect them afterwards or just not being forthcoming with information that they were being asked for.
[43:47.790 --> 43:48.710]  I found it interesting.
[43:48.710 --> 43:51.250]  I was listening to some of the news reports about this.
[43:52.450 --> 43:57.010]  And apparently, the surviving bomber and one of his friends shared a Twitter account.
[43:57.130 --> 44:00.990]  I don't know why you'd share a Twitter account, but they were tweeting back and forth between each other.
[44:02.150 --> 44:10.310]  And one person said, yes, that person looks like you, you know, the person whose face was being plastered all over the world.
[44:10.730 --> 44:13.290]  And the guy responded, LOL, laugh out loud.
[44:13.730 --> 44:17.750]  And then said, please don't message me again or don't tweet again or something like that.
[44:17.750 --> 44:25.630]  Now, the police raided the home where that first tweet came from, thinking that that's where that bomber might have been.
[44:26.250 --> 44:27.930]  And, well, how'd they get that information?
[44:28.150 --> 44:33.190]  They had real-time access to that information, apparently, where they could simply trace the IP that a tweet came in on.
[44:33.190 --> 44:37.930]  Now, there's another instance where two Facebook photos disappeared overnight.
[44:37.950 --> 44:43.670]  Facebook photos of friends of this particular, those two bombers or alleged bombers.
[44:45.450 --> 44:47.930]  And the FBI was all over that as well.
[44:48.010 --> 44:49.870]  They noticed that these pictures had changed.
[44:50.050 --> 44:53.930]  And again, you know, if you've used Facebook, only your friends are supposed to see that information.
[44:53.930 --> 45:01.390]  So obviously, they had real-time access to more than they were supposed to have access to because, well, apparently, they already can do this.
[45:01.390 --> 45:03.070]  So why do they need things like CISPA?
[45:04.090 --> 45:09.570]  Because there are some small companies that occasionally stand up to the government, and the government doesn't like that.
[45:10.050 --> 45:12.950]  I mean, so Facebook doesn't even pretend to care about your privacy.
[45:13.090 --> 45:14.410]  Google pretends to care.
[45:14.850 --> 45:18.450]  They publish reports about how much data they give to the government every year.
[45:18.790 --> 45:20.530]  And that offends the government.
[45:21.150 --> 45:21.890]  They're sad.
[45:22.170 --> 45:22.770]  Yeah, well...
[45:22.770 --> 45:24.010]  You should feel bad for the FBI.
[45:24.010 --> 45:30.050]  I just think it's important to look at these things with these stories when they're coming out and say, okay, this means that they have the ability to do this.
[45:30.170 --> 45:40.310]  So if you change your Facebook picture and you only have two friends, well, the government is your third friend because they can look in and see exactly what it is you're doing, no matter how private you might think it is.
[45:40.450 --> 45:41.410]  And same thing with Twitter.
[45:41.610 --> 45:45.490]  You know, you might just be talking to somebody else, but they got your IP and they can go to your house anytime they want.
[45:45.970 --> 45:51.190]  And God only knows what they can do with your Google searches and anything else that you share in Gmail.
[45:51.190 --> 45:56.750]  Now, I cannot believe, and this really annoys me, and we're going to get angry mail about this because there's a lot of Google fanboys out there.
[45:56.850 --> 45:57.450]  I know about this.
[45:58.410 --> 46:00.790]  When people embrace Gmail, like you would not believe.
[46:00.950 --> 46:05.330]  So many people I know use Gmail and they don't care that their mail is being read.
[46:05.410 --> 46:07.530]  Now, it's not being read by a human as if that makes it okay.
[46:07.770 --> 46:09.150]  They say, no, it's a computer reading the email.
[46:09.570 --> 46:13.810]  The computer is reading your email, sending you advertising based on what you say.
[46:14.110 --> 46:18.170]  You know, talk about funeral homes in your email and see what kind of ad you get in response.
[46:18.170 --> 46:23.230]  Talk about terrorism, see what kind of government flags get flown as a result of that.
[46:23.550 --> 46:25.290]  We should not be okay with that.
[46:25.390 --> 46:30.650]  We should not be okay with anybody monitoring email, whether it's for advertising purposes, surveillance purposes, whatever.
[46:31.090 --> 46:33.430]  And once you give that up, you don't get it back.
[46:33.650 --> 46:36.030]  You have to be aware of these things.
[46:36.170 --> 46:36.770]  Yeah, it's cool.
[46:36.870 --> 46:40.010]  Great software, amazing capabilities, but real danger.
[46:40.190 --> 46:44.230]  And that's another factor behind the motivation to get something like CISPA passed.
[46:44.230 --> 46:50.610]  If, as you say, the government can already access this information all they want right now, why would they be pushing for something like CISPA?
[46:50.730 --> 46:55.170]  It's not only to change how they can do things, it's to change the social attitudes about what they're doing.
[46:55.590 --> 47:01.710]  They don't, you know, right now you hear about them getting little bits of information behind everyone's back, and you might get angry about that.
[47:01.770 --> 47:10.310]  But if everyone thought it was okay, and it was on all the newspapers, and if there were laws actually on the books saying it was okay, well, then what right have you got to complain?
[47:10.410 --> 47:11.990]  Because apparently everyone thinks it's okay.
[47:11.990 --> 47:17.410]  And the other thing is, you know, we are in a time where people are afraid, because they're being told to be afraid.
[47:17.850 --> 47:19.990]  This is exactly the time to challenge these things.
[47:20.150 --> 47:24.390]  It's not inappropriate to say, yeah, you know, you guys are going too far to protect us.
[47:24.650 --> 47:31.890]  This is when it's necessary to speak out, so don't feel like you have to hold back because some evil people are out there doing evil things.
[47:31.950 --> 47:37.810]  Because there are more evil people doing different evil things, and this is your opportunity to make others aware of that and to help stop it.
[47:37.810 --> 47:42.250]  But I'd like to take a couple of phone calls, because next week we go into fundraising mode for the spring.
[47:42.970 --> 47:48.390]  And in fact, we're not on for two weeks after that, and then we're on on the 29th, where the two-hour show.
[47:48.490 --> 47:49.250]  So that's going to be interesting.
[47:49.930 --> 47:53.010]  So I'd like to take a phone call, if possible, 212...
[47:53.010 --> 47:54.350]  I don't have this number memorized.
[47:54.590 --> 47:56.090]  650-5782.
[47:56.250 --> 47:56.490]  That's right.
[47:56.570 --> 47:58.110]  212-650-5782.
[47:58.190 --> 48:00.270]  I see we already have a call, and hopefully it's on topic.
[48:00.850 --> 48:01.610]  Let's see who's out there.
[48:01.630 --> 48:01.930]  Good evening.
[48:02.070 --> 48:03.110]  You're on Off the Hook.
[48:03.670 --> 48:19.010]  Hey, I called last week, and I was talking about, well, what was the, sort of the trail, the digital forensic trail, in the way of identifying the suspects in Boston.
[48:19.010 --> 48:21.490]  Someone said it was not through facial recognition.
[48:21.850 --> 48:26.610]  So that makes it, you know, it raises curiosity right there.
[48:26.750 --> 48:27.950]  Well, then what was it?
[48:28.010 --> 48:34.230]  They said from the start that facial recognition did not play a part in it, other than people facially recognizing them.
[48:35.190 --> 48:38.530]  That software just wasn't, it didn't come up with any hits.
[48:38.770 --> 48:41.210]  Now, they say, we'd like it to come up with more hits in the future.
[48:41.210 --> 48:41.790]  It can be better.
[48:41.890 --> 48:42.790]  We can find them even quicker.
[48:42.950 --> 48:55.090]  But, you know, I think this shows that showing a grainy picture, and it was pretty grainy, was enough to track these guys down, especially when the picture went out and they realized that people were onto them.
[48:55.090 --> 48:56.890]  And this is, of course...
[48:56.890 --> 49:06.850]  I also feel like in the overall discussion about the need for surveillance or, you know, the pervasiveness of surveillance and whether it's a good or bad thing, you know, it just has to be a more subtle discussion.
[49:07.090 --> 49:09.690]  It's sort of like arguing whether TV is a good or a bad thing.
[49:09.970 --> 49:13.770]  Well, if you're learning foreign languages and math, well, I guess TV is a good thing.
[49:13.770 --> 49:17.150]  If you're being made ignorant, well, I guess it's a bad thing.
[49:17.230 --> 49:18.070]  It's an instrument.
[49:18.290 --> 49:20.010]  It's like arguing whether money is bad.
[49:20.170 --> 49:20.630]  Exactly, yeah.
[49:20.630 --> 49:21.590]  Or a gun itself is bad.
[49:21.690 --> 49:22.650]  Guns don't kill people.
[49:22.650 --> 49:24.470]  People kill people, so on and so forth.
[49:24.670 --> 49:26.090]  There needs to be a little more...
[49:26.090 --> 49:40.070]  I think the problem is a general lack of awareness by the public that, A, they're under surveillance constantly, and then the general question that even some pretty knowledgeable people don't seem to be able to answer, where are these digital images going?
[49:40.230 --> 49:40.370]  Yes.
[49:40.370 --> 49:41.710]  Is there a central database?
[49:42.090 --> 49:44.930]  Where is the Stellar WINS program?
[49:45.610 --> 49:56.590]  Like with any technology, it's defined by how much control, how much innovation you as an individual have over it, and not that it's just simply forced upon you, and there's nothing you can do about it.
[49:56.690 --> 49:58.510]  So it's that freedom that we advocate.
[49:58.650 --> 49:58.750]  Rob?
[49:58.890 --> 49:59.070]  Right.
[49:59.210 --> 50:11.630]  And to touch back on what the caller was saying about the digital forensic trail, people are speculating in all sorts of directions right now, but this is going to be something that's going to be very interesting when this goes to trial, and it becomes part of the public record exactly what evidence they have and how.
[50:12.170 --> 50:12.350]  Yeah.
[50:12.510 --> 50:27.010]  And things keep coming out that kind of surprise me, like the fact that the guy was unarmed when they were doing that whole shootout with him, you know, you find out things when the evidence actually is exposed, and it sort of changes the way the whole thing played out,
[50:27.030 --> 50:29.630]  and you realize that maybe your assumptions weren't correct.
[50:29.770 --> 50:30.870]  Any closing thoughts, sir?
[50:31.590 --> 50:32.090]  Oh, no.
[50:32.270 --> 50:33.590]  Thanks for the great program.
[50:33.810 --> 50:34.910]  Thanks for 2600.
[50:35.230 --> 50:46.890]  And, you know, I keep imploring you guys, you got to make some sort of manual for dummies, because building blocks as to how people are supposed to arm themselves in this day and age, it's just not clear.
[50:47.090 --> 50:51.050]  Well, just because you don't know certain things certainly doesn't make you or anybody else a dummy.
[50:51.190 --> 50:58.990]  In fact, it might even give you some more insight, because a lot of us are clouded by what we assume, by the technology that we use every day.
[50:59.110 --> 51:02.930]  So sometimes we need somebody to say, wait a minute, that doesn't make any sense.
[51:02.930 --> 51:05.470]  What you're doing here can really wind up hurting people.
[51:05.850 --> 51:08.430]  And that applies, which you just said, applies to every field.
[51:08.750 --> 51:09.150]  Absolutely.
[51:09.390 --> 51:09.730]  Absolutely.
[51:09.730 --> 51:18.330]  But that said, we will try and give some help to people to catch them up to all the things that we already know.
[51:18.490 --> 51:19.410]  Thanks again for that call.
[51:20.210 --> 51:22.890]  Again, 212-650-5782.
[51:22.970 --> 51:24.130]  We only have a few minutes left.
[51:24.290 --> 51:28.610]  And again, only a few minutes left before we go into fundraising mode starting next week.
[51:28.990 --> 51:34.390]  And yes, this is, you know, it might seem like we're doing this a lot, and we are doing this a lot.
[51:34.390 --> 51:36.270]  But this is the normal time for that to happen.
[51:37.150 --> 51:40.630]  May traditionally has always been the spring fundraiser here at WBAI.
[51:40.750 --> 51:42.150]  We'll try to make it as fun as possible.
[51:42.830 --> 51:43.690]  You know, we have...
[51:43.690 --> 51:45.110]  Are you going to call it a fundraiser?
[51:45.250 --> 51:46.010]  No, I'm not going to do that.
[51:46.090 --> 51:46.390]  All right.
[51:46.530 --> 51:47.050]  I won't do that.
[51:48.470 --> 51:49.850]  212-650-5782.
[51:49.970 --> 51:52.790]  And we are aware, Bernie, how quickly do people get cut off when they call in?
[51:53.690 --> 51:55.210]  Well, it was 40 seconds.
[51:55.390 --> 51:55.830]  40 seconds.
[51:55.870 --> 51:56.710]  But I just learned tonight.
[51:56.910 --> 52:00.830]  I just learned tonight that it's at least a minute now.
[52:00.990 --> 52:02.930]  So we say they fixed it.
[52:02.930 --> 52:06.690]  I've been talking to the AI management about it, and apparently they fine-tuned that a bit.
[52:06.870 --> 52:07.990]  That's something that we control?
[52:08.110 --> 52:09.990]  I thought that was something that the phone company controlled.
[52:11.370 --> 52:16.290]  Well, maybe they changed the phone company or whatever, but it was consistently 40 seconds.
[52:16.450 --> 52:16.950]  And I was...
[52:16.950 --> 52:21.450]  When I called into the show before it started, it rang for over a minute before Mike picked up.
[52:21.490 --> 52:22.470]  So it just changed.
[52:22.890 --> 52:23.290]  Okay.
[52:23.350 --> 52:23.710]  Well, you know what?
[52:23.730 --> 52:24.450]  We're not getting any calls.
[52:24.470 --> 52:26.210]  I don't hear that noise that we usually hear.
[52:26.810 --> 52:27.890]  I think we changed something.
[52:28.130 --> 52:30.250]  212-650-5782.
[52:30.250 --> 52:33.470]  We only have about three minutes left to take phone calls.
[52:33.610 --> 52:39.870]  So if there's anything that we've been talking about that you're interested in that you'd like to share with us, please do so.
[52:40.970 --> 52:41.370]  Wow.
[52:41.570 --> 52:42.170]  No calls.
[52:42.290 --> 52:42.970]  That's never happened before.
[52:43.430 --> 52:44.130]  Well, we're waiting.
[52:44.250 --> 52:48.150]  I'll just mention really quick that this Friday, 2,600 meetings everywhere all over the world.
[52:48.310 --> 52:48.530]  Wow.
[52:48.530 --> 52:49.970]  2,600.com slash meetings.
[52:50.330 --> 52:50.530]  Okay.
[52:50.630 --> 52:50.810]  Yes.
[52:50.870 --> 52:52.670]  That's this Friday coming up, first Friday of the month.
[52:52.770 --> 52:53.370]  Let's take this phone call.
[52:53.450 --> 52:53.770]  Good evening.
[52:54.210 --> 52:54.390]  Whoops.
[52:54.950 --> 52:55.730]  I hit the button.
[52:55.870 --> 52:56.190]  It's green.
[52:56.290 --> 52:56.730]  What does that mean?
[52:57.250 --> 52:57.650]  Green.
[52:57.870 --> 52:58.250]  Oh, no.
[52:58.750 --> 52:59.050]  Mint.
[52:59.710 --> 53:00.710]  I don't know what that means.
[53:00.970 --> 53:01.330]  It means go.
[53:02.570 --> 53:03.770]  Well, I can't get rid of it now.
[53:03.770 --> 53:05.490]  Is the phone off the hook somehow?
[53:05.770 --> 53:06.630]  How is the phone off the hook?
[53:06.670 --> 53:07.010]  I don't know.
[53:07.110 --> 53:08.670]  Maybe somebody else picked up in a different part of the studio?
[53:08.690 --> 53:10.390]  This is a very mysterious phone system.
[53:10.570 --> 53:10.850]  Okay.
[53:11.010 --> 53:11.190]  Hang on.
[53:11.230 --> 53:11.830]  It's the name of the show.
[53:12.110 --> 53:12.970]  Bernie, are you still there?
[53:13.570 --> 53:14.190]  I'm still here.
[53:14.230 --> 53:15.170]  I'm going to put you on hold.
[53:15.930 --> 53:16.210]  Okay.
[53:16.990 --> 53:18.330]  No, I wound up putting the other person on hold.
[53:18.410 --> 53:18.610]  Hang on.
[53:18.670 --> 53:19.270]  Let's see if anybody is there.
[53:19.290 --> 53:19.490]  I'm still here.
[53:19.730 --> 53:20.950]  Is anybody else there?
[53:22.010 --> 53:22.850]  Oh, the light's green.
[53:22.970 --> 53:24.650]  It's not red like it's supposed to be.
[53:24.790 --> 53:25.510]  Or orange.
[53:26.350 --> 53:27.290]  I could get some paint.
[53:28.130 --> 53:29.370]  Bernie, how do I put you on hold?
[53:29.450 --> 53:30.290]  That's the real question.
[53:31.690 --> 53:32.210]  Oh, okay.
[53:32.250 --> 53:32.890]  Now he's on hold.
[53:33.770 --> 53:35.370]  And I'm going to hang this one up.
[53:35.850 --> 53:37.150]  I can't hang up that phone.
[53:37.230 --> 53:37.710]  That's the problem.
[53:37.830 --> 53:38.950]  There's something wrong with the phone.
[53:39.190 --> 53:39.510]  Okay.
[53:39.510 --> 53:39.990]  Now it's gone.
[53:40.110 --> 53:40.490]  Now it's gone.
[53:41.130 --> 53:42.170]  Somebody hacked our system.
[53:42.390 --> 53:42.530]  Okay.
[53:42.530 --> 53:43.510]  Let's try that again.
[53:44.570 --> 53:46.010]  212-650-5782.
[53:46.190 --> 53:46.990]  We have a call coming in.
[53:47.110 --> 53:47.710]  Let's take this one.
[53:47.770 --> 53:48.010]  Good evening.
[53:48.150 --> 53:48.890]  You're on off the hook.
[53:49.690 --> 53:49.870]  Hey.
[53:49.970 --> 53:50.370]  How are you doing?
[53:50.690 --> 53:51.090]  Pretty good.
[53:51.090 --> 53:51.350]  How are you?
[53:51.590 --> 53:56.430]  I've been hearing you back and forth with it and calling and calling back and getting that I couldn't get through.
[53:56.610 --> 53:57.150]  Hey, I'm through.
[53:57.290 --> 53:58.550]  I got a good question.
[53:58.730 --> 53:58.950]  All right.
[53:59.330 --> 54:08.830]  If something really big happens, like a big investment, what do you think would be a safe way to handle, let's say, a currency exchange or a cash-in?
[54:09.330 --> 54:17.730]  How to put it from one account to another with or without a computer or phone, you know, with the internet?
[54:18.170 --> 54:22.250]  I probably want to do it manually from one account to another.
[54:22.390 --> 54:24.030]  Do we still have the money laundering show?
[54:24.130 --> 54:26.650]  Yeah, I was going to say, Alex appears to be the expert.
[54:26.650 --> 54:27.850]  There are money launderers in the room.
[54:27.950 --> 54:29.230]  Well, we don't have the money laundering show anymore.
[54:29.290 --> 54:29.490]  Okay.
[54:29.550 --> 54:30.050]  I thought we did.
[54:30.350 --> 54:32.290]  I would look into something called Hawala.
[54:33.150 --> 54:42.350]  H-A-W-A-L-L-A-H, I think, which is the way in which terrorists have been known to basically make money transfers that are under the radar.
[54:42.350 --> 54:45.050]  We really have to start the Tips for Terrorists section of the show.
[54:45.150 --> 54:47.030]  This has been reported on many, many times.
[54:47.190 --> 54:48.470]  I'm not advocating this, obviously.
[54:48.550 --> 54:49.710]  Bernie, did you have something on this?
[54:50.230 --> 54:52.670]  I was just going to say, Alex read my mind.
[54:52.850 --> 54:58.670]  The Hawala system has been used by far more people than terrorists, just like automobiles and pressure cookers have been.
[54:58.850 --> 55:01.250]  So it's not like it was invented for terrorists.
[55:01.250 --> 55:05.950]  It's just a really interesting human-based system of getting money transferred around the world.
[55:07.550 --> 55:10.050]  It's just intriguing to read up on how it works.
[55:10.430 --> 55:10.550]  Okay.
[55:10.590 --> 55:12.070]  Let's see if we can take one more phone call.
[55:12.290 --> 55:15.710]  In the few seconds we have left, 212-650-5782, we have something coming in.
[55:15.830 --> 55:16.350]  Good evening.
[55:16.490 --> 55:17.070]  You're on off the hook.
[55:17.770 --> 55:18.430]  Make it quick.
[55:19.630 --> 55:20.270]  Really quick.
[55:21.070 --> 55:21.690]  Too slow.
[55:21.870 --> 55:22.050]  Okay.
[55:22.590 --> 55:23.030]  Let's see.
[55:23.070 --> 55:25.910]  So this system we're talking about is not related to the sesame candy?
[55:27.070 --> 55:27.930]  No, I don't think so.
[55:28.110 --> 55:28.270]  All right.
[55:28.330 --> 55:28.570]  Good evening.
[55:28.690 --> 55:29.170]  You're on off the hook.
[55:30.050 --> 55:30.570]  Oh, yes.
[55:30.570 --> 55:31.290]  Good evening.
[55:31.690 --> 55:35.750]  When I was listening before, you were talking about whether or not the government can read our minds.
[55:36.070 --> 55:44.610]  And I know someone, or a relative, who is business in the government is they predict the behavior of people.
[55:45.150 --> 55:55.870]  They will willing, you know, knowingly, they'll kind of, with the news, with media, so forth and so on, if they create these stories, how will people react?
[55:56.030 --> 55:56.870]  That's his job.
[55:57.230 --> 55:57.670]  Yeah.
[55:57.790 --> 56:04.150]  And you're going to see more and more of that in the future, being able to predict patterns and behavior and pre-crime and all that kind of thing.
[56:04.170 --> 56:08.050]  It's dangerous to us as human beings, and we have to be on the lookout for that.
[56:08.270 --> 56:09.050]  We're out of time.
[56:09.350 --> 56:18.110]  If you want to write to us and maybe have your letter read over the air or just read by us, OTH at 2600.com is our email address.
[56:18.550 --> 56:23.030]  We'll be back again next week with our special fundraising show, and stay tuned for the Personal Computer Show.
[56:23.030 --> 56:28.870]  In the meantime, keep your eyes out for surveillance and spies and things like that.
[56:28.990 --> 56:29.250]  Good night.
[56:38.370 --> 56:40.030]  We'll see you next week with our special fundraising show, and we'll see you next week with our special fundraising show, and we'll see you next week with our special fundraising show, and we'll see you next week with our special fundraising show, and we'll see you next week with our special fundraising show,
[56:40.270 --> 56:40.410]  and we'll see you next week with our special fundraising show, and we'll see you next week with our special fundraising show, and we'll see you next week with our special fundraising show, and we'll see you next week with our special fundraising show,
[56:40.830 --> 56:40.830]  and we'll see you next week.
[56:40.830 --> 56:40.870]  We'll see you next week.
[56:40.870 --> 56:40.870]  We'll see you next week.
[56:40.870 --> 56:40.870]  We'll see you next week.
[57:09.570 --> 57:14.630]  We'll see you next week.
[57:14.630 --> 57:17.130]  We'll see you next week.
[57:17.130 --> 57:18.330]  We'll see you next week.
[57:18.330 --> 57:18.510]  We'll see you next week.
[57:18.530 --> 57:19.610]  We'll see you
[57:25.260 --> 57:26.540]  next week.
[57:26.540 --> 57:26.620]  We'll see you next week.
[57:26.620 --> 57:27.940]  We'll see you next week.
[57:27.940 --> 57:29.060]  We'll see you next week.
[57:29.060 --> 57:29.500]  We'll see you next week.
[57:29.800 --> 57:30.920]  We'll see you next week.
[57:30.960 --> 57:33.020]  We'll see you next week
[59:17.560 --> 59:18.360]  Okay, wow.
[59:18.560 --> 59:19.820]  I keep asking, is that it?
[59:19.900 --> 59:20.260]  Is that it?
[59:20.340 --> 59:20.680]  Is that it?
[59:21.240 --> 59:22.960]  Yeah, well, that's great.